International Association Of Machinists And Aerospace Workers, Afl-Cio, (General Dynamics Corp.)

MACHINISTS LODGE 1233 (GENERAL DYNAMICS) 1101 International Association of Machinists and Aero- space Workers, AFL-CIO, Aerospace Lodge No. 1233; International Association of Machin- ists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, Aero- space Lodge No. 2659 (General Dynamics Cor- poration, Pomona Division) and Clifford Donald Blue International Association of Machinists and Aero- space Workers, AFL-CIO, Aerospace Lodge No. 1233 and Rosalie E. Ulloa and Jean E. Fereday and Shirley Barry and Carol A. Turner. Cases 21-CB-6688, 21-CB-6699-1, 21-CB-6699-2, 21-CB-6699-3, and 21-CB- 6699-4 17 July 1987 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN DOTSON AND MEMBERS BABSON AND STEPHENS On 6 July 1979 Administrative Law Judge Ber- nard S. Seff issued the attached decision. The Re- spondents filed exceptions and a supporting brief. On 25 September 1979 the Board issued an Order Remanding Proceeding to Administrative Law Judge, directing the judge, inter alia, to make fur- ther factual fmdings and credibility resolutions. On 28 November 1979 the judge issued a Remand De- cision, The Respondents filed exceptions and a sup- porting brief. The National Labor Relations Board has delegat- ed its authority in this proceeding to a three- member panel. The Board has considered the decision, the remand decision, and the record in light of the ex- ceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings,' and conclusions as modi- fied but not to adopt the recommended Order. From 18 September through 18 December 19782 the Respondent Unions engaged in an economic strike against the Employer. During the strike, nine employees who were members of the Respondents resigned their memberships and returned to work. Pursuant to charges filed against them, each of the employees was fmed 1 day's wages for each day they crossed the picket line and subjected to a for- feiture of voting rights and a bar on holding union office for 5 years. The judge found that the Re- spondents' actions against all nine employees vio- lated Section 8(b)(1)(A). For the reasons set forth 1 The Respondents have excepted to some of the judge's credibility findings. The Board's established policy is not to overrule an administra- tive law judge's credibility resolutions unless the clear preponderance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect. Standard Dry Wail Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir._ 1951), We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for re- versing the findings. All dates are 1978 unless otherwise noted. below we agree that the fines imposed on employ- ees Galop, Dannelley, Fereday, Ulloa, Barry, and Turner violated Section 8(b)(1)(A). We also agree that the Respondents violated the Act by imposing certain fmes on employees Blue, Swank, and Mat- zolf. Contrary to the judge, however, we fmd that portions of the fines imposed on Blue, Swank, and Matzolf were lawful. The parties stipulated to most of the pertinent facts. As noted, the strike began on 18 September At that time each of the nine employees in question was a member of one of the Respondents and each3 initially took part in the strike. Subsequently, each of the nine employees submitted a written res- ignation to their respective Union and returned to work. Blue mailed his resignation on 25 September and returned to work the same day. His resignation was received by the Union on 26 September. Swank mailed his resignation on 5 October. It was received by the Union on 7 October. He returned to work on 6 October. Matzolf mailed his resigna- tion 6 October and returned to work that day. His resignation was received 7 October. The six re- maining employees, Galop, Dannelley, Fereday, Ulloa, Barry, and Turner also mailed their resigna- tions. Each then returned to work either on the day their resignation was received, 4 or on a subse- quent day. 5 Accordingly, three employees returned to work before their resignations were received, two returned on the same day their resignations were received, 6 and four returned after their resig- nations were received. The record further reveals that each of the above-named employees was charged with violat- ing article L, section 3, of the constitution of the International Association of Machinists and Aero- space Workers, AFL-CIO (TAM), that had been adopted by Respondent Unions. Article L, section 3, provides, in pertinent part: Improper Conduct of a Member . . . Accepting employment in any capacity in an establishment where a strike or lockout exists as recognized under this Constitution, without permission. Resignation shall not relieve a member of his obligation to refrain from ac- cepting employment at the establishment for 3 Employee Fereday was on vacation when the strike began, and it is unclear whether she supported the strike at its outset. 4 Galop and Donnelley returned to work on the day their resignations were received. 5 Fereday, Ulloa, Barry, and Turner returned to work on a day subse- quent to the Union's receipt of their resignations. 6 Although the record is not clear, it appears that Blue, Swank, and Matzolf (who all returned to work prior to the receipt of their resigna- tions) may also have worked on the days their resignations were re- ceived. 284 NLRB No. 132 1102 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD the duration of the strike or lockout if the res- ignation occurs during the period of the strike or walkout or within 14 days preceding its commencement. Where observance of a pri- mary picket line is required, resignation shall not relieve a member of his obligation to ob- serve the primary picket line for its duration if the resignation occurs during the period that the picket line is maintained or within 14 days preceding its establishment. Pursuant to charges filed against the nine em- ployees, Respondents found that each had violated article L, section 3. The penalty imposed for each employee was 1 day of wages for each day the em- ployee crossed the picket line for the duration of' the strike, forfeiture of voting rights as a member, and a prohibition against the employee holding office in the JAM for a period of 5 years. At the time of the hearing, no actions had been taken to collect the fmes. In the remand decision the judge found that em- ployees Blue, Ulloa, Fereday, Barry, Turner, and Matzolf had no knowledge of the restrictions con- tained in article L, section 3. He also found that Galop learned of the restrictions after the strike began, but before he resigned, 7 while Donnelley and Swank learned of the restrictions only after they resigned, if at all. It is clear that none of the employees had actual knowledge of article L, sec- tion 3's restrictions at a time when they could have resigned in compliance with the provision and avoided its sanctions, i.e., prior to 14 days before the strike began.8 In Machinists Local 1414 (Neufeld Porsche-Audi), 270 NLRB 1330 (1984), the Board held that a union violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) by imposing a fme on an employee who effectively resigned his union membership and then returned to work during a strike. In so doing, the Board ruled that a union cannot lawfully restrict an employee's Sec- tion 7 right to resign from a union. Accordingly, any union-imposed restriction on an employee's right to resign is invalid and any fines imposed on employees who exercise their right to resign and then return to work during a strike violate Section 8(b)(1)(A). See Pattern Makers League v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95 (1985). If, however, an employee does 7 The judge inadvertently stated in his findings of fact that Galop learned of the restrictions after he sent his resignation. It is clear from the record that Galop learned of the restrictions several days before he re- signed as is stated in the discussion section of the judge's remand deci- sion. 8 The record does contain testimony that employees generally were concerned about whether Respondents would take action against employ- ees who crossed the picket line in view of similar acts which had oc- curred in a previous strike. The generalized concern is not inconsistent with the finding that the employees in question did not have actual notice of the existence of art. L, sec. 3. not effectively resign° his or her union membership before returning to work during a strike, that em- ployee can be lawfully fined or sanctioned by the Union. NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967). Applying those principles to the fines imposed in the instant case, it is clear that the Respondents' ar- ticle L, section 3, is invalid insofar as it restricts the Respondents' members' right to resign and that the fmes imposed against the nine employees are un- lawful to the extent the fmes were imposed against them for returning to work after they had effec- tively resigned. Accordingly, the fines imposed against Fereday, Ulloa, Barry, and Turner were unlawful inasmuch as they returned to work after their resignations had been received. Similarly the fmes against Galop and Donnelley were unlawful because their resignations were received on the same day they returned to work, and there is no direct evidence that their resignations were re- ceived after they crossed the picket line. Regarding Blue, Swank, and Matzolf, however, the record re- veals that they returned to work before their resig- nations were received. Thus, the fines that were imposed against them for returning to work prior to the Respondents' receipt of their resignations were lawful. Any fmes imposed against them for working on the day their resignations were re- ceived, or thereafter, are, of course, violative of Section 8(b)(1)(A).1° In addition to the fines, the Respondents imposed other sanctions on the nine employees. Thus, each of the nine had their voting rights suspended and each was barred from holding union office for 5 years. We find that these additional sanctions which have not been shown to be more coercive in nature than the suspensions at issue in our decision in Food & Commercial Workers Local 81 (MacDon- ald Meat), 284 NLRB 1084, which issued today, do not violate Section 8(b)(1)(A)." 'A union resignation normally is effective on its receipt by the union. Machinists Local 751 (Boeing Co.), 173 NLRB 450,452 (1968); Communi- cations Workers (NJ. Bell Telephone), 106 NLRB 1322, 1324 (1953), enfd. 215 F.2d 835 (2d Cir. 1954) When a resignation is received on the same day that the member crosses a picket line the resignation is "presumed to have been received . . at an hour before the employee crossed the picket line" absent direct contrary evidence. Teamsters Local 610 (Brown- ing-Ferris), 264 NLRB 886,899-900 (1982). '° When this proceeding was remanded to the judge the issue of whether the nine employees had actual knowledge of art. L, sec. 3, was a necessary threshold inquiry. See Auto Workers Local 1384 (Ex-Cell-0 Corp.), 227 NLRB 1045 (1977). Since that time the Board has ruled that all restrictions on resignation are invalid Such a rule obviates the impor- tance of the notice issue inasmuch as a restriction on resignation is now invalid whether or not the employee allegedly subject to the rule knows of it. Thus, although we adopt the judge's findings on the notice issue, those findings are not a necessary predicate to our decision that the fines were unlawful. " For the reasons set forth in his partial dissent in Food & Commerical Workers Local 81, Chairman Dotson would fmd the additional sanctions violative of Sec. 8(bX1)(A). MACHINISTS LODGE 1233 (GENERAL DYNAMICS) 1103 REMEDY Having found that the Respondent violated Sec- tion 8(b)(1)(A), we shall order that they cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act in- cluding the refund to the fined employees of any moneys they may have paid as a result of the fines unlawfully imposed against them, with interest computed in the manner prescribed in New Hori- zons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987), and make them whole for any loss of earnings, benefits, travel expenses, or any other expenses incurred as a result of their need to defend themselves against the charges unlawfully preferred against them. Food & Commercial Workers Local 1439 (Allied Employers), 275 NLRB 995 (1985). Finally, we shall order the Respondent to cease and desist from maintaining the restrictions on resignation found in- valid and to expunge the provision from its govern- ing documents. Auto Workers Local 73 (McDonnell Douglas), 282 NLRB (1986). ORDER The National Labor Relations Board orders that the Respondents, International Association of Ma- chinist and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, Aero- space Lodge No. 1233, and International Associa- tion of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL- CIO, Aerospace Lodge No. 2659, Pomona, Califor- nia, their officers, agents, and representatives, shall 1. Cease and desist from (a) Maintaining or giving effect to the following rule of the constitution of the International Asso- ciation of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, to the extent it defines "Improper Conduct of a Member" as: Accepting employment in any capacity in an establishment where a strike or lockout exists as recognized under this Constitution, without permission. Resignation shall not relieve a member of his obligation to refrain from ac- cepting employment at the establishment for the duration of the strike or lockout if the res- ignation occurs during the period of the strike or walkout or within 14 days preceding its commencement. Where observance of a pri- mary picket line is required, resignation shall not relieve a member of his obligation to ob- serve the primary picket line for its duration if the resignation occurs during the period that the picket line is maintained or within 14 days preceding its establishment. (b) Restraining or coercing employees who have resigned from, and are no longer members of, the Respondents in the exercise of the rights guaran- teed them by Section 7 of the Act by imposing fines because of the employees' postresignation conduct in working at General Dynamics Corpora- tion, Pomona Division, during the strike that began on 18 September 1978. (c) In any like or related manner restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action neces- sary to effectuate the policies of the Act. (a) Remove from their governing documents the portion of the constitution of the International As- sociation of Machinists and Aerospace Workers set forth above. (b) Rescind the fines levied against Clifford Blue, Rosalie Ulloa, Jean Fereday, Shirley Barry, Carol Turner, Jay Matzolf, Lee Galop, Roger Dannelley, and Richard Swank because of their postresigna- tion work for General Dynamics Corporation, Pomona Division during the strike that began on 18 September 1978 and refund to them any moneys they may have paid as a result of such fines, with interest, and make them whole for any loss of earn- ings, benefits, travel expenses, or any other ex- penses incurred as a result of their need to defend themselves against the charges unlawfully pre- ferred against them. (c) Remove from their records any references to the fines imposed against the above-named employ- ees and inform them, in writing, that such action has been taken. (d) Preserve and, on request, make available to the Board or its agents for examination and copy- ing, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this Order. (e) Post at their offices and meeting halls copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."" Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Re- gional Director for Region 21, after being signed by the Respondent's authorized representatives, shall be posted by the Respondents immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondents to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. 12 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Na- tional Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the Nation- al Labor Relations Board." 1104 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (f) Sign and return to the Regional Director suf- ficient copies of the notice for posting by General Dynamics Corporation, Pomona Division, if will- ing, at all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. (g) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days from the date of this Order what steps the Respondent has taken to comply. CHAIRMAN DOTSON, dissenting in part. I agree with my colleagues that the fines im- posed by the Respondents on the employees who tendered resignations before returning to work during the strike violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. Unlike my colleagues, however, I find that the additional sanctions imposed on these employ- ees also violated Section 8(b)(1)(A). In addition to fining them, the Respondents also suspended the employees' voting rights and barred them from holding any union office for five years. However, those added sanctions, like the fines, were imposed in response to the employees' postre- signation conduct. As stated in my joint dissenting opinion in Food & Commercial Workers Local 81 (MacDonald Meat), 284 NLRB 1084, which issued today, 1 Section 8(b)(1)(A) requires that unions accept employee resignations and refrain from sanctioning former members for postresignation conduct. Thus, for the reasons stated in that dis- senting opinion, I find that the added sanctions im- posed on these nine employees, like the fines, vio- late Section 8(b)(1)(A).2 1 Member Cracraft and I jointly dissented in that case. 2 It is clear that the additional sanctions were imposed for the employ- ees' overall conduct and did not distinguish between preresignation and postresignation acts. For this reason, the additional sanctions imposed on employees Blue, Swank, and Matzolf, all of whom had returned to work before their resignations had been received, also violated Sec. 8(bX1)(A). APPENDIX NOTICE To MEMBERS POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to post and abide by this notice. WE WILL NOT maintain or give effect to the fol- lowing rule of the constitution of the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, to the extent it defines "Improper Conduct of a member" as: Accepting employment in any capacity in an establishment where a strike or lockout exists as recognized under this Constitution, without permission. Resignation shall not relieve a member of his obligation to refrain from ac- cepting employment at the establishment for the duration of the strike or lockout or within 14 days preceding its commencement. Where observance of a primary picket line is required, resignation shall not relieve a member of his obligation to observe the primary picket line for its duration if the resignation occurs during the period that the picket line is maintained or within 14 days preceding its establishment. WE WILL NOT restrain or coerce employees who have resigned from, and are no longer members of, the Unions in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act by imposing fines be- cause of the employees' postresignation conduct in working at General Dynamics Corporation, Pomona Division, during the strike that began on 18 September 1978. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner re- strain or coerce employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights. WE WILL remove from our governing docu- ments the portion of the constitution of the Inter- national Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers set forth above. WE WILL rescind the fines levied against Clifford Blue, Rosalie Ulloa, Jean Fereday, Shirley Barry, Carol Turner, Jay Matzolf, Lee Galop, Roger Dan- nelley, and Richard Swank because of their postre- signation work for General Dynamics Corporation, Pomona Division, during the strike that began on 18 September 1978 and refund to them any moneys they may have paid as a result of such fines, with interest. WE WILL make whole the above-named employ- ees for any loss of earnings, benefits, travel ex- penses, or any other expenses incurred as a result of their need to defend themselves against the charges unlawfully preferred against them. WE WILL remove from their records any refer- ences to the fines imposed against the above-named employees and inform them, in writing, that such action has been taken. INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS AND AEROSPACE WORK- ERS, AFL-CIO, AEROSPACE LODGE No. 1233; INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIA- TION OF MACHINISTS AND AERO- SPACE WORKERS, AFL-CIO, AERO- SPACE LODGE No. 2659 Frank M. Wagner, Esq., for the General Counsel. MACHINISTS LODGE 1233 (GENERAL DYNAMICS) 1105 Robert M. Simpson, Esq (Rose, Klein & Marias), of Los Angeles, California, for the Respondent. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE BERNARD J. SEFF, Administrative Law Judge. This case came on for hearing before me in Los Angeles, California, on March 21, 1979. It is grounded on a con- solidated complaint which issued on December 8, 1978, based on charges filed by several individual employees in October 1978. The complaint, as amended at the hearing, alleges, in effect, that during the period of an economic strike against General Dynamics Corporation, Pomona Division (the Employer), which lasted from September 18 through December 17, 1978, Respondents, Interna- tional Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, Aerospace Lodge No. 1233 (Respondent 1233), and International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, Aerospace Lodge No. 2659 (Respondent 2659), engaged in certain acts of con- duct violative of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act including: (1) preferring charges against nine employees after they had effectively resigned their respective union member- ship, because each had resigned from the Union during the period of a strike and because each had crossed a picket line and returned to work for the Employer; and (2) on or about October 1978, Respondents, acting through their agent, Clyde Combs, and other agents en- gaged in various acts of restraint and coercion including the blocking of ingress and egress and the taking of pho- tographs of employees who were attempting to work for the Employer during the strike. On the entire record in this proceeding, including my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses as they tes- tified, and with due consideration of the briefs, I make the following FINDINGS OF FACT I. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT The Employer is a corporation that has been engaged in the design and production of tactical weapons systems and military electronics equipment, chiefly for the United States Navy, with its plant facilities located in Pomona, California. In the normal course of its business, the Employer an- nually purchases and receives goods and products valued in excess of $50,000 directly from suppliers located out- side the State of California. I fmd the Employer is an employer engaged in commerce and in a business affect- ing commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. II. THE UNIONS INVOLVED Respondent 1233 and Respondent 2659 are labor orga- nizations within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. Clyde Combs has been and is now a district represent- ative of the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, District Lodge 120, to which both Respondents are affiliated and has been and is now acting on behalf of both Respondents and, at all times material, has been and is now an agent of the Re- spondents within the meaning of Section 2(13) of the Act. On or about September 18 and continuing to Decem- ber 18, 1978, Respondents have been engaged in a labor dispute with the Employer at its facilities described above, and during that period, directed their respective members not to work or perform services for Employer. At all times material the following persons have been and are now employees of the Employer, at the Employ- er's facilities within the meaning of Section 2(3) of the Act: Clifford D. Blue Jay Matzolf Rosalie E. Ulloa Lee W. Galop, Jean E. Fereday Roger Donnelley Shirley Barry Richard Swank Carol Turner A. The Issues 1. Did Respondents violate Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by preferring charges against the nine employees that resulted in fines and suspensions against all, except for the few who refused service of the charges, for their actions after effectively resigning their union membership and returning to work for the Employer during this strike? 2. Did Respondents, acting through Clyde Combs and other agents, engage in acts of coercion and restraint against employees at the picket line during the strike? 1. The picket line conduct Sometime during the middle of October, employees Rosalie Ulloa, Shirley Barry, and Carol Turner traveled back and forth from work in an automobile owned by Barry. An incident occurred on October 18 involving Combs, the business representative of the district lodge to which Respondents 1233 and 2659 are both affiliated. At approximately from 4:15 to 4:20 as the employees were leaving work in Barry's car, the car approached the gate on Mission Boulevard to leave the premises. Combs pointed to the car while it was in line to leave the premises and said, "Here comes that pile of shit." The cars in front of Barry's car were allowed to leave the premises but the pickets, about seven or eight in number, did not allow Barry's car to leave the gate at once. When Barry's car was next in line to proceed through the gate, Combs said, "It sure smells around here," and with that the pickets began walking in front of Barry's car very slowly. Combs walked in front of the car from one headlight to the other for about 2 or 3 min- utes. At the end of this period Combs said, "Let's clear the air around here and let this pile of shit through," and with these words the pickets all moved away thus pro- viding a path for the car to leave the gate. It was further testified by Ulloa that she observed Combs taking photo- graphs of employees as they left work. On October 6 a picture was taken of Barry's car when it was leaving the premises driven by Barry with Carol Turner as a passen- ger. Ulloa observed pickets taking photographs of the employees as they left work on two or three occasions.' 1106 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Both Barry and Turner testified essentially corroborat- ing the same information as is set forth, supra. The General Counsel contends that by the language used as the three employees attempted to leave the plant, the Respondents violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. In reaching this conclusion, he cites as authority Teamsters Local 777 (Crown Metal), 145 NLRB 197, 204 (1963). The language of this case states: The loud use of profanity and obscenity in the public streets directed to an employee and to police whose duty it is to preserve order at the scene of a strike is, when committed in the presence of em- ployees going to work and employees on strike, an act of coercion in itself. It should be noted that in Taxicab cited above, the sec- tion quoted is only a small part of the activities being en- gaged in by the Union which consisted of rather strong action taken against the strikebreakers. To this extent the facts are not opposite to the case at bar. When language of an objectionable nature is employed against strikebreakers during the course of the strike, it is not to be expected that it will be couched in tearoom style. Tempers are high, and there are few things that excite pickets more than to see strikebreakers going through their picket line. So far as the time element is concerned, it appears to me that a 3-minute delay in leaving the plant is de minitnis' . Taking these factors into consideration, while I do not condone what occurred on the picket line, it does not appear to me that the evi- dence would warrant the issuance of a remedial order based on the incidents described, supra. For this reason, I recommend the dismissal of this allegation of the com- plaint. 2. The internal union charges and fines The material facts in regard to the preferring of charges against all of the employees named in the com- plaint and the fines and suspensions that resulted from the convictions thereon are uncontested and, in fact, were stipulated to by the parties at the hearing. While the dates vary from employee to employee, es- sentially the same course of action was taken against each of the employees named in the complaint, and one example would suffice to cover the incidents that oc- curred. Clifford Blue, a member of Respondent 2659, sent a letter of resignation to the union by registered mail on September 25, 1978, which was received by the Union on September 26. Blue returned to work for the Employ- er on September 25. Charges were preferred against him on October 13 under the provisions of the Union's Inter- national constitution, article L, section 3: Accepting employment in any capacity in an estab- lishment where a strike or lockout exists as recog- nized under this Constitution, without permission. Resignation shall not relieve a member of his obli- gation to refrain from accepting employment at the establishment for the duration of the strike or lock- out if the resignation occurs during the period of the strike or walkout or within 14 days preceding its commencement. Where observance of a primary picket line is required, resignation shall not relieve a member of this obligation the primary picket line for its duration if the resignation occurs during the period that the picket line is maintained or within 14 days preceding its establishment. The present Board law concerning the internal union charges and fmes is succinctly set forth in The Developing Labor Law, 1977 Supplemental, pages 13 and 14, as fol- lows: A. Section 8(b)(1)(A): Fines and Discipline of Union Members 1. The Effect of Resignation on the Legality of Discipline. In Machinists, Local 1327 (Dalmo Victor), 231 NLRB No. 115, 96 LRRJYI 1160 (1977), the Board considered whether a union's constitutional provision was a restriction on former members' pos- tresignation conduct or a restriction on the resigna- tion itself. The Board found that the facts and cir- cumstances involved were similar to those which existed in Local Lodge No. 1994, International Ass'n of Machinists (0. K Tool Co.), 215 NLRB 651, 88 LRRM 1120 (1974). In that decision the Board had concluded that a union violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) by finding employees who returned to work during a strike in violation of a provision in the union con- stitution that resignation from the union did not re- lieve a member from his duty to refrain from work- ing at a struck establishment if the resignation oc- curred during the strike or within 14 days preced- ing its commencement. Finding no evidence that distinguished the present case from 0. K Tool, nor support for any argument that 0. K Tool was de- cided incorrectly, the Board held that the union, by fining former members for their postresignation "strikebreaking," violated Section 8(b)(1)(A). Member Jenkins dissented, stating that the real issue before the Board was whether the union's con- stitutional provision was a restriction on the em- ployees' right to resign or an attempt to exercise control over ex-members. Member Jenkins noted, as did the majority of the Board, that the Supreme Court has specifically left open the question of whether a union's constitution can legally restrict an employee's right to resign. Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423, 70 LRRM 3105 (1969); NLRB v. Granite State Joint Board, Textile Workers Union of America, Local 1029, 409 U.S. 213, 81 LRRM 2853 (1972); and Booster Lodge No. 405, International Ass'n of Machinists v NLRB, 412 U.S. 84, 83 LRRM 2189 (1973). Member Jenkins argued that the union's constitutional provision was, in fact, a limitation was reasonable in that the employees "freely, know- ingly and expressly" agreed to such limitation, had proper notice of its existence, and the fine imposed was limited to the strike benefitslreceived by the in- dividuals from the union. MACHINISTS LODGE 1233 (GENERAL DYNAMICS) 1107 In Carpenters Local 1233 (Polk Construction Co.), 231 NLRB No. 114, 96 LRRIVI 1193 (1977), a unan- imous Board held that union fmes violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) since the union's restriction on member resignation "prohibited all resignations at all times for the purpose of performing non-union. . . ." The Board agreed with the administrative law judge that the union's restriction attempted "to impede forever the Section 7 rights to refrain from union activity." I am bound by Board law and consequently because the Board majority has determined this precise issue in the cases cited supra, I fmd that the Respondents in the instant case have violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. Discussion The General Counsel in oral argument at the conclu- sion of the hearing, after first recapitulating the state of the law as substantially set forth in the extensive quota- tion from The Developing Labor Law, concluded with the following statement: Turning now to the application of these legal prin- ciples to the facts of the instant proceeding, the legal conclusion must be that Respondent's action in initiating and processing the instant internal charges which resulted in the fines and suspensions of mem- bership of some of the individuals, was clearly in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. Thus it is undisputed that all of the employees submitted clear unequivocal written resignations which were duly received by the appropriate local prior to the institution of any charges. Thus all ef- fectively resigned their respective union member- ships prior to the institution of charges. . . . The charge seeks to retaliate a former member for en- gaging in Section 7 rights, the refraining from en- gaging in concerted protected activity.. . Each of the charges filed against the named persons in the complaint, consisted of the fact that each ex- member crossed the picket line when a sanctioned strike was in progress at General Dynamics Corpo- ration. Nothing in that first paragraph which relates to employees crossing the picket line, referred to whether or not the person who crossed the picket line, was or was not an ex-member. I agree with the General Counsel's summation of the law and his conclusion that the Respondents violated Section 8(bX1)(A). CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1.General Dynamics Corporation, Pomona Division is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. 2. The Unions are labor organizations within the meaning of the Act. 3. By suspending and fming employees for exercising rights guaranteed to them in Section 7 of the Act, which permits individuals to refrain from union activities, the Respondents have violated Section 8(b)(1XA) of the Act. 4. The aforementioned unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of the Act. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondents engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that it be or- dered to cease and desist therefrom and to take such af- firmative action, including the posting of customary no- tices as will serve the purposes of the Act. [Recommended Order omitted from publication.]