282 NLRB 772
P & M Cedar Products, Inc.
772
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
P & M Cedar Products, Inc. and International
Woodworkers of America, Local 3-433, AFL-
CIO. Case 20-CA-2013,2
15 January 1987
ORDER DENYING MOTION
On 11 September 1986 Administrative Law
Judge James M. Kennedy of the National Labor
Relations Board issued his decision in the above-en-
titled proceeding and, on the same date, the pro-
ceeding was transferred to and continued before
the Board in Washington, D.C. The judge found
that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair
labor practices, and recommended that it take cer-
tain affirmative action to remedy such unfair labor
practices. On 27 October 1986 the Respondent filed
exceptions to the judge's decision and a brief in
support. By letter dated 27 October 1986 the
Charging Party requested an extension of time to
file an answering brief. By mailgram, dated 31 Oc-
tober 1986, the time to file an answering brief was
extended to 19 November 1986. On 17 November
1986 the Board received answering briefs from the
Charging Party and the General Counsel. On that
same date the General Counsel filed cross-excep-
tions to the judge's decision.
On 15 December 1986 the Respondent filed a
"Motion to Strike Cross-Exceptions and Answering
Brief' of the General Counsel, submitting that the
cross-exceptions and answering brief were untimely
because the General Counsel "neither requested
nor was granted an extension of time, as required
by the Board's Rules and Regulations." The Re-
spondent further submits that the Charging Party
requested and received an extension of time to file
an answering brief, that the General Counsel's
cross-exceptions and answering brief were due on 9
November, and that since they were not mailed
until 14 November 1986, the General Counsel's
cross-exceptions and answering brief were untime-
ly. The Respondent contends that there are no un-
usual circumstances which would warrant an ex-
ception to the Board's Rules requiring strict com-
pliance with respect to timely filing. The General
Counsel
filed
an
opposition
to
Respondent's
motion, contending that he believed that the exten-
sion of time granted to the Charging Party to file
an answering brief also applied to the General
Counsel and also enlarged the time to file cross-ex-
ceptions.
The Board having duly considered the matter,
IT IS ORDERED that the Respondent's motion to
strike is denied. Section 102.46(e) of the Board's
Rules and Regulations provides in pertinent part
that "[a]ny party who has not previously filed ex-
ceptions may, within 14 days, or such further
282 NLRB No. 108
period as the Board may allow, from the last date
on which exceptions and any supporting brief may
be filed, file cross-exceptions . . -.." The only limi-
tation on the right to file cross-exceptions is that
the party who wishes to file cross-exceptions may
not already have filed exceptions. With respect to
extensions of time, the Board's longstanding policy
and practice is that a request for an extension of
time filed by" one party is applicable to all parties,
provided, of course, that the party is otherwise eli-
gible to file the document for which the extension
is sought. Thus, if one party files a request for an
extension of time to file an answering brief to an-
other party's exceptions, any extension of time
granted applies to all parties without regard to
whether the request for an extension was a joint re-
quest. Any other practice would result in the
anomalous situation in which a party who may not
have needed additional time to file the document
for which the extension was granted must either
file its own request for an extension or put itself at
a disadvantage by filing the document in question
by the earlier due date. As an alternative, requiring
all parties to join in a request for an extension of
time would not be practicable from an administra-
tive standpoint.
Because the filing of cross-exceptions usually,
but not invariably, is accompanied by the filing of
an answering brief, a request for an extension of
time to file cross-exceptions has been construed to
enlarge the time to file an answering brief even if
the extension-of-time request does not specifically
allude to an answering brief. The reverse is not
true, however; i.e., a request for an extension of
time to file an answering brief does not enlarge the
time to file cross-exceptions. However, as is the
case with respect to whether a request for an ex-
tension of time is applicable to all the parties, the
Board's Rules are silent with respect to whether an
extension of time to file an answering brief also en-
larges the time to file cross-exceptions.
Although the General Counsel would have been
better advised to have filed a specific request to en-
large the time to file cross-exceptions, in the cir-
cumstances present here, and given the ambiguity
in the Rules, the General Counsel's cross-excep-
tions are accepted' and will be considered by the
Board.2
1 Acceptance of the General Counsel's cross-exceptions is in accord
with our longstanding policy that the Board's Rules should be liberally
construed to effectuate the purposes and provisions of the Act. See Sec.
102.121. Henceforth, however, an extension of time to file an answering
brief will not enlarge the time to file cross-exceptions Further, to avoid
any prejudice to the Respondent, the time to file an answering brief to
the General Counsel's cross-exceptions is extended to 29 January 1987.
2 Member Johansen concurs in the denial of the Respondent's motion
to strike the General Counsel's answering brief, but would grant
the
motion to strike the General Counsel's cross-exceptions
P & M CEDAR PRODUCTS
773
By direction of the Board: Joseph E. Moore,
Deputy Executive Secretary.