Iron Workers Local 433 (United Steel)

IRON WORKERS LOCAL 433 (UNITED STEEL) Ironworkers Local 433, affiliated with the Interna- tional Association of Bridge, Structural and Or- namental Iron Workers, AFL-CIO and United Steel and Aram Kazazian Construction, Inc. and Carlson Southwest Corp. Cases 31-CC- 1761, 31-CC-1777, 31-CC-1770, and 31-CC- 1801-1 31 July 1986 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN DOTSON AND MEMBERS JOHANSEN AND STEPHENS On 14 February 1986 Administrative Law Judge Gordon J. Myatt issued the attached decision. The Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and the General Counsel filed limited cross-excep- tions and an answering brief. The National Labor Relations Board has delegat- ed its authority in this proceeding to a three- member panel. The Board has considered the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings, l and conclusions and to adopt the recommended Order. ORDER The National Labor Relations Board adopts the recommended Order of the administrative law r We note an apparently inadvertent error in the administrative law judge's decision as to the date the charge was filed concerning conduct at the Hollywood jobsite. The relevant charge was filed on 27 June 1984. The judge found that the Respondent's statement to Blaise Possum, Vegas Steel's general manager, violated Sec. 8(b)(4xn )(B) of the Act be- cause the Respondent failed to qualify its statement by clearly indicating that its picketing would comply with the lawful restrictions placed on common situs picketing. The Respondent excepts to the judge's finding on the grounds that Possum testified that the work it subcontracted to United Steel was the entire job. The Respondent asserts that since Vegas Steel subcontracted its entire job to United Steel, there was no need for it to add that its picketing would comply with the restrictions established in Sailors Union (Moore Dry Dock), 92 NLRB 547 (1950) The Respondent relies on Electrical Workers Local 38 (Cleveland Electra Metals), 221 NLRB 1073 (1975), in support of its proposition that it did not have a duty to clarify its statement to Possum The Respondent's reliance on Cleveland Electra Metals is misplaced In that case, we concluded that a statement concerning picketing by a union's business agent should not be construed as an unlawful threat to engage in secondary picketing because it was clear that of the two other contracts involved, one was virtually completed and the other had not yet been awarded . Furthermore, the business agent's statement that the union right picket was made in reply to a question by the contractor. Therefore, the Board concluded it would be unreasonable to construe the statement as an unlawful threat. That is not the case here While Possum testified that Vegas Steel, a subcontractor, was subcontracting its entire job to United Steel, the record does not contain evidence showing that the Respondent had a basis for assuming that other subcontractors, doing work other than the steel erection work, would not be present at the site. Consequently, we do not have the assurance that we had in Cleveland Electra Metals that the Respondent understood the primary's employees would be the only employees on the jobsite. In such circumstances, we conclude that the Respondent had an affirmative duty to qualify its threat by clearly indi- cating that the picketing would conform with the Moore Dry Dock guide- lines, and we affirm the judge's finding. 1325 judge and orders that the Respondent, Ironworkers Local 433, affiliated with the International Associa- tion of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers, AFL-CIO, its officers, agents, and repre- sentatives, shall take the action set forth in the Order, except that the attached notices are substi- tuted for those of the administrative law judge. APPENDIX A NOTICE To EMPLOYEES AND MEMBERS POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to post and abide by this notice. WE WILL NOT in any manner induce or encour- age employees of Carlson Southwest Corp., Cal Erectors, Ben F. Smith, or any other person en- gaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, to refuse in the course of their employ- ment to perform any service where an object there- of is to force or require Carlson Southwest Corp., Cal Erectors, Ben F. Smith, or any other person to cease doing business with Warehouse Equipment Inc., with each other, or with any other person. WE WILL NOT in any manner threaten, coerce, or restrain Carlson Southwest Corp., Cal Erectors, Ben F. Smith, or any other person engaged in com- merce or in an industry affecting commerce, where an object thereof is to force or require Carlson, Cal Erectors, Ben F. Smith, or any other person to cease doing business with each other, Warehouse Equipment, Inc., or any other person. IRONWORKERS LOCAL 433, AFFILI- ATED WITH INTERNATIONAL Asso- CIATION OF BRIDGE, STRUCTURAL & ORNAMENTAL IRON WORKERS, AFL-CIO APPENDIX B NOTICE To EMPLOYEES AND MEMBERS POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to post and abide by this notice. WE WILL NOT in any manner induce or encour- age employees of J & R Steel, or any other person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, to refuse in the course of their employ- 280 NLRB No. 152 1326 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD ment to perform any service where an object there- of is to force or require J & R Steel, or any other person to cease doing business with Aram Kaza- zian Construction, Inc., or with any other person. WE WILL NOT in any manner threaten, coerce, or restrain J & R Steel, or any other person en- gaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, where an object thereof is to force or require J & R Steel, or any other person to cease doing business with each other, Aram Kazazian Construction, Inc., or any other person. IRONWORKERS LOCAL 433, AFFILI- ATED WITH INTERNATIONAL ASSO- CIATION OF BRIDGE, STRUCTURAL & ORNAMENTAL IRON WORKERS, AFL-CIO APPENDIX C NOTICE To EMPLOYEES AND MEMBERS POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to post and abide by this notice. WE WILL NOT in any manner threaten, coerce, or restrain Vegas Steel, S. J. Amoroso, Nevada Steel, or any other person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, where an object thereof is to force or require Vegas Steel, S. J. Amoroso, Nevada Steel, or any other person to cease doing business with United Steel, or with any other person. IRONWORKERS LOCAL 433, AFFILI- ATED WITH INTERNATIONAL ASSO- CIATION OF BRIDGE, STRUCTURAL & ORNAMENTAL IRON WORKERS, AFL-CIO Arthur Yuter, Esq., for the General Counsel. David A. Rosenfeld, Esq. (Van Bourg, Weinberg, Roger & Rosenfeld), of San Francisco, California, for the Re- spondent. James T. Winkler, Esq. (Atkinson, Andelson Loya, Ruud & Romo), of Cerritos, California, for Charging Parties Kazazian and Carlson. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE GORDON J. MYATT, Administrative Law Judge. On a series of charges " filed by United Steel (United), Aram i Several amended consolidated complaints were issued in this matter. Among other things, they included an additional charging party and Kazazian Construction, Inc. (Kazazian),2 and Carlson Southwest Corp. (Carlson) against Ironworkers Local 433, affiliated with the International Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers, AFL- CIO (Respondent Union or Local 433), the Regional Di- rector for Region 31 issued a second amended consoli- dated complaint and notice of hearing on 31 December 1984.3 In essence, the amended consolidated complaint alleges Respondent Union was involved in a dispute with an employer performing work as a subcontractor on a construction project in San Bernardino, California where Carlson was the general contractor. It further alleges that Respondent Union engaged in picketing at the Carl- son jobsite and the legend on the picket signs failed to identify the employer with whom Respondent Union had a dispute. This conduct is alleged to have been for an un- lawful objective and in violation of Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. Next it alleges that Respondent Union induced and en- couraged certain of its members to withhold services from their employer at a jobsite in Hollywood, Califor- nia, where Kazazian was performing work as a concrete subcontractor. Additionally, it alleges that Respondent Union brought internal charges against and subsequently fined certain of its members for working behind a picket line established at the Hollywood jobsite. This conduct is also alleged to have been for an unlawful objective and in violation of Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) of the Act. Finally, it alleges that in Las Vegas, Nevada, Respond- ent Union threatened to picket two separate jobsites in order to prevent United from performing steel erection work: the first incident occurring at the Circus Circus Hotel where United had been awarded a subcontract; the other occurring at the McCarran International Airport where United was performing on a subcontract. In each instance, this conduct is alleged to have violated Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act. A hearing4 was held in this matter in Los Angeles, California, and Las Vegas, Nevada, on 4 March and 18 April 1985, respectively. All parties were represented by counsel and afforded full opportunity to examine and cross-examine witnesses and to present material and rele- vant evidence on the issues involved. After presentation of the evidence, the General Counsel argued orally on the record and, in addition, all counsel submitted written briefs which have been duly considered. cited several other labor organizations as respondents along with Iron- workers Local 433 Immediately preceding the hearing herein, the Re- gional Director approved settlement agreements relating to the other labor organizations and, on request, a withdrawal request was approved at the hearing involving the additional charging party cited in the final amended consolidated complaint Hence, the caption of these cases re- flects the remainder of the charges underlying the final amended consoli- dated complaint. The name of this Charging Party appears as amended at the hearing Unless otherwise indicated, all dates herein refer to the 1984. 4 At the hearing, Respondent Union admitted certain allegations of the final amended consolidated complaint , denied others, and specifically denied engaging in any conduct which violated Sec. 8(bX4Xi) and (u)(B) of the Act IRON WORKERS LOCAL 433 (UNITED STEEL) On the entire record in this consolidated matter, in- cluding my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying, I make the following FINDINGS OF FACT 1. JURISDICTION The pleadings admit and I fmd the following: (1) United Steel is a Nevada corporation engaged in the business of steel erection and fabrication. United has an office and place of business located in Las Vegas, Nevada. In the course of its business operations, United annually sells goods or services valued in excess of $50,000 to Kerr-McGee Chemical Corporation, a compa- ny located in Nevada, which in turn meets the Board's jurisdictional standards. (2) Kazazian is a California corporation engaged in the building and construction industry as a concrete contrac- tor. In the course of its business operations, Kazazian an- nually purchases and receives goods and services valued in excess of $50,000 from a combination of suppliers- some of whom are located within the State of California and some of whom are located outside the State of Cali- fornia. Of those suppliers located within the State of California, the goods and services they supply to Kaza- zian are received from sources located outside the State of California. (3) Carlson is a Texas corporation engaged in the building and construction industry as a general contrac- tor. In the course and conduct of its business operations, Carlson annually purchases and receives goods and serv- ices valued in excess of $50,000 directly from suppliers located outside the State of California for use on its con- struction project located in San Bernardino, California. (4) Vegas Steel (Vegas) is a Nevada corporation oper- ating in the building and construction industry as a con- tractor engaged in the business of steel erection and fab- rication. In April 1984, Vegas awarded a subcontract to United to perform steel erection work on the Circus Circus Hotel jobsite located in Las Vegas, Nevada. (5) S. J. Amoroso Construction Corporation (Amor- oso) is a California corporation which maintains an office and place of business in Las Vegas, Nevada. Amoroso is engaged in the building and construction industry as the general contractor. Amoroso is the general contractor for structural construction at the McCarran International Airport. (6) Nevada Steel Corporation (Nevada) is a Nevada corporation engaged in the business of steel fabrication and installation in the building and construction industry. Amoroso subcontracted steel fabrication work at the McCarran jobsite to Nevada who in turn subcontracted steel retrofitting work on that jobsite to United. (7) J & R Steel Company (J & R) is a California cor- poration with an office and place of business located in Fontana, California. J & R is engaged in the business of installing structural steel stairs and building frames in the building and construction industry. In the course and conduct of its business operations, J & R annually pur- chases and receives goods and services valued in excess of $50,000 directly from suppliers located outside the State of California. 1327 Based on the above, I find that United Steel, Kerr- McGee, Amoroso, Vegas Steel, Nevada Steel, Carlson, Kazazian, and J & R Steel are, and have been at all times material herein, persons engaged in commerce or an in- dustry affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED The pleadings admit, and I find, that Ironworkers Local 433, affiliated with the International Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers, AFL- CIO is a labor organization within the meaning of Sec- tion 2(5) of the Act. III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The Carlson Jobsite in San Bernardino The undisputed testimony indicates that in November 1984 Carlson was the general contractor on a project for Southland Corporation constructing a distribution center in San Bernardino, California. The project involved the construction of a 300,000-foot warehouse facility and a 25,000-foot vehicle maintenance facility. Carlson had 70 to 80 of its own employees working at the jobsite and none of these employees were represented by a union. There were also 8 to 10 subcontractors of Carlson em- ployed at the jobsite. In addition, Southland directly sub- contracted the installation of metal racks in the ware- house to Warehouse Equipment, Inc. (Warehouse). The unrefuted testimony of Larry Aronson, Carlson's project manager at the jobsite, reveals that on 7 Novem- ber Dan Prentice, a business agent for Local 433, came to the project. Prentice went into the general contrac- tor's trailer and spoke with Aronson's superior. Aronson, who was in the trailer at the time, heard Prentice ask the name of the company that had been awarded the con- tract to install the racks in the warehouse. When told that Warehouse was performing the work, Prentice asked for and was given the telephone number of that employer. Aronson testified that Carlson's officials subsequently heard rumors that Local 433 was upset over the fact that the racks were being installed by a company employing workers who were not members of Respondent Union. As a result, Aronson sent a telegram on 8 November to Prentice at Local 433 notifying the Respondent Union that Warehouse would be installing the racks and that Carlson was establishing a reserved gate for that employ- er at the jobsite. Aronson acknowledged on cross-exami- nation that the telegram designated Gate 1 as the gate re- served for Warehouse. On 14 November, two pickets appeared at the jobsite at approximately 7 a.m. and began picketing at Gate 1 and Gate 2. The sign erected by Carlson at Gate 1, how- ever, reserved its use for several contractors other than Warehouse. Specifically, the posted sign reserved the gate for the use of the personnel, visitors, and suppliers of General Floor Company, Continental Plumbing, Aldon Electric Co., and Southcoast Electric. The posted sign directed all others to use Gate 2. (See G.C. Exh. 5.) 1328 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Aronson testified that Gate 1 was reserved for contrac- tors who did not employ ironworkers. There is no testimony regarding the identity or union affiliation of the pickets other than the legend on the picket signs they were carrying . The picket signs con- tained the following legend: Work Being Performed Below Standards Established By Ironworkers Local 433 Authorized By San Bernardino Building & Construction Trades Council AFL-CIO (See G.C. Exh. 4.) The pickets remained until approxi- mately 10:30 a.m. and resumed picketing the following morning.5 Aronson's unrefuted testimony indicates that two sub- contractors on the project, Cal Erectors and Ben F. Smith, employed workers who were members of the Iron Workers and they were performing work on the jobsite at the time the picketing began. Aronson stated these employees refused to work on each of the days that the picketing took place. Respondent Union's answer denied the occurrence of each of the incidents to which the witnesses for the Gen- eral Counsel testified regarding the Carlson jobsite. At the conclusion of the General Counsel 's case, however, Respondent Union rested without introducing any evi- dence to refute the testimony or evidence presented by the General Counsel. Concluding Findings Respondent Union contends the General Counsel has failed to establish that the Union authorized and was re- sponsible for the picketing which occurred at the Carl- son jobsite on 14 and 15 November. It is argued that the absence of such evidence constitutes a fatal defect in the element of proof required to sustain a finding that Local 433 engaged in unlawful picketing on the dates in ques- tion. I reject this contention and find that the record, in the circumstances of this case, warrants a determination that Local 433 bears a responsibility for the picketing at the Carlson jobsite. As the record reveals, Local 433 rested and did not put on any evidence to rebut the testimony of the Gener- al Counsel's witnesses nor did it make any attempt to dis- credit or offer any explanation regarding the exhibits placed into evidence. Furthermore, I find the testimony of the witnesses for the General Counsel was candid, precise, and straightforward . Accordingly, I credit their account of the events which occurred and consider them to be accurate and truthful. 6 The testimony indicates that the millwrights were also picketing the project on the same days as the above pickets. Thus, the record establishes that on 7 November the business agent of Local 433 (Prentice) asked Carlson's supervisors for and received the name and telephone number of the employer (Warehouse) scheduled to per- form the rack installation work on the project. It is also established in the record that as a result of rumors to the effect that the ironworkers considered the rack installa- tion to be their work, Carlson's supervisors sent a tele- gram to Local 433 on 8 November notifying the Union again that Warehouse would perform the rack installa- tion work and that Gate 1 would be reserved for that employer's use. When the picketing occurred on 14 and 15 November, the pickets carried picket signs which the record exhibit reveals to be commercially preprinted and containing the name of Local 433. Additionally, there was no indication on the picket signs of the name of the employer with whom Local 433 had its dispute at the project. Although there is no direct evidence in the record that Local 433 authorized or ratified the picketing, as counsel for Carlson correctly stated in his brief, reasonable infer- ences may be drawn from the circumstantial evidence to sustain the General Counsel's burden of proving respon- sibility for the conduct; especially when there is no evi- dence offered to rebut any of the circumstantial evi- dence. Cf. Teamsters Local 536 (Connecticut Foundry), 165 NLRB 916 (1967). See also Iron Workers Local 433 v. NLRB, 598 F.2d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 1979). In these cir- cumstances, I find the record supports the inference that Local 433 was responsible for the picketing at the Carl- son jobsite on 14 and 15 November and, further, that the picketing occurred because the employees of Warehouse were performing the rack installation work. Respondent Union next contends that even if it is held responsible for the picketing at the Carlson jobsite, the picketing occurred at the gate which Carlson designated in its telegram and the Union had a right to rely on this notification. As with Respondent Union's first conten- tion, I also reject this argument. Concededly, when the pickets arrived, Gate 1 was not posted as reserved for use by Warehouse or its employees but, rather, was posted as being reserved for use by several other con- tractors, their employees, suppliers, and visitors. The posted sign clearly stated, however, that "all others must use Gate No. 2." In these circumstances, I find the dis- crepancy between the telegram notification and the actual posting at Gate 1 did not invalidate that gate as being reserved for use by the listed neutral employers. Although Carlson did not directly notify Local 433 of the change in the designation of the neutral gate, the posting at Gate I was clear and precise and the employ- ers not specified on the sign-"all others"-were direct- ed to use Gate 2. Furthermore, because Respondent Union presented no evidence whatsoever, there is noth- ing in the record which indicates any confusion existed among the pickets because of the discrepancy between the notification and the actual posting of the neutral gate. See Electrical Workers IBEW Local 400 (County of Ocean), 269 NLRB 119 (1984); Carpenters Local 1622 (Specialty Building), 262 NLRB 1244 (1982). IRON WORKERS LOCAL 433 (UNITED STEEL) Having determined Respondent Union picketed a properly established neutral gate on 14 and 15 November and that the picket signs did not identify the employer with whom the Union had a dispute, the critical question remaining is whether the picketing was for a proscribed secondary objective. I find that it was and the Union violated Section 8(b)(4XB) of the Act. It has been long established that the provisions of Sec- tion 8(bX4) reflect "the dual Congressional objectives of preserving the right of labor organizations to bring pres- sure to bear on offending employers in primary labor dis- putes and of shielding unoffending employers and others from pressures and controversies not their own." NLRB v. Denver Building Trades Council (Gould & Preisner), 341 U.S. 675, 692 (1951). In determining whether picketing is primary (and therefore lawful) or secondary (and thus designed to enmesh neutrals in the dispute), the Board has developed, with court approval, guidelines which are found in the Moore Dry Dock case. 8 These guidelines, however, are evidentiary in nature and are not to be ap- plied in a mechanical fashion. Thus, compliance with the Moore Dry Dock standards gives rise only to a rebuttable presumption that the picketing is primary in nature, and it is necessary to consider the totality of the evidence in each case to determine whether an underlying secondary objective exists. Electrical Workers IBEW Local 400 (County of Ocean), supra, fn. 2; Carpenters Local 1622 (Robert Wood), 262 NLRB 1211, 1216 (1982). It is equally settled law that when the picketing occurs at a common situs, such as exists here, an employer may insulate neutral employers, their employees, suppliers, and visitors from disputes not their own by properly es- tablishing and maintaining separate gates for those in- volved in the labor dispute as opposed to those not so involved. When such gates are properly established and maintained, a union may picket only at the gate of the employer with whom it has the dispute. Operating Engi- neers Local 761 v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667 (1961); Building & Construction Trades Council of New Orleans (Markwell & Hartz), 155 NLRB 319 (1965), enfd. 387 F.2d 79 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied 391 U.S. 914 (1968). Because the unrefuted evidence shows Respondent Union picketed at both the neutral and primary gates and did so with picket signs which did not disclose the iden- tity of the employer with whom the dispute existed, the record supports the presumption that the picketing had a secondary objective; i.e., to encompass the entire project in the dispute by appealing to the employees of all em- ployers having business at the jobsite. Inasmuch as Re- spondent Union has failed to present any evidence to jus- tify its conduct and therefore rebut this presumption, a s Sailors Union (Moore Dry Dock), 92 NLRB 547 (1950). The guidelines developed by the Board to determine if the picketing is presumptively primary are: (a) The picketing is strictly limited to times when the sites of the dispute is located on the secondary employer's premises; (b) At the time of the picketing, the primary employer is engaged in its normal business at the situs; (c) The picketing is limited to places reasonably close to the loca- tion of the situs; and (d) The picketing discloses clearly that the dispute is with the pri- mary employer. Id. at 549. 1329 finding that the picketing was unlawful is fully warrant- ed. Service Employees Local 32B-33J (New York Assn. for the Blind), 250 NLRB 240, 247-248 (1980). See also Plumbers Local 274 (Stokely-Van Camp), 267 NLRB 1111, 1114 (1983). Accordingly, I find that by picketing the Carlson job- site on 14 and 15 November, Respondent Union induced and encouraged employees of Carlson, Cal Erectors, Ben F. Smith, and other neutral employers to cease perform- ing services for their employers and also threatened, co- erced, and restrained these employers in order to force them to cease doing business with Carlson and/or South- land to compel the removal of Warehouse from the job- site. Hence, the record establishes Respondent Union violated Section 8(b)(4Xi) and (ii)(B) of the Act. B. The Hollywood Jobsite Kazazian Construction was employed as a subcontrac- tor on a construction project in Hollywood, California. The general contractor on this project was Van Baka- layan. Kazazian's subcontract was for the building of a subterranean parking structure . Kazazian's employees performed work as laborers, cement masons, and carpen- ters and they were not represented by any labor organi- zation. J 8c R Steel was one of the subcontractors on the Hol- lywood project and was responsible for the structural steel work. Jose Para, a principal owner and officer of J & R, performed hands-on work at the project along with approximately 12 employees; among whom were his two brothers, Marbel and Pedro Para. Jose and his brothers were members of Local 433 and that union represented the employees of J & R. Kazazian began working on the Hollywood jobsite in August 1983. In November 1983, Carpenters Local 1052 began picketing the project protesting that Kazazian was not paying prevailing wages. The picketing continued until 17 December 1983 . It stopped until 27 December 1983 and continued thereafter until the second week in February 1984. The unrefuted testimony of Aram Kazazian , president of Kazazian, discloses that on 28 December he went to the jobsite and discovered his employees were not work- ing. Kazazian was informed by his foreman that the iron- workers had chased the Kazazian employees off the job. Kazazian then spoke to Al Mendoza, steward of the ironworkers employed by J & R, about the problem.7 Mendoza told Kazazian that the ironworker employees would not work with "scabs" on the job. Kazazian then called the office of Local 433 and spoke with Joe Ward, the Union's business manager. Kazazian testified he told Ward there was a two-gate system at the project. Ward replied that Respondent Union did not recognize a two- gate system but he would discuss the matter with the 4 Respondent Union denies that Mendoza was the Iron Workers stew- ard. However, YA,,,m,n testified he was told by the business agent of Local 433, Les Rogers, that Mendoza was the Iron Workers steward on the project. Jose Para testified that Mendoza was the steward of his em- ployees on the project and that Rogers appointed Mendoza to this posi- tion. Neither Mendoza nor Rogers appeared as a witness in these pro- ceedings. 1330 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD business agent of the Carpenters Local.8 The next day Rogers came to the jobsite and Kazazian spoke to him about the problem he was encountering with the iron- worker employees. Rogers promised that he would speak to Mendoza, who Rogers said was the steward of the ironworkers on the project. The following Monday, 3 January, Kazazian over- heard Mendoza speaking to the Carpenters business agent outside the project. Mendoza told the business agent that the ironworkers would continue to work on the project until instructed by Rogers to do otherwise.9 The following morning when Kazazian arrived at the jobsite he saw approximately 20 business agents from various craft unions gathered at the project. Rogers was among this group . He observed Rogers conducting a meeting with the ironworker employees of J & R for ap- proximately half an hour. After Rogers concluded his meeting, Kazazian spoke with Mendoza in an effort to ascertain what was going on at the project. Mendoza told Kazazian the ironworkers could not work on the job with Kazazian's employees. He stated that if they did, they would be fined $500 and blacklisted. Kazazian testified the ironworkers refused to work on the project that day. Jose Para testified J & R began work on the Holly- wood project in mid-December 1983 and continued until the end of February 1984. Para stated that about the second week on the job he had a conversation in a nearby restaurant with Rogers and Mendoza. Para said they discussed the unsafe conditions on the job and that the ironworkers could not work behind picket lines. Para further testified that 3 or 4 weeks later, Rogers came on the project and spoke to him and other ironworkers about the unsafe conditions on the project. Rogers also told the employees it was up to each individual whether they would work behind the picket line. Para stated that near the end of J & R's work on the job, he was putting up a safety line and Mendoza called him to a telephone to speak to Ward. Para was told by Ward to finish the safety line and get off the job.'o Sometime in March, after J & R had completed its work on the project, Mendoza brought charges against Jose Para and his two brothers before the executive board of Local 433. The charges were for working behind a picket line, cursing a union official, and work- ing under unsafe conditions.l' A hearing was held ° Ward did not testify in these proceedings. ° It should be noted here that the General Counsel represented at the hearing that none of the events or conversations occurring on 28 and 29 December and 3 January are alleged to be violations of the Act. The rel- evant charge in this matter was filed on 27 December and served shortly thereafter. To avoid any problems relating to the 6-month limitation period under Sec. 10(b) of the Act, the General Counsel does not assert or plead any of these conversations or events as violations of the Act. The testimony was presented, however , to shed light on and explain events which occurred within the 6 -month limitation period. Machinists Local 1424 (Bryan Mfg. Co.) v. NLRB, 362 U.S. 411 (1960). 10 None of Para's conversations with Rogers or Ward are alleged by the General Counsel to be violations. 11 Para testified he "lost," "misplaced," or "threw away" the docu- ments notifying him of the charges and the subsequent imposition of the fine. Pars also testified that while on the Hollywood project , he told his ironworker employees, "Fuck Les Rogers." He stated this statement was the basis for the charge of cursing a union official. The General Counsel subpoenaed the Union's copies of the internal charges and the results of before the executive board on Mendoza's charges. Rogers presided and Mendoza and other J & R employ- ees testified against Para and his brothers . Para testified they were each found guilty. He was fined $600 and his brothers were fined $300 each by the Respondent Union. Concluding Findings At the hearing, Respondent Union denied Mendoza was the Iron Workers steward or that he was an agent for Local 433 at the Hollywood jobsite. Despite this denial, however, the only evidence presented regarding Mendoza's status was the unrefuted testimony of wit- nesses presented by the General Counsel. Contrary to Respondent Union, I find this testimony is sufficient to establish that Mendoza was the steward for Local 433 at the Hollywood project. Kazazian's testimony stands uncontradicted that on 29 December he was informed by Rogers that Mendoza was Respondent Union's steward on the job. Of equal importance is the testimony of Jose Para, employer of the ironworkers on the project, that Mendoza was the Iron Workers steward and had been appointed to this position by Rogers. In light of this uncontroverted testi- mony, I find that Mendoza was the steward for Local 433 on the Hollywood project. I also find that Mendoza, as the Iron Workers steward on the project, was an agent for the Union within the meaning of Section 2(13) of the Act. He was the only onsite union representative for the ironworker employees on the project and in this capacity possessed and exer- cised apparent authority to deal with any disputes in- volving these employees; including disputes arising over working with nonunion employees on the jobsite. Indeed, the record amply demonstrates that Mendoza was cloaked with and exercised such authority on the jobsite on behalf of Local 433. Thus, when Kazazian complained to Rogers on 29 December about the trouble between his employees and the ironworkers, Rogers promised Kazazian that he would speak to Mendoza about the matter. Likewise, on 3 January Mendoza told the business agent of the Carpenters Local that the iron- workers would continue to work on the Hollywood project until advised by Rogers to do otherwise. I find, therefore, that Mendoza was Respondent Union 's agent on the Hollywood project and , in this capacity, his state- ments and conduct are imputable to Respondent Union. Cf. Teamsters Local 886 (Lee Way Motor Freight), 229 NLRB 832 (1977). Thus, by telling Kazazian on 4 January that the iron- workers could not work on the job with Kazazian's em- ployees and if they did, they would be fined $500 and blacklisted, Mendoza was disclosing the position adopted by his superiors in the Union. His comments in this regard clearly indicate that Local 433 was engaging in unlawful secondary activity by involving J & R in the dispute with Kazazian. The threats to fine and blacklist the employees of J & R, if they worked on the job with the executive board action against the Paras. Respondent Union refused to comply with the subpoena and enforcement was not sought by the General Counsel IRON WORKERS LOCAL 433 (UNITED STEEL) Kazazian's employees, were clearly intended to induce and encourage the ironworker employees to withhold their services from J & R to cause that neutral employer to cease doing business with the general contractor and Kazazian. In so doing, Local 433 also coerced and re- strained J & R for the same unlawful secondary objec- tive. Accordingly, I find that on 4 January Local 433 en- gaged in conduct at the Hollywood jobsite which violat- ed Section 8(b)(4Xi) and (ii)(B) of the Act. Cf. Carpenters Local 180 (B & K Drywall), 181 NLRB 94 (1970); NLRB v. Glaziers Local 1621, 632 F.2d 89 (9th Cir. 1980). The General Counsel contends the fines imposed by Respondent Union on Jose Para and his two brothers also violated Section 8(bX4)(B) of the Act. Specifically, the fines against Marbel and Pedro Para are alleged to constitute inducement and encouragement of these em- ployees for an unlawful secondary objective and the fine against Jose Para constitutes restraint and coercion of him, as owner of J & R, for the same purpose. Respond- ent Union contends there is no competent evidence in the record that establishes charges were brought against or fines imposed on the Para brothers. Further, Respond- ent Union argues that Jose Para does not constitute a "person" within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the Act. I reject all Respondent Union's contentions in this regard and find that the record fully supports a finding that the fines violated Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) of the Act. Jose Para testified regarding the charges brought against him and his brothers and the events that occurred at their joint hearing before the executive board of the Union on the charges. Respondent Union offered nothing to refute this testimony. Hence, the record establishes that Para saw copies of the charges brought against him and his brothers, participated with his brothers at the hearing before the executive board, and received and read the written notifications imposing the fines. Respondent Union's contention that this testimony is not competent to establish that charges were brought and fines imposed upon the Paras misconstrues the pur- pose of this testimony. Jose Para's testimony was not presented to establish the precise contents of the docu- ments charging him and his brothers or the contents of the letters notifying them of the imposition of the fines. Rather, he was testifying to the fact that charges were brought, that a hearing was held, and that fines were im- posed. The absence of the underlying documents, issued by the Respondent Union, does not destroy the compe- tency of his testimony on these matters. Contrary to Re- spondent Union, therefore, Rule 1004 of the Federal Rules of Evidence has no application here. Moreover, because Respondent Union refused to comply with the subpoena of the General Counsel requesting copies of the underlying documents and did not present any evi- dence to refute Para's testimony, it cannot now be per- mitted to assert that the absence of these documents causes the testimony of Para on these matters to be in- competent. It is well established that fines imposed on members, who are employees of a neutral employer at a common situs, for working during a dispute with a primary em- ployer at the situs, induces and encourages the fined em- 1331 ployees to withhold their services from the neutral em- ployer for an unlawful secondary objective; i.e., to force the neutral to cease doing business with the primary and other employers at the common situs. Orange County District Council of Carpenters, 242 NLRB 585 (1979); Carpenters' District Council of Southern Colorado (Pace Construction), 222 NLRB 613 (1976). See also Plumbers (Hansen Plumbing), 277 NLRB 1231 (1985). It follows, therefore, that the imposition of the fines on Marbel and Pedro Para violated Section 8(b)(4)(i)(B) of the Act. Although Jose Para's fine was imposed in his capacity as a union member, he was also the principal owner of J & R. Thus, a natural consequence of the fine imposed on him was to force him, as a neutral employer, to cease doing business with other employers, including Kazazian with whom Respondent Union had its dispute. Contrary to Respondent Union, I find Jose Para, as an owner of J & R, was a "person" within the meaning of subsection (ii) of Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the Act. See Carpenters Local 180 (B & K Drywall), supra. Accordingly, I find the im- position of the fine on Jose Para violated Section 8(b)(4Xii)(B) of the Act. Nor does the fact that J & R had completed its portion of the work on the Hollywood project prior to the impo- sition of the fines rule out the finding of a violation here. The Board has consistently held that "the cease doing business element of Section 8(b)(4)(B) embraces prospec- tive as well as existing business relationships, and does not require that the company-party to the primary dis- pute even be known at the time of the union conduct in question." Carpenters District Council of Southern Colora- do (Pace Construction), supra at 618. See also Orange County District Council of Carpenters, supra; Lithographers Local 17 (Graphic Arts), 130 NLRB 985 (1961). C. The Circus Circus Jobsite The allegations relating to Respondent Union's activi- ties in Las Vegas, Nevada, involve two separate con- struction jobs. The first is alleged to have occurred at the Circus Circus Hotel. Blaise Fossum, part owner and general manager of Vegas Steel (Vegas), testified that Vegas was awarded a subcontract by Ainsworth-Faulkner in mid-March 1984 to perform steel erection work at the Circus Circus project. Vegas in turn subcontracted the steel erection on the project to United Steel. United was scheduled to commence work on 2 May. Fossum's undisputed testimony discloses that on 1 May he received a call from Fred Toomey, business agent of Respondent Union. Toomey asked who Vegas hired to put up the steel on the Circus Circus project. Toomey also stated he heard that Vegas hired a scab outfit to do the work. Fossum replied that Vegas was going to have United perform the steel work. Toomey then called Fossum an "asshole" and asked if Fossum knew his laws. He stated Respondent Union had $75 million to fight Vegas if it used United. Toomey concluded this conver- sation with Fossum by saying, "I'll picket the job and see 1332 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD that Pat [Pat Puckett, president of United] doesn't put up a piece of steel." 12 On cross-examination, Fossum testified that the steel erection was the entire job and he understood Toomey to mean he would picket Puckett at the Circus Circus job. Both Puckett and Fossum testified that United did not perform any work on the Circus Circus job. Fossum stated that after the conversation with Toomey, he with- drew the contract from United. Puckett corroborated this testimony. He stated that United was instructed by Fossum not to do the work and that the contract was "denied." Concluding Findings Respondent Union contends that Toomey 's statements to Fossum were lawful. It argues that it had a right to advise Fossum that it had a dispute with United and would picket United at the jobsite. In support of this ar- gument, Respondent Union cites Electrical Workers IBEW Local 38 (Cleveland Electra Metals), 221 NLRB 1073 (1975). In that case, a union representative threat- ened to engage in informational picketing of a neutral employer's plant if the primary employer were awarded a contract to perform certain electrical work. In revers- ing the finding of a violation by the administrative law judge, the Board found the primary employer was the only contractor under discussion during the time the al- leged threat was made and that other contracts on the job had either been almost completed or were not yet awarded. The Board held that under these circumstances the threat was a lawful statement of the possibility to engage in informational picketing only against the pri- mary. The General Counsel, on the other hand , relies on cases of more recent vintage to support the finding of a violation. In Sheet Metal Workers Local 418 (Young Plumbing)19 a union informed a neutral employer that it would be forced to put up a picket line if the primary employer were not pulled off the job at the neutral's premises. There the administrative law judge found that although there was no evidence that the union would engage in unlawful picketing, Board precedent obligated the union to give advance assurance the picketing would be conducted within the Moore Dry Dock limitations. The administrative law judge held a generalized threat to picket did not carry a presumption that the picketing would "conform with established restrictions." The Board specifically adopted the reasoning of the adminis- trative law judge in that case and upheld the finding of a violation of Section 8(bX4)(ii)(B) of the Act. The General Counsel also cites a more recent case in- volving a threat to picket in which the Board affirmed an administrative law judge's finding of a violation. In Food & Commercial Workers Local 506 (Coors Distribut- ing), 268 NLRB 475 (1983), the administrative law judge found where threats are made to picket at a secondary i a Toomey was not called as a witness during any portion of the hear- ing regarding the Union's Las Vegas activity . Respondent Union rested after the conclusion of the presentation of the General Counsel 's case and did not present any evidence whatsoever. la 227 NLRB 300 (1976) employer's business, "the burden is on the union to re- strict its statement to the giving of notice of prospective lawful activity against the primary. Unqualified or am- biguous threats will be construed against the union as threats to the secondary's business relationship with the primary." Thus, it would appear that more recent Board deci- sions require that a union, when expressing threats to a secondary to picket a primary at the premises of a sec- ondary, to qualify the threat by clearly indicating that the picketing will conform with the lawful restrictions imposed on such picketing . Accordingly, I am con- strained to find that when Toomey told Fossum he would picket at the Circus Circus Hotel if United per- formed the steel erection work, Respondent Union's threat did not contain the necessary qualifications re- quired by Board law. I find this to be true in spite of the fact that Fossum testified the steel erection work was the entire job. Therefore, I find that the threat to picket the Circus Circus Hotel if United performed the work was in violation of Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act. D. The McCarron Airport Jobsite S. J. Amoroso Construction Co. (Amoroso), a general contractor, had a contract at the McCarran International Airport for the retrofitting of structural steel. Amoroso subcontracted a portion of the retrofitting work to Nevada Steel (Nevada) who in turn subcontracted a por- tion of its work to United. Carl Mumper, a project manager for Amoroso on the McCarran job, testified that he received a telephone call from a person who identified himself as Toomey at ap- proximately 10 a.m. on 25 July. Mumper had never seen or spoken to Toomey prior to this conversation. He testi- fied that he was able to ascertain the caller was Toomey not only because the caller identified himself as such, but also because the caller imparted certain information which caused him to conclude that he was in fact speak- ing with Toomey. 14 Mumper stated he had been in- formed by his superintendent that Toomey had appeared on the McCarran project shortly after midnight on 25 July in the company of the foreman from American Bridge and inspected Amoroso's jobsite . Mumper testi- fied that during the telephone conversation he asked the caller how he got on the jobsite because security require- ments enforced at the airport mandated that all persons had to have a picture badge. The caller replied that he had been brought on the project by the foreman of American Bridge and he had inspected Amoroso's job- site. Mumper further testified that during the telephone conversation, Toomey asked if Mumper realized he had nonunion workers on his job and he identified them as the employees of United. Mumper replied that he did not have a contract with United and stated that Amoroso's contract was with Nevada. Toomey then requested that Mumper ask Nevada to remove United from the project. 14 It should be noted at this point that on cross-examination Mumper stated he had talked with Toomey subsequent to this initial telephone conversation As previously indicated, Toomey did not appear at or testi- fy in these proceedings. IRON WORKERS LOCAL 433 (UNITED STEEL) Mumper refused, stating that the work was at a critical point and he would not ask United's employees to leave the job. Toomey then said, "You know I can throw up a line." Mumper replied, "Go for it," and repeated that the work was too critical to stop at this point . The conversa- tion concluded with Toomey stating he hoped they could work something out and he would talk to Mumper later. Puckett testified that in the early morning hours on 25 July, he spoke with Toomey at the McCarran jobsite. Toomey told Puckett that Puckett had been caught "sneaking around" again. He said Respondent Union was going to put up a picket and get United pulled off the job just as it had on the Circus Circus job. During this conversation, Toomey repeated that Respondent Union was going to get United 's contract "pulled." Paragraph 23 of the final amended consolidated com- plaint alleged a purported conversation between Toomey and the president of Nevada Steel relating to United working on the McCarran Airport jobsite . Although sub- poenaed by the General Counsel, the president of Nevada failed to appear at the hearing and no other evi- dence was presented in support of this allegation. On motion by counsel for Respondent Union, without objec- tion by the General Counsel, this allegation of the con- solidated complaint was dismissed at the hearing. Concluding Findings At the hearing, Respondent Union strenuously object- ed to Mumper's testimony regarding the telephone con- versation in which the caller identified himself as Toomey. Although the objection was overruled, it was renewed by Respondent Union in its brief. In essence, Respondent Union argues that because its answer denied Toomey made the telephone call to Amoroso's project manager and because Mumper had never met or spoken with Toomey prior to the telephone conversation, the caller's identity must be established by evidence inde- pendent of the caller identifying himself as Toomey. Fur- ther, that Mumper's testimony regarding the information he received from his superintendent was hearsay and in- admissible to establish the factors on which Mumper relied in concluding that Toomey was the calling party. After consideration of Respondent Union's renewed objections, I find no reason to reverse my earlier rulings. As correctly noted by the General Counsel, it is a "well established rule that the substance of a telephone conver- sation may itself be enough to make prima facie proof of the identity of the caller, based on circumstantial evi- dence." See U.S. v. McMillan, 508 F.2d 101 (8th Cir. 1974); U.S. v. Alper, 449 F.2d 1223, 1229 (3d Cir. 1971); Kansas Electric Supply Co. v. Dun & Bradstreet, 448 F.2d 647, 650-651 (10th Cir. 1971). Furthermore, Mumper's testimony regarding the information given him by his su- perintendent concerning Toomey's early hour visit to the jobsite does not constitute hearsay. Rather, this testimo- ny was offered, as the General Counsel correctly indicat- ed at the hearing, to establish that the statements were made to Mumper and were not offered for the purpose of establishing the truth of these statements. Therefore, when the caller independently corroborated the information previously given Mumper by his superin- 1333 tendent, this was sufficient circumstantial evidence to au- thenticate the identity of the caller as being Toomey. In the absence of any evidence whatsoever to the contrary, I find the record establishes that Toomey made the tele- phone call to Mumper on 25 July. I further find that Toomey's independent corroboration of information passed on to Mumper by the superintendent constitutes admissions by a party-opponent under Rule 801(dX2) of the Federal Rules of Evidence and are not hearsay. Moreover, it should be noted at this point that in re- sponse to a question on cross-examination by counsel for the Respondent Union, Mumper stated he had spoken with Toomey subsequent to the telephone conversation in question. Toomey's statement that he could "throw up a line" at the McCarran project was an unqualified threat made to a secondary employer. The Board has long ago found that such expressions by union agents to secondary em- ployers constitute threats within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act. See Sheet Metal Workers Local 418 (Young Plumbing), supra ("would be forced to put up a picket line"); Carpenters Local 180 (B & K Drywall), supra (union "would get kind of rough" and "could picket job"); Electrical Workers IBEW Local 5 (Janet Construction), 164 NLRB 455 (1967) (threat that there would be "trouble"). As in the Circus Circus situation, such generalized threats, made without assurance that the picketing would be within the limitations established by Board law, have as their objective the purpose of co- ercing secondary employers to force a cessation of busi- ness between the secondaries and the primary employer. Food & Commercial Workers Local 506 (Coors Distribut- ing), supra; Sheet Metal Workers Local 418 (Young Plumb- ing), supra. In light of the above, I find Toomey's statement to Mumper was a threat to force Amoroso and Nevada to cease doing business with United on the McCarran project. It follows that, in so doing, Respondent Union has violated Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act. CONCLUSIONS OP LAW 1. Carlson Southwest Corp., Ben F. Smith, Inc., Cal Erectors, Warehouse Equipment, Van Bakalayan, Aram Kazazian Construction, Inc., J & R Steel, Vegas Steel, S. J. Amoroso Construction Co., Nevada Steel, and United Steel are employers engaged in commerce or in an indus- try affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. Ironworkers Local 433, affiliated with the Interna- tional Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers, AFL-CIO is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. By picketing the Southland Distribution Center con- struction project in San Bernardino , California, with picket signs that did not disclose the employer with whom Local 433 had a dispute, and by picketing at a gate reserved for neutral contractors , Respondent Union has violated Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) of the Act. 4. By inducing and encouraging employees of J & R Steel to withhold their services and by fining members who were employed by J & R Steel for working behind 1334 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD a picket line for the purpose of forcing or requiring J & R Steel and other neutral employers to cease doing busi- ness with Aram Kazazian Construction, Inc., Respondent Union has violated Section 8(b)(4)(i)(B) of the Act. 5. By fining a member who is the principal owner of J & R Steel for working behind a picket line at a jobsite in Hollywood, California, Respondent Union coerced J & R Steel in order to force that neutral employer to cease doing business with Aram Kazazian Construction Co., Inc., in violation of Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act. 6. By making an unqualified threat to Vegas Steel that Local 433 would picket the job if United Steel per- formed the steel erection work at the Circus Circus Hotel in Las Vegas, Nevada, Respondent Union threat- ened, coerced, and restrained Vegas Steel to force that employer to cease doing business with United Steel and thereby violated Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act. 7. By telling S. J. Amoroso that Local 433 could put up a line at the McCarran Airport jobsite in Las Vegas, Nevada, to force Amoroso and Nevada Steel to remove United Steel from that construction project, Respondent Union threatened, coerced, and restrained S. J. Amoroso and Nevada Steel to force those employers to cease doing business with United Steel and thereby violated Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act. 8. The above unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sec- tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent Union has engaged in unfair labor practices proscribed by Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (iiXB) of the Act, I shall recommend that it cease and desist therefrom, and that it take certain affirmative action designed to remedy the unfair labor practices and to effectuate the policies of the Act. Counsel for the General Counsel and counsel for Charging Parties Carl- son and Kazazian urge that a broad remedial order be issued in these cases. Review of the violations found herein and consideration of prior cases, in which Re- spondent Union has been found to have violated the sec- ondary boycott provisions of the Act, fully persuade me that a broad order is warranted. On 23 October 1984, the Board, in the absence of ex- ceptions, adopted the decision of an administrative law judge finding that Respondent Union violated Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) of the Act.15 In that case, the ad- ministrative law judge found Respondent Union engaged in proscribed secondary conduct from 29 September through 24 October 1983. Although no exceptions were filed to the administrative law judge's decision, thereby accounting for the Board's pro forma adoption, the adju- dicated conduct is a legitimate factor to be considered in determining whether Respondent Union has demonstrat- ed a proclivity to violate the Act's secondary boycott provisions. Operating Engineers Local 12 (Associated Engi- neers), 270 NLRB 1172 (1984). Again, in Iron Workers Local 433 (Oltmans Construction), 272 NLRB 1182 (1984), the Board affirmed and adopted my decision that 15 Iron Workers Locals 433 & 416 (V Systems), "SF)- 163-84 (not re- ported). Respondent Union engaged in conduct proscribed by Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) of the Act for a period of time lasting from 7 to 30 December 1983. The unlawful secondary activity found in these prior cases and the vio- lations found in the instant cases (occurring at four dif- ferent jobsites in two different States) sufficiently estab- lishes a pattern of conduct by Respondent Union that evinces a proclivity to violate the secondary boycott provisions of the Act. Accordingly, I find the request for a broad remedial order is appropriate and that it should be granted. On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the following recommend- ed's ORDER The Respondent, Ironworkers Local 433, affiliated with the International Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers, AFL-CIO, its officers, agents, and representatives, shall 1. Cease and desist from (a) In any manner inducing and encouraging employ- ees of Carlson Southwest Corp., Cal Erectors, Ben F. Smith, or any other person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, to refuse in the course of their employment to perform any services where an object thereof is to force or require Carlson Southwest Corp., Cal Erectors, Ben F. Smith, or any other person to cease doing business with Warehouse Equipment, Inc., with each other, or with any other person. (b) In any manner threatening, coercing, or restraining Carlson Southwest Corp., Cal Erectors, Ben F. Smith, or any other person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, where an object thereof is to force or require Carlson, Cal Erectors, Smith, or any other person to cease doing business with each other, Ware- house Equipment, Inc., or any other person. (c) In any manner inducing and encouraging employ- ees of J & R Steel, or any other person engaged in com- merce or in an industry affecting commerce, to refuse in the course of their employment to perform any service where an object thereof is to force or require J & R Steel, or any other person, to cease doing business with Aram Kazazian Construction, Inc., or any other person. (d) In any manner threatening, coercing, or restraining J & R Steel, or any other person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, where an object thereof is to force or require J & R Steel, or any other person, to cease doing business with Aram Kazazian Construction, Inc., or any other person. (e) In any manner threatening, coercing, or restraining Vegas Steel, or any other person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, where an object thereof is to force or require Vegas Steel, or any other person, to cease doing business with United Steel, or any other person. 38 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102 .46 of the Board's Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur- poses IRON WORKERS LOCAL 433 (UNITED STEEL) (f) In any manner threatening, coercing, or restraining S. J. Amoroso, Nevada Steel, or any other person en- gaged in commerce or in an industry affecting com- merce, where an object thereof is to force or require Amoroso, Nevada, or any other person, to cease doing business with United Steel, or any other person. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act. (a) Post at its business offices and all meeting halls, lo- cated in the States of California and Nevada, copies of the attached notices marked "Appendix A" (Carlson Southwest), "Appendix B" (Aram Kazazian), and "Ap- pendix C" (United Steel).17 Copies of the notices, on 17 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Nation- al Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board " 1335 forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 31, after being signed by the authorized representatives of Local 433, shall be posted by Respondent Union immedi- ately upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to members are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent Union to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (b) Furnish the Regional Director for Region 31 with a sufficient number of signed copies of each of the ap- propriate notices for posting by Carlson, Cal Erectors, Ben F. Smith, J & R Steel, Aram Kazazian, Vegas Steel, S. J. Amoroso, Nevada Steel, and United Steel, provided those employers are willing, at all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. (c) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days from the date of this Order what steps the Re- spondent has taken to comply.