Reed & Prince Manufacturing Company

In the Matter of REED & PRINCE MANUFACTURING COMPANY and STEEL WORKERS ORGANIZING COMMITTEE OF THE C. I. O. Case No. C-601.Decided May 15, 1939 Nut, Bolt, and Screw Manufacturing Industry-Interference, Restraint, and Coercion : anti-union statements or petitions , propaganda campaign by means of radio, press releases, and literature mailed to employees ; discrediting union and leaders, characterizing it as "alien", imputing mercenary motives to its leaders, vilification ; employer financed publicity campaign to influence public opinion and break down morale of strikers ; initiating and fostering anti-strike sentiment ; soliciting strikers to return to work ; coercing employees to form and join a back-to-work movement-Labor Organization: back-to-work move- ment, inactive, as-Company Dominated Union: charges of, dismissed for want of a labor organization-Unit Appropriate for Collective Bargaining : produc- tion, maintenance, and shipping-room employees, excluding supervisory and clerical employees ; no controversy as to-Representatives: proof of choice : comparison original signatures with signed union cards-Collective Bargain- ing: meaning of; strike, effect upon, when enjoinable under State law; avoidance of concession or agreement while at same time attacking union by propaganda-Discrimination: refusal to reinstate employees because of participation in illegal strike, employees had violated injunction and were arrested for breach of peace in connection with strike-Reinstatement Ordered-Back Pay: awarded-Contracts : brought about by unfair labor practices, executed with employees over heads of union representatives, when union was exclusive bargaining representative of all employees ; abrogated- Strike: enjoined-Picketing-Conciliation: efforts at, by United States De- partment of Labor, Massachusetts State Board or Arbitration, and mayor of Worcester, Massachusetts. Mr. Edward Schneider, for the Board. Vaughan, Esty, Clark c Crotty, by Mr. J. Clark, Jr., of Worcester, Mass., and Mr. Donald W. Webber of Auburn, Maine, for the respondent. Mr. Samuel Angoff f and Mr. Sumner Marcus, both of Boston. Mass., for the Union. Mr. Charles Ward Johnson, of Worcester, Mass., for the Intervenors. Mr. Francis Hoague, of counsel to the Board. 12 N. L. R. B., No. 97. 944 REED & PRINCE MANUFACTURING CO . 945 DECISION AND ORDER STATEMENT OF THE CASE Charges and amended charges having been duly filed by Steel Workers Organizing Committee of the C. I. 0., herein called the Union, the National Labor Relations Board, herein called the Board, by A. Howard Myers, Regional Director for the First Region (Boston, Massachusetts), issued its complaint dated November 17, 1937, against Reed & Prince Manufacturing Company, Worcester, Massachusetts, herein called the respondent, alleging that the respondent had engaged in and was engaging in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8 (1), (2), (3), and (5) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449, herein called the Act. Copies of the complaint, accompanied by notice of hearing, were duly served upon the respondent and the Union. With respect to the unfair labor practices, the complaint, as amended at the hearing, alleged in sub- stance : (1) that the respondent from May 28, 1937, to June 14, 1937, conducted a campaign of propaganda against the Union by dis- tributing among its employees circulars criticizing and disparaging the Union, and holding it up to scorn, contempt, and ridicule for the purpose of (a) discouraging its employees from membership in the Union, (b) breaking the Union's strike, (c) causing a "back-to- work" movement among its employees, (d) avoiding collective bargaining with the Union, and (e) causing its employees to bargain individually with the respondent; further, that the respondent cir- culated "back-to-work" petitions and by coercion, intimidation, and promise of consideration caused employees to sign these petitions and to sign a contract with the respondent; (2) that the respondent had dominated, interfered with, and fostered the formation and administration of a labor organization of its employees; (3) that the respondent, by the discharge of and refusal to reinstate certain named employees on or about July 16, 1937, and August 3, 1937, had discriminated in regard to their hire and tenure of employment, thereby discouraging membership in the Union; and (4) that although the Union had at all times since April 20, 1937, represented a majority of the respondent's employees in a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining, the respondent on April 28, 1937, and at all times since had refused to bargain collectively with the Union. On November 26, 1937, the respondent filed its answer in which it admitted that it was engaged in interstate commerce, but denied the 946 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD alleged unfair labor practices. The answer stated affirmatively that (1) the questions involved in that section of the complaint alleging unfair labor practices under Section 8 (1) and (2) of the Act had become moot; (2) that the Act was in violation of the Fifth Amend- ment of the Constitution of the United States; (3) that the Union had been guilty of lawless conduct; and (4) that the Board had no jurisdiction to determine either the facts or the law relating to an alleged contract signed on July 13, 1937, between the respondent and 411 of its employees and subsequently signed by approximately 100 additional employees. Pursuant to notice duly served upon the respondent, the Union, and Charles Ward Johnson, the attorney for certain of the respond- ent's employees seeking to intervene, a hearing was held at Worcester, Massachusetts, from December 6, 1937, to January 17, 1938, before Alvin J. Rockwell, the Trial Examiner duly designated by the Board. At the outset of the hearing Charles Ward Johnson, representing cer- tain of the respondent's employees, filed a motion for leave to in- tervene on their behalf. The motion was allowed as to five of the employees named in the motion but denied as to 523 other employees., Thereafter the Board, the Union, the respondent, and Johnson par- ticipated in the hearing and were afforded full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to introduce evi- dence bearing on the issues. At the close of the hearing the Trial Examiner granted a motion to dismiss the allegations of the com- plaint concerning Mae Hadley. During the course of the hearing the Trial Examiner made several rulings on motions and on objections to the admission of evidence. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner and finds that no prejudicial errors were com- mitted. Except as stated below, the rulings are hereby affirmed. Thereafter the respondent, the Intervenors, and the Union filed briefs. On April 23, 1938, the Trial Examiner filed his Interme- diate Report in which he found that the respondent had engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (1), (3), and (5) of the Act. He accordingly recommended that the respondent cease and desist from engaging in such unfair labor practices, that the respondent inform its employees that the purported contract dated July 13, 1937, was unlawful and that the respondent would not en- force any portion of it against its employees, that the respondent reinstate four named employees with back pay from July 16, 1937, that the respondent upon demand bargain collectively with the Union, and that the complaint in so far as it alleged unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (2) of the Act be dismissed. 1 This ruling is dealt with below in Section III A 3 f of the Findings of Fact. REED & PRINCE MANUFACTURING CO. 947 Thereafter the respondent and the Intervenor filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report. Pursuant to notice duly served on all the parties, a hearing for the purpose of oral argument was had before the Board in Washington, D. C., on October 27, 1938. The respond- ent and the Union were represented by counsel and participated in the argument. The Board has considered the exceptions to the In- termediate Report, and in so far as they are inconsistent with the findings, conclusions, and order set forth below, finds them to be without merit. Upon the entire record in the case the Board makes the following : FINDINGS OF FACT I. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT The respondent is a Massachusetts corporation having its principal office and place of business in Worcester, Massachusetts. It is en- gaged in the manufacture, sale, and distribution of nuts, bolts, and screws. During the year 1936, the respondent purchased raw mate- rials of an approximate value of $1,250,000, for use at its plant at Worcester, of which approximately 90 per cent were shipped to the respondent from points outside Massachusetts. During the same year the respondent sold approximately 14,000,000 pounds of manufac- tured products, of which approximately 90 per cent were sold to cus- tomers outside of Massachusetts. The respondent in its answer admitted that it was engaged in interstate commerce. On March 19, 1937, the respondent had approximately 782 produc- tion and maintenance employees. II. THE ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED Steel Workers Organizing Committee is a labor organization affili- ated with the Committee for Industrial Organization. Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel & Tin Workers of North America, Lodge No. 1315, represented by Steel Workers Organizing Committee in this case, is also a labor organization, affiliated with Steel Workers Organizing Committee and the Committee for Industrial Organiza- tion, and admits to membership all production, maintenance, and shipping-room employees of the respondent, excluding supervisory and clerical employees.2 2 The Steel Workers Organizing Committee functions under an agreement with the Amalgamated Association of Iron , Steel & Tin Workers of North America whereby the Committee is to conduct organizational work and to negotiate with employers, all for the benefit of the Amalgamated. We will refer to both organizations as "the Union" without differentiation. 169134-39--vol. 12-61 948 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD M. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The refusal to bargain collectively; interference, restraint, and coercion; and the alleged domination of and interference with the formation and administration of a labor organization 1. Appropriate unit The complaint alleges that the production and maintenance em- ployees of the respondent excluding clerical and supervisory employ- ees constitute the appropriate unit within the meaning of Section 9 (a) of the Act. The respondent's answer admits this allegation. At the hearing, however, it appeared that the Union had organized the shipping-room employees together with the production and main- tenance employees in a single unit, and had dealt with the respondent as the representative of such unit. At no time has the respondent controverted the appropriateness of such a unit. The respondent's plant is a typical mass-production factory, in which there are no strong lines of demarcation between the types of work performed by the various employees. The normal industrial unit appears to us to be the most appropriate one for the purposes of collective bargaining. Upon all the evidence, therefore, we find that the respondent's pro- duction, maintenance, and shipping-room employees, excluding super- visory and clerical employees, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining and that such a unit insures to em- ployees of the respondent the full benefit of their right to collective bargaining and otherwise effectuates the policies of the Act. 2. Representation by the Union of the majority in appropriate unit Prior to 1937, no labor organization had been active at the re- spondent's plant. In the middle of February 1937, the Union com- menced a membership drive among the respondent's employees. By March 19, 1937, at least 703 of the 782 employees within the appro- priate unit had signed cards accepting membership in the Amalga- mated Association of Iron, Steel & Tin Workers of North America and authorizing "Steel Workers Organizing Committee, its agents or representatives" to act for them "as a collective bargaining agency in all matters pertaining to rates of pay, wages, hours of employ- ment, or other conditions of employment." By April 20, 1937, an additional 38 had signed similar cards." The only evidence which was introduced at the hearing to show defection from the ranks of the Union after April 20 was the signing 8 These cards were produced at the hearing and checked by a bank teller against original signatures of employees of the respondent . The teller found that of 757 signatures on the original cards, all except approximately 16 were genuine. REED & PRINCE MANUFACTURING CO. 949 of "back-to-work" petitions and the "back-to-work" movement in June and July 1937. As set out hereafter, the petitions and the movement were the products of the respondent's unfair labor prac- tices and therefore cannot be held effective to detract from the Union's right to represent the employees 4 We find that on March 19, 1937, and at all times thereafter the Union was the duly designated representative of a majority of the respondent's employees in the appropriate unit for the purposes of collective bargaining, and that pursuant to Section 9 (a) of the Act, it was the exclusive representa- tive of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employ- ment, and other conditions of employment. 3. The refusal to bargain collectively; interference, restraint, and coercion ; and the alleged domination of and interference with the formation and administration of a labor organization a. The preliminary contract In the middle of March 1937, the Union requested a conference with the respondent to discuss the terms of a collective-bargaining contract. The respondent granted the request and three conferences between representatives of the respondent and the Union were held on March 16, 18, and 19, respectively. During the conferences the Union stated that it represented a majority of the respondent's employees. This was not disputed by the respondent. The nego- tiations resulted in the signing of a preliminary agreement on March 19. By the terms of this agreement the respondent recog- nized the Union as the collective bargaining agency for such em- ployees of the respondent as were members of the Union. The agreement provided for a 121/2-per cent raise on all base and piece rates, a 40-hour Monday to Friday workweek, and an 8-hour day. The agreement further provided that the parties should meet again not later than April 2, 1937, "for the purpose of effectuating a written agreement on working conditions, application of wage rates, hours, rules and a method for the adjudication of disputes arising under the terms of this agreement, and which agreement shall incor- porate the terms of this agreement." On April 2, the appointed day, the Union representatives met with the respondent and discussed various features which the Union desired the permanent agreement .to cover. It was decided to turn these matters over to the Union's attorney to be drawn up in legal ' See Matter of Arthur L. Colten and A. J. Colman, co-partners, doing business as Kiddie Kover Manufacturing Company and Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, 6 N. L. B. B., 355; Matter of Bradford Dyeing Association ( U. S. A.) (a Corporation ) and Textile Workers Organizing Committee of the C. 1 0., 4 N. L. R. B. 604. 950 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD terminology and then to be discussed by him with the respondent's attorney. Within the following weeks the Union's attorney sub- mitted drafts of the proposed final contract to the respondent's attorney. The second of these drafts was the basis of discussion during subsequent negotiations. b. Negotiations for a permanent contract On April 28, May 7, 10, 11, and 19, the respondent met with the union representatives and discussed the terms that should be em- bodied in the final contract. The Board's complaint raises the ques- tion whether the respondent during negotiations on the above dates bargained in good faith with the intention of reaching an agreement if possible, or whether it merely went through the formality of negotiations with the intent of avoiding any agreement. In deter- mining the question of good faith, it should be noted that up until April 28 relations between the two parties were cordial and coop- erative. On April 28 and thereafter the respondent's representa- tives showed a marked change in their attitude toward the Union. Whereas the preliminary agreement of March 19 had been reached without serious controversy, the negotiations on April 28 and there- after were marked by a show of hostility toward the Union and by a tendency to raise and magnify objections over matters of trivial concern. At the hearing the respondent freely admitted a change of attitude, but claimed that this was due to the conduct of the Union organizer, Martin J. Walsh, in unjustifiably ordering the shipping department to change the hours of employment, and of the Union in voting to authorize its negotiating committee to call a strike should negotiations fail to reach a successful conclusion. The respondent explained this change of attitude on the further ground that various newspaper articles, brought to its attention during the period of negotiations, raised doubts in its mind con- cerning the responsibility of the Union. The evidence shows that this change was related in part at least to the appearance of two new figures on the respondent's negotiating staff. The attorney who up to this point had handled negotiations for the respondent was replaced by his associate, Jay Clark, Jr. Clark acted as spokesman for the respondent at the conferences which followed and played a prominent part in the respondent's activities during the period following the conferences. On his recommenda- tion the respondent took steps to' hire one Charles F. Gallagher to assist the management. At the hearing it was contended by the respondent that he was hired to take the place of E. Windsor Reed, who prior to his death on February 13, 1937, had been in charge of engineering and production at the plant. Gallagher testified that REED & PRINCE MANUFACTURING Co. 951 he was experienced in many fields of manufacturing and distribution g However, the facts are that he had not long previously written an article on strikebreaking for a trade magazine in which he styled himself "Labor Counsel to Industry," that his stationery was headed "C. F. Gallagher and Company, Inc. Labor Counsel to Industry," and that, except for minor matters, his services up to the date of the hearing in this case concerned only matters relating to the Union and its members. On April 25 or thereabouts, the respondent decided to engage Gallagher's services for $36,000 a year. On May 3, 1937, an agreement was signed by the respondent and C. F. Gallagher and Company 6 whereby the Gallagher Company was "to act as counsel in all matters affecting the client's (respondent's) Public Relations Policy and to advise the client, upon request, on matters affecting employer-employee relations." It is noteworthy that the contract makes no mention of management or advisory duties in connection with engineering or production. From May 3 on, Gallagher was the general who guided the respondent's strategy in dealing with the Union. He never appeared at any of the conferences, nor was his name or existence ever mentioned to the Union. He established offices in a hotel, at which he conferred with the respondent's officials and Clark before and after each bargaining conference. There the details of the bargaining conferences would be discussed and plans would be laid for the next steps to be taken by the respondent. Gal- lagher admitted that during this period his office maintained a file of newspaper clippings, which linked the C. I. O. with Communism, sit-down strikes and industrial warfare. These clippings he showed to the respondent's officials, and there were discussions regarding Communism and industrial warfare. It is clear that the progress of the negotiations with the Union was seriously hampered by the anxi- ety engendered in the officials by this course of action. Negotiations were further hampered by the fact that the respondent was relying for guidance upon the advice of a person who refused to expose him- self to the tempering influence of the conference table. Despite the fact that during the negotiations much time was con- sumed by the respondent's bickering over matters that could not have given it serious concern, we do not think the evidence warrants a finding that from April 28 to May 19 the respondent did not i Gallagher testified that he was equipped to advise clients regarding : sales, merchandis- ing, packaging, insurance, real estate, shipping and freight problems, bonus and incentive plans, engineering, metallurgy, public relations, labor relations, time systems, shop lay-out, mining, fire prevention, taxes, social events for employees, pricing and distribution problems, and community projects. 8 Gallagher acted through a corporation, C. F. Gallagher and Company, Inc., over which he had exclusive control. 952 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD expect or intend to enter into a contract with the Union if terms acceptable to both sides could be reached. At the end of the last of the five conferences, on May 19, the two parties had agreed tentatively to the preamble and four sections of the contract which dealt respectively with (1) recognition, (2) wages, (3) hours of work, and (4) vacations. Most of the pro- visions of these sections had been covered by the preliminary con- tract. In addition the respondent now agreed to a minimum wage provision provided that a minimum production standard could be agreed to. The Union on its part agreed to a 44-hour week for the shipping department provided that the shipping employees voted to accept this variation of the preliminary contract, and left the granting of vacations to the discretion of the respondent. Although mentioned, no agreement was reached as to grievance procedure, holidays, access to the plant for a union delegate, adjustment of inequalities in rates of pay, minimum production standards, and the inclusion or exclusion of citizenship as a consideration in promotions and lay-offs. c. The strike On May 25, 1937, Walsh and the negotiating committee, feeling that the respondent was delaying negotiations unduly, called a strike, and work ceased at about 2 o'clock in the afternoon. An hour or so after the commencement of the strike, Walsh received from Clark a copy of an uncompleted draft of the contract as the respondent wished it to be. Accompanying the draft was a letter which stated in part : "We wish it to be distinctly understood that in typing this draft for you we are doing so purely as a matter of courtesy and it is not to be construed in any sense as the submission of a contract by the management or the Company . . . Due to the fact that you have persisted in your contention that you feel that aliens as a matter of seniority should have equal preference to United States citizens and Americans we feel very strongly on this point, but are willing to concede that there may be some definite reason on your part why you feel that aliens should stand on the same footing as American citizens . . . Will you therefore be good enough to write us at once the basis of your contention that aliens should have equal rights with American citizens." On or about June 3, 1937, the respondent sent Walsh a completed form of contract, signed by the officers of the respondent. This pro- posed contract set up a grievance procedure and a method of ad- justment of wages which had been rejected by the Union, and included citizenship as a consideration in promotions and lay-offs. It provided no pay for holidays and gave no access to the plant for a union delegate, as requested by the Union. It also contained the REED & PRINCE MANUFACTURING Co. 953 following provision: "During the continuance of this agreement, or any extension thereof, or at any time in the future, the employees and the union agree that they will not request or demand either a closed shop agreement or the check-off system so-called." Together with this contract was sent a letter which, although addressed to Walsh, shows on its face that it was intended for employee consump- tion. Copies of this letter were mailed by the respondent to each employee and read in part : If it is dues, fines, and assessments you are after-and we can- not believe the employees are interested in those things-that is another matter. We had 52 years of peaceful, harmonious relations with our employees until you and the C. I. O. became "intermediaries" for our workers. Since then our employees and ourselves have had nothing but trouble, strikes, loss of work and wages, etc. Our Directors could quickly settle with our employees if you did not needlessly agitate said employees, mis-inform and mis- lead them. The law . . . for the present . . . forces us to deal with you-and as U. S. citizens (despite your dislike of them and desire to exalt the alien) we still, speaking for the company, do and will obey the law. Judging from the many unsolicited letters received by the management from our employees, you will undoubtedly find that the great majority of them are anxious to return to work, are opposed to this C. I. O. sabotage of their wage earning capacity, and will enthusiastically welcome your prompt signing. We find that the respondent was fully aware that this proposed contract would not be acceptable to the Union, and that the respond- ent sent it to Walsh with the letter purely as a strategic maneuver to undermine the faith of the union members in their leaders, and not as an attempt to reach an agreement. As set out more fully in following sections, this constituted an unfair labor practice within the meaning of Section 8 (1) of the Act. d. Tactics used by the respondent to defeat collective bargaining and to break the strike (1) Interference, restraint, and coercion With the beginning of the strike Gallagher and his corporation expanded their activities. In the magazine article mentioned above, entitled "Public Relations and Strikes," he had written : 954 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD A labor crisis today demands new methods for quickly and skilfully organizing public opinion-methods which capital until recently has been too proud or too indifferent to accept. Force and bloodshed are entirely unnecessary; also the thick-headed guards, the provocative private detectives, and questionable characters of all types, who practice the so-called `Art of Strike Breaking.' Instead of these strong armed men, a scientific staff swings into action to present the facts, to organize public opinion, to defend business against the attacks of labor racketeers. Spot news men, reporters, wire men, statistical men land at the strike headquarters. Government, Federal, State and Local laws and labor requirements are at their finger tips, or at the end of a telephone. Every conference is planned; the military strategy of warring armies is no more carefully prepared than that of a big industrial dispute. Full cooperation is given the national and local press. No favors are asked. What is wanted by the newspapers is news and the truth. They get it. The strategy of the opponent is carefully watched, checked and in many cases pre-diagnosed. Weak points are attacked; strong points call for a strong defense or counter offense. Instead of trying to settle the strike by collective bargaining as requested by the Union and required by the Act, most of the respond- ent's activities during the strike, under the direction of Gallagher, conformed to the campaign advocated in the foregoing quotation. Gallagher's office, employing four persons, was equipped with mimeo- graphing machines and mailing facilities. From May 28 to June 14, bulletins, cartoons, reprints of correspondence, and a copy of a radio address given on June 1, 1937 by Chester T. Reed, the respondent's president, were mailed to all employees. News releases were given to the press. The dispatches were aimed primarily at discrediting the Union and its leaders in the eyes of its members. One of several means of discrediting the Union was by stigmatizing it and its methods as "alien" and "Un-American." Thus in the letter to Walsh on June 3, copies of which were distributed to the employees, the respondent said : "The law ... for the present ... forces us to deal with you ... and as U. S. citizens (despite your dislike of them and desire to exalt the alien) we still ... will obey the law." Again on June 14 a dispatch to the employees said: "They (the employees) are realizing that the only way they can ever get back to work is to go down to the Union meeting ... and take a written ballot, supervised by their own people, and not a group of aliens and foreigners, to go back to work." An oblique method of reinforcing this stigma was the hiring of a stamping machine which printed on envelopes sent to employees the REED & PRINCE MANUFACTURING CO. 955 legend "U. S. Citizenship is an Asset." We are convinced that the respondent's choice of this legend was in no way induced by patriotic motives; on the contrary we find that this was one of the many devices used by the respondent to discourage the employees' allegiance to the Union. Another method of attack running through all the dispatches was the imputation of pecuniary motives to the union leaders. Thus on June 7 the respondent mailed a mimeographed letter to each em- ployee, which reads in part: The New York Herald Tribune of February 16, 1937, states : "John L. Lewis as head of the United Mine Workers in one year disciplined 4,031 members with fines aggregating $387,205.00 and with expulsions amounting to 150,117 years; an average fine of about $70.00 and an average period of exile of 37 years for each culprit. The nature of the offense was not revealed, but the accused has to pay the fine once it is assessed and cannot work at the one calling at which he is experienced unless the fine is paid." Ask C. I. 0. Walsh to tell you about this C. I. 0. "scheme" for getting money from your pay envelope. If our employees want this kind of an arrangement where eventually their pay envelopes are slashed by fines and assessments, we can do nothing. It is costing our employees $30,000.00 a week-$6,000.00 a day-$12.50 every minute-in wages, that "Salary" Walsh holds you out on strike and the C. I. 0. refuses to let you work. "Salary" Walsh gets his salary, he never goes on strike-his pay never stops-while he opens up soup kitchens and offers you charity, the Company offers honest work and good wages. Which do you want, Charity-"hand outs" at a soup kitchen, or decent work, with decent hours, at decent wages? C. I. 0. offers you the former, the Company the latter. You won't find "Salary" Walsh on strike taking any charitable hand-outs from a soup kitchen. He gets paid, whether you work or starve. The C. I. 0. takes care of him. Has it taken care of you, did it pay you substitute wages for what you are losing? From its bulging financial treasury is it paying you benefits? Ask yourself what it is costing you to listen to the mis-information that is being put in the press by C. I. 0. "Salary" Walsh. We can and have proved his statements are false. Some of his demands are im- possible . . . The Company cannot by law tell you that you must join or must not join any organization. It cannot and will not inter- fere with any union activities. But when our employees are the 956 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD victims of what has all the earmarks of a well organized "racket" we can, and will, tell them what the law is, what their rights are, and see that they are not exploited. On June 14 this idea was expanded by sending to each employee a newspaper article written by a syndicated columnist, Westbrook Pegler, denouncing the "ruthless dictatorship robbing the children of the workers ... in the guise of altruistic labor leadership." A third theme running through the dispatches was the suggestion that the Union was being managed by the leaders in disregard of the wishes of the members. In the radio speech referred to above, Reed said : "The C. I. O. is your servant, not your master. It merely represents you. They cannot order you around, and make you do what you do not wish to do." And again in the letter of June 3 it was said, "you (Walsh) may realize you are really their agent or servant and not their dictator or master." The June 7 letter to the employees reads : "The Company feels that those active in the strike are just being made `dupes' and `used' by the C. I. O. but can't as yet realize they are just puppets while the C. I. O. pulls the strings. The Company . . . regrets . . . that a few lent themselves to a scheme to fool the workers." A fourth resort was to outright abuse and name-calling. The letter of June 14 reads : "Little by little we are exposing the FAKES and CROOKED moves of Walsh and his C. I. O. group." Later in the letter the respondent continues : Arthur O. Wharton, President of the International Associa- tion of Machinists, in the New York Times, characterizes the C. I. O. as follows : "Lewis, Hillman, Dubinsky, Howard, and their gang of sluggers, communists, radicals and soap box artists, professional bums, expelled members of labor unions, outright `scabs' and all the . . . red affiliates." This is what one of the leading labor authorities says of C. I. O. Which classification does C. I. O. Walsh and his group belong to? Most of the literature contained invitations and pleas to the em- ployees to write letters to the respondent setting forth their indi- vidual views as to the justification for the strike. "We promise your names will not be divulged, and as President of the Company I will be glad personally to answer each and every letter and make any explanations you may request or furnish you with any data you may require." 7 't Chester T. Reed's radio speech of June 1, 1937. REED & PRINCE MANUFACTURING CO. 957 During the strike a number of letters were sent in by employees. One such, written by Arthur T. Royal, Jr., is in evidence. A reply to this was sent by Reed which read in part : "From the many replies we are receiving from our people we realize that a great majority of our employees do not, and did not, want this strike." Further on in the letter Reed referred to the pecuniary motives of the union leaders, and castigated the Union as being run by "a minority of foreigners, aliens and outsiders." The letter in no way attempted to answer a specific question concerning wages which Royal had asked in his letter. It is clear that the respondent's solicitation of letters was not, as announced, for the purpose of answering questions that had arisen in the minds of the employees, but was a scheme of further poisoning the minds of those employees wl,o showed themselves to be particu- larly responsive to the respondent's propaganda, as well as to ascer- tain the effectiveness of such propaganda. It is unnecessary to quote further from the mimeographed material that was mailed to the employees. For the respondent to address such anti-union propaganda to its employees was coercive and derogated from the rights of the employees to self-organization. The respondent in defense contends that these were merely expressions of opinion and were made for the purpose of defending the Company's good name from misstatements made by the Union. The matter quoted above as well as much of the other material contained in the respondent's literature had no relation to correcting misstatements or defending the Company's good name, but served merely as a part of a deliberate campaign used to break the Union and coerce and intimidate the employees from joining and assisting the Union. We find that by disseminating this anti-union propaganda the respondent has interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them in Section 7 of the Act. (2) The back-to-work movement and the contract of July 13 From the radio speech of June 1, until June 14, each piece of lit- erature sent out by the respondent contained an exhortation to the employees to turn against the union leaders. After the mailing of the contract to Walsh on June 3, this suggestion of revolt became associated in the respondent's literature with the signing of the con- tract and the ending of the strike. Thus in the second letter of June 3, Reed said : We believe our employees may descend upon you (Walsh) in a body with such a strenuous demand to be allowed to sign this contract and go back to work and insist upon their right to tell you what to do and how to do it that you may realize you are really their agent or servant and not their dictator or master. 958 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 4 Neither your threat of imposing fines nor the so-called crack- ing of the whip will deter some of these employees judging by the tone of their letters to the management from taking pretty prompt action in forcing you to obey their wishes, sign the con- tract, call off the strike and permit them to go back to work. On June 14 the respondent's letter read in part : Walsh and his C. I. O. understrappers don't fear any com- pany union. They fear the rising tide of angry employees, the men and women they have forced out of work for weeks, without work, without pay, into debt and worry-these people are be- ginning to awaken-they have tired of listening to Walsh and the C. I. O.-they are tired of his miserable charity, hand outs-they can't eat "hot air" and "blah." They are awakening. They are coming from their homes and residences. They are realizing that the only way they can ever get back to work is to go down to the union meeting, demand the right to have the contract signed by the union officers, and take a written ballot, supervised by their own people, and not a group of aliens and foreigners, to go back to work. This rumbling roar C. I. O. hears in its ears is a group of determined Americans ready to fight for the right to work through the ballot. They have had enough of delay, of unfilled promises, of lies and CHARITY. Our people do not want to have to beg for their bread in a C. I. O. soup line. They want work, and the avalanche of our people is about to descend. Walsh and the C. I. O. are afraid-those who booed our people are about - ready to hunt their holes. Similar advice was contained in the bulletins and letters mailed out June 7, 10, and 11. After suggesting this in the letter of June 7, the respondent said : What are you going to do about it? The Company is ready, willing and able to open the factory, when a majority of our employees demand that they return to work. Delay may change this plan. During the third week of the strike a movement began among some of the employees to return to work. On June 10, 1937, Hargrove and Stoddard, two employees, went to the office of Charles Ward Johnson, an attorney whom both of them had previously known, told him that they believed that a majority of the employees wanted to return to work, and asked him what could be done. Johnson pre- pared a written motion for a vote of the union members by secret ballot as to whether or not the strike should be ended and the re- REED & PRINCE MANUFACTURING CO. 959 spondent's contract accepted. This he gave to Hargrove and Stoddard with the suggestion that they present it at a meeting of the Union. At a union meeting on the following Tuesday, June 15, Hargrove and Stoddard caused Johnson's motion to be presented and it was unanimously voted to hold such a secret ballot at a subsequent meet- ing. On the following day Hargrove and Stoddard learned that at a meeting of the Union held at noon on that day, the vote for a secret ballot had been rescinded. This meeting had not been attended by Hargrove or Stoddard. On Thursday, June 17, Hargrove and Stod- dard again called at the office of Johnson and told him the result. Johnson stated that in his judgment the Union was not playing fair with the workers and that the back-to-work group must take the initiative in circulating a petition among the employees. Johnson then called Clark, the respondent's attorney, on the telephone and told him that there had been a new development in the strike situation. A few minutes later Clark appeared at Johnson's office and Johnson explained the situation to him. Clark replied that he was sorry but he could not touch the matter with a 10-foot pole. In reply to John- son's question, however, he did indicate that if Johnson represented a majority of the respondent's employees he supposed the respondent would be obliged to deal with him. Hargrove and Stoddard then left Johnson's office and arranged another meeting for Saturday, June 19, which was attended by about 30 of the employees. At the meeting of June 19, Johnson gave the employees mimeo- graphed forms of a petition upon which they were to secure the signa- tures of as many workers as possible. The petitions were addressed to the respondent and read as follows : We, the undersigned employees of the Reed & Prince Manu- facturing Company of Worcester, Mass. herewith state that we are desirous of returning to work and are willing to accept the contract offered by the Reed & Prince Manufacturing Company and signed by said Company and delivered to the C. I. O. head- quarters under date of June 2, 1937,8 and we on behalf of our- selves herewith authorize the annexation of our signatures to said contract and agree that this act shall constitute our acceptance and approval of said contract and the ending of the present strike. The testimony of witnesses called by Johnson shows that the mem- bers of the back-to-work movement had little or no interest in signing any contract before returning to work. A large number of these witnesses testified on cross-examination that they desired the contract because they felt that they could get back to work sooner with this • This should properly have been June 3, 1937. 960 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD contract than without it. The fact that the signing of the respond- ent's contract was always coupled in the respondent's literature with the ending of the strike is the only explanation of the inclusion of both in the motion presented to the union meeting, and in the back-to-work petition. This coincidence, together with the fact that a motion for a secret ballot was also suggested in the respondent's bulletins, indi- cates that this movement was the looked-for result of the respondent's campaign of propaganda. It is also clear that some of the employees felt that the acceptance of the contract was a necessary condition to returning to work. We find that the signing of the petitions was in- duced and brought about by the suggestions .and exhortations con- tained in the literature which the respondent mailed to its employees. During the following weeks several of the employees were active in soliciting signatures to the petitions. By July 12, 1937, 411 of the respondent's employees had signed these petitions. At a meeting held in Johnson's office on that day it was decided to give Walsh a final opportunity to sign the respondent's contract on behalf of the Union. A committee was, therefore, sent to Walsh with a letter from Johnson stating that Johnson had in his possession the signatures of a majority of the employees of the respondent "with the authori- zation that their signatures may be annexed to the contract offered by the Reed & Prince Mfg. Company and delivered to the C. I. O. head- quarters under date of June 2, 1937,9 such act to constitute their acceptance and approval of said contract and the ending of the present strike." The letter finished with this paragraph : ". . . if said contract has not been delivered to the Reed & Prince Mfg. Com- pany by ten A. M. July 13th, 1937, with the proper signatures of the officers of the C. I. O. attached thereto, I shall feel free to offer the signatures in my possession to Jay Clark, Esq., attorney for the Reed & Prince Mfg. Company for their annexation to the said contract" This letter indicates the confusion in the mind of Johnson and the leaders of the back-to-work movement as to whether these petitions signified the desire of the employees that the Union should execute the respondent's contract or whether they authorized the annexation of the signatures of the employees directly to the respondent's con- tract. Walsh told the committee which called upon him with John- son's letter that he would not sign the respondent's contract. Johnson thereupon communicated with the respondent and a conference was arranged, to be held in Clark's office on Tuesday, July 13. On July 13 Johnson and a committee met at Clark's office and annexed the signed petitions to a contract similar to the June 3 contract, but sub- stituting the words : "the employees of the Company" for "the Union." This should properly have been June 3, 193T. REED & PRINCE MANUFACTURING Co. 961 When the plant reopened on July 14 after the strike, as discussed below, it was generally known, of course, that a majority of the em- ployees had signed the respondent's contract and that the respondent had these signatures in its possession. Word circulated through the plant that the respondent's contract was available for signature in the office of Irvine, the personnel manager. Subsequent to the reopening of the plant 107 additional employees affixed their signatures to this contract. Those who signed the contract left their work at various times and went to Irvine's office. According to Irvine's testimony he always gave employees a chance to read the contract and offered to explain any provisions of it to them. It appears, however, that few availed themselves of this opportunity. We find that the employees signing the contract after the plant had reopened were impelled to this step not because they understood the contract and independently desired to become parties to it, but because they did not want to set themselves apart from the majority of the employees in the eyes of the respondent. It was, therefore, merely a continuation of the origi- nal impetus given the back-to-work movement by the respondent's propaganda. It is not clear whether the petitions envisaged a collective agree- ment or a series of individual contracts. They were not in any sense the result of collective or individual bargaining. Whatever their status as contracts may have been, they were the result of the exhorta- tions and admonitions contained in the respondent's literature and a part of its plan for destroying the Union. When a contract is brought about through unlawful means and for an unlawful purpose it partakes of the illegality with which it is associated, and is therefore invalid. Furthermore, if this was intended as a collective contract it is invalid for the further reason that it was signed and executed at a time when the Union was the exclusive representative of the employ- ees to negotiate and sign a contract. The only evidence introduced at the hearing of a defection from the ranks of the Union, which other- wise had the membership of an overwhelming majority, was that of the back-to-work movement. We have found that this was the prod- uct of the respondent's unfair labor practices and therefore cannot be held effective to detract from the Union's right to represent all the employees. The contract, having been made in contravention of this superior right, must give way to it, and is invalid. If the contracts were individual contracts with each employee they were made as a result of the respondent's direct dealing with the employees over the heads of the union leaders. At this time no impasse had been reached between the respondent and the Union. 962 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Such a practice of dealing with individual employees over the heads of their representatives is destructive of the principles of collective bargaining, for it not only undercuts the authority of the chosen representatives to act within the sphere of representation but subjects the individual employee to the very pressures which collective bar- gaining would obviate. The contracts, having been attained by going over the heads of the union representatives, are the intended result of the respondent's unfair labor practice and are therefore invalid. We find that the respondent, by using coercive means to induce employees to repudiate the strike and to sign the contract, has inter- fered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them in Section 7 of the Act. From July 12 until the hearing in this proceeding, the back-to- work movement was inactive as a labor organization. It never per- fected its structure or held meetings. It had no further contact with the respondent. Because it has not functioned in the plant as a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act, we shall dismiss the allegations of the complaint that the respondent has en- gaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (2) of the Act. (3) Attempts by the Union to bargain collectively after commence- ment of the strike Shortly after the beginning of the strike the Union had taken steps to secure a conciliator from the United States Department of Labor. On June 4, James L. Bernard, the conciliator, arrived in Worcester and conferred with both parties separately. On the next day, June 5, Bernard and the union representatives met with the respondent. Bernard stated that he felt that all the differences could be settled if the respondent would agree to a provision setting up an arbitration system as a final recourse for the settlement of grievances. The re- spondent, however, both promptly refused this compromise and re- sented the efforts of Bernard to persuade the respondent to accept it. Ernest C. Boyd, the respondent's vice president, testified that at the conference of June 5, Bernard was an "excellent C. I. O. advocate." Following the conference of June 5, Bernard made the following statement to the press : I found that the contract as submitted by the Company would leave no legal redress for an employee seeking an adjustment of a grievance. The law courts of Massachusetts have no jurisdic- tion in labor matters unless such matters concern the discharge of an employee for union activities. No judge would admit a REED & PRINCE MANUFACTURING CO. 963 case of a dispute between employer and employee. It does not belong in the courts. My suggestion to revise this paragraph in the contract was turned down by the Company. It was accepted by the Union, however. While the statement that no judge would admit a case of a dispute between an employer and employee may not be technically accurate, it is obvious that law courts have no jurisdiction over the normal employee grievance inasmuch as the subject matter is usually within the discretion of the employer. Whether or not the issuance of this statement exceeded the bounds of propriety, the respondent's reaction affords eloquent proof that its representatives were in no mood for bargaining. On June 6, the respondent sent to Secretary of Labor Perkins an extravagantly worded telegram which, after quoting the first three sentences of Bernard's statement, continued : OUR COMPANY AMAZED AT PUBLIC UTTERANCE OF SUCH INCORRECT, FALSE, UNTRUE AND DAMAGING STATEMENTS BY A GOVERNMENT REPRE- SENTATIVE IN A STRIKE. ON BASIS OF BENARD [sic] STATEMENTS WE DEMAND HIS IMMEDIATE RECALL AND SUSPENSION OF SUCH DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS DEPARTMENT MAY DECIDE. STATEMENTS BY BENARD SHOW ABSOLUTE AND TOTAL IGNORANCE OF ELEMENTAL LABOR PROCEDURE, LA- BOR LAWS BOTH STATE AND FEDERAL, REQUIREMENTS OF HIS OWN DE- PARTMENT, JURISDICTION OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD AND COLOSSAL IGNORANCE OF THE VERY FUNDAMENTALS OF THE WAGNER ACT ITSELF.... WE DEMAND THE SUSPENSION AND REMOVAL OF THIS GOVERNMENT CONCILIATOR WHO ISSUES SUCH UNWARRANTED, BIASED, UNTRUE AND FALSE STATEMENTS AND LEAVES THE COMPANY IN THE POSITION OF THESE FALSE CLAIMS WENT UNANSWERED, OF BEING UNCOOPERATIVE, WE CAN- NOT FIND LANGUAGE STRONG ENOUGH TO CONDEMN SUCH UNFAIR AND UNTRUE PUBLISHED STATEMENTS BY A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WHOSE JOB IS ACTUALLY TO TRY TO END THE TERRIFFIC LOSS OF WAGES TO OUR EMPLOYEES AND BE IMPARTIAL BUT WHO BY HIS OWN PUBLISHED STATEMENTS HAS IN EFFECT JOINED FORCES WITH THE C. I. O: IN THEIR CAMPAIGN OF MISREPRESENTATION TO OUR EMPLOYEES IT IS BEYOND OUR COMPREHENSION WHY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT THROUGH ITS REPRESENTATIVES WOULD PERMIT ITSELF TO BECOME PART OF THIS QUESTIONABLE STRATEGY. WE SHALL CONTINUE AS BEFORE TO TELL THE PUBLIC AND OUR EMPLOYEES THE PLAIN TRUTH AS TO WHY THEY WERE FORCED OUT ON STRIKE. THEY WELL KNOW WHAT IT IS COSTING THEM AND DOZENS HAVE WRITTEN IN TO US PROTESTING AT THE UN-AMERICAN METHODS TO WHICH THEY ARE OPPOSED CONTINUOUSLY BEING USED BY THE C. I. 0. AND THEIR AGENTS. This telegram was given by the respondent to the press. Thereafter Bernard withdrew from the negotiations. A second effort to resolve the dispute was made by the Union a few days later when Clinton S. Golden, northeastern regional director of the Union, wrote Chester T. Reed the following letter : 169134-39-vol. 12--62 964 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD STEEL WORKERS ORGANIZING COMMITTEE, 3600 Grant Building, Pittsburgh, Pa., June 9, 1937. PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL Mr. CHESTER T. REED, President, Reed and Prince Manufacturing Company, Worcester, Massachusetts. DEAR MR. REED: (1) As indicated above this is a personal and confidential letter to you. It is not being released to the press, nor will its contents be made known to anyone by us. It is sent you with the hope that a way may be found to effect an honor- able settlement of the controversy between our organization rep- resenting your employees and your Company. (2) When the original contract was entered into with your -Company, the reports reaching us indicated you were an honor- able man to deal with and that you commanded the respect both of your employees and our representatives. We looked forward to developing a sound and mutually satisfactory collective bar- gaining relationship of a permanent character. (3) From this distance it appears that some mistakes have been made by our representatives and that you have been badly advised by someone. (4) As for the responsibility and integrity of the officers of this Committee and of the writer we refer you to the executives of any of the several score of companies with whom we have dealt and with whom we have concluded contracts. (5) We would much prefer a settlement on an honorable and mutually satisfactory basis of the present controversy than to have to continue it. If it continues indefinitely, both your Com- pany and our organization will lose. (6) From all I have heard of you prior to the strike I believe you and I can reason together and pave the way at least for a settlement. May we meet° as man to man without either of us being burdened or handicapped by the presence of lawyers or other experts? I will be glad to hear from you. Sincerely yours, (Signed) CLINTON S. GOLDEN, Director, Northeastern Region. CSG/mgs REED & PRINCE MANUFACTURING CO . 965 To this letter the respondent sent the following reply : REED & PRINCE MFG. CO., 1 DUNCAN AVENUE, Worcester, Mass., U. S. A., June 11, 1937. Mr. CLINTON S. GOLDEN, Director, Northeastern Region, Steel Workers Organizing Committee, 3600 Grant Building, Pittsburgh, Pa. DEAR SIR : This will acknowledge your amazing letter of June 9th, marked "Personal and Confidential," and I have numbered the six paragraphs so that I may reply to it by reference con- secutively. 1. You state that you have not released your letter to the press, nor will the contents be made known to anyone by you. Let us make ourselves clear, Mr. Golden. We are not going into any secret back room conference with the C. I. 0., and permit our employees "to be sold down the river." We believe Collective Bargaining should be out in the open between the Company and the alleged representatives-the cards on the table-and we want no part of any secret or confidential bargaining as you suggest. Your Mr. Walsh tried to get a secret meeting with me , and stated in front of the employees' committee it was not concerning the proposed contract. His later admission proved his statement to be false. 2. Secondly, you state that reports reaching you indicated that I was an honorable man and commanded the respect of our em- ployees. Both reports are still correct, Mr. Golden. 3. You state that some mistakes have been made by your rep- resentative. I presume you refer to the following: A. Calling an unjustified strike in the middle of collective bargaining. B. Destroying by this action, through loss of orders, etc., dozens of permanent jobs for our employees. C. Causing an unjustified loss of thousands of dollars in wages to our employees. D. Continuing to hold out these employees on strike at fur- ther heavy loss, without reason. E. Refusal to sign the fair, honest contract signed by the Company, and continuing to hold our employees from working. F. Coercing the Company to sign an illegal contract, and unless we do, prohibit us from operating. G. Issuing false statements to the press , and deliberately at- tempting to mis-lead our employees. 966 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD H. Threatening our officials with violence, if we attempted to exercise our legal rights and ship merchandise. I. Your Mr. Walsh showed C. I. O.'s true purpose and stand- ard of conduct when he said "to Hell with the courts of Massachusetts. They are 50 years behind the times." That was a mistake worthy of being con- ceived in the womb of a Russian Communist. There are more, but I will not tire you. You further state that we have been badly advised by some- one. We were advised by Conciliator Bernard of the U. S. De- partment of Labor to sign the C. I. O. stock contract, that others had signed, without debate, and submit to an umpire scheme, and give up the company's rights in court, and throw overboard the National Labor Relations Board. You are right-we were badly advised. But we are no longer taking Mr. Bernard's advice. 4. As to your references as to responsibility and integrity of your C. I. O. executives, you refer us to the executives of several score of companies with whom you have contracts. We notice you failed to include the names of the companies. Do you by any chance refer to General Motors with whom C. I. O. has a contract-with 65 strikes since February 11th? Do you possibly mean the dozens of companies in Michigan about whom we read so much in the press? Or do you refer to the- Chrysler Company with its strikes after contracts? 5. You say you want an honorable and mutually satisfactory contract. This is the third time you, of all people, use the word "honorable." Very well, Mr. Golden, instruct your local C. I. O. agent to do what our employees want him to do. Sign the con- tract the company has already signed, and permit our many employees to return to work without further loss. That's the only answer, Mr. Golden. And now for the most important part of your letter. You state that if the controversy continues indefinitely both our company and your organization will lose. Not a single word in your whole letter about the eight hundred employees, our people, who are without work, without wages, because of C. I. O. and its agent's despicable refusal to permit them to work. You ignore the loss of $6,000 a day, now $72,500, to our employees. What about all these people, Mr. Golden? We are losing money, it is true, lots of it. But we are interested in our em- ployees; we understand what it means to be without work, with no wages coming in, with bills to pay, people to feed, clothes REED & PRINCE MANUFACTURING CO. 967 to buy, homes to purchase, payments to make. We understand and sympathize with our people and their problems. But your only worry is your organization. Isn't it the dues, fines and assessments which you annually collect from employees that you and the C. I. O. are losing, which you bemoan, rather than the wages of our employees? That's the trouble with this whole strike. The employees who are the most concerned-the people most affected-you don't even mention them. They don't count apparently so long as the C. I. O. organization is taken care of. We have suspected right along that was the case and now you confirm it. 6. And finally you want us to meet as man to man, without, as you state, "being burdened or handicapped by the presence of lawyers or other experts." No, Mr. Golden, that will never happen with the Reed and Prince Company. We do our business out in the daylight; we are neither burdened or handicapped by the presence of lawyers or other experts. Our counsel, we have found, has been of im- measurable value and service to us, and our policy is to retain the best possible. We want no part of any "secret" meetings, no "back room" conferences. We are not going "to sell our em- ployees down the river" in any confidential deal. If you really want to end this strike, Mr. Golden, there is only one answer. The contract the Company has signed contains all the clauses mutually agreed. upon in collective bargaining. It is already signed by us. All it needs is the signature of the alleged representatives of our employees on it. This can be done in ten minutes. And the strange part of this whole wasteful strike is, that if your agent Walsh of the C. I. O. were to call a meeting of all the employees of our mill, and employees only-and take a vote on the two questions : (1) Do they wish the contract signed by the Company to be signed by the employees' representatives? (2) Do they wish to call off the strike and return to work? he would get only one answer. Take a written, "secret" ballot on that-if you want secrecy, Mr. Golden-and you will find, that our employees will be back at work Monday morning. We regret we cannot accept your kind invitation for a "secret" meeting. Yours very truly, REED & PRINCE MFG. COMPANY, CHESTER T. REED, President. 968 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD A mimeographed copy of Golden's letter and Reed's reply was mailed to each employee. Reed's reply shows on its face that he was not insisting on the right to have "lawyers or other experts" present at bargaining conferences, but was using Golden's request as an op- portunity to heap abuse upon the Union. In this letter, as well as in other mimeographed material distributed to the employees, the respondent endeavored to picture the arbitration provision as a novel and dangerous device. It was variously char- acterized as "illegal," "C. I. 0. `umpire scheme,' " "anti-American, alien, foreign doctrines," "the `umpire scheme' concocted by the Union," "scheme of umpires" which would "throw overboard the courts of Massachusetts and the National Labor Relations Board." At the hearing Gallagher testified that he had seen "hundreds" of labor contracts containing arbitration provisions. The respondent was fully apprised from other sources that such a device was far from uncommon in labor contracts. To misrepresent intentionally this subject to its employees over the heads of the union leaders is clearly indicative of an attitude inimical to collective bargaining. Similar insincerity is to be found in the manner in which the re- spondent represented the issue of citizenship as a consideration in promotions and lay-offs. Prior to the strike, approximately 15 per cent of the employees were aliens. No substantial distinction had ever been made by the respondent between aliens and citizens. It was testified that if all other factors were equal between two em- ployees, a citizen would be preferred, to an alien. No instance, how- ever, of such a preference could be cited. The respondent's president testified that he would "consider citizenship of minor importance." Subsequent to the strike, Irvine, the manager of industrial relations, told an employee, a citizen who had been laid off, that the issue of citizenship "is something we played up during the strike." The re- spondent's attitude on the citizenship issue at the time of the hearing stands in contrast to its efforts to magnify it during the strike. We find that it was merely a device to sow dissension among the union members. A third effort by the Union resulted in a conference before the State Board of Arbitration and Conciliation on June 28. At this conference Samuel Angoff, the attorney who now represented the Union, "raised certain questions as to other clauses (than the sen- iority and grievance clauses), wanted then to reopen negotiations on clauses we had already agreed to with the Union, clauses relating to time, equitable adjustment of rates, all of which he wanted to reopen and swap one clause against another, and we (the respondent) de- clined to do that." 10 Regarding the seniority and grievance clauses 10 Statement made by Clark before the Superior Court of Worcester County, June 30, 1937, in an injunction suit. REED Bc PRINCE MANUFACTURING CO . 969 the respondent refused to make any concession. The respondent ap- pears to have agreed to limit to a 10-year period the provision that there should be no request for a closed shop. No further compromise was reached. At the conclusion of the discussion Angoff asked Clark for another conference. Clark replied in substance that he would wait until after the court hearing on the respondent's bill in equity, seeking an injunction and damages against those who participated in the strike, which had been filed in the Superior Court on June 23. The testimony of Reed at the court hearing on June 30 throws light on the attitude of the respondent. We quote: Q. You have made statements to the press that you would never modify the contract that you submitted to the Union ; isn't that true ? A. Maybe. I don't recall particularly. Q. Do you insist that this Exhibit 3, or this agreement marked Exhibit 3 and signed by you and other officers of the Reed & Prince Corporation is the only contract you will agree to? A. I will say yes. Had the respondent had any intention of trying to reach an agree- ment, it is inconceivable that Reed would not have denied the pub- lication of such an ultimatum. His subsequent statement that the respondent would sign no contract other than the one offered by the respondent confirms its attitude as one of complete intransigence. A final effort to bring the parties together was made by the Union through the mayor of Worcester. At a conference on July 15 between the mayor and the respondent's representatives, the mayor requested that the respondent meet with the Union. Clark refused flatly this time on the ground that the respondent had already signed a contract with its employees (discussed above) and that the Union no longer represented them. e. Conclusions regarding the refusal to bargain collectively It is obvious that in order that the collective bargaining contem- plated by Section 8 (5) of the Act may be an effective means of settling a strike which is already under way, more is necessary than a mere statement of ultimata. The employer must meet the union in an honest attempt to-compose the differences wherever possible. In the present case there were some items in the contract offered by the respondent that had not been taken up prior to the strike and several more items that had merely been alluded to without any serious discussion or negotiations. The respondent admitted that after the conference of May 19 and prior to the strike they felt that negotiations were going satisfactorily and expected that through 970 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELkTIONS BOARD further negotiations the differences would be ironed out and a con- tract arrived at which would be satisfactory to both parties. Instead of continuing this course during the strike, the respondent stood flatly on the offered contract as it was. We find that with the begin- ning of the strike the respondent entirely abandoned its efforts and intention to reach an agreement acceptable to both parties. The first two efforts made by the Union to meet with the respond- ent after the beginning of the strike, were utilized by the respondent merely as material from which to mold propaganda which it directed to its employees in an effort to forestall bargaining with their duly designated representatives. At the meeting before the State Board, the respondent held firmly to all the provisions of its contract except for the one concession above mentioned, which it must have realized was so insubstantial as to be no concession at all. The fourth over- ture through the mayor met with a flat refusal. The respondent contends that the specific responses, with which the first three overtures of the Union were met, did not constitute refusals to bargain collectively but were merely the insistence upon rights which the respondent undoubtedly had. Although, viewed as acts isolated from their context, this might appear to be the true situation, nevertheless considering the negotiations prior to the strike, and the whole course of the respondent's violently anti-union conduct subse- quent to the strike, we find that these were part of a larger plan to avoid any concessions that would be acceptable to the Union and in the meantime to break the ranks of the Union so that collective bar- gaining would be unnecessary. The carrying out of this plan in the face of the various overtures from the Union constituted a refusal to bargain collectively within the meaning of the Act. The respondent raises the question as to whether the Union made a proper request for collective bargaining within the contemplation of the Act, when it insisted on bargaining on behalf of its members only. At the conference on April 28, 1937, Clark made an objection to the Union's proposed contract on the ground that it was a contract on behalf of its members only. He maintained that under the Act the Union was the exclusive representative of all the employees, and that it therefore was under a duty to bargain on behalf of non- members as well as members. The Union, however, insisted upon a contract on behalf of its members only. At the second conference, on May 7, the respondent acceded to the Union's stand but stated that it would extend the benefits of the contract to all employees regardless of their affiliation, and that it would post notices to that effect. The Union did not object to this stand. In fact the benefits of the pre- liminary contract were extended to all employees by the respondent. At no point thereafter was this objection ever raised by the respond- REED & PRINCE MANUFACTURING Co. 971 ent as the basis for refusing to bargain with the Union. It is prob- able that had this objection been voiced as the reason for the refusal to bargain, the Union would have changed their demands to obviate the difficulty. We do not feel that the respondent can be heard at this time to raise such an objection 11 The respondent maintains that under Massachusetts law the strike was "unlawful and illegal." 12 The implication is that the respondent was thereby relieved of its duty to bargain collectively. Nothing in the language of the Act affords any support for such a proposition. Nor would such a construction of the Act tend to effectuate its spirit or purposes. The objective of the Act is to substitute collective bar- gaining for industrial warfare by requiring that an employer shall bargain collectively with the freely chosen representatives of his em- ployees. If this objective is to be achieved it is fully as important that the bargaining process be as available during the course of a strike as prior to or subsequent to a strike. And the fact that the strike may be tortious or enjoinable does not alter the situation. Were the respondent's argument to be accepted it would mean that, at the very point when an industrial controversy becomes most bitter and when the collective bargaining provisions of the Act should provide a peaceful means of settlement those provisions are cast aside and the employer is permitted to engage in unrestricted violation thereof.13 We find no merit in the respondent's contention. Furthermore, the alleged illegality of the strike was never given by the respondent as a reason for refusing to bargain with the Union during this period, nor do we find that the alleged illegality was in any way related to the refusal to bargain. It cannot be raised at this date as a ground for refusal. We find that on June 5, 1937, and thereafter, the respondent re- fused to bargain collectively with the Union as the representative of its employees within the appropriate unit, and that such refusal prolonged the strike. We also find that by such refusal the respond- ent has interfered with, coerced, and restrained its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. f. The motion to intervene As stated above, at the outset of the hearing Johnson presented a motion signed by 5 employees and Johnson to intervene on behalf of themselves and 523 other employees. The Trial Examiner granted the motion as to the 5 signers but denied it as to the 523 on the ground that Johnson had not adequately proved his authority to in- U See National Labor Relations Board v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F. (2d) 862 (C. C. A. 2d), certiorari denied, 304 U. S. 576. 32 This contention is discussed below in Section III B. 23 See National Labor Relations Board v. Remington Rand, Inc., footnote 11 supra. 972 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD tervene on their behalf. Thereafter, Johnson fully participated in the hearing in all respects as if the motion had been granted in its entirety. Toward the end of the hearing Johnson introduced into evidence mimeographed petitions signed by 552 employees which read as follows : We the undersigned, employees of the Reed & Prince Mfg. Company, of Worcester, Massachusetts, herewith authorize, instruct and direct Charles Ward Johnson of said Worcester to intervene in our behalf in all proceedings before the National Labor Relations Board, where in his judgment our interests are affected and more particularly in case $E1-C-307 and we further authorize, instruct and direct Charles Ward Johnson to protect our rights and interests in our contract dated July 13, 1937 with the Reed & Prince Mfg. Company. Of these 552 signatures Johnson testified that 528 had been signed prior to the hearing and 24 during the hearing. He further testified that of this number 417 had called at his office and had either signed the authorization petition in his presence or had ratified their earlier signature. It was stipulated that all the signatures were genuine and that all the signers were employees of the respondent. The Trial Examiner granted a motion by Johnson to amend his original motion to intervene by dropping the names of certain employees and adding the names of others thereby enlarging the number of inter- venors from 528 to 547. The denial by the Trial Examiner of Johnson's original motion to intervene on behalf of 523 of the 528 employees was proper at the time it was made. After the introduction of evidence of Johnson's authority to represent them in this proceeding, however, it should have been allowed as to all the employees named in the motion as amended, other than the five employees as to whom it had already been granted. We are of the opinion, however, that the rights of the 542 employees have not been prejudiced by the ruling of the Trial Examiner. The interests of all 547 employees were identical, so that in representing the 5 named intervenors, Johnson protected the inter- ests of such other employees as joined with the 5. No restriction on Johnson's participation in the proceeding resulted from the partial denial of the motion to intervene. We hereby grant Johnson's motion and consider him as having participated in the hearing on behalf of all 547 intervenors. B. The refusals to reinstate Following hearings before the Superior Court of Worcester County, Massachusetts, on June 30 and July 1, 1937, the Court on July 12 issued a preliminary injunction which prohibited all strike activity including REED & PRINCE MANUFACTURING CO. 973 picketing. The injunction was based on the theory, hereafter dis- cussed, that the strike was illegal in that one of the purposes of the strike was to obtain an arbitration provision. On July 14 the respond- ent opened its plant and 249 employees returned to work. The Union, however, did not immediately call off the strike. On Thursday, July 15, shortly before noontime, a group of union members and sym- pathizers variously estimated at between 72 and 200 were picketing on Cambridge Street, which adjoins the respondent's property but is about 200 feet from the plant. In this group were Roy Harold Stevens, Jr., Clifford A. Gallant, Michael C. Sullivan, and Mary P. Sullivan, who were members of the Union and had been working at the plant at the time of the strike on May 25. Mary Sullivan is the sister of Michael Sullivan. All four had been active in the Union during the strike. During the course of the picketing on this day a number of persons, including some or all of the four named employees, yelled "scab" and "rat" at the employees in the plant. Shortly after noon, police officers of the city of Worcester arrested the four named employees, together with three pickets not employed by the respondent, and charged them with disturbing the peace. The evidence shows that most, if not all the other pickets had shouted "scab" and "rat" also. Later that afternoon the strike was called off and the members of the Union sought to return to work. All who applied were reinstated with the exception of the four employees who had been arrested. The respondent announced to them that they would not be reinstated until they had cleared themselves of the charges. 14 Within a few days these four employees were tried in the local District Court. Clark, the respondent's attorney, appeared and prosecuted the cases. At the close of the evidence the judge placed their cases "on file," which under Massachusetts practice means that the four defendants were neither acquitted nor convicted. Thereafter, the respondent continued to refuse to reinstate them, giving as the reason that they had not cleared their names of the charges. The three men subsequently reapplied for reinstatement and were refused; Mary Sullivan, having heard from her brother of the respondent's stand, did not reapply. It was admitted that she would have been refused reinstatement had she applied. At the hearing the respondent's president testified that the sole reason for not reinstating these four employees was their conduct in committing a breach of the peace and violating the injunction on July 15. That the violation of the injunction was not the true reason, however, is indicated by the respondent's professed willing- ness to reinstate these four if they were found not guilty of the breach 14 Stevens and Gallant applied for reinstatement July 16, Michael Sullivan July 15, and Mary Sullivan July 17. 974 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD of the peace. Also, the respondent took no disciplinary action against other of its employees who had violated the injunction against pick- eting to the respondent's knowledge. A moving-picture film of the picketing, which it introduced as an exhibit in this proceeding, was a means of identifying these employees. In connection with the arrests, the -respondent's manager of industrial relations, Irvine, was watching the picket line both before and after the arrests took place. We find that he knew the identity of at least some of the other em- ployees who shouted "scab" and "rat" No disciplinary measures of any kind were taken regarding these others. A further fact which discredits the respondent's contention that its refusal to reinstate the four employees was motivated by their arrests was the rehiring of an employee, Gustav Gasturas, with the others at the end of the strike, with the knowledge that he had been arrested and charged with an assault and battery, committed during the strike. At first it was contended that the reason for differentiating between him and the other four was that Gasturas' offense had been committed 3 miles from the plant. The respondent's president, however, testi- fied that it would have made no difference if the four had been arrested for activities out of sight and hearing of the plant, so long as they were trying to prevent the respondent's employees from coming back to work. It is to be noted that during the noon hour on the day of the arrests, employees who had returned to work passed freely through the picket line. We feel that had the respondent really considered the breach of the peace and violation of the injunction so serious an offense as to merit, even for the purpose of setting an example, the harshest form of punishment within its power to give, it would have taken at least some minor form of discipline or given some indication of dis- approval in these other similar situations. The fact that it did not leads us to the conclusion that it did not consider this type of offense very reprehensible and that it was not because of these violations that the four employees were refused reinstatement. For all the reasons stated above, we find that the respondent was unwilling that the strike, called and prosecuted in defiance of the respondent, should go entirely unpunished. The provisions of the Act forbade discrim- ination against the strikers as strikers. The arrests of these four furnished a pretext for the refusal to reinstate them. The desire of the respondent to have the four convicted, as evidenced by Clark's prosecution of the charges, supports this view. We find that the respondent refused to reinstate these four employees because they participated in the strike. By such refusal the respondent discrimi- nated against them in regard to hire and tenure of employment, thereby discouraging membership in the Union. REED & PRINCE MANUFACTURING CO. 975 The respondent, however, maintains that the strike itself was illegal, apparently arguing that therefore it was free to discriminate against employees for engaging in the strike. Two cases decided by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts would indicate that in Massachusetts a strike is enjoinable where it has for one of its objects the obtaining of an arbitration agreement with the employer.I5 One of the objectives of the strike called by the Union was to obtain an arbitration provision in the grievance clause, and presumably the ac- tivities of the strikers must, therefore, be deemed to be tortious under the Massachusetts law. There is no question but that, except for the tortious nature of the strike, the refusals to reinstate were discrimina- tory under the Act, inasmuch as a strike to enforce demands is a legitimate union activity and cannot be made the basis for disci- plinary action. We do not feel that the fact that by Massachusetts law a strike to enforce a demand for an arbitration clause is tortious should alter the situation in this respect. The situation is very differ- ent from that in the case of the National Labor Relations Board v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corporation 'e in which the Court held that an employer could properly discharge employees because they had seized and held the plant of the employer and had participated in violence and destruction of property. We do not think that the holding of the Supreme Court in that case was intended to apply to a situation such as this where the action of the strikers was peaceful and involved no violence. The strike in the present case was at most a civil tort from which the respondent had adequate protection in the courts of Massa- chusetts. It cannot be said seriously that engaging in this strike was of sufficient gravity to reflect on the personal character of the four employees, certainly as far as their suitability for employment was concerned. We therefore feel that tortious nature of the strike was not a legitimate ground for refusing to reinstate these four employees and that in refusing to reinstate them the respondent engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (3) of the Act. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE We find that the activities of the respondent set forth in Section III above, occurring in connection with the operations of the respondent described in Section I above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce, among the several States, and tend to lead and have led to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. 15 Folsom Engraving Company v. McNeil (1919 ) 235 Massachusetts 269; Reynolds v. Davis (1908) 198 Massachusetts 294. 16 306 U. S. 240. 976 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD V. THE REMEDY Having found that the respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, we will order it to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. We have found that on June 5, 1937, and thereafter, the respondent has refused to bargain collectively with the Union. The respondent contends that the Union no longer represents a majority of its em- ployees within the appropriate unit. We have found, however, that prior to the respondent's unfair labor practices the Union had the membership of a large majority of such employees. If this member- ship waned at all, it was a result of these unfair labor practices. To permit the respondent to relieve itself by such methods of the obligation to bargain collectively, would violate the purposes and policy of the Act 17 We shall, therefore, in order to effectuate the policies of the Act, order the respondent, upon request, to bargain collectively with the Union. For reasons set forth above, we will order the respondent to notify each employee personally in writing that the contract or contracts executed with its employees on July 13, 1937, and any other contracts made since then in derogation of the Union's right of exclusive repre- sentation, are void and of no effect. We shall also order the respondent to offer reinstatement to Roy Harold Stevens, Jr., Clifford A. Gallant, Michael C. Sullivan, and Mary P. Sullivan to their former or substantially equivalent posi- tions, and shall order the respondent to make them whole for any loss of pay they have suffered by reason of the respondent's dis- criminatory refusal to reinstate them, by payment to each of them a sum equal to the amount which he normally would have earned as 17 In Hatter of Inland Steel Company and Steel Workers Organizing Committee and Amalgamated Aacociation of Iron. Steel and Tin Workers of North America, Lodge Nos. 64, 1010, and 1101, 9 N. L. R. B. 783, we said: The necessary delays incident to the adjudication of a dispute have postponed the Board's order until a time considerably subsequent to the original wrongful refusal to bargain. The refusal to bargain collectively disrupts the morale of the men, has a deterring effect upon the organizational activity of the Union and a discouraging influence on members already gained which tends to induce them to drop from the ranks . . . If an order to bargain collectively cannot be deemed an appropriate remedy for the refusal to bargain collectively unless the [Union's] majority is kept intact until the Board can issue a decision, the plain policy and intent of the Act will be defeated. The respondent would be permitted further to evade the obligation of Section 8 (5) by profiting from the discouraging effects of its already accomplished violation of that very obligation. We cannot concede the validity of such a doctrine of futility, and we hold that to effectuate the policies of the Act, the respondent's refusal to bargain must be remedied by an order to bargain, based on the majority obtaining on the date of the refusal to bargain. REED & PRINCE MANUFACTURING CO. 977 wages from the date he was refused reinstatement to the date of offer of reinstatement, less his net earnings is during said period. We feel that in this case the usual remedy of reinstatement will best effectuate the policies of the Act, as in other cases where em- ployees have been discriminated against. Neither the strike, the alleged breach of the peace, nor the violation of the injunction were of sufficient gravity to constitute a reason for not applying this remedy. As set forth above in Section III B, we are of the opinion that the Fansteel decision is not applicable to the facts of this case and does not foreclose the remedy of reinstatement. Further, even assuming that the respondent's refusal to reinstate these employees did not constitute an unfair labor practice, never- theless we feel that as a means of removing the consequences of the respondent's refusal to bargain with the Union and of its campaign of intimidation and coercion during the strike, it is necessary to order these four reinstated. Here the strike had been peacefully conducted by the Union for 6 weeks. The refusals to reinstate occurred at the end of the strike during the course of which the respondent had en- gaged in numerous unfair labor practices. By July 15 its campaign to break the strike was beginning to succeed. On that day these four were arrested for a minor offense, in connection with the strike. They were prosecuted for these alleged offenses by the respondent but not found guilty. Despite this they were refused reinstatement. Under these circumstances the employees would naturally, although mis- takenly, consider the fate of these four an example of what happens to an employee who engages in activities protected by the Act. Such an atmosphere constitutes an impediment to their freedom of self- organization into a union of their own choosing. Reinstatement of these four will remove this impediment. We will, therefore for this additional reason, order the reinstatement of Roy Harold Stevens, Jr., Clifford A. Gallant, Michael C. Sullivan, and Mary P. Sullivan. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the en- tire record in the case, the Board makes the following : CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Steel Workers Organizing Committee and Amalgamated Associa- tion of Iron, Steel & Tin Workers of North America, Local No. 1315, 1e By "net earnings" is meant earnings less expenses , such as for transportation, room, and board, incurred by an employee in connection with obtaining work and working else- where than for the respondent, which would not have been incurred but for his unlawful discharge and the consequent necessity of seeking employment elsewhere . See Matter of Crossett Lumber Company and Untied Brotherhood of Corpenters and Joiners of America, Lumber and Sawmill Workers Union, Local 2590 , 8 N. L. R. B 440. Monies received for work performed upon Federal , State, county, municipal, or other work-relief projects are not considered as earnings, but, as provided below in the Order, shall be deducted from the sum due the employee , and the amount therof shall be paid over to the appropriate fiscal agency of the Federal , State, county, municipal , or other government or governments which supplied the funds for said work-relief projects. 978 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD are labor organizations within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act. 2. By discriminating in regard to the hire and tenure of employ- ment of Roy Harold Stevens, Jr., Clifford A. Gallant, Michael C. Sullivan, and Mary P. Sullivan, thereby discouraging membership in Steel Workers Organizing Committee and Amalgamated Associa- tion of Iron, Steel & Tin Workers of North America, Lodge No. 1315, the respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor prac- tices within the meaning of Section 8 (3) of the Act. 3. The production, maintenance, and shipping-room employees of the respondent, excluding supervisory and clerical employees, con- stitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9 (b) of the Act. 4. Steel Workers Organizing Committee is the exclusive representa- tive of all the employees in such unit for the purpose of collective bargaining, within the meaning of Section 9 (a) of the Act. 5. By refusing on June 5, 1937, and thereafter, to bargain col- lectively with the Steel Workers Organizing Committee as the ex- clusive representative of all its employees in such unit, the respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (5) of the Act. 6. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed- in Section 7 of the Act, the respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (1) of the Act. 7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act. ORDER Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and conclusions of law and pursuant to Section 10 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the respondent, Reed & Prince Manufacturing Company, Worcester, Massachusetts, and its officers, agents, successors, and assigns shall: 1. Cease and desist from : (a) Discouraging membership in Steel Workers Organizing Com- mittee and Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel & Tin Workers of North America, Local 1315, or in any other labor organization of its employees, by discriminating in regard to their hire or tenure of employment or any other term or condition of employment; (b) In any manner giving effect to the contract or contracts exe- cuted between the respondent and its employees or some of them on July 13, 1937, and thereafter, hereinbefore described, or to any other contract or agreement concerning wages, hours, and working REED & PRINCE MANUFACTURING Co. 979 conditions which it may have entered into with its production, main- tenance, and shipping-room employees or any of them, excluding supervisory and clerical employees, or the representative of such employees other than Steel Workers Organizing Committee or Amal- gamated Association of Iron, Steel & Tin Workers of North Amer- ica, Local 1315, in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment; (c) Refusing to bargain collectively with Steel Workers Organ- izing Committee as the exclusive representative of its production, maintenance, and shipping-room employees, exclusive of supervisory and clerical employees; (d) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, as guaranteed in Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds will effectuate the policies of the Act : (a) Upon request bargain collectively with Steel Workers Organ- izing Committee as the exclusive representative of its production, maintenance, and shipping-room employees, exclusive of supervisory and clerical employees; (b) Offer to Roy Harold Stevens, Jr., Clifford A. Gallant, Michael C. Sullivan, and Mary P. Sullivan immediate and full reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent positions, without preju- dice to their seniority and other rights and privileges; (c) Make whole Roy Harold Stevens, Jr., Clifford A. Gallant, Michael C. Sullivan, and Mary P. Sullivan for any loss of pay they may have suffered by reason of the respondent's refusal to reinstate them, by payment to each of them of a sum of money equal to that which he would normally have earned as wages from the date of the respondent's refusal to reinstate him, to the date of such offer of reinstatement, less his net earnings during said period; deducting, however, from the amount otherwise due each of the said employees moneys received by him during said period for work performed on any Federal, State, county, municipal, or work-relief projects, and pay over the amount so deducted to the fiscal agency of the Federal, State, county, municipal, or other government or governments which supplied the funds for said work-relief projects; (d) Personally inform in writing each of its employees who has entered into one or more of the contracts described in paragraph 1 (b) of this Order, that such contracts were entered into pursuant to 169134-39-vol. 12-63 980 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD unfair labor practices within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act, that such contracts are null and void, and that such contracts will therefore be discontinued as a term or condition of employment and will in no manner be enforced; (e) Immediately post notices in conspicuous places throughout its plant, and maintain such notices for a period of sixty (60) con- secutive days, stating that the respondent will cease and desist in the manner set forth in 1 (a), (b), (c), and (d), and that it will take the affirmative action set forth in 2 (a), (b), and (c) of this Order; (f) Notify the Regional Director for the First Region in writing within ten (10) days from the date of this Order what steps the respondent has taken to comply herewith. AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be, and it hereby is, dismissed in so far as it alleges that the respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (2) of the Act.