Burroughs Interstate Services Credit Union

292 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Burroughs Interstate Services Credit Union and Local 42, Office and Professional Employees International Union, AFL-CIO. Cases 7-CA- 23441 and 7-CA-21269 10 June 1986 DECISION AND ORDER By MEMBERS DENNIS, BABSON, AND STEPHENS On 26 November 1985 Administrative Law Judge Bruce C. Nasdor issued the attached deci- sion and supplemental decision.' The Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and the General Counsel filed an answering brief. The National Labor Relations Board has delegat- ed its authority in this proceeding to a three- member panel. The Board has considered the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the judge's rulings, ftndings,2 and i On 10 December 1985 the judge issued an erratum , amending the notice z In sec. IV of the judge's decision at par . 9 under the heading "Subse- quent Events," the judge suggested that the Respondent made contrac- tual cost-of-living wage adjustments between 1967 and 1982 based on changes in the Bureau of Labor Statistics' consumer price index for urban wage earners and clerical workers (CPI-W), all cities and items . Prior to 1978, however, the Respondent's alter ego used the CPI, rather than the CPI-W. The Bureau of Labor Statistics first began publishing the CPI-W in 1978 when it discontinued its original CPI. We nevertheless do not find the judge's error material and adopt his finding that the Respondent is contractually bound to make cost-of-living wage adjustments pursuant to changes in the CPI-W, all cities and items Although the Respondent's collective-bargaining agreement with the Union does not specify on which index cost-of-living wage adjustments are to be based, the Union provided the Respondent's alter ego with information pursuant to the CPI-W and the record establishes that the Respondent 's alter ego had made wage adjustments consistent with that index since 1978 . According- ly, we find the parties contemplated using that index when they executed their agreements in 1978 and 1979. a In adopting the judge's conclusion that he should not defer to the parties' grievance and arbitration procedures the question on which con- sumer price index the parties agreed to base their contractual cost-of- living wage adjustments, we rely on the fact that this case in part con- cerns compliance with Administrative Law Judge Elbert D Gadsden's decision and Order in Case 7-CA-21269 The Board has long held that compliance issues are not appropriate for deferral See Ernst Steel Corp, 217 NLRB 1069 In. 1 (1975). While Case 7-CA-23441 arises from sepa- rate complaint allegations, the result in both cases turns in part on resolv- ing the same factual and legal issues. We therefore shall not separately defer Case 7-CA-23441 See SQI Roofing, 271 NLRB 1 fn. 3 (1984). In declining to defer, we also rely on the Respondent 's having specifi- cally reserved its right to raise before the arbitrator the question whether the Charging Party's claim is arbitrable under their agreement We there- fore conclude that the Respondent, who contends we should defer, has not "credibly asserted its willingness to resort to arbitration ," Collyer In- sulated Wire, 192 NLRB 837, 842 (1971), and the purposes of the Act would not be served by deferral In his "Conclusion and Analysis," under the heading "Patricia Foster's Backpay" at par 1 , Judge Nasdor discussed Judge Gadsden's having or- dered the Respondent to "reinstate0 " employee Nancy Purviance and to "recall" employee Patricia Foster. We agree with Judge Nasdor's conclu- sion that Judge Gadsden's choice of words does not unply that employee Foster is not entitled to backpay for any period before Judge Gadsden's decision issued We observe, however, that Judge Gadsden's choice of words was not careless; he found the Respondent unlawfully denied Fos- conclusions3 and to adopt the recommended Order.4 ORDER The National Labor Relations Board adopts the recommended Order of the administrative law judge and orders that the Respondent, Burroughs Interstate Services Credit Union, Plymouth, Michi- gan, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Order. ter's request to extend her maternity leave, compelling her resignation, and that the Respondent unlawfully discharged Purviance 4 We amend the judge's remedy for Case 7-CA-23441 to provide that the Respondent shall pay backpay as prescribed in Ogle Protection Service, 183 NLRB 682 (1970), enfd 444 F.2d 502 (6th Cit. 1971), with interest as prescribed in Florida Steel Corp., 231 NLRB 651 (1977). Richard Whiteman, Esq., for the General Counsel. Douglas A. Witters, Esq., for the Respondent. Mary L. Craig, president of the Charging Party Union, for the Charging Party. DECISION AND SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE Bruce C. Nasdor, Administrative Law Judge. This case was tried at Detroit, Michigan, on 24 January 1985. The complaint dated 13 June 1984 in Case 7-CA-23441 alleges violations of Sections 8(a)(1) and (5) and 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act). On 31 Octo- ber 1984 it was consolidated with a backpay specification in Case 7-CA-21269. The backpay specification was amended at the hearing by the introduction of General Counsel's Exhibit 2. Respondent agreed to certain stipu- lations in General Counsel's Exhibit 3, and it does not dispute the calculations set forth in the backpay specifi- cation. On the entire record, including my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and after due consideration of the briefs, I make the following FINDINGS OF FACT 1. JURISDICTION At all times material herein, Respondent has main- tained its only place of business at 13000 Haggerty Road in Plymouth, Michigan. Respondent is, and has been at all times material herein , engaged in providing credit union services to the employees of Burroughs Corpora- tion, Plymouth Road plant, Plymouth, Michigan. During the fiscal year ending 31 December 1983, which period is representative of its operations at all times material herein, Respondent realized gross reve- nues in excess of $500,000. During the same period, Re- spondent loaned funds in excess of $50,000 to individuals residing outside the State of Michigan. Respondent is now , and has been at all times material herein, an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7), of the Act. 280 NLRB No. 34 BURROUGHS CREDIT UNION 293 II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION The Charging Party Union is, and has been at all times material herein, a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE COLLECTIVE-BARGAINING UNIT All office clerical employees employed by Respondent at its facility located at 13000 Haggerty Road, Plymouth, Michigan; but excluding guards and supervisors as de- fined in the act, constitute a unit appropriate for the pur- poses of collective bargaining within the meaning of Sec- tion 9(b) of the Act. IV. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES AND THE BACKPAY SPECIFICATION A. Background On 19 December 1983, Administrative Law Judge Elbert D. Gadsden issued a decision in Case 7-CA- 21269. No exceptions were filed and, on 25 January 1984, the Board adopted Judge Gadsden's findings and conclusions and ordered Respondent to take the affirma- tive action set forth in his recommended Order. In his decision, Judge Gadsden found that the Re- spondent was an alter ego of Burroughs Suburban Credit Union and violated the Act by dishonoring the collec- tive-bargaining agreement in effect between Suburban and the Charging Party. Judge Gadsden's recommended Order included, inter alia, directives that Respondent cease and desist from failing and refusing to recognize the Charging Party, unilaterally changing wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, and ter- minating employees or forcing and causing employees to terminate their employment to avoid complying with the terms of the collective-bargaining agreement. Judge Gadsden also ordered Respondent to cease and desist from failing and refusing to recall employees Nancy Pur- viance and Patricia Foster and failing and refusing to give effect to the collective-bargaining agreement be- tween Suburban and the Charging Party. Furthermore, the Order required that Respondent offer reinstatement to Purviance and make her whole, offer to recall Foster, rescind terms and conditions unilaterally instituted, re- turning to the status quo ante, and make whole all em- ployees who suffered financial loss as a result of the uni- lateral changes. B. Subsequent Events In January 1984, pursuant to Judge Gadsden's recom- mended Order, Respondent recalled Patricia Foster and Nancy Purviance , paying them the same rate of pay they had formerly been enjoying , but no interim COLA in- creases. Respondent's manager, Ralph Reyes, testified that Respondent had not made any COLA adjustments in any unit employee's pay since 1 October 1982. Reyes further admitted that the rates of pay were arbitrarily de- termined by him, based on market information he had re- ceived from other credit union managers. Other employ- ees working for Respondent during the period of Janu- ary 1984 continued receiving the same weekly rate they had been receiving , based on Respondent's unilaterally imposed wage rates which it had put into effect on 1 Oc- tober 1982. On 10 January 1984 Respondent's counsel, Douglass Witters, sent a letter to Union President Mary Craig in which he states, inter alia, "the import of this letter is to provide the union with a 60-day notice that Burroughs Interstate Services Credit Union proposes to terminate the collective bargaining agreement that has been im- posed by the National Labor Relations Board through Administrative Law Judge Gadsden's December 19, 1983 Decision and Order." Moreover, Attorney Witters re- quested that the Union meet for purposes of negotiating a new contract. The contract was effective until 1 Janu- ary 1984 and for successive periods of 1 year thereafter unless either party gave a 60-day written notice prior to the anniversary date or any subsequent anniversary date of its desire to change, amend, or terminate the agree- ment. The notice requirement was not met. On 12 Janu- ary 1984 President Craig responded to Witters by letter stating, inter alia, "the Union does not choose to accept your invitation to bargain at this time." On 27 February 1984 Craig received a letter from Wit- ters dated 24 February in which he referred to the Union's refusal to negotiate and informed Craig that ef- fective 1 March 1984 Respondent was going to pay unit employees according to an attached wage schedule. Fur- thermore, Witters advised Craig that Respondent was eliminating the COLA adjustments. The reduction in wages was implemented on 1 March 1984, lowering unit employees' rates of pay to rates in the 1978-1981 collective-bargaining agreement, plus 3- percent wage increases that had become effective on I January 1979, 1 January 1980, and 1 January 1981. The wage reduction eliminated the COLA adjustments that employees had enjoyed since January 1978. Therefore, beginning 1 March 1984 , all unit employees have been paid at the reduced rates set forth in the back- pay specification. The Charging Party Union has been a party to collec- tive-bargaining agreements with Respondent and its predecessors since approximately 1967. Every contract since that time has contained COLA provisions which have been similar in each successive collective-bargain- ing agreement. There have been modifications in the COLA language. For example, in the 1975-1978 agree- ment, the parties agreed to change the index date from 1957-1959 equals 100 to 1967 equals 100, and to change from a 1-cent adjustment for each 0.4 change in the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Consumer Price Index (CPI) to a 1-cent adjustment for each 0.3 change in the BLS CPI. Current COLA language is embodied in the contract effective from 1 January 1978 until 1 January 1981. In that regard see the language contained in article IX, Cost of Living. The cap referred to in that article was removed by agreement in 1979, retroactive to 1 Jan- uary 1979. During negotiations for a new contract in 1981, COLA was not discussed. Accordingly, the exten- sion of the contract until 1 January 1985 did not change or modify the COLA article. Since 1967 the COLA adjustments, pursuant to con- tract, were made quarterly. The contract language did 294 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD not particularize when the actual payments were to be made. Barbara Brender, who worked for Respondent until 10 February 1984 as a bookkeeper and accounting supervisor, and Patricia Foster, who worked for Re- spondent as head teller and loan clerk , both testified that the COLA adjustments always became effective the first full pay periods of March, June, September, and Decem- ber of each year. Brender, as union steward , received quarterly newsletters from the Union, as did Respond- ent's managers, who were sent copies. Brender received these letters from May 1976 through August 1982. They set forth COLA adjustments to be made in the first pay period of March, June, September, and December of each year under the BLS 1957-1959 equals 100 and 1967 equals 100 indexes in the pay of employees in various bargaining units represented by the Charging Party. When the newsletters were received by Brender, she made a copy and furnished it to the manager. Then they would figure out the new hourly rate and compare fig- ures. The newletters listed the adjustments on a cent-per- hour basis, except for 1978, when there was a 25-cent- per-year cap on the COLA adjustment, and after 1 Octo- ber 1982, when Respondent disavowed the Charging Party's status and failed to recognize it. All employees consistently received the COLA adjustments set forth in the newsletters. On 15 February 1984, subsequent to the Board's Order in Case 7-CA-21269, Foster was elected steward. There- after, she received the newsletter concerning the March 1984 COLA adjustment. That newsletter related that a 5- cent-per-hour adjustment was due. Unit employees did not receive that adjustment or any subsequent adjust- ment. Detailed testimony was elicited from Jesse Bridge- water, International representative, and President Mary Craig regarding how the COLA was arrived at and how the newsletter was compiled. The Charging Party has contractual relationships with the United Auto Workers (UAW). The UAW had a practice of sending the Charg- ing Party a quarterly letter setting forth the COLA ad- justments. Bridgewater would verify the amount by call- ing the Detroit Public Library and the UAW research department. Also, at times he utilized these same sources when the UAW's letter was not forthcoming. The COLAs were based on quarterly changes in the CPI-W, all cities and items. Bridgewater sent quarterly newslet- ters requesting the COLA to all stewards including Brender. Since June 1983, Craig utilized the Detroit Library and the UAW research department for COLA changes. She also disseminated the COLA adjustment newsletter to all stewards. The testimony and documentary evidence reflect that all COLA adjustments since 1978 had conformed to changes in the CPI-W index. C. The Senior Teller Position Opening On 13 February 1984 a position of senior or head teller became available upon the promotion of employee Bay- lerian to accounting supervisor. Reyes posted a notice in- forming employees they could apply for the position. Purviance applied for the position and was informed by Reyes that it would pay $365 per week, $20 less per week than Baylerian had been earning . Purviance de- clined to accept the position because she had been earn- ing $389 per week. The position was subequently accept- ed by another employee who was paid the $365 per week. The contract rate of pay including the COLA for the position of senior teller as of January 1984 was $397.04 per week based on the backpay specification schedule H. Reyes testified that he came up with the $365-per-week rate based on his feelings about Pur- viance's experience and the rates paid by other credit unions. D. The Issue of Backpay for Patricia Foster Judge Gadsden states in his conclusions of law that "by forcing or causing the termination of the employ- ment of employee Patricia Foster, Respondent has violat- ed Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act." The judge in his recommended Order directs Respondent to "offer to recall Patricia Foster in accordance with the recall pro- visions of the collective-bargaining agreement , to a posi- tion substantially equivalent to the position she held prior to termination, without loss of seniority or other privi- leges and benefits previously enjoyed." Judge Gadsden's Order also required Respondent to rescind the wage rates and any other terms and condi- tions unilaterally imposed and to make whole all employ- ees who suffered financial loss due to unilateral changes instituted by Respondent . Among the uniteral changes were leaves of absences and maternity leave . Respond- ent's unilateral changes did not provide for any leaves of absence and provided a more restrictive maternity leave benefit. Foster testified that if Respondent had granted her 6- month leave-of-absence request, she would have returned to work no later than after the 6 months. Respondent bears the burden of affirmatively raising willful loss as a defense but chose not to do so. Foster also testified re- garding her efforts to find work in an effort to bolster her testimony that she would have returned to work at Respondent if she had been granted her leave-of-absence request. In this regard, she filed job applications and talked with individuals at savings and loan institutions and credit unions. E. Conclusion and Analysis Respondent contends that the unfair labor practice issue and the COLA interpretation issue can both be re- solved by arbitration.' Counsel for Respondent cites sev- eral cases in which arbitration, pursuant to the contrac- tual grievance procedure, has been held to be compatible with the Act. Moreover, Respondent avers that it could not follow Judge Gadsden's order to implement the col- lective-bargaining agreement because it could not calcu- late COLA adjustments from the information contained in the agreement itself. It is true that the COLA provi- sion does not set forth the specific CPI index, dates for calculations, or dates for quarterly payments. The uncon- troverted evidence attests to the fact that Respondent 1 See Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 NLRB 837 (1971). BURROUGHS CREDIT UNION had no problem complying with the COLA provisions for 17 years. In my opinion Respondent is taking the po- sition that because past practice is a concept that can be arbitrated, it must be arbitrated , ergo the Board is an im- proper forum. I do not agree that arbitration will be a quick and fair resolution of the dispute, particularly when Respondent can still raise arbitrability2 as a de- fense. Moreover, to defer could bring about unnecessary duplication of litigation if the arbitrator failed to reach the unfair labor practice issues. Moreover, I fully agree with counsel for the General Counsel, for the reasons set forth in his brief, that Re- spondent's deferral arguments are lacking in merit. I con- clude that Respondent has never complied with the Board Order in Case 7-CA-21269 and has further com- pounded its unfair labor practices by continuing and du- plicating unfair labor practices in Case 7-CA-23441. F. Patricia Foster's Backpay Respondent harps on Judge Gadsden's words "rein- state" Purviance and "recall" Foster. "The ALJ's choice of words left the employer with no contemplation that the ALJ really meant that the employer was to also 're- instate' Pat Foster." This exercise in semantics is spe- cious. What the judge "meant" is clear and unambiguous. I conclude that Foster is entitled to backpay from 18 April 1983 until her recall in January 1984. If Respondent had granted Foster's leave request, I can presume she would have returned at the conclusion of the leave period. By way of her unrefuted testimony, she confirms this. Moreover, Judge Gadsden ordered a make-whole remedy for all affected (by the unilateral changes) employees, which would include Foster. G. The Senior Teller Posting Respondent contends that this issue, like the overall COLA issue, should be "Collyerized." It argues that an arbitrator would be able to determine the correct rate and the merits of the alleged unfair practice. Again, I do not agree. The position was filled at $365 per week, rather than the correct wage of $397 .04 per week. This was a clear violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) and Section 8(d) of the Act by unilaterally modifying the contract . Indeed, the manager testified that the lesser figure was arbitrarily set. Accordingly, Respondent unilaterally modified the collective-bargaining agreement in violation of its bar- gaining obligations. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. The Union is labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. All office clerical employees employed by Respond- ent at its facility located at 13000 Haggerty Road, Plym- outh, Michigan; but excluding guards and supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the 2 Respondent specifically reserved this defense 295 purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. 4. At all times material herein the Union has been des- ignated exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the unit employees, and the Union has been recognized in the current collective-bargaining agreement which is effective by its terms for the period from 1 January 1981 until 1 January 1984 and for successive periods of 1 year thereafter unless either party gives a 60-day written notice prior to the anniversary date or any subsequent anniversary date of its wish to change, amend, or termi- nate in accordance with article 11, section 1, of the col- lective-bargaining agreement. 5. By refusing to bargain collectively with the Union by unilaterally modifying the current agreement and by eliminating all prior cost-of-living adjustments that have become incorporated into bargaining unit employees' rates of pay since 1 January 1978, Respondent has en- gaged in violations of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) and Section 8(d) of the Act. 6. Beginning on 1 March 1984, by unilaterally modify- ing the current collective-bargaining agreement through failing to pay any unit employees a quarterly cost-of- living adjustment due them as of that date, Respondent has violated Sections 8(a)(1) and (5) and 8(d) of the Act. 7. By unilaterally modifying the terms of the current collective-bargaining agreement by posting a notice for a bargaining unit position at less than the contract rate of pay and subsequently paying the unit employee in that position at less than the contract rate of pay, the Re- spondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) and Section 8(d) of the Act. 8. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. THE REMEDY Case 7-CA-23441 Having found that Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Sections 8(axl) and (5) and 8(d) of the Act, I shall recommend that it cease and desist therefrom, and that it take certain affirmative action to effectuate the policies of the Act. I will recommend in my Order that Respondent be or- dered to cease and desist from engaging in the conduct described in the "Conclusions of Law" section, or in any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. I will further recommend that Respondent be ordered to cease and desist from engaging in the conduct de- scribed in the "Conclusions of Law" section by other- wise refusing to bargain in good faith with the Charging Party Union regarding any terms and conditions of em- ployment of the employees in the unit. I will further recommend that Respondent be ordered to make the employees in the unit whole for any loss of pay suffered as a result of the modifications of the terms and conditions in the current collective -bargaining agree- ment, with interest thereon computed in accordance with current Board policy. 296 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Case 7-CA-21269 The gross backpay formula, as set forth in the backpay specification as modified, is appropriate. I therefore con- clude that Respondent owes the unit employees backpay, as set forth in the amended backpay specification, with interest thereon in accordance with current Board policy. Foster shall be awarded backpay for the period from 18 April 1983 until January 1984 based on the hours worked by Tamara Hill during that same period. Foster's backpay shall be based on the wage rate for the loan clerk classification. Foster's backpay shall include an $800 bonus for 1983 that is not specifically set forth in the backpay specifica- tion, but has been stipulated to by the parties in General Counsel's Exhibit 3. With the exception of Foster (the floating holiday for Foster in 1983), the employees specified are entitled to the floating holiday sought. With the exception of Foster, the employees specified are entitled to the vacation weeks sought. Brender, Baylerian, and Leonard are entitled to the service days sought. The rates of pay have been determined in the unfair labor practice Case 7-CA-23441. On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the following recommend- eds ORDER The Respondent, Burroughs Interstate Services Credit Union, Plymouth, Michigan, its officers, agents, succes- sors, and assigns, shall 1. Cease and desist from (a) Refusing to bargain collectively with the Union by unilaterally modifying the current agreement by eliminat- ing all prior cost-of-living adjustments that had become incorporated into bargaining unit employees rates of pay since 1 January 1978. (b) Refusing to bargain collectively with the Union by unilaterally modifying the current agreement by failing to pay any unit employees a quarterly cost-of-living ad- justment due to them as of 1 March 1984. (c) Refusing to bargain collectively with the Union by unilaterally modifying the terms of the current collec- tive-bargaining agreement by posting a notice for a bar- gaining unit position at less than the contract rate of pay and subsequently paying the unit employee in that posi- tion at less than the contract rate of pay. (d) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guar- anteed them by Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act. (a) Make the employees in the unit whole with interest for any loss of pay suffered as a result of Respondent's 8 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the Board's Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur- poses unilateral changes and modifications of the terms of the collective-bargaining agreement. Interest shall be com- puted in accordance with current Board policy. (b) Post at Respondent's Plymouth, Michigan plant copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."4 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 7, after being signed by the Re- spondent's authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respond- ent to ensure that the notices are not altered , defaced, or covered by any other material. (c) Furnish to the Regional Director signed copies of the notice for posting by the Union in places where no- tices to members are customarily posted. (d) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days from the date of this Order what steps the Re- spondent has taken to comply. The unit employees shall be paid backpay as alleged in the amended backpay specification with interest comput- ed in accordance with current Board policy. Regular and overtime hours listed for each of the employees for whom backpay is sought have been stipulated to be ac- curate. Foster shall receive backpay for the period 18 April 1983 until January 1984, the computation being based on the hours worked by Tamara Hill for that same period. Foster's backpay should be based on the wage rate for the loan clerk classification. Furthermore, Foster's back- pay should include an $800 bonus for 1983. With the exception of Foster, the employees specified are entitled to the floating holidays. With the exception of Foster, the employees specified are entitled to vacation weeks. Brender, Baylerian, and Lenoard are entitled to the service days. Jankiewicz and Hill shall receive the serv- ice days based on the Decision and Order in Case 7-CA- 23441.5 Interest on all of the above should be computed in ac- cordance with current Board policy. 4 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Nation- al Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." 5 This addresses their rate of pay for those days. APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United Stated Government WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with the Union by unilaterally modifying the terms of the agree- ment by eliminating all prior cost-of-living adjustments that had become incorporated into bargaining unit em- ployees' rates of pay since 1 January 1978. BURROUGHS CREDIT UNION 297 WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with the pay and subsequently paying the unit employee in that Union by unilaterally modifying the current agreement position at less than the contract rate of pay. by failing to pay any unit employees a quarterly cost-of- WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, re- living adjustment due to them as of 1 March 1984. strain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaran- WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with the teed you by Section 7 of the Act. Union by unilaterally modifying the terms of the current collective-bargaining agreement by posting a notice for a BURROUGHS INTERSTATE SERVICES bargaining unit position at less than the contract rate of CREDIT UNION