International Brotherhood Of Electrical Workers, Local Union No. 194

328 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union No. 194 and Cahn Electric Co., Inc. Case 15-CB-3233 18 August 1987 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN DOTSON AND MEMBERS STEPHENS AND CRACRAFT On 31 March 1987 Administrative Law Judge Howard I. Grossman issued the attached decision. The General Counsel filed limited exceptions. The National Labor Relations Board has delegat- ed its authority in this proceeding to a three- member panel. The Board has considered the decision and the record in light of the exceptions' and has decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings, and conclu- sions2 and to adopt the recommended Order. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner vio- late our obligation to bargain in good faith with Cahn Electric Co., Inc. WE WILL notify the Council on Industrial Rela- tions in writing that we are withdrawing our sub- mission of a dispute with Cahn Electric Co., Inc. and WE WILL send a copy of this notification to Cahn Electric Co., Inc. INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, LOCAL UNION No. 194 Clement J. Kennington, Esq., for the General Counsel. James Madison Woods, Esq., Shreveport, Louisiana, for the Respondent. Frederick Gover, Esq. (Canterbury, Stuber, Elder & Gooch), of Dallas, Texas, for the Charging Party. DECISION ORDER The National Labor Relations Board adopts the recommended Order of the administrative law judge and orders that the Respondent, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union No. 194, Shreveport, Louisiana, its officers, agents, and representatives, shall take the action set forth in the Order, except that the attached notice is sub- stituted for that of the administrative law judge. ' The General Counsel's sole exception was to the apparently inadvert- ent use of the word "mandatory" rather than "nonniandatory" in the first paragraph of the judge's "Notice to Members." We have substituted the attached notice, conforming the language to the judge's corresponding cease-and-desist provision in his recommended Order. 2 No exceptions were filed with regard to the substantive legal issues involved in this case APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES AND MEMBERS POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to post and abide by this notice. WE WILL NOT insist to impasse that Cahn Elec- tric Co., Inc. or any other employer agree to inter- est arbitration or any other nonmandatory subject of bargaining. WE WILL NOT continue to submit to the Council on Industrial Relations our negotiation dispute with Cahn Electric Co., Inc. STATEMENT OF THE CASE HOWARD I. GROSSMAN, Administrative Law Judge. The charge was filed on 8 August 1986 by Cahn Electric Co., Inc. (Cahn), and complaint issued on 10 September 1986. As amended at the hearing, it alleges that Interna- tional Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union No. 194 (Respondent or the Union) restrained and co- erced Cahn in the selection of its employer representa- tives (1) by notifying Cahn that it intended to submit un- resolved contractual issues to binding interest arbitration before a third party, the Council on Industrial Relations for the Electrical Construction Industry of the United States and Canada (CIR); (2) by submitting the issues to CIR notwithstanding the fact that Cahn had not agreed to such submission and had objected to it; (3) by failing to withdraw the submission; and (4) by oral presentation of unresolved issues to the CIR resulting in an order from CIR to the parties to resume negotiations and submit unresolved contractual issues to the CIR thereaf- ter-all in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act). Further, the complaint alleges, by such conduct the Respondent insisted to impasse on interest arbitration, a nonmandatory subject of bargaining, and thereby violat- ed Section 8(b)(3) of the Act. A hearing was held before me on these matters in Shreveport, Louisiana, on 23 October 1986. No testimo- ny was adduced, but documentary evidence was submit- ted and oral arguments were made. Thereafter, briefs were submitted by the General Counsel, the Respondent, and the Charging Party. On the entire record, I make the following FINDINGS OF FACT I. JURISDICTION Cahn is a Louisiana corporation with its principal office and place of business located in Shreveport, Lou- isiana, where it is engaged in the electrical contracting 285 NLRB No. 58 ELECTRICAL WORKERS IBEW LOCAL 194 (CAHN ELECTRIC) business. During the 12-month period preceding issuance of the complaint, a representative period, Cahn pur- chased and received goods and materials valued in excess of $50,000 directly from suppliers located within the State of Louisiana who in turn received same directly from sources located outside the State of Louisiana. The pleadings establish, and I find, that Cahn is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED The pleadings establish, and I find, that the Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Factual Summary For about 40 years prior to 24 April 1984, Cahn en- gaged in collective bargaining through its agent, North Louisiana Chapter, Inc., National Electrical Contractors Association (NECA). By letter dated 24 April 1984, Cahn revoked NECA's authority to bargain on its behalf with the Union, notified the Union of the revocation, and informed the latter that Cahn intended to negotiate only on an individual basis and not as a member of the multiemployer association.' Thereafter, Cahn and the Union engaged in nine collective-bargaining sessions from August through December 1984. While this individual bargaining was in process, NECA entered into an agreement with the Union (the 1984-1985 agreement), beginning 10 October 1984, and continuing thereafter from year to year unless changed or terminated in the manner provided in the contract. The agreement states that it applies "to all firms who sign a letter of assent to be bound by" the agreement. The contract also requires that any termination or change be preceded by written notice from the party de- siring the change or termination to the other party at least 90 days preceding 9 October of any year beginning in 1985 Article I of the agreement further provides that, in the event of a "question in dispute" that cannot be adjusted by the parties, "any matter," including, e.g., the terms of a renewal of the agreement, shall then be referred to a Joint Conference Committee composed of management and union representatives. In the event this committee cannot adjust the matter, it shall be referred to the Coun- cil on Industrial Relations for the Electrical Construction Industry of the United States and Canada (CIR), whose decisions shall be final and binding. The CIR is an inter- est arbitration body composed of equal numbers of repre- sentatives of NECA and the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW).2 The parties stipulated that the 1984-1985 agreement authorizes the CIR to impose a collective-bargaining agreement on parties who fail to reach agreement. The CIR rules provide that "its local labor agreements are all multiemployer agreements," and that it will adju- I Jt Exh 1 2 It Exh 23, p 12 329 dicate cases submitted by a local union and a NECA chapter, or other multiemployer bargaining agent How- ever, the CIR may elect to accept a case involving an individual employer and a local IBEW union "upon re- ceipt of a written stipulation . . . ."3 Respondent's coun- sel contended at the hearing and in his posthearing brief that the CIR rules are binding on the parties to the col- lective-bargaining agreement "through implicit incorpo- ration " After about 4 months of individual bargaining, on 3 December 1984, Cahn reappointed NECA as its collec- tive-bargaining agent in the following Letter of Assent- A: In signing this letter of assent, the undersigned firm does hereby authorize (NECA) as its collective bargaining representative for all matters contained in or pertaining to the current approved inside labor agreement between (NECA) and (the Union) This authorization, in compliance with the current ap- proved labor agreement, shall become effective on the 10th day of October 1984 It shall remain in effect until terminated by the undersigned employer giving written notice to (NECA) and to the Local Union at least one hundred fifty (150) days prior to the then current anniversary date of the aforemen- tioned approved labor agreement . . . .4 On 25 April 1985, Cahn wrote NECA as follows, with a copy to the Union. This is to advise you that Cahn . . . hereby ter- minates its Letter of Assent-A given to you to act as Cahn's collective bargaining representative with the IBEW, Local Union No. 194 We hereby advise that this termination shall be construed as a revocation of your authority to bar- gain on behalf of Cahn . in any manner with (the Union), either by way of modifications, renew- als, extensions, termination, and/or renegotiation of the current collective bargaining contract . . By copy of this letter to the Union, we hereby direct that all correspondence and contacts relating to the termination, renegotiation and/or extension of the collective bargaining contract be,made with the undersigned solely as it pertains to Cahn . and not to or through (NECA) Such Association does not have the authority any longer to negotiate or make agreements on behalf of Cahn . . . Cahn will hereafter negotiate with the Union on an indi- vidual basis only and not as a member of the multi- employer association . . . 5 The Union replied with a letter acknowledging receipt of Cahn's desire to "negotiate individually," and stated that "all sections of the agreement would be subject to bargaining."s ' it Exh 23, p 3 4 it Exh 2 The document is a preprinted form marked "IBEW Form 302," and is filled in and signed by Cahn and the Union 5 it Exh 4 6 it Exh 5 330 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD On 25 June 1985 Cahn sent the following notice to the Union: In accordance with Article I of the Agreement dated October 10 1984, this correspondence serves as notice that Cahn . . . desires to terminate this Agreement effective on its termination date which is October 9, 1985. Cahn . . . is willing to meet and confer with you in order to negotiate a new contract at your convenience . . . .7 The Union responded with a statement of willingness, dated 12 July 1985, "to begin negotiations with Cahn Electric Company . . . on all subjects," and proposed a first meeting.8 The record does not specify the chronolo- gy of all the bargaining sessions . In early October, Cahn agreed to continue paying the prevailing wage rate and fringe benefits during negotiations, but affirmed that this was not to be construed as assent to any agreement be- tween the Union and the multiemployer unit.9 A bar- gaining session was held on 15 October. On 28 October, Cahn presented proposals on the term of an agreement, wages, exceptions to a proposed hiring hall clause, a hos- pitalization program, vacation benefits, and hours of work. 10 The parties reached impasse, and Cahn implemented its final offer on 4 December 1985. A strike ensued and Cahn offered to reinstate strikers as long as positions were available." At a meeting of the Joint Conference Committee on 20 June 1986, the Union's business manager stated his opin- ion that Cahn was still obligated to comply with the con- tract, apparently referring to the automatic renewal of the NECA agreement on 9 October 1985 provided for in article I, and noted that Cahn was paying wages differ- ent from those provided for therein, and had changed working conditions. The employer members of the com- mittee stated that the committee had no jurisdiction over Cahn because the latter had not signed a new agree- ment.12 Three days later, on 23 June 1986, the Union notified Cahn that it intended to file a case with the CIR con- cerning the negotiations.13 On 26 June 1986 the CIR sent Cahn and the Union a form letter 'enclosing copies of forms for submitting the dispute to CIR, together with the admonition to observe the rules governing timely submission, "both Joint and Unilateral." 14 Cahn's counsel wrote to the Union and its counsel stating that the submission to CIR was unlawful and that Cahn would oppose it. 15 A copy of one of these letters was sent to the CIR. On 29 July 1986 the CIR informed Cahn's counsel that the issue of arbitrabi- lity would be argued and determined as a threshold Jt Exh 6 8 it Exh 7 8 Jt Exhs 18, 19 10 Jt Exh 8 u Jt Exh 9 12 Jt Exh 10 18 it Exh 11 14 it Exh 12 Is Jt Exhs 13, 14 issue. 16 On 5 August 1986 the CIR informed Cahn by telegram that the Union had filed a unilateral submission on the "entire agreement."17 A proceeding was held before the CIR, which issued a decision dated 20 August 1986. The parties were in- structed to resume negotiations and, if unsuccessful in reaching agreement by October 1986, to submit unre- solved issues to the November session of the CIR. There is no discussion in the decision of the threshold issue of arbitrability.111 On 3 September 1986 the Union proposed a bargaining session on 24 September. Cahn agreed, and a meeting was held on that date. The parties stipulated that Cahn then stated that it was not meeting because of the CIR directive, but because of what it perceived to be its con- tinuing obligation to bargain with the Union. There was no further meeting. B. Legal Conclusions 1. Cahn's letter of Assent-A dated 3 December 1984 It is obvious that Cahn's letter designated NECA as his bargaining agent. The legal issues are whether it also manifested his intention to be bound by the existing agreement and to become a member of the multiemploy- er bargaining unit. If so, the further issue is whether the letter contains any limitation on its binding effect. The legal effect of such letters has been a subject of Board litigation in the past. Most recently, the Board had under consideration the finding of the Regional Director for Region 1 in a representation case that the signatory of such a letter had merely adopted the results of negoti- ations between NECA and the union, but had not become a member of the multiemployer bargaining group. A panel majority of the Board, Chairman Dotson dissenting, held that the employer had manifested an in- tention to become part of the multiemployer group. Vin- cent Electric Co., 281 NLRB 903 (1986). In contrast to the dissent's observation that the Letter of Assent was ambiguous, the majority referred to past Board decisions holding that by such letter the employer becomes a member of the association. "[W]e believe that one cannot simply ignore the interpretation given to this document by many past Board decisions. To confine the meaning of this document to its `plain language' at this late date, in our opinion, is unfair to those who have spe- cifically relied on the document's longstanding interpre- tation by the Board" (id. at fn. 4) It may be noted that the cited history of interpretation does not negate the right of employer withdrawal from a multiemployer group in appropriate circumstances. Thus, in one of the cases relied on in Vincent Electric, the Board accepted a conclusion of the administrative law judge "that if the 150-day notice was not given, the party signing said assent would remain in the chapter and be bound by the succeeding contracts between the chapter and the Union," thereby suggesting that giving 18 Jt Exh 15 11 it Exh 20 18 it Exh 21 ELECTRICAL WORKERS IBEW LOCAL 194 (CAHN ELECTRIC) 331 the notice would release the signatory from the obliga- tions of the contract. McCormack Electrical Construction, 240 NLRB 418, 424 (1979). Arid, in Central New Mexico Chapter, 152 NLRB 1-604, 1607 (1965), also cited in Vin- cent Electric, supra, the Board itself stated that signato- ries to a Letter of Assent-A, "except those which may have timely revoked the authority granted in accordance with the terms of `Assent A,' comprise a multiemployer bargaining group." These conclusions are consistent with the language of the Letter of Assent, which specifies the procedure by which it may be terminated. I conclude herein Cahn, by signing the Letter of Assent-A on 3 December 1984, thereby designated NECA as its bargaining agent and manifested an inten- tion to be a member of the multiemployer group, but did not waive its right to revoke the former and withdraw from the latter, as established by the Letter of Assent and by prior law. 2. Cahn's notices dated 25 April and 25 June 1985 As described above, the first anniversary date of the 1984-1985 collective-bargaining agreement was 9 Octo- ber 1985. Cahn's Letter of Assent-A, executed in De- cember of 1984, specified that it was to remain in effect unless terminated at least 150 days prior to the anniversa- ry date. Cahn's letter on 25 April 1985 to NECA and the Union, terminating the Letter of Assent, met this dead- line. As further described above, the collective-bargaining agreement requires that notice of intention to change or terminate the agreement must be sent to the other party at least 90 days prior to the anniversary date. Cahn's letter to the Union dated 25 June 1985 also met this deadline; there is no evidence that any collective-bar- gaining negotiations were then taking place between NECA and the Union. These two documents manifest Cahn's intention to cancel, revoke, or withdraw from the following, legal constraints: (1) NECA's authority to negotiate on behalf of Cahn in any manner, including "renewal" of the agreement; (2) participation in multiemployer bargaining; and (3) the existing collective-bargaining agreement on its expiration date. With respect to Cahn's purported withdrawal from multiemployer bargaining, it is well established that mul- tiemployer bargaining is consensual in nature, and is based on evidence that the employers intend to be bound by group rather than individual action. Similarly, an em- ployer may be excluded from the group based on evi- dence of an intention to pursue an individual course of action with respect to labor relations. In this respect, the Board has recently reaffirmed the principle that an em- ployer may withdraw from a multiemployer bargaining relationship provided that his'attempt to do so is timely and unequivocal. Watson-Rum,rnelt Electric Co., 277 NLRB 1401 (1985). It is clear that Cahn's 25 April at- tempt was timely and unequivocal, and I conclude that it thereby effectively withdrew from the multiemployer group. Respondent Union argues that Cahn, nonetheless, was bound by the arbitration provision of the 1984-1985 agreement. In addressing this issue, the first question is whether Cahn intended, by, its 1985 notices, to cancel that provision. It is well established that the Board will not defer to arbitration if no„arbitration agreement in fact exists. Atlas Tack Corp., 266 NLRB 222 (1966), enfd. 559 F.2d 1201 (1st Cir. 1977). Neither of Cahn's 1985 notices explicitly states its intention to cancel the arbitration pro- vision. On the other hand, Cahn's vigorous opposition to the Union's submission of the dispute to arbitration shows that Cahn intended cancellation, and that the sub- mission to arbitration was a surprise., I conclude that it was Cahn's intention, at least, to abrogate all provisions of the 1984- 1985 agreement on its expiration date, and that it impliedly abrogated the arbitration provision. The next question is whether Cahn had legal authority to do so. This, in turn, depends on the terms of the con- tract and the Letter of Assent-A. As noted, the former provides that it applies to all firms who sign a letter of assent "to be bound" by the agreement, and the letter of assent has been interpreted by the Board to manifest the employer's intention to become a member of the multi- employer group. The Letter of Assent is ambiguous on the issue of the binding effect of the contract on Cahn. The only express grant of authority is from Cahn to NECA as Cahn's bar- gaining representative with respect to the "current ap- proved labor agreement." However, this grant of author- ity may reasonably be interpreted to manifest Cahn's in- tention to abide by the agreement-an inference support- ed by Cahn's actions. The Letter of Assent continues, however, to state that "it shall remain in effect until ter- minated" (by 150-day notice). What shall remain "in effect?" NECA's authority? The binding effect of the contract on Cahn, which has been inferred although not expressly stated? The Letter of Assent is unclear. On one construction, it may be interpreted to give to Cahn the right to withdraw from the obligations of the contract, if not in midterm, at least on expiration-which is all that Cahn is contending. It may be recalled that the Letter of Assent-A was r ' IBEW form that was filled in and signed by Cahn and the Union. It is fundamental that doubtful language in a contract must be interpreted most strongly against the party who selected that language.ia Application of this principle leads to a conclusion that the Letter of Assent- A, by which Cahn.arguably adhered to the contract, also gave him authority to terminate the agreement, at least by the end of its stated term. This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that the, Union did not protest Cahn's 25 April notice. Rather, it, referred to such notice as Cahn's desire to "negotiate in- dividually," declared its willingness to negotiate "with Cahn Electric Company" on all subjects, and thereafter engaged in individual bargaining with Cahn on wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment of Cahn's employees. By such actions the Union acquiesced in Cahn's withdrawal from multiemployer bargaining. I. C. Refrigeration Service, 200 NLRB 687 (1972). Where a labor organization thus consented to abandonment of multiemployer bargaining by several employers, the 19 17 Am Jur.2d, Contracts § 276, Restatement, Contracts § 236. 332 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Board held that the employers did not violate the Act by refusing to abide by the terms of a collective-bargaining agreement between the union, and an employer associa- tion (id.).20 Even without such action by Cahn and the Union, the Employer could have abrogated the arbitration clause of the contract. It is well established that such clauses con- cern nonmandatory subjects of bargaining and, _ as such, may be abrogated by either party during the life of the agreement without violating the Act. Allied Chemical Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 188 (1971). The Union argues that by its submission of its dispute with Cahn to arbitration, it was merely seeking to en- force its rights under the arbitration provision in the 1984-1985 agreement, which, it asserts, survived expira- tion of the contract. The Union cites various Federal court cases holding that interest arbitration provisions in contracts survive expiration of the contract.2 i However, this may be, Cahn was not bound by the provisions of the 1984-1985 contract when it gave timely notice of withdrawal from the multiemployer group and the Union acquiesced. Without passing on the irrelevant issue of whether such obligation ceased during the term of the contract, it clearly ended not later than the expiration date of 9 October 1985. This conclusion' is consistent with the established law on the nature of multiemployer bargaining, and on an employer's right to withdraw from such bargaining under appropriate circumstances. Cahn did so withdraw, and it would be anomalous to hold that, nonetheless, it was still obligated to abide by a "survived" provision of the multiemployer agreement. On the contrary, Calm had no obligation to submit to arbitration, and there was nothing to "survive" an agreement by which it was no longer bound. Even if it was so bound by a prior con- tract, this would not have justified the Union's unilateral submission of the dispute to the CIR. Electrical Workers IBEW Local 135 (La Crosse Electrical), 271 NLRB 250 (1984). 3. The substantive allegations As set forth above, the complaint alleges that the Union restrained and coerced Cahn in the selection of its bargaining representative by submitting the dispute to ar- bitration, in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(B).22 Presented 20 Accord Acropolis Painting, 272 NLRB 150 (1984), NLRB v. Hayden Electric, 693 F.2d 1358 (11th Cir 1982), denying enf of 256 NLRB 601 (1981), NLRB v. Caller, 630 F 2d 595 (8th Cir 1980), enfg. 243 NLRB 1114 (1979), Fairmont Foods Co v. NLRB, 471 F 2d 1170 (8th Cir 1972), denying enf 196 NLRB 849 (1972); NLRB v Spun-Jee Corp., 385 F 2d 379'(2d Ctr 19172), denying enf of 152 NLRB 943 (1965) 21 Nolde Bros v. Bakery Workers, 430 U S 243 (1977), in which the Supreme Court held that a dispute over severance pay under an expired collective-bargaining agreement was arbitrable , and other cases applying this principle to interest arbitration provisions, to wit, Sheet Metal Work- ers Local 120 v Huggins Sheet Metal, 752 F 2d 1473 (9th Cir 1985); Hotel & Restaurant Employees Local 703 v. Williams, 752 F 2d 1476 (9th Cir. 1985), Sheet Metal Workers Local 57 Welfare Fund v. Tampa Sheet Metal Co., 768 F 2d 1459 (11th Cir 1986) 22 The complaint particularizes the various subsidiary stages of the submisison, i e., the notification of intention to submit, the submission without Cahn's consent, the failure to withdraw the submission, and the oral presentation of unresolved issues resulting in an order from the CIR with this issue in another case now before the Board, Judge Gordon J. Myatt concluded that the employers' cancellation of the letters of assent therein impliedly ab- rogated the CIR provisions of the existing agreement. Thereafter, the union's submission of the dispute to the CIR was an unlawful attempt to compel the employers to relinquish their right to select their own bargaining representative. 2$ The Act states that the term "representatives" includes "any individual or labor organization. 1124 Although the CIR cannot be said to be Cahn's "representative" in the usual sense, it does consist of equal numbers of employer and union representatives. More particularly, it exists as a substitute or supplement to the normal bargaining proc- ess. Any assistance that Cahn may seek to advance its cause must be found within the CIR, possibly with the employer members thereof, since Cahn is no longer able to select its own bargaining representative after the in- voluntary submission. In these circumstances, and con- sistent with the statutory definition, I conclude that the individuals comprising the CIR were "representatives" of Cahn, and that the latter was compelled to select such representatives by the Union's unilateral submission of the dispute to arbitration. Accordingly, I find, the Union thereby violated Section 8(b)(l)(B) of the Act. The complaint also alleges that the Union violated Section 8(b)(3) of the Act by insisting to impasse on' in- terest arbitration, a nonmandatory subject of bargaining. Although the bargaining history does not specifically in- dicate that the arbitration clause was one on which the parties reached impasse, when the Union submitted the dispute to arbitration it did so on the entire agreement. The entire agreement, of course, included the interest ar- bitration provision, and it is unlikely that the Union would have submitted to the CIR issues on which Cahn had agreed, e.g., an interest arbitration provision. Ac- cordingly, I find that the Union did insist to impasse on such provision, and thereby violated Section 8(b)(3) of the Act. That there may have been other issues dividing the parties is no defense. Electrical Workers IBEW Local 135 (La Crosse Electrical), supra. Respondent Union argues that the Board should defer to the threshold determination by the CIR of the arbitra- bility of this dispute. This argument is fallacious for sev- eral reasons . In the first place, the Union's submission of the dispute violated the CIR's stated rules on unilateral submissions in that there was no "stipulation" from the Employer. Secondly, the CIR's written decision con- tained no discussion whatever of the arbitrability issue. Finally, as the Board has stated: Issues presented in the interest arbitration proceed- ing, concerning what contractual terms shall bind the parties for the future, are in no sense parallel to the statutory issue presented . . . whether the Union failed to bargain in good faith by insisting to impasse on a nonmandatory subject of bargaining. [271 NLRB at 251.] 23 Electrical Workers Local 46 (Puget Sound), Case 19-CB-5160, etc., JD-(SF)-84-85, slip op at 22-23 (1985) 24 Sec 2(4) ELECTRICAL WORKERS IBEW LOCAL 194 (CAHN ELECTRIC) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Cahn Electric Co., Inc. is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. Respondent International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union No. 194 is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. All employees performing electrical work within the jurisdiction of the aforesaid Respondent Union em- ployed by Cahn, excluding all office clerical employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for purposes, of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. 4. At all times material, Respondent Union has been the collective-bargaining representative of the employees of Cahn in the unit described above. 5. By insisting to impasse that a collective-bargaining agreement include a provision for interest arbitration, Respondent Union thereby violated Section 8(b)(3) of the Act. 6. By unilaterally submitting its negotiation dispute with Cahn to the Council of Industrial Relations (CIR), and by continuing such submission after Cahn protested same, Respondent Union thereby violated Section 8(b)(1)(B) of the Act. 7. The foregoing unfair labor practices affect com- merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent Union violated Section 8(b)(3) of the Act by insisting to impasse, as a condition of any collective-bargaining agreement, that Cahn agree to interest arbitration, and that the Union also violated Section 8(b)(1)(B) of the Ac9 by unilaterally submitting its negotiations dispute with Cahn'to the Council on In- dustrial Relations (CIR), and by continuing such submis- sion after Cahn protested same, in violation of Section 8(b)(l)(B) of the Act, I shall recommend that Respond- ent Union be ordered to cease and desist from this or any like or related unfair labor practices, to take certain affirmative action in order to effectuate the policies of the Act, and to post appropriate notices. On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the following recommend- ed25 25 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the Board's Rules and Regulations , the findings, conclusions, and recommended ORDER 333 The Respondent, International Brotherhood of Electri- cal Workers, Local Union No. 194," its officers, agents, and representatives, shall 1. Cease and desist from (a) Insisting to impasse that Cahn Electric Co., Inc. or any other employer agree to interest arbitration or any other nonmandatory subject of bargaining. (b) Continuing to submit to the Council on Industrial Relations for the Electrical Construction Industry of the United States and Canada its negotiation dispute with Cahn Electric Co., Inc. (c) In any like or related manner violating its obliga- tion to bargain in good faith, under Section 8(b)(3) and Section 8(d) of the Act, with Cahn Electric Co., Inc. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act. (a) Notify the Council on Industrial Relations for the Electrical Construction Industry of the United States and Canada in writing that it is withdrawing its submission of a dispute with Cahn Electric Co., Inc., and send a copy of the notification to Cahn Electric Co., Inc. (b) Post at its offices and meeting halls copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."26 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 15, after being signed by the Respondent's au- thorized representative, shall be posted by the Respond- ent immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60 con- secutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to members are customarily posted. Rea- sonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (c) Sign and mail sufficient copies of the notice to the Regional Director for Region 15 for posting by Cahn Electric Co., Inc., provided that it is willing. The notices are to be posted in all locations where notices to employ- ees are customarily posted. (d) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply. Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102 48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur- poses 26 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Nation- al Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board."