Barnard Engineering Co., Inc.

BARNARD ENGINEERING CO. Barnard Engineering Company, Inc. and Road Sprinkler Fitters Local Union No. 669, United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry of the United States and Canada, AFL-CIO. Case 21- CA--23677 5 January 1987 DECISION AND ORDER BY' CHAIRMAN .DOTSON AND MEMBERS BABSON AND STEPHENS On 7 October 1985 Administrative Law Judge Jay R. Pollack issued the attached decision. The Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and the General Counsel and the Charging Party filed briefs in opposition to the Respondent's excep- tions. The National Labor Relations Board has delegat- ed its authority in this proceeding to a three- member panel. The Board has considered the decision and the record in' light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings, and conclusions' and to adopt the recommended Order. ORDER The National Labor Relations Board adopts the recommended Order of the administrative law judge and orders that the Respondent, Barnard En- gineering Company, Inc., Anaheim, California, its officers, agents, successors,, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Order. ' The Respondent excepts to the judge's conclusion that the Union is entitled to the requested information, asserting in conclusory terms in its brief to us that the Union's request is overbroad and burdensome and that it relates to confidential, corporate material. We find no merit in these contentions. The Respondent provided no evidence to support its posi- tion that the material sought is confidential . Accordingly, absent any "ex- planation of why the items in question should be found to constitute con- fidential records," General Dynamics Corp., 270 NLRB 829, 830 (1984), Respondent's mere assertions are insufficient to support a determination that the information sought is confidential Similarly, the Respondent has not supported its claim that the request is burdensome and, accordingly, we find no merit in that assertion. Sec generally Colgate-Palmolive Co., 261 NLRB 90 (1982), enfd. 711 F.2d 3419 (D.C. Cit. 1983). Glen C. Shults, Esq., and Paul H. Fisch, Esq., for the General Counsel. Michael A. Hood, Esq., and Daniel F. Fears, Esq. (Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker), of Costa Mesa, Califor- nia, for the Respondent. William W. Osborne Jr., Esq. (Heins, Aexlrod & Osborne), of Washington, D.C., for the Union. DECISION 617 STATEMENT OF THE CASE JAY R. POLLACK, Administrative Law Judge. I heard this case in trial at Los Angeles, California , on June 6, 1985. Based on an unfair labor practice charge filed on January 14, 1985, by Road Sprinkler Fitters Local Union No. 669, United Association of Journeymen and Appren- tices of the Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry of the United States and Canada , AFL-CIO (the Union), the Acting Regional Director for Region 21 of the National Labor Relations Board issued a complaint and notice of hearing on February 28 against Barnard Engineering Company, Inc. (Respondent). The complaint alleges in substance that Respondent violated Section 8(aXS) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act by refusing to furnish the Union with certain requested information al- legedly relevant to the Union's performance of its duties as collective-bargaining representative of a unit of Re- spondent's employees. All parties were given full opportunity to appear, to introduce relevant evidence and cross-examine witnesses, to argue orally, and to file briefs. Based on the entire record and from my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, I make the following FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 1. JURISDICTION Respondent, a California corporation with a principal place of business in Anaheim, California, is engaged in the fabrication and installation of fire sprinkler systems at various locations throughout the State of California. During the 12 months prior to the issuance of the complaint, Respondent performed services valued in excess of $50,000 for California customers which them- selves meet the Board's direct inflow standard for assert- ing jurisdiction. Accordingly, Respondent admits and I find that it is an employer engaged in commerce and in a business affecting commerce within the meaning of Sec- tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act. Respondent admits and I find that the Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The Facts As discussed above, Respondent fabricates and installs fire sprinkler systems at various locations throughout the State of California. Since about July 1970, Respondent has been a member of the National Automatic Sprinkler and Fire Control Association (the Association). The, As- sociation is a multiemployer group which negotiates and executes collective-bargaining agreements with the Union on behalf of its employer-members. Respondent has been party to a series of collective-bargaining agree- ments between the Association and the Union, the most recent of which was effective from April 1, 1982, to March 31, 1985. 282 NLRB No. 86 618 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD The instant case arose out of the Union's request in September 1984 for information from Respondent con- cerning a company known as Fire Sprinkler, Inc. In a letter dated September 5, 1984 , the Union stated: It appears that Barnard and a company known as Fire Sprinkler, Inc. [hereinafter referred to as FSI] constitute a single and/or alter ego employer within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act. As such, both Barnard and PSI are bound by our collective-bargaining agreement. Michael Slomski, the Union's business agent, testified that during the last week of June 1984 he investigated a jobsite near Perris, California , to determine who was in- stalling the fire sprinkler system. Slomski followed a van carrying sprinkler fitting equipment to a restaurant in Perris, California."SIomski spoke to the driver of the van, who told Slomski that a company called Fire Sprinkler, Inc. (FSI) was installing the fire sprinkler system at the jobsite. Slomski later wrote down the van's license plate number, which was BECI 20. Slomski later secured copies of state motor vehicle reports showing that the van was registered to Respondent. Slomski contacted Jim Hosey, business agent for Road Sprinkler Fitters Local Union No. 709 (Local 709), a sister local of the Union, and told Hosey that , he believed PSI was performing work within the Union's jurisdic- tion. Hosey had previously told Slomski that he believed FSI was affiliated with Respondent. Slomski and Hosey agreed to meet during the first week of July to investi- gate the Perris jobsite. Slomski and Hosey went to the Perris jobsite on July 6. The two business agents observed a trailer which Hosey claimed to have observed being constructed in Respondent's fabrication shop. The trailer had a logo with the wording "Lindley Motor Ltd." Leslie L. Lind- ley is the president of Respondent. Slomski and Hosey entered the building under con- struction and saw four persons doing sprinkler work, in- cluding the driver of the van whom Slomski had spoken with at the restaurant in Perris. Hosey testified that this driver was Bill Schock, a member of the Union, who had worked for Respondent as late as December 1983. Slomski and Hosey drove to the Department of For- estry in Perris to find out what company had taken out the permit to install the fire sprinkler system . They were shown a copy of the blueprint of the jobsite, which indi- cated that FSI was installing the sprinkler system and that the project designer was named "Rush." Hosey told Slomski that Rush was employed by Respondent as an engineer. ^Slomski and Hosey returned to the jobsite and took pictures. Slomski took pictures of a forklift and a special- ly manufactured "scissor-lift" which Hosey identified as one owned by Respondent.) Hosey found a blueprint for the installation of the sprinkler system showing FSI to be the contractor. According to the blueprint, Ed Rush was 1 Slomski later obtained a motor vehicle department record stating that Respondent was the registered owner of the forklift. the engineer for the project . Hosey testified that he knew Rush to be an engineer for Respondent. In July, Hosey obtained records purportedly from the motor vehicle department 'showing that the vehicles on the PSI jobsite were registered , to Respondent. In the latter part of July, Hosey showed these documents to Slomski. Slomski again visited the Perris jobsite with Hosey. On this visit, Slomski again observed Bill Schock at the plant. Slomski also observed a flatbed truck with "Bar- nard Engineering" painted on its cab and bearing a Cali- fornia license plate with the number BECI 146.2 Sometime between July 22 and 27 Slomski turned over his materials concerning FSI and Respondent to the Union's attorneys. Finally, sometime during the summer of 1984, Slomski called Respondent's telephone number. The person who answered the call identified the business as "Barnard Engineering." Slomski said he thought the company was FSL The person answered , "It is." Jeffrey Cutler, an attorney for Local 709, testified that in the investigation of a grievance which Local 709 filed against Respondent, he requested information from the California Contractors License Board and California Sec- retary of State. Cutler received two documents from the Contractors License Board showing that Leslie L. Lind- ley, Respondent's president, was the "qualifying individ- ual" for the construction bonds which Respondent and FSI were required to post. Cutler also received docu- ments from the Secretary of State showing the address for both Respondent and FSI to be 2200 East Via Burton, Anaheim, California. These documents further indicated that Leslie L. Lindley was the president and agent for service of process for both companies .$ Cutler informed the Union's legal counsel of these facts in late August and supplied copies to the Union's counsel no later than mid-September. On September 5, 1984, A. V. Simpson, the Union's business manager, sent Lindley a letter stating that Re- spondent had violated provisions of the collective-bar- gaining agreement including article 3 (Recognition)4 and article 18 (Subcontracting). Simpson further stated: 8 Slomski later obtained records showing that the truck was registered to Respondent. 9 Lindley testified that he is currently the president of Respondent but not FSI. 4 Art. 3 of the agreement includes the following language: In order to protect and preserve for the employees coverd by this Agreement all work historically and traditionally performed by them, and in order to prevent any device or subterfuge ,to avoid the protection or preservation of such work, it is hereby agreed as fol- lows: If and when the Employer shall perform any work of the type covered by this Agreement as a single or joint Employer (which shall be interpreted pursuant to applicable NLRB and judicial princi- ples) within the trade and territorial jurisdiction of Local 669, under its own name or under the name of another, as a corporation, sole proprietorship, partnership, or any other business entity including a joint venture, wherein the Employer (including its officers, directors, owners, partners or stockholders) exercises either directly or indi- rectly (such as through family members) controlling or majority ownership, management or control over such other entity, the wage and fringe benefit terms and conditions 'of this Agreement shall be applicable to all such work performed on or after the effective date of this Agreement. The foregoing shall not be interpreted to apply to separate Employer situations. It is not intended that this Article be the exclusive source of rights or remedies which the parties may have under State or Federal laws. BARNARD ENGINEERING CO. 619 It appears that Barnard and a company known as Fire Sprinkler, Inc. (hereinafter FSI) constitute a - single and/or alter ego employer within the mean ing of the National Labor Relations Act. As such, both Barnard and FSI are bound by our collective- bargaining agreement. Attached to the letter was a five-page questionnaire re- questing information concerning both Respondent and FSI. The complaint allegations, which create the issues herein, differ from the Union's request. The complaint al- legations are attached hereto as "Appendix A." To the extent that the Union requested information not con- tained in the complaint allegations, I treat the refusal to furnish that 'information as having been dismissed by the Acting Regional Director. On September 17, Lindley wrote Simpson denying that Respondent and FSI constitute either a single em- ployer or alter ego, and denying that Respondent had violated the collective-bargaining agreement. Lindley stated that Respondent and FSI had completely separate owners, personnel, management employees, and contrac- tors' licenses; ,were separately recognized and under sep- arate control; occupied different offices at separate loca- tions; and bid on jobs independently. Lindley ended his letter by requesting that the Union "specify in detail all the observations made, the facts gathered, and the infor- mation obtained from other sources, so that we may quickly clear up any confusion on your part." On September 25, Simpson wrote Lindley stating that "Local 669 is entitled to form its own conclusions re- garding the relationship between your company and [FSI]" and reiterated his request for the information con- cerning the two companies. Thereafter, the parties and their counsel exchanged a series of letters, with the Union adhering to its demand for the information and Respondent contending that the Union had not estab- lished its entitlement to the information. B. Analysis and Conclusions It is well settled that an employer has a statutory obli- gation to provide a union, on request, with relevant in- formation the union needs for the proper performance of its duties as a collective-bargaining representative. NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 152 (1956);' NLRB Y. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432, 435-436 (1967); De- troit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301 (1979). In deter- mining whether an employer is obligated to supply par- ticular information, the question is only whether there is a "probability that the desired information [is] relevant, and that it would be of use to the union in carrying out its statutory duties and responsibilities." NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., supra at 437. The Supreme Court has characterized the standard to be applied in determining the union's right to information as "a broad discovery type standard," permitting the union access to a broad scope of information potentially useful for the purpose of effectuating, the bargaining process. NLRB v. Acme In- dustrial, supra at 437 and fn. 6. The union's right to relevant information is not limited to the period during which the employer and the union are engaged in negotiations for a collective-bargaining agreement. The union is equally entitled to relevant in- formation during the contract's terms, in order to evalu- ate or process grievances and to take whatever other bona fide actions are necessary to administer the collec- tive-bargaining agreement. Electrical Workers v. NLRB, 648 F.2d 18, 25 (D.C. Cir. 1980); J. I Case Co. v. NLRB, 253 F.2d 149, 153 (7th Cir. 1958). The failure of either an employer or a union to give the other information neces- sary to enable the requesting party intelligently to evalu- ate its contract rights may constitute an unfair labor practice. NLRB v. Acme Industrial, supra at 435-436; NLRB v. Safeway Stores, 622 F.2d 425, 429 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied 450 U.S. 913 (1981). When the union's request deals with information pertaining to employees in the unit which goes to the core of the employer-employ- ee relationship, the information is "presumptively rele- vant." Shell Development Co. v. NLRB, 441 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1971). When the information is presumptively rele- vant, the employer has the burden of proving the lack of relevance. Prudential Insurance Co. v NLRB, 412 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1969). "[B]ut where the request is for infor- mation with respect to matters occurring outside the unit, the standard is somewhat narrower ... and rel- evance is required to be somewhat more precise.... The obligation is not unlimited. Thus where the informa- tion is plainly irrelevant to any dispute there is no duty to provide it." Ohio Power Co., 216 NLRB 987, 991 (1975), enfd. mein. 531 F.2d 1381 (6th Cir. 1976); Dou- barn Sheet Metal, 243 NLRB 821, 823 (1979). When the requested information deals with matters outside the bar- gaining unit, the union must establish the relevancy and necessity of its request for information. Newspaper Guild Local 95 v. NLRB, 548 F.2d 863 (9th Cir. 1977). In cases when the employer, party to a collective-bar- gaining agreement, appears to be operating another com- pany which might be so interrelated as to constitute a single employer or alter ego, the union party to that agreement is entitled to information from the employer about the nature of and relationship between the two op- erations which may be relevant and useful to' the union representing the employees in negotiating terms and con- ditions of employment with the employer, or administer- ing and enforcing the collective -bargaining agreement. See, e.g., Walter N. Yoder & Sons,'270 NLRB 652 (1984), enfd. 754 F.2d 531 (4th Cir. 1985); Associated General Contractors of California, 242 NLRB 891 (1979), enfd. as modified 633 F.2d 766 (9th Cir. 1980); Leonard B. Her- bert' Jr. & Co., 259 NLRB 881 (1981), enfd. 696 F.2d 1120 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied 104 S.Ct. 76' (1983). The union must demonstrate reasonable or probable rel- evance whenever the requested information ostensibly relates to employees outside the represented bargaining unit even though the information may show ultimately that the employees are part of the bargaining unit be- cause of the existence of a single employer or an alter ego relationship. Walter N. Yoder & Sons, supra at fn. 5. The applicable legal principles were not in dispute in this case. The issue is whether the Union has established the relevance of the information requested here. For the following reasons, I find, contrary to the contentions of Respondent, that the Union has demonstrated a reasona- 620 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD ble probability that, the information will be useful to the Union in deciding ' whether to file a grievance or take other action to assure the contractual rights of unit em- ployees.5 On the basis of the credited testimony of Slomski, Hosey, and Cutler, I fmd that the Union had a reasona- ble belief that Respondent and FSI had common owner- ship, common management, shared equipment, shared office space, and interchange of employees and engi- neers. The, Union was not required to establish that Re- spondent and FSI were in fact a single employer or alter ego, nor do I 'make any finding regarding that issue. Rather, I simply find that the Union has established a reasonable basis 'far requesting the information concern- ing the relationship between the two companies and that the information was relevant to a determination of whether Respondent violated the provisions of the con- tract cited by the Union. Respondent contends that the recent Board case of Bo- hemia, Inc., 272 NLRB 1128 (1984), leads to a -contrary conclusion. 1 fmd that the Bohemia case is distinguishable on its facts. I further conclude that Bohemia was not in- tended to overrule the Supreme Court cases establishing the broad discovery standard and the statutory policy of facilitating informed collective bargaining. In Bohemia Inc., the Board (Member Dennis dissent- ing) reversed Administrative Law Judge Timothy D. Nelson's conclusion that the union had demonstrated the relevance of requested information pertaining to the em- ployees at the employer's nonunion plant. The Board concluded that the union's request for information was based solely on the suspicion of some union -represented employees that work had been transferred to the employ- er's nonunion facility. The Board found no objective evi- dence for believing that such a transfer of work had oc- curred. Further, the union never indicated to the em- ployer which contract provision was alleged to have been violated. Combining these conclusions with the fact that there was no pending grievance and that there was no evidence that the union had raised the matter during negotiations for a new contract, the, Board concluded that the union had failed to establish the relevance of the information requested. First, in the instant case, the Union had objective facts to support its belief that Respondent and FSI were relat- ed companies. Slomski personally observed equipment registered to, Respondent on the FSI jobsite. He ob- served a former employee of Respondent working for FSI and found that both companies used engineer Rush. The Union obtained state records showing that Lindley was the president, qualifying individual, and agent for process of both companies. The records further indicated that the companies used the same address. Although Slomski did not have sufficient evidence to establish a single employer or alter ego relationship, he did have a 6 To establish a contract violation the Union would have to show that Respondent and FSI were either a single employer or alter ego. Relevant facts conceded by the Board in the single employer issue are (1) interrela- tion of operations, (2) common management, (3) centralized control of labor relations, and (4) common ownership. See, e.g., Shellmaker Inc., 265 NLRB 749, 753-754 (1982). The same facts are relevant to the alter ego question. See, e.g., Crawford Door Sales Co., 226 NLRB 1144 (1976). reasonable belief that the companies were related and a basis to seek information to determine whether the Union should file a grievance. The reasonable belief established by the Union here is much greater than the mere suspi- cion found in the Bohemia case. Second, the Union clearly indicated to Respondent that it was investigating an alleged breach of the recog- nition and subcontracting provisions of the contract. The contract specifically states that ' a single employer or alter ego will be bound to the agreement. The Union clearly indicated that the request was for its investigation of the single employer and alter ego issue. Third, the fact that there were no pending grievances or negotiations for a new contract is irrelevant. As the Supreme Court stated a union shall not be forced to process a grievance without the "opportunity to evaluate the merits of the claim." See NLRB v. Acme Industrial, supra at 438. Respondent next argues that the Union was required to state the basis of its belief that Respondent and FSI were , related companies . Although it certainly would have been preferable had the Union responded, to Re- spondent's requests to state the basis for its request, it does not follow that the Union's failure to do so results in a forfeiture of its right to the information. Such a result would be contrary to the policies favoring the ex- change of a broad range of information necessary for in- formed bargaining. Rather it would focus the parties on attacking or defending the union's basis for seeking the information rather than resolving the underlying dispute. It would create issues which the broad discovery stand- ard has been utilized to avoid. As stated by Judge Nelson in Bohemia, supra at 1133: To require any more particularized showing, for ex- ample, identification by the union of the precise legal purpose to which it might put the requested data, would be to impose a burden well beyond that "liberal, discovery-type" standard. Acme Industrial, supra. In Soule Glass Co. v NLRB, 652 F.2d 469, 494 (1st Cir. 1981), the court stated "where the relevance of the requested ... information is obvious in the context of the negotiations, the [employer] cannot resist disclosure simply because the union has failed to make a formal presentation of its theory of relevance." Accord: Westwood Import Co., 251 NLRB 1213, 1227 (1980), enfd. 681 F.2d 664 (9th Cir. 1982). In any event, the Union's information request-submit- ted in September 1984 and thereafter renewed in an ex- change of letters between September and December- was a continuing request, and the relevance of the re- quested information to the Union 's performance -of its statutory duties was fully clarified at the hearing. That clarification alone would seem to be sufficient to trigger Respondent's duty to provide the information under Board law. See Ohio Power Co., 216 NLRB at 990-991 fn. 9, in which the Board stated: [T]he Union's purposes in seeking the information are relevant to a determination of the legitimacy of BARNARD ENGINEERING CO. 621 the requests.... [The employer] --was apprise"d" at the hearing of those purposes. The requests for in- formation are still outstanding. The [employer's] continuing failure to accede to them can thus no longer be attributed to inadequacy of the communi- cations. See also Oil Workers Local 6-418 v. NLRB, 711 F.2d 348, 363 fn. 40 (D.C. Cir. 1983); 'NLRB v., Temple-Eastex, 579 F.2d 932, 936-937 (5th Cir. 1978); and Press Democrat Publishing Co. v. NLRB, 629 F.2d 1320, 1325 fn. 8 (9th Cir. 1980). Respondent contends that the Union's request was "substantially overbroad, overreaching, and vague." It further argues that the clearest evidence of this fact is that the complaint allegations are narrower than the Union's request. As indicated earlier, I will make no findings nor issue any order regarding any information sought by the Union which is not alleged in the com- plaint. The mere fact that a union's request encompasses information which the' employer is not legally obligated to provide does not excuse the employer from complying with the union's request to the extent it encompasses in- formation which the employer is statutorily required to provide. Fawcett Printing Corp., 201 NLRB 964, 965 (1973); Oil Workers Y. NLRB, 711 F.2d at 361. Respondent contends that it supplied sufficient infor- mation to the Union to establish that the two companies were entirely separate. I find no merit to,this argument. The Union was not required to accept Lindley's conclu- sions that the companies were entirely separate." Rather, the Union was entitled to make its own investigation and evaluation of the merits of the claim. See Associated Gen- eral Contractors of California, supra; Lumber & Mill Em- ployers Assn., 265 NLRB 199, 203 (1982), enfd. 736 F.2d 507 (9th Cir. 1984). III. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that it be ordered to cease and desist therefrom and that it take certain affirmative action to effectuate the policies of the Act. Respondent correctly argues that the request for infor- mation assumes that Respondent has access to informa- tion concerning FSI. Accordingly, Respondent will only be ordered to furnish the information to the extent it is able to do so. Questions raised concerning Respondent's ability to comply with the recommended Order are more properly left to the compliance stage of the proceeding. CONCLUSIONS OF LAw 1. Respondent Barnard Engineering Company, Inc. is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. The Union, Road Sprinkler Fitters Local Union No. 669, United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry of the United States and Canada, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. ' The records obtained from state agencies gave the Union sufficient grounds to doubt Lindley'sstatements. 'By refusing' tofurnish the Union with information necessary and relevant to the administration of its collec- tive-bargaining agreement with Respondent, Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. ' 4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the following recommend- ed' ORDER The Respondent, Barnard Engineering Company, Inc., Anaheim, California, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall 1. Cease and desist from (a) Refusing to bargain collectively with Road Sprin- kler Fitters Local Union No. 669, United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipe- fitting Industry of the United States and Canada, AFL- CIO, by refusing ` to supply relevant information on re- quest. (b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re- straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary, to effectuate the policies of the Act. (a) Furnish, on request, to the Union the information set forth in Appendix A of this decision. _ (b) Preserve and, on request, make available to the Board or its agents for examination and copying, all records, concerning fire Sprinkler, Inc. and all other records necessary to determine questions concerning compliance with this Order. (c) Post at its office copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix B."" Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 21, after being signed by the Respondent's authorized representa- tive, , shall be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other materi- al. (d) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days from the date of this Order what steps the Re- spondent has taken to comply. T If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board's Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of•the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur- pos es. 9 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Nation- al Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." 622 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD APPENDIX A Since on or about September 5, 1984 , the Union by let- ters dated September 5, September 25 and November 30, 1984, has requested Respondent to furnish the Union with the following information: (i) States in which Respondent and Fire Sprinkler Inc. are incorporated and the dates of such incorporation; (ii) All present and previous addresses and telephone numbers of each office and facility of Respondent and Fire Sprinkler Inc.; (iii) Office addresses and employment histories, includ- ing job titles and responsibilities, of all current and former officers and directors employed by Respondent and/or Fire Sprinkler Inc. since January 1, 1983; (iv) Names and employment histories, including job titles and responsibilities, of all current and former offi- cers, directors, supervisors and employees of Respondent or Fire Sprinkler Inc. who at any time since January 1, 1983, have been employed by the other company in any capacity; (v) All states in which Respondent and Fire Sprinkler Inc. are or have been registered or qualified to do busi- ness and the dates of such registration or qualification; (vi) All names under which Respondent and Fire Sprinkler Inc. have traded and done business; (vii) Names and addresses of all persons, corporations and other entities which are or have been owners of stock in Respondent and/or Fire Sprinkler Inc. as of Jan- uary 1, 1983; January 1, 1984 and January 1, 1985, and each such entity percentage of ownership on said dates; (viii) The nature of any business carried on by Re- spondent and/or Fire Sprinkler Inc., including products and services offered, identities of customers and locations of all manufacturing, fabricating and sales facilities; (ix) Name, title, and job duties of each person who is or has been responsible for the labor and/or personnel relations for Respondent and/or Fire Sprinkler Inc. and the period of time during which each such person was assigned these responsibilities and his or her employer during that period; (x) Name and title of each person who is or has been responsible for the hiring, firing and supervising of em- ployees of Respondent and/or Fire Sprinkler Inc. and the period of time during which each such person was assigned these responsibilities and his or her employer during that period; (xi) Whether ' Respondent and Fire Sprinkler Inc. own or lease 'jointly or in common any real property, and if so, the location of the real property and the terms of the leases; (xii) Whether Respondent and Fire Sprinkler Inc. lease real property from each other, and if so, the location of the real property and the terms and conditions of the leases; (xiii) Whether Respondent and Fire Sprinkler Inc. own or lease jointly, or in common, any facilities and/or equipment, and if so, the type and location of the facili- ties and/or, equipment and the terms of any such lease; (xiv) Whether Respondent and Fire Sprinkler Inc. lease any facilities and/or equipment from each other, and if so, the type and location of the facilities and/or equipment and the terms of any such lease; (xv) Whether Respondent and Fire Sprinkler Inc. own jointly or in common any bank accounts, notes, bonds and/or other types of security, and if so, the type and monetary value of any such bank accounts and/or securi- ties; (xvi) Dates, parties and terms and conditions of each oral and written contract, commitment or understanding by which Respondent and Fire Sprinkler Inc. are or have been jointly obligated to engage in business activi- ty; (xvii) Dates, parties and terms and conditions of each oral or written agreement by which either Respondent or Fire Sprinkler Inc. is or has been required or author- ized to use the services, facilities, personnel or equipment of the other company; (xviii) Dates, terms, parties to and persons entering into each oral or written contract, commitment or under- standing between Respondent and Fire Sprinkler, Inc.; (xix) Dates, terms, parties to and persons entering into each oral or written contract, commitment or under- standing by which either Respondent or Fire Sprinkler Inc. has agreed to loan, sell and/or contribute equip- ment, services, money or any other thing , of value to the other company; (xx) Date and substance of each bid submitted by either Respondent or Fire Sprinkler Inc. which called for the work to be performed in whole or in part by the other company; (xxi) Date and substance of each contract entered into by Respondent or Fire Sprinkler Inc. the work for which is being or was performed in whole or in part by the other company; (xxii) Identity of each person or entity which has guar- anteed the performance of any contract entered into by Respondent or Fire Sprinkler Inc. and the substance of each such guarantee of the parties to each such contract; (xxiii) Names, effective , dates and terms of each health, life insurance, pension, incentive, stock option, retirement and/or other similar benefit plan offered by Respondent and/or Fire Sprinkler Inc. and the class of officers, di- rectors, supervisors and/or employees of Respondent and/or Fire Sprinkler Inc. who are eligible to take part in each such plan; (xxiv) Nature and terms of any lines of credit, revoly- ing credit or other credit arrangements which Respond- ent or Fire Sprinkler Inc. offered to each other and the dates and amount of credit extended along with the iden- tities of the parties to such extensions of credit; (xxv) Nature and amount of indebtedness owed by Re- spondent or Fire Sprinkler Inc. to each other as of June 1, 1983 and June 1, 1984. (xxvi) Dates and participants of any meetings, confer- ences and/or discussions attended by any directors, offi- cers, supervisors and/or employees of Respondent or Fire Sprinkler Inc. at which the formation and/or func- tion of Fire Sprinkler Inc. was discussed; ' (xxvii) Copies of those portions of all documents, in- cluding correspondence, memoranda, notes and minutes, which refer directly or indirectly, to the formation and/or function of Fire Sprinkler Inc.; BARNARD ENGINEERING CO. (xxviii) Dates and participants of any meetings, confer- ences, conversations and/or discussions attended by any directors, officers, supervisors and/or employees of Re- spondent or Fire Sprinkler Inc. at which either of the following subjects were discussed : (a) the operation of Fire Sprinkler Inc. as a non-union company or as a com- pany to which the wage and fringe benefit terms and conditions of the Local 669 agreement would not apply, or (b) the steps which were being ,or should be taken to establish and/or maintain Fire Sprinkler Inc. as a non- union company or a company to which the wage and fringe benefit terms and conditions of the Local 669 agreement would not apply; (xxix) Copies of those portions of all documents, in- cluding correspondence, memoranda, notes and minutes, which refer, directly or indirectly, to either of the fol- lowing subjects: (a) Status of Fire Sprinkler Inc. as a non-union company or as a company to which the wage and fringe benefit terms and conditions of the Local 669 agreement would not apply, or (b) the steps which were being or should be taken to establish and/or maintain Fire Sprinkler Inc. as a non-union company or a compa- ny to which the wage and fringe benefit terms and con- ditions of the Local 669 agreement would not apply. APPENDIX B NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government 623 The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the National Labor Relations Act and has or- dered us to post and abide by this notice. WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with Road Sprinkler Fitters Local Union No. 669, United As- sociation' of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumb- ing and Pipefitting Industry of the United States and Canada, AFL-CIO, by refusing to supply relevant infor- mation on request. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act. WE WILL furnish, on request, to the Union the infor- mation set forth in Appendix A of the Board's decision. BARNARD ENGINEERING COMPANY, INC.