Putnam Buick, Inc.

868 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Putnam Buick, Inc. and International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, District Lodge 190, Local Lodge 1414. Case 20- CA-18523 24 June 1986 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN DOTSON AND MEMBERS DENNIS AND JOHANSEN On 28 December 1984 Administrative Law Judge George Christensen issued the attached deci- sion. The Respondent filed exceptions and a sup- porting brief and the General Counsel filed an an- swering brief. The National Labor Relations Board has delegat- ed its authority in this proceeding to a three- member panel. The Board has considered the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings, and conclusions only to the extent consistent with this Decision and Order. The judge found that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor Rela- tions Act by attempting to deal directly with its employees within the Mechanics and Service Writ- ers units concerning changes in the employees' terms and conditions of employment. The Re- spondent excepts to this finding, and argues that its communications to the employees were privileged under Section 8(c). For the reasons set forth here and in United Technologies Corp., 274 NLRB 1069 (1985), affd. 789 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1986), and United Technologies Corp., 274 NLRB 609 (1985), affd. 789 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1986), we agree with the Respondent. The Respondent, between 1968 and 1983, had been represented in contract negotiations by the Peninsula Automobile Dealers Association (PADA). The Respondent advised the Union that effective 15 July 1983 it would bargain with the Union on an individual basis. At some point before the Union and the Respondent exchanged contract proposals, the Union called the Respondent's em- ployees into a meeting with employees from six other dealerships and took a strike vote. In fact, at the time the Respondent and the Union held their first negotiation session on 30 August 1983,1 the Union was then on strike against various dealer- ships still PADA members. As set forth more fully in the judge's decision, the dispute centers on communications which oc- curred between the Respondent and its employees ' All dates hereinafter are 1983 during contract negotiations. After the conclusion of the initial negotiating session with the Union on 30 August, the Respondent called its employees to- gether and passed out copies of the Respondent's contract proposals and the Union's telephone mes- sage canceling the afternoon meeting. Joseph Putnam, the president of the dealership, after read- ing the proposals aloud, and describing the benefits to be derived in accepting them, asked Eric Pro- dinger, an employee leader and local union trust- ee, 2 what he thought of the proposals.3 Prodinger did not directly address the proposals' merits, but questioned why the Company was bargaining on an individual basis when it had previously been represented through PADA. Putnam replied that the comment "pisses me off," that he wanted only his employees voting on his proposal; the Union was going to let the employees vote on the propos- al; and stated "if you don't accept it, then you might be on strike." A month later, the Respondent's vice president, Corso, called the employees to another meeting to tell them that there would be no more negotiating sessions until President Putnam was released from the hospital. He also declared, "[I]t's up to you guys what you want, an IRA or a pension. If you want an IRA, I am willing to fight for you." The Respondent's IRA proposal had been offered to the Union 20 August. On 9 November Putnam called still another meeting of unit employees. He introduced a repre- sentative from Merrill Lynch and an insurance broker. The Merrill Lynch representative explained the benefits of an Individual Retirement Account, while the insurance broker explained the hospital surgical and insurance plan in which the Respond- ent was interested, assuring the employees that it would equal the benefits the employees were then currently receiving. As the Supreme Court has declared, "The Na- tional Labor Relations Act does not countenance negotiating with individuals when they have bar- gaining representatives." Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678, 683-685 (1944). However, Section 8(c) of the Act provides that: (c) The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provi- sions of this Act, if such expression contains 2 A union trustee is the custodian of the Local Union's property A trustee verifies the incoming bills, payments, and the audit 3 Prodinger conceded in his testimony that it was "obvious" that the "purpose" of the meeting was not to negotiate with the employees but to bong them up to date on the status of negotiations 280 NLRB No. 101 I PUTNAM BUICK no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit. The judge acknowledged that under Section 8(c) an employer is entitled to communicate noncoerci- vely with its unit employees during collective-bar- gaining negotiations.4 Indeed, as the Board recent- ly stated, "[e]mployees ought to be fully informed as to all issues relevant to collective-bargaining ne- gotiations and the parties' positions as to those issues. We believe employees are fully capable of evaluating the relative merits of those positions for themselves."5 Nonetheless, violations of Section 8(a)(5) will be found if employer communications with unit employees during collective-bargaining negotiations are coercive or invite direct bargain- ing between the employer and the employees.6 The judge reasoned that the Respondent exceed- ed its 8(c) rights and violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act because it denigrated the union rep- resentatives, conveyed the impression that the Re- spondent and not the Union was advancing the em- ployees' interests, argued the merits of the Re- spondent's proposals, implied that the failure of union representatives to accept its proposals would mean that employees would have to strike in sup- port of the union proposals, solicited employees' views of the Respondent's proposals, and implicitly urged employees to communicate their views on the proposals to the union representatives. Contrary to the judge, we do not find that the facts in this case establish that the Respondent en- gaged in unlawful direct dealing with the employ- ees. Nor, in our view, did the communications tend to undermine the Union's representative status. As set forth above, the Respondent's mechanics, along with the employees of six other dealerships, had al- ready taken a strike vote on the PADA contract proposals. In fact, the Union was already on strike against the other dealerships. Thus, when the Re- spondent called its unit employees together after the 30 August negotiating session with the Union, it did so to inform them of the specific content of proposals the Respondent had already presented to the Union, so that there would be no confusion or misunderstanding on which proposals the employ- ees would be voting. Given the fact that some of these employees had earlier participated in voting on the PADA proposal, it was entirely reasonable for the Respondent to report directly to its em- ployees on the status and the content of the negoti- ations. 4 Procter & Gamble Mfg Co, 160 NLRB 334, 340 (1966) s United Technologies Corp, above, 274 NLRB 1069, 1074 ( 1985), see also United Technologies Corp, above, 274 NLRB 609 (1985) ' See, e g, Mashkin Freight Lines, 272 NLRB 427 (1984), Friederich Truck Service, 259 NLRB 1294 (1982) 869 As stated earlier, even though he alone was asked to comment on the Respondent' s proposals, trustee Prodinger conceded that the Respondent was not trying to bargain with the employees in the 30 August meeting. In the subsequent October meeting, Vice President Corso made the statement that if employees wanted proposed increases in company contributions for their pensions to go into an IRA established for each employee (a proposal already made to the Union), rather than into the union pension fund, he would "fight" to get the IRA. This statement was made in the context of ongoing negotiations with the Union and was an implicit suggestion that the employees inform the Union if they wanted the IRA. Nor do we view the presentation in November by the Merrill Lynch representatives as support for finding a vio- lation. Again, the Respondent had already present- ed the proposals to the Union at the bargaining table, and was merely giving a more detailed expla- nation to employees who might not otherwise un- derstand fully the substance of the proposals. Finally, Putnam's statement that, if his proposals were not accepted, the employees might be on strike acknowledges a realistic possibility given the strike vote the Union conducted 6 weeks earlier among the Respondent's employees and those from the six PADA dealerships and the ongoing PADA strike. Under similar circumstances, the Board in United Technologies Corp.7 found that an employer did not engage in unlawful direct dealing with its employees when it placed a full-page editorial ad- vertisement in the local newspaper describing its offer to the union and urging employees to "weigh the company's final offer against the alternative of a strike." Similarly, we do not view Putnam's com- ments here as coercive. Accordingly, based on the foregoing, we find that the Respondent has not attempted to deal di- rectly with its unit employees. We shall therefore dismiss the complaint. ORDER The complaint is dismissed. MEMBER JOHANSEN, dissenting. Contrary to the majority, I agree with the judge that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) be- cause the Respondent's statements invited a bar- gaining exchange between the Respondent and its employees. The Respondent's president, Putnam, presented the Company's proposals to the employees at a 30 August meeting, and described how the employees ' 274 NLRB 1069 (1985), affd 789 F 2d 121 (2d Cir. 1986) 870 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD would benefit by accepting these proposals. Putnam then singled out employee Eric Prodinger and put him on the spot by engaging in a bargain- ing exchange with him over the merits of the pro- posals despite Prodinger's unfamiliarity with the issues. Thus, Putnam first solicited Prodinger's as- sessment of the proposals in front of the assembled employees, then chastised him for his response, and then threatened the employees that if they did not accept the Company's proposals they "might be on strike." Any invitation to engage in a dialogue on the relative merits of the proposals should have been directed to the collective-bargaining representative rather than to the employees. The fact that Pro- dinger was a trustee does not in any way change or modify the character of the Respondent's coercive conduct or its object, because the fact remains that Prodinger was a rank-and-file employee vis-a-vis the Respondent; he was not a member of the Union's bargaining committee. Further, it was the Respondent who planted the threat of a strike in the minds of unit employees only hours after its first negotiating session with the Union. This coercive statement was made when Putnam voiced displeasure with Prodinger's solicit- ed comments. By way of explanation, the majority asserts that, before its meeting with employees, the Union had already conducted a strike vote among mechanics at Putnam and six other dealerships. Further, at the time of the meeting, other employ- ees represented by the Union were already on strike against various other PADA dealerships. Given this context, according to the majority, Put- nam's comments constituted a lawful exercise of his right to communicate with his employees. But the Respondent had chosen to bargain separately from PADA, thus the PADA negotiations had no direct relationship to the Respondent's individual bargain- ing. It was the Respondent who raised to employ- ees the possibility of a strike on the very day its separate negotiations for a new contract com- menced. In this context, President Putnam's re- marks must be deemed coercive. The Respondent's appeal to its employees to engage in direct bargaining was further compound- ed in early October when Vice President Corso called the unit employees together to inform them that contract negotiations were being temporarily suspended while Putnam was in the hospital. How- ever, Corso told employees that in the meantime, if they wanted proposed increases in company contri- butions for their pensions to go into an IRA estab- lished for each employee, rather than into the union pension fund, he would "fight" to get the IRA. Such a face-to-face appeal contemplated, by its terms, direct discussions between the Respond- ent's vice president and the employees. Corso's "it's up to you" remarks clearly invited employees to discuss with him their desires regarding the IRA. Only by this process would he know whether to "fight" for an IRA. The context of this case is vastly different from that found in United Technologies.' There, the par- ties had a long and fruitful history of bargaining one-on-one. Here, the Respondent had always bar- gained through PADA, the multiemployer group representative; this was its first attempt at bargain- ing one-on-one with the Union. In its zeal to wrest control of its destiny from others and speak for itself, the Respondent took on the role rightfully belonging to the Union. This was no implicit sug- gestion for employees to go to the Union but, rather, was an explicit attempt to convince employ- ees that the Respondent was more interested than the Union in their welfare. Thus, Corso's remarks were an attempt to reach agreement on an issue with employees rather than with their chosen rep- resentative and in the process undermined the Union's status as the collective-bargaining repre- sentative. The 9 November meeting with the Merrill Lynch and insurance representatives is yet another example of the Respondent's direct dealing with the employees. The Respondent engaged the serv- ices of salespersons in the securities and insurance fields in an effort to have them explain and sell the Respondent's proposals to the employees. This effort was misplaced. Rather than direct these pres- entations to the union negotiators who were in a position to evaluate, accept, and recommend the proposals to the employees, and who alone had au- thority to act,2 the Respondent bypassed the Union and made its appeal directly to the employees. Accordingly, the Respondent 's statements to em- ployees about going on strike and about an IRA unlawfully undermined and bypassed the Union. I also find that the solicitation of Prodinger's com- ments on the Respondent's proposals, chastising him for questioning the Respondent' s bargaining tactics, and the presentation by brokerage and in- surance salesmen constituted direct bargaining with individual employees rather than with their desig- nated bargaining representative, all in violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. 1 274 NLRB 609 (1985), affd 789 F 2d 121 (2d Cir. 1986) 2 Pursuant to Sec 9(a) the Union is the exclusive bargaining represent- ative and that imposes "the negative duty to treat with no other " NLRB v Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp, 301 U S 1, 44 (1937) PUTNAM BUICK Donald R. Rendall, Esq., for the General Counsel. James A. Carter, Esq. (Berman & Carter), of San Francis- co, California, for the Respondent. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE GEORGE CHRISTENSEN, Administrative Law Judge. On May 23, 1984, I conducted a hearing at San Francis- co, California, to try issues raised by a complaint issued on January 11, 1984, based on a charge filed by Local Lodge 1414, an affiliate of District Lodge 190 and the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO (Union) on November 14, 1983.£ The complaint alleged that Putnam Buick, Inc. (Com- pany) violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act (Act) by attempting to undermine the Union's status as the collective-bargaining representa- tive of its employees within two bargaining units, bypass the Union in negotiations over changes in the unit em- ployees' wages, and interfere with, restrain, or coerce the unit employees' exercise of their Section 7 rights under the Act, through comments by its officers at meetings with the employees which disparaged the Union, and conveyed the message the Company was representing their best interests, that acceptance of changes in their wages the Company was proposing in negotiations with the Union was in their interest, and that they might have to strike if the Union did not accept the Company's pro- posal; and by urging the employees to communicate their view of the Company's proposals to the Union, soliciting the view of an employee leader concerning the Compa- ny's wage proposals, and requesting a copy of the pen- sion plan covering the unit employees. The Company in its answer to the complaint denied committing any violation of the Act and denied that at all times since 1968 the Union has been and is the exclu- sive representative of its employees within the mechanics unit and since 1973 has been and is the exclusive repre- sentative of its employees within the service writers unit. The issues created by the pleadings are: (1) whether since the dates set out above, and currently, the Union has been, and is, the exclusive representative of the Com- pany's employees within the two units; (2) whether the Company made the comments, statements, and requests set out above, and (3) if so, whether the Company there- by violated the Act. The parties appeared by counsel and were afforded full opportunity to adduce evidence, examine and cross- examine witnesses, argue, and file briefs. Both counsel argued orally and elected not to file briefs. Based on my review of the entire record, observation of the witnesses, perusal of the arguments, and research, I enter the following FINDINGS OF FACT 1. JURISDICTION AND LABOR ORGANIZATION The complaint alleged, the answer admitted , and I find at all pertinent times the Company was an employer en- I Read 1983 after all further date references omitting the year 871 gaged in commerce in a business affecting commerce and the Union was a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2 of the Act. II. THE UNITS AND THE UNION'S REPRESENTATIVE STATUS For many years the Company has been an auto dealer employing sales and services personnel in its operations. Between 1968 and 1983, it was a member of the Penin- sula Automobile Dealers Association (PADA), and au- thorized PADA to act on its behalf in bargaining with the Union concerning the rates of pay, wages, hours, and working conditions of certain of its employees, and to execute contracts setting out the rates of pay, wages, etc., of those employees. In 1968, the Company authorized PADA to negotiate and execute a contract on its behalf in which the Union was recognized as the exclusive bargaining representative of employees performing mechanical and related work (the mechanics unit and contract) and which set forth their rates of pay, wages, etc. In 1973, the Company au- thorized PADA to negotiate and execute a contract on its behalf in which the Union was recognized as the ex- clusive bargaining representative of the employees classi- fied as service writers, road testers , dispatchers, and tower men (the service writers unit and contract) and which set forth their rates of pay, wages, etc. The em- ployees within the two units were continuously covered by like contracts between PADA and the Union through July 15. Prior to commencement of negotiations between PADA and the Union for contracts covering the unit employees for a term commencing July 16, the Company withdrew its membership in and authorization for PADA to represent it for collective- bargaining purposes and advised the Union it would bargain with the Union as an individual over the rates of pay, wages, etc., of its employees within the two units, effective on and after July 16. Representatives of the Company and the Union met thereafter to negotiate those terms. In view of my findings (and the Company' s admission in its answer to the complaint) that since 1968 the Com- pany has recognized the Union as the exclusive collec- tive-bargaining representative of its employees perform- ing mechanical and related work (the mechanics unit), that since 1973 the Company has recognized the Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of its employees classified as service writers, road testers, dis- patchers, and tower men (the service writers unit), and that continuously since those dates, either through PADA or directly, the Company has bargained with the Union and executed contracts covering the wages, rates of pay, hours, and working conditions of its employees within those units, I find and conclude the two units were appropriate for collective-bargaining purposes within the meaning of Section 9 of the Act. On the above facts, the Union's continued majority representative status is presumed , unless that presumption is rebutted by substantial evidence.2 In this case, not 2 Bartenders Assn. of Pocatello, 213 NLRB 651 (1974), Emerson Mfg Co, 200 NLRB 148 (1972), and cases cited therein 872 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD only did the Company fail to produce any evidence to rebut the presumption, its officers testified they met and bargained with the Union concerning the wages, etc., of the unit employees following the July 15 expiration of the PADA-union contracts, without ever asserting any doubt concerning the Union's representation of a majori- ty of its employees within the units or advancing any grounds to support such an assertion. I therefore find and conclude that at all pertinent times since 1968 and 1973, including all pertinent times since the July 15 expiration of the last PADA-union contracts covering those employees, the Union has represented a majority of the Company's employees within the two units. I also find and conclude that at all times since 1968 the Union has been, and is, the exclusive collective-bargain- ing representative of the Company's employees within the mechanics unit and since 1973 of employees in the service writers unit, within the meaning of Section 9 of the Act. III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The Alleged August 30 Direct Dealing and Solicitation The expired PADA-union contracts required the Com- pany to make specified monthly contributions to the automotive industries pension fund and the PADA insur- ance trust fund on behalf of each unit employee (to pro- vide the employees with pension, hospital, surgical, sick- ness, accident, and life insurance benefits) and to comply with all the terms and conditions of the trust agreements creating the two funds, any modifications thereof, and any rules and regulations promulgated by the trustees designated under the terms of the trust agreements to ad- minister their terms. During the morning of August 30, Joseph Putnam, the Company's president and co-owner, and Richard Corso, the vice president and general manager,3 met with repre- sentatives of the Union to negotiate the terms of a com- pany-uion contract covering the rates of pay, wages, hours, and working conditions of the employees within the two units on and after July 16. In the course of those negotiations, Putnam proposed, inter alia, increases in the Company's monthly pension contributions, but with the condition each employee have the opportunity to elect payment of the increases into an individual retirement ac- count rather than the pension fund (with continued pay- ments of the basic contribution specified in the expired PADA-union contracts into the pension fund), and that the Company cease making contributions into the insur- ance fund but rather preserve the level of benefits pro- vided under that fund through a plan of the Company's choosing. The negotiators broke for lunch with the understand- ing they would resume negotiations that afternoon. Over the luncheon recess, however, the union representatives H The complaint alleged, the answer admitted, and I find at all perti- nent times Putnam and Corso were officers, supervisors , and agents of the Company acting on its behalf within the meaning of Sec 2 of the Act telephoned the Company's office and left a message they would be unable to attend the planned afternoon session. Putnam and Corso received the message when they went to the offices after lunch. They summoned the unit employees to a meeting. Putnam stated he wanted to tell the employees what was happening in the negotiations; advised them he and Corso met with representatives of the Union that morn- ing, presented a company proposal for new contract terms, and planned to continue negotiations that after- noon, but the Union canceled the meeting; passed around the telephone message canceling the meeting and copies of the company proposals; told the employees their rep- resentatives said the company proposals were better than they expected, they did not know what to do, and would have to consult their superior; described how the em- ployees would benefit by acceptance of the company proposals; and urged the employees to convey their view of the company proposals to their union representatives. Putnam solicited a statement from employee Eric Pro- dinger 4 concerning the merits of the company proposals. Prodinger was reluctant to comment but, at the urging of several unit employees, Prodinger finally responded by asking Putnam if the company proposals the employ- ees had before them was the Company's final offer. Putnam replied in the negative. Prodinger then professed an inability to understand why Putnam was bargaining as an individual, since he previously always joined with auto dealers in the area whose employees were repre- sented by the Union in negotiating the wages, etc. of the unit employees. Putnam replied that comment "pisses me off," he wanted only his employees voting on his propos- al, and the Union was going to have to let them vote on it and, if they did not accept it, they might be on strike.5 B. The Alleged October Direct Dealing In early October, Corso summoned the unit employees to another meeting. He informed the employees Putnam was in the hospital with a serious blood clot; that no one knew how long Putnam was going to be confined to the hospital; and that there were not going to be any negoti- ations between the Company and the Union over the terms of a new contract covering their wages, etc., while Putnam was unavailable. He went on to state it was going to be up to the employees to decide whether they wanted increases in company contributions for their pen- sions to go to the pension fund or into an IRA estab- lished for each employee, and he would fight to get the latter for them if that was what they wanted.6 " Prodinger held various offices in Local 1414, at this time he was a trustee 5 These findings are based on the testimony of Prodinger, who im- pressed me as a sincere and reliable witness, plus testimony by Putman and Corso, which substantially corroborated Prodmger's testimony 6 These findings are based on the testimony of Prodinger and Corso. While Corso denied making the latter statement, I credit Prodinger's tes- timony to that effect, as noted above, Prodinger, a current employee, im- pressed me as a sincere, reliable witness PUTNAM BUICK C. The Alleged Early November Direct Dealing In early November, Corso approached Prodinger at his work station and told Prodinger the Union and Serra- monte Oldsmobile (another auto dealer in the area) had reached a settlement on new contract terms which in- cluded the establishment of IRA plans for each employ- ee, in addition to the union pension plan. Prodinger re- plied an IRA and a pension plan were two different things and the pension plan was not a union pension plan, but a multiparty plan administered by trustees se- lected in equal numbers by the representatives of the par- ticipating employers and the affected employees. Corso said he would like to see the plan. Prodinger offered to supply a copy and later did so. D. The Alleged November 9 Direct Dealing On November 9, Putnam summoned the unit employ- ees to another meeting. He introduced a Merrill Lynch representative and an insurance broker, stating the former was an expert on IRA plans and the latter an expert on insurance plans. The Merrill Lynch representa- tive spoke, extolling the benefits of an IRA plan and ex- plaining the options available; she did not make any com- parisons between the potential income from an IRA plan, given the size of the contributions into that plan, and in- creased pension income based on similar contributions to the existing pension fund. The insurance broker de- scribed a hospital, surgical, and insurance plan the Com- pany was interested in, assuring the employees it would equal the hospital, surgical, and insurance benefits the employees were receiving under the PADA insurance trust fund. The two departed and Putnam took the floor to announce he met with the employees' union represent- atives earlier that day, and the negotiators were unable to resolve their differences on the pension and insurance issues (the Union proposed the increased pension contri- butions offered by the Company go into the pension fund for credit to each employee's pension account and the Company continue its contributions into the PADA In- surance Trust Fund to provide hospital, surgical, sick- ness, accident, and life insurance benefits for each em- ployee). He distributed two documents to the employees; one was a copy of a letter from a CPA firm setting out the tax consequences for employees establishing an IRA account and the second reported there was a bill pending in Congress to permit doubling the amount which an em- ployee could place in an IRA account. Corso then took the floor, and stated that he had examined the booklet setting out the terms of the automotive industries pension fund; that under its terms an employee who elected early retirement would be penalized 6 percent for each early year; and that if a retiree worked more than a certain number of hours, he could lose his pension. E. Analysis and Conclusions At the August 30 and early October employee meet- ings, Putnam and Corso made remarks which created the impression the unit employees' bargaining representative was not pursuing their interests diligently and effectively 873 and they, rather than their representative, were seeking to advance the employees' economic interest.' At all three general employee meetings (August 30, early October, and November 9), Putnam and Corso (and their invited speakers) tried to secure employee sup- port for changes in current pension and health and wel- fare benefit plans advanced by the Company and op- posed by the Union, implying the employees might have to go on strike if their representative did not accept the changes the Company was advocating, to cause the em- ployees to pressure their representative to accept the Company's proposals.8 At the August 30 meeting, Putnam also solicited employee leader Prodinger's views concerning the Company's proposals in an obvious at- tempt to promote direct bargaining with the employees over their proposals. Although an employer is privileged under Section 8(c) of the Act to inform his employees of the details of proposals he has made to their collective- bargaining representative concerning their wages, etc. (as well as the representative's proposals) and the status of negotiations over those proposals,9 the Board, with court approval, has ruled he exceeds his 8(c) rights and vio- lates Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act when he deni- grates his employees' collective-bargaining representa- tive, conveys the impression he and not their representa- tive is advancing their interests, argues the merits of his proposals, implies the failure of their representative to accept his proposals would mean they would have to strike in support of the union proposals, solicits employee views of his proposals, and urges the employees to com- municate their views of his proposals to their representa- tive (with the expectation they will pressure the repre- sentative to accept his proposals). As the Board stated in a leading case: Good faith bargaining . . . requires . .. on the part of the employer . . . recognition that the statutory representative is the one with whom it must deal in conducting bargaining negotiations . . . it is incon- sistent with this obligation for an employer . . . to seek to persuade the employees to exert pressure on the representative to submit to the will of the em- ployer, and to create the impression that the em- ployer rather than the union is the true protector of the employees' interests . . . the employer's statutory obligation is to deal with the employees through the r Putnam, by telling the employees on August 30 the lull in negotia- tions was caused by their representative's cancellation of the afternoon bargaining session and by telling the employees their representative char- acterized his contract proposals as so much better than they expected, they did not know what to do, and Corso, by telling the employees at the early October meeting he would fight their representative to secure for them the change in pension contributions the Company was advancing in negotiations with their representative 8 This purpose was established by Putnam's urging the employees to convey their views of the Company's proposals to their union represemta- tive and his statement they might have to go out on strike if their repre- sentative did not accept the Company's proposals, following his (and his visitors') sales pitches for those proposals 9 Seneca Electric Co, 265 NLRB 1531 (1982), Ampac, 259 NLRB 1075 (1982), Semperit Pacific, Inc, 237 NLRB 478 (1978), Penasquitos Gardens, 236 NLRB 994 (1978) 874 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD union, and not with the union through the employees. [Emphasis added.] 10 And, repeaied more recently: Such a tactic far exceeds the permissible limits of direct communication [and] amounts to a campaign among unit members to exert pressure on their rep- resentative to agree to the employer's request. Such efforts are inconsistent with an employer's obligation to negotiate directly with the Union and constitutes by- passing the collective-bargaining representative. [Em- phasis added.] 1 1 On the basis of the foregoing, I find and conclude that in the course of conducting meetings with unit employ- ees on August 30, in early October, and on November 9, Putnam and Corso (and their invited speakers) made re- marks, statements, and requests creating the impression the Union was not pursuing the employees' interest dili- gently and effectively, that the Company rather than the Union was seeking to advance the employees' economic interests, that the Company's proposals for changes in the employees' currently effective pension and health and welfare benefits were more to their benefit than the Union's proposals on those subjects, and that the em- ployees might be forced out on strike if their representa- tives did not accept the Company's proposals, urged the employees to communicate their views concerning the Company's proposals to the Union, and solicited an em- ployee leader's views regarding the Company's propos- als. I further find and conclude that by those remarks, statements, and requests, the speakers were attempting to undermine and bypass the employees' collective-bargain- ing representative and deal directly with the employees rather than the Union with respect to proposed changes in the employees' wages, thereby violating Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act. The foregoing findings and conclusions dispose of all but one issue-whether, as alleged in the complaint, Corso requested in early November that Prodinger supply him with a copy of the current effective pension plan and, if so, -whether the Company thereby violated the Act. Findings have been entered that Prodinger vol- unteered to supply a booklet describing the current pen- sion plan when Corso expressed an interest in its terms; it was not supplied at Corso's request. In any event, the Company, as a participant in the pension plan, was enti- tled to the document. I therefore find and conclude this complaint allegation lacks merit and will recommend it be dismissed. 10 General Electric Co, 150 NLRB 192, 194 (1964), enfd 418 F 2d 736 (2d Cir 1969). 11 Hiney Printing Co., 262 NLRB 157, 164 (1982) See also Farm Crest Bakeries, 241 NLRB 1191 (1979), Limpco Mfg Co, 225 NLRB 987 (1976), and Eastern Washington Distributing Co, 216 NLRB 1149 (1975). With respect to employee solicitations, see Goodyear Aerospace Corp, 204 NLRB 831 (1973), modified on other grounds 497 F 2d 747 (6th Cu 1974), and Harrison Mfg Co, 253 NLRB 675 (1980), enfd. 682 F 2d 580 (6th Cir. 1982) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. At all pertinent times the Company was an employ- er engaged in commerce in a business affecting com- merce and the Union was a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2 of the Act. 2. At all pertinent times Putnam and Corso were offi- cers, supervisors, and agents of the Company acting on its behalf, and the two speakers invited by Putnam to speak to the employees on November 9 were agents of the Company acting on its behalf,' within the meaning of Section 2 of the Act. 3. Units titled the mechanics unit, consisting of compa- ny employees performing mechanical and related work, and the service writers unit, consisting of company em- ployees classified as service writers, road testers, dis- patchers, and tower men, at all times have been and are appropriate units for collective-bargaining purposes within the meaning of Section 9 of the Act. 4. At all times since 1968 the Union has represented a majority of the Company's employees within the former unit and since 1973 the Union has represented a majority of the Company's employees within the latter unit. 5. At all times since 1968, including all times since July 16, the Union has been and is the exclusive collective- bargaining repesentative of the Company's employees within the mechanics unit within the meaning of Section 9 of the Act and at all times since 1973, including all times since July 16, the Union has been and is the exclu- sive collective-bargaining representative of the Compa- ny's employees within the service writers unit within the meaning of Section 9 of the Act'. 6. On August 30, in early October, and on November 9, the Company violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act by attempting to undermine and bypass the Union and directly deal with its employees within the mechan- ics and service writers units concerning changes in those employees' wages. 7. The Company did not violate the Act by Pro- dinger's offer to supply Corso with a copy of the booklet describing the terms of the current pension plan covering the unit employees. 8. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affected and affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2 of the Act. ' THE REMEDY Having found that the Company committed unfair labor practices, I recommend it be directed to cease and desist therefrom and take affirmative action designed to effectuate the purpose of the Act. Having found that the Company did not commit one of the unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint, I recommend those portions of the complaint so alleging be dismissed. [Recommended Order omitted from publication.]