Logo 7, Inc.

204 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Logo 7, Inc. and Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union, AFL-CIO, CLC. Case 25-CA- 17649 12 June 1987 DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS JOHANSEN, BABSON, AND STEPHENS On 30 June 1986 Administrative Law Judge Martin J. Linsky issued the attached decision. The Respondent filed exceptions and a support- ing brief. The National Labor Relations Board has delegat- ed its authority in this proceeding to a three- member panel. The Board has considered the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and brief and has decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings, 1 and conclusions and to adopt the recommended Order as modified.2 1. For the reasons set forth below, we agree with the judge's finding that the Respondent violat- ed Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by distributing to its employees the 4 June 1985 letter which initially made the point that the Respondent was opposed to the Union, and which contained the following statement concerning union authorization cards: The union may tell you that no one other than a union representative or representative of some federal agency will ever see the card. This is not the truth. In some instances, the signed card is disclosed to an employer by the union, the federal agency, or both. DON'T SIGN ANYTHING UNLESS YOU KNOW WHAT YOU'RE SIGNING. In adopting the judge's conclusion that the Re- spondent's letter constituted an unlawful threat, we do not rely on the judge's discussion of credited testimony by Lloyd Van Seawall, an International union representative, that the Union had a difficult time getting authorization cards signed between the time the Respondent sent the 4 June 1985 letter to employees and the end of August 1985. Nor do we 1 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge's credibility find- ings. The Board's established policy is not to overrule an administrative law judge's credibility resolutions unless the clear preponderance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing the findings. 2 The judge's recommended Order includes a visitatorial clause author- izing the Board, for compliance purposes, to obtain discovery from the Respondent under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure under the super- vision of the United States court of appeals enforcing this Order We, however, find that under the circumstances of this case it is unnecessary to include such a clause. The judge's recommended Order has been modi- fied to delete the visdatorial claim rely on any inferences based on such testimony as to the subjective effect of the letter on employees. Rather, we rely on our recent decision in Adco Metals, 281 NLRB 1300 (1986), in which we found a similar employer statement to be an unlawful threat of retaliation against employees who had signed authorization cards. In Adco Metals, we rec- ognized the vital role played by the solicitation of authorization cards in an organizational campaign and the chilling effect on the right of employees to signify their union support if they know that their employer can readily ascertain their identity. Quot- ing from Southwire Co., 277 NLRB 377 (1985), we stated that "the violation flow[ed] from the context in which the [r]espondent made the statements." In its 4 June letter, the Respondent in the present case announced to employees that the union cards may be turned over to an employer, and it made this statement gratuitously, apparently in the ab- sence of any inquiries or open controversy about the confidentiality of union cards. This suggestion that the Respondent might fmd out who had signed cards was, moreover, included in a letter that was signed by an impressive array of company offi- cials2 and that stated that the Respondent opposed the Union, that the employees did not "get their jobs" through a union, and that they should not "sign anything unless you know what you're sign- ing." Separately these statements (with the possible exception of the statement about the nonsecrecy of union authorization cards) are fairly innocuous. But it is hard to see how, in combination, they can be differentiated in effect from an employer's an- nouncement that it is the source of the employees' jobs and benefits, that it is not at all pleased at the idea of a union coming in, and that it would like its employees to know that sometimes employers just happen to find out who has been signing union cards. For the reasons we stated in Adco Metals, supra, and in Colony Printing & Labeling, 249 NLRB 223, 225-226 (1980), enfd. 651 F.2d 502, 505-506 (7th Cir. 1981), we conclude that the Re- spondent's statement about the disclosure of union authorization cards, in the context made, reason- ably tended to discourage employees from signing union authorization cards by instilling a fear of re- prisa1.4 We therefore fmd, that the statement violat- ed Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. The signatures were those of the president and chief executive offi- cer, Thomas Shine; the vice president and chief operating officer, Mi- chael R. Kistler; and DeWitt "Sonny" Short, vice president for manufac- turing. 4 In NLRB v. Colony Printing & Labeling, supra, the Seventh Circuit distinguished a much earher case, NLRB v. Sparton Mfg. Co., 355 F.2d 523 (7th Cir. 1966), which denied enforcement of a Board Order predi- cating an 8(a)(1) violation on an employer speech somewhat similar to Continued 284 NLRB No. 19 LOGO 7, INC. 205 2. The judge further found that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act when President Thomas Shine interrogated employees Theresa L. Towles and Christine Morgan concerning their views regarding the Union and what it could do for the employees, and when Supervisor Jeff Whit- sett interrogated employee Karen Brown about how she was going to vote in the upcoming union election. We agree with the judge's conclusions. We find the Shine-Morgan interrogation to be par- ticularly coercive because, after asking Morgan what she thought the Union could do for her, Shine, in his capacity as the Respondent's presi- dent, informed Morgan that they "were not going to negotiate with any outsiders," and that "this is one issue I do not intend to lose." We find, under these circumstances, that Shine's interrogation of Morgan reasonably tended to coerce, restrain, and interfere with rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. 3. Finally, the judge found that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act through the conduct of Supervisor Maria Fair in unlawfully so- liciting grievances from the second-shift embroi- dery crew employees. On a number of occasions during the union organizing campaign, Fair, the second-shift embroidery supervisor, held meetings with her crew to discuss complaints relating to the existing friction between the first- and second-shift embroidery crews concerning the way the ma- chines were left from the previous shifts, quality of work, failure to fmish orders, and other matters. Employee Mary Theresa Boles testified that she and seven other second-shift embroidery employees attended a meeting in November 1985 conducted by Supervisor Fair in which Fair opened the meet- ing by mentioning the upcoming union election.5 According to Boles' credited testimony, Fair then asked the employees if they "had any suggestions that-of any improvements on some of the com- plaints that they had, things like benefits and the letter in Colony and the letter in the present case. The court noted that the letter in Colony also contained two other statements that violated the Act, but it pnnexpally distinguished Sparton on the ground that the court there apparently focused on only the portion of the speech that warned employees not to sign cards unless they knew what they were signing 651 F 2d at 505. In fact, although the speech at issue in Sparton also included the point that unions might show authonzation cards to an employer, that point was given less prominence than it has m the letter involved in the present case. The thrust of the sentence in the Sparton speech was that the union might "show" the cards to the employer "in order to force recognition without an election." Finally, we note that Spartan was decided before the Supreme Court in NLRB v Gissel Pack- ing Co., 395 U.S 575, 617 (1969) emphasized the importance, in assessing whether employer statements violate Sec 8(a)(1), of taking "into account the economic dependence of the employees on their employers, and the necessary tendency of the former, because of that relationship, to pick up intended implications of the latter that might be more readily dismissed by a more disinterested ear." 5 The union election was scheduled to be held on 26 November 1985. wages." Fair's notes of the various meetings sup- port Boles' testimony that during one of the meet- ings Fair initiated a discussion concerning specific complaints about working conditions which dealt with matters unrelated to the friction between the first and second shifts. When asked if she indicated to the employees during any of the meetings that she would pass their complaints along to her super- visor, Manufacturing Manager Brad Copp, Fair re- sponded affirmatively. We agree with the judge that Fair's conduct in asking employees if they had particular complaints about wages and working conditions (but not her conduct in meetings devoted simply to discussing complaints related to friction between the two shifts) violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. In Uarco Inc., 216 NLRB 1, 1-2(1974), the Board stated: [T]he solicitation of grievances at preelection meetings carries with it an inference that an employer is implicitly promising to correct those inequities it discovers as a result of its in- quiries. . . . However, it is not the solicitation of grievances itself that is coercive and viola- tive of Section 8(a)(1), but the promise to cor- rect grievances or a concurrent interrogation or polling about union sympathies that is un- lawful; the solicitation of grievances merely raises an inference that the employer is making such a promise, which inference is rebuttable by the employer. The Board has further held that in the absence of evidence of an established program of grievance meetings, the holding of meetings during a union campaign at which employees are encouraged to air grievances constitutes solicitation of those grievances and an implied promise of corrective action if employees reject the union, thereby violat- ing Section 8(a)(1).6 In the instant case, therefore, even accepting the legitimacy of Fair's practice in conducting a series of meetings to discuss friction between the shifts, we find that her solicitation of grievances at the same meeting at which she noted the upcoming union election and indicated that she would pass along the employees' complaints amdunted to a de- parture from her practice of dealing with the second-shift embroidery employees. Fair's conduct therefore raised the inference that the Respondent was promising to remedy the employee complaints raised at the meeting. Thus, in the absence of any evidence that the Respondent made any statement or took any action to establish that is was not 6 See Borg-Warner Corp., 229 NLRB 1149, 1152-1153 (1977). Cf. L. M. Berry & Co, 266 NLRB 47, 54 (1983). 206 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD promising to remedy grievances, we find that the Respondent did not meet its burden under Uarco, above, of rebutting the unlawful inference.7 For the above-discussed reasons, we conclude that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by unlawfully soliciting and promising to recti- fy employee grievances.8 ORDER The National Labor Relations Board adopts the recommended Order of the administrative law judge as modified below and orders that the Re- spondent, Logo 7, Inc., Indianapolis, Indiana, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Order as modified. Substitute the following for paragraph 2(b). "(b) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days from the date of this Order what steps the Respondent has taken to comply." 7 See Merle Lindsey Chevrolet, 231 NLRB 478 fn 2 (1977). Based on the above conclusion, we find it unnecessary to pass on the judge's statement at the end of sec. III,F of his decision that the conduct found to constitute an unlawful solicitation of grievances "would tend to interfere with a fair election since the implication is that you don't need a union just let us know what your working condition complaints are and we will correct them," The judge's reliance on Gull, Inc., 279 NLRB 931 (1986), is misplaced as in that case the Board found the employer's institution of an open-door policy in response to a union campaign violated Sec. 8(a)(1) of the Act because it constituted an unlawful grant of benefits designed to under- mine employee support for the union, rather than a solicitation of griev- ances. John Petrison, Esq., for the General Counsel. Douglas J. Heckler, Esq., of Indianapolis, Indiana, for the Respondent. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE MARTIN J. LINSKY, Administrative Law Judge. On 22 November 1985 a charge was filed against Logo 7, Inc., by Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union, AFL-CIO-CLC (Union or Charging Party). Following an investigation, the National Labor Relations Board, by the Regional Director for Region 25, issued a complaint in Case 25-CA-17649 alleging that Logo 7, Inc. (Re- spondent) violated Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act, on several occasions during the course of a union organizing campaign. Respondent filed an answer in which it denied that it violated the Act in any way. A hearing was held in Indianapolis, Indiana, on 25 March 1986. On the entire record in this case, to include posthear- ing briefs submitted by the General Counsel and Re- spondent, and on my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, I make the following FINDINGS OF FACT I. JURISDICTION Respondent Logo 7, Inc. is an Indiana corporation, with an office and place of business in Indianapolis, Indi- ana, where it is engaged in the sale and manufacture of embroidered and screen printed garments. Respondent admits, and I find, that it is now, and has been at all times material, an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. H. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Respondent admits, and I fmd, that the Charging Party, Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union, AFL-CIO-CLC, is now, and has been at all times material, a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Introduction In June 1985 the Union began an organizing campaign at Respondent's facility in Indianapolis where Respond- ent employs between 165 and 175 persons. During the course of the campaign it is alleged that Respondent, acting through four persons, i.e., Thomas Shine, Dewitt "Sonny" Short, Jeff Whitsett, and Maria Fair, all of whom are admitted by Respondent as being supervisors and agents within the meaning of the Act, violated Sec- tion 8(a)(1) of the Act on a number of occasions. Shortly before the scheduled Board-supervised election the Union filed the charge, which served as a blocking charge, and the election was postponed pending the out- come of this unfair labor practice case. There was no showing, by way of authorization cards or otherwise, that the Union enjoyed majority support among the em- ployees and, therefore, the General Counsel is merely seeking a cease-and-desist order and the posting of a notice. Section 7 of the Act provides as follows: Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bar- gain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted ac- tivities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as au- thorized in section 8(a)(3). Section 8(a)(1) provides that "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer . . . to interfere with, re- strain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7." I will first address a letter Respondent sent to its em- ployees and then I will separately address whether each or any of the supervisors violated the Act. LOGO 7, INC. 207 B. Respondent's Letter to Employees The union organizing campaign began on 2 June 1985 when union organizers met with a number of Respond- ent's employees at a motel in Indianapolis. On 4 June 1985, Respondent sent a letter to each of its employees. The letter, which is 1-1/2 pages in length, was signed by Thomas K. Shine, president and chief executive officer; Michael R. Kistler, vice president and chief operating of- ficer; and Dewitt "Sonny" Short, vice president for man- ufacturing. It is alleged that Respondent violated the Act by having in the letter the following language concern- ing union authorization cards: The union may tell you that no one other than a union representative or representative of some fed- eral agency will ever see the card. This is not the truth. In some instances, the signed card is disclosed to an employer by the union, the federal agency, or both. DON'T SIGN ANYTHING UNLESS YOU KNOW WHAT YOU'RE SIGNING. The General Counsel contends that this language im- pliedly threatens employees with reprisals if they sign a union authorization card. Respondent contends it is merely a correct statement of the law. I conclude that al- though the statement is a correct statement of the law it is nevertheless a threat in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. The rest of the letter legally lets the employees know that Respondent does not want to see its employ- ees represented by a union. There could be no reason why the language cited above is in the letter other than to threaten or scare the employees and to interfere with the free exercise of their rights under Section 7 of the Act. Two of the signers of the letter testified (President Shine and Vice President Short) and neither knew of any circumstance under which authorization cards would be shown to the employer and neither furnished an explana- tion for having that language in the letter. Michael R. Kistler, the third person to sign the letter, did not testify. It is my conclusion that the sending of this letter to em- ployees, because it contained the quoted language, violat- ed Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. This is especially so in light of the fact that I find other violations of Section 8(a)(1). See Southwire Co., 277 NLRB 377 (1985). In the context of this case the "quoted language" was never rendered harmless by Respondent's behavior subsequent to the sending of the letter. Although two employees, Karen Brown and Christine Morgan, did testify that they signed authorization cards subsequent to their receipt of the 4 June 1985 letter, Lloyd Van Seawell, an International representative for the Union, credibly testified that the Union had a diffi- cult time getting authorization cards signed between the time Respondent sent the 4 June 1985 letter to employees and the very end of August 1985. A petition seeking to represent Respondent's employees was not filed until 11 October 1985. The fact that the quoted language from the letter is ac- curate is no defense. If, for example, the president of a company told a group of employees during the course of an organizing campaign that "In some companies those employees trying to organize the work force are fired," and nothing else, this would constitute a violation of the Act even though the statement is true. There was no purpose, to be served in informing the employees that Respondent may fmd out that they signed union authorization cards other than to encourage its employees not to sign cards because of the implied threat that Respondent may do something unpleasant if it finds out an employee signed an authorization card. It is enlightening to note that President Thomas Shine, when answering a question from his own attorney, testified that "The only people that I knew who'd signed a card were people that had come up to me and said that they signed a card before they knew what they were doing." Shine's own testimony establishes why informing an em- ployee that an employer may fmd out (by whatever means) that he signed an authorization card interferes with and restrains an employee in the exercise of his Sec- tion 7 rights. C. President Thomas Shine Employee Theresa L. Towles credibly testified that in early November 1985 she had a conversation with Re- spondent's president, Thomas Shine, in the ink room at Respondent's plant. Towles was not an open and active union supporter. Shine asked her what her views were regarding the Union. She testified that she was "surprised" and "scared to answer." She replied that she really had not thought about it, one way or the other. This constitutes unlawful interrogation. See Sunnyvale Medical Clinic, 277 NLRB 1217 (1985) Under the totality of the circumstances test this was not casual conversation as far as Towles was concerned. I did not believe Shine when he testified that this conversation never took place. In late October 1985 former employee Marcus Durker- son testified that he overheard Shine ask employee Steve Lee how everything was going and Lee replied that fumes in the plant were bothering him Shine said that the Company was working on installing some exhaust fans to alleviate the problem. This is alleged to constitute an unlawful solicitation of grievances. I do not believe it is. Shine credibly testified that for years he has circulated throughout the plant as part of his job and asked em- ployees how they were getting along and complaints were voiced by employees on occasions about working conditions. Shine maintains that he continued this prac- tice dining the organizing campaign but made it a point, on the advice of counsel, not to make any promises to employees about benefits or improving their working conditions. A major complaint for the 7 years that Respondent has been in its present location was the intense heat during the summer and Shine testified that employees com- plained about the heat. Shine admits that he continued to tell employees during the organizing campaign as he had for more than a year before the organizing campaign began that Respondent was considering relocating to a facility where working conditions would be better. In my judgment this does not violate the Act. Shine might 208 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD have circulated around Respondent's facility somewhat more during the union organizing campaign than before but not significantly more. In addition, he was under no legal obligation to significantly modify his management style just because the Union was trying to organize the workplace. His statement to employee Steve Lee about exhaust fans and his statements to other employees about the proposed move to a new facility do not constitute either an unlawful solicitation of grievances or a promise of a benefit calculated to undermine support for the Union. About 24 October 1985 Shine approached employee Christine Morgan, who was not an open and active union supporter, inside the plant and asked her if she had seen the notice on the bulletin board concerning the up- coming union election. She said she had not Shine then asked her what she thought the Union could do for her. She testified that she was "kind of shocked" that Shine came up and spoke to her about the Union. She said she thought the Union could get the employees more money. She credibly testified that Shine then informed her that they "were not going to negotiate with any outsiders," and that "this is one issue I do not intend to lose." Shine denied that this conversation ever took place. I do not believe him. The statements of Shine constitute unlawful interrogation because it is clear that, under all the cir- cumstances, his conduct had a reasonable tendency to coerce, restrain, and interfere with rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. See Sunnyvale Medical Clinic, supra. On 8 November 1985 a meeting was held in Shine's office. In attendance were Shine and employees Clifford Wood and Christine Morgan. The fact that this meeting took place and what was said during the meeting do not violate the Act. It was Clifford Wood who set up the meeting with Shine. Morgan asked Wood if she could go with him to the meeting after she heard that Wood was going to meet with Shine. Wood said okay. At the meet- ing Wood told Shine that Wood was opposed to the Union, told Shine what some of the employees com- plaints were, e.g., 10-hour days, no heat breaks, mandato- ry overtime, and suggested to Shine that possibly Wood could speak with Shine in the future on behalf of his fellow employees and keep the Union out of the picture. Shine credibly testified that he spoke with his attorney before agreeing to meet with Wood and did not make any promises to, or threaten, Wood or Morgan during the meeting. Shine is, for the most part, corroborated by Morgan. Neither side called Wood as a witness. Shine, to his credit, did not agree to Wood's suggestion of having Wood become the spokesman for the other employees. D. Vice President Dewitt "Sonny" Short Employee Karen Brown testified that at a meeting of employees called by management, Vice President Dewitt "Sonny" Short said, "Whenever you did collective bar- gaining that you had to give up something to receive something." She said that Short said to get a pension plan the employees might have to give up something else. She conceded on Cross-examination that Short said in this meeting that "sometimes you have to give up things to gain things." (Emphasis added.) Short admits that he discussed the bargaining process at a group meeting and did say that everything was "open to negotiation and could change for the better or for the worse." He admits he said, "The union might be willing to, as a for instance, to get a dues check-off to give away some benefits of something like that." In essence, Short admits he said what employee Karen Brown claims he said; however, what he said does not amount to a violation of the Act. Short accurately de- scribed the bargaining or negotiation process as one of give and take and made no illegal threats or promises in doing so. See Robert Bosch Corp., 256 NLRB 1036, 1046 (1981). E. Supervisor Jeff Whitsett I credit the testimony of employee Karen Brown, who was not an open and active union supporter, who stated that about 20 November 1985, approximately 1 week before the scheduled election, she was approached by Supervisor Jeff Whitsett inside the plant. Whitsett asked her several questions. The conversation took place after a meeting attended by employees. Whitsett asked what she thought about what was going on. She asked what was he talking about. He said about the Union. She re- plied that she really did not know how she felt. He then asked how she was going to vote. She said she was not sure and that it was none of his business. He Said that if she is unsure she should vote against the Union. She asked him if he was asking other employees how they were going to vote. He replied no. Whitsett, who I do not believe on this point, denied he ever asked employee Karen Brown how she felt about the Union or how she was going to vote, but does admit that she asked him if Whitsett was asking other employ- ees how they were going to vote. Whitsett testified that he replied to Brown by stating no he was not asking other employees how they were going to vote and would not do that because he was not allowed to do so. It makes more sense to believe that Brown would ask Wliitsett if he were asking other employees how they were going to vote if he had first asked her. I credit Brown over Whitsett. Considering the totality of the cir- cumstances this was clearly an illegal interrogation in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. See Sunnyvale Medical Clinic, supra. F. Supervisor Maria Fair Employee Mary Theresa Boles testified that she and other employees on the second-shift embroidery section (a total of eight people) attended a meeting in November 1985 presided over by the Second-Shift Embroidery Sn- pervisor Maria Fair. Fair opened the meeting by men- tioning the upcoming union election and then asked those in attendance if they had any suggestions on how to address the complaints of the employees. According to Boles, one or more of the employees, whom she could not identify, stated they wanted better wages and bene- fits and less overtime. Fair testified that there was friction between the first- and second-shift embroidery crews about the way the machines were left from the previous shifts, quality of LOGO 7, INC. 209 work, failure to finish orders, and other matters. On a number of occasions, during the union organizing cam- paign, Fair says she held meetings with her crew to hear the complaints her crew had with first shift and to dis- cuss the complaints first shift had with her shift. Fair admits that at one of these meetings she told her crew about the upcoming union election. Fair kept notes on complaints and problems that were discussed at the various meetings she held. Her own notes (received in evidence as G.C. Exh. 3) reflect that the matters dis- cussed were for the most part a result of the friction be- tween first and second shift, e.g., area left dirty, empty boxes left in the work area, machinery problems, lack of material. However, one page of her notes supports the testimony of employees Mary Theresa Boles that Fair so- licited grievances from the members of her crew. The notes reflect in pencil on the bottom half of a sheet of paper the following: "11/12—Union cancelled vote until labor board investigation." On the same page, but in ink and on the top portion of the paper, Fair lists the com- plaints of her crew as follows: "Why does 1st shift have a choice of overtime, early or late? Who decides who gets helper jobs—Pat was fast operator. What happened to company parties, bowling, softball, etc. What hap- pened to open house, monthly meetings, lockers, coats, boots, etc?" Fair was unable to state if both the top and bottom portions of the page were written on different dates or on the same date. However, the fact that one portion is in ink and the other in pencil would tend to show they were written at different times and the top portion writ- ten at a time prior to the bottom portion being written. In other words, Fair's last recorded notes regarding a meeting with her crew prior to telling them the election was postponed concerned itself with specific complaints about their working conditions above and beyond any friction between first and second shifts and constitute an unlawful solicitation of grievances. This would tend to interfere with fair election because the implication is that you do not need a union just let us know what your working condition complaints are and we will correct them. See Gull, Inc., 279 NLRB 931 (1986). THE REMEDY The appropriate remedy in this case is to order Re- spondent to cease and desist from its unlawful practices and to post a notice. I note that in crediting the testimo- ny of witnesses, Towles, Morgan, Brown, and Boles, I considered that all four women were still employed by Respondent at the time they testified before me. This was one more factor—in addition to others, including de- meanor—to conclude that they were telling the truth. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1.Respondent Logo 7, Inc. is an employer engaged in commerce, and in operations affecting commerce, within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. 2. Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union, AFL-CIO-CLC is a labor organization within the mean- ing of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act when it sent a letter to its employees telling them that an agency of the Government or the Union may show au- thorization cards signed by its employees to the employ- er, when President Thomas Shine unlawfully interrogat- ed Theresa L. Towles and Christine Morgan concerning their views regarding the Union and what it coult:1 do for the employees, when Supervisor Jeff Whitsett unlawfully interrogated employee Karen Brown about how she was going to vote in the upcoming union election, and when Supervisor Maria Fair unlawfully solicited grievances from the employees on the second-shift embroidery crew. 4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 5.Respondent has not otherwise violated the Act. On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the following recommend- ed ORDER The Respondent, Logo 7, Inc., Indianapolis, Indiana, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall 1. Cease and desist from (a) Sending letters to its employees telling them that an agency of the Federal Government or the Union may show union authonzation cards signed by its employees to the employer, unlawfully interrogating its employees concerning their views regarding the Union and asking them how they are going to vote, and unlawfully solicit- ing grievances from its employees. (b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re- straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act. (a) Post copies of the attached notice marked "Appen- dix."2 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 25, after being signed by the Respondent's authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are cus- tomarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, de- faced, or covered by any other material. (b) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps have been taken to comply. For the purpose of determining or se- curing compliance with this Order, the Board, or any of its duly authorized representatives, may obtain discovery from the Respondent, its officers, agents, successors, or If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board's Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur- poses. 2 If this Order is enfOrced by a judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Na- tional Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the Nation- al Labor Relations Board." 210 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD assigns, or any other person having knowledge concern- ing any compliance matter, in the manner provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures. Such discovery shall be conducted under the supervision of the United States court of appeals enforcing this Order and may be had on any matter reasonably related to compliance with this Order, as enforced by the court. APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the National Labor Relations Act and has or- dered us to post and abide by this notice. Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights. To organize To form, join, or assist any union To bargain collectively through representatives of their own choice To act together for other mutual aid or protec- tion To choose not to engage in any of these protect- ed concerted activities. WE WILL NOT do anything that interferes with these rights. WE WILL NOT send letters to our employees telling them that union authorization cards signed by them may be shown to us by an agency of the Federal Government or by the Union. WE WILL NOT unlawfully interrogate our employees by asking them what their views are concerning the Union or by asking how they are going to vote in a union representation election. WE WILL NOT unlawfully solicit the grievances of our employees. WE WILL NOT in Any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act. LOGO 7, INC.