Bay State Ambulance And Hospital Rental, Inc.

BAY STATE AMBULANCE RENTAL Bay State Ambulance and Hospital Rental, Inc. and Teamsters Union Local 25, a/w International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Ware- housemen and Helpers of America. Cases 1- CA-20237 and 1-CA-20256 24 June 1986 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN DOTSON AND MEMBERS DENNIS AND JOHANSEN On 7 June 1984 Administrative Law Judge Harold Bernard Jr. issued the attached decision. The Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and the Genral Counsel filed a brief in sup- port of the judge's decision. The National Labor Relations Board has delegat- ed its authority in this proceeding to a three- member panel. The Board has considered the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings, I and conclusions as modified,2 and to set forth the Order in full below. We agree with the judge's findings that the Company committed several violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by making certain threats and ' The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge's credibility find- ings The Board's established policy is not to overrule an administrative law judge's credibility resolutions unless the clear preponderance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd 188 F 2d 362 (3d Cir 1951) We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing the findings In this regard, we note that in crediting the testimony of employee Tim Malinowski over that of Supervisor Gerry Lambert, the judge erroneously concluded that Lambert did not deny that he had told an employee that if the Union got in conditions would be the same, but if the Union did not get in conditions would be better and there would be newer ambulances, better sleeping quarters, and conditions in general would improve Our review of the record reveals that Lambert denied having made a substantially similar statement and we therefore do not rely on any difference between the statement attributed to Lambert and the statement he denied having made in adopting the judge's conclusion that Malinowski should be credited Instead, we rely on the judge's addi- tional finding that Lambert's "overall testimonial performance" rendered his testimony less credible than the contradictory testimony of employee witnesses We also note that the judge erred in finding that Lambert did not deny telling Malinowski that the Respondent's president Michael Kotzen knew the identities of the main union organizers Because that statement was not found to be violative of the Act, however, the judge's error is there- fore harmless Although the Respondent contends that before 25 August 1982, the date of a memorandum from the Respondent to its employees that was found to contain statements violative of Sec 8(a)(1) of the Act, the elec- tion scheduled for 26 August had been called off, there is no record evi- dence to support that assertion 2 Consistent with our decision in Sterling Sugars, 261 NLRB 472 (1982), we shall require the Respondent to remove from its records any reference to employee Appel's and employee Groblewski's unlawful dis- charges We shall also require the Respondent to notify these employees in writing of such removal and to inform them that the Respondent's un- lawful conduct will not be used as a basis for future personnel actions concerning them We have modified the Order and notice accordingly 1079 promises3 and that the Company violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by discharging employ- ees Kathy Appel and Thomas Groblewski. We dis- agree, however, with some of his other findings of violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act and, for the following reasons, reverse the judge's decision in those respects. The judge found that by telling employee Mat- thew Stuart that "the union probably won't get you anything more than you have now," Supervi- sor Michael Forget violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. We disagree. The statement was merely one of opinion, protected by Section 8(c) of the Act, from which no threat reasonably could be per- ceived by the employee. See Fieldcrest Mills, 259 NLRB 914, 920 (1982). s We adopt the judge's finding that Sec 8(a)(1) of the Act was violat- ed by the statement in the Respondent's president's 19 July 1982 memo- randum to employees, "My sincere belief is that if a union were to repre. sent you in our operations, it would not work to your benefit but to your serious harm " Contrary to our colleague, we find a direct link between that statement and other unfair labor practices committed by the Re- spondent during the campaign For example, in the weeks preceeding the memorandum, Supervisor Michael Forget told one employee that the em- ployees would have received a raise if the employees had not attempted to organize a union, and subsequently told another employee that if the Union got in, the Respondent's president could close the location in- volved in the campaign Furthermore, the same memorandum contained an unlawful no-solicitation rule The Respondent's campaign also includ- ed other unlawful threats and promises, as well as the unlawful dis- charges of two employees Under these circumstances, we find that the "serious harm" statement had a "sinister meaning," Ohm ire Mfg. Co, 217 NLRB 435 fn 2 (1975), and therefore violated Sec 8(a)(1) of the Act. We also adopt the judge's conclusion that the Respondent's president's 4 August 1982 memorandum to employees violated Sec 8(a)(l) of the Act by stating that without customers "we are all doomed to look for other jobs" and "[l]et us be very careful that we do not vote ourselves into a new situation wherein we cannot continue our good performance, thereby easily losing our prime accounts This would mean the loss of jobs for all of us here " (Emphasis in original) We disagree with our col- league's conclusion that these statements "fall within the area of legiti- mate campaign propaganda and opinion permitted by Sec 8(c) of the Act " We find that the statements were not linked to the success of the Respondent's business, but rather were linked to the election campaign, as evidenced by the reference to "vot[ing] ourselves into" a negative situ- ation The statements were not based on objective facts regarding the Re- spondent's business or its customers and thus were not protected state- ments of opinion under Sec 8(c) See Long-Airdox Co, 277 NLRB 1157 (1985) Chairman Dotson disagrees with the judge's finding that Sec 8(a)(1) was violated by the statement in the Respondent's president's 19 July 1982 memorandum to employees that "my sincere belief is that if a union were to represent you in our operations, it would not work to your bene- fit but to your serious harm " The Board has held that almost identical statements are lawful noncoercive expressions of opinion protected by Sec 8(c) absent some link between them and unfair labor practices com- mitted by a respondent Ohmite Mfg Co, 217 NLRB 435 (1975) The Chairman finds no such link here. Chairman Dotson would also reverse the judge's finding that the Re- spondent's president's 4 August 1982 memorandum to employees violated Sec 8(a)(1) by stating that without customers "we are all doomed to look for other jobs" and "[llet us be very careful that we do not vote our- selves into a new situation wherein we cannot continue our good per- formance, thereby easily losing our prime accounts This would mean the loss of jobs for all of us here " These statements contain no threat of re- prisal against union activities, they fall within the area of legitimate cam- paign propaganda and opinion permitted by Sec 8(c), because the loss of jobs is linked to the success of the Respondent' s business See Maremont Corp, 251 NLRB 1617, 1620-1621 (1980) 280 NLRB No. 122 1080 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD In addition, we disagree with the judge's treat- ment of Supervisor Lambert's conversation with employee Tim Malinowski during which Lambert said that if the Union got in conditions would be the same, but if the Union did not get in conditions would improve in several specified ways. The judge found that Lambert thereby committed two violations of the Act, that is, promising a benefit to employees for not selecting the Union to represent them and predicting that there would be no im- provements in employment conditions if the em- ployees did select the Union. We agree with the judge's conclusion that Lambert violated the Act during this conversation. We do not, however, regard the conversation as constituting two viola- tions. The thrust of Lambert's comments was that, if the employees voted against the Union, working conditions would improve. Accordingly, we con- strue the violation to be a promise of benefits only, and not an additional prediction of loss of benefits. ORDER The National Labor Relations Board orders that the Respondent, Bay State Ambulance and Hospi- tal Rental, Inc., Malden, Massachusetts, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall 1. Cease and desist from (a) Telling an employee that employees lost a planned wage increase because of their support for the Union. (b) Informing an employee that employees would not get improved employment conditions as long as they tried to get a union to represent them. (c) Threatening an employee with closing the Springfield operation if the Union got in. (d) Threatening employees that union representa- tion would not work to their benefit but to their se- rious harm. (e) Directing employees to report any efforts ex- erted on them to join a union at work to the Re- spondent. (f) Threatening employees with a reduction in working hours if the Union got in. (g) Promising employees improved employment conditions all around including newer ambulances and better sleeping quarters if the Union did not get in. (h) Telling employees that voting for the Union will lead to a loss of customers and employment. (i) Promoting an employee association as a better alternative than the Union for employees to secure improved employment conditions. (j) Threatening an employee with discharge for continued tardiness and that life would be rough for him in the Company if employees selected the Union and if he were the main organizer for the Union. (k) Announcing for the first time that policies were being drafted to upgrade benefits for regular part-time employees on the day before a scheduled Board representation election in order to discour- age employee support for the Union. (1) Terminating an employee because of employ- ee union activities. (m) In any other manner interfering with, re- straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action neces- sary to effectuate the policies of the Act. (a) Offer Kathy Appel and Thomas Groblewski immediate and full reinstatement to their former jobs or, if those jobs no longer exist, to substantial- ly equivalent jobs, without prejudice to their se- niority or any other rights or privileges previously enjoyed, and make them whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits suffered as a result of the discrimination against them, in the manner set forth in the remedy section of the judge's decision. (b) Remove from its files any reference to the unlawful discharges and notify the employees in writing that this has been done and that the dis- charges will not be used against them in any way. (c) Preserve and, on request, make available to the Board or its agents for examination and copy- ing, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this Order. (d) Post at all its facilities in Massachusetts copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."4 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Re- gional Director for Region 1, after being signed by the Respondent's authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent immediately upon re- ceipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where no- tices to employees are customarily posted. Reason- able steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (e) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days from the date of this Order what steps the Respondent has taken to comply. 4 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Nation- al Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board " BAY STATE AMBULANCE RENTAL 1081 APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to post and abide by this notice. Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights. To organize To form, join, or assist any union To bargain collectively through representa- tives of their own choice To act together for other mutual aid or pro- tection To choose not to engage in any of these protected concerted activities. WE WILL NOT tell any employee that a planned wage increase was lost because of the employees' support for the Union. WE WILL NOT inform any employee that em- ployees would not get improved employment con- ditions as long as they try to get a union to repre- sent them or if they select a union. WE WILL NOT threaten any employee with clos- ing the Springfield facility if the Union gets in. WE WILL NOT threaten employees that union representation would not work to their benefit but to their serious harm. WE WILL NOT direct employees to report any ef- forts exerted on them to join a union at work. WE WILL NOT threaten employees with a reduc- tion in working hours if the Union gets in. WE WILL NOT promise employees improved em- ployment conditions all around including newer ambulances and better sleeping quarters if the Union did not get in. WE WILL NOT tell employees that voting for the Union will lead to a loss of customers and employ- ment. WE WILL NOT promote an employee association as a better alternative than the Union for employ- ees to secure improved employment conditions. WE WILL NOT threaten an employee with dis- charge for continued tardiness and that life would be rough for him in the Company if employees se- lected the Union and if he were the main organizer for the Union. WE WILL NOT announce that policies were being drafted to upgrade benefits for regular part-time employees on the day before a scheduled Board representation election in order to discourage em- ployee support for the Union. WE WILL NOT terminate any employee because of the employee's support for Teamster Union Local 25, a/w International Brotherhood of Team- sters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America or any other labor organization. WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act. WE WILL NOT offer Kathy Appel and Thomas Groblewski immediate and full reinstatement to their former jobs or, if those jobs no longer exist, to substantially equivalent positions, without preju- dice to their seniority or any other rights or privi- leges previously enjoyed and WE WILL make them whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits resulting from their discharge, less any net interim earnings, plus interest. WE WILL notify each of them that we have re- moved from our files any reference to his or her discharge and that the discharge will not be used against him or her in any way. BAY STATE AMBULANCE AND HOSPI- TAL RENTAL, INC. Gerald Wolper, Esq., and Jonathan S. R. Beal, Esq., for the General Counsel. Juhus Kirle, Esq., of Newton Centre, Massachusetts, for the Respondent. John McBride, of Boston, Massachusetts, for the Union. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE HAROLD BERNARD JR., Administrative Law Judge. I heard these cases in March and May 1983 in Springfield, Massachusetts, pursuant to charges filed' September 1982 and complaint issued October 28, 1982, amended March 8, 1983, alleging that Respondent interfered with its employees' rights under Section 7 of the Act during the Union's organizational campaign and discharged em- ployees Kathy Appel and Thomas Groblewski because they supported the Union, thereby violating Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. On the entire record,2 including the demeanor of the witnesses and briefs filed by the parties, I make the fol- lowing FINDINGS OF FACT 1. JURISDICTION The Respondent is a Massachusetts corporation en- gaged in providing ambulance services to individuals and I Although the Respondent's answer disclaims "sufficient" knowledge thereof, the record clearly shows that the charges in these cases were duly filed and served on Respondent as alleged in the complaint 2 The General Counsel's unopposed motion to correct errors in the transcript, after due consideration, is granted 1082 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD health care facilities from its numerous locations throughout Massachusetts. Annually, the Respondent, as payment for such services, derives gross revenues in excess of $250,000, including more than $50,000 from the Federal Government's medicare program. I find, as ad- mitted, that the Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. Siemons Mail- ing Service, 122 NLRB 81 (1958), and Walters Ambulance Service, 212 NLRB 422 (1974). Admittedly, the Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. Respondent admits that Michael Kotzen, its president and chief operating officer, is a supervisor and agent within the meaning of Section 2(11) and (13) respectively of the Act. In addition, during the course of this hearing, the parties stipulated that Gerry Lambert and Michael Forget were, during relevant periods referred to below, supervisors within the meaning of the Act. Further, the record establishes that both Lambert and Forget, while in charge of Respondent's Springfield, Massachusetts office, also served as "top man" in the Northampton and Holyoke locations, and that this position carried with it wide-ranging supervisory authority, which was inde- pendently exercised. I find that Forget and Lambert were also agents of the Respondent. GAC Properties, 205 NLRB 1150, 1153 (1973); Glenroy Construction Co., 215 NLRB 866, 867 (1974), enfd. 527 F.2d 465 (7th Cir. 1975).3 Il. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES The timespan covering relevant events in the case is the 7-month period beginning April 1982 and ending in October that same year. Background The Respondent maintains 10 locations in Massachu- setts including a Springfield facility from which its am- bulance, manned by emergency medical technicians, are dispatched to provide transportation and care enroute for the sick and injured. Members in the complement of about 140 employees are assigned 24-hour shifts and, when not engaged in driving ambulances or serving as crew with another employee during the trips, maintain equipment and work to keep up the crews' quarters during their tour of duty. Respondent's employees were unrepresented by any labor organization when the events leading to this case first unfolded. The Union's Organizational Drive-May 1982 The Union began efforts to organize Respondent's em- ployees in late May 1982 leading to a meeting at an em- ployee's apartment in West Springfield on June 3, attend- ed by five employees, including Groblewski and Appel a Thus, the record indicates that while serving as a supervisor over the Springfield office, Lambert was in charge of all hiring there, and at the Holyoke and Northampton, Massachusetts offices as well, and that he ex- ercised authority to transfer employees , arrange for substitutions , and ap- prove vacation times. Both Lambert and Forget, who served in this posi- tion during periods in May, June, and July 1982, were acknowledged as supervisors by Respondent as well as union officials. Discussion involved the Union's experience and what it could offer to do for Bay State Ambulance employees. After the meeting closed, Appel, who had signed a union card, took some unsigned cards and discussed membership in the Union with Hol- yoke office employees, together with a second Spring- field employee, Richard Pendergast, and received signed union cards from two Holyoke employees. Continuing their efforts to solicit employees to join the Union, Appel and her companion then traveled to Respondent's Northampton facility, where they discussed the union meeting with employees there and distributed union cards which employees returned to them. Appel contin- ued to discuss benefits of a union with employees at both Springfield and Holyoke in early June and afterward. In the same timeframe Groblewski had discussions with Gerald Lambert while Lambert was a nonsupervisory employee in which Groblewski informed Lambert he had attended a union meeting, strongly favored a union, and that he was encouraging support from fellow em- ployees. Respondent's Communications with Employees About 2 weeks after his assignment to the position of supervisor at the Springfield office, the position de- scribed above, Michael Forget engaged in a conversation there about the employees' current effort to secure union representation by the Teamsters with employee Grob- lewski. According to the latter, Forget said it was stupid to try to organize a union, and that if it was not for that, the employees would have gotten a raise . About 2 weeks afterward, Groblewski further testified, Forget also told him twice that "it was stupid of us to try to organize a union, that the Company would not respond favorably to any of our wanting to get better conditions as long as we were striving to get a union there." During the Respond- ent's opportunity to contradict or deny the foregoing through the testimony of Michael Forget, the Respond- ent's counsel failed to specifically direct Forget' s testimo- ny to the testimony by Groblewski, whose accounts therefor remain unrebutted. Thus, during direct examina- tion, Forget merely identified the reason why he be- lieved and stated the union efforts by employees had caused them to lose out on a raise-namely, his belief that a raise would look like a bribe. This scarcely softens the coercive and damaging effect upon employee action and support for representation protected by Section 7 of the Act which flows from equating such activities with the punishing loss of wage increases, and is therefore a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Sun Chemical Corp., 226 NLRB 646 (1976), enfd. in part 560 F. 2d 470 (1st Cir. 1977). Forget simply was not asked about Grob- lewski's other testimony in which the latter attributed to Forget the doubly unlawful combined threat and promise that employees would not get improved employment conditions as long as they engaged in efforts to "get a union there." I find that Forget's undenied statement fur- ther violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Knogo Corp., 262 NLRB 1346 (1982). Employee Matthew Stuart also attributed a statement to Forget that "[The Union] probably won't get you BAY STATE AMBULANCE RENTAL anything more than you have now" during this same period of time, June or early July, while Forget was the Springfield facility supervisor. Employee John Anderson testified that Forget, in the same period, after the topic of the Union had been raised by Anderson, stated that if the Union got in, Michael Kotzen could close down Springfield and that the Union would not do anything for employees. Forget admits making the statement at- tributed to him by Stuart and did not deny the similar comment to Anderson. Once again, when the opportuni- ty came to pass during Respondent's case-in-chief, for the testimony of the employee witness to be denied, con- tradicted, or placed in a more favorable context, Re- spondent's witness Michael Forget was simply not exam- ined in a manner calculated to test or even to confront squarely the employees' accounts. Thus, with no con- necting tissue to either Anderson 's or Stuart's accounts, Forget was merely asked in leading question form whether he ever told any employee the selection of a union would result in no increase in benefits, and even to that question, to which he replied that he explained and could not recall if that was the entire conversation with any employee regarding closing. In determining that the employee account of a threatened closing was in fact made by Forget, I have considered the straightforward, candid, and unprompted nature of Anderson 's testimony to warrant credibility, rather than the testimony of Forget, which was prompted by leading questions posed in general fashion and which did not specifically address the opposing testimony. In finding such statement by Forget to be a violation of the Act, I am aware that Forget stated that Respondent's president, Michael Kotzen, could close the Springfield facility but consider Forget, and therefore Respondent, to have raised the harsh spectre of a possible closing just as effectively as if he had omitted such word since there was no exculpato- ry predicate of justifying circumstances attending the conversation so that the forecasted closing was made solely as a consequence of employees selecting the Union, a clear violation of Board law. High Energy Corp., 259 NLRB 747, 751 (1981). I further find that For- get's repeated declarations to employees that the Union probably would not get employees more than they have now and would not do anything for employees, when viewed in combination with Respondent's written memo- randum on the subject of the Union and its effect on em- ployees, as well as similar statements by Supervisor Gerald Lambert discussed below, are calculated to estab- lish the futility of employee efforts to secure union repre- sentation in order to improve their working conditions and thus such statements violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Red Barn System, 224 NLRB 1586, 1596 (1976), and Fredeman's Calcasieu Locks Shipyard, 206 NLRB 399 (1973). Respondent's July 19 Memorandum Thus, following a second employee meeting at the Union's hall in Charleston, Massachusetts, attended by 14 employees, including Appel and Groblewski, on June 22, and a Board representation hearing on the Union's repre- sentation petition on July 16 , the Respondent's president issued a memorandum addressed to all its employees 1083 (G.C. Exh. 12), on July 19. In the memorandum, Kotzen, referring to the union organizing campaign , explained that he was, "stating the Company's position on this matter." He went on to state, inter alia: My sincere belief is that if a union were to represent you in our operations, it would not work to your benefit but to your serious harm. [Emphasis added.] I sincerely believe that the introduction of a union into Bay State Ambulance is not necessary or bene- ficial to your welfare and growth with us. [Emphasis added.] Nowhere in the memorandum is reference made to any basis for the sinister comments that union representation would not work to employees' benefit "but to your seri- ous harm," and when considered in the context of earlier Respondent expressions threatening closing of the Springfield office and unlawfully portraying the futility of employee efforts to secure representation, such state- ment derives further coercive import for employee exer- cise of Section 7 rights in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Community Cash Stores, 238 NLRB 265 at 268 (1978), and see also Bancroft Mfg. Co., 189 NLRB 619, 626 (1971). Kotzen's memo further instructed that: 4. If anyone causes you any trouble at your work 0I puts you under any kind of pressure, at your work to join a union, you should let me know, and I will undertake to see that it is stopped. Subsumed, if not nearly expressed outright in this direc- tion to employees, is that they should let Kotzen know the circumstances surrounding "any kind of pressure, at your work, to join a union," a plain encouragement that employees report on the protected activities of union supporting fellow employees including their identity, an announcement calculated on its face to strongly discour- age such protected activity and therefore violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Colony Printing, 249 NLRB 223 at 225 (1980), enfd. 651 F.2d 502 (7th Cir. 1981). Gerald Lambert's Discussions with Employees in July and Respondent's Second Memorandum to Employees on August 4 The Regional Director issued a Decision and Direc- tion of Election for Respondent's employees on July 26, paving the way for a secret-ballot election to be con- ducted on the question of union representation for Re- spondent's employees. About this time, employee Mat- thew Stuart testified, former Supervisor Gerald Lambert told Stuart and employee Groblewski during a conversa- tion concerning the Union that "there was nothing stop- ping [Respondent President] Kotzen from going to a 40- hour work week." Stuart, like other full-time employees, under the prevailing system in effect at the time of Lam- bert's statement, worked a full 60-hour workweek. Em- ployee Tim Malinowski testified that during a discussion in July in the Springfield facility dispatch office, Lam- bert told employees Mike LaCroix, Jan Stec, Matthew 1084 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Stuart, and him that "If the union got in the work week could be cut down from a 60-hour work week to 40," telling the employees the source of his information was Michael Kotzen. Lambert admitted during direct exami- nation the statement concerning a reduction to a 40-hour week adding that he attributed the reduction, "as a result of union negotiations" and did not deny other elements in the attribution. On cross-examination, Lambert ex- plained he based the remark on his feeling that "anything could happen after negotiations." This last sentiment on Lambert's part is, of course, on the surface and standing alone a harmless truism; but Lambert's expression of a reduction in working hours and consequent substantial cuts in pay for employees with no objective basis or predicate being communicated for such occurrence is therefore a clearly coercive and unlawful forecasting of severe economic losses by employees should they exer- cise their rights to select a union, hence a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618 (1969). The use by Lambert of the word "could" does not ameliorate the harm done. Econo- my Fire & Casualty Co., 264 NLRB 16 (1982). Moreover, there is no question that the comment by Lambert was part of a string of coercive statements made by him, dis- cussed further below, and evinced hostility towards em- ployees' efforts to seek union representation and that such statement was "linked to the current campaign for the Union" of which Lambert, the record abundantly es- tablishes, had prior knowledge. See Marlan Lewis, Inc., 270 NLRB 432 at 436 (1984). Malinowski further testified that in late July or early August, while he was complaining to Lambert about the condition of an ambulance while Malinowski was clean- ing it, Lambert told him that if the Union got in, condi- tions would be the same, as the Company could not afford to make improvements but if the Union did not get in, "conditions would get better [there would be] newer ambulances, better sleeping quarters and the con- ditions all around would improve." On direct examina- tion, there was no denial of the foregoing by Lambert, hence Malinowski's version is credited-' I find that Lam- bert's promises of newer ambulances, better sleeping quarters, and improved conditions all around if the Union did not get in, as candidly described by Malin- owski and undenied, violated Section 8(a)(1) as such statement constituted an unlawful promise of benefit interfering with employees' Section 7 rights under the Act. Armour Oil Co., 253 NLRB 1104, 1108-1109 (1981); Clements Wire Co., 206, 210 (206). It is further found that Lambert's prediction that there would be no improve- ments in employment conditions if the Union were se- lected by employees, without reference to why Respond- ent would not be able to afford any such improvements, further violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. St. Francis 4 Instead, Lambert was asked the leading question whether he had told employees the Company would not be able to make improvements "of sleeping quarters or to purchase new ambulances if employees selected the union." After replying no, he did not "remember that, no" and prodding, he said no. His denial of a statement not attributed to him by Mahnowski and failure to deny either the threat or promise left Mahnowski 's account undenied and credited. Hospital, 249 NLRB 180 at 188 (1980); and NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., supra. On August 4, Respondent President Kotzen issued a second memoranc' um to all employees containing, inter alia, reference to the fact that without the hospitals and municipalities (customers of Respondent) "we are all doomed to look for other jobs." (Emphasis added.) The memo continues with references to the fact that because of "our position and reputation, our customer expects and demands of us the best in quality, service and equip- ment. Let us be very careful that we do not vote ourselves into a new situation wherein we cannot continue our good performance, thereby easily losing out prime accounts. [Em- phasis added.] To lose our accounts is to lose our source of income which would mean the loss of jobs for all of us here." (Emphasis in original.) From its reference to all being doomed to look for other jobs without Respondent's prime customers, to the thinly veiled prediction that voting "ourselves" into a new situation in which-it is flatly asserted (no maybes here) "we cannot continue our good performance," so that the prime accounts are easily lost, along with loss of jobs for all (the repeated theme), this communication, I find in effect, equates a vote for "a new situation," viz the Union, with a loss of prime accounts flowing from a cessation in good performance hence loss of employment for all-in one unbroken chain of unexplained causation, the beginning link in which is a vote for the Union. This message is, therefore, no example of the free and protect- ed expression of an employer's position about the merits of union representation for its employees under Section 8(c) of the Act, but rather a blatant scare tactic to coerce employees into shrinking from the exercise of rights guaranteed under Section 7 of the Act out of fear for their livelihood and, therefore, a further violation of Sec- tion 8(a)(1) of the Act. Patsy Bee, Inc., 249 NLRB 976, 977 (1980), enf. denied 654 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1981); Weather Tamer, Inc., 253 NLRB 293, 303-305 (1980), enfd. in pertinent part 676 F.2d 483 (11th Cir. 1982). Respondent's Announcement and Promotion of an Employee Association In the same timeframe, Respondent, through Lambert, was introducing on the scene for the first time an em- ployee association which was touted to employees as an effective and "better" avenue towards improvements in working conditions than the Union. Thus, Malinowski testified that in late July or early August, Lambert told him an employee association formed by Bay State was .,now in the works and that whether or not the Union got in it would still be formed, and would [sit] down and listen to employees' problems, their complaints, and try to do something about improving all around conditions at Bay State." Lambert reportedly said this to employees a number of times, telling them Michael Kotzen was considering forming the association. In a like vein, employee John Anderson testified that on August 19, Lambert told him there would be a meet- ing that Friday in the Respondent's main office in Malden, Massachusetts, to discuss an employee associa- tion, inviting Anderson to attend and assuring Anderson I BAY STATE AMBULANCE RENTAL that Lambert would cover his scheduled shift and that Anderson would be paid for his time there. 5 In yet a third conversation, this time with employee Thomas Groblewski on September 1, Lambert again ad- dressed the existence of an employee association as a means for employees to secure improved conditions, tell- ing the employee he, Lambert, had the impression that Groblewski was bitter about the Company and condi- tions, that the Union would never get voted in, and that an employees' association would be a better avenue to better working conditions and better pay at the Compa- ny. Lambert admitted telling employees an employee as- sociation would be such a route, and only partially or generally responded to the specifics in the employees' testimony so that his vague and misdirected denials left the employees' accounts untouched by credible or rele- vant contradictions. His overall testimonial performance, including the overly general and nongermane questions put to him, imparted unreliability to what he said, and I credit the employees' accounts as they were spontane- ously rendered and are consistent with other record events either expressly admitted or left undenied con- cerning the employee association, discussed further below. Respondent's strong promotion of an employee association as an alternative to the Union as expressed by Lambert's communications to employees described above constitutes an unlawful interference with employee Sec- tion 7 rights in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. S. L. Industries, 252 NLRB 1058, 1069 (1980); St. Francis Hospital, supra. The fact that no evidence was presented which establishes Respondent actually formed such an association into existence is immaterial to this finding. Homemaker Shops, 261 NLRB 441, 442 (1982). Lambert's Threat to Malinowski Shortly before the originally scheduled election- August 26-Malinowski testified that Lambert spoke to him in the Springfield office telling him "that Michael Kotzen had thought that myself and another person-an- other person being a woman-were the main organizers of the union activity. [He also said] if I was late again, then it could cost me my job. He also mentioned that if I was the main organizer that life, for me, if the union did get in, around Bay State would be rough." Some days later, Malinowski testified that Lambert told him "Mi- chael Kotzen had found out that it was somebody else who was organizing the union activities." Lambert could not recall, but did not deny referring to Kotzen's knowing the identity of the main union organiz- ers identifying Malinowski and a female employee. Moreover, Lambert did not deny Malinowski' s assertion that Lambert told him if he were one of the main union organizers life would be rough for him, instead, he skirt- ed around the question. In a continuation of direct-exam- ination which consisted of questions failing to address the specifics in opposing witnesses' testimony, Lambert denied saying things which had not been attributed to him by Malinowski, so that Lambert's testimony was un- responsive and immaterial and left Malinowski's accounts 5 Anderson later received a call from either Lambert or the dispatcher on duty cancelling the meeting 1085 untouched. Moreover, although Lambert denied telling Malinowski in these exact words that "life would be rough for him" (meaning Malinowski) and proffered that his comments had "nothing to do with the Union" he promptly admitted that he did tell Malinowski, "I would get rough with him or take measures to end his tardi- ness," a threat made for the very first time entirely within the context of, and to appearances prompted solely by, Lambert's accusation of Malinowski and a female employee as the main union organizers . Respond- ent's warning to employee about his continued tardiness and threatening discharge or measures to correct such conduct standing alone is an unquestioned managerial prerogative not here under review. Connecting the emer- gence of such strong measures to the employee 's identity as a main union organizer, however, is a scarcely con- cealed retaliation for the exercise of Section 7 rights. I find that Malinowski was threatened with discharge for continued tardiness and that life would be rough for him around Bay State if he was the main organizer and the Union got in, to discourage employee support for the Union in plain violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Dependable Lists, 239 NLRB 1304 (1979).6 Respondent's Third Memorandum-August 25 In an August 25 memorandum from Respondent's fi- nancial manager to employees describing employee fringe benefits-sick, holiday, and personal time-special reference was made regarding improved benefits for em- ployees regularly working less than full time as follows: PLEASE NOTE: Policies are in the process of being drafted to upgrade benefits for those employ- ees currently working 40-59 hours/week regularly. This was the first printed announcement circulated among employees concerning the impending upgrading or improvement of substantial fringe benefits for all em- ployees who regularly worked 40 to 59 hours a week, and who beforehand had not enjoyed the substantial fringe benefits accorded 60 hours a week "full timers," and Respondent offered no reason requiring such an- nouncement's publication on the day before the election scheduled for August 26. Although there is an alleged dispute in testimony over whether such plans were com- municated to employees David Clark and John Ander- son earlier in June, the record fully supports a finding that the August 25 announcement was the first such dis- closure. Thus, though Respondent on brief relies on David Clark's testimony to support the assertion of an earlier communication to employees, that testimony does not do so, inasmuch as Clark stated he was told on such occasion, "That because I wasn't receiving my full 60 6 I do not consider Lambert's remarks concerning the supposed knowl- edge of Kotzen of the identity of the main union organizers , even with Lambert's later remarks correcting such identification, as creating the im- pression of unlawful surveillance inasmuch as there were other obvious sources not involving surveillance including voluntary statements, the open union activities of employees , discussions around the office, and em- ployee views expressed at the employee association meeting , discussed below, to which such knowledge could as well have been attributed by Malinowski or other employees 1086 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD hours [after going from a 60-hour a week schedule as an emergency medical technician to the position of dis- patcher wherein he worked fewer hours] my benefits would not be reduced and that they would work on the schedule to get me my 60 hours." In the first place, this does not support an assertion that Respondent had an- nounced earlier what it announced in the August 25 memo, that is, an employeewide benefits hike for regular part-time employees . For all that appears , this was an ac- commodation to Clark based upon his accepting the im- portant position to Respondent's operation of dispatch- er-a way to alleviate his consequent loss of fringe bene- fits flowing from the less than 60-hour workweek, rather than a general upgrading for all employees in such cate- gory. Secondly, it is clear on the face of matters that Re- spondent would not need to reassure Clark it was going to work to get him his 60 hours so he could continue to receive the fringe benefits if such, or their equivalent, were to be made available to him as a result of the im- pending upgrading . In fact, Respondent assigned Clark the necessary additional hours. The uncertainty de- scribed above arising from the specifics concerning Baker's transfer to dispatcher , and the internal inconsist- ency in his testimony as a Respondent witness leave Re- spondent's assertion of an earlier announcement unpro- ven insofar as Clark's testimony is concerned. Michael Forget testified, for his part, that he told em- ployees Clark and Anderson that the Company was "in the process of upgrading the benefit package for employ- ees who worked 40 to 59 hours a week" on the day he returned from a meeting in the Maiden office [Clark] and on the following Monday [Anderson]. As noted, Clark does not support such testimony , and he was, as was Forget, Respondent's own witness . Anderson testified, contrary to Forget, that he had been steadily receiving work for 60 hours a week-proven by his paycheck stubs, and that he never told Forget he was not receiving full-time benefits or that he was afraid of losing full-time benefits . This proven factual account completely under- mines Forget's asserted reason for communicating such news to Anderson, so that Forget's testimony regarding such earlier disclosure of the upgrading is, when also seen unsupported by Clark, Respondent's own witness, bereft of probative value . This being the case , I consider the August 25 announcement of an impending improve- ment in employee benefits on the very eve of the Board- conducted election which Respondent has been found herein to have unlawfully attempted to thwart by inter- fering with the free choice of its employees on the ques- tion of their representation, to be yet another such un- lawful interference designed to undermine support for the Union and therefore a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Renton Village Cinema , 228 NLRB 377 (1977). Respondent's Termination of Kathy Appel Appel was employed by Respondent in late April 1982 as an emergency medical technician (EMT) in the Springfield office following an interview with Gerry Lambert, who asked Appel during the interview whether she was just looking for summer employment. Appel re- plied no, that she was looking to stay through the fol- lowing school year. Appel accepted a position for part- time employment, asking Lambert for consideration when full-time work became available, to which Lam- bert replied that that would be fine. Appel, who was at- tending a nearby college full time, continued to do so until mid-May. She recalled clearly that at no time did she in any way indicate to Lambert that she was looking for only a summer job, and Lambert's assertion that she said she was a college student only looking for summer work is belied by the fact that she started work the very next day, after the interview, well in advance of the summer and while still a student. Indeed, Respondent was at no time able to support its assertion that Appel was summer help only, and the record shows that Appel's assertion of her year-round employment status- made to fellow employees-was not contradicted at any time during her employment . Rather, such alleged status was, as shall be noted below, created out of thin air to bolster one of multiple contradictory reasons given for her discharge by Respondent's supervisor, Gerry Lam- bert. Suffice it to say further also that Respondent, until the date of Appel's termination , at no time informed her of such status. Confirming such view still further is the fact that in late July, Appel asked Lambert for a full-time EMT po- sition then or soon to be vacated by employee Greg Du- brille and after Lambert told her that there was no prob- lem, Appel pointed out specifically the proviso that she would be going back to school in September, at which time she told Lambert she would then return to part-time employment, again meeting with Lambert's consent. Thereafter, Appel testified she worked a full-time sched- ule, three 24-hour days-Monday, Wednesday, and Friday, then two 24-hour days, Tuesday and Thursday, the following week. Her assertion in this regard was fully supported by work records submitted into the record without objection by Respondent, whose witness Lambert was, via these records, revealed still further as an unreliable source of factual information on this sub- ject. (G.C. Exh. 14.) Appel's Activities in Support of Union Representation The record shows that Appel was among the foremost of Respondent's employees supporting efforts for union representation. She attended union meetings from the start in the organizing drive on June 3 and June 22, signed a union card, solicited employees to join the Union, and secured authorization cards from them. She did so openly, at Respondent's Springfield, Holyoke, and Northampton, Massachusetts facilities and discussed the benefits of union representation, even with Gerry Lam- bert, who later became an admitted supervisor and, ac- cording to Appel-as well as amply demonstrated by the record-switched from an enthusiastic union card signer to a decidedly antiunion posture on his return to supervi- sion. During an employee association meeting on August 10, Appel strongly supported the Union and was one of a relatively few 14 among Respondent's 140 to 150 em- ployee complement who openly revealed their support for the Union at such meeting when attendees were asked to raise their hands if they favored a union. In ad- BAY STATE AMBULANCE RENTAL 1087 dition, it was undenied that Appel also discussed the Union at various times with Lambert after he had become a supervisor at Springfield. Appel also communi- cated to a number of employees, an estimated 30, in all three of Respondent's western Massachusetts divisions, the contents in discussions held at the union meetings she attended. There can be no doubt, in my view, that Appel's support for the Union at relevant times herein was a matter of widespread common knowledge, which includes Respondent's officials. Appel's Termination Respondent's animosity towards the efforts of employ- ees seeking union representation has already been dem- onstrated, and it is well established that all the relevant factors surrounding the termination of a known, active union supporter warrant careful examination to deter- mine whether the alleged cause for such action was the reason advanced, or in truth lies in the employees engag- ing in activities protected by the Act, that is, Appel's support for the Union, for it is rare that such motive will be openly admitted or rise quickly to the surface without such scrutiny into the circumstances. Appel's union activities, Respondent's knowledge con- cerning that activity, its antiunion animosity-fueled viola- tions of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, and the timing of its action against Appel at the height of the Union's orga- nizing campaign close to a Board election soon to be re- scheduled in a second Decision and Direction of Elec- tion' known pending, raise reasonable suspicions con- cerning the reason for Appel's loss of employment at the outset. This concern is heightened by the testimony of Re- spondent's president, who disassembled, skirted, and con- tradicted himself in response to relatively simple ques- tions concerning his knowledge about Appel's employ- ment status. This performance led me to conclude he was anxious to avoid the truth, for I cannot believe he knew so little concerning Appel's status, the reasons for her loss of employment, or even whether she had been separated from employment, given the charges and com- plaints served on his Company prior to the hearing. But matters connected with Respondent's position grew worse when Lambert testified, for it then appeared he had given Appel, during a telephone call on Septem- ber 10, three different reasons for no longer scheduling her for work, the first being that he was only going to use people willing to work 2 days on the weekend as it was easier for him-the problem with such testimony being that Appel had never told him she would not work 2-day weekends and denied to him she had ever done so, but had only once earlier that summer inquired whether such was possible and he answered that there were em- ployees doing it. Further, Appel had called, not only to inquire why Lambert had not scheduled her for further work (as she had been informed by the dispatcher) but also to ask to be "covered" merely for that Sunday-not 7 The first Decision and Direction of Election was vacated on August 31, over problems arising with the voting list in the aftermath of substan- tial new hiring by Respondent The second Decision and Direction of Election issued September 21 leading to an election on October 21 every weekend Sunday thereafter so that there is no reason why Lambert should then exclude her from all future scheduling, especially because until that date, all weekend scheduling was admittedly a very "flexible" process and there was no evidence Respondent had de- cided to tighten matters in this regard for all employees. Moreover, Appel noted to Lambert that there were em- ployees on weekends working beyond their schedules into overtime pay which seemed to contradict to her his comment that it was "easier" to use employees willing to work 2-day weekends. Lambert, in the same conversation, also told Appel the reason for not scheduling her was because she was "only hired as summer help anyway," the assertion demonstrat- ed above to be without support in the record and, in fact, the converse of which-that there was no such limi- tation on Appel's employment tenure-to have been demonstrated affirmatively via Appel's credited testimo- ny and the absence of countervailing evidence from Re- spondent. The reason advanced was not only demon- strated to be false, but it constitutes a shifting and contra- dictory reason for Respondent's action, piled on top of the first one. As Respondent's supervisor Lambert con- tinued, so did the basis for disbelief. Thus, Lambert told Appel another reason for not scheduling her was that she had not been around for a couple weeks-moreover, in his own testimony, he said he was unsure of her schedule since school had started. It is undenied that Appel had made calls to Lambert and left word, recently in relation to September 10, seeking to talk to him and that Lambert conceded at the hearing he supposed she was trying to contact him regarding her schedule of work. This being so, it is not logical for Lambert to have taken her off the schedule when her efforts to reach him on several occa- sions would normally indicate an intention by such em- ployee to continue her work even if she had not been around-a circumstance arising from Lambert himself not scheduling her. Still further indicative of a suspicious desire to rid the Company of Appel's presence is the fact that she had worked weekends earlier in April and May while attending college classes, and had specifically told Lambert she intended to continue working after school began again, so that Lambert really did not have any basis to be "unsure" about her availability after the first week or so in September merely because he believed only that she was returning to school. Finally, Lambert switched or shifted again from the Respondent's first po- sition that Appel had quit-Lambert saying he never ter- minated her-to the final scenario that he discharged her later for not coming in to discuss her schedule. In that respect, it was clear to her, Appel testified, that she had been terminated when Lambert told her she was only hired for the summer during the September 10 telephone call. She was entirely correct to reach this conclusion. I find that Respondent's contradictory and shifting de- fenses coupled with evasion and what constituted trans- parent pretexts for its action in terminating Appel to strongly support, when viewed in combination with her union activity, Respondent's knowledge thereof, its an- tiunion animus, and the timing of its action at the height of the employees' efforts seeking union representation, 1088 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD the finding herein that Respondent discharged Kathy Appel because of her support for the Union , thereby vio- lating Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.8 Marlan Lewis, Inc., supra; Taft Broadcasting Co., 238 NLRB 588 (1978); and McLean Trucking Co., 261 NLRB 793 (1982). The Termination of Thomas Groblewski Groblewski worked full time as an EMT (emergency medical technician) from October 1981 until separated from employment by Gerry Lambert on September 7, in highly questionable circumstances, discussed below. Like Appel, Groblewski was also a strong supporter of em- ployees seeking union representation , and also attended union meetings, signed a union card, and spoke about the Union to Gerry Lambert shortly after Groblewski had attended the initial June 3 meeting with only four other employees. On such occasion, Groblewski told Lambert he had attended the union meeting and that he was strongly in favor of a union. Groblewski again conversed with Lambert about the Union, asking him if he had signed a union card. In addition, Groblewski talked with Supervisor Forget about 2 weeks after the latter became the supervisor at the Springfield facility, as described above, letting Forget know that he, Groblewski, did not believe that "because of our [employees] efforts to orga- nize a union," employees would not be getting a raise, as communicated by Forget to Groblewski. As Groblewski put it in his testimony, he told Forget it was bull-and ,.was implying . . . that I did not believe that we were not trying to form a union we would have gotten a raise." Lambert further implied knowledge concerning Groblewski's sentiments when he returned to his position as supervisor at Springfield and told Groblewski he had the impression the latter was very bitter about Respond- ent and about conditions in general at Respondent. Groblewski's activities in this regard, and Respond- ent's knowledge thereof, together with its established animus towards such conduct clearly emerging from the record, leads to consideration of the reasons advanced for his termination. Once again Lambert's explanation leaves much to be desired, for he claims at one point in testimony that Groblewski quit his employment on September 7, when the latter informed him he would be attending classes on September 9 (Groblewski was not scheduled on Septem- ber 8) and that is why he no longer thereafter worked at Bay State Ambulance. Yet, Lambert himself in the same testimony described Groblewski's quitting only "from full time," which amounts to a non sequitur or meaning- less assertion inasmuch as Groblewski had already in- formed Lambert on August 30 that September 7 would be his last shift as full time, but was under the impression he would be allowed to shift to part-time work as as- sured by Lambert earlier, who told him, "We could work something out," on two separate occasions, during the week of September 1 to September 6, so that Grob- I I find that the effective date of Appel 's discharge was sometime during the week preceding, or on the weekend of August 28-29 when dispatcher Rick Pendergast informed Appel by telephone that she was not on the following work period 's schedule Appel's working on Sep- tember 4 and 5 as a by-chance substitute for an employee who asked her to do so is a matter going to backpay remedy only lewski could work on weekends. In the second conversa- tion, Lambert told Groblewski, I find, that he probably had a weekend shift for him. The record demonstrates, and it is undenied, that other school attenders have been shifted or accommodated to weekend work in such cir- cumstances and given Respondent's flexible staffing system. It is clear also that this matter came as no sur- prise to Lambert, as Groblewski had notified him specifi- cally earlier and again later in August concerning his- hopes for enrolling in a graduate program that Septem- ber. Again in September, Groblewski kept Lambert in- formed on two occasions, keeping him up to date on his plans and that he wanted to work out a reduced sched- ule. In fact, I find, as Groblewski testified, that Lambert told the former during a telephone call that he could have every Sunday, a 24-hour shift, and be used for call. Thus, Lambert's explanation for Groblewski's separation from employment because he had quit from full time evaded the issue before him and manifested an unsatisfac- tory reply casting doubt on the bona fides for Respond- ent's action. In addition, Lambert told Groblewski during a tele- phone call on September 9 that the latter was fired be- cause (1) there were three people out that day and Grob- lewski was one of them, (2) Lambert was angry about this, and (3) Groblewski had not given him "enough notice." When Groblewski asked him about his earlier assurance that he could have every Sunday and also why he had not raised the question of notice during the earli- er call on September 7, Lambert merely replied that things are different now and that he had changed his mind, without further explanation. The strong implica- tion from all this, including the fact that Groblewski had no responsibility for the absence of two other employees, had in fact, I find, notified Lambert concerning his shift to Sunday work only and kept him up to date on that whole subject and was given no explanation why, all of a sudden, Lambert considered the notice insufficient, is that Lambert was casting about for a reason to discharge him. Lambert later told employee Anderson, who asked why Groblewski had been fired, that it was because three people were out (Lambert knew about the two well beforehand) and he did not like Groblewski's atti- tude. Yet, when later questioned by Anderson for the reason, Lambert told him, "he gave his notice and he quit; I didn't fire him." It is reasonable to suppose that this flip-flop in position-taking arises from the dilemma created by the undenied fact that Groblewski was will- ing to take care of the "short-handedness" problem alleg- edly causing Lambert's anger to rise by working that Thursday for another employee off because of school, and his further willingness to work on Sunday, despite which Respondent denied him the opportunity choosing instead to incur overtime costs to employ others, rather than Groblewski, on the weekend following Groblews- ki's discharge. The problem arising for Respondent is that neither the "discharge" scenario or the "quit" con- text hold any water whatever and therefore the only reason emerging from this record to explain Groblews- ki's sudden cessation of any employment is that he was terminated because of his known union support in viola- BAY STATE AMBULANCE RENTAL tion of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act, the absence of any persuasive reason being advanced to support any other motive providing a strong basis, when considering Groblewski's activities, Respondent's knowledge thereof, its animus, the timing and suddenness of its action, and the wholly unpersuasive shifting nature of its asserted reasons for terminating him, noted above, for reaching such conclusion. McCarthy & Son, 268 NLRB 1136 (1984); Marian Lewis, supra; Taft Broadcasting Co., supra; and McLean Trucking Co., supra. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. The Union is a labor organization within the mean- ing of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. Respondent officials Michael Kotzen, Gerry Lam- bert, and Michael Forget at all times material herein were supervisors and agents for Respondent acting on its behalf within the meaning of the Act. 4. Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices in vio- lation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by (a) Telling an employee that employees lost a planned wage increase because of their support for the Union. (b) Informing an employee that employees would not get improved employment conditions as long as they tried to get a union to represent them. (c) Threatening an employee with closing the Spring- field operation if the Union got in. (d) Informing employees that employee efforts seeking union representation so as to improve working condi- tions were futile. (e) Threatening employees that union representation would not work to their benefit but to their serious harm. (f) Directing employees to report any efforts exerted on them to join a union at work to the Respondent. (g) Threatening employees with a reduction in work- ing hours if the Union got in. (h) Promising employees improved employment condi- tions all around including newer ambulances and better sleeping quarters if the Union did not get in. (i) Predicting to employees there would be no im- provements in employment conditions if the Union were selected by employees. (1) Telling employees that voting for the Union will lead to a loss of customers and employment. (k) Promoting an employee association as a better al- ternative than the Union for employees to secure im- proved employment conditions. (1) Threatening an employee with discharge for contin- ued tardiness and that life would be rough for him in the Company if employees selected the Union and if he were the main organizer for the Union. (m) Announcing for the first time that policies were being drafted to upgrade benefits for regular part-time 1089 employees on the day before a scheduled Board repre- sentation election to discourage employee support for the Union.9 5. Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices in vio- lation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act by terminating Kathy Appel and Thomas Groblewski because of employees' union activities. 6. Respondent did not engage in conduct creating the impression that employees' union activities were being kept under surveillance. 7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. THE REMEDY' ° Having found that Respondent engaged in the unfair labor practices set forth above, I will recommend that it be ordered to cease and desist therefrom and to take cer- tain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Having found that Respondent unlawfully terminated Kathy Appel and Thomas Groblewski, I will recom- mend that Respondent be ordered to offer them immedi- ate and full reinstatement to their former or substantially similar positions, without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges, and that Respondent make them whole for any loss of pay they may have suffered by reason of Respondent's discriminatory actions by pay- ment to them of a sum equal to that which they would have normally received as wages from the date of their termination until Respondent offers them reinstatement, less any net earnings in the interim. Backpay, with inter- est, is to be computed on a quarterly basis in the manner prescribed in F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950), and Florida Steel Corp., 231 NLRB 651 (1977)." It will also be recommended that Respondent make available to the Board, on request, payroll and other records in order to facilitate checking the amount of backpay due them and other rights they may be entitled to receive. As the Respondent's conduct found unlawful herein goes "to the very heart of the Act," a broad order is warranted.) 2 [Recommended Order omitted from publication.] 9 Noting in this finding or the portion in my recommended Order ad- dressing this finding shall be construed as requiring that Respondent cease such upgrading or rescind any employee benefits resulting from said upgrading 10 The counsel for the General Counsel request on brief seeking for the first time several specific findings relating to reinstatement and back- pay formulas based partially on supposition and drawn from the discn- minatees' testimony alone such as when and whether they were available for different lengths of employment following their terminations is denied, as such matter raises questions better resolved in the compliance stage of this proceeding, if necessary 11 See generally Isis Plumbing Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962) 12 Hickmott Foods, 242 NLRB 1357 (1979)