Florsheim Shoe Store Co.

950 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Florsheim Shoe Store Company and Murray Gren- ier. Case 12-CA-11535 16 May 1986 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN DOTSON AND MEMBERS DENNIS AND BABSON On 28 October 1985 Administrative Law Judge Robert A. Gritta issued the attached decision. The Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, the General Counsel filed limited cross-exceptions and an answering brief and the Charging Party filed cross-exceptions and a supporting brief. The Respondent also filed an answer to the General Counsel's and the Charging Party's cross-excep- tions. The National Labor Relations Board has delegat- ed its authority in this proceeding to a three- member panel. The Board has considered the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings,I and conclusions only to the extent consistent with this Decision and Order. The judge found that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) when it discharged employ- ee Murray Grenier for his union activities while working at the Respondent's New York stores. We find merit to the Respondent's exceptions to these findings for the reasons stated below. As fully set forth by the judge in his decision, Murray Grenier began working for the Respondent at its Florida stores in 1978. He served in various capacities including salesman, assistant manager, and manager. In July 1982 Grenier moved to New York and continued working at the Respondent's New York stores.2 While employed at the 43d Street and Fifth Avenue store, Grenier joined the Union and attended two union meetings.3 In July 19844 Grenier moved back to Florida. After sever- al unsuccessful attempts to secure a job, on 5 De- cember he applied for a position at the Respond- ent's Florsheim Thayer McNeill store at the Gal- leria shopping mall. The manager, Chuck Pantano, i The parties have excepted to some of the judge's credibility findings The Board's established policy is not to overrule an administrative law judge's credibility resolutions unless the clear preponderance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd 188 F 2d 362 (3d Cir 1951) We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing the findings 2 The Respondent's stores in New York are unionized whereas its Florida stores are not 3 Although the judge found Grenier attended several union meetings, according to Greaser's testimony he attended "about two union meet- ings " There is no evidence the Respondent was aware of Greeter's at- tendance at the meetings 4 Unless otherwise stated, all dates are 1984 informed Grenier that no positions were available, but suggested that Grenier apply for work with Manager Pryor at the Respondent's Florsheim Shoe Store located in that same mall. Grenier spoke to Pryor, who hired him. They agreed that Grenier would report to work on 14 December, the following Friday. The day Grenier reported to work, and after working for approximately 1-1/2 hours, Grenier overheard Pryor mention his name in a telephone conversation. Immediately after- ward, Pryor met with Grenier and informed him he was fired. Grenier inquired about the reasons for the discharge. Pryor responded that Grenier would have to contact Robert A. May, the North Miami general manager, for management's re- sponse. Grenier contacted May, who informed him it was a "company decision." The judge found that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) by discharging Grenier, re- lying primarily on the timing and abruptness of the discharge, as well as on the Respondent's failure to offer Grenier any justification for its action. The judge reasoned that, inasmuch as the Respondent did not offer Grenier an explanation, there were no valid reasons for discharge.5 The judge concluded that the Respondent was intent on preventing Grenier, an employee who had been a member of the union in New York, from working at its nonun- ionized stores in Florida. We disagree with the judge that the General Counsel has established that Grenier's discharge was motivated by his union activities. Grenier's sole involvement with the Union, other than his membership, consisted of attending "about" two union meetings of which there is no indication the Respondent was aware. There is no evidence that the Respondent sought to preclude former union members from working at its nonunion stores; indeed, the record shows that at least one former union member, who had worked in a New York store, had been employed in one of the Respond- ent's south Florida stores. The Respondent did acknowledge that manage- ment would be concerned about unionization at- tempts at its Florida stores. However, there was no ongoing or incipient organizational campaign at the Florida stores, and the testimony that the Respond- ent had never prevented former union members from working at its nonunion stores is uncontra- dicted. It is natural for employers to display an in- terest in union campaigns. There is nothing to indi- 5 The judge found that if, as asserted by the Respondent, the decision had been based on an unfavorable recommendation given by Jay Behr- man, the general manager of the New York stores, regarding Greeter's work performance, the Respondent would have had no reason to conceal its motives and would have presented Grenier with an explanation 279 NLRB No. 133 FLORSHEIM SHOE STORE CO. 951 cate that the Respondent was so concerned about the possibility that a union would organize employ- ees in Florida that it would discharge an employee who had, so far as it knew, merely held routine membership while employed at its unionized stores outside Florida. Therefore, we find that the General Counsel has not satisfied the initial burden under Wright Line6 and has failed to establish a prima facie case that Grenier's discharge was motivated by union activi- ties. Accordingly, we shall order that the 8(a)(3) and (1) allegations of the complaint be dismissed. ORDER The complaint is dismissed. 6 Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), enfd 662 F 2d 899 (1st Cir 1981), cert denied 455 US 989 (1982), NLRB v Transportation Manage- ment Corp, 462 U S 393 (1983) In disagreement with the judge, we do not find that the unexplained absence from Greeter's personnel records of his termination notice, and record of his hiring by Pryor, sufficient to infer unlawful motive Ac- cordingly, this absence, coupled with the abruptness of the discharge, even taken together with the failure to explain to Grenier the reasons for the discharge, is insufficient to establish the General Counsel's puma facie case While Member Babson does not concur entirely in his colleagues' ra- tionale for dismissing the allegations that employee Murray Grenier was unlawfully discharged, he agrees with their conclusion that the allega- tions must be dismissed In his view, the record simply does not contain sufficient evidence of a nexus between Greeter's discharge and either his minimal union activity when employed at one of the Respondent's other stores or the fact that he had previously been employed in some of the Respondent's unionized stores Accordingly, Member Babson agrees that, in light of all the circumstances, the General Counsel has not estaolished a puma facie showing that Sec 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act has been violat- ed Andres Rivera-Ortiz, Esq., for the General Counsel. James K. Pendleton, Esq, of St. Louis, Missouri, for the Respondent Susan Dolin, Esq., of Fort Lauderdale, Florida, for the Charging Party. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE ROBERT A GRITTA, Administrative Law Judge. This case was tried before me on 22 July 1985 in Miami, Flor- ida, based on a charge filed by Murray Grenier, an indi- vidual, on 20 March 1985, and a complaint issued by the Acting Regional Director for Region 12 of the National Labor Relations Board on 22 May 1985. The complaint alleges that Florsheim Shoe Store Company (Respond- ent) violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act by dis- charging Grenier for exercising his rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. Respondent's timely answer denies the commission of any unfair labor practices. All parties were afforded full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, to introduce evi- dence, and to argue orally Briefs were submitted by the General Counsel and Respondent on 13 August 1985. Both briefs were considered. On the entire record in this case and from my observa- tion of the witnesses and their demeanor on the witness stand and on substantive, reliable evidence considered along with the consistency and inherent probability of testimony, I make the following FINDINGS OF FACT 1. JURISDICTION AND STATUS OF LABOR ORGANIZATION-PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS OF LAW The complaint alleges, Respondent admits, and I find that Florsheim Shoe Store Company is a Florida corpo- ration engaged in the retail sales of men's shoes and re- lated products in south Florida. Jurisdiction is not in issue. Florsheim Shoe Store Company, in the past 12 months, in the course and conduct of its business oper- ations had a gross volume of revenue in excess of $300,000 and purchased and received at its Florida facili- ty goods and materials valued in excess of $50,000 direct- ly from points located outside the State of Florida. I conclude and find that Florsheim Shoe Store Company is an employer engaged in commerce and in operations affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. The complaint alleges, Respondent admits, and I con- clude and find that Local Union 888, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, is a labor or- ganization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. II. BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT Respondent is comprised of two organizational divi- sions: Florsheim Shoe Store and Florsheim Thayer McNeill. Florsheim Shoe Store specializes in men's shoes only. Florsheim Thayer McNeill, in addition to men's shoes, retails ladies' and children's shoes. There are out- lets for both divisions around the country including New York City and several cities in south Florida. The New York City stores are unionized whereas the Florida stores are nonunion. There is no evidence in the record that any organizing efforts of Respondent's stores are extant. All store personnel are paid commissions on sales including the manager and assistant manager. A manag- er, in addition to commissions, receives a salary and the assistant manager receives an additional amount as key money (intended to compensate for opening and closing the store). Managers report to a general manager who, in turn, is responsible to an area supervisor All supervisors are ulti- mately responsible to operations management at the home office. The parties stipulated that the store manag- er is a supervisor as defined in the Act, but an assistant store manager is nonsupervisory. Pertinent testimony of witnesses is detailed below. III. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES Murray Grenier testified that he was first employed by Respondent in July 1978 as a salesman in the Florsheim Thayer McNeill store in Pompano Beach, Florida. Within 4 months he was transferred to the Florsheim Thayer McNeill store at Broward mall in Plantation, 952 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Florida. Several months later Greiner was offered the as- sistant manager position and he accepted it. As assistant manager Grenier had sales responsibility as well as scheduling, ordering, and daily reporting responsibilities. Bob Rubin was general manager of Florsheim Thayer McNeill stores in south Florida, and several months later offered the manager's position to Greiner which he also accepted. Greiner remained manager until late 1980 when a new store was built in a renovated shopping center and renamed "The Galleria." He corresponded with Rubin and Chuck Pantano, Galleria manager, about becoming assistant manager in the new Gallena store. Shortly thereafter, he was made assistant manager of the Galleria store and helped open the store to the public. Greiner also solicited a position with a New York City store of Florsheim Thayer McNeill through Jay Behr- man, the general manager in New York. He was given assurance of a sales position in New York. In early 1981 Grenier went to New York and applied for work, but a position was not immediately available. Behrman told Grenier to wait until a new store at 54th and Madison Avenue was completed and he would be hired. The first week of March Grenier was hired as a salesman in the 70th and Third Avenue store on an interim basis since the store was marked for closing in 5 or 6 months. The store was closed in July and Grenier was transferred to the 43d Street and Fifth Avenue store. Grenier joined the Union shortly after his transfer. He never served as a union official, but he did attend several union meetings preparatory to contract negotiations . Grenier, at some point in time, became assistant manager and remained so until mid-1982 when by mutual agreement with Store Manager Stern he reverted to salesman. In the fall of 1983, Grenier was transferred to the 54th Street and Madison Avenue store as a salesman. Around March 1984, the store received notice that its building was to be razed and Florsheim Thayer McNeill had to vacate the premises by 1 August. Grenier took his vacation within the last month of the store's operation, and told management of his intent to leave Florsheim and return to Florida. He did return to Florida on 28 July 1984. After a continued vacation of 3 to 4 weeks, in which he settled his household, Grenier sought employ- ment other than Florsheim. In December 1984, Grenier spoke with Manager Pantano of the Florsheim Thayer McNeill store in the Galleria mall. Pantano informed Grenier that he would have to submit an application for employment. Grenier did so but did not hear from Pan- tano. A week or so later, on a Wednesday, Pantano told Grenier that no positions were available at that time Pantano suggested Grenier speak to Manager Pryor in the Florsheim Shoe Store in the same mall That same day Grenier spoke to Pryor, who asked if he could start immediately Grenier suggested, because the workweek started on Friday, he would return and start then On Friday, Grenier began work by helping Pryor to prepare the store for opening. When the store opened, Grenier waited on customers and made sales for approximately 1- 1/2 hours During one sale Grenier went to the stock- room for merchandise and heard his name mentioned by Pryor during a phone conversation. When Pryor finished the phone call, he told Grenier that his employment was terminated. Grenier asked why and Pryor told him he would have to contact May for the particulars. Several days later Grenier contacted May, but May stated he could not say "why." A day or two later Greiner con- tacted May again and asked why he was let go. Gren- ier's testimony of May's response is, "He told me due to a conversation with Mr. Jay Behrman and a.Aother gen- tleman out of the headquarters in Chicago, that they didn't want me working in that store due to my affili- ation with the Union in New York." Grenier replied, "Thank you, that's what I wanted to hear. Goodbye." Robert A. May testified that he began employment with Respondent in 1976 as a part-time salesman. Pres- ently, he is assistant operations manager in the corporate office having transferred from the North Miami Flor- sheim Shoe Store position of general manager. As the North Miami general manager, May reported to Ned Fuller. Prior to the discharge, May did not know Gren- ier, nor did he have any responsibility over his employ- ment. May did have employment responsibility for Gren- ier when he applied for employment in Florida after re- turning from New York. May's first contact with Gren- ier was in October 1984. At that time Grenier called May to inquire about employment in Florsheim Shoe Store in Florida. May told Grenier to fill out an applica- tion in the Pompano store. May later received word that Grenier had applied for employment, but May never saw a Pompano store application from Grenier. i May called several managers for a reference check. May spoke with Jay Behrman in New York, and was given an unfavor- able recommendation on Grenier as an unsatisfactory employee. Behrman's exact words were, "Grenier is bad news." May, at this point, did nothing albeit Howard Cramer, director of operations for Florsheim Shoe Store, contacted Fuller to apprise him of Grenier's application in Pompano. Two months later, while in contact with the Galleria store, May learned that Grenier had been hired by the manager, Pryor. May told Pryor to dis- charge Grenier. May then informed Fuller that Grenier had been hired and fired. An ensuing discussion between May and Fuller took place because both were concerned that the wrong impression would be conveyed by Pryor to Grenier, specifically Pryor could not properly convey the reasons for termination. They wanted to be sure that Grenier knew that his termination was not for discrimi- natory or union reasons. Each was concerned that later court proceedings could arise if Grenier was not handled correctly. May then double checked with Pryor to con- firm Grenier's discharge, and told Pryor to have Grenier call him if any questions arose Several days later, May received a phone call from Grenier. Grenier asked May why he was discharged. May told Grenier that it was a company decision not to rehire him due to an unfavor- able recommendation from Behrman. Grenier asked why May had not spoken to Manager Derringer in New York. May replied that Behrman was the only person he had to check with. Grenier asked on what the unfavor- able recommendation was based May responded that he ' This fact resulted from May's recantation of a statement in his affida- vit FLORSHEIM SHOE STORE CO did not pursue the matter with Behrman, since his rec- ommendation alone was enough. Grenier told May that he felt the discharge was because of his union affiliation with the New York stores May told Grenier that his union affiliation had nothing to do with it. Grenier re- sponded that he had hired a lawyer, said thank you, and goodbye May later testified that it was his decision to discharge Grenier. May stated that he did not know of Grenier's union affiliation or that the New York stores were orga- nized when he decided to discharge Gremer He also stated that there is no company policy to blacklist union members from future employment. May knows that former union employees have been hired in the south Florida stores because he checked personnel files prepar- atory to trial. May further stated that on average, appli- cants for employment do not have the 6 years' experi- ence that Grenier had when he applied at Pompano. In addition, there is nothing in Grenier's personnel file that is adverse to his continued employment. Robert S. Rubin, general manager of the southern divi- sion of Florsheim Thayer McNeill stores until retirement in 1982, testified that Grenier had been a satisfactory em- ployee as a salesman and was never disciplined by Rubin. Rubin made Grenier manager in the Broward store, and the promotion lasted until a corporate team from New York was in town. Grenier's store sales were down so he was removed as manager and transferred to another store as a salesman. Ned Fuller testified that he is the southeast area super- visor for the Florsheim Shoe Store. The 11 general man- agers report to him. He began his employment in 1967 as a stockboy and worked his way up the career ladder in various stores located throughout the country. Within 3 months of his initial employment in Philadelphia, he joined the Union. After leaving Philadelphia, he no longer was a union member and he worked in nonunion stores. Fuller stated that the wages in Florida are good and the employees are pleased so he has no concerns about union threats in Florida. In the fall of 1984, Howard Cramer, in Chicago, called and told Fuller that Grenier was back in Florida looking for a job. Cramer said Grenier was an unsatisfactory em- ployee and instructed Fuller to advise the general man- agers to prevent Grenier from being hired. Fuller then called May to advise him of Cramer's predetermination on Grenier's employment and gave May direct orders not to hire Grenier. May acknowledged that he knew Grenier had applied for work in Pompano several weeks before. May told Fuller that he had checked Grenier's references with Behrman in New York who had recom- mended not hiring Grenier because he was an unsatisfac- tory employee. May told Fuller that Grenier had not been in contact with the store since. Fuller did nothing further about Cramer's instructions at that time. Subse- quent to Grenier being hired by Pryor at the Galleria store and May directing the discharge of Grenier the same day, May called Fuller to report the incidents. Fuller was surprised that Grenier had been hired, but no discussion took place because the outcome had been pre- determined. Although the hiring and firing of salesmen is usually left to the store manager, it is not all that unusual 953 for him or the general manager to become involved in particular cases, especially when directed to do so by corporate management, such as Cramer Fuller recalled at least three individuals who, in spite of prior union affiliation, were hired in Florida stores after the customary check of their references Analysis and Conclusions The resolution of any issue depends on proof of facts. Neither mere conclusions nor expressions of feeling satis- fy that standard. Even the positive assertions of a witness can be so diluted and qualified by other testimony of the same witness to render such assertions of no probative value. Here, as is so often the case, the crucial determination must rest on a choice between differing versions of what transpired. Whether the factual difference arises from faulty memory or design, the result is the same. There- fore, credibility resolutions will decide the facts of the case on which findings and conclusions will be based. Several internal inconsistencies exist in May's testimo- ny, in addition to comparable inconsistencies between testimony of May, Grenier, and Fuller May testified that Grenier sought employment from him in October and he told Grenier to make application to the Pompano store. May, pursuant to the Pompano application, immediately checked Grenier's references through Florida, Chicago, and New York. May stated that he got a cryptic "bad recommendation" from Behr- man in New York and, based on that report, decided not to hire Grenier. May did not notify Gremer that he would not be hired, electing rather to wait until Grenier checked back with the store. Much of May's testimony depicts the coordination and accommodation of the vari- ous outlets of Respondent and the responsible supervi- sors. However, contrary to such an organization, Gren- ier's personnel file does not contain any Pompano appli- cation, although all other applications are contained therein. Also, May's understanding of the procedure for processing employment applications was minimal and fails to explain the absence of the Pompano application Respondent's personnel department processes employ- ment applications, which includes a work history summa- ry as evidenced by Grenier's December 1984 application which bears the administrative number of Grenier's last New York store of employment. Contrary to May's as- sertion that applications are only sent to Chicago for processing after a person is hired, in Greeter's case the processing took place before his hire Otherwise, the ap- plication was processed in Chicago in less than 2 hours, including time spent sending the application from Florida to Chicago. In addition, nothing prevents supervisors from checking applicants on applying, as May stated he did and as Howard Cramer obviously did.2 Albeit May recanted the statement in his affidavit that he reviewed Grenier's October application to check the references he maintained its existence. It is questionable whether May ever talked with Gremer in October 1984. Behrman's af- ' Howard Cramer , director of operations at corporate offices in Chica- go, did not testify 954 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD fidavit (an exhibit in the record) details the response to May's inquiry of Grenier and specifically states that the inquiry came after Grenier was reemployed in the Gal- leria store in December 1984. Behrman adds that if the New York store had not been closing, he believes that discipline would have been initiated against Grenier for dress code violations and failure to do that "little extra." May expressed ignorance of Cramer's knowledge of Grenier's presence in Florida, and that Grenier was seek- ing employment with Respondent, but did recall that Fuller,3 pursuant to Cramer's directive, did notify him that Grenier was not to be rehired and places the inci- dent in October 1984 after Grenter supposedly applied for employment at the Pompano store in accord with May's prior suggestion. As Fuller stated, "[Y]ou don't question Cramer, you just do as he says." If May had previously suggested to Grenier that he could be hired and Cramer vetoed the suggestion, May would have surely contacted the Pompano store manager or in the alternative, Grenier, rather than simply wait.4 Moreover, neither May nor Fuller followed through on Cramer's directive by notifying Florsheim Shoe Store managers, who normally have the responsibility of hiring and firing. Nor were the managers of the Florsheim Thayer McNeill stores apprised of Cramer's directive, a circum- stance that may be explained by the lack of time in which to act following Cramer's contact with Fuller. May, like Fuller, was subordinate to Cramer at the time of the incidents herein and one rung lower than Fuller. It is not conceivable that corporate management's inter- est in a given applicant would have been disregarded with such cavalier conduct. May's demeanor while testi- fying, coupled with his hesitancy and evasiveness, causes me to discredit his account of any October 1984 contact with Grenier or Behrman . In addition, when asked by his counsel for his recall of the first contact with Grenter as an employee, May promptly stated the contact oc- curred in December 1984. Later questioning brought out the earlier incident of October 1984. I conclude and find that no intercourse between May and Grenier or May and Behrman took place in October 1984, nor did Gren- ier apply for work at the Pompano store. I further con- clude and find that Grenter first applied at the Galleria store with Manager Pantano as reflected on the employ- ment application in his personnel file. Grenier's applica- tion for reemployment on 5 December 1984 at the Gal- leria store began the entire process relative to Grenier's employment. Grenier's credible and uncontroverted testimony is that within a week of making application with Pantano he was informed by Pantano that no positions were pres- ently available. Pantano did suggest employment at the Florsheim Shoe Store in the mall . Grenter followed through that same day, Wednesday, checking with Man- ager Pryor and was told he could start immediately Grenier elected instead to begin work that Friday, and did so. Fuller testified that Cramer called him in the fall of 1984 and directed him to alert the general manager not 3 Fuller testified to the fact of Grenner's discharge, but little else * Cindy Escomilla, Pompano store manager, did not testify to hire Grenter, because of his past performance in New York. Fuller also expressed ignorance of how Cramer, in Chicago, became aware of Grenier's presence in Florida, or his desire to be reemployed by Respondent. Be that as it may, Cramer did learn of Grenier and did not want him hired. Cramer would not have issued a directive on a mere supposition that an ex-employee may apply for work in Florida. He would only do so if he knew a par- ticular employee had in fact applied for employment. Thus, Cramer's action can only emanate from Grenier's application on 5 December 1984. Whatever the interplay between Cramer, Fuller, and May, it is clear that May was acting without having alerted any of his managers, and all May's actions involving Grenier took place the day of the discharge. As May put it, "in a matter of min- utes and after the fact." As the General Counsel argues, there are contradic- tions between Fuller and May and inconsistencies of pur- pose. May's stated reason for his personal involvement in Grenier's discharge was to keep Pryor from botching the termination . Yet May stated unequivocally that the dis- cussion he had with Fuller about handling the discharge was after May had directed Pryor to fire Grenter. May could hardly prevent Pryor from mishandling the dis- charge if Pryor is admonished after the discharge is a fact. May's second call to Pryor would not preempt what had already taken place Grenier's uncontroverted testimony is that when Pryor discharged him he asked, "Why?" Pryor immediately told Grenier that he would have to contact May for the reasons . The precise admon- ishment May states he gave Pryor occurred in the second call subsequent to the actual discharge. There is no doubt that May spoke to Pryor on two occasions. What is doubtful is that May, in the first call, informed Pryor to fire Grenier In fact, Fuller stated that although he was surprised to learn that Grenier had been hired by Pryor, he did not discuss the situation because it was predetermined by Cramer that Grenter was not to be re- employed. Fuller stated that Cramer called with his nonhtring di- rective several weeks prior to Grenier's application for employment, but when Fuller immediately called May to apprise him of Cramer's directive, May told Fuller that Grenter had already applied for work and May had al- ready checked with Behrman in New York. As previous- ly noted, Behrman's affidavit places May's inquiry about Grenier after Grenier had been hired by Pryor in the Galleria store. Fuller's stated respect for corporate man- agement and their wishes leaves little doubt about the actual chronology. Cramer could not have called several weeks prior to Grenier's work application. I do not credit May's and Fuller's testimony relative to the common phone calls, nor that relating to Cramer's phone call with respect to the chronology. Neither wit- ness was specific about this testimony, and the substance of the testimony is contrary to plausibility and the objec- tive evidence in the record. Moreover, the mutual cor- roboration by both May and Fuller is less than complete and includes contradictions. In relation to timing of events, I find May and Fuller completely untrustworthy and only intent on supporting a preconceived plan with- FLORSHEIM SHOE STORE CO 955 out regard for the actual events being recalled. May's testimony restricts the limited timeframe to his phone calls with Fuller and Pryor . However, I conclude that Cramer's and Behrman's phone calls were within the same limited timeframe. The General Counsel's complaint alleges a discrimina- tory discharge. The determination of the ultimate fact therefore turns on Respondent's motivation The causali- ty test of Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), applies. The determination is twofold; first, whether protected activity played a role in Respondent's decision (probative of prohibitive motivation) and, second , whether Re- spondent's asserted business reasons are sufficiently proven to be the cause for its action to negate the pres- ence of protected activity in the discharge . The General Counsel must establish a prima facie case of discrimina- tion by a preponderance of the affirmative evidence. The discrediting of all or any part of Respondent 's evidence does not, without more, constitute affirmative evidence capable of sustaining or supporting the General Coun- sel's burden of proof. The record evidence shows that Grenier applied for reemployment with Respondent on 5 December 1984. He was hired on 14 December 1984 at the start of the workday, and was discharged within 2 hours. Pryor, the store manager who was directed to discharge Grenier, was not given any reason for the discharge by his super- visor, May Later, when Grenier sought the reason for the discharge from May, he was only told it was a "com- pany decision." An abstract reason, if a reason at all, is insubstantial to preclude future litigation over the dis- charge or to constitute a prescription to prevent Pryor's anticipated misstatement of the reason for the discharge to Grenier The company decision was based on a "bad news" recommendation by Behrman in New York, who explained that Grenier was guilty of violating the Com- pany's dress code (rolled-up sleeves, no jacket) on occa- sion, and failing to perform at the "little extra level." However, Behrman only believed that discipline for the infractions may be in order Behrman's belief did not even hint at discharge Respondent had a single reason to consider not reem- ploying Grenier and it was articulated by Behrman in New York. Contrary to May's testimony, he did not author the decision to not reemploy Grenier. That deci- sion was made by Cramer in Chicago, as Fuller testified, and apparently based on information received from New York. If the information was a legitimate complaint by Grenier's superior, why was it not given to Grenier as the cause for his discharge? In effect, Grenier was not given a reason for his discharge. Thus, the purported reason was either insufficient to support a discharge, or the real reason is something else and undisclosed. May denied knowledge of the union presence in New York, but admitted to knowledge of union stores in Philadel- phia However, Fuller and Behrman stated that the unionization of the New York stores is common knowl- edge, at least at their supervisory level in the Company. Clearly, then Cramer would have had such knowledge, and Cramer was the high corporate official who made the decision not to hire Grenier . As Fuller stated, Cramer's directive about Greaser was self-enforcing. Nei- ther Fuller, May, nor anyone else would or could ques- tion the directive itself or its basis . Whatever Cramer's reason for not hiring Grenier, it was not communicated to Fuller or May, which explains May's failure to ade- quately inform Grenier why he was being discharged. If Respondent's real reason for discharging Grenier, or for not wanting to rehire him, was that he was lazy then that should have been advanced along all administrative channels. All responsible supervisors and Grenier should have been told, "Grenier is lazy." Respondent's argument that May's lack of knowledge of Grenier's union affiliation in New York is unavailing. As shown above, Cramer made the decision , not May. Assuming arguendo, if May had made the decision to discharge Grenier, Cramer's and Fuller's knowledge of the union affiliation would be imputed to their subordi- nate, May It is clear that Grenier's union affiliation in New York was mentioned in the postdischarge conversation be- tween May and Grenier. I am not convinced that either witness recalls accurately the conversation. May was intent to not give Grenier any specifics concerning his discharge. Grenier was equally intent to search May for the reason for his discharge . I conclude that the actual conversation lies somewhere between the two witnesses' accounts. Therefore, the General Counsel has failed to sustain his allegation of an independent violation of Sec- tion 8(a)(1). I shall, accordingly, dismiss paragraph 8 of the complaint. Grenier's work record was good and there is no evi- dence of any prior adverse action against him. Respond- ent did attempt to depict Grenier as a poor employee by showing his fluctuations between manager , assistant man- ager, and salesman , but there is no discipline associated with any of the changes . Furthermore, according to May, the basis for the "company decision" is Behrman's recommendation, which did not include consideration of Grenier's changes in employee status Greaser was origi- nally hired in 1976 as a management trainee , which itself implies a series of management assignments as normalcy. I consider such testimony as nothing more than a poor attempt to bootstrap the discharge action. The abruptness of a discharge and its timing are per- suasive evidence regarding motivation . Particularly is this so, as here, when cause for the discharge is never communicated to the employee or his several supervi- sors. I conclude and find that the real reason for Gren- ier's discharge was his union affiliation in the New York stores. Respondent's evidence that other New York em- ployees with union experience were hired in south Flori- da stores in the past is not persuasive otherwise . It is not uncommon for a union employee to be singled out from among all other union employees for special treatment in the workplace. I conclude that Grenier's circumstance in the instant case was that unique . Fuller admitted that unionization of the Florida stores would present prob- lems to the corporation , and that management would be concerned about any such attempts In my view , it does not stress the imagination to conclude that Respondent did not want Grenier, as a new union employee, reem- ployed in its nonunion stores in Florida Further, an in- 956 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD ference of illegal motive can be drawn even if the con- duct of the employee would, standing alone, dictate a discharge. Here, Respondent's evidence of the employ- ees' conduct and the correlative discipline for the con- duct does not withstand scrutiny . Moreover, Respondent did not treat the employees ' conduct as any reason for discipline either in its consideration of the discharge or via communication to the affected employee . Grenier's personnel file neither contained a termination notice for the 14 December discharge, nor did it contain the volu- minous separation form that was supplied for Grenier's discharge from the New York stores. Therefore, the Company records do not reflect that Grenier was reem- ployed in Florida, in keeping with Cramer's directive not to hire. Accordingly, I conclude and find that the Gener- al Counsel presented a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that Respondent 's reason for Grenier's dis- charge was unlawful. I further conclude and find that Respondent has failed to offer evidence of its reason for discharge sufficient to rebut the General Counsel's prima facie case of discrimination. REMEDY Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I find it necessary to order Re- spondent to cease and desist therefrom and to take cer- tain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Respondent having discriminatorily discharged em- ployee Murray Grenier , it must offer him full reinstate- ment to his former position or, if that position no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position , with back- pay computed on a quarterly basis and interest thereon to be computed in the manner prescribed in F. W. Wool- worth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950), and Florida Steel Corp., 231 NLRB 651 (1977),5 from 14 December 1984, the date of discharge , to the date of proper offer of reinstate- ment. [Recommended Order omitted from publication.] 5 See generally Isis Plumbing Co, 138 NLRB 716 (1962)