General Clothing Corp. (U.N.I. Corp.)

596 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD General Clothing Corporation (U.N.I. Corp.) and Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Internation- al Union Local 3-951. Case 10-CA-21906 31 August 1987 DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS JOHANSEN, BABSON, AND STEPHENS On 23 March 1987 Administrative Law Judge William N. Cates issued the attached decision. The Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief. The National Labor Relations Board has delegat- ed its authority in this proceeding to a three- member panel. The Board has considered the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and brief and has decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings,' and conclusions,2 to modify the remedy,3 and to adopt the recommended Order as modified.4 ORDER The National Labor Relations Board adopts the recommended Order of the administrative law judge as modified below and orders that the Re- spondent, General Clothing Corporation (U.N.I. Corp.), Erwin, Tennessee, its officers, agents, suc- cessors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Order as modified. Add the following as paragraph 1(c). "(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the ex- ercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act." i The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge's credibility find- ings The Board's established policy is not to overrule an administrative law judge's credibility resolutions unless the clear preponderance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd 188 F 2d 362 (3d Cir 1951) We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing the findings The Respondent also has requested oral argument The request is denied as the record, exceptions, and briefs adequately present the issues and the positions of the parties 2 In agreeing with the conclusions of the judge, we note that at the time of the Respondent's refusal to reinstate the employees, the Respond- ent relied solely on its assertion that no strike settlement agreement had been reached with the Petitioner on 17 July 1986 In so doing the Re- spondent, in effect, foreclosed a determination as to whether the Petition- er would abide by the terms of this agreement. 3 Interest will be computed in accordance with our decision in New Horizons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987) Interest on amounts accrued prior to I January 1987 (the effective date of the 1986 amend- ment to 26 U S C § 6621) shall be computed in accordance with Florida Steel Corp, 231 NLRB 651 (1977) 4 With respect to the make-whole order, we note that under the strike settlement agreement Kay Allen was required to take a "one week vaca- tion." We leave this matter to the compliance stage of this proceeding The judge inadvertently omitted the narrow injunctive language from his recommended Order Milton D. Jones, Esq., for the General Counsel. Judith Fain, Esq., of Erwin, Tennessee, and Jacob Oliner, Esq., of New York, New York, for the Company. Larry Abel, of Johnson City, Tennessee, for the Union. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE WILLIAM N. CATES, Administrative Law Judge. This proceeding was heard by me in Erwin, Tennessee, on 16 and 17 December 19861 and on 26 January 1987,2 on an unfair labor practice charge filed on 28 July by the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union Local 3-951 (Union). A complaint and notice of hearing issued on 31 October alleging that General Clothing Corporation (U.N.I. Corp.) (Company) violated Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act (Act). More specifically it is alleged the Company has since on or about 21 July in violation of Section 8(a)(5), (3), and (1) of the Act, repudiated a strike settlement agreement it reached with the Union on 17 July and that it has thereafter, failed, and refused to reinstate its em- ployees'3 who engaged in the strike on that date. It is fur- ther alleged that the Company in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act on or about 5 August and 4 September failed and refused to accept grievances filed by the Union pursuant to the parties collective-bargain- ing agreement.4 In its duly filed answer the Company denied that any unfair labor practices were committed. Following close of the trial, counsel for the General Counsel and counsel ' Unless stated otherwise all dates occurred in 1986 2 This proceeding was originally closed on 17 December Thereafter it was discovered the record was incomplete in that certain portions of Charles Oliner's (Oliver) testimony given on 16 December was not re- corded, transcribed, or included in the official transcript I reopened the record on 26 January 1987 for the limited purpose of allowing the parties to reexamine Ohner on matters not transcribed at the original hearing. 3 Those employees alleged to have engaged in the strike and subse- quently denied reinstatement are Kay Allen, Linda Shelton, JoAnn Lyons, Velma Nelson, Nancy Shelton, Shelby Artrip, Judy Hawkins, Tammy Lovette, Virginia Worley, Lanna Harris, James Morton, and Lisa Kegley. 4 The Company in its answer, at trial, and in its posttrial brief contends the complaint is not within the scope and purview of the allegations con- tained in the charge giving rise to the case sub judice The Company's contention is without merit A review of the 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) charge reflects it contains allegations that the Company, in order to discourage membership in a labor organizat'on, refused to honor an agreement it had with the Union to return to work certain named employees who had en- gaged in a strike The Company contends its actions did not discourage union membership I reject that contention It also contends the com- plaint contains allegations of wrongdoing that occurred subsequent to the filing of and outside the scope of the charge The complaint does contain two allegations that the Company, at dates subsequent to the filing of the charge, refused to accept grievances filed by the Union pursuant to the parties collective-bargaining agreement The grievances in question, how- ever, grew out of the Company's failure to return to work those employ- ees who had engaged in the strike at the Company. It is clear these com- plaint allegations are directly related to matters specifically raised in the charge and are not so completely outside the charge that it might be said the General Counsel initiated proceedings on its own Furthermore, the Board, with court approval, has long followed the principle that the con- tents of the charge do not limit the scope of the complaint, that the charge merely sets the Board's investigatory machinery in motion See, e.g, Cathey Lumber Co., 86 NLRB 157 (1949), enfd 185 F 2d 1021 (5th Cir 1951), vacated on other grounds 189 F 2d 428 (5th Cir 1951) 285 NLRB No. 79 GENERAL CLOTHING CORP. for the Company filed briefs, the contents of which have been carefully considered. On the entire record in this proceeding5 including my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor I make the following FINDINGS OF FACT 1. JURISDICTION The Company is a Tennessee corporation with an office and place of business located at Erwin, Tennessee, where it is engaged in the manufacture of clothing. The Company during the calendar year preceding issuance of the complaint herein, a representative period, sold and shipped from its Erwin, Tennessee facility finished prod- ucts valued in excess of $50,000 directly to customers lo- cated outside the State of Tennessee. The complaint al- leges, the Company at trial admitted, and I find, it is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. II. LABOR ORGANIZATION The complaint alleges, the Company admits,6 and I further find that the Union is, and at all times material has been, a labor organization within the meaning of Sec- tion 2(5) of the Act. III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The Material Facts Following a strike, the Company in early April recog- nized the Union as the collective-bargaining representa- tive for its full-time and regular part-time employees.7 On 17 April the parties entered into a collective-bar- gaining agreement that, by its terms, expires on 30 April 1988.8 The collective-bargaining agreement in pertinent part provides: Article 15 No strike or lock outs. There shall be no work stoppage, strikes or picket- ing and no lock-outs by the company. If this provi- sion is violated by an illegal strike, the employees 5 The Company urges that the instant matter be deferred under the Collyer Insulated Wire, doctrine (192 NLRB 837 (1971)) to the grievance and arbitration procedures of the parties collective-bargaining agreement Deferral is inappropriate because the Company has prevented a resolu- tion of the matter in that forum by rejecting on 5 August and 4 Septem- ber the Union's attempts to file grievances on the underlying dispute The 4 September rejection came at a time after the Regional Director for Region 10 of the Board had on 26 August initially deferred this matter to arbitration 6 The Company in its answer did not specifically admit, deny, or ex- plain any of the facts alleged in par 3 through 8 of the complaint Nor did it contend it was without knowledge to respond to those allegations, nor did it advance at trial any good cause for not doing so. Accordingly, I deem those complaint allegations to be admitted See the Board's Rules and Regulations, Sec 102 20 4 At material times, the Company employed approximately 24 such employees 6 The collective-bargaining agreement was signed by Company Owner Olmer, International Union Representative Larry Abel (Abel), Union Steward Sandra K Allen (Allen), and Union Steward Linda Shelton (Shelton) 597 participating in such strike shall be deemed to have quit their employment. At midmorning on Thursday, 17 July, approximately 12 employees concertedly ceased work and engaged in a strike at the Company. According to the credited testi- mony of Union Steward Allen, the employees went on strike over disputes with management on pay and work- ing conditions, and because Company Owner Oliner had stated he was not going to recognize the Union any longer. After the employees commenced to strike, Allen and Union Steward Shelton tried, at Oliner's request, to persuade them to return to work. The employees would not do so at that time. That afternoon Allen notified International Union Representative Abel of the strike.9 Abel told Allen the Union did not approve of or con- done the strike and that the striking employees should return to work. t ° Abel then telephoned the Company and was told by Company Vice President Williams that Oliner had left the plant and was en route to a local air- port for a flight to New York.' I Abel left negotiations at an unrelated company in Elizabethton, Tennessee, and went to the local airport to see if he could speak with Oliner about the situation at the Company.I2 Abel locat- ed Oliner at the airport. It is undisputed the two of them discussed the situation at the Company and what had brought about the strike. Abel told Oliner he thought he could persuade the striking employees to abandon their strike and return to work. Abel asserts he and Company Owner Oliner then arrived at a strike settlement agree- ment whereas Oliner insists they only discussed possible terms for such an agreement. Oliner contends he told Abel he would have to consult with his lawyer in New York and that he would make suggestions and recom- mendations to those in New York who make the deci- sions for the Company, but he could not agree to a set- tlement at that time. A resolution of what was said at the airport is neces- sary in order to determine what, if any, agreement was 9 Abel had been at the plant during the very early morning hours of 17 July to meet with Oliver, Allen, Shelton, and Vice President/Plant Man- ager Charlotte Williams (Williams) on a number of outstanding griev- ances. At that meeting Oliver told Abel he had heard rumors there might be a strike Abel told him the Union would not agree to or condone any strike activity, but added he had heard from the employees that Oliner had threatened to not abide by the parties collective- bargaining agree- ment. 1° On 18 July International Union President Joseph Misbrener sent the following mailgram to the Company: I I have been advised that members of Local 3-951 have, engaged in unauthorized work stoppage against General Clothing Corporation (UNI) at Erwin, Tennessee This action is detrimental to the best interest of the members in- volved, the Local Union and the International Union Members of the Local involved are hereby instructed to return to work as instructed without further interruption unless and until strike action is official [sic] authorized and permitted by myself as president of the International Union in accordance with proper procedures. The Officers of Local 3-951 are hereby authorized and instructed to exercise their full authority as officers and to take all steps neces- sary to enforce compliance herewith immediately , The record reflects Company Owner Oliner lives in New York 12 Two of the Union's negotiating committee members at the unrelated company, namely, Trula Ellis and Debora Lacaster, accompanied Abel to the local airport. 598 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD arrived at between Abel and Oliner. Abel was a forth- right and candid witness who impressed me as attempt- ing to testify truthfully and with good recollection Ac- cordingly, I credit his account of the airport meeting with Oliner. In contrast I am persuaded Oliner's testimo- ny was calculated to at least, mislead the court, or at worst, to conceal the whole truth. For example, on direct examination Company Owner Oliner testified he was simply a consultant for the Company. His local trial counsel even stated at the beginning of the trial before Oliner had testified that Oliner would state he was not "an officer nor a shareholder or whatever of the compa- ny," that he was "a consultant to the company" with au- thority to "sign" on behalf of the Company only when he had been specifically given authority to do so from New York. However, when Oliner was questioned by the court about the ownership of the Company he ac- knowledged owning 100 percent of the stock of the cor- poration that owns the Company herein In addition to the above facts, Oliner's testimony was confusing and at times so disjointed that it was difficult to follow or be- lieve. He gave expanded evasive dissertations even when asked the simplest of questions. I am persuaded Oliner's testimony cannot be regarded as trustworthy, accurate, or reliable. Abel testified Oliner, after some discussion about when Union Steward Allen and employee Tammy Lovette should be allowed to return to work, agreed that all of the striking employees could return to work on Monday, 21 July except Allen Oliner insisted Allen take a week off because he believed she started trouble at the plant. Oliner, however, agreed that rather than have Lovette, who had filed a grievance against the Company, take any time off he would permit her to return to work with a written warning Abel told Oliner he would recom- mend the settlement to the striking employees and do ev- erything in his power to have them back at work on Monday. Abel said he and Oliner sealed their strike set- tlement agreement with a handshake. i 3 Thereafter Abel contacted Union Steward Allen and arranged for a meeting with the striking employees for Sunday, 20 July.'' At the Sunday meeting, Abel ex- plained the terms of the settlement agreement. Allen agreed to having to take a week off from work, and Lo- vette agreed to being given a written warning Abel told the employees he did not want anything like this to happen in the future and he asked them to report for work on Monday morning 21 July. The employees agreed to return to work but asked Abel to accompany them the first day because the Company had obtained an injunction barring them from its premises. It is not disputed that Abel and 11 employees who had been on strike appeared at the Company, prior to work- time, ready to go to work on 21 July.' 5 Company Vice 13 During the weekend Olmer spoke separately via telephone with Abel, Allen, and Shelton I have considered but find it unnecessary in re- solving the issues herein to discuss those conversations 14 The employees ceased picketing on Friday, 18 July is According to Company Vice President Williams, the group was ac- companied by two local sheriffs deputies President Williams said it surprised her that the striking employees showed up for work. Williams told the group they could not return to work because she had just been on the telephone with Company Owner Oliner and he had told her they were not to return to work. Abel ex- plained to Williams that he and Oliner had an agreement to return the employees to work. Vice President Wil- liams then telephoned Oliner in New York, and Abel spoke with him. Abel reminded Oliner of their agree- ment and told him the employees had fulfilled all the Company's requirements regarding their being able to return to work. Abel asked Oliner why he had changed his mind. Abel credibly testified Company Owner Oliner told him he was a consultant to the Company, that he had been overruled, and he was not going to live by their agreement. That ended the conversation. Abel then had the employees who had showed up for work sign a letter indicating they were present for work. Company Vice President Williams acknowledged receiving a copy of the letter. It is undisputed that Abel and the employees returned to the plant the following morning before the start of the work shift ready for work. They were again told by Company Vice President Williams they could not go to work. Thereafter, on 28 July, Abel filed the charge giving rise to the instant case. Subsequent to his filing the in- stant charge, Abel was informed by the Board's Regional Office in Atlanta, Georgia, that the matter was going to be administratively deferred to the arbitration procedures of the parties collective-bargaining agreement. Thereafter Abel contacted Union Steward Allen and told her to get with Union Steward Shelton and file with the Company grievances concerning the fact the employees were not allowed to return to work. Abel then telephoned Compa- ny Vice President Williams and told her two individuals would be coming to the plant to file grievances and if there were any problems to telephone him. On 5 August Allen and Shelton went to the plant and attempted to file the grievances in question 16 Company Vice President Williams told the two they no longer worked for the Company and she was not going to take grievances from them. Allen told Williams they were there representing the Union. Company Owner Oliner then asked Allen and Shelton to leave the plant. The Regional Director for Region 10 of the Board, in a letter to the parties dated 26 August, advised them he was administratively deferring the instant case for arbi- tration However, he added he would revoke his decision to do so if the Company impeded a prompt resolution of the matter Abel was contacted by the Board's Regional Office in early September and informed the Company had said no grievances had been filed in the instant matter. Abel con- tacted Union Steward Shelton and instructed that she and Allen again attempt to file grievances with the Com- pany on the matter iS Allen and Shelton testified Allen had the grievances in her hand when they met with Company Vice President Williams Williams said she did not recall seeing any grievances, but added she would not have taken them if they had been offered to her GENERAL CLOTHING CORP. It is undisputed that Allen and Shelton went to the plant on 4 September and again attempted to file the grievances in question with Company Vice President Williams. Williams told them she could not accept any grievances. Allen asked why. Williams told her it was on advice of counsel. Allen and Shelton left the company premises unable to file the grievances in question. Discussion and Analysis The July strike was unauthorized by the Union and those who participated in it engaged in conduct forbid- den by the parties collective-bargaining agreement. Therefore, their concerted activity that otherwise would have been lawful and protected was,rendered unprotect- ed because they breached the no-strike provision of the parties collective bargaining agreement. Under the terms of the collective-bargaining agreement; and absent any subsequent agreement to the contrary, the employees that engaged in the strike were deemed to have quit their employment with the Company. However, the credited evidence establishes the Company (with two stipulations) agreed to return the striking employees to work and as such condoned the strike and forgave the employees' misconduct. Condonation takes place when an employer, as in the case sub judice, demonstrates a willingness to forgive the improper aspects of the concerted activity of its employees and agrees to wipe the slate clean. See, e.g., Packers Hide Assn. v. NLRB, 360 F.2d 59 (8th Cir. 1966), and Davis Coal Co., 261 NLRB 728 at 730 (1982). As was noted by the court in Jones & McKnight, Inc. v. NLRB, 445 F.2d 97 (7th Cir. 1971): The key element of condonation is a clearly evi- denced intention and commitment on the part of the employer to overlook the misconduct and to permit a continuation or resumption of the company-em- ployee relationship as though no misconduct had occurred. The principle of condonation is not repugnant to the Act, but rather advances the public' s interest in the prompt settlement of labor disputes. See NLRB v. Cast Optics Corp., 458 F.2d 398 at 405 (3d Cir. 1972). The condonation in the instant case was conditional. It was conditioned upon Allen and Lovette agreeing to certain adverse actions being taken against them by the Compa- ny. The doctrine of condonation may however be effec- tively invoked after conditions for condonation have been timely fulfilled. Jones & McKnight, Inc. v. NLRB, supra. The conditions the Company insisted on in the in- stant case were agreed to prior to the date and time for the employees to return to work. In summary it is clear the Company, by agreement with the Union, condoned the unprotected strike activi- ties of its employees and it violated Section 8(a)(5), (3), and (1) of the Act, when on 21 July it repudiated that agreement and thereafter refused to reinstate the employ- ees in question. i 7 17 I reject the Company's contention that the strike settlement agree ment, even if made, would have constituted an amendment or modifica- tion to the parties collective-bargaining agreement and as such would have had to have been in writing in order to have been effective. The 599 The final issue to be considered is whether the Compa- ny violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act, when on 5 August and 4 September it admittedly refused to accept the grievances the two union stewards attempted to file regarding the Company's refusal to reinstate its employ- ees who had participated in the July strike at the Compa- ny. The Company's rejection of the grievances in question may have been consistent' with its contention that no strike settlement was ever arrived at nevertheless its ac- tions violated the Act. The Board in Storall Mfg. Co., 275 NLRB 220 at 221 (1985), held: It is well settled that grievances relating to terms and conditions of employment, including discipli- nary actions taken against employees, are proper subjects of collective bargaining. An employer's ob- ligation under the Act with respect to individual grievances presented by the collective-bargaining representative of its employees is no different from its obligation with respect to contract negotiations. That is, an employer is obligated to discuss and process such grievances with the union in a sincere effort to reach resolution. I recognize that the situation in Storall involved a com- pany's refusal to accept and process grievances until such time as the parties therein had arrived at a collec- tive-bargaining agreement with grievance and arbitration machinery in it. However, the principles in Storall are applicable to the instant case. In the case sub judice, the Union attempted to file the grievances in question in order to set the parties grievance arbitration machinery in motion. The Board had administratively deferred processing the instant case so the parties could resolve their differences pursuant to their collective-bargaining agreement. For the Company to reject the Union's griev- ances on the very subject matter that the Board had ad- ministratively deferred processing this case on clearly re- flects the Company had, no intention of dealing with the Union in good faith or of having the underlying dispute proceed to arbitration. Considering all the above, it' is clear, and I find, the Company violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act when on or about 5 August and 4 September it refused to accept and process the Union's grievances. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. General Clothing Corporation (U.N.I. Corp.) is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. 2. Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union Local 3-951 is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. All full-time and regular part-time hourly paid em- ployees, employed by the Company at its Erwin, Ten- nessee facility, excluding guards, and supervisors as de- fined in the Act constitutes an appropriate unit for the agreement simply was not an amendment or modification to the collec- tive-bargaining agreement 600 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD purpose of collective-bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. 4. Since about 1 April 1986 the Union has been, and is now, the exclusive bargaining representative of all em- ployees in the aforesaid unit for the purpose of collec- tive-bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. 5 Since about 17 April the Company and Union have been parties to a collective-bargaining agreement, which by its terms expires on 30 April 1988. 6. About 17 July and until about 18 July 1986 the fol- lowing named employees of the Company concertedly ceased work and engaged in a strike: Kay Allen Judy Hawkins Linda Shelton Tammy Lovette JoAnn Lyons Virginia Worley Velma Nelson Lanna Harris Nancy Shelton James Morton Shelby Artrip Lisa Kegley 7. About 17 July 1986 the Company and Union arrived at a strike settlement agreement that provided for the aforesaid employees to be returned to work. 8. The Company violated Section 8(a)(5), (3), and (1) of the Act when on 21 July 1986 it repudiated the afore- said strike settlement agreement and thereafter failed and refused to reinstate the aforesaid employees. 9. The Company violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act when about 5 August and 4 September 1986 it failed and refused to accept and process grievances filed by the Union pursuant to the aforesaid collective-bargaining agreement. 10. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sec- tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act. THE REMEDY Having found that the Company has engaged in cer- tain unfair labor practices, I find it necessary to order it to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain affirma- tive action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Having found the Company entered into and then un- lawfully repudiated a strike settlement agreement with the Union that called for the return to work of the em- ployees that had engaged in the strike, I shall recom- mend that it be ordered to offer Kay Allen, Linda Shel- ton, JoAnn Lyons, Velma Nelson, Nancy Shelton, Shelby Artrip, Judy Hawkins, Tammy Lovette, Virginia Worley, Lanna Harris, James Morton, and Lisa Kegley immediate reinstatement to their former positions, or sub- stantially equivalent positions of employment, without prejudice to their seniority or other rights, and make them whole for any loss of pay they may have suffered by reason of the discrimination against them with inter- est. Backpay shall be computed in accordance with F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950), interest shall be computed as prescribed in Florida Steel Corp., 231 NLRB 651 (1977). See generally Isis Plumbing Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962). Further, it is recommended the Com- pany be ordered to remove from its files any reference to its 21 July refusal to reinstate the above-named employ- ees and notify them in writing that this had been done and that evidence of its failure to reinstate them will not be used as a basis for any future personnel actions against them See Sterling Sugars, 261 NLRB 472 (1982). It also having been found that the Company failed and refused to accept and process grievances filed by the Union pur- suant to the parties collective-bargaining agreement, I shall Order that it accept, discuss, and process employee grievances with the Union on request. Finally, it is rec- ommended the Company be ordered to post a notice for 60 consecutive days in order that employees may be ap- prised of their rights under the Act, and the Company's obligation to remedy its unfair labor practices.18 On these findings of fact, conclusions of law, and on the entire record, I issue the following recommended" ORDER The Respondent, General Clothing Corporation (U.N.I. Corp.), Erwin, Tennessee, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall 1 Cease and desist from (a) Repudiating its strike settlement agreement with the Union and from failing and refusing to reinstate its employees Kay Allen, Linda Shelton, JoAnn Lyons, Velma Nelson, Nancy Shelton, Shelby Artrip, Judy Hawkins, Tammy Lovette, Virginia Worley, Lanna Harris, James Morton, and Lisa Kegley who participated in a strike at the Company in July 1986. (b) Failing and refusing to accept, discuss, and process employee grievances with the Union. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act. (a) Offer Kay Allen, Linda Shelton, JoAnn Lyons, Velma Nelson, Nancy Shelton, Shelby Artrip, Judy Hawkins, Tammy Lovette, Virginia Worley, Lanna Harris, James Morton, and Lisa Kegley immediate and full reinstatement to their former jobs and if their former jobs no longer exist, to substantially equivalent positions of employment without prejudice to their seniority and other rights and privileges and make them whole for any loss of earnings they may have suffered by reason of the discrimination against them in the manner set forth in the remedy section of this decision. (b) Remove from its files any reference to its failure to reinstate its employees named in subparagraph (a), above, and notify them in writing that this has been done and that evidence of its unlawful failure to reinstate them will not be used as a basis for any future personnel ac- tions against them. (c) Accept, discuss, and process employee grievances with the Union on request. 11 The General Counsel has requested that my recommended remedy include a visitatorial clause authorizing the Board to engage in discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure so that it may be able to monitor compliance with the Board's Order I am not persuaded such a remedy is necessary in the instant case Accordingly, I deny the General Counsel's request 19 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the Board's Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec 102 48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur- poses GENERAL CLOTHING CORP. (d) Preserve and, on request, make available to the Board or its agents for examination and copying , all pay- roll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records, and reports, and all other records nec- essary to analyze the amounts of backpay due under the terms of this Order. (e) Post at its Erwin, Tennessee facility copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix. 1120 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 10, of the Board, after being signed by the Com- pany's authorized representative, shall be posted by the Company immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Company to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (f) Notify the Regional ` Director in writing within 20 days from the date of this Order what steps the Compa- ny has taken to comply. 20 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Nation- al Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the National Labor Relations Act and has or- dered us to post and abide by this notice. WE WILL NOT repudiate the strike settlement agree- ment we arrived at on 17 July 1986 with the Oil, Chemi- 601 cal and Atomic Workers International Union Local 3- 951, and WE WILL NOT refuse to reinstate our employees who participated in July 1986 strike at our plant. WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain in good faith with the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union Local 3-951 as the collective-bargaining representative of our employees in the following described unit, by fail- ing and refusing to accept, discuss, and process employee grievances filed by the Union: All full-time and regular part-time hourly paid em- ployees, employed by us at our Erwin, Tennesse fa- cility, excluding guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. WE WILL accept, discuss, and process employee griev- ances with the Union on its request. WE WILL offer immediate and full reinstatement to Kay Allen, Linda Shelton, JoAnn Lyons, Velma Nelson, Nancy Shelton, Shelby Artrip, Judy Hawkins, Tammy Lovette, Virginia Worley, Lanna Harris, James Morton, and Lisa Kegley, to their former jobs or, if those jobs no longer exist, to substantially equivalent positions of em- ployment without prejudice to their seniority or other rights or privileges previously enjoyed and WE WILL make them whole for any loss of earnings and other ben- efits resulting from our failure to reinstate them less any net interim earnings, plus interest. WE WILL notify each of them that we have removed from our files any reference'to our failure to reinstate them and that our failure to reinstate them will not be used against them in any way. GENERAL CLOTHING CORPORATION (U.N.I. CORP.)