Advertiser'S Manufacturing Co.

ADVERTISER'S MFG. CO. Advertiser's Manufacturing Company and General Teamsters, Warehouse and Dairy Employees Union, Local No. 126, affiliated with Interna- tional Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America. Cases 30-CA-6105, 30-CA-6105-2, 30-CA-6253, and 30-CA-6266 30 June 1986 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN DOTSON AND MEMBERS JOHANSEN AND BABSON On 29 December 1981 Administrative Law Judge Richard A. Scully issued the attached deci- sion. The Respondent and the General Counsel filed exceptions and supporting briefs. The National Labor Relations Board has delegat- ed its authority in this proceeding to a three- member panel. The Board has considered the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings, I and conclusions2 and to adopt the recommended Order as modified. For the reasons fully discussed in the attached decision, the judge found that the Respondent dis- charged Supervisor Carol Hahn as an act of retalia- tion against her prounion son, Chief Steward Ronald Hahn. Hahn herself had not engaged in any union activities. Based on the discriminatory dis- charge fording, the judge determined that: . .. the Respondent's action in discharging Carol Hahn violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act i The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge's credibility find- ings. The Board's established policy is not to overrule an administrative law judge's credibility resolutions unless the clear preponderance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd 188 F 2d 362 (3d Cit . 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing the findings. 7 In concluding that the Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by discontinuing its longstanding practice of permitting employee Schmidt to drink soda at his work station, the judge stated that the Re- spondent's reason for the discontinuance was not a "valid" reason. In adopting the judge's conclusion, we emphasize his findings that the Re- spondent's conduct was yet another act of retaliation against its employ- ees for their support of the Union and that its conduct was motivated solely by antiunion concerns. Accordingly, we find based on all the cir- cumstances that the Respondent's asserted reason for its conduct was pre- textual. We agree with the judge's finding that the Respondent violated Sec. 8(aX3) and (1) of the Act by discontinuing the receiving clerk's inventory card system, but we find it unnecessary to reach and rely on his finding that this same conduct violated Sec. 8(ax5) and (1) of the Act. The judge found that Jerry Chase was a supervisor at the time he en- gaged in conduct in violation of Sec . 8(aXI) of the Act The Respondent has excepted, inter ails, to the judge's finding concerning Chase's supervi- sory status. We find no ment in the Respondent's exception, which raises the issue for the first time. In addition to the record evidence indicating that Chase was a supervisor at the time of his unlawful conduct, we note that the Respondent's answer to the complaint admits Chase's superviso- ry and agency status at all material times. 1185 in that it was motivated by the Union support of her son61 and was part of a "pattern of con- duct aimed at coercing employees in the exer- cise of their Section 7 rights."52 Si See Dewey Brothers Inc., 187 NLRB 137 (1970), Consolidated Foods Corp, 165 NLRB 953 (1967). 62 Brothers Three Cabinets, 248 NLRB 828, 829 (1980). Having found the violation, the judge recommend- ed that the Respondent offer Carol Hahn immedi- ate and full reinstatement to her former job, with backpay. In Parker-Robb Chevrolet, 262 NLRB 402 (1982), issued subsequent to the judge's decision, the Board expressly overruled the so-called "integral part" or "pattern of conduct" line of precedent referred to by the judge, stating (id. at 404) that: ... when a supervisor is discharged either be- cause he or she engaged in union or concerted activity or because the discharge is contempo- raneous with the unlawful discharge of statuto- ry employees, or both, this incidental or sec- ondary effect on the employees is insufficient to warrant an exception to the general statuto- ry provision excluding supervisors from the protection of the Act. [Citation omitted.] Parker-Robb did, however, preserve an exception in situations where the act of supervisory discharge itself severely and directly impinged on the exer- cise of employees' Section 7 rights. Specifically mentioning cases involving the discharge of super- visors for giving testimony adverse to their em- ployer's interest in Board or contractual grievance proceedings, for refusing to commit unfair labor practices, or for failing to prevent unionization, s the Board stated that the protection afforded super- visors in those exceptional circumstances was es- sential to vindicate employees' Section 7 rights. To the extent that the judge relied on the "over- all pattern of conduct" rationale for finding an 8(a)(1) violation for Carol Hahn's discharge, we disavow that rationale for the reasons set forth in Parker-Robb. The question remains, however, whether the Respondent's discharge of Supervisor Hahn solely because of the union activities of her employee son violated the Act. We conclude that it did. In Consolidated Foods Corp., 165 NLRB 953 (1967), cited by the judge, and in Golub Bros. Con- cessions, 140 NLRB 120 (1962), the Board found that employers had violated Section 8(a)(1) by dis- charging supervisors because of the union activities of employees who were members of the discrimina- 8 262 NLRB at 402-403, and see cases cited there. 280 NLRB No. 128 1186 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD tees' immediate family. The supervisors themselves had not engaged in any union activity. Although the majority opinion in Parker-Robb did not specifi- cally discuss this precedent, that rationale for find- ing a violation and ordering a make-whole remedy in the exceptional cases that were mentioned in Parker-Robb applies with equal force here. The discharges of Carol Hahn and the supervi- sors in Consolidated Foods and Golub Bros. were not the result of any participation in union or con- certed activities. On the contrary, the supervisory discharges resulted solely from the independent ex- ercise of Section 7 rights by employee relatives. Furthermore, the direct, severe, and unmistakable thrust of the act of discharge was to interfere with those employee relatives in the exercise of their rights The Board does not lack the power to pro- tect those employees. Here, for instance, the impact of Carol Hahn's discharge on her employee son's union activities, magnified by other unlawful acts directed by the Respondent against Ronald Hahn, compels that he be protected by finding a violation and by ordering reinstatement and back- pay for his mother. Accordingly, we agree with the judge's fording of a violation and shall direct an appropriate remedy.4 ORDER The National Labor Relations Board adopts the recommended Order of the administrative law judge as modified and set out in full below and orders that the Respondent, Advertiser's Manufac- turing Company, Ripon, Wisconsin, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall 1. Cease and desist from (a) Threatening to impose more onerous working conditions on employees if they select the Union as their bargaining representative. (b) Discharging supervisors because of the pro- tected activities of relatives in order to coerce its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. (c) Issuing disciplinary warnings to or otherwise discriminating against its employees regarding hire or tenure of employment or any other term or con- dition of employment for engaging in activities in • Although judicial opinions in collateral proceedings under Sec. 100) of the Act do not control our disposition of unfair labor practice charges, we note that our conclusion here with respect to the supervisory dis- charge issue is essentially the same conclusion reached by United States District Court Judge Terence T. Evans for the Eastern District of Wis- consin. On 8 November 1982, Judge Evans denied the Respondent's motion, based on Parker-Robb, to modify an outstanding 10(j) injunction by deleting provisions relating to Carol Hahn. Sguillacote v. Advertisers Mfg. Co., Civil Action No. 81-C-343. Distinguishing situations governed by Parker-Robb, Judge Evans briefly stated : "Carol Hahn, on the other hand, was discharged not because of her own union activities, but be- cause of the union activities of her son Ronald Hahn . Carol Hahn's dis- charge is unlawful because Ronald Hahn is protected by the Act " support of the Union or any other labor organiza- tion or for engaging in activities protected by Sec- tion 7 of the Act. (d) Refusing to bargain with General Teamsters, Warehouse and Dairy Employees Union, Local No. 126, as the exclusive certified bargaining repre- sentative of employees in the appropriate unit by unilaterally making changes in the terms and condi- tions of employment of such employees without first notifying the Union of the proposed changes and affording it an opportunity to bargain about such changes. (e) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the ex- ercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action neces- sary to effectuate the policies of the Act. (a) Offer Carol Hahn immediate and full rein- statement to her former job or, if that job no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to her seniority or any other rights or privileges previously enjoyed, and make her whole for any loss of earnings and other bene- fits suffered as a result of the discrimination against her. (b) Make whole employees Gregg Yasick, James Crook, Lori Dorsey, Margaret Reinsch, Mary Shurpit, Lorie Weber, and Grada Woodruff for any loss of earnings or benefits they have suffered as a result of having been unlawfully laid off by the Respondent. (c) Make whole as prescribed in Ogle Protection Service, 183 NLRB 682 (1970), all employees who have suffered any loss of earnings as a result of the Respondent's having unlawfully reduced their hours of work, changed the piece rates paid for work performed, changed the method of payment for work performed, or changed the effective date of the employees' annual wage increases. In each case where backpay is due under the terms of this Order, it will be computed in the manner set forth in the remedy section of the judge's decision. (d) Preserve and, on request, make available to the Board or its agents for examination and copy- ing, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this Order. (e) Rescind the verbal and written warnings issued to Ronald Hahn on 8 and 30 December 1980, remove these warnings from its records, and remove from its personnel files any documentary evidence of these warnings, and notify him that ADVERTISER'S MFG. CO. these warnings will not be used as a basis for future discipline against him. (f) Rescind all warnings issued to employees for any violations occurring as the result of any unlaw- ful change in working conditions found herein, remove these warnings from its records, and remove from its personnel files any documentary evidence of such warnings, and notify them that they will not be used as a basis for future discipline against them. (g) On request by the Union, reinstate the prac- tices existing prior to 12 September 1980, with re- spect to washup time in the printing and art and silkscreen departments, free telephone privileges, tardiness, taking breaks and lunch periods in the loading dock area, granting employees time off for personal reasons, piece rates paid for house sam- ples, and the methods of payment of employees. (h) On request, bargain with the Union concern- ing all proposed changes in terms and conditions of employment of the employees in the appropriate unit. (i) Reinstate the practices existing prior to 12 September 1980 with respect to employees' parking in the parking lot, the conduct of football pools during work hours, permitting Raymond Schmidt to keep and drink soda pop at his work station throughout the day for medical reasons, and the maintenance of inventory cards by the receiving clerk. (j) Post at its facility in Ripon, Wisconsin, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."5 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Re- gional Director for Region 30, after being signed by the Respondent's authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (k) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days from the date of this Order what steps the Respondent has taken to comply. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the remaining alle- gations of the consolidated complaint be dismissed in their entirety. 5 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Nation- al Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board " APPENDIX 1187 NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to post and abide by this notice. WE WILL NOT threaten to impose more onerous working conditions on employees if they select General Teamsters, Warehouse and Dairy Employ- ees Union, Local No. 126, as their bargaining rep- resentative. WE WILL NOT discharge supervisors because of the Union or other protected activities of their rel- atives or in order to coerce employees in the exer- cise of the rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. WE WILL NOT issue disciplinary warnings to or otherwise discriminate against employees regarding their hire or tenure of employment or any other term or condition of employment for engaging in activities in support of the Union or any other labor organization or for engaging in activities pro- tected by Section 7 of the Act. WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain with the Union as the exclusive certified bargaining representative of employees in the appropriate unit by unilaterally making changes in the terms and conditions of em- ployment of those employees without first notify- ing the Union of the proposed changes and afford- ing it an opportunity to bargain about such changes. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the exer- cise of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act. WE WILL offer Carol Hahn immediate and full reinstatement to her former position of employ- ment, discharging, if necessary, anyone who was hired or assigned to perform the work that she had been performing prior to 8 October 1980, or, if her former position no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to her se- niority or other rights and privileges. WE WILL make whole Carol Hahn for any loss of earnings she may have suffered by reason of our having unlawfully discharged her, with interest. WE WILL make whole Gregg Yasick, James Crook, Lori Dorsey, Margaret Reinsch, Mary Shurpit, Lorie Weber, and Grada Woodruff for any loss of earnings or benefits they may have suf- fered by reason of our unlawful layoff of them with interest. 1188 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD WE WILL make whole all employees who have suffered any loss of earnings as a result of our having unlawfully reduced their hours of work, changed the piece rates paid for work performed, changed the methods of payment for work per- formed, or changed the effective date of their annual wage increases, with interest. WE WILL rescind the verbal and written warn- ings issued to Ronald Hahn and remove any docu- mentation relating to those warnings from our per- sonnel files, and will notify him that they will not be used as a basis for future discipline against him. WE WILL rescind all warnings issued to employ- ees for violations occurring as the result of any un- lawful change in working conditions and remove any documentation relating to such warnings from our personnel files, and we will notify them that they will not be used as a basis for future discipline against them. WE WILL reinstate the practices existing prior to 12 September 1980, with respect to employees' parking lot, the conduct of football pools during work hours, and the maintenance of inventory cards by the receiving clerk. WE WILL permit Raymond Schmidt to keep and drink soda pop at his work station throughout the day for medical reasons. WE WILL, on request by the Union, reinstate the practices existing prior to 12 September 1980, with respect to washup time in the printing and art and silkscreen departments, free telephone privileges, tardiness, taking breaks and lunch periods in the loading dock area, granting employees time off for personal reasons, piece rates paid for house sam- ples, and the methods of payment of employees. WE WILL notify the Union and, on its request, bargain with it concerning all changes in the terms and conditions of employment in the appropriate unit. ADVERTISER'S MANUFACTURING COMPANY Philip E Bloedorn, Esq., and Judith E. Kuhn, Esq., for the General Counsel. Russ R. Mueller, Esq., of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, for the Respondent. Ira Epstein, Esq., of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, for the Charging Party. DECISION RICHARD A. SCULLY, Administrative Law Judge. On charges' filed by General Teamsters, Warehouse and ' Charges were filed on October 20, November 4, 6, 1980 , and January 5 and 9, 1981, respectively, and copies were served on the Respondent. Dairy Employees Union, Local 126 (the Union), the Re- gional Director for Region 30 of the National Labor Re- lations Board issued a consolidated complaint on Febru- ary 19, 1981 , alleging that Advertiser's Manufacturing Company (the Respondent) had committed certain viola- tions of Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the Act. The con- solidated complaint was subsequently amended and the Respondent has filed timely answers denying that it has committed any violation of the Act. A hearing was held in Green Lake, Wisconsin, on May 18 through 22 and June 15 through 19, 1981,2 at which all parties were given a full opportunity to partici- pate, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to present other evidence and argument. Briefs submitted on behalf of the General Counsel and the Respondent have been considered. 3 On the entire record and from my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, I make the following FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT At all times material, the Respondent was a Wisconsin corporation engaged in the manufacture , sale, and distri- bution of cloth specialty products, with its office and place of business in Ripon, Wisconsin. During the pre- ceding calendar year, a representative period, the Re- spondent shipped from its Ripon , Wisconsin plant prod- ucts, goods, and materials valued in excess of $50,000 di- rectly to points located outside the State of Wisconsin. The Respondent admits , and I find, that it is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED The Respondent admits, and I find, that at all times pertinent the Union was a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES Background The Respondent is involved in the manufacture of cloth specialty items such as aprons, newsbags, sports- caps, visor caps, and painters' caps on which the buyer's logo and advertising copy are printed and which are used by the buyer for advertising and sales promotion purposes. The Company moved into its present plant, a facility designed specifically for its purposes, in July 1979. 2 Counsel for the General Counsel has filed an unopposed motion to correct numerous errors in the trial transcript. The motion is granted. ' Counsel for the Charging Party has adopted the analysis in the Gen- eral Counsel's brief. On October 9, 1981, an official of Local 126 sent me a letter urging a prompt ruling in this matter Counsel for the Respondent has responded demanding that the consolidated complaint be dismissed, as the only "real" remedy for the prejudicial effect of that letter. Al- though the propriety of the letter is questionable, I have given it no con- sideration whatsoever in reaching my decision in this case; consequently, there is no prejudicial effect to be remedied ADVERTISER'S MFG. CO Around mid-July 1980,4 the Union began an organiz- ing campaign at the Respondent's plant and on July 24 made a demand for recognition and a request for bar- gaining. On July 28, the Union filed a petition with the Board for an election in Case 30-RC-3809. A secret- ballot election was conducted at the plant under the su- pervision of the Regional Director for Region 30 on Sep- tember 12 among the employees in a bargaining unit con- sisting of All full and regular part-time production, mainte- nance, and janitorial employees of the Respondent at its Ripon, Wisconsin plant excluding managers, office clerical employees, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act. The tally of ballots indicates that of approximately 162 eligible voters, 115 voted in favor of the Union and 43 voted against, with 1 challenged ballot. The Respondent filed objections and the Board ultimately certified the Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining representa- tive for the unit on January 19, 1981. About January 26, 1981, and thereafter, the Union re- quested that the Respondent bargain collectively with it as representative of the unit and has been refused. An unfair labor practice charge was filed with the Board in Case 30-CA-6320, and on June 27, 1981, the Board issued its Decision and Order5 finding that the Respond- ent's refusal to bargain was in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act and granting the General Counsel's Motion for Summary Judgment. A. Alleged 8(a)(1) Violations During mid-August, while the Union's organizing campaign was underway, Jerry Chase, a supervisor with direct responsibility for the Respondent's printing depart- ment, engaged in a conversation with printing depart- ment employees concerning the pros and cons of having the Union in the plant. According to employee Ronald Schroeder, Chase stated: "If you think having a union is so good, we're going to show you what it's like to work in a union shop." Also in August, during the campaign and prior to the election, Chase told employee Kater- zynski: "If the Union gets in you will see how bad this place can get." Chase did not deny making these state- ments, but did say he could not recall making the state- ment to Katerzynski. I credit the testimony of Schroeder and Katerzynski in this regard and find that Chase made the statements attributed to him, which implied that the Respondent would take unspecified reprisals against the employees if the Union were voted in. Accordingly, I find that Chase's statements constituted threats that vio- lated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. There was testimony that on the morning of Septem- ber 11, during a conversation among printing department employees, Department Foreman William Belmont told the employees that if the Union got in he would show them "how big a prick" he could be . During a conversa- tion on September 12, the day of the election, before the 4 Hereinafter, all dates are in 1980 unless otherwise indicated. 5 256 NLRB 644 (1981). 1189 polls closed, Belmont stated that he hoped the Union would get in because he "would enjoy being a prick." Belmont did not deny making such statements but said that he could not recall any such statements prior to September 12. According to Belmont, after he learned that the Union had won the election on the morning of September 12, he told printing department employees that he was "really going to enjoy having to be a prick about everything," which he stated meant having to en- force strict work rules of the type referred to in a letter issued to employees by the Respondent during the cam- paign. I find that Belmont made the statements referred to above on the morning of September 11 and the morning of September 12, before the election had been complet- ed.6 I find such statements to be threats of reprisals the Respondent would take if the Union were voted in and that they constituted violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. B. Alleged Unilateral Changes in Working Conditions The General Counsel contends that after the Union won the election, the Respondent made several changes in the employees' working conditions without notice to and bargaining with the Union in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (5). Several of the changes were effected prior to the time the election results were certified by the Board on January 19 , 1981. It is also contended that the changes were intended to retaliate against employees for their support in violation of Section 8(a)(3). The Re- spondent does not deny its refusal to recognize and bar- gain with the Union at all times since the election. On September 17, the temporary union stewards, Evon Kreuger and James Katerzynski, asked for a meeting with management to discuss postelection changes, and were told by Executive Vice President Edward Bumby that he and Plant Superintendent Donald Bebow would speak to them as "employees" but not as "union stew- ards." Written requests for bargaining forwarded to the Respondent after the election and after certification of the election by the Board have been rejected. In its brief, the Respondent contends that it has not made any unilateral changes, all its actions being "con- sistent with on-going policies and procedures." It further contends that if there were any changes, "a refusal to bargain § 8(a)(1) and (5) finding may not be made in view of the Company's challenge to the validity of the Certification." The law in this regard is clear that "absent compelling economic considerations for doing so, an employer acts at its peril in making changes in terms and conditions of employment during the period that objections to an election are pending and the final 6 This finding is based on the credited testimony of Ronald Schroeder and Raymond Schmidt concerning the conversation on September 11 and the testimony of Ronald Schroeder , Raymond Schmidt, and Gregg Yasick concerning the conversation on September 12. Although there were minor differences in their testimony concerning the details of the conversations, their testimony is mutually corroborative with respect to the thrust of Belmont's remarks I did not find Belmont to be a credible witness with the exception of his admission that his reference to "being a prick" related to enforcing strict work rules mentioned in the Respond- ent's letter. 1190 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD determination has not yet been made."7 A unilateral change that constitutes a refusal to bargain "is not ex- cused by the fact that it occurred before certification."8 There is no merit to the Respondent's contention that a decision in this case should be deferred until a final de- termination on its challenge to the certification.9 1. Elimination of washup time for the printing department On September 15, the next workday after the election, the printing department foreman, Belmont, informed the department employees that they would not be permitted to wash their hands prior to the bell signifying the time for the morning break, the noon lunch period, and quit- ting time. Approximately 2 weeks later, Belmont issued verbal warnings to employees Gregg Yasick and Pete Kreuger for washing their hands on company time prior to the start of the lunch period and, on October 28, issued verbal warnings to employees John Bowlsby, Richard Erdman, and Kenneth Hall for washing their hands before the bell. Although the Respondent denies that it had a policy permitting employees in the printing department to wash up on company time before breaks and quitting time, it is evident that this was a longstand- ing practice done with the Company's knowledge and consent. Employee Raymond Schmidt, who had once been foreman of the department, testified that employees were permitted such washup time at the old and new plants for all the 18 years he had worked for the Re- spondent. Ronald Schroeder testified that washup time had been permitted prior to September 15 for all the ap- proximately 13 years he had worked in the printing de- partment. There was no credible evidence to the con- trary.10 The result of the discontinuance of washup time was that printing department employees were required to work between 9 and 15 minutes longer each day between September 15 and the date washup time was reinstated pursuant to an order of the Federal district court. I find that prior to September 15 printing department employ- ees had been permitted washup time of up to 5 minutes immediately before the morning break, lunch, and quit- ting time and that the withdrawal of washup time with- out consultation with the Union was a unilateral change in a term or condition of employment at a time when the Respondent was obliged to deal with the Union concern- ing such matters. Accordingly, I find that by making such changes the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act." The fact that this change was insti- tuted immediately after the Union won the election, without any prior notice or stated reason, and following the foreman's threats that the Respondent would retaliate if the Union were voted in, as discussed above, con- " Mike O'Connor Chevrolet, 209 NLRB 701, 703 (1974), enf. denied on other grounds 512 F.2d 684 (8th Cit. 1966). a NLRB Y. Laney & Duke Co., 369 F.2d 859, 866 (5th Cir. 1966). See Metropolitan Petroleum Co., 216 NLRB 404 (1975) 1o Belmont admitted that employees had always been permitted to wash up prior to noon and quitting time throughout his 13 years in the printing department. I do not credit his testimony that employees were not allowed to wash up prior to the morning break and that he had only done so, himself, once or twice in 13 years. 11 See Appalachian Power Co., 250 NLRB 228 (1980) vinces me that this change was motivated by antiunion and retaliatory considerations and, as such, was also a violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.12 2. Elimination of washup time for the art and silkscreen department Employees in the Respondent's art and silkscreen de- partment, who also work with various inks and solvents, had a similar longstanding practice of employees' wash- ing up during working time 3 to 5 minutes prior to the morning break, lunch period, and quitting time. Al- though washing up was optional in the printing depart- ment, safety regulations require that silkscreen depart- ment employees wash their hands before leaving the de- partment for breaks and lunch because of the toxic nature of some of the materials they use. On January 5, 1981, Department Foreman William Weber informed his employees that they would no longer be permitted to wash up prior to the buzzer, thus, requiring them to wash up on their own time. Weber informed them that the reason for this change in company policy was that "the Union's biggest gripe is consistency" and, in order to be consistent with the printing department, washup time was being abolished. This change in working condi- tions was made without notice to or consultation with the Union and, like the similar unilateral change in the printing department , was a violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1), and I so find. The Respondent's attempt to put the onus for this adverse action on the Union"s demon- strates that the change was intended to penalize employ- ees for and to undermine their support for the Union. Accordingly, I also find that the Respondent's actions violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1). 3. Changes in telephone policy Prior to September 12, in its old plant and in the new one, the Respondent had provided a telephone for its employees to make local calls free of charge. Also, prior to the union election, the Respondent had a policy of permitting employees to make and receive telephone calls during working hours. 14 During the meeting on September 17 concerning changes in working conditions, Evon Kreuger and James Katerzynski were informed that the open telephone was to be removed and replaced by pay telephones. At the end of September, the tele- phone in the lunchroom the employees used was changed so that it could only be used to receive calls 12 See Albert's Inc., 213 NLRB 686 (1974). is There was no evidence that would justify Weber's comment about "the Union's biggest gripe " Given the Respondent's refusal to meet or bargain with any union representative, it is doubtful that it had any mean- ingful knowledge of the Union's position. Weber's apology and admission to his department employees , on April 15, 1981, that he had been putting pressure on them "because the Union was trying to get into the factory" and that he was "going to try to make it up" to them is further evidence that the changes in has department were motivated by antiunion consider- ations. 14 Incoming calls were received by the switchboard operator who would page the employees or their supervisors , who would inform the employees of the calls. There was no restriction on when outgoing calls could be made, however, such calls were usually made during breaks and lunch periods ADVERTISER'S MFG. CO. and not to call outside the plant. At the same time, a pay telephone was installed in the lunchroom. A notice was posted informing employees of those changes and that they could only make calls during breaks and lunch pen- ods. In addition, the notice stated that employees would no longer be paged during working hours for personal telephone calls, except in emergencies, and that messages would be taken and relayed to employees by their super- visors. The notice stated that these changes were being made "due to the abuse of free telephone privileges." The record is devoid of a single instance that could, under any objective standard, be considered an "abuse" of the free telephone privilege by the Respondent's em- ployees although the privilege had been in effect for a number of years. The explanations for the changes in telephone policy offered by the Respondent' s witnesses are not convincing. Plant Superintendent Bebow, who signed the notice, testified that the telephone in the new plant was not restricted to local calls, as was the one in the old plant, and the "abuse" he referred to was "we had no control over it as far as any long distance tele- phone calls." There was no evidence presented of any unauthorized long-distance calls having been made from the phone in the more than a year it was unrestricted. Bebow also stated that because of the location of this phone, out of sight of management personnel, persons coming into the plant, such as truckdrivers or salespeo- ple, as well as employees "could abuse the phone without our control." Significantly, he did not say that they had done so or gave any examples of any actual abuse of the privilege. Although, according to Bebow, the abuses had occurred as long as the phone was in the lunchroom, there is no evidence that employees were ever informed that the free telephone privilege was being abused or that they were given any warning that this privilege might be eliminated before it was done. Vice President Edward Bumby's version of the abuse of the telephone privilege was that because employees were using the telephone in the lunchroom (a telephone put there for their use), during breaks and lunch periods, supervisors who were in the lunchroom area were sometimes unable to take calls there and had to walk 25 to 70 yards away to find a free phone and sometimes a call might be lost. Although this problem may have been a valid reason for putting a telephone restricted to the use of management personnel in the lunchroom or nearby (probably at less inconvenience than the Respondent experienced in get- ting the pay phone installed), it in no way justified abol- ishing the free telephone privilege long enjoyed by the employees. No justification of any kind was offered for the change in policy, which discontinued the practice of paging employees and permitting them to take incoming calls during working hours.15 The use of a free tele- phone for local calls and the opportunity to receive a reasonable number of incoming calls during the working hours are terms or conditions of employment, the unilat- eral discontinuance of which, without notice to or con- is Although Bumby's testimony seems to imply that this practice was discontinued shortly after the new plant opened (Tr. 1389), other evi- dence, including the notice posted by Plant Superintendent Bebow, shows that it was being done until that notice was posted at the end of September 1980 1191 sultation with the Union, was a violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. Given the timing of the changes in telephone policy, immediately after the Union won the election, the pretextual nature of the "abuses" cited by the Respondent as the reasons for the changes, the lack of any valid reason for discontinuing these privi- leges, and the other acts of reprisal taken by the Re- spondent, I conclude that the revocation of these privi- leges was also in reprisal for the employees' having voted in the Union and was in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1).16 4. Use of the dock area during breaks Prior to the election several employees had routinely taken their breaks and lunch periods both at the old and new plants in the area of the receiving dock. Breaks had been taken in the dock area at the new plant whenever the weather was good except in summer when picnic tables were available outside the plant. At the new plant in the dock area there were two benches and one or two pails of gravel that were used as ashtrays. Supervisors Belmont, Weber, and Harold Jackowski had used dock area for breaks on occasion.17 In September or October, Plant Superintendent Bebow posted a sign in the dock area, which stated: "No Smok- ing or Eating Except in Lunch Room." As a result em- ployees ceased taking breaks on the dock. Bebow testi- fied that he had no knowledge of any employees using the dock area for breaks and that he posted the sign after noticing cigarette butts in the pail of gravel and being told by receiving clerk Ronald Hahn that truckdrivers were responsible for the butts. Bebow further testified that the purpose of the sign was to give notice to the truckdrivers not the Respondent's own employees. In its brief, the Respondent states that this notice to truckdriv- ers "inadvertently brought the abuse of the plant rule" to an end. I find it doubtful that Bebow had no knowledge that employees were taking their breaks on the dock al- though this had gone on for over a year before he had the notice posted, because in August 1980 he told Hahn not to do so. t 8 In any event, the Respondent is charged with the knowledge of its other supervisors who were aware of and permitted this activity. It is also doubtful that the Respondent had a policy prohibiting such activi- ty. Although the Respondent's employee handbook states that "eating or smoking outside the lunchroom is not permitted," this rule was not absolute as evidenced by the fact that the Respondent not only allowed but en- couraged employees to take their breaks outside the lunchroom by providing picnic tables for their use. Even assuming that there was a rule prohibiting the taking of breaks in the dock area, it was not enforced. By institut- is See Elizabeth Motors, 252 NLRB 1148 (1980). 17 I do not credit Belmont's denial that he had ever taken a break on the dock area in the new plant as I found him to be hesitant and general- ly unconvincing throughout his testimony. His testimony that he knew that eating and smoking in the dock area were prohibited, but that he never said anything to the employees he saw violating this prohibition, even those from his department, because the dock area was not under his area of supervision was also incredible. 18 There is no evidence that any other employee was ever told that the dock area was not to be used for breaks before the notice was posted. 1192 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD ing or beginning to strictly enforce a rule that prohibited this longstanding employee practice after the Union won the election, without notice to or consultation with the Union about it, the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. 19 In view of the timing of this change in working conditions, the fact that I find the reason given for the change by Donald Bebow to be untrue, and in the absence of any evidence of a valid reason therefor, I find this to be a further act of reprisal against the Respondent's employees for their support of the Union in violation of Section 8(aX3) and (1). 5. More restrictive tardiness policy In early October, the Respondent's supervisors advised that it had a new policy regarding tardiness . Supervi- sor Bernice Wichman told employees in her department that after 7 a.m. their timecards would be pulled and taken to the front office and employees who came in after 7 a.m. would have to go to the front office and ex- plain why they were late before they could punch in. About the same time, Supervisor William Weber gave the employees in his department similar information, except they would have to report to him in order to get their timecards, and he added that if employees were late too many times, they could be written up or given time off. Wichman and Weber told employees that the new policy had been announced by Personnel Director Jill Cartier.2 ° Prior to the election, the Respondent had no announced policy concerning tardiness , timecards were not removed after 7 a.m., and there is no evidence that anyone was ever warned or disciplined for excessive tar- diness. By instituting a new policy concerning tardiness after the Union won the election without notifying or consulting with the Union, the Respondent violated Sec- tion 8(a)(5) and (1).21 The Respondent contends that this unilateral change in policy was not in retaliation for union activities because it was part of a program to gain better control of absen- teeism and tardiness begun by Cartier when she was hired as personnel director on June 30, 1980 . Cartier tes- tified that she took action with respect to what she con- sidered to be a problem with absenteeism in July 1980. She also testified that when questioned by her , the Re- spondent's supervisors told her there were no problems with absenteeism or tardiness. She gave no explanation why the new tardiness policy was instituted or why it was not done until shortly after the election. It is notable that the policy, as announced by Weber, was similar to a tardiness rule included in the preelection letter the Re- spondent's president sent to employees, which Cartier had prepared and which allegedly listed samples of strict work rules taken from collective-bargaining contracts of ' See Larsen Supply Co., 251 NLRB 1642 (1980); Allis-Chalmers Corp., 234 NLRB 350 (1978). ao Jill Cartier testified that she simply told supervisors to find out why employees were late and report the information to her . Both Wichman and Weber testified at the hearing and neither denied making the state- ments attributed to them. I do not credit Cartier 's testimony and find that a new policy regarding the tardiness was instituted by the Respondent in October 1980, as announced by Wichman and Weber. 11 See Hamwe Servo Controls, 250 NLRB 958, 1073 (1980); Production Plated Plastics, 254 NLRB 560 (1981). companies in the surrounding area. I fmd institution of this new policy to be in line with the other retaliatory measures taken by the Respondent as a result of the em- ployees' support for the Union and that it was a violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1). 6. Restrictions on employee conversations Another unilateral change alleged in the complaint is that since September 15, the Respondent has prohibited employees from talking during working hours under cir- cumstances theretofore permissible and begun monitoring employee conversations. The evidence is clear that prior to the election employees were permitted to talk on the job as long as it did not disrupt their work. Several em- ployees testified concerning instances since the election when they were told by a supervisor to end a conversa- tion during working time . Only one, Ardis Schmidt, tes- tified to more than one instance . She stated that her su- pervisor speaks to her every time she stops to talk, but later said she does still have 1- or 2-minute conversations with other employees. Another witness called by the General Counsel, Antoinette Perrone, testified that em- ployees in her department carry on conversations while working, apparently without any supervisory interfer- ence. I am unable to find on the basis of the evidence presented that the Respondent has instituted a rule or policy prohibiting or restricting employees from talking to each other during working hours that is different from the practice followed before the election or that the iso- lated instances in the record establish a pattern of con- duct on the part of the Respondent's supervisors that un- reasonably restricts employee conversations so as to con- stitute a violation of the Act. I also find no evidence to establish that employee conversations, particularly those of union stewards, are being monitored by the Respond- ent. I find that the General Counsel has failed to estab- lish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Re- spondent committed violations as alleged and I shall rec- ommend that these allegations be dismissed. 7. Personal time off Before the election, employees were routinely granted time off on their request for "personal reasons," when working conditions permitted . There was no requirement that they specify what that reason was and, consequent- ly, there was no evaluation by supervisory personnel whether the absence should be excused. Bebow admitted that the Respondent did not ask for a reason when an employee requested time off except in the case overtime was involved. In October 1980, employee Dawn Schwandt asked Su- pervisor Bernice Wichman, several days in advance, if she could take Friday, October 17, off in order to move. Wichman, who prior to the election had herself ap- proved a request by Schwandt for an afternoon off, told her that Wichman would have to check with Bebow and reported back that Schwandt would have to work if her department worked. Schwandt, who had recently been elected union steward for her department, was required to work on October 17 because her department or, at ADVERTISER'S MFG. CO. least, most of it worked. However, the department did not work on the previous or the following Friday. In March 1980, employee Antoinette Perrone asked her supervisor, William Weber, if she could leave work 30 minutes early in order to participate in a bowling tournament she had already paid for and was initially told that her reason was "not good enough." Later, Weber allowed her to leave 15 minutes early. Employee Evon Kreuger testified that prior to the election she had been granted time off for "personal rea- sons" at least every 4 to 6 weeks. In mid-April 1981, early in the morning, Krueger asked Supervisor Harold Jackowski for the afternoon off for personal reasons. Jackowski told her it was fine with him but he would have to check with his supervisor, Jerry Chase. Jack- owski later told Kreuger that he wanted to know what her reason was and that only three reasons were accepta- ble for an excused absence: "a doctor, dentist, or lawyer." Later in the day, in a conversation with Jack- owski and Chase, Chase told her that more than one or two unexcused absences in a year could lead to discipli- nary action. Sometime later after Kreuger had ridiculed the excused absence policy, Chase told her that she could have the afternoon off as an excused absence. The Respondent contends that there have been no changes in the policy in effect prior to the election be- cause Kreuger, Perrone, and other employees have been granted time off. That is not the issue. There is no allega- tion that time off for personal reasons has been eliminat- ed, rather, the allegation is that the Respondent's policy concerning time off for personal reasons has changed sig- nificantly. In the instances in the record occurring since the election, employees who would have routinely been given the time off they requested before the election22 have either been denied that time off or have been asked for reasons to justify their requests. In addition, the Re- spondent, through its supervisors, has informed the em- ployees that only three reasons are acceptable in order to obtain an excused absence and that too many unexcused absences can lead to discipline. This policy differs mark- edly from that in effect prior to the election. Bebow's testimony that the Respondent needs to know why em- ployees want time off to determine whether they are en- titled to overtime pay provides no evidence of "compel- ling economic considerations" justifying the changes. Such considerations were the same prior to the election. I find that the changes in policy concerning whether em- ployees will be granted excused absences for personal reasons has a significant impact on the terms and condi- tions of their employment. Because the changes were in- stituted after the Union won the election and without no- tifying or consulting with it, they constitute additional violations of Section 8(a)(5) and (1). Like numerous other unilateral changes found herein, there is no evi- dence to indicate that these changes were made for any reason other than to penalize employees for having 21 Schwandt's request was denied although there is no indication her presence that day was essential. She was given involuntary days off twice within 10 working days of the day she asked to have off. 1193 chosen the Union23 and I find that they constitute viola- tions of Section 8(aX3) and (1) as well. 8. Employee parking On September 15, the first workday following the election, employee Ronald Hahn was told by Supervisor Harold Jackowski to move his car from the first row of the employee parking lot and not to park there anymore. On the same day, employee Vic Luther was given simi- lar instructions by Jackowski, who said company policy had changed and only supervisors could park in the front row. Jackowski was told to give these instructions to Hahn and Luther by Donald Bebow. Both employees had been parking in the first row since the parking lot had been completed over a year earlier, as had Bebow, other supervisors, and some other employees. The General Counsel contends that this was another unilateral change in working conditions in violation of the Act. The Respondent contends that it always had a policy restricting parking in the first row. Bebow testi- fied that a notice that the first row was restricted to su- pervisors, visitors, and the handicapped was posted when the lot was completed, but he was unable to produce a copy. Several employees testified that they had no knowledge of any restrictions on parking in the first row, although Supervisor William Weber recalled seeing such a notice. The employee handbook section on employee parking makes no mention of any restrictions on parking in the first row. In any event, it is evident that Hahn, Luther, and other employees had been parking in the first row for over a year and that Bebow, who also parked there, was obviously aware of this. Consequently, the prohibition against employees parking in the first row after the election was at least a stricter enforcement of the Respondent's parking policy if not a new policy altogether. Despite this fact, I do not find the prohibi- tion, which, at most, required a few employees to walk a few extra yards from their cars to the plant to be a term or condition of employment about which the Respondent was obliged to bargain with the Union or that its failure to do so violated Section 8(a)(5), and I shall recommend that this allegation be dismissed. On the other hand, the complaint alleges that this action was also a violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1). This allegation has merit. I find it difficult to believe that Bebow's action in barring Hahn and Luther from the first row of the parking lot on the first workday after the Union had won the election was a coincidence. They had been parking there for over a year without any problems, but suddenly Bebow decided to prohibit them from doing so for no apparent reason.24 I find this action to fit the pattern of harassment of and retaliation against its employees, which the Respondent embarked on im- mediately following the election. Counsel for the Re- 2 None of the incidents in the record involved a situation having any- thing to do with overtime pay. Q' Bebow's attempt to fix this action in November, rather than immedi- ately after the election, was one of several reasons I found his testimony generally untrustworthy. I did not believe his testimony that he had told four other employees not to park in the first row and yet never said any- thing to Hahn or Luther about it in over a year 1194 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD spondent argues that this matter is de minimis . Standing alone it might be. In context, it demonstrates the level of pettiness the Respondent reached in its efforts to penalize its employees for supporting the Union. I find the Re- spondent's action in restricting employee parking was motivated by antiunion considerations and to constitute a violation of the Act. 9. Raymond Schmidt Schmidt has been employed by the Respondent for over 18 years, working in the printing department where he was foreman for a period of about 5 years until health problems caused him to be relieved of those duties. Schmidt has had serious medical problems for a long time. He has only one kidney, he has twice undergone surgery and has had three nonoperative procedures to remove kidney stones, he suffers from ulcers, and, on one occasion, suffered from heart failure, which caused him to be out of work for 5 months. Because of his kidney problems, Schmidt must drink a substantial amount of liquids throughout each day. As a result, during all the time he has worked for the Respondent, he had been allowed to keep a cooler containing soda pop for his own consumption at his work station. Although employees were allowed to eat and drink at their work stations because of the lack of facilities at the old plant, they are generally not allowed to do so in the new plant, which has a large lunchroom. Schmidt, however, contin- ued his practice of keeping and consuming soda pop at his work station on a daily basis since moving to the new plant. His supervisor, Belmont, was aware of this,25 and he was permitted to do so. On the morning of February 18, 1981, Belmont told Schmidt that he could not keep his cooler at his work station and that he could drink soda pop only during breaks and lunch. At the morning break, Schmidt took his cooler to his car. Belmont also told Schmidt he would need "a new doctor's slip." That afternoon Schmidt's mother obtained a new slip from his doctor and Schmidt brought it in the next day. Accord- ing to Belmont, he had no problem with Schmidt's drinking soda but was questioned about it by Bebow. It was at Bebow's direction that Belmont told Schmidt to remove his cooler and get a new doctor's slip. The slip Schmidt brought from his doctor said: This is to certify that Raymond Schmidt has been a patient of mine and only has one kidney and is re- quired to drink liquids every hour. If there are any questions please let me know! Belmont gave the slip to Bebow who, in turn, had Jill Cartier call the doctor to inquire further. The doctor's nurse allegedly told Cartier that soda was not absolutely essential and that water would suffice during work hours ..as long as soda was available during break periods." Bebow then told Schmidt he could drink water at his work station throughout the day. Consequently, since February 22, 1981, Schmidt has been bringing a contain- a' At Belmont's request, upon moving into the new factory, Schmidt brought in a slip from his doctor verifying his need for liquids through- out the day. er of water from home each day (because the water at the plant is too hard), which he keeps at his work station and drinks throughout the day.26 Bebow denied his re- quest to be allowed to put Kool-Aid in the water. The General Counsel contends that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act when it estab- lished a new policy prohibiting Schmidt's soda drinking. Although it is clear that the Respondent was aware of and permitted Schmidt to keep and consume soda pop at his work station between the time the new plant opened and February 18, 1981 , despite a general rule to the con- trary, its action in changing its policy toward Schmidt is not a matter that affects terms and conditions of employ- ment inasmuch as the change applied only to one em- ployee and not to its employees in general . Accordingly, the Respondent's action in this regard does not violate Section 8(aX5).27 It is also alleged that the Respondent's action violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1). Schmidt had worn a Teamsters T-shirt on occasion throughout the preelection cam- paign, and once a month since the election, and had dis- cussed the Union in conversations in which Belmont had participated. Schmidt's mother was also a longtime em- ployee of the Respondent and she, too, had worn a Teamsters T-shirt and had a Teamsters emblem on her purse. As noted, Schmidt's foreman, Belmont, had no problems with his soda drinking , which he knew had gone on for the 13 years Belmont had worked in the printing department . There is no evidence that Schmidt ever abused his soda drinking privilege. According to Bebow, he was asked about Schmidt's soda drinking by Bumby, who learned of it from Lynn Sommers of customer services, who had "complained or mentioned it to him."28 The combined efforts of the Re- spondent's vice president, its customer services man, its plant superintendent, and its personnel director resulted in Schmidt's bringing in and drinking a container of water each day instead of a container of soda pop. The reason given by Bebow for the Respondent 's action: "It violates a company policy in our handbook." I do not believe that this was a valid reason for discontinuing its longstanding practice of permitting Schmidt to keep and drink soda pop at his work station, and find that the Re- spondent's action was yet another of its acts of retalia- tion against its employees for their support of the Union and that it was motivated solely by antiunion concerns. As such, it was a violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1). 10. Katherine Treptow The complaint alleges that the Respondent violated Section 8(aX5), (3), and (1) when it "transferred an em- ployee from the Stencil [art and silkscreen] Department when she refused to take a cut in wage rates and sign a request for placement in the Stencil Department." The employee in question, Katherine Treptow, was hired in 86 Schmidt mixes baking soda with the water in order to get the needed alkalizing effect 27 See Mike O'Connor Chevrolet, supra at 704. 88 The record is devoid of any evidence concerning what responsibil- ity customer services has with respect to the printing department or en- forcement of plant rules. ADVERTISER'S MFG. CO. the inspection department in October 1979, where she worked inspecting aprons and newsbags . She has also worked for periods in the sportscap and visor cap de- partments. During the first week of April 1981, when work in the inspection department was slow , Treptow was told by her supervisor, E. J. Dorsch, that she was being transferred to the silkscreen department beginning the next day for an indefinite period. She worked in that department while continuing to receive her inspector's pay rate until April 28, 1981, when in a meeting with Dorsch, Weber, and Bebow, she was given a choice of either staying in the silkscreen department at a lower rate of pay or returning to inspection at her then-current pay rate. Bebow told her that he could not guarantee her 40 hours a week in inspection. However, Dorsch told her that if she did return to inspection and work was slow there, he would try to find work for her elsewhere. The next day, Treptow told Weber she had decided to stay in the silkscreen department and he later told her she would have "to sign an agreement saying that [she] had asked for the transfer into silkscreening ." Treptow refused to sign any such "agreement" and was returned to the inspection department the following Monday. Bebow testified, and the employee handbook indicates, that the Company has had a policy of temporarily trans- ferring employees from one department to another, as needed, since prior to the union campaign. Bebow also testified that, since the campaign, employees who have requested transfers to different departments have been re- quired to put their requests in writing . In the brief, the General Counsel contends that this requirement was an "unlawful unilateral change" and that "Treptow's situa- tion was a further extension" of that unlawful action. Even if this unilateral change were alleged as a viola- tion in the complaint, I would find no violation of Sec- tion 8(aX5). The Respondent has simply required em- ployees who have requested transfers since the election, in circumstances where the transfers might initially result in lower wages, to put their requests in writing so it will be clear that they were voluntary transfers . This require- ment is not onerous or unreasonable and does not affect terms or conditions of employment. As for the Respondent's action with respect to Trep- tow, it appears that she was temporarily transferred to the silkscreen department because of lack of work in the inspection department in accordance with established company policy and, thereafter, was given the option of remaining in that department permanently at the silk- screen wage rate rather than the inspection wage rate she had continued to receive despite the change in her job assignment. When she chose not to do so, she was returned to the inspection department and continued at the wage rate she had been receiving . There is no evi- dence that Bebow's statement that there might not be 40 hours of work available in the inspection department every week was untrue or that she was being pressured into staying in the silkscreen department at a lower wage rate. There is also no evidence that the Respondent's ac- tions concerning Treptow were in any way motivated by antiunion considerations. I find that such actions did not violate Section 8(a)(5), (3), or (1) and shall recommend that this allegation be dismissed. 1195 11. Football pools During football seasons prior to the 1980-1981 season, employees had the opportunity to participate in football pools for weekend and Monday night games . There was no restriction on the soliciting of employees by the indi- vidual employees running the pools and solicitations and payoffs were routinely done during working hours. Sev- eral supervisors participated in the pools . Following the election, employees Ronald Hahn and Ronald Schroeder were told they could no longer run these pools during working hours and that they would be restricted to breaktime and lunch periods or before work . Hahn con- tinued to run pools during breaks and lunch . This was al- leged to be a violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) because the Respondent failed to consult with the Union before restricting the pools to nonworking time . Insofar as the employees in general are concerned, they continued to have the opportunity to participate in football pools while at work in spite of the restrictions placed on those running them. Consequently, there was no significant change in the opportunities for diversion and/or profits afforded them by the pools . It appears that the restric- tions on the times the pools could be run affected only two or three people at the most and did not constitute a term or condition of employment. Accordingly, the Re- spondent's action did not violate Section 8(a)(5). At the same time, I did not believe Bebow 's vague tes- timony that football pools were one of the things he had tried to tighten up on since moving to the new plant over a year before. There was no indication of any effort to do so prior to the election. There was also no evi- dence that the pools were at all disruptive of the Re- spondent's operations. However, there was evidence that the restrictions on running the pools were placed on Schroeder and Hahn, known union supporters, but not on another employee, Pete Kreuger, who continued to run a pool in which at least one supervisor participated, during working hours throughout the 1980 football season. When Hahn asked Supervisor Jerry Chase about this, Chase replied that "he [Chase] talked to him but Pete does what he wants anyway." I find that the Re- spondent's action imposing limitations on Hahn's and Schroeder's theretofore unrestricted solicitation of foot- ball pools during working hours was intended to harass and penalize them for their support of the Union and was a violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1). 12. The annual first-of-the-year wage increases and holiday pay Prior to 1981, the Respondent's customary practice was to grant annual wage increases to its employees ef- fective January 1 of each year. While the timing of the increases was fixed, the amounts of the increases in- volved elements of discretion. On December 30, 1980, the Respondent posted a notice stating that the annual wage increases were not being implemented because the outcome of its objections to the election was not known. On February 6, 1981, a notice was posted stating the amounts of the wage increases and that they would be retroactive to January 5, 1981 . Increases were granted to all employees except those in the sportscap department. 1196 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD The Respondent did not notify or consult with the Union before taking these actions concerning the annual wage increases. It is alleged that by failing to consult with the Union before withholding and, later, implementing the annual wage increases and before denying employees in the sportscap department an increase , the Respondent violat- ed Section 8(a)(5) and (1). The facts as stated above are not in dispute. An employer with a past practice of wage increases may not discontinue that program and may not continue to unilaterally exercise its discretion with re- spect to such increases once an exclusive bargaining rep- resentative has been selected.29 The Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by determining the amount of the annual wage increases without affording the Union an opportunity to bargain .30 By changing the effective date of the annual increase to January 5, 1981, the Respond- ent deprived employees of the increase for the paid holi- day, January 1. The Respondent's explanation for the change was that, historically, piece rate workers were paid for this holiday at their average rate for the fourth quarter of the previous year and it felt it was unfair to those workers to pay the hourly workers for the holiday at the increased rate . However, this is exactly what it had been doing in previous years by making the in- creases for hourly workers effective on January 1. This unilateral change in the hourly workers' holiday pay was a violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1). It is also alleged that withholding the annual increases and changing the effective date of the increases when implemented violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1). The with- holding of the annual increases announced on December 30 was specifically attributed to the employees' union ac- tivity in the Respondent's notice. The alleged reason for the change in the effective date of the annual increase is not credible. I find the Respondent's actions were further efforts to discourage the employees ' support for the Union in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1). The complaint alleges that the Respondent violated the Act by discontinuing holiday pay, effective January 1, 1981. There is no evidence to support this allegation. On the contrary, the evidence establishes that the Re- spondent has continued its program of paid holidays. Ac- cordingly, I shall recommend that this allegation be dis- missed. 13. Reduced workweeks in the sewing department In the weeks following the September 12 election, the Respondent reduced the working hours available to most of the employees in its various sewing departments.31 Significant reductions in hours began the week immedi- ately after the election and continued until early Novem- ber. The General Counsel contends that there was no economic justification for these reductions, that they were made without notice to or bargaining with the Union, and were based on the Respondent's desire to re- taliate against the employees for their union support. The 29 Oneita Knitting Mills, 205 NLRB 500, 502 (1973). 30 See Allis Chalmers Corp., 237 NLRB 290 (1978). ai Employees in these departments constitute approximately 85 percent of the plant's workers. Respondent contends that the scheduling of work hours during this period "was in response to the reduced volume of business and the downward trend thereof." The evidence available in the record shows that there had been only a few isolated instances of reduced work- weeks in the sewing departments between June and the second week of September. During the week following the election most of the employees in the apron and tote- bag departments had their workweeks reduced by I or more days. Reductions continued during the 3 succeed- ing weeks. In the sportscap department, reduced work- weeks began the second week after the election and con- tinued for 4 of the next 6 weeks. In the newsbag depart- ment most employees had their workweek reduced during the second week after the election and some for 2 to 3 weeks thereafter. Most employees in the visor cap department had reduced hours either the second or fourth week after the election. From the second week of November through the end of the year, almost all the employees of the sewing departments had full work- weeks and, in many cases, overtime available to them. In his August 25 letter to employees concerning the union campaign, Company President Gordon Minch en- closed a copy of a recent magazine article describing widespread unemployment in the nearby city of Fond du Lac, Wisconsin, which the letter states is "quite reveal- ing as to how the union employees are doing," although the word "union" is not found in the article. The Re- spondent's reduction of workweeks immediately after the election appears calculated to fulfill the implied promise to the employees in Minch's letter that choosing the Union would lead to unemployment and that of Supervi- sor Jerry Chase that they would "see how bad this place can get" if the Union got in. Given these facts, the lack of any significant reductions in workweeks in previous months, the timing of these reductions, and the numerous other acts of retaliation the Respondent has been found herein to have engaged in, I fmd that the General Coun- sel has made a prima facie showing sufficient to support the inference that the employees' support for the Union was a motivating factor in the Respondent's decision to reduce their work hours.32 The Respondent has failed to provide evidence in sup- port of its contention that the reduced workweeks were due to a reduced volume of business. It is not clear who made the decisions to reduce working hours in the vari- ous sewing departments during the postelection period or what factors went into those decisions. The Respondent introduced records showing the number of products or- dered and shipped during 1980 and calculations by Vice President Edward Bumby concerning the number of workdays theoretically available in each department based on the products ordered.33 Neither this evidence nor the conclusionary testimony of the Respondent's offi- cials about declining business establishes that there was no work available during the postelection weeks when working hours were being reduced or that the reductions 32 Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980). 33 Bumby admitted that these calculations could not be relied on as a basis for scheduling work because there were a number of variables that were not included. ADVERTISER'S MFG. CO. 1197 were compelled by economic considerations. Rather than being the basis for the Respondent's decisions to reduce working hours, the evidence presented appears to be merely an after-the-fact attempt to justify its actions. It is noteworthy that in May, Company President Minch sent a letter to employees in which he discussed "the current recession" and raised the possibility of lay- offs at the plant. The letter states the Company was "doing everything we can to get new business and so far we have been quite successful." No significant layoffs or cutbacks in employee workweeks followed this letter. In the first issue of the company newsletter, published in August, a letter from Minch, written before the start of the Union's organizing effort, contains the following statement: "Despite the deepening recession and rising unemployment, our business continues to hold up well and we have a comfortable backlog in most depart- ments." A few weeks after the newsletter was distribut- ed, the Union won the election and large reductions in employee workweeks followed. I find that the Respondent has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that these reductions were motivated or justified by economic or other busi- ness considerations or that they would have occurred in the absence of the employees' having selected the Union in the election. I find that the Respondent's actions in re- ducing the workweeks of employees in its sewing depart- ments was in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1). Having found that these workweek reductions were discriminatorily motivated, I find it unnecessary to make a finding whether such reductions were also violations of Section 8(a)(5). 14. The 1981 layoffs and reduced workweeks Since January 1981, the Respondent has laid off seven employees34 and reduced the workweeks of some bar- gaining unit employees in different departments on sever- al occasions without first notifying or bargaining with the Union. The Respondent does not deny this and the dates and extent of the layoffs and reductions in hours have been stipulated by the parties. The Respondent con- tends that such actions were not violations of the Act be- cause they were not changes, but were "consistent with on-going policies and procedures" and were caused by "the poor business conditions confronting the Company at that time." There is no contention that the layoffs and reductions were motivated by other than economic con- siderations. The Respondent was obligated to notify and bargain with the Union concerning layoffs from the time it became the exclusive representative of the employees on September 12, 1980.35 The Respondent has not estab- as Gregg Yasick and James Crook were laid off on January 19, 1981, and Lori Dorsey, Margaret Remsch, Mary Shurpit, Lon Weber, and Grade Woodruff on February 26, 1981 All but Shurpit have returned to work for the Respondent ; however, on returning they had to requalify for coverage under the Respondent's group medical insurance plan and some did not receive the annual wage increase 35 Mike O'Connor Chevrolet, supra. lished that the layoffs were caused by "compelling eco- nomic considerations" or were pursuant to an established practice. There is no evidence of the circumstances sur- rounding or the specific reasons for any of the layoffs. By unilaterally laying off unit employees on January 19 and February 26, 1981, the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1).36 With respect to the reductions in hours in 1981, unlike the period immediately following the election, there is no allegation that they were discriminatory or violated Sec- tion 8(a)(3). According to the testimony of Donald Bebow, in the past the Company had not reduced em- ployees' working hours in order to reduce costs and had never considered doing so. The only basis for reducing workweeks was lack of work. There was no evidence to the contrary. With one exception, the visor cap depart- ment discussed below, there is no evidence that the re- duced workweeks that occurred in 1981 were not the result of lack of work. Therefore, I find that the General Counsel has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that the 1981 workweek reductions in depart- ments other than visor caps were changes in working hours, which required bargaining with the Union and shall recommend that this allegation be dismissed. There is evidence that in the visor cap department the Respondent's actions in reducing working hours were clear departures from its past practices. In order to pro- vide work during slack periods, the Respondent had de- veloped so-called warehouse orders, which are large on- going orders for items that can be made up at the Re- spondent's convenience and kept in the warehouse until such time as the customer requests delivery of a specified number of those items. Company President Minch admit- ted that he had ordered, as a cost-cutting measure, that such orders not be worked on because he did not want "to put money into things in the warehouse and have money tied up."37 The evidence shows that there were warehouse orders for visor caps, which were available for sewing between January and May 1981. During that period, employees of the visor cap department were given days off when such work was available on 13 oc- casions. By failing to bargain with the Union over its de- cision to reduce workweeks in the visor cap department, for reasons other than lack of work, the Respondent vio- lated Section 8(aX5) and (1), notwithstanding its alleged economic justification for this unilateral change. 98 15. House samples Periodically, the Respondent makes up samples of its regular products in quantities of 100 to 200 pieces, which it keeps in its sample room and sends out to customers. Because of their nature, "house samples" are supposed to be sewn with greater care and take longer to produce than regular items. In March 1981, the Respondent posted a notice to employees that work on house samples would be paid at the regular piecework rates for the se See Hillcrest Furniture Mfg. Co., 253 NLRB 72 (1980) 14 The sewing component of such orders accounts for the largest per- centage of the Respondent's cost. sa Akron General Medical Center, 232 NLRB 920, 925 (1977); Amoco Chemical Corp., 211 NLRB 618, 623 (1974). 1198 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD items involved. 3a The Respondent contends that this was not a change in the rates paid for house samples as al- leged in the complaint, but was merely a correction of discrepancies among departments on how such work was paid. For at least 20 years prior to January 1981, house sam- ples in the apron department had been paid at a rate of average40 plus 25 cents per hour. A similar rate has been paid for house samples in the visor cap department for at least as long. In sportscaps, a relatively new department, there does not appear to have been a consistent policy on how work on house samples would be paid, some- times they were paid at regular piece rates and some- times with a bonus.41 The evidence is clear that the Respondent changed the rates that it was paying employees in the visor cap and apron departments without notice to or consultation with the Union at a time when it was obligated to bargain about this mandatory subject with the Union. The fact that not all employees lost money working on house samples at the newly established rates (although some did) or that the change was not improperly motivated does not alter the fact that it was a violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1).42 16. Changes in methods of paying employees In February 1981, four employees in the silkscreen de- partment,43 who previously had always been paid by the hour, were assigned to work on a large order of "crowd caps." They were told they were to be paid on a piece rate basis for this order, but that if they did not earn an amount equal to or more than their current hourly rate they would be paid at their hourly rate. As a result, none of the four lost money and in some cases they earned more than if they had been on an hourly rate. However, this change required them to work harder in order to make the same money and exposed them to the possibili- ty of discharge should they fail to meet production quotas over a sustained period. In April 1981, another silkscreen department employee, Gregg Yasick , was in- formed that he was being taken off his hourly rate of pay and would be trying out piece rates for screening, which would eventually be applied to other silkscreen workers. 89 In January 1981, a similar announcement concerning house samples had been made in the apron department. 40 "Average" is determined on the basis of what a piece rate worker has earned during the previous 3 months divided by the number of hours worked during those months. 41 These findings concerning the Respondent 's practices regarding payment for house samples are based on the consistent , credible testimo- ny of several longtime, experienced employees of the Respondent's sewing departments. I do not credit the vague and evasive testimony of Donald Bebow to the effect that house samples should have been paid at normal piecework rates and that he did not know "for a fact" that in some departments they were being paid at other than piece rates . Edward Bumby testified that decision was made in 1979 that house samples should be made at piece rates . There is no evidence that the decision, if made, was ever implemented or communicated to employees or even to the Respondent's supervisors before 1981. 49 Crystal Springs Shirt Corp., 245 NLRB 882 (1979), enfd. 637 F.2d 399 (5th Cit. 1981) 48 Antoinette Perrone, Lu Rae Pucker, Bonnie Hintz, and Vicki Ma- thias. Employees in the visor cap department who worked on the same crowd cap order, discussed above, were being paid incentive rates, which were causing them to lose money. They complained about this in November 1980, and in February 1981 the Respondent changed the method of payment for work on this order from piece rate to average. The Respondent contends that its actions were consist- ent with past policies and procedures. However, it has failed to establish that these actions were "automatic and pursuant to definite guidelines."44 According to Bebow, on previous occasions employees sewing crowd caps had been paid "different at different times" and depending on how much money employees lost on piecework rates "we'd make adjustments if necessary." There was clearly a large degree of discretion involved in the Respondent's decisions concerning the way the visor cap employees were to be paid for these crowd caps. It is also clear that rather than being an automatic move, placing the silk- screen employees on piece rates was the result of discus- sions among Bebow, Bumby, and Weber after Bumby ex- pressed his desire to put the job on piece rates to control costs and become more efficient. The Respondent' s argu- ment that there was no violation of the Act because the employees involved did not lose money is similar to that rejected by the Fifth Circuit in NLRB v. Crystal Springs Shirt Corp., 637 F.2d 399, 404 (1981). Whatever the ef- fects, the Respondent's unilateral changes in methods and rates of payment in the silkscreen and visor cap depart- ments were in derogation of the Union's right to negoti- ate over wages and were violations of Section 8(a)(5) and (1).45 C. The Allegations Concerning Ronald Hahn Ronald Hahn has been employed by the Respondent for about 8 years, the last 2 years as a receiving clerk. Hahn had supported the Union since the start of its cam- paign at the plant and, on October 2, was elected chief steward by the unit employees. Prior to the election Hahn had no immediate supervisor but worked with the Company's purchasing agent, James Rashid, and if he had a problem, went directly to Donald Bebow. On Sep- tember 15, the fast workday after the election, Bebow called Hahn to a meeting at which Rashid and the cut- ting room supervisor, Harold Jackowski, were also present. Bebow told Hahn that he had been wandering around and talking too much and that henceforth Jack- owski would be his supervisor. Prior to that date Hahn had never been told that Bebow was concerned about his wandering around or talking too much. After the meet- ing, Jackowski told Hahn that he did not want to be Hahn's supervisor because he did not know what Hahn's duties were. On the same day, Jackowski relayed to Hahn Bebow's orders that he was not to park in the front row of the parking lot, an act that has been found to have been motivated solely by antiunion consider- ations. In early October, Hahn was one of those employ- NLRB Y. Crystal Springs Shirt Corp., supra at 403. *s See Crystal Springs Shirt Corp, supra, Master Slack, 230 NLRB 1054 (1977) ADVERTISER'S MFG. CO. ees told they, could no longer conduct , football pools on company time, another action that has been found to have been in retaliation for supporting the Union. The record indicates that Hahn, who-apparently never had any disciplinary problems before the election, was, thereafter, subjected to repeated acts of harassment by the Respondent's supervisors,- particularly Bebow. Since long before Hahn took over the position, the receiving clerk had kept a set of inventory cards similar to those maintained by Rashid in his,office on the other side of the building, which showed the types and quantities of materials stored in the warehouse . Hahn's duties included receiving and storing these materials and filling orders for the materials by the various departments in the plant. In January or February, it became known that receiving clerk Fred Yurk would retire. Hahn was chosen to re- place him and was trained to do so. At a meeting with Bebow and Rashid, Hahn was told he could continue keeping the inventory cards as Yurk had done or discon- tinue them at his option. bn October 8, Bebow came to Hahn and told him that he and Rashid had agreed there was no need for Hahn to keep a set of inventory cards and he should stop doing so. Hahn told Bebow that he thought the cards should be kept because without them whenever a supervisor called to inquire about the avail- ability of materials, instead of just looking at a card, he would have to go-into the' warehouse to ascertain what was there. Bebow responded that it was not necessary to keep the cards and Hahn stopped. Two days later, Bebow told Hahn, in a meeting with Jackowski and Su- pervisor E. J. Dorsch, that because he would have an extra 45 minutes to an hour each day now that he no longer had to maintain the inventory cards, he should report each day to Dorsch and assist him in carting boxes of finished products to the shipping area. It is al- leged that the foregoing actions were violations of Sec- tion 8(aXl), (3), and (5). According to Rashid, he and Bebow had decided that the set of inventory cards kept by the receiving clerk was an unnecessary duplication of effort several months before Yurk retired, but they let him continue to keep them "for sentimental reasons." If this were the case, there was no reason for Hahn to have been allowed to keep the cards for several months until shortly after his election as chief steward . I credit Hahn's testimony that he was told he should decide whether to continue keep- ing the cards or not. As for the Respondent's argument that the second set of cards was a duplication of effort, this was not the case. While both Hahn and Rashid were making the same entries on similar cards, each was doing so for an entirely different reason. Rashid kept track of inventory in order to know what materials to purchase and when to do so, while Hahn did so,in order to facili- tate •his job of responding to department supervisors' in- quiries concerning available materials . Hahn did not have access to Rashid's cards because, after the election, for unknown reasons, he was prohibited from entering the front office area, where those cards were kept, without specific permission. As a result, in order to answer these inquiries,'he had to go to the warehouse and check the materials. He also had to call Rashid from one to four times a day to obtain purchase order numbers for incom- 1199 ing shipments. He has previously, entered these numbers on his inventory cards. I find that the maintenance and the availability of these inventory cards was aFsignificant aspect of the receiving clerk's job and, as such, was a condition of employment within the meaning , of Section 8(d) of the Act. Consequently, the Respondent's unilater- al action in discontinuing this aspect of the receiving clerk's job and replacing , it with another, unrelated duty-carting boxes-was a violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1). - I also find, based on the timing of this change, right after Hahn became chief steward, the lack of any legiti- mate reason therefor, and the other discriminatory acts directed at Hahn, that this action of the Respondent vio- lated Section 8(a)(3) as well. Concerning why this change occurred when it did, the Respondent points to the fact that in August or September Hahn complained to Rashid that employees were making unauthorized withdrawals of materials from the warehouse without filling out required forms and, therefore, he could not be responsible for the accuracy of the inventory cards. This complaint, which Rashid admitted was justified, provid- ed no reason for discontinuing Hahn's cards. The inaccu- racies caused by such' withdrawals would be reflected in Rashid's cards as well as Hahn's and in no way could be corrected by discontinuing Hahn's set of cards. All that seems to have been accomplished is a less efficient method of responding to supervisors' inquiries concern- ing the availability of materials. There is no indication that the Respondent was compelled to discontinue the cards so that -Hahn would be available to cart boxes. After December 23, when Hahn ceased carting boxes in order to assist in the end-of-year inventory, he was never again called on to 'cart any boxes. I find that the Re- spondent's action in causing Hahn to stop keeping his in- ventory cards was not based ' on any legitimate business reason, but was motivated solely by its desire to retaliate against him for his union support. As noted above, after the representation election Hahn was prohibited from entering the front office without permission whereas he had previously routinely gone in there to deliver papers and parcels. After his election as chief steward, Supervisor Jerry Chase remarked to Hahn, who was wearing a Teamsters T-shirt, that he "fi- nally got enough guts" to wear his union T-shirt and, a few minutes later, said something about Hahn being the "big president of the Union." On an almost daily basis, Bebow would come into the warehouse where Hahn worked and stand around but have little or no conversa- tion with him. In early January 1981, Hahn asked Jack- owski for and was granted permission to call his home during working hours to check on the condition of his son who was W. He later asked Jackowski if it was nec- essary to obtain his permission for every such call and was told that it was not. On the following morning, Hahn made a brief call for the same reason without asking Jackowski for permission. Thereafter, Bebow who had observed him make the call, came into the ware- house and told Hahn ' he needed advance permission before making any calls no matter what their duration. It is against this background that the allegations concerning 1200 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD two disciplinary warnings issued to Hahn have been con- sidered. On the morning of December 8, Hahn was called to Bebow's office. Jackowski and Personnel Director Jill Cartier were also present. Bebow told Hahn that it "seemed funny" that he was the first one in the lunch- room every day when his department was the farthest from the lunchroom. Hahn said that he thought it was because he walked directly from the warehouse to the lunchroom by way of an outside sidewalk and on many occasions he was out in the plant making deliveries when the bell rang. Bebow told him he was not to go outside the plant to get to the lunchroom. Hahn was also cau- tioned not to carry on idle conversations with other em- ployees. Bebow referred to a conversation he observed Hahn have with employee Velma Witkowski for "5 straight minutes," and told Hahn he should talk to em- ployees only if it pertained to work. That afternoon Hahn called Cartier and asked if he should consider that morning's meeting a verbal warning. Cartier responded that "in her personal opinion," he was to consider it a verbal warning. The Respondent clearly considers the event a verbal warning and contends that it was justified because Bebow had previously warned Hahn not to use the out- side sidewalk in going to the lunchroom and because Hahn does not dispute that he had such a conversation with Witkowski, only the date it occurred. Bebow testified that he told Hahn not to use the side- walk to get to the lunchroom because "he is supposed to stay in the building" and referred to two prior occasions when he allegedly spoke to Hahn about leaving the building. The first time was in the spring of 1980 when he saw Hahn on the road to the plant during breaktime and learned Hahn had gone to buy hamburgers. Bebow told Hahn he was not to leave the property during break without permission. The second incident allegedly oc- curred in August 1980, when Hahn told Bebow he had used the outside sidewalk to get to the shipping depart- ment and Bebow told him to stay in the building and not to use the outside sidewalk. However, the original subject of the conference was not Hahn's use of the outside sidewalk, but his being the first one in the lunchroom. There was no allegation that he was getting to the lunchroom before the break or lunch period started, only that he was the first one there which violates no company rule and could not conceiv- ably be the basis for discipline . As for his using the out- side sidewalk, this also violated no promulgated compa- ny rule.4 a Employees were not only permitted but en- couraged to go outside the building during breaks. Nor did Hahn's action violate either of Bebow's previous ad- monitions to him because he did not leave the property and he did not leave the building during working time, but only after the bell rang. The other subject of the verbal warning was Hahn's alleged idle conversation with employees. The evidence 46 Hahn testified without contradiction that prior to December 8 Bebow was usually in the lunchroom when he got there ; however, Bebow never said anything to him about being the first employee there or about how he got there. is clear that employees were always permitted to con- verse with one another during working hours prior to the election and I have found that there was no change in that policy after the election. The only example of Hahn's alleged excessive idle conversation given by Bebow was a single 5-minute conversation that, accord- ing to Hahn's credited testimony, had occurred in late October or early November, more than a month prior to the warning. There is no evidence that any other em- ployee has been given a warning for carrying on a 5- minute conversation, not even Witkowski, the other par- ticipant in Hahn's allegedly improper conversation. Con- sidering the pretextual nature of the Respondent's rea- sons for the warning issued to Hahn, the lapse of time between the date of his alleged excessive idle conversa- tion, the date of the warning, and the fact that other em- ployees were not disciplined for similar conduct, I con- clude that this warning was another part of the Respond- ent's continuing pattern of harassment directed at Hahn because of his support for and his position with the Union and was in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1). On December 30, Hahn was issued a written warning for being insubordinate to Silkscreen Department Super- visor William Weber on December 23. The General Counsel also alleges that this warning was discriminatori- ly motivated and violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1). Ac- cording to Hahn, when he had materials to deliver to the sportscap department, he went through the silkscreen de- partment because it was the shortest route. This was the route used by his predecessor, Fred Yurk, and the one Hahn and Yurk had always used since the new plant opened. On December 16, while going through the silk- screen department with a two-wheeled handcart, Weber told Hahn that he did not want Hahn going through his department with the cart because "there wasn 't enough room." Hahn responded that he thought there was plenty of room. Hahn continued to use the route through the silkscreen department and on three or four occasions Weber told him he did not want him to do so. Hahn told Weber he should speak to Jackowski, Hahn's supervisor, about the matter and that he thought Weber was over- stepping his authority. Hahn asked Jackowski about the route he was to take and Jackowski replied that no one had said anything to him about it. On the morning of December 23, Hahn and employee Steve Soda, who was temporarily assisting him, were taking materials to the sportscap department . Hahn was carrying bundles of ma- terial and Soda was pushing the cart . Before entering the silkscreen department, Hahn told Soda that Weber had complained about the cart being pushed through his de- partment; however, Soda followed along with the cart. When they approached Weber's desk, he stood up and said he did not want Hahn coming through with a cart. Hahn responded that he did not have a cart and Weber said he did not want Hahn walking through there with bundles. Hahn continued walking and told Weber to "take a hike." On December 24, Hahn went to Bebow and asked for clarification about going through the silk- screen department. Bebow told him he should not be going through there with a cart because he might run into someone and that because they had just put in a new ADVERTISER'S MFG. CO. oven there was not enough room. Minch, who came into Bebow's office during this conversation, told Hahn to use the building's main aisle and, since then, he has done so. On December 30, Hahn was called to the lunchroom where Bebow, Cartier, and Jackowski were present. Bebow informed Hahn that he was being given a written warning for being insubordinate by telling Weber to "take a hike." l3ebow also read from a piece of paper a day-by-day account of the number of times Hahn had been the first person in the lunchroom at breaktimes since their December 8 meeting and told Hahn it would have to stop or they would have no choice but to termi- nate him. Bebow also said that they were being more "lenient" with Hahn because he "was a Union activist." According to Weber, he had had a conversation with Bebow and Bumby in Bebow's office in which he was told that because his department had several new pieces of equipment and its aisle space was becoming smaller, Hahn should not be coming through there but should use the main aisle. Weber said that when he saw Hahn he would tell him this and the meeting concluded.47 On December 18, he told Hahn to use the main aisle because of the congestion in his department . He told Hahn the same thing when he came through about a week later. Thereafter, the incident in which Hahn told him "to take a hike" occurred. Weber placed this at "the end of Janu- ary." He reported the incident to Bebow immediately after it happened and was told to write it up and did so in a handwritten note dated December 24, 1980. I credit Hahn's version of these events because he was an impres- sive witness and appeared to have a clearer recollection of the events and the dates they occurred than did Weber. Bumby testified that during the first part of December, while walking through the silkscreen department reading a paper, he had a near collision with Hahn who was going the opposite way pushing a handcart . Bumby went to Bebow to ask him what route he was using to deliver materials. Bebow responded that he would "check his notes and see if this was the proper procedure to be used." Bebow later told him he had talked to Weber and Hahn and "this shouldn't happen again." Bumby made no mention of attending a meeting with Bebow and Weber at which this matter was discussed. Bebow testified that after Bumby mentioned his near collision with Hahn, he went immediately to Weber and told him that when Hahn came "through his department to tell him to use the main aisle." He told this to Weber rather than Hahn because Weber "is the supervisor of that area." It is difficult to believe that if Weber, in telling Hahn that he was not to come through Weber's department with materials, was relaying instructions from Bebow and/or Bumby he would not have said so, particularly after Hahn first ignored his order and then specifically questioned his authority to give him such an order. It is also difficult to understand why, if Bebow was the 47 Weber initially testified that this meeting was in March or April 1980 but, in response to a leading question from counsel for the Respond- ent, placed it in December 1980. 1201 source of this change of procedure, Bebow did not bring it to the attention of Hahn, personally, as he had done with respect to football pools, or through Jackowski, the person Bebow had designated as Hahn's supervisor, as he had done with respect to Hahn 's parking in the first row of the parking lot. Weber never indicated to Hahn that his order to stop coming through the silkscreen depart- ment was anyone's idea but his own. Weber's contempo- raneous record of the incident makes no reference to any contact with Bebow or Bumby about the matter, but states: "I [Weber] said to him, Ron I told you I wanted you to go around with material and not through my de- partment"; "I told him I didn't want him coming through"; and "I don't want you bringing it through my department." In his conversation with Hahn on Decem- ber 24, Bebow made no mention of having told Weber to order Hahn not to go through the silkscreen department. The record convinces me that Bebow, having learned of Hahn's telling Weber to "take a hike," seized the op- portunity to continue his campaign of harassment of the principal union official in the plant. The pretextual nature of a warning based on Hahn 's remark to Weber is apparent from evidence that establishes supervisors at the Respondent's plant were almost routinely spoken to in far more obnoxious and obscene terms than "take a hike" without any disciplinary action being taken. Weber, for example, on one occasion, had been called a "bull bas- tard carp" by one of the female employees under his direct supervision. On another occasion, the same em- ployee had intentionally spit a mouthful of water into Weber's face in full view of department employees. In neither case was the employee given a warning or other- wise disciplined for her actions. The discriminatory nature of the Respondent's action in this matter is also manifested by the fact that employ- ee Fred Kreuger continued to bring materials through the silkscreen department on a cart after Hahn was pro- hibited from doing so. When Hahn mentioned this to Weber, he responded that he "never gave it a thought." Although, thereafter, Kreuger was also prohibited from going through Weber's department , if the real reason for the Respondent's concern was that there was not enough room for a cart, it should not have mattered who was pushing it. The written warning given Hahn also refers to the verbal warning on December 8 concerning being first into the lunchroom at breaktimes. As noted above, there was no evidence that Hahn was beginning his breaks before the bell or arriving in the lunchroom before the breaks began. Being the first person to arrive violated no rule and was no basis for the verbal or written warning. I find that the Respondent discriminated against Ronald Hahn because of his union activity48 in issuing a written warning to him on December 30, 1981, in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1). 48 The statement in the written warning that the Respondent treated Hahn "more leniently" because of his union activity is demonstrably untrue. It does, however, manifest the Respondent's awareness of that ac- tivity. 1202 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD D. The Discharge of Carol Hahn Carol Hahn, the mother of Ronald Hahn, had been employed in the Respondent's visor cap department for approximately 17 years, the last 9 years as supervisor of that department. On October 8, Carol Hahn was called to a meeting with Bebow and Bumby about 3:20 p.m. and was told by Bebow that they had to let her go; that she had two choices, - she could "resign or quit"; and that she had to make that choice by-quitting time, 3:35 p.m. In response to her inquiry why she -was being let go, Bebow responded that it was because, of her attitude about attending school and her attitude toward the em- ployees. Carol Hahn was paid for accumulated sick and vacation days, was given 4 weeks' severance pay, and the Respondent did not contest her claim for unemploy- ment compensation. _ The General Counsel contends that Carol Hahn was discharged because of her son and to discourage support for the Union in violation of Section 8(axl) of the Act. They point to the fact that her discharge came only 2 days after the Respondent learned of the election of her son as the union chief steward at the plant. However, the Respondent claims-that the decision to discharge Carol Hahn had been made on September 22, but the discharge was not implemented immediately because she was scheduled to go on vacation during the first week of Oc- tober and was delayed again after it learned of Ronald Hahn's election until it had the opportunity to consult with its attorney concerning the implications of discharg- ing her in view of her son's position. I find that there is sufficient corroborating evidence, particularly, the cred- ited testimony of Geraldine Kono that she was offered Carol Hahn's job on September 26, to support a finding that the decision to discharge Carol Hahn was made prior to the date the Respondent learned of Ronald Hahn's election as chief steward. On the other hand, it is clear that the decision was made shortly after the elec- tion, after the Respondent had knowledge of Ronald Hahn's support for the Union, and after it had begun, its campaign of unlawful retaliation against its employees, in general, and Ronald Hahn, in particular, for their, union support. Carol Hahn, herself, had engaged in no union activity of any kind and it is not claimed by either side that her discharge resulted from any such activity. The Respondent contends that Carol Hahn's discharge had long been considered. Gordon Minch testified that in 1977, when the Company was planning its move to the new plant, he told' Bebow that certain supervisors had to be "upgraded and if that wasn't possible , terminated." He initially - was referring to Carol Hahn and Jeanne Jones and later added Delores Retzlaff to the list. He said that `.every couple of months or so" he brought the subject up with Bebow and asked him if he had found suitable replacements. Jones, who had been supervisor of the apron , and newsbag department, was discharged in August 1979, and Retzlaff was relieved of her duties as a supervisor of the art and silkscreen department but con- tinued to be employed in that department. Bebow, to whom Minch supposedly gave this man- date, testified that he had never told Carol Hahn her job was in danger prior to the day she was fired. Also, Carol Hahn testified without contradiction that shortly after the. Company moved to the new plant in 1979, Bebow had approached her about taking over the duties of the supervisor of the sportscap department who was expect- ed to be leaving due to illness. At the hearing, Bebow produced a series of notes he had written concerning his alleged "dissatisfaction" with Carol Hahn's performance which the Respondent con- 'tends document Carol Hahn's failings as a supervisor and support its decision to discharge her. These notes are suspect for several reasons . They were written and kept by Bebow in his own files rather than the Company's personnel files and were never shown to anyone. He did not, make or keep similar notes about other supervisors. Although Bebow claimed these notes were made con- temporaneously with the incidents they concern, one bears a date that has no relation - to the incident it con- cerns. Finally, there appears to be no reason for the notes to have been made. Bebow claims he started making the notes in June 1980 because of pressure from Minch. However, he would have had no need to docu- ment Hahn's shortcomings to Minch if Minch had, in fact, been concerned about them for, nearly 3 years. All these notes do is document Bebow's own failure to effec- tively carry out Minch's directions to upgrade Carol Hahn or terminate her. For all these reasons, I believe that the notes were manufactured after the fact in con- nection with its defense of the charges filed with the Board" and that they cast substantial doubt of the.rea- sons given by the Respondent as justification for Carol Hahn's discharge. I also find the whole story, as related by Minch and Bebow, about Minch's longstanding concern about Carol Hahn's deficiencies as a supervisor to be a fabrication. According to Bebow, it took him over 2 years to do anything about Carol Hahn because he "felt that Carol Hahn possibly with supervisors school and so forth could become, an efficient supervisor ." Carol Hahn had been a supervisor for 6 or 7 years by the time Minch al- legedly started complaining about her. There is no indi- cation that Bebow did anything about "supervisors school" until August 1980, when Carol Hahn and the Respondent's other supervisors were given the opportu- nity to attend a supervisory course held in Oshkosh. Ac- cording to Bebow, he' encouraged Carol ' Hahn to attend, but when she asked if she had to, he said it was up to her and he would not force her. Bebow could not say what the course was about or if Carol Hahn had taken a similar course in the past although he knew she- had taken at least one course previously. According to Carol Hahn, Bebow simply asked her if she was going to take the course and she said no. He did not tell her she should attend and she did not ask him if she had to. Iron- ically, Carol Hahn had attended a supervisory course on the day she was discharged. 49 This is not to say that the incidents referred to in the notes did not occur. However, in most cases, Carol Hahn's version of what happened differed markedly from that of Bebow. I credit the testimony of Carol Hahn over that of Bebow, who I found to be generally untrustworthy as a witness based on his demeanor and the other reasons discussed herein. None of these incidents, as described by Carol Hahn , taken singly or to- gether, support the Respondent's claim that she was discharged because of her inefficiency as a supervisor. ADVERTISER'S MFG. CO. Another problem with the Respondent 's attempt to justify Carol Hahn's discharge is that while Bebow alleg- edly found numerous deficiencies in her performance as a supervisor, he did not make the decision to terminate her, Minch did. Other than the claim of longstanding dis- satisfaction with Carol Hahn's inefficiencies, which I have indicated I do not credit, the Respondent offered no reason on September 22 Minch told Bebow the time had come to terminate Hahn whether he had a replace- ment for her or why Minch felt they were "better off with nobody than we are with Carol Hahn."ao This an- nouncement apparently came as a surprise even to Bebow, who had no replacement lined up despite the claim that Minch brought the matter up every couple of weeks for over 2 years, and who had trouble finding someone to take the job. On September 26, Bebow of- fered the job to Jerry Chase and Geraldine Kono, both of whom declined . He finally secured a temporary re- placement, Freddie Kreuger. Kono eventually reconsid- ered and took the job in March 1981 , after, in Bebow's words, "things cooled off." She testified that she de- clined the job, at first, although a supervisory position had always been her goal, because "I liked Carol Hahn and I really didn't know what the reasons were for get- ting rid of her and I didn't want to take it." She further testified that she still does not know why Carol Hahn was terminated. It would seem reasonable that if the Re- spondent had valid reasons for replacing Carol Hahn, her replacement would be made aware of her deficien- cies so that she could avoid similar mistakes and correct the problems these deficiencies created in the department she was going to supervise. The Respondent has also failed to establish a reasona- ble basis for its decision to terminate Carol Hahn rather than demote her as it had done in the cases of several other employees it considered good workers but incapa- ble of handling supervisory duties. Only one other super- visor, Jeanne Jones, had been discharged and following her discharge a notice was posted at the plant giving a long, detailed explanation what Jones had done wrong. When Carol Hahn was discharged , there was a notice posted stating simply that "Carol Hahn had resigned her duties." Bebow admitted that Carol Hahn's only alleged deficiencies were as a supervisor and that she had been a good employee for a long time in all other respects. Minch testified that an experienced sewing machine op- erator is a valuable asset to the Company and that it is policy to retain good workers "unless they do something wrong." He stated that, if a good worker does not work out in a particular job, "every effort" would be made to place the person in another job. He also stated that it would be up to the superintendent (Bebow) to decide whether a supervisor who does not work out should be retained in a nonsupervisory job. In Carol Hahn's case it was Minch who determined that "we're going to get rid of Carol Hahn." Although Bebow told her one of the reasons for her discharge was her attitude toward the employees, there is no evidence that any employee had 50 There is more specific evidence in the record of the supervisory de- ficiencies of Supervisors Weber and Belmont and the general lack of re- spect accorded them by their department employees , than there is regard- ing Carol Hahn 1203 ever complained about Carol Hahn. On the contrary, after she left the employees in her department bought her a gift and Bebow's choice to succeed her, Geraldine Kono, initially turned the job down because of her regard for Carol Hahn. Consequently, it is unlikely that Carol Hahn would have had problems in returning to the visor cap or another sewing department as a production worker. It would appear that had Carol Hahn been demoted, it would have had little effect on the Respondent's employ- ees. However, by discharging, without warning or expla- nation, a longtime, respected employee, who was the mother of a prominent union supporter , in the wake of the Union's election victory and the Respondent's cam- paign of retaliation that followed, the Respondent sent an indirect but clear message to its employees that union support can be hazardous to their jobs or that of a rela- tive. Giving the timing of the discharge, the lack of any le- gitimate reason or justification therefor, and the coinci- dental acts of retaliation against its employees , in particu- lar Ronald Hahn, I find that the Respondent's action in discharging Carol Hahn violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act in that it was motivated by the union support of her son61 and was part of "a pattern of conduct aimed at co- ercing employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights."52 E. The Discharge of James Katerzynski James Katerzynski has been employed by the Re- spondent on three different occasions, the most recent beginning in July 1979, when he helped with the move to the new plant. Thereafter, he worked in the printing department until early July 1980, prior to the start of the Union's organizing effort, when he was transferred to the silkscreen department.59 This transfer was involuntary and resulted in a $1 -per-hour cut in pay. Katerzynski was one of the first and most active supporters of the Union. He helped pass out leaflets to employees, often wore a Teamsters T-shirt and button, served as the Union's elec- tion observer, and was one of the temporary stewards who met with Bebow and Bumby shortly after the elec- tion to discuss changes in working conditions. When he came to work for the Respondent in July 1979, he had requested and was granted time off to attend an airshow held in Oshkosh in late July or early August each year . In 1980, he had requested time off to attend the airshow from his supervisor in the printing de- partment and was told he could have the time off. After his transfer to the silkscreen department, he asked Wil- liam Weber about the time off. According to Kater- zynski, Weber said it would be okay; however, Weber testified that he told Katerzynski he could not give him a yes or no because it would depend on production de- a' See Dewey Bros., 187 NLRB 137 (1970); Consolidated Foods Corp., 129 NLRB 953 (1967). as Bros Three Cabinets, 248 NLRB 828, 829 (1980). sa There was evidence that the Respondent's printing function was gradually being phased out and replaced by silkscreening 1204 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD mands at the time.54 A few days before the airshow Ka- terzynski asked again and Weber told him he could not afford to give him more than 1 day off. Katerzynski took 2-1/2 days off to attend the airshow and on his return was called to a meeting with Bebow, Weber, and Jill Cartier at which he was given a written warning for his unauthorized absence. Within a few weeks after his transfer to the silkscreen department, Katerzynski began to complain about the work he was assigned and the money he was making. On two occasions during August, Katerzynski met with Weber, Bebow, and Cartier to discuss his poor attitude and lack of productivity. On the afternoon of October 9, Weber assigned Kater- zynski to an order involving multicolor silkscreening of aprons, which was one of the most difficult jobs in the department. Katerzynski was having trouble with the job and Weber worked with him on it, for from 40 minutes, according to Katerzynski, to 2 hours, according to Weber, and by the end of the afternoon Weber thought the problems had been corrected. On the following morning, Weber noticed Katerzynski was still having problems with the aprons and showed him what he was doing wrong. Katerzynski said he did not want to do the order and suggested that Weber should do it. Weber told him it was his job to show Katerzynski how to do it and that Katerzynski had to do it. Weber left after Kater- zynski produced about five good aprons. About 10:30 a.m. Weber returned to the department and Katerzynski was standing by the machine. Weber told him to get to work and Katerzynski said he had a headache and was going home. Weber told him he could not, and Kater- zynski walked away. Katerzynski returned and when Weber told him a headache was not a good enough reason to go home, Katerzynski said he was sick. Weber said, "okay, but clean the screens first." Katerzynski said, "To hell with it" and walked out.55 That afternoon Katerzynski went to a parade in Ripon and while waiting for it to start went into a tavern where he encountered Supervisor Bernice Wichman and a companion. During a brief conversation, Wichman asked Katerzynski what he was doing there and Kater- zynski said, "I got fed up and walked out."56 On the following Monday morning, Katerzynski was given a 3-day suspension for leaving work without per- mission. After Bebow learned what Katerzynski had told Wichman on the afternoon of October 10, he was called to a meeting with Bebow and Cartier and confronted with his statement to Wichman. Katerzynski refused to admit or deny making the statement. Bebow then told Katerzynski he was discharged. 64 I credit Weber over ICaterzynski who from my observation did not impress me as truthful in his testimony concerning this and other inci- dents relating to his discharge. Other evidence in the record indicates that silkscreen department employees were working overtime during July and August. 16 These findings are based on the credited testimony of Weber. De- spite some minor inconsistencies between his testimony at this hearing and in other proceedings, I found him to be a more reliable witness than Katerzynski. as Katerzynaki denied making this statement. I credit the testimony of Wichman, which was corroborated by her companion, Leon Hilt, who has no connection with the Respondent and no interest in this matter. I find that given the fact of Katerzynski's open in- volvement in union activity at the plant of which the Re- spondent was aware, its demonstrated antiunion animus, and the numerous unlawful acts of retaliation against its employees for their union support found herein, the Gen- eral Counsel has made a prima facie case under Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), which is sufficient to sup- port the inference that Katerzynski's union activity was a motivating factor in the Respondent's decision to dis- charge him. I also find that the evidence as a whole is sufficient to establish that the Respondent would have discharged him even in the absence of that activity. There is no dispute about or justification for Kater- zynski's absence from work to attend the airshow in August, which was one of the factors leading to his dis- charge. The General Counsel's contention that the warn- ing he received for that incident was an example of dis- parate treatment is incorrect. That warning was based not on the Company's policy on unexcused absences, but on Katerzynski's willful and deliberate refusal to comply with his supervisor's direction to report to work. Nor do I fmd any merit in the contention that the work assigned to Katerzynski on October 9 and 10 was an attempt to harass or provoke him. Contrary to the assertion that Weber refused to help or relieve Katerzynski when he had problems with the job, the evidence shows that Weber did personally assist Katerzynski who made little or no effort to do the job and relieved himself of it by walking out. The problems obviously were not insoluble because the job was completed by other employees. I do not agree that Weber gave Katerzynski permission to leave on October 10 and find that the Respondent was justified in discharging him when it learned that he had admitted he walked out, not because he had a headache or was sick, but because he got "fed up" with his job. Although I have found that the Respondent engaged in numerous discriminatory and retaliatory actions against its employees, this was not one of them. I shall recom- mend that this allegation be dismissed. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The Respondent's unfair labor practices, occurring in connection with its operations set forth in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and ob- structing commerce and the free flow of commerce. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The Respondent, Advertiser's Manufacturing Com- pany, is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. The Union is a labor organization within the mean- ing of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. The Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by threatening employees with more onerous working conditions if the Union were selected as their bargaining representative and by terminating Carol Hahn because of the union activities of her son and in order to discourage support for the Union among its employees. ADVERTISER'S MFG. CO. 4. The Respondent violated Section 8(aX3) and (1) of the Act by changing the terms and conditions of employ- ment of its employees and by issuing disciplinary warn- ings to Ronald Hahn in retaliation for their support of the Union. 5. The Respondent violated Section 8(aX5) and (1) of the Act by making the following unilateral changes in the terms and conditions of employment of its employ- ees: (a) Eliminating washup time in the printing and art and silkscreen departments. (b) Discontinuing the privilege of making free local telephone calls and the practice of permitting and paging employees to receive incoming telephone calls. (c) Prohibiting employees from taking their breaks and lunch periods in the loading dock area. (d) Instituting a more restrictive tardiness policy. (e) Instituting a more restrictive policy concerning granting employees time off for personal reasons. (f) Determining the amounts of and delaying imple- mentation of the employees' annual wage increases. (g) Laying off employees Gregg Yasick , James Crook, Lori Dorsey, Margaret Reinsch, Mary Shurpit, Lorie Weber, and Grada Woodruff during January and Febru- ary 1981. (h) Reducing workweeks of employees in the visor cap department during 1981. (i) Changing the piecework rates paid employees for work on "house samples." (j) Changing the methods of payment of employees in the art and silkscreen and visor cap departments for work on "crowd caps" and changing an employee from hourly paid to piecework rates. 6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices constitute unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 7. The Respondent did not engage in any unfair labor practices alleged in the consolidated complaint which are not specifically found herein. REMEDY 1205 Having found that the Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that the Respondent be required to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the poli- cies of the Act. Having found that the Respondent violated Section 8(aXl) of the Act by terminating Carol Hahn, I will rec- ommend that it be ordered to offer her immediate and full reinstatement to her former job or, if it no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without prej- udice to her seniority or other rights and privileges, and make her whole for any loss of earnings that she may have suffered from the time of her termination to the date of the offer of reinstatement. Backpay will be com- puted in the manner prescribed in F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950), with interest to be paid on the amount owing in accordance with Florida Steel Corp., 231 NLRB 651 (1977).67 Having also found that the Respondent violated Sec- tion 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by unilaterally discontinu- ing certain employment benefits and privileges enjoyed by employees represented by the Union, by reducing workweeks, by changing the effective date of annual wage increases, by changing piecework rates, by chang- ing the terms and conditions of employment, and by laying off certain employees, I shall recommend that the Respondent be ordered to bargain, on request, with the Union with respect to such changes and to restore the status quo ante in all respect, to make whole all employ- ees who have suffered monetary losses as a result of such unlawful conduct, with interest to be computed in the same manner as the backpay discussed above, and to re- scind all warnings issued to employees for violations aris- ing out of the Respondent's unlawful changes. [Recommended Order omitted from publication.] 67 See generally his Plumbing Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962).