Pioneer Conrete Co.

PIONEER CONCRETE CO. 749 Cousani Company, Inc. d/b/a Pioneer Concrete' `Co. and General Truck Drivers, Warehousemen and Helpers Union, Local No. 624, Marin and .Sonoma Counties, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Help- ers of America. Cases 20-CA-19854 and 20- RC-15902 14 January 1987 DECISION, ORDER, AND CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE By CHAIRMAN DOTSON AND MEMBERS JOHANSEN AND BABSON On 30 October 1986 Administrative Law Judge Roger B. Holmes issued the attached decision. The Charging Party filed exceptions and a supporting brief. The National Labor Relations Board has delegat- ed its authority in this proceeding to a three- member panel. The Board has considered the decision and the record in light of the exceptions' and brief and has decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings, and conclusions and to adopt the recommended, Order. ORDER The National Labor Relations Board adopts the recommended Order of the administrative law judge and orders that the Respondent, Consani Company, Inc. d/b/a Pioneer Concrete Co., Santa Rosa, California, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Order. CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE IT IS CERTIFIED that a majority of the valid bal- lots have been cast for the General Truck Drivers, Warehousemen and Helpers Union, Local No. 624, Marin and Sonoma, Counties, International Brother= hood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America, and that it is the exclusive col- lective-bargaining representative of the employees in the following appropriate unit: All full-time and regular part-time ready-mix drivers, bulk drivers, end dump drivers, and mechanics; excluding yard boys, batch per- sons, confidential employees, office clericals, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act. 1 The Charging Party excepts only to the judge's finding that Craig Bloom is a supervisor within the meaning of the Act. Paula J. Paley, Esq., for the General Counsel. Jay G. Putnam, Esq., of Santa Rosa, California, for the Respondent-Employer. 282 NLRB No. 109 David A. Rosenfeld, Esq. (Van Bourg, Weinberg, Roger & Rosenfeld), of San Francisco, California, for the Charg- ing Party-Petitioner. DECISION' STATEMENT OF THE CASE ROGER B. HOLMES,` Administrative Law Judge. The Charging Party, General Truck Drivers, Warehousemen and Helpers Union, Local No. 624, Marin and Sonoma Counties, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America (the Union), filed the unfair labor practice charge in Case 20- CA-19854 on 22 August 1985. The Regional Director for Region 20 of the National Labor Relations Board, who was acting on behalf of the General Counsel, issued the complaint in this proceeding on 4 October 1985. The General Counsel alleged that the Respondent, Consani Company, Inc. d/b/a Pioneer Con- crete Co. (the Respondent or the Employer), had en- gaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. The General Counsel was permitted to amend her complaint allegations during the case-in-chief and towards the end of the first day of the hearing. The Respondent filed an answer to the General Coun- sel's complaint and denied that it had engaged in the al- leged unfair labor practices. The Respondent also amend- ed its answer to deny the General Counsel's complaint amendments made at the hearing. The Union filed the representation petition in Case 20- RC-15902 on 24 May 1985. The Union and'the Employ- er signed a Stipulation for Certification Upon Consent Election, which was approved by the Regional Director on 18 June 1985. In order to be eligible to vote, unit em- ployees had to be employed by the Employer during the payroll period ending on Friday, 14 June 1985. An election by secret ballot was conducted between 3 and 4 p.m. on 8 August 1985 among employees in the, unit described below: All full-time and regular part-time ready-mix driv- ers, bulk drivers, end dump drivers, and mechanics; excluding- yard boys, batch persons, confidential employees, office clericals, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act. The tally of ballots disclosed that four employees cast votes for the union, and that three employees cast votes against union representation. There were four challenged ballots. On 15 August 1985 the Union filed objections to conduct of election and/or to conduct affecting the out- come of an election. On 18 October 1985 the Regional Director issued a Report on Objections and Challenged Ballots, order con- solidating cases and, notice of hearing. The Regional Di- rector recommended to the Board that the Union's Ob- jections 2, 3, 6, 7, and 8 and the issues involving the challenged ballot of Mark Allmon be consolidated for hearing with the complaint in Case 20-CA-19854. The Regional Director recommended that the Union's Objec- tions 1, 4, and 5 be overruled; that the challenges to the 750 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD ballots of Rocky Flowers and Robert Johnson be sus- tained; and that the challenge to the ballot of Craig Bloom be overruled. On 23 December 1985 the Board in Washington, D.C., issued a Decision and Direction in Case 20-RC-15902 in which the Board adopted the Regional Director's find- ings and recommendations except that the Board found that the challenged ballot of Craig Bloom raised issues of fact that may best be resolved by a hearing.' On 31 December 1985 the Regional Director issued an Amendment to Report on Objections and Challenged Ballots, order, consolidating cases and notice of hearing in which the issues regarding the challenged ballot of Craig Bloom were referred for hearing in this proceed- ing. I heard the evidence in this consolidated proceeding on 4 March 1986 and 29 , and 30 April 1986 at Santa Rosa, California. The attorney for the Charging Party made a closing argument on the record at the hearing. The General Counsel and the attorney for the Respond- ent filed posthearing briefs by the due date of 21 July 1986. On 28 July 1986 the General Counsel filed a motion to strike a certain portion of the posthearing brief filed by the attorney for the Respondent. On 31 July 1986 I issued an Order to Show Cause why the General Counsel's Motion to Strike should not be granted. The attorney for the Respondent did not object to the grant- ing of the General Counsel's motion. Accordingly, on 11 August 1986 I issued an Order that granted the General Counsel's motion. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. JURISDICTION III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Background Evidence The Respondent first met on 22 May 1985 with Donald B. Azevedo, the union president. The meeting took place at Papa Vito's pizza parlor. As a result of his meeting with the employees, Azevedo authorized Patrick C. McLaughlin, a union ,organizer, to send a letter to the Employer. General Counsel's Exhibit 3 is a copy of the letter that McLaughlin addressed to Robert Consani, the owner of the Employer. The letter is dated 23 May 1985. In sum- mary, General Counsel's Exhibit 3 stated that the Union represented a majority of the Employer's truckdriver employees, and that the Union was prepared to prove its majority status by submitting signed authorization cards to a mutually selected impartial person, General Coun- sel's Exhibit 3 also requested that the Employer enter into negotiations with the Union with regard to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment. General Counsel's Exhibit 3 further asserted that no other person or organization represented a majority of the Employer's employees at that time and cautioned the Employer against entering into any contract or renewing any contract with any other person or organization. General Counsel's Exhibit 3 indicated that the letter was sent by certified mail. General Counsel's Exhibit 4 is a copy of a Postal Service return receipt card, which indi- cates that the date of delivery of the letter was 24 May 1985.2 As indicated in the statement of the case section of this decision, the representation petition in Case 20-RC- 15902 was filed on 24 May 1985. The Respondent is engaged in both the retail and non- retail sale and delivery of ready-mix concrete. The Re- spondent has an office and place of business in Santa Rosa, California. During the 12 months preceding 31 May 1985, the Re- spondent had gross revenues in excess of $500,000, and sold and shipped products, goods, and materials valued in excess of $50,000 to other enterprises located within the State of California that are engaged directly in inter- state commerce. Based on the pleadings and the evidence presented in this proceeding, I find that the Respondent has been at all times material an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. II. LABOR ORGANIZATION Based on the pleadings and the evidence presented in this proceeding, I fmd that the Union has been at all times material a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. ' The Board's panel consisted of Chairman Dotson and Members Jo- hansen and Babson. The Decision and Direction was not published in the Board's bound volumes. B. The Allegations Pertaining to Robert Consani 1. Allegations The General Counsel alleged the following conduct in paragraphs 6 and 8 of her complaint, as amended, as being violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act: 6. Beginning about 22 May 1985, and ending about 8 August 1985, Respondent, acting through Robert Consani, at Respondent's facility: (a) threatened to close Respondent's facility if the employees selected the union as their bargaining agent. (b) informed its employees that it would be futile for them to select the union as their bargaining rep- resentative. 8. In or about late May 1985, Respondent, acting through Robert Consani, at Respondent's facility: (a) interrogated its employees regarding their union membership, activities, and sympathies and the union membership, activities, and sympathies of their fellow employees. 2 The foregoing is based on a credited portion of the testimony of Aze- vedo and documentary evidence PIONEER CONCRETE CO. (b) informed its employees that it would be futile for them to select the union as their bargaining rep- resentative. (c) threatened to close Respondent's facility if the employees selected the union as their bargaining agent. 2. Facts Ernest Moore was employed as a ready-mix truckdriv- er for the Employer from sometime during the summer of 1983 until sometime in September 1985. At the hear- ing, Moore related two conversations that he had with the owner of the Employer, Robert Consani. Moore did not recall the specific dates of his two con- versations with Consani. Moore believed the first con- versation took place a few days after the first union meeting among the Employees of the employer. He had been told that a union meeting was scheduled to be held. He believed he had been told that in May 1985, and he said it was after Moore had begun reporting to Jerry Griffith.3 Moore did not attend the union meeting, but Moore was told by some of the Employer 's drivers that the union meeting had been held. The first conversation regarding the Union between Moore and Consani took place in the Employer's yard. Moore had just driven his truck into the yard, and he was waiting in the truck to gel, a load of concrete. Con- sani approached the truck. No one else was present during their conversation. Consani asked Moore if Moore had heard about the union meeting. Moore re- plied that he had heard about it . Consani then asked if Moore had gone to the meeting. Moore replied no. Con- sani next asked if Moore knew who was instigating this. Moore replied that he thought it was Tim, and that Moore had some cards in the glove compartment that Tim had given to him . Moore then reached into the glove compartment of the truck, and Moore showed the cards to Consani. Consani -then asked Moore if Moore had passed out any of them. Moore replied no, and that he was not going to do so. Consani next asked if any- body had signed them . Moore replied no. Consani, then told Moore that it had cost Consani $30 ,000 to get the Union out. Consani pointed , towards the Company's gate. Consani told Moore that they were "crazy as hell" if they thought they were going to get the Union back in, and that Consani would close Lhat gate before that hap- pened. Moore said that his conversation with Consani ended when another truck drove into the yard. Moore ob- served that Consani then went over to talk to the other truckdriver. When Moore had his first conversation with Consani, Moore was not wearing a union button or pin on his coat. He was not wearing any insignia of any kind such as a union T-shirt, union helmet, or union hat. Moore did not have a union bumper sticker, a "vote yes" sticker, or any kind of sticker on his personal car. However, when Moore was hired by the Employer during the summer of s Griffith testified that he had become general manager of the Employ- er on 5 May 1985. 751 1983; Moore had informed the Employer that he was a member of the Teamsters Union on withdrawal. The second , conversation between Moore and Consani occurred in July 1985 .,Consani had put up a poster re- garding the representation election. Moore asked Con- sani what the poster was. Consani replied that Moore had to vote, and that was it. No one else was present during that conversation . Moore did not have any dis- cussion about the Union with Consani after that conver- sation in July. The findings of fact in the foregoing paragraphs in this section are based on a composite of the credited portions of the testimony given by Moore. Consani did not testi- fy. Thus, Moore's testimony regarding the above matters was not contradicted by the testimony of any other wit- ness. In making credibility resolutions throughout this decision, I have relied primarily on the demeanor of the witnesses as they gave their testimony at the hearing. I have considered the perception, the memory, and the ability of the witnesses to relate past events on the wit- ness stand. In addition, I have considered the matters brought out on the record by the attorneys for the three parties. For example, Moore had, been fired by the Employer. After Moore was fired by the Employer , Moore contacted Griffith about three times to ask Griffith what the story was. Moore's first conversation with Griffith regarding Moore's being fired was the next evening after Moore had been fired. Moore did not recall at the hearing when that had occurred, but he estimated that it occurred in mid-September 1985 . Moore telephoned Griffith. Moore asked Griffith if there was any work. Griffith replied that there was no work for Moore. Moore replied that he would call. Griffith the, next day. Griffith said all right. The next afternoon Moore telephoned Griffith once again. Griffith told Moore that he did not think that Moore could work for the Employer any more because Consani was mad. Griffith said that Consani was mad be- cause the back-end of Moore's truck was - dirty. Moore then told Griffith that Consani should not be mad about that because Moore had just paid the yard boy $5 to wash it. Moore acknowledged at the hearing that he be- lieved that the truck had been dirty. The following day Moore again telephoned Griffith. Griffith told Moore in that conversation that Griffith did not believe that Moore could work for the Employer anymore because Moore was uninsurable . Griffith told Moore that he had a letter from an, insurance agent who had stated that Moore was , uninsurable. When Moore came in to the Employer's office the next day, Moore got a copy of that letter and his paycheck. Moore then left the Employer's office . Moore identified the attach- ment marked as Exhibit A to his prehearing affidavit, Respondent's Exhibit 2, as being a copy of the letter dated 10 August 1985 that had been given to him. As a result of the foregoing, Moore began to operate a board- and-care home where he lived. Moore's two prehearing affidavits were introduced into evidence as Respondent's Exhibits 2 and 3. I have considered those documents, but I conclude that they do 752 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD not impeach Moore's otherwise believable testimony. I consider the differences to be minor and not truly signifi- cant. Craig Bloom is one of the voters whose ballot was challenged at the representation election. The issues per- taining to a resolution of his eligibility to vote in the election will be discussed in section V,B of this decision. As will be indicated in that section, I have concluded that Bloom was a supervisor within the meaning of the Act at the times relevant herein. Thus, I would have to consider any statements regarding the Union made by Consani solely to Bloom and not in the presence of em- ployees in light of the fact that I have found Bloom to be a supervisor. However, based on the criteria for re- solving credibility summarized above with regard to Moore's testimony, I find that I cannot base any findings of fact on Bloom's accounts of his conversations with Consani. His perception, memory, and ability to relate those conversations on the witness stand were not reli- able. Although Bloom guessed that he had four to six conversations with Consani regarding the Union, he also acknowledged that he could have had a dozen such con- versations because he did not remember. Bloom ac- knowledged at the hearing that he could not state with certainty what month any of those conversations with Consani had taken place. Linking the date of his first conversation with Consani to the union meeting was not helpful because Bloom did not know when that union meeting had been held. He said it could have been in May or June, but he said he did not know. In response to the question of whether the union meeting could have been in April, Bloom replied: "It could have been yester- day. I don't know." When he was asked again whether the meeting could have been in April, Bloom testified, "Sure." He also acknowledged at the hearing that he could not state with certainty that no one else was present during any of his conversations with Consani. Bloom further acknowledged at the hearing that he could not recall the contents of his conversations with Consani separately, but instead he could only recall "bits and pieces" of some of the conversations. Some facts were elicited from him by the use of leading questions on direct examination, but I am not convinced that he actu- ally recalled those facts without reliance on the specific facts suggested to him in the leading questions. Thus, I have not credited the portions of Bloom's testimony re- garding his conversations with Consani as being reliable and accurate even though his versions were not contra- dicted. McCormick & Co., 254 NLRB 922 (1981). 3. Conclusions Based on the findings of fact set forth above regarding Moore's first conversation about the Union with Con- sani, I conclude that Consani coercively" interrogated Moore regarding Moore's union activities and regarding the union activities of other employees of the Employer. In reaching that conclusion, I have considered to be es- pecially significant: (1) the nature of the information sought by Consani in his questioning of Moore; (2) the position of Consani as the owner of the Employer; and (3) the fact that in the same conversation Consani made a threat to Moore to close the Employer's facility if the employees selected the Union as their collective-bargain- ing representative. Under all the circumstances, I con- clude that Consani's questioning of Moore reasonably tended to restrain, coerce, and interfere with rights guar- anteed by the Act. Therefore, I further conclude that such interrogations violated Section 8 (a)(1) of the Act. The Well-Bred Loaf, 280 NLRB 306 (1986); Kona 60 Minute Photo, 277 NLRB 867 (1985); Sunnyvale Medical Clinic, 277 NLRB 1217 (1985); and Rossmore House, 269 NLRB 1176 (1984). As indicated above, I also conclude that Consani made an unlawful threat to Moore that was not a carefully phrased prediction based on objective facts that con- veyed the Employer's belief as to demonstrably probable consequences beyond his control. NLRB v. Gissel Pack- ing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618 (1969). Instead, the threat made here was directly linked merely to the employees' selection of the Union as their collective-bargaining rep- resentative, and not to any valid economic factors or other factors beyond the Employer's control. Therefore, I further conclude that such a threat violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. I conclude that the findings of fact set forth above do not support the General Counsel' s allegations that Con- sani informed employees that it would be futile for them to select the Union as their bargaining representative. Accordingly, I recommend to the Board that those alle- gations pertaining to Consani be dismissed. C. The Allegations Pertaining to Jerry Griffith 1. Allegations The General Counsel alleged the following in para- graph 7 of her complaint, as amended, as being a viola- tion of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act: 7. Beginning on or about May 22, 1985, and ending on or about August 8, 1985, Respondent, acting through Jerry Griffith, at Respondent's facili- ty, informed its employees that it would be futile for them to select the union as their bargaining rep- resentative. 2. Facts About a 1-1/2 to 2 weeks after Ernest Moore had his first conversation with Consani, as described above in section III,B, Moore was present in a group of employ- ees when Jerry Griffith made statements regarding the Union. Griffith and the employees were in the secre- tary's office at the employer's facility during lunchtime. Present in the office were: Griffith, Moore, Jerry Nich- ols, Steve Palmer, and an employee who was identified only as Greg. Those persons were having lunch at the time. Nichols told the group that his feelings were hurt because he had not been invited to attend the union meeting. Someone else replied that the reason Nichols had not been invited to the union meeting was because the first thing Nichols would do would be to run right to Consani and tell Consani about it. At the hearing Moore did not recall which person in the group stated the fore- going. Nichols then told the group that it was not legal PIONEER CONCRETE CO. for him to vote because he was now a management-iruc°k boss, and his vote would not count. Griffith then told the group either that it was silly, or that it was dumb, for them to try to get the Union in because they would just go on strike; that they would be out there walking on the picket line; that the Company would get nonunion drivers to drive and to haul concrete as usual; and that the employees would be out of a job. Moore then told the group: "I'll be damned if I'll walk a picket line." About 2 or 3 days following the 'conversation de- scribed above and continuing on five or six occasions be- tween then and a couple of days before the representa- tion election, Moore overheard Griffith tell employees: "Everybody is going crazy with this union thing. It's nuts., They'll never get in." Moore acknowledged that he could not be more specific regarding the dates and places when Griffith made those remarks. However, Moore stated that Griffith made those comments when a new NLRB poster was posted, and when employees were talking about the Union and were talking about who was for the Union and who was against the Union. The findings of fact set forth in the foregoing para- graphs in this section are based on credited portions of the testimony given by Moore based on the same reasons for resolving credibility regarding Moore's testimony as set forth in section III,B. Griffith became the general manager of the Employer on 5 May 1985. Previously, Griffith had worked for Carter Maxwell from April 1978 until sometime in 1981 when he went to work for another employer. Carter Maxwell owned the Company prior to selling the Com- pany to Consani. The name Pioneer Concrete was not used as the trade name of the Company during the time that Griffith was employed by Maxwell. The Company was known as Maxwell Concrete dining that period of time. As the general manager of the Employer since 5 May 1985, Griffith has been charged with the 'responsibility for the day-to-day running of the Employer's operations. Griffith has, under his control the dispatcher, the truck- drivers, the office manager, and the truckdrivers who haul raw materials into the plant. Griffith acknowledged at the hearing that beginning in late May 1985 he became aware that there was a union organizing campaign being conducted among the em- ployees of the Employer. Griffith also acknowledged that he had spoken to,some of the employees of the Em- ployer about the Union beginning in late May and early June 1985. , Griffith acknowledged that he probably had spoken about the union election with Moore, Bloom, Barrett,' and Allmon. However, Griffith stated at the hearing that he did not recall the substance of his con- versations with them. In Griffith's opinion, what he told the employees was not "prejudicial" insofar as the elec- tion was concerned. Griffith did not elaborate or define what he viewed "prejudicial" comments to be. As indi- cated above, I have credited Moore's testimony with regard to the statements that Moore attributed to Grif- fith. None of the other persons who were present in the secretary's office during lunchtime, as described above by Moore, testified as witnesses at the hearing. 753 3. Conclusions Based on the findings of fact set forth above regarding the statements made by Griffith to employees during lunchtime in the secretary's office, I conclude that Grif- fith expressed to the employees that their efforts to orga- nize a union at the facility would be an exercise in futili- ty. In-reaching that conclusion, I have considered to be especially significant the fact that Griffith was the gener- al manager of the Employer at the time, and that Griffith told the employees that the selection of the Union would result in them going on strike and would result in the employees losing their jobs. In essence, Griffith's state- ments on that occasion were an anticipatory refusal to bargain in good faith with the Union. Kona 60 Minute Photo, 277 NLRB 867 (1985). Therefore, I further con- clude that Griffith's statements to employees on that oc- casion violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. IV. THE PETITIONER'S OBJECTIONS IN THE REPRESENTATION CASE Five of the Petitioner's objections to the election in the representation case were referred by the Regional Director to be resolved after the hearing in this consoli- dated proceeding. These were Objections 2, 3, 6, 7, and 8, alleging: 2. The employer, by its agents, intimidated eligi- ble voters with loss of employment opportunities if they supported the union, 3. The employer, by its agents, made promises of benefits to those eligible voters who would vote against the union, and made promises of benefits to all eligible employees as an inducement not to vote for the union, and promised benefits if the union lost. 6. The above-named employer, by its agents, threatened to close the facility and/or to take other retaliatory measures if the union won the election. 7. The ' above-named employer, by its agents, interfered with, restrained, and/or coerced its em- ployees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. 8. The employer threatened known union adher- ents because of their membership in and activities on behalf of the union. Based on the findings of fact set forth in sections III,B, and C, I find that the evidence already set forth in those sections support the Petitioner's Objections 2, 6, 7, and 8. Dal-Tex Optical Co., 137 NLRB 1782, 1786-1787 (1962). I further conclude that the findings of fact do not sup- port Petitioner's Objection 3. I will make recommendations to the Board with regard to the representation case in section VI of this de- cision. V. THE CHALLENGED BALLOTS A. Mark Allmon The ballot of Mark Allmon was challenged by the Union at the representation election on the grounds that 754 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Allmon was hired by the Employer after the eligibility date. 1. Facts Andy Kilass is a management consultant with the Red- wood Employers Association. Kilass has been a manage- ment consultant for approximately 11 years. Kilass was involved in representing the Employer in the representa- tion case. He represented the Employer in dealing with the Board and in setting up the representation election. In that connection Kilass was sure that he had discus- sions with Consani regarding the representation matter. Kilass had no specific recollection of any conversation regarding the representation case with Griffith, but he said he was sure that he did have some conversations with Griffith regarding that. He, stated that he did not specifically remember any conversations with Griffith during the period of May through August 1985. Kilass' recollection was that the parties stipulated to an election at the time that had been scheduled for the hearing in the representation case. Kilass said that the hearing was scheduled to be held on 14 June 1985 in Santa Rosa. The parties actually reached verbal agree- ment to stipulate on the night before the scheduled date for the hearing. The next day the parties executed the stipulation rather than going on the record at the hear- ing. With regard to the Excelsior list, Kilass asked Con- sani when the payroll cutoff dates were. Because the payroll ended that day, Kilass told Consani that the list of names of employees would be as of that day. Consani expressed his concern to Kilass about people whose em- ployment had been terminated,' and that their names would be on the'list. Kilass assured Consani that those persons had to be currently employed. Kilass also told Consani that supervisors would not be on the Excelsior4 list. Kilass did not remember discussing with Consani an employee by the name of Flowers, and the question as to whether Flowers should be on the Excelsior list. Kilass did not remember any discussion regarding Allmon with Consani at that time. The first time that Kilass discussed Allmon by name specifically with Consani was after Allmon's ballot had been challenged in the election. Kilass advised Consam that'Allmon's ballot had been challenged. Consani asked Kilass why it had been challenged. Kilass stated at the hearing that he did not remember what he had told Con- sani on that occasion, but Kilass probably said something to Consani to the effect that they had questioned wheth- er Allmon was an employee. Consani then told Kilass that Allmon, was employed. That was all Kilass remem- bered being said between him and Consani on that occa- sion. Several days or a week or so after the election, Kilass had another conversation with Consani regarding All- mon's challenged ballot. That conversation took place over the telephone. Kilass told Consani what the prob- lem was. Kilass did not remember specifically what Con- sani said. Thereafter, Kilass believed that he had several conversations with Consani about Allmon, because Allmon was the subject of a challenged ballot. Kilass did 4 Excelsior Underwear, 156 NLRB 1236 (1962) not remember specifically anything being said except that, they discussed the status of Allmon and whether Allmon was an employee as of the cutoff date. Consani told Kilass that Allmon was. Kilass believed that Con- sani told him that Allmon was a ready-mix driver. Kilass did not recall that Consani mentioned a specific date that Allmon had been hired, but Kilass remembered that he was satisfied that Consani had stated to him that Allmon was "on board" as of the cutoff date. Consani did not testify at the hearing in this proceeding. The only kind of record that Kilass saw was a copy of one of Allmon's W-4 forms. When a copy of Charging Party's Exhibit 6 was shown to Kilass on the witness stand, Kilass did not believe that he had seen that W-4 form before. That document is dated 5 July 1985. When a copy of Charging Party's Exhibit 8 was shown to Kilass on the witness stand, Kilass said he did not believe that he had seen that W-4 form before. That document is dated 8 November 1985. When a copy of Charging Party's Exhibit 3 was shown to Kilass on the witness stand, Kilass said that he believed that Charging Party's Exhibit 3 was the form that had been shown to him. Kilass did not remember whether it was Consani or the bookkeeper who had shown that form to him. Kilass ac- knowledged that he did not do anything, other than looking at Charging Party's Exhibit 3, to verify when Allmon's employment had begun. That W-4 form is dated 13 June 1985.5 Kilass identified the second page attached to a letter from the Regional Director to the Union as being a copy of the voter eligibility list, which previously had been sent to Region 20. The letter from the Regional Director to the Union was received into evidence as Charging Party's Exhibit 14. The Excelsior list attached to Charg- ing Party's Exhibit 14 indicates that Allmon had been hired on 12 June 1985. Kilass identified General Counsel's Exhibit 6 as being a letter written on the stationery of the Redwood Employ- ers Association. Kilass identified the signature as that of David Comb. General Counsel's Exhibit 6 is a copy of a letter dated 11 September 1985 from Comb to Andy Baker, agent of Region 20. In summary, General Coun- sel's Exhibit 6 states that the payroll records of the Em- ployer substantiated the fact that Mark Allmon was hired on 13 June 1985; reported for work on that date; and was paid for work that he had performed on that dates Charging Party's Exhibit 2 is Allmon's application for employment with the Employer. The application was dated 13 June 1985. The date shown as the date Allmon could start to work was 15 June 1985. Charging Party's Exhibit 5 is Allmon's personnel infor- mation folder from the Employer's files. It has a date of 12 June 1985 written on it. To the left of that date some- thing has been marked over in black ink. I was unable to determine what was written underneath that marking. As s There was still another W-4 form for Allmon on file with the em- ployer. That W-4 form is undated and is attached to Allmon's personal information folder, C P. Exh. 5. S The findings in the foregoing paragraphs in this section are based on credited portions of the testimony of Kilass and on documentary evi- dence. PIONEER CONCRETE CO. indicated previously,, Allmon's W-4 form attached to Charging Party's Exhibit 5 is not dated. Charging Party's Exhibit 7 is a copy of Allmon's pay- roll record from the Employer's files. It shows the date Allmon started to work as 12 June 1985. His wage rate is shown as $13.25. It shows his gross pay as of 18 June 1985 to have been $56.32.7 Griffith acknowledged at the hearing that the amount of $56.32 shown on Charging Party's Exhibit 7 as being paid to Allmon was not consistent with the number of hours shown on the weighmaster's certificates in Charg- ing Party's Exhibit 4 as having been worked by Allmon on 13 and 14 June 1985. Charging Party's Exhibit 4 contains the Employer's copies of the weighmaster certificates for June 1985. Those certificates are bound into two folders or books. The weighmaster certificates sometimes were referred to at the hearing as delivery tickets, tags, or invoices. Those certificates contain such information as the date of the delivery; to whom the concrete was sold; the amount and type of concrete; information regarding the times that the driver left the employer's facility, delivered the load, and returned to the, plant; and the name of the ready-mix truckdriver and the truck number. The weigh- master's certificates are numbered. Each weighmaster certificate comes in a set, which consists of an original and three copies. The original copy is white, and the other three copies in the set are colored pink, yellow, and goldenrod. The set consists of what is commonly called carbonless paper. Although there is no carbon paper in the set, an impression made on the original copy is simultaneously made on the other three copies in the set. Griffith acknowledged at the hearing that the name of the driver and the truck number were written on the weighmaster's certificate before the copies were separat- ed from the original. The employer retained the original white copy of the weighmaster certificate. According to Griffith, at the end of each month, the original white copies of the weighmaster's certificates were placed in a folder or book. The employer's white copy of weighmaster certificate number 20142 has the name "'Mark" written over the name of "Dave" and the truck number 11 written over truck number 14. The weighmaster's, certificate number 20142 is dated 13 June 1985. However, the customer's copy of weighmaster's certificate number 20142 shows that the driver was Dave and the truck number was 14. That document was received into evidence as Charging Party's Exhibit 9. Ann 'Vanderford, who performs the bookkeeping for Merga Foundations, Inc., identified Charging Party's Exhibit 9 as the yellow copy of the em- ployer's weighmaster's certificate that she had received during ' the first few days of July 1985. In the course, of her business, Vanderford compared such yellow copies of weighmaster's certificate with the goldenrod copies that were left when the concrete was delivered at the ' The findings in the foregoing paragraphs are based on documentary evidence. 755 jobsite, -and after comparing those, she made payment to the employer.8 An examination of Charging Party's Exhibit 4 revealed that there were weighmaster certificates from the Em- ployer's files, which indicated that Allmon had made three deliveries for the Employer on Thursday, 13 June 1985; one delivery on Friday, 14 June 1985; no deliveries on Monday, 17 June 1985; no deliveries on Tuesday, 18 June 1985; two deliveries on Wednesday, 19 June 1985; and two deliveries on Thursday, 20 June 1985. In every instance the name "Mark" was written over the name of another driver. In every instance there appears to be an indentation on the white copy of the weighmaster certifi- cate immediately under the weighmaster certificates on which the name "Mark" had been written over someone else's name. At the hearing, Griffith acknowledged that he saw such an impression on such weighmaster certifi- cates that followed weighmaster certificates number 20319, 20329, 20365, and 20379. Griffith was unable to explain at the hearing how such indentations could appear on the weighmaster's certificates. The numbers of the weighmaster's certificates on, which Allmon's name had been written over another driver's name were: 20124, 20133,' 20142, 20192, 20319, 20329, 20365, and 20379. ' Beginning with weighmaster certificate 17606, which is dated 21 June 1985, the name "Mark" appears for the first time in Charging Party's Exhibit 4 without having been written over someone else's name. The weighmaster's certificates for Friday, 21 June 1985 indi- cate that Allmon made six deliveries on that date for the Employer. Only one of those weighmaster's certificates for that date had the name "Mark" written over some- one else's name. That was weighmaster's certificate number 17637. The other weighmaster certificates for Friday,, 21 June 1985 that have Allmon's name on them are: 17606, 17616, 17622, 17629, and 17640.9 2. Conclusions After comparing Charging Party's Exhibit 9 with the Employer's copy of that same weighmaster's certificate in Charging Party's Exhibit 4, I conclude that the Em- ployer's copy was changed sometime after 13 June 1985 by writing the name: "Mark" and the truck number "11" on it. Considering the method in which those weighmas- ter's certificates were prepared at the time of the deliv- ery, I conclude that Charging Party's Exhibit 9, rather than the weighmaster's certificate in Charging Party's Exhibit 4, represents the accurate weighmaster's certifi- cate. Based on the indentations on the Employer's copies of the weighmaster's certificates that follow the weigh- master 'certificates on which the name "Mark" was writ- ten over someone else's name, I conclude that the Em- ployer's copies, of the weighmaster certificates in ques- tion were changed sometime after,the weighmaster cer- tificates were bound in folders or books after the end of June 1985. I further conclude that there is a consistency or pattern with regard to the weighmaster certificates in 8 The foregoing findings are based on credited portions of the testimo- ny of Vanderford and documentary evidence. 9 The foregoing findings are based on documentary evidence. 756 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD question involving Allmon up until Friday, 21 June 1985. I conclude that that pattern distinguishes the changes made on the weighmaster certificates in question from some of the other weighmaster certificates in Charging Party's Exhibit 4, which have some changes or mark- overs on them. My examination of the records presented at the hear- ing leads to the conclusion that Allmon was hired by the Employer, after the payroll period for eligibility, which ended on Friday, 14 June 1985. On the basis of the evi- dence before me, I conclude that Allmon was hired Friday, 21 June 1985. Allmon did not testify as a witness in this proceeding. I do not credit Griffith's testimony that he hired Allmon on 13 June 1985. I did .not find that his testimony was credible, accurate, or reliable based on his demeanor while testifying and based on the conflicts noted above with regard to the Employer's records. Except for ad- missions made by Griffith, I have not relied on his testi- mony with regard to either one of the challenged voters. In view of the fact that I have concluded that Allmon was hired by the Employer after the eligibility period, I further conclude that Allmon was not an eligible voter in the representation election. Accordingly, I recommend to the Board that the challenge to his ballot be sustained. B. Craig Bloom The ballot of Craig Bloom was challenged by the Em- ployer at the representation election on the grounds that Bloom was a supervisor within the meaning of the Act. 1. Facts Bloom had two periods of employment with the Em- ployer. The first time he worked for the Employer was for just 1 week around March 1983. Bloom's job was to keep the Employer's trucks running. Bloom's second period of employment with the Employer began in Octo- ber 1984 and continued until December 1985. Again, his primary job for the Employer was to work on the- trucks and keep them running. During the period of time be- tween the Board-conducted election and the time that Bloom quit working for the Employer in December, 1985, Bloom continued to perform the same work. Bloom was not given any additional duties or responsi- bilities and his salary remained the same during that period of time. Bloom left the employment of the Em- ployer in December 1985 because Bloom received a better job offer. As a general rule, Bloom worked his own hours at the Employer's facility during his second period of employ- ment. As long as Bloom got his work done, there was no problem with Bloom's doing that. Bloom received a $500-a-week salary during the entire time of his second period of employment. Most of the time Bloom received his entire, salary even if he missed a day of work that week. However, on one occasion Bloom did not receive pay for 1, day that he had missed. In addition to his salary, Bloom received a paid vacation; paid holidays; and health insurance benefits. Bloom's testimony with regard to the benefits received by the truckdrivers em- ployed by the Respondent was too uncertain on which to base findings of fact. However, Moore testified that he had received 1 week's,paid vacation after he had been employed for 1 year by the Employer. Moore also testi- fied that he had received some paid holidays while he worked for the Employer, but he did not remember how long he had worked for the Employer before he became eligible to receive the paid holidays. Moore testified that he did not receive any medical insurance coverage, and that he did not punch a timecard. 10 The parties stipulated that the Employer's trucks are an important part of its operation. That was true at all of the times relevant in this proceeding. The Employer had approximately 15 trucks, which included cement mixers, dump trucks, and bulk trucks. In addition, the employer had a loader, a transfer, and a backhoe. Bloom changed oil, greased, fixed lights, changed clutches, changed tires, performed brake jobs, and did whatever mechanical work was necessary in order to make the equipment op- erate. Bloom had the authority to use the Company's credit for parts. Bloom ordered such parts in order to maintain the Employer's trucks and other equipment. Bloom did not always discuss the purchase of the more expensive parts with Consani, but on occasion Consani had in- structed Bloom not to order such parts because Consani was short of money. Bloom acknowledged at the hearing that he had told the truth to the best of his recollection and knowledge at the time that he gave a prehearing affidavit to a Board agent., In that affidavit, Bloom had stated that Consani was his immediate supervisor, and that Griffith did not direct Bloom's work because Bloom knew what to do. However, Bloom said that if Griffith told Bloom what to do, Bloom would do it. Because Consani signed Bloom's paychecks; Bloom said that he considered Consani to be his boss. I i When 'Moore wanted anything done to the truck that he was driving, Moore usually told Griffith first. On those occasions Griffith then told Moore to contact Bloom.-,Moore said that he never asked Bloom whether Moore's truck had been fixed. Instead, Moore asked Griffith. Moore did not know how many times his truck had been fixed during the time of his employment with the Employer. At the hearing Moore estimated that his truck had been fixed under 100 times. However, Moore also stated that he spoke to Bloom every time that Moore picked up a load at the Employer's facility, sever- al times each workday.12 10 As indicated, the findings just stated are based on credited portions of the testimony of Moore for the reasons previously given in sec IH,B. The other findings set forth above in this section are based on credited portions of the testimony given by Bloom As indicated in sec. III,B, Bloom had a poor recollection of the events pertinent to that sec. How- ever, with regard to the foregoing matters set forth in this section, and with regard to certain other findings to be set forth in this section, Bloom appeared to have a better recollection of these matters affecting his em- ployment. As I will indicate later, however, I have credited the testimo- ny of former employee Desi Wiegand over the testimony of Bloom 11 The findings in the foregoing paragraphs are based on credited por- tions of the testimony of Bloom. 12 The foregoing findings are based on credited portions of the testi- mony of Moore. PIONEER CONCRETE CO. 757 As indicated above, Bloom testified at the hearing that he had told the truth to the best of his recollection and knowledge at the time he gave his prehearing affidavit to a Board agent. In that affidavit, Bloom stated that he had told Consani that the helpers were getting out-of-hand, and that Consani told Bloom, "Well, fire them." Bloom stated in his affidavit that he replied to Consani: "Hey! I didn't hire them." Bloom stated in -his affidavit that Con- sani just shrugged his shoulders. At the hearing, Bloom gave slightly different versions of that conversation with Consani, but in one version at the' hearing, Bloom testi- fied that he told Consani that a shopboy was lazy. Bloom testified that Consani told Bloom, "Well, if he's not doing his job, fire him." At the hearing, Bloom testified that he replied to Consani: "I didn't hire him. It's not my job to fire him." I have accepted Bloom's version given in his prehearing affidavit, which he acknowledged to be true, as being the more reliable account of Bloom's con- versation with Consani on that occasion. Desi Wiegand worked for the Employer as a yardboy during October and November 1985. During that period of time, no other yardboy was working for the Employ- er. When Wiegand sought work with the Employer, he obtained an employment application at the Employer's office from a secretary who he identified as being-Cindy. Wiegand filled out the employment application at the office, and he left his employment application with Cindy. About 2 months later, Griffith telephoned Wiegand and asked Wiegand to come into the office for an inter- view. During Wiegand's interview with Griffith, Griffith told Wiegand what his duties would be at the facility; that his working hours would be from 7 a.m. to 5 p.m.; and that his wage would be $4.50 an hour. Griffith also 'told Wiegand that Wiegand would be taking instructions from' Griffith, Bloom, and the dispatcher, Greg. In terms of his day-to-day activities, Wiegand received his job instructions from Bloom about 80 percent of the time. Wiegand received his job instructions from Griffith and Greg the remainder of the time. As a yardboy, Wie- gand spent most of his working time doing things for Bloom; Wiegand gave going to get parts as an example. Bloom told Wiegand what part was needed and Wiegand would go and pick up that particular part., In addition, Bloom instructed Wiegand regarding which trucks were to be cleaned. Bloom also told Wiegand to sweep; pull weeds; or move old tires, rims, and junk parts around in the Employer's yard. Wiegand-gave as examples moving old tires, rims, and junk parts. When Wiegand had noth- ing to do, he asked Bloom to assign work to him. Wiegand acknowledged at the hearing that he did not get along with Bloom. Wiegand said that he occasionally had arguments with Bloom and complained to Griffith about these arguments. Griffith told Wiegand that Wie- gand would have to listen to Bloom. The findings in the foregoing paragraphs are based on credited portions of Wiegand's testimony and on his de- meanor While testifying. Wiegand was not 'employed by the Employer at the time that he gave his testimony. Al- though Wiegand acknowledged at the hearing that he and Bloom did not get along during the 2 months that Wiegand worked for the -Employer, I found that Wie- gand's testimony at the hearing was believable and con- vincing. I have not credited Bloom's testimony that Bloom -had no responsibility for the yardboys, and that the yardboys reported to Griffith. I have considered the testimony given by Moore with regard to the yardboys, but I found that Wiegand's testimony was more reliable with regard to the work he actually performed and with regard to his receiving instructions from Bloom 80 per- cent of his working time. On Wiegand's last day of employment with the Em- ployer, Bloom and Wiegand had an argument. Prior to the ' argument, Wiegand was looking for a masonry hammer in order to chip cement. Wiegand spent about 15 minutes looking for the hammer. Bloom then walked up to Wiegand, began to yell at him, and told him that Wiegand was taking too much time, looking for the hammer. An argument then ensued in which Bloom swore at Wiegand, and Wiegand swore at Bloom. Bloom then grabbed Wiegand and told him, "I'm going to kick shit out of you." Wiegand said to go ahead and do it. Bloom replied that he did not want to waste his time, and Bloom told Wiegand: "Just get out of here. Go home. You're fired."13 Wiegand did not talk to Griffith on the day that he was fired. About 2 weeks later, Wiegand returned to the Employer's facility and spoke with Griffith. Wiegand asked Griffith for his paycheck. Griffith then gave the paycheck to Wiegand. The paycheck already had been made up. That was the last time that Wiegand spoke with anyone at the Company.14 2. Conclusions Based on the foregoing findings, I conclude that Bloom possessed the authority to discharge employees of the Employer at the times relevant in the representation case. Those relevant - times were the payroll period for eligibility through the time that the polls closed on the date of the representation election. I conclude that the evidence established that Consani gave the authority to Bloom to discharge employees prior, to the date of the representation election when Consani told Bloom that if the yardboys were not performing their jobs to fire them. Bloom did not exercise that authority until after the representation election. However, his duties and re- sponsibilities had remained the same during his second period of employment with the Employer. The Board held in its, decision in New Jersey Famous Amos Cookie Corp., 236 NLRB 1093 (1978): "It is,long settled that the existence of'authority, not the exercise of that authority, determines whether an individual is an employee or a su- pervisor." NLRB v. Brown & Sharpe Mfg. Co., 169 F.2d 331 (1st Cir. 1948); Hook Drugs, 191 NLRB 189, 191 (1971). 13 The foregoing findings are based on credited portions of the testi- mony of Wiegand. For the reasons previously stated, I do not credit the accounts given by Bloom to the contrary. 34 The foregoing findings are based on credited portions of the testi- mony of Wiegand for the reasons previously given. 758 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Thus, Bloom's decision to discharge Wiegand and Bloom's taking such action, without consulting with anyone in higher management, illustrates the fact that Bloom possessed the authority to discharge employees both before the representation election was held, as well as after. The manner in which Bloom made an immediate decision to fire Wiegand, without consultation with higher management and the manner in which Bloom im- mediately fired Wiegand, without any such consultation, show that Bloom exercised his authority with independ- ent judgment on behalf of the Employer. It is not necessary that a person possess all of the stat- utory authority set forth in Section 2(11) of the Act be- cause that section is to be read in the disjunctive. Ohio Power Co. v. NLRB, 176 F.2d 385 (6th Cir. 1949), cert. denied 338 U.S. 899; Arizona Public Service Co. v. NLRB, 453 F.2d 228 (9th Cir. 1971); Big Rivers Electric Corp., 266 NLRB 380, 382 (1983). Because Bloom possessed the authority to discharge employees during the relevant times before the election, I have concluded that Bloom was a supervisor within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act. Moreover, I conclude that the evidence established that Bloom responsibly directed the work of the yard- boys in assigning tasks to them. The fact that the work of the yardboys was not complex does not preclude such a finding. The Board, held in its decision in New Jersey Famous Amos Cookie Corp.,' supra: "Responsible direction is not dependent on the complexity of the work , in- volved; that would rule out a finding of responsible di- rection whenever the work involved does not require a high degree of skill or technical competence." See Holi- day Inn of Dunkirk-Fredonia, 211 NLRB 461 (1974). For the reasons set forth above, I conclude that Bloom was not an eligible voter in the election, and I recom- mend that the challenge to his ballot be sustained. VI. RECOMMENDATIONS WITH REGARD TO THE REPRESENTATION CASE Because I have recommended that the challenges to the ballots of both Allmon and Bloom be sustained, and because the tally of ballots shows that the Union has re- ceived a majority of the valid votes cast in the election, I recommend that the Board issue a certification to the Pe- titioner. In these circumstances, I further recommend that all of the Petitioner's objections to the election be dismissed. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The Respondent is an employer engaged in com- merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. The Union is a labor organization within the mean- ing of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. The Respondent has engaged in unfair labor prac- tices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by coercively interrogating an employee about his union ac- tivities and about the union activities of other employees of the Employer; by threatening an employee that the Employer would close its facility if the employees select- ed the Union as their collective-bargaining representa- tive; and by telling employees that it would be futile for them to select the Union as their collective-bargaining representative because selecting the Union would result in: (a) the employees going, on strike and walking a picket line; (b) the Employer would get nonunion drivers to drive and haul concrete as usual; and (c) the employ- ees would lose their jobs. 4. The unfair labor practices described above affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. THE REMEDY Because I have found that the Respondent has en- gaged in 'certain unfair labor practices within the mean- ing of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, I shall recommmend to the Board that the Respondent be ordered to cease and desist from engaging in such unfair labor practices and to take affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the following recommend- ed15 ORDER The Respondent, Consani Company, Inc. d/b/a Pio- neer Concrete Co., Santa Rosa, California, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall 1. Cease and desist from (a) Coercively interrogating an employee about his union activities and about the union activities of other employees of the Employer. (b) Threatening an employee that the Employer would close its facility if the employees selected the Union as their collective-bargaining representative. (c) Telling employees that it would be futile for them to select the Union as their collective-bargaining repre- sentative because selecting the Union would result in: (1) the employees going on strike and walking a picket line; (2) the Employer would get nonunion drivers to drive and haul concrete as usual; and (3) the employees would lose their jobs. (d) In any like or related manner interfering with, re- straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act. (a) Post at its Santa Rosa, California, facility copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 16 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 20, after being signed by the Respondent's au- thorized representative, shall be posted by the Respond- 15 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board's Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102 48 of the Rules, be' adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur- poses. 16 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Nation- al Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." PIONEER CONCRETE CO. 759 ent immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60 con- secutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Rea- sonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered , defaced, or covered by any other material. (b) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days from the date of this Order what steps ' the Re- spondent has taken to comply. APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government 'The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the National Labor Relations Act and has or- dered us to post and abide by this notice. Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights. To organize To form, join, or assist any union To bargain collectively through representatives of their own choice To act together for other mutual aid or protec- tion To choose not to engage in any of these protect- ed concerted activities. ' WE WILL NOT coercively interrogate an employee about his union activities and about the union activities of other employees of our Company. WE WILL NOT threaten an employee that we would close the facility if our employees selected General Truck Drivers, Warehousemen and Helpers Union, Local No . 624, Marin and Sonoma Counties, 'Internation- al Brotherhood of, Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers, of America, or any other labor organization as their collective-bargaining representative. WE WILL NOT tell employees that it would be futile for them to select the Union as their collective-bargain- ing representative because selecting the union would result in: (1) the employees going on strike and walking a picket line; (2) our Company would get nonunion drivers to drive and haul concrete as usual; and (3) our employ- ees would lose their jobs. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the ,exercise of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act. CONSANI COMPANY, ' INC. D/B/A PIONEER CONCRETE CO.