M.U. Industries, Inc.

388 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD M.U. Industries, Inc. and Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union, Local 37-38H, AFL-CIO. Case 18-CA-9118 22 June 1987 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN DOTSON AND MEMBERS JOHANSEN AND CRACRAFT On 3 April 1986 Administrative Law Judge Martin J. Linsky issued the attached decision. The Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief,' the General Counsel filed cross-exceptions and a supporting brief, which the Charging Party joined, and the Respondent filed an answering brief. The National Labor Relations Board has delegat- ed its authority in this proceeding to a three- member panel. The Board has considered the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the judge's rulings, fmdings, and conclusions as modified and to adopt the recom- mended Order. The judge found, and we agree, that the Re- spondent, M.U. Industries, was a successor employ- er to Malrov-United Cap and Hat Co., Inc. and, therefore, it had a duty to recognize and bargain with the Union and violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act when it failed and refused to do so. However, the judge also found that when the Union demanded recognition by letter dated 28 August 1984 former employees of the Respondent's predecessor Malrov were not a majority in a sub- stantial and representative complement, but were a majority of such a complement as of 4 January 1985. The judge found that the Respondent should have recognized and bargained with the Union as of that date, and should have honored the Union's second demand for recognition on 8 March 1985. The General Counsel excepts to the judge's find- ing that the 17 employees did not constitute a sub- stantial and representative complement out of an eventual full complement of 26 to 31 employees, and to his failure to find that the Respondent's bar- gaining obligation attached at the time of the Union's initial demand, 28 August 1984. We find merit in the General Counsel's exceptions. The judge found that the Respondent employed 17 employees during the week ending 31 August 1984, almost half of the full complement of 35 to 41 alleged by the Respondent. Although the judge concluded that the Board in the past has held that 1 The Respondent has requested oral argument. The request is denied as the record, exceptions, and briefs adequately present the issues and the positions of the parties this is sufficient to constitute a substantial and rep- resentative complement, he also found that, in the light of the Board's decision in Myers Custom Prod- uct, 2 this is not sufficient to constitute a substantial and representative complement. We disagree. In Myers the Board found the parties had stipulated that when the respondent commenced operations, it had a defmite plan to substantially increase the employee complement within a short and specified period of time. We fmd that Myers is inapplicable here. The Respondent's plan when it commenced pro- duction on 2 July 1984 to expand its work force to 30 to 40 employees was in fact speculative. The Respondent, in the circumstances of this case, therefore had a duty to recognize and bargain with the Union when the Union made its 28 August 1984 demand. As more fully set forth in the judge's decision, Malrov, the predecessor, ceased production after 23 March 1984. William Lipkin, who had been the president and treasurer of Malrov at the time a its failure, became the president of the Respondent. The Respondent had the same business operation; the same plant; the same work force; the same jobs and working conditions; the same supervision for the most part; the same machines, equipment, and methods of production; and the same products as its predecessor. Shortly after Malrov failed, Lipkin explored the possibility of starting a new company; he held two unsuccessful meetings with the Union in an effort to reach agreement on a contract covering employ- ees working for the new company. Lipkin contrib- uted $50,000 of his own money and acquired the assistance of a venture capitalist, Michael Edison, who also invested $50,000. A shareholder control agreement was executed by Lipkin and Edison giving each of them an equal voice on the Re- spondent's board of directors. The agreement also gave Edison veto power over decisions with regard to the Respondent's operations; such power had the potential of restricting Lipkin ability to plan and operate the Respondent. The Respondent had unsuccessfully attempted to secure a loan from the Small Business Administra- tion during August and September 1984. It was not until 4 October 1984, more than a month after the Union's demand for recognition and bargaining, that Lipkin secured a $250,000 line of credit with a local bank and a $200,000 loan from the Communi- ty Initiatives Consortium. The latter loan imposed conditions on the Respondent, including restric- tions on its operations and its ability to borrow the 2 Myers Custom Products, 278 NLRB 636 0986). 284 NLRB No. 46 M.U. INDUSTRIES 389 additional funds that would be necessary for expan- sion. Finally, Lipkin testified that until he secured additional fmancing in October 1984 be was unsure whether the Respondent's operations would be ex- panded. There is thus ample evidence that Lipkin's ap- proach to the forming and operating of the Re- spondent was highly speculative and contingent on acquiring the necessary financing. That condition was not satisfied until more than 3 months after commencing operations and more than 1 month after the Union had acquired majority status and had demanded recognition. The record also shows that the Respondent's em- ployee complement dropped sharply after October 1984 and stabilized in the 26 to 31 employees' range until mid-June 1985 when it went up to around 40 and remained there until the time of the hearing. However, as the judge found, the 26 to 31 employees' range more accurately reflected a full complement of employees for the Respondent. We find, based on the foregoing, that when the Union demanded recognition in a letter dated 28 August 1984 the former employees of the Respond- ent's predecessor Ma1rov were a majority in a sub- stantial and representative complement of employ- ees and that the Respondent should have recog- nized and bargained with the Union as of that date. Accordingly, by refusing to recognize and bargain with the Union as the majority representative of its employees on receipt of the Union's letter dated 28 August 1984, the Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. 3 ORDER The National Labor Relations Board adopts the recommended Order of the administrative law judge and orders that the Respondent, M.U. Indus- tries, Inc., Minneapolis, Minnesota, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Order. 3 In Hudson River Aggregates, 246 NLRB 192 (1979), the Board held that the appropriate date for determining majority status was the date the Respondent began full scale operations and had employed a majority of its predecessor's employees. Moreover, the Board pointed out that the Respondent could pot rely on unit changes 6 months later to justify its initial refusal to bargain. James L. Fox, Esq., for the General Counsel. David C McDonald, Esq., of St. Paul, Minnesota, for the Respondent. Robert D. Metcalf; Esq., of Minneapolis, Minnesota, for the Charging Party. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE MARTIN J. LINSKY, Administrative Law Judge. On 21 February 1985 the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union, Local 37-38H, AFL-CIO (Union or Charging Party) filed a charge alleging that M.U. Indus- tries, Inc. had unlawfully failed and refused to recognize it and bargain collectively with it. Thereafter, on 20 March 1985, the National Labor Re- lations Board, by the Regional Director for Region 18, issued a complaint alleging that M.U. Industries, Inc. (Respondent) was a successor employer to Malrov- United Cap and Hat Co., Inc. and, therefore, had a duty to recognize the Union and bargain with it and violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act) when it failed and refused to do so. Re- spondent filed an answer in which it admitted its refusal to recognize and bargain with the Union but denied that it was a successor employer to Malrov-United Cap and Hat Co., Inc., and claims as a result thereof that it had no duty to recognize the Union and bargain with it. A hearing was held in Minneapolis, Minnesota, on 3 October 1985. On the entire record in this case, the posthearing briefs submitted by the General Counsel and Respondent, and my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, 1 I make the following FINDINGS OF FACT I. JURISDICTION Respondent M.U. Industries, Inc. is a Minnesota cor- poration with an office and place of business in Minne- apolis, Minnesota, where it is engaged in the manufacture and nonretail sale and distribution of headwear and relat- ed products. Respondent admits, and I fmd, that it is now, and has been at all times material, an employer en- gaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union, Local 38-38H, AFL-CIO is now, and has been at all times material here, a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES There are three principal issues to be decided in this case: (1) Whether there is a "substantial continuity" in the employing entity between Respondent and its predeces- sor, Malrov-United Cap and Hat Co., Inc. (Malrov). (2) Whether the appropriate time for determining successorship status is when the successor employer em- 1 There were only two witnesses in this case, i.e., William Lipkin, president of Respondent, and Allan Beltz, Respondent's plant manager. The credibility of the witnesses is not as significant a factor in this case as it is in many others. Although the facts are essentially undisputed in this case, the consequences of those facts are not. 390 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD ploys a "substantial and representative" or a "full" com- plement of employees. (3) Whether the Union demanded recognition as bar- gaining representative at a time when Respondent em- ployed a majority of Malrov's employees in the appro- priate complement of employees. One of the two companies that eventually became Malrov was founded around the turn of the century by the grandfather of William Lipkin, Respondent's presi- dent. When Lipkin joined Malrov full time 2 years after graduating from college, his father, Sol Lipkin, and uncle, Sydney Levinson, were Malrov's shareholder. In approximately 1979, William Lipkin and his brother Charles Lipkin purchased the common shares of Malrov, holding 51 and 49 percent, respectively. Their father continued to hold an unspecified number of preferred shares. At the time that Malrov ceased operations in March 1984, the following persons occupied supervisory and other management positions: William Lipkin President and Treasurer Charles Lipkin Vice President and Secretary Sol Lipkin Sales Renee Peterson General Manager Allan Beltz Plant Manager Richie Bridges Distribution Manager Richard Dobak Equipment Manager Eugene Lassek Production Development Manager Milma Mains Production Development Assistant Manager Arthur Raeker Cutting and Packaging Department Manager Petronna Irizary Training and Sewing Department Manager Larry Dennie Controller Mask Heilman Credit Manager MaRoy's principal business was the manufacture and wholesale sale of men's headwear. These products were sold to four major retail outlets, ie, JC Penney, Sears Roebuck and Co., CR Anthony, the Military Exchange Service (PX), and to organizations such as grain compa- nies and unions for use in promotions. Malrov's office and manufacturing operations occupied three full floors and part of a fourth floor in the Wyman Building in downtown Minneapolis, Minnesota. For many years em- ployees performing manufacturing and related functions were represented by the Union. During the term of the most recent collective-bargaining agreement, which was effective from 1 July 1982 until 30 June 1984, Malrov employed an average of approximately 55 employees. Job classifications covered by the agreement included cutters, operators, blockers, hand sewers, packers, im- printing, and warehouse. The primary duties performed by employees in these classifications included all hand and machine work necessary to transform raw materials into finished headwear, and to prepare this product for shipment to Malrov's customers. Equipment utilized in performing these functions including cutting presses and tables, a variety of sewing machines, blocking and press- ing equipment, and imprinting equipment. Throughout 1983, representatives of Mahov and its primary institutional creditor, Norwest Bank Minneapo- lis, were engaged in negotiations to restructure Malrov's indebtedness. In December 1983, Norwest stopped pay- ment on all of Malrov's checks, including employee pay- checks, in an apparent attempt to hasten negotiations and encourage Malrov to seek additional credit elsewhere. When Malrov's attempts in this regard floundered, Nor- west in March 1984 again stopped payment on Malrov's check. No further production occurred after 23 March 1984. Thereafter, pursuant to a security interest held by Norwest, Malrov conveyed all of its tangible and intan- gible assets to the bank. In exchange for being released from his personal guarantee on the Norwest loan, Lipkin agreed to assist Norwest in disposing of Malrov's assets. By agreements dated 31 May 1984, all of Malrov's tangi- ble and intangible assets were conveyed to a liquidating company called JYJ II Corporation (JYJ). Shortly after the collapse of Malrov, Lipkin began ex- ploring the possibility of starting a new company. Two meetings were held with the Union in an effort to reach agreement on a contract covering employees working for the new company, but these efforts proved unsuc- cessful. Recognizing that a new business would require a substantial capital investment, Lipkin made contact with a local venture capitalist named Michael Edison. Lipkin and Edison agreed to initial contributions to this endeav- or in the amount of $50,000 each. Respondent was incor- porated in June 1984. In exchange for their investments, Lipkin and Edison received 60 and 40 percent, respec- tively, of the common shares of Respondent. However, a shareholder control agreement executed by Lipkin and Edison gave each of them an equal voice on Respond- ent's board of directors. By virtue of this agreement, Edison in effect acquired veto power over decisions re- garding Respondent's operations. This power, at least in theory, restricted Lipkin's ability to plan and operate Re- spondent. Additional capital was not secured until 4 Oc- tober 1984. On that date, Respondent secured a $250,000 line of credit with First Bank Minneapolis and a $200,000 loan from the Community Initiatives Consortium (CIC). The CIC agreement imposed conditions on Respondent, including restrictions on its operations and ability to borrow the additional funds that would be necessary for expansion. Because all of Malrov's tangible and intangible assets had been repossessed by Norwest, Lipkin began seeking to purchase equipment for Respondent's operations. In late May 1984, Lipkin purchased approximately $4000 worth of equipment. On 8 June 1984 Lipkin entered into two agreements for the purchase from JYJ of $90,000 to $95,000 worth of Malrov's former assets, including raw material, work-in-progress, and equipment. Malrov's fin- ished goods inventory and accounts receivable were not purchased. Later, Respondent sold approximately $10,000 worth of surplus equipment acquired from JYJ, and purchased an additional $40,000 to $50,000 worth of equipment, principally a boiler and a computer, from en- tities other than JYJ. Lipkin also negotiated a lease for the use of one floor in the Wyman Building, which is the same building in which Malrov was located. M.U. INDUSTRIES 391 In June 1984, supervisory personnel began preparing for resumed operations in the Wyman Building under Respondent, and production actually commenced on 2 July 1984. Like Malrov, Respondent's principal business was the manufacture and wholesale sale of men's head- wear. Respondent's employees had the same job classifi- cations, performed the same duties, and utilized much of the same equipment as had their counterparts at Malrov. Because Respondent purchased Malrov's work-in- progress, Respondent's employees actually worked on some of the same goods as had Malrov's employees. During the time period from 2 July through 28 August 1984, the following individuals occupied supervisory and management positions for Respondent: William Lipkin President Charles Lipkin Sales Sol Lipkin Sales Renee Peterson General Manager Allan Beltz Plant Manager Richie Bridges Distribution M[anager Richard Dobak Equipment Manager Eugene Lassek Production and Development Manager Petronna Irizary Training and Sewing Manager Thus, with the exception of four individuals who were employed by Malrov but not by Respondent, Respond- ent's supervisory and management team consisted of the same individuals as did Malrov's. By letter dated 28 August 1984, the Union demanded recognition as the collective-bargaining representative of Respondent's production employees. At the time of this demand, Respondent employed 17 production employ- ees, 13 of whom were former Malrov employees. By letter dated 10 October 1984, Respondent denied the UniOn's demand for recognition. At the time of the denial Respondent employed 36 production employees, 15 of whom were former Matroy employees. Thus, at the time of the 28 August 1984 demand for recognition, former Malrov employees constituted a majority of Re- spondent's employee complement and remained so for approximately 3 weeks; but, by the time of Respondent's 10 October 1984 denial of that demand, majority status no longer existed. Subsequently, by letter dated 8 March 1985, the Union reiterated its demand for recognition; and by letter dated 14 March 1985 Respondent again denied the Union's demand. Former Malrov employees again constituted a majority of Respondent's employee complement at the time of the renewed demand on 8 March 1985 (17 out of 30 employees were former Malrov employees) and denial on 14 March 1985 (16 out of 29 were former Malrov employees). Former Malrov employees remained a majority of Respondent's employ- ees for approximately 2-1/2 months after the demand for recognition was denied the second time. The records reflects that the periods of majority and nonmajority status are as follows: Weeks Ending Majorio Status July 6-Sept. 14, 1984 Yes Sept. 21-Dec. 7, 1984 No Dec. 14, 1984 Yes Dec. 21, 1984-Dec. No 28, 1985 Jan. 1-May 3, 1985 Yes June 7-Sept. 27, 1985 No The first issue presented in this case is whether there is a "substantial continuity" in the employing entity from Malrov to Respondent. I conclude that there clearly was substantial continuity as evidenced by continuity in (1) business operation; (2) plant; (3) work force; (4) jobs and working conditions; (5) supervision; (6) machines, equip- ment, and methods of production; and (7) product. Basi- cally the same people (management and labor) were making the same product in the same location for the same customers.2 All the above argues in favor of finding Respondent a successor to Malrov. See Premium Foods, 260 NLRB 708, 715 (1982), enfd. 709 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1983). The fact there was a 3-1/2-month hiatus in operations from 24 March (when Malrov stopped production) to 2 July (when Respondent began production) does not mean that Respondent is not a successor to Malrov. See Fall River Dyeing Corp., 272 NLRB 839 (1984), enfd. 775 F.2d 425 (1st Cir. 1985) (7-month hiatus not controlling); Daneker Clock Co., 211 NLRB 719 (1974), enfd. 516 F.2d 315 (4th Cir. 1975) (7-month hiatus not controlling); C. G. Conn Ltd., 197 NLRB 442 (1972), enfd. 474 F.2d 1344 (5th Cir. 1973), 4-1/2-month hiatus not controlling). The second issue to be decided is whether the appro- priate time for determining successorship status is when the successor employer employs a "substantial and repre- sentative" complement of employees or a "full" comple- ment of employees. The Board, with court approval, has reaffirmed its tra- ditional view that the appropriate time for determining successorship status is when a demand for bargaining has been made and a "substantial and representative" com- plement of employees has been retained. See Myers Custom Products, 278 NLRB 636 (1986); Cutter Dodge, 278 NLRB 572 (1986); Fall River Dyeing, supra, Premium Foods, supra. In determining whether the substantial and representative complement test has been met at a given point in time, the Board considers whether the job classi- fications were filled or substantially filled; whether the operation was in normal or substantially normal produc- tion; the size of the employee complement; the time ex- pected to elapse before a substantially larger complement would be at work; and the relative certainty of the ex- pected expansion. See Premium Food v. NLRB, 709 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1983); Indianapolis Mack Sales, 272 NLRB 690 (1984). With respect to employee complement, Respondent contends that it did not reach a full complement until October 1984 and prior to that Respondent claims it was still in a transition period or startup phase. It is noted that Respondent employed between 35 and 41 employees at various times during October 1984. Since Respondent 2 Only one of Malrov's principal customers—Sears, Roebuck and Co.—did not become a customer of Respondent. The other three did become customers of Respondent. 392 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD employed 17 employees during the week ending 31 August 1984, i.e., the week during which the Union first demanded recognition, Respondent employed almost half of its full complement at the time of the demand. The Board has in the past concluded that this is sufficient to constitute a substantial and representative complement. See, e.g., Jeffries Lithograph Co., 265 NLRB 1499 (1982), enfd. 752 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1985) (19 employees consti- tuted substantial and representative complement of even- tual full complement of 65); Hudson River Aggregates, 246 NLRB fn. 3 (1979), enfd. 639 F.2d. 865 (2d Cir. 1980) (30 to 40 employees constituted substantial and represent- ative complement of eventual full complement of 90 em- ployees); Pacific Hide & Fur Depot, 223 NLRB 1029 (1976), enf. denied 553 F.2d 609 (9th Cir. 1977) (7 em- ployees constituted substantial and representative com- plement of eventual full complement of 19). It should be noted, however, that Respondent's employees comple- ment dropped sharply after October 1984 and stabilized in the 26 to 31 employees range until mid-June 1985 when it went back up to around 40 and remained around 40 up to the time of the hearing in this case in October. These figures (26 to 31 employees) more accurately re- flect a full complement. The 17 employees employed at the time of the first demand for recognition constituted well over half of Respondent's full complement. Is this sufficient to constitute a substantial and representative complement? In light of the recent Board decision in Myers Custom Products, supra, I conclude that it is not. Respondent's plans when it commenced production on 2 July 1984 to expand its work force to approximately 30 to 40 employees 3 was not so speculative that it had a duty to recognize and bargain with the Union when the Union made its demand on 28 August 1985. As the Board stated in Myers Custom Products: "When a new employer expects, with reasonable certainty, to increase its employee complement substantially within a relatively short time, it is appropriate to delay determining the bar- gaining obligations for that short period." It took the Employer in Myers Custom Products slightly more than 1 month to increase its work force. It took Respondent somewhat longer in this case, i.e., approximately 2 months (August to October to expand from 17 employ- ees to the 30 employees range). While it is true that the Union had majority status when it first demanded recognition on 28 August 1984, I find that Respondent did not have a "substantial and rep- resentative" complement of workers at the time. The Union lost its majority status during the week ending 21 September 1984. It regained that status during the week ending 14 December 1984, lost it for a 2-week period, and then regained majority status from the week ending 4 January 1985 through the week ending 31 May 1985. This 5-month period from January to the end of May oc- curred well after Respondent concedes it reached "full" complement, i.e., in October 1984. A demand for recog- nition and bargaining is a continuing demand, which 3 Lipkin testified and Respondent conceded in its brief, p. 9, that Re- spondent planned to expand its work complement to between 30 and 40 employees. need not be repeated.4 Accordingly, Respondent should have recognized and bargained with the Union on and after 4 January 1985 since former Malrov employees constituted a majority of Respondent's 30 employees. Even assuming that the Union's 28 August 1984 demand was no longer viable, the Union reiterated its demand by letter dated 8 March 1985. Since the Union clearly enjoyed majority status in a concededly "full" complement of employees at that time, because Respond- ent denied this second request for recognition by letter dated 14 March 1985, Repondents at a minimum violated the Act on and after 8 March 1985. Because this refusal to bargain is violative of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act, Re- spondent cannot justify this refusal on the ground that the Union in June lost its majority support in the absence of some other indicia of loss of majority support for the Union. I note for the record that there was no evidence presented at the hearing that the employees did not want the Union to represent them. The three issues in the case are decided as follows: 1. There was a substantial continuity in the em- ploying entity between Respondent and its prede- cessor, Malrov, and Respondent was a successor to Malrov. 2. The appropriate time for determining succes- sorship status is when the successor employer em- ploys a "substantial and representative" complement of employees. 3. When the Union demanded recognition on 28 August 1984 Respondent did not employ a majority of Malrov's employees in a "substantial and repre- sentative" complement of employees, but it did employ such a complement as of 4 January 1985 and Respondent should have recognized and bar- gained with the Union as of that date and should have honored the Union's second demand for rec- ognition on 8 March 1985. REMEDY Having found that Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act, the recommended Order will require Respond- ent to cease and desist therefrom and to take such affirm- ative action as will effectuate the policies of the Act. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce and in operations affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 4. All full-time and regular part-time employees of Re- spondent engaged directly or indirectly in the manufac- ture or handling of headwear products, including all cut- ters, operators, blockers, hand sewers, packers, and all other kinds of floor help employed by Respondent at its Minneapolis, Minnesota facility; excluding office clerical 4 See Fall River Dyeing Corp, supra, 775 F 2d 459 (1st Qr. 1985) M.U. INDUSTRIES 393 employees, salesmen, nonworking foremen, janitors, por- ters, maintenance employees, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for col- lective-bargaining. 5. At all material times the Union has represented a majority of the employees in the unit set forth in Conclu- sion of Law 4, above. 6. By failing and refusing to recognize and bargain with the Union as the collective-bargaining representa- tive of the employees in the unit set forth in Conclusion of Law 4, above, Respondent has engaged in, and is en- gaging in, an unfair labor practice within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act. 7. The unfair labor practice engaged in by Respond- ent, as set forth in Conclusion of Law 6, above, affects commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the following recommend- ed6 ORDER The Respondent, M.U. Industries, Inc., Minneapolis, Minnesota, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall 1. Cease and desist from (a) Failing or refusing to recognize Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union, Local 37-38H, AFL-CIO as the collective-bargaining representative of its employees in the following appropriate unit: All full-time and regular part-time employees of the Respondent engaged directly or indirectly in the manufacture or handling of headwear products, in- cluding all cutters, operators, blockers, hand sewers, packers, and all other kinds of floor help employed by Respondent at its Minneapolis, Minnesota facili- ty; excluding office clerical employees, salesmen, nonworking foremen, janitors, porters, maintenance employees, guards, and supervisors as defmed in the Act. (b) Failing or refusing to bargain with the labor orga- nization respecting rates of pay, wages, hours, or other terms or conditions of employment of its employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit. (c) In any like or related manner interfering with, re- straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act. (a) On request, bargain with Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union, Local 37-38H, AFL-CIO as the collective-bargaining representative of the employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit, respecting rates of pay, wages, hours, or other terms or conditions of employ- 5 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102 46 of the Board's Rules and Regulations, the findmgs, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur- poses. ment and, if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement. (b) Post at its premises in Minneapolis, Minnesota, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."6 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 18, after being signed by the Re- spondent's authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respond- ent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (c) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days from the date of this Order what steps the Re- spondent has taken to comply. 6 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Nation- al Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Governinent The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the National Labor Relations Act and has or- dered us to post and abide by this notice. Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights. To organize To form, join, or assist any union To bargain collectively through representatives of their own choice To act together for other mutual aid or protec- tion To choose not to engage in any of these protect- ed concerted activities. WE WILL NOT refuse to recognize or bargain with Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union, Local 37-38H, AFL-CIO as your union about your rates of pay, wages, working hours, and other terms and con- ditions of employment. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act. WE WILL, if we are asked to do so by Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union, Local 37-38H, AFL-CIO, recognize and bargain with it as your union about your rates of pay, wages, working hours, and other terms and conditions of employment. If we come to an agreement about any of these things with the Union, WE WILL put that agreement in writing and sign it. M.U. INDUSTRIES, INC.