Angelica Healthcare Services Group, Inc.

844 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Angelica Healthcare Services Group, Inc. and Amal- gamated Service and Allied Industries Joint Board, Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union, AFL-CIO, CLC. Case 39-CA- 2643 30 June 1987 DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS JOHANSEN, BABSON, AND STEPHENS On 19 November 1986 Administrative Law Judge D. Barry Morris issued the attached deci- sion. The Respondent filed partial exceptions and a supporting brief; the Charging Party filed partial cross-exceptions and a supporting brief; the Gener- al Counsel filed cross-exceptions and a supporting brief; and the Respondent filed an answering brief to the General Counsel's and the Charging Party's cross-exceptions. The National Labor Relations Board has delegat- ed its authority in this proceeding to a three- member panel. The Board has considered the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings, 1 and conclusions, as modified, to modify his remedy,2 and to adopt the recommended Order as modified.3 The Respondent, the General Counsel, and the Charging Party have excepted to some of the judge's credibility findings The Board's estab- lished policy is not to overrule an administrative law judge's credibility resolutions unless the clear preponderance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir 1951). We have carefully examined the record and fmd no basis for reversing the findings. In adopting the judge's finding that Supervisor Benoit's statement to employees Pearson and Ramos that their names had been mentioned at a management meeting as "union organizers" created the impression that the employees' union activities were under surveillance m violation of Sec. 8(a)(1), we particularly note that neither Pearson nor Ramos had openly campaigned for the Union or declared herself to be a union sup- porter. Further, we conclude that It is unnecessary to pass on the judge's fail- ure to make a finding concerning the complaint allegation that Benoit's questions to Pearson and Ramos whether they were going to attend a union meeting at a Howard Johnson's constituted the creation of the im- pression of surveillance. We note that the finding of such an additional violation would be merely cumulative to the creation of the impression of surveillance violation found above and would not materially affect the Order. In adopting the judge's findings that, under all the circumstances, the Respondent did not violate Sec. 8(a)(1) on the basis of Customer Service Representative Kilstrom's 25 March conversation with employee Pearson or Plant Manager Vere's conversation with employees Pearson and Ramos in the garment department in March 1985, we disavow the judge's reliance on the fact that the conversations concerned wages and benefits. 2 In accordance with our decision in New Horizons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987), interest will be computed at the "short-term Fed- eral rate" for the underpayment of taxes as set out in the 1986 amend- ment to 26 U S C §6621 3 The General Counsel excepts to the judge's failure to include a visi- tatorial clause in the recommended Order. A visitatonal clause authorizes the Board, for compliance purposes, to obtain discovery from the Re- spondent under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure under the supervi- sion of the United States court of appeals enforcing the Board's Order. 284 NLRB No. 92 1. The judge concluded, inter alia, that the Re- spondent, acting through its supervisor, Benoit, did not violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by promul- gating a rule forbidding discussion of the Union among the employees. The judge found in this regard that Benoit's statement to employees Pear- son and Ramos that there was to be no talking about the Union while working did not constitute disparate treatment. We find merit in the General Counsel's and the Charging Party's exceptions to the judge's conclusion. Pearson credibly testified that during an occasion in March 1985,4 when she and Ramos were tempo- rarily transferred from the garment to the tumble- fold department, Benoit called out as they ap- proached, "Here come the union organizers. Don't come down here talking to my people about the union." Pearson's testimony was corroborated by Ramos and also by employee Claudio, who stated that Benoit yelled out, "Oh no, here come the union or- ganizers," and, 10 minutes after Pearson and Ramos went to work, further yelled out, "No talk- ing about the union." Contrary to the judge, we fmd that Benoit's statements constitute an unlawful promulgation of a rule forbidding discussion about the Union among employees. In this regard, we note that her direc- tive to Pearson and Ramos not to discuss the Union with her "people" was made in conjunction with her exclamation, "Here come the union orga- nizers." We also note that Benoit did not qualify her restriction against talking about the Union by limiting that restriction to worktime only. Further, we note that Benoit's instruction was limited to dis- cussion about the Union and that, as such, there is no evidence that Benoit was attempting to enforce the Respondent's no-solicitation rule contained in the employee manual. 5 In this regard, there was no evidence adduced in the present case that either Pearson or Ramos had engaged in union activity during worktime. Accordingly, we find on the basis of the forego- ing that Benoit's statements to Pearson and Ramos in the tumblefold department in March violated Section 8(a)(1). Under the circumstances of this case, we find it unnecessary to include sueli a clause. Accordingly, we deny the General Counsel's request. 4 All dates are m 1985 unless otherwise specified 5 We find that Houston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 265 NLRB 766, 781- 782 (1982), relied on by the judge, is distinguishable from the present case Thus, in that case the warning given to the employee was prompted by a second employee's complaint that the employee had distributed union literature to him during their worktirne and the employee was told that the company rules prohibited distribution of literature, without sin- gling out union literature, and the prohibition was limited to working time ANGELICA HEALTHCARE SERVICES 845 2. The judge concluded that statements made by Personnel Manager Lufler to Pearson and Ramos in early March did not violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. The judge noted that Lufler's questioning of Pearson and Ramos took place in the garment department and that Lufler was a part-time em- ployee. Further, the judge stated that the conversa- tion did not appear threatening. We disagree with the judge's conclusion. As found by the judge, Pearson credibly testified that in early March Lufler approached her and said, "Janice, what do you think about anything that's going on?" When Pearson asked him in what manner he meant that, Lufler replied he was talk- ing, "about the union and all this mess that's going on." Ramos similarly testified that when Lufler came to bring Ramos her check while she was working on the press, he asked her what her opin- ion was about the Union. Contrary to the judge, we find that Lufler's questioning of Pearson and Ramos constitutes un- lawful interrogation. Initially, we note that Lufler was stipulated to be a supervisor and agent of the Respondent. We further note that the questioning occurred during the same time period as the coer- cive rule-promulgation incident involving Pearson and Ramos, found above. Finally, as we have al- ready noted, neither Pearson nor Ramos had openly declared support for the Union. Consider- ing the totality of the circumstances under Ross- more House, 269 NLRB 1176 (1984), enfd. 760 Fld 1006 (9th Cr. 1985), we find that Lufler's question- ing of Pearson and Ramos violated Section 8(a)(1).6 3. The judge made no finding regarding a con- versation that occurred between Plant Manager Vere and employee Tether in late February. Vere credibly testified that when Production Manager Bove reported to him that Techer was leaving her work station and making unsubstantiated claims about unionization, he asked Tether to come to his office. There, according to Vere, he cautioned Techer to confine her union activities to breaktimes and before and after work. On the basis of the judge's credibility resolutions, we find that Vere's statements to Techer did not violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 7 Accordingly, 6 Member Stephens finds it unnecessary to pass on whether Lufier's questiomng constituted an unlawful interrogation because it is merely cu- mulative to unlawful mterrogations findings by the judge that we have adopted, 7 In adopting the judge's credibility resolutions, however, we do not rely on the judge's findmg that Vere's former status as a union officer made him knowledgeable about the statements supervisors are permitted to make in union campaigns we shall dismiss that portion of the complaint al- leging that the Respondent, through Vere, created an impression among the employees that their union activities were under surveillance; interrogat- ed them regarding their union membership, activi- ties, and sympathies; or threatened employees with loss of benefits if they selected the Union as their bargaining representative. ORDER The National Labor Relations Board adopts the recommended Order of the administrative law judge as modified below and orders that the Re- spondent, Angelica Healthcare Services Group, Inc., New York, New York, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Order as modified. 1. Insert the following as paragraph 1(b) and re- letter present paragraph 1(b) and the subsequent paragraphs. "(b) Unlawfully promulgating rules forbidding discussion of the Union among the employees." 2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the administrative law judge. APPENDIX NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to post and abide by this notice. Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights. To organize To form, join, or assist any union To bargain collectively through representa- tives of their own choice To act together for other mutual aid or pro- tection To choose not to engage in any of these protected concerted activities. WE WILL NOT unlawfully interrogate you re- garding your union activities, solicit you to engage in surveillance of other employees' union activities, or create an impression among you that your union activities are under surveillance. WE WILL NOT unlawfully promulgate rules for- bidding discussion of the Union among you. WE WILL NOT unilaterally lay off or transfer you or change your work schedules, without prior notice to or bargaining with the Union. 846 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain with Amalga- mated Service and Allied Industries Joint Board, Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union, AFL-CIO, CLC as your certified exclusive collective-bargaining representative in the follow- ing unit: All full-time and regular part-time hourly paid production and maintenance employees, in- cluding drivers, warehouse employees, and leadpersons employed by the Employer at its Milford, Connecticut facility; but excluding all office clerical employees, casual employees, managerial employees, and all guards, profes- sional employees and supervisors as defined in the Act. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the exer- cise of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act, WE WILL, on request, bargain collectively and in good faith with the Union as the exclusive collec- tive-bargaining representative of the above unit of employees, including bargaining concerning changes in work schedules, transfers, and layoffs WE WILL, at the request of the Union, revoke the changes in work schedules of the maintenance department employees instituted on 15 April 1985. WE WILL make whole Tony Calogine and George Pickering for any loss of earnings as a result of the work schedule changes, instituted on 15 April 1985, with interest. WE WILL, at the request of the Union, revoke the transfers of Janice Pearson and Susan Ramos from the day shift in the garment department to the night shift in the OR inspection department, in- stituted in May 1985, and make them whole for any losses of earnings, with interest. WE WILL offer Bobby Blount, Mattie Williams, Migdalia Lopez, Casandra Waller, Raul Rivera, In- iovel Mendez, and Dennis Barnes immediate and full reinstatement to their former jobs or, if those jobs no longer exist, to substantially equivalent po- sitions, without prejudice to their seniority or any other rights or privileges previously enjoyed and WE WILL make them whole for any loss of earnings and lother benefits resulting from their discharge, less any net interim earnings, plus interest. ANGELICA HEALTHCARE SERVICES GROUP, INC. Mark W. Engstrom, Esq., for the General Counsel. Howard L. Mocerf Esq. (Borovsky, Ehrlich & Kronenberg), of Chicago, Illinois, for the Respondent. Larry Cary, Esq., of New York, New York, for the Charging Party. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE D. BARRY MORRIS, Administrative Law Judge. This case was heard before me in Hartford, Connecticut, on 5, 6, and 7 November and 3 and 4 December 1985. 1 On a charge filed on 30 May and amended on 11 July, a com- plaint was issued on 11 July, alleging that Angelica Healthcare Services Group, Inc. (Respondent) violated Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the National Labor Rela- tions Act. Respondent filed an answer denying the com- mission of the alleged unfair labor practices. The parties were given full opportunity to participate, produce evidence, examine and cross-examine witnesses, argue orally, and file briefs. Briefs were filed by all the parties on 30 January 1986. The record was reopened on 7 March 1986 and supplemental briefs were filed by the parties on 24 March 1986. On the entire record of the case, including my obser- vation of the demeanor of the witnesses, I make the fol- lowing FINDINGS OF FACT I. JURISDICTION Respondent, a New York corporation with a place of business in Milford, Connecticut, is engaged in the oper- ation of a commercial laundry. It annually derives gross revenues in excess of $500,000 and receives at its Con- necticut facility goods valued in excess of $50,000 from points located outside the State of Connecticut. Respond- ent admits that it is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act, and I so find. In addition, I find that Amalgamated Service and Allied Industries Joint Board, Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union, AFL-CIO, CLC (the Union) is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The Issues The issues in this proceeding are: 1. Did Respondent unlawfully interrogate employees concerning their union activities, create the impression among employees that their union activities were under surveillance, and solicit an employee to engage in sur- veillance of other employees' union activities? 2. Did Respondent promulgate a rule forbidding dis- cussion of the Union with other employees in violation of the Act? 3. Did Respondent transfer an employee in retaliation for her union activities in violation of the Act? 4. Did Respondent threaten employees with the loss of benefits and with the loss of employment in the event that employees supported the Union? 5. Did Respondent refuse to negotiate with the Union with respect of layoffs, transfers, and certain changes it made, in violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act? All dates refer to 1985 unless otherwise specified. ANGELICA HEALTHCARE SERVICES 847 B. The Facts 1. Background Respondent operates a commercial laundry facility in Milford, Connecticut, where it rents hospital linens to hospitals and other health care institutions and provides laundry services for these linens. Approximately 140 em- ployees are employed at the Milford plant. Around the first week of February the Union began an organizing campaign at the plant. On 14 February the Union wrote to Respondent requesting recognition. The request was received by Respondent the next day. Respondent de- clined to extend recognition to the Union and on 21 Feb- ruary the Union filed a petition seeking a representation election. Pursuant to a Stipulation for Certification Upon Consent Election, an election was conducted on 11 and 12 April among the employees in the following appropri- ate collective-bargaining unit: All full-time and regular part-time hourly paid pro- duction and maintenance employees including driv- ers, warehouse employees, and leadpersons em- ployed by the Employer at its Milford, Connecticut facility; but excluding all office clerical employees, casual employees, managerial employees, and all guards, professional employees, and supervisors as defined in the Act. In the election, a majority of the votes was cast for the Union. Respondent subsequently filed objections to con- duct affecting the results of the election and a hearing on those objections was held before Administrative Law Judge Steven Davis on 31 May. On 8 August Judge Davis issued his recommended decision on objections, recommending that Respondent's objections be overruled and that the Union be certified. On 12 February 1986 the Board affirmed Judge Davis' decision and certified the Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining representa- tive of the employees in the appropriate unit. 2. Alleged statements of Brian Hawley Miryam Caez 2 credibly testified that in February, while she was taking inventory, she was approached by Production Manager Brian Hawley. Hawley told Caez that he wanted to speak with her, and Caez subsequently reported to Hawley's office. No one but Hawley was present in the office when she arrived and according to the uncontradicted testimony of Caez, Hawley asked her "Miryam, are you going to the union meeting?" Caez re- plied that she was planning to attend the union meeting, at which point Hawley asked her if she would "investi- gate what's going on with the union." Caez replied that she would not do so and Hawley responded, "Okay, no problem." The meeting then ended. Caez further credi- bly testified that subsequent to the union meeting she en- countered Hawley while she was walking in the hall. He asked her if "[she] still think[ing] about it and [she] told him no." 2 Caez' name was mcorrectly spelled in the transcript. In this respect, and in all other respects, Respondent's motion to correct errors in the transcript is granted. 3. Alleged statements of Joyce Benoit The complaint alleges that Respondent, acting through Joyce Benoit, violated the Act by creating an impression among employees that their union activities were under surveillance and by promulgating a rule forbidding dis- cussion of the Union with other employees. Janice Pearson credibly testified that in February she and Susan Ramos were approached by Joyce Benoit, their supervisor. Pearson testified, that Benoit: asked us if we were going to the meeting, and I re- plied and asked her what meeting was that, and she said. . . there was a union trying to form in Angel- ica and they were having a meeting at Howard Johnson's. Pearson further testified that several weeks later, Benoit again approached herself and Ramos and "told us of a meeting that management had had and she told Susan Ramos and myself that our names had been brought up in a meeting as being union organizers." Pearson also stated that during an occasion when she, Ramos, and another employee were temporarily trans- ferred to another department that Benoit also supervises, Benoit called out "here come the union organizers, don't come down here talking to my people about the union." Ramos largely corroborated Pearson's testimony. She testified that Benoit told them that she had attended a management meeting at which both she and Pearson were mentioned as being "heavily involved with the union." In addition, Ramos testified that when she and Pearson were reassigned to the tumblefold area, Benoit stated, "here come the union organizers" and Benoit "asked Janice Pearson and myself not to discuss the union [with] the people." Maria Claudio, an employee in the tumblefold depart- ment, appeared to me to be a particularly credible wit- ness. 3 She stated that prior to the election Ramos and Pearson came into the tumblefold department to "help with the work." She testified: [As] they were coming in, my supervisor, Joyce Benoit. . . yelled out, oh no, here come the union organizers. Q. What happened then? A. What happened then was that they went to work, and I would say about. . . ten minutes later she yells out "no talking about the union." Benoit denied having a conversation with Pearson or Ramos concerning the Union. She also denied ever shouting words to the effect "here come the union orga- nizers" or ever instructing Pearson and Ramos not to talk about the Union. In addition, Benoit denied telling Pearson and Ramos that their names had come up as or- ganizers in a management meeting concerning the Union. 3 Claudio was a current employee of Respondent with no charge having been filed on her behalf The testimony given by such an employ- ee adverse to the interests of a respondent is entitled to considerable weight. See Bohemia, Inc. 266 NLRB 761, 765 (1983); Shop-Rite Super- market, 231 NLRB 500, 505 (1977). 848 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD I credit Pearson's testimony. She testified in a forthright manner and her testimony, in large part, was corroborat- ed by Ramos and Claudio. On the other hand, Benoit ap- peared to be an evasive witness during many portions of her testimony. 4. Alleged statements of Eileen Kilstrom The complaint alleges that Eileen Kilstrom, Respond- ent's customer service representative and admitted agent, unlawfully interrogated employees regarding their union activities. Pearson testified that towards the end of February Kil- strom approached Ramos and herself while they were in the garment department and asked "how did we feel about the union." Pearson further testified that again in March Kilstrom approached them while they were in the garment department and "again asked us if we had an opinion about the union." Pearson stated that there was a third conversation, also in the garment department, when Kilstrom told Ramos and herself that, "if I [were] you, I would look into the union a little bit further before I made a decision. . . because you could lose a lot instead of gaining." In this connection, Ramos testified: Q. Would you tell us how you happened to have a conversation with Miss Kilstrom? A. She came down to my department. . . while I was at work and asked Janice Pearson and myself how did we feel about a union coming in.. . . Janice Pearson and myself had told her that we were attending both the company meetings and the union meetings, that we wanted to hear both sides of the story.. . . [S]he asked what could we gain from a union coming to the plant. I mentioned to her job security. I recall Janice mentioning some- thing about sick days, and she asked me why I needed job security when the company hired me back three separate times. Kilstrom stated that she had two conversations with Pearson and Ramos concerning the union campaign. The first conversation took place when she went to the gar- ment department to check on garments scheduled for de- livery. Kilstrom testified: Q. Did the subject of the union come up? A. Yes. Q. How did the subject come up? A. After I asked [them] this question, then said hello, how are things going either Sue or Janice brought up the union. Q. Could you tell us what you recall about the conversation? A. . . . I asked, after they mentioned the union, what they thought the union would provide for them, what they would gain from the union. Kilstrom stated that the second conversation took place around 25 March, again in the garment depart- ment. Respondent had begun posting a question and answer sheet called the "Question of the Day." Kilstrom testified: I had asked Janice if she had read the question of the day and that particular day the questioning was concerning. . . wages and benefits. Janice said that she was under the impression that if the union was voted in, that the wages and benefits would remain the same and be negotiated up. I told her that it was my understanding that if the union was voted in and it came down to negotiations that it would start at ground zero; it would start at minimum wage, meaning. . the wages and benefits could be more than what they are getting now, it could be less, or it could be the same. Pearson, Ramos, and Kilstrom all appeared to me to be credible witnesses. They all testified in a forthright manner. Accordingly, the General Counsel has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Pear- son's and Ramos' versions of the conversations should prevail. Kilstrom appeared to me to have good recall of the details and I credit her version a the two conversa- tions. 5.Alleged statements of Henry Lufler Pearson credibly testified that in early March, while she was working in the garment department, Henry Lufler, personnel manager, approached her and said, "Janice, what do you think about anything that's going on and I said in which manner do you mean that. He said about the union and all this mess that's going on." Similarly, Ramos credibly testified that while she was working on the press, Lufler came to bring her her check. Ramos testified: [H]e said good morning to me. He asked me . . . what my opinion was about the union. . . . I re- plied to him that I have no opinion, and I would like to keep it to myself, my opinions to myself. Although Lufler denied that he had any conversation concerning the Union with either Pearson or Ramos, I credit the testimony of both Pearson and Ramos, who corroborated each other. 6.Alleged statements of Michael. Bove Mary Techer, an employee in the flat-iron department, testified that Michael Bove, production manager, ap- proached her while she was working 4.0 in her depart- ment. She stated, "He asked me where did I stand with the union and I asked him why did he ask me that. I asked him did he want to get me into trouble. He walked away." Concerning this conversation, Bove testified: It was my habit to go around and talk with em- ployees on a daily basis and I stopped by Mary's station to talk with her to ask her how she was doing; how work was progressing for the day and I asked her in the course of conversation what she thought about what was going on in the plant. Q. And did she respond? A. At that point she said something . . . to the effect that she was neither pro-union or against the ANGELICA HEALTHCARE SERVICES 849 union; that she was for God and at that point I ended the conversation. I credit Techer's version of the conversation. Bove's own testimony indicates that Techer replied "she was neither pro-union or against the union." This indicates that Techer understood the question being asked of her about what her opinion was of the Union. 7. Alleged statements of Mark Vere The complaint alleges that Respondent, acting through Mark Vere, violated the Act by creating an impression among employees that their union activities were under surveillance, by interrogating employees concerning their union activities, and by threatening employees with a loss of benefits and a loss of employment if they support- ed the Union. a. The meeting with Mary Tee/2.er Vere, plant manager of Respondent, stated that in late February he had a conversation with Mary Techer. He stated that Bove reported to him that Techer was "leav- ing her station" and had some "off-the-wall type com- ments about the union." Vere testified: Now, I asked Mike, what do you mean by off- the-wall? What does that mean? Well, that Mary would leave her work station, and let's say, walk to the next ironer. She was in the Flat Work Depart- ment. For instance, she would tell the girls, if the union were here, we would not have to work over- time. It was something to that effect, or if the union comes in, we are going to get a big raise. Vere credibly testified that he asked Techer to come to his office, at which time he told her: I understand that . . . you are an active propo- nent of the union. By that I mean you are leaving your work station. You are going to other work sta- tions. you are telling the girls. . . that if the union were here, we would not have to work overtime, and that the union is going to get us a big wage in- crease . . . I just want you to be careful of when you involve yourself in union activities. Please try to do them on breaktime, after work, before work, but not during work time. Techer stated that after she entered Vere's office he told her "I would like to know where you stand with the union." She testified: I told him that my vote didn't count. He said yes it did and he said that all the employees stand to lose a lot. I asked him what did he mean. He said such as [dis]ability benefit[s] and vacation. I credit Vere's testimony. He testified in a forthright manner and was able to recollect many of the details. In addition, in view of his background, including his having formerly been a union officer, I believe he was knowl- edgeable regarding the statements supervisors are permit- ted to make. I believe it is unlikely that he would have made the statements attributed to him by Techer. b. Employee meetings Vere testified that two meetings were called in mid- March, one with the first-shift employees and one virith the employees of the second shift. The meetings were called to inform the employees concerning the possible loss of Long Island Jewish Hospital as a customer. He stated that a hiring freeze had been put into effect and that the Company was "attempting to reduce the work- force through attrition." He testified that he did not say anything about the Union election and "tried to restrict this meeting to just the Long Island Jewish issue." Pearson stated that she attended the meeting called for the first-shift employees. She testified that Vere stated at the meeting that several hospitals considering becoming customers of Respondent were hesitant because Re- spondent's employees were "trying to organize a union" and that "hospitals don't like to deal with. . . unionized shops because. . . they're afraid that they might go on strike." Miganlia stated that she too attended the meeting of first-shift employees. She testified that Vere stated that the Company "might be losing hospital contracts be- cause some hospitals might not want to do business with Angelica if it's a union shop." She further stated that it was Kinsella who discussed the issue of the possible loss of Long Island Jewish Hospital as a customer. For the reasons stated above I credit Vere's testimony. With respect to Lopez' testimony, it appears she was mistaken. I credit Vere's testimony that Kinsella was not present at that meeting. C. Interrogations Pearson testified that sometime in March while she and Ramos were in the garment department Vere ap- proached them and asked them "what did we think about everything that was going on." Pearson testified that she asked "everything like what" and that Vere an- swered "as far as the union goes, do you have any ques- tion about the union?" Concerning the same conversation Ramos testified that Vere asked "what our views were on the union." Vere stated that the conversation took place in late March after he had been informed by Kilstrom that she received a question from Pearson and Ramos concerning the Question of the Day. Vere testified that he went to the garment department, approached Pearson and Ramos and said, "Ladies, I understand you have a question con- cerning the question of the day," which on that day dealt with wages and fringe benefits. Vere's testimony was as follows: Q. Did either Ms. Ramos or Ms. Pearson say anything? A. . . . I'm not sure if it was Janice or Sue—said that they had been told, by the union, that they could not lose benefits. That they would not come out with less than they currently had, as far as a wage and fringe package. That the union had given them a phone number, in Hartford, to call someone 850 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD at the labor board, or someone with the NLRB, and they would confirm that. . . . I left there saying . . . go ahead and call. See if you get an answer. I credit Vere's testimony concerning the conversation. He testified in a forthright manner and appeared to have a good recall of the details. His testimony is not substan- tially different from that of Pearson who stated that Vere asked them if they had any questions about the Union. 8. Transfer of Caez The complaint alleges that Caez was transferred to a different department because of her union activities, in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. At the beginning of 1985 Caez was working as a second shift leadperson in the soil sort department. She continued to work in this capacity until March, at which time she requested a transfer to the first shift, and was assigned to work in the tumblefold department. On 11 April Caez served as a union observer at the election and on 15 April she was transferred to "the blues." Caez tes- tified that the blues work is based "way back in the corner" of the tumblefold department and involves sewing doctors' and nurses' uniforms, folding them, and bringing them to the receiving dock. Caez stated that she remained on the first shift while working in the blues and that no pay cut was involved. When asked whether the blues work was less desirable, she replied, "It didn't make [any] difference to me." When Caez first transferred into the tumblefold de- partment she was assigned to work the blues. After working in that capacity for about 1 week Benoit started training her to "work the board." Working the board in- volved counting the inventory and maintaining produc- tion update sheets. Vere testified that during this period it was discovered that Caez was making errors on the production updates. Accordingly, a decision was made during the last week of March or the first week of April to reassign Caez. He stated that they were hesitant to re- assign her then because "we were getting close to elec- tion time." He testified that no demotion or loss of wages was involved and that there was "just a reassign- ment of duties, in the department." In terms of the location of the blues, Vere credibly tes- tified: [T]he Blues would be in the southeast corner. That is the area where the scrubs were folded, tied and packed out. In the immediate vicinity was a salvage girl, one-two folder operators—two small piece folder operators. Two girls who operated the small piece folding machines. That is in the immediate vi- cinity. JUDGE MORRIS: How far away are they from the person working in Blues? THE WITNESS: I would guestimate ten feet. Q.. . . Is there any barrier between them? A. No. No physical barriers. Vere further credibly testified that there is no position called "Assistant to the Leadperson" in the tumblefold department, that the blues was not considered to be a separate department and that "working the blues" is merely the process of folding, packaging, and getting the material ready for delivery. 9. Unilateral changes, layoffs, and transfers The complaint alleges that starting 15 April Respond- ent changed the work schedules of its maintenance de- partment employees and laid off and transferred certain employees without prior notice to the Union and without having afforded the Union an opportunity to negotiate and bargain with respect to such action. Joseph Brandalick credibly testified that on 15 April the maintenance department employees were advised of the following changes in their work schedules: his and Healy's schedules were changed from 6:30 a.m. to 3 p.m. to the new schedules of 7 a.m. to 3:30 p.m.; Calogine's schedule was changed from 6 a.m. to 4 p.m. to the new schedule of 6 a.m. to 2:30 p.m.; and Pickering's schedule was changed from 6:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. to the new schedule of 6:30 a.m. to 3 p.m. Kinsella conceded that these changes occurred. The complaint alleges and Respondent admits that on 26 April it laid off Blount, Williams, Lopez, and Waller and on 17 May it laid off Mendez and Barnes. The com- plaint also alleges that on 26 April Respondent laid off Rivera. This was conceded by Kinsella. In addition, the complaint alleges and Respondent admits that during May Pearson and Ramos were transferred and, as dis- cussed previously, Caez was reassigned on 15 April. It was stipulated that the changes in work schedule, the layoffs, and transfers were made without prior notice to the Union and without affording the Union an opportuni- ty to bargain. C. Discussion In Rossmore House, 269 NLRB 1176 (1984), enfd. sub nom. Hotel & Restaurant Employees Local 11 v. NLRB, 760 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1985), the Board returned to the test originally established in Blue Flash Express, 109 NLRB 591 (1954), in which the Board required that all the circumstances involved in an interrogation be exam- ined to determine whether the interrogation tended to re- strain, coerce, or interfere with rights guaranteed by the Act. Among the factors examined are the background of the interrogation, the nature of the information sought, the identity of the questioner, and the place and method of interrogation. Sunnyvale Medical Clinic, 277 NLRB 1217 (1985). In Sunnyvale the Board also considered whether there was a history of employer hostility to- wards union supporters and whether the questions were general and nonthreatening. 1. Interrogation of Techer I have credited Techer's testimony that Bove ap- proached her and asked her "where did I stand with the union." She then asked Bove why he asked her the ques- tion and "did he want to get me into trouble." I find Bove's question to constitute an unlawful interrogation. Bove was production manager and Techer had not openly declared herself to be a union supporter. The ex- change was not a casual conversation which sought in- ANGELICA HEALTHCARE SERVICES 851 formation of a general nature. Rather, Bove specifically asked Techer where she stood with the Union. That Techer did not regard the conversation as casual is evi- denced by her responding whether Bove wanted to get her into trouble. While the fact that the questioning took place at the employee's work station rather than in a less formal setting is a relevant consideration, under all the circumstances, I conclude that Bove's question reason- ably tended to coerce Techer in the exercise of rights guaranteed by the Act, in violation of Section 8(a)(1). See Kona 60 Minute Photo, 277 NLRB 867, 868 (1985). 2. Interrogation of Caez and request to engage in surveillance I have credited Caez' testimony that Hawley, the pro- duction manager, requested her to come to his office where he asked her whether she was going to the union meeting. I fmd that Hawley's questioning Caez whether she was going to the union meeting constituted an un- lawful interrogation. She had not openly declared herself to be a union supporter and the questioning took place in Hawley's office. Under all the circumstances, I conclude that Hawley's question reasonably tended to coerce Caez in the exercise of rights guaranteed her by the Act, in violation of Section 8(a)(1). Kona 60 Minute Photo, supra. . After Caez informed Hawley that she was planning to attend the union meeting, he asked her to "investigate what's going on with the Union." Caez refused to do so. I find that Hawley's request constitutes a solicitation to engage in surveillance, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, irrespective of the fact that Caez refused to comply. United Artists Theatre Circuit, 277 NLRB 115, 118 (1985); Southern Illinois Petrol, 277 NLRB 160, 170 (1985). 3. Creating impression of surveillance I have credited Pearson's testimony that Benoit told her and Ramos that their names had been mentioned at a management meeting as being "union organizers." A su- pervisor's statement to employees that management is aware of their union activities creates an impression that the employees' union activities are under surveillance, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. See Cardivan Co., 271 NLRB 563, 568 (1984). 4. Interrogation of Pearson and Ramos by Lufier I have credited the testimony of Pearson and Ramos that Lufler, part-time personnel manager, approached them in the garment department and asked either "what do you think about [what's] going on" or, according to Ramos' recollection, what her opinion was about the Union. I note that the questioning was done in the gar- ment department and that Lufler is a part-time employee. In addition, the conversation did not appear threatening. Under the totality of the circumstances, I find that Lufiees interrogation did not violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. See Rossmore House, supra. 5. Other interrogations I have credited Kilstrom's testimony with respect to the conversations she had with Pearson and Ramos. Ac- cording to Kilstrom, in the first conversation Pearson or Ramos first brought up the subject of the Union, after which Kilstrom asked "what they thought the union would provide for them." The second conversation in- volved Kilstrom asking Pearson whether she had read the question of the day. A discussion then ensued con- cerning wages and benefits. Under the totality of the cir- cumstances, I find that Kilstrom's questions did not vio- late Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Similarly, I have credited Vere's testimony concerning his conversations with Pearson and Ramos. He ap- proached Pearson and Ramos in the garment department and said, "Ladies, I understand you have a question con- cerning the question of the day." Again, a discussion ensued concerning wages and fringe benefits. Under the totality of the circumstances, I find that Vere's discussion with Pearson and Ramos did not violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 6. No-solicitation rule The complaint alleges that in March Respondent, acting through Benoit, promulgated a rule forbidding the discussion of the Union with other employees. As previ- ously found, while Pearson and Ramos were working in the tumblefold department, Benoit told them "no talking about the union." Respondent's employee manual contains the following provision: Soliciting: Employee: Solicitation by an employee of another employee, or distribution of literature of any kind for any purpose whatsoever, may not be conducted during working time. This excludes breaks and lunch periods when employees are not engaged in performing their work duties. Ramos testified that she had been aware of the compa- ny rule prohibiting solicitation or distribution of litera- ture during working time. The General Counsel does not argue that Respondent's no-solicitation rule does not conform with Board standards. See Our Way, Inc., 268 NLRB 394 (1983). Although the General Counsel cites Southern Illinois Petrol, , supra, in that case the record does not show whether the company had a no-solicita- tion rule (277 NLRB at 160 fn. 2). As Claudio credibly testified, Benoit made her statement while Pearson and Ramos were working. The General Counsel has not shown that employees were allowed to discuss other nonwork subjects while working. I conclude that the General Counsel has failed to show that Benoit's state- ment to Pearson and Ramos that there was to be no talk- ing about the Union while working constituted disparate treatment. See Houston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 265 NLRB 766, 782 (1982), modified 740 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1984). Accordingly, the allegation is dismissed. 7. Transfer of Caez The complaint alleges that Caez was transferred to a different department because of her union activities, in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. I have credited Vere's testimony that Caez was reassigned to working in 852 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD the blues because of her errors on the production up- dates in the job previously assigned to her. The blues work was a function of the tumblefold department and was done approximately 10 feet away from where sever- al other employees worked Caez remained on the first shift, no pay cut was involved and, when asked whether the blues work was less desirable, she replied that it did not make any difference to her. I find that the General Counsel has not shown that Caez was reassigned because of her union activities and, accordingly, the allegation is dismissed. 8. Employee meetings The complaint alleges that Vere impliedly threatened the employees with the loss of their jobs if they selected the Union as their bargaining representative. I have cred- ited Vere's testimony that the meetings in the cafeteria were called to inform the employees concerning the pos- sible loss of Long Island Jewish Hospital as a customer. He informed the employees that a hiring freeze had been put into effect and that the Company was attempting to reduce the work force through attrition. I have credited his testimony that he did not speak about the union elec- tion. Accordingly, the allegation is dismissed. 9. Unilateral changes, layoffs, and transfers On 14 February the Union requested recognition, and on 11 and 12 April an election was held in which the Union won a majority. On 26 April the Union sent a telegram to Respondent that stated, in pertinent part: We hereby renew our February 14 demand for recognition and request that you immediately begin negotiations concerning the terms and conditions of employment for the employees in the bargaining unit. It has come to our attention that your firm in- tends to institute a layoff next week. I wish to put you on notice that any layoff instituted without first negotiating with this union shall be considered by us to be a unilateral change in terms and conditions of employment in violation of our collective bar- gaining rights. On 12 February 1986 the Board certified the Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the employees in the appropriate unit. On 15 April Respondent changed the work schedules of four of its maintenance department employees. The changes resulted in Calogine and Pickering having their regularly scheduled overtime eliminated. Healy's and Brandalick's schedules were changed so that they began and ended work one-half hour later than previously scheduled. On 26 April Respondent laid off Blount, Williams, Lopez, Waller, and Rivera and on 17 May Respondent laid off Mendez and Barnes. On 15 April Caez was reas- signed and during May Respondent transferred Pearson and Ramos. These changes were all made without prior notice to the Union and without affording the Union an opportunity to bargain. In Mike O'Connor Chevrolet, 209 NLRB 701, 703 (1974), enf. denied on other grounds 512 F.2d 684 (8th Cir. 1975), the Board stated: [A]bsent compelling economic considerations for doing so, an employer acts at its peril in making changes in terms and conditions of employment during the period that objections to an election are pending and the final determination has not been made. And where the final determination on the ob- jections results in the certification of a representa- tive, the Board has held the employer to have vio- lated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) for having made such unilateral changes. Such changes have the effect of bypassing, undercutting, and undermining the union's status as the statutory representative of the employees in the event a certification is issued. In Clements Wire & Mfg. Co., 257 NLRB 1058 (1981), the Board found that the company violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act by laying off employees prior to certi- fication of the union, without notice to, or bargaining with, the union. The Board stated (at 1059): Although an employer may properly decide that an economic layoff is required, once such a decision is made the employer must nevertheless notify the Union, and, upon request, bargain with it concern- ing the layoffs, including the manner in which the layoffs and any recalls are to be effected. By failing to so notify the Union while its objections to the election were pending, Respondent acted at its peril and, since the Union was thereafter certified as the collective-bargaining representative of its employ- ees, Respondent thereby violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. Similarly, in Van Dorn Plastic Machinery Co., 265 NLRB 864 (1982), modified 736 F.2d 343 (6th Cir. 1984), the company engaged in certain unilateral changes after the election, but prior to certification. In raiding a viola- tion of Section 8(a)(5), the Board stated (at 865): The Board has repeatedly held that economic ex- pediency or sound business considerations are insuf- ficient defenses to justify unilateral changes in terms and conditions of employment. Once the General Counsel has made a prima facie showing of an 8(a)(5) violation—as has been done here—a re- spondent must demonstrate why the refusal to bar- gain was privileged. In the instant case, Respondent was responsible for showing that "compelling eco- nomic considerations" warranted its acting unilater- ally. This it has not done here. Respondent argues that the loss of a significant con- tract with Long Island Jewish Hospital, effective 24 April, justifies its having implemented the changes with- out prior notice to the Union and without bargaining with the Union. I have credited Kinsella's testimony that the Long Island Jewish Hospital account represented ap- proximately 14 percent of Respondent's revenue. ANGELICA HEALTHCARE SERVICES 853 I do not believe that Respondent has sustained its burden of showing "compelling economic consider- ations" which would absolve it from being required to notify the Union and to bargain concerning the changes. I believe that an underlying reason for not requiring bar- gaining when there are "compelling economic consider- ations" is that an unforeseen occurrence, having a major economic effect, is about to take place that requires the company to take immediate action.4 In the instant pro- ceeding, this has not occurred. In the first place, it has not been shown that the loss of an account representing 14 percent of revenue, albeit a significant loss, is the type of "compelling" economic consideration that the cases require. In addition, the loss of Long Island Jewish Hos- pital as a customer was not unforeseen. Respondent's contract with the hospital expired in January and negoti- ations for its renewal had been underway since Novem- ber 1984. The record shows that as early as March, Kin- sella was apprehensive that the account would be lost and that he and Vere decided to put a general freeze on hiring and to reduce the work force through attrition. On 8 April Kinsella was informed that the contract was cancelled, effective 2 weeks later, on 24 April. Citing Kal-Die Casting Corp., 221 NLRB 1068 (1975), Respondent argues that the changes in work schedules of the maintenance department employees were "routine" and thus Respondent was not required to notify the Union or bargain with it. In that case the Board stated (at 1068 fn. 1): We agree with the Administrative Law Judge's conclusions that Respondent's postelection but pre- certification activity concerning routine production scheduling and adjustments relating to diminishing available hours of work did not violate Sec. 8(a)(5) of the Act. There is no evidence in the record that this activity varied from the Respondent's past prac- tice or that the Union at any time attempted to broach these issues with the Respondent. I believe that the Kal-Die decision is distinguishable. The elimination of regularly scheduled overtime is hardly a "routine" adjustment. In addition, there is no provision in the employee manual dealing with changes in work schedules, nor was there any "past practice" for Respondent to follow. For, as pointed out in Respond- ent's brief, "the Milford plant had never been faced with a similar loss of business before." Consequently, unless the change were "routine" it would constitute a unilater- al change that would have required prior bargaining. The complaint alleges that the layoffs of seven em- ployees on 26 April and 17 May, the transfer of Caez on 15 April, and the transfer of Pearson and Ramos during May, all done without prior notice to the Union and 4 An analogy may be drawn to the situation m the normal bargaining context when an event occurs, such as the breakdown of machinery, where there is no time for management to consult with the union. In such a case it has been held that the company was permitted to lay off employees without prior nonce to the union. See Tylertown Wood Prod- ucts, 251 NLRB 515, 521 (1980). Even in that situation, however, the company would still be required to bargain concerning the effects of the layoffs without affording an opportunity to bargain, constitute violations of Section 8(a)(5). In order for a statutory bargaining obligation to arise with respect to a particular change unilaterally imple- mented by an employer, such change must be a "materi- al, substantial, and a significant" one affecting the terms and conditions of employment of bargaining unit em- ployees. Alamo Cement Co., 281 NLRB 737 (1986); United Technologies Corp., 278 NLRB 306 (1986). As I have previously found, Caez had been reassigned to work in the blues. This was a function of the tumblefold department, the same department in which she was working. She remained on the same shift and suffered no loss in pay. I find that this change was not "material, substantial and significant" and accordingly, failure to furnish prior notice to the Union or to bargain concern- ing the reassignment was not a violation of Section 8(a)(5), During May, Pearson and Ramos were transferred from the day shift in the garment department to the night shift in the OR inspection department. These trans- fers, together with the layoffs of the seven employees on 26 April and 17 May were, in my view, "material, sub- stantial and significant" changes affecting the terms and conditions of employment of bargaining unit employees. Accordingly, for the above reasons, in accordance with the Board's decision in Mike O'Conner Chevrolet, supra, as reaffirmed in Clements Wire & Mfg. Co., supra, and Van Dorn Plastic Machinery Co., supra, I find that by im- plementing changes in the work schedules, by transfer- ring Pearson and Ramos, and by laying off seven em- ployees without prior notice to the Union and without affording the Union an opportunity to bargain, Respond- ent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. 2. The Union is a labor organization within the mean- ing of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. By interrogating employees concerning their union activities, by creating an impression among employees that their union activities were under surveillance, and by soliciting an employee to engage in surveillance of other employees' union activities, Respondent has en- gaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 4. By refusing to negotiate with the Union with re- spect to certain changes in work schedules, transfers, and layoffs, Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. 5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices constitute unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 6. Respondent did not violate the Act in any other manner alleged in the complaint. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I find it necessary to order Re- 854 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD spondent to cease and desist therefrom and to take cer- tain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Respondent, having violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by laying off employees without notice to, and bargaining with, the Union, I shall order Respondent, on request, to bargain with the Union concerning the layoffs of em- ployees between 26 April and 17 May 1985. I shall fur- ther order that Respondent make whole those employees laid off during the aforementioned period for any loss of earnings suffered by reason of Respondent's unlawful conduct. Backpay shall be computed in the manner set forth in F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950), with interest thereon to be computed in the manner set forth in Florida Steel Corp., 231 NLRB 651 (1977).5 Having also found that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by unilaterally changing the work schedules of its maintenance department employees and by transferring several of its employees, without notice to, and bargaining with, the Union, I shall order Respondent to restore the status quo by rescinding the unilateral changes and by making whole the employees for any loss of earnings, the amounts to be computed in the manner set forth above. On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the following recommend- eds ORDER The Respondent, Angelica Healthcare Services Group, Inc., Milford, Connecticut, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall 1. Cease and desist from (a) Unlawfully interrogating employees regarding their union activities, soliciting employees to engage in sur- veillance of other employees' union activities, or creating an impression among the employees that their union ac- tivities are under surveillance. (b) Unilaterally laying off or transferring employees or changing employees' work schedules, without prior notice to or bargaining with the Union as the exclusive representative of its employees in the below-described bargaining unit. (c) Refusing to bargain with Amalgamated Service and Allied Industries Joint Board, Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union, AFL-CIO, CLC in the fol- lowing appropriate unit: All full-time and regular part-time hourly paid pro- duction and maintenance employees including driv- ers, warehouse employees, and leadpersons em- ployed by the Employer at its Milford, Connecticut facility; but excluding all office clerical employees, 5 See generally Isis Plumbing Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962). 6 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102.46 of the Board's Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec 102 48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur- poses casual employees, managerial employees, and all guards, professional employees, and supervisors as defined in the Act. (d) In any like or related manner interfering with, re- straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights under Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act. (a) At the request of the Union, revoke the changes in work schedules of the maintenance department employ- ees instituted on 25 April 1985. (b) On request, bargain with the Union as the exclu- sive collective-bargaining representative of the above unit of employees, including bargaining concerning the aforementioned changes in work schedules, transfers, and layoffs. (c) In the event it has not already done so, offer to Bobby Blount, Mattie Williams, Migdalia Lopez, Casan- dra Waller, Raul Rivera, Iniovel Mendez, Dennis Barnes, Janice Pearson, and Susan Ramos immediate and full re- instatement to their former position, or, if such positions no longer exist, to substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges, and make them whole for any losses of earn- ings, with interest, in the manner set forth in the remedy section. (d) Make whole Tony Calogine and George Pickering for any loss of earnings as a result of the work schedule changes on 15 April 1985, with interest, in the manner set forth in the remedy section. (e) Preserve and, on request, make available to the Board or its agents for examination and copying all pay- roll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports and all other records nec- essary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this order. (f) Post at its facility in Milford, Connecticut, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." Copies of the notice on forms provided by the officer in charge for Subregion 39, after being signed by Respondent's author- ized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecu- tive days in conspicuous places including all places Where notices to employees are customarily posted. Rea- sonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or coVered by any other material. (g) Notify the officer in charge in writing within 20 days from the date of this Order what steps the Re- spondent has taken to comply. IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that those allegations of the complaint that no violations have been found are dis- missed. 7 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words m the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Nation- al Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board"