Princeton Health Care Center

1016 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Princeton Memorial Hospital d/b/a Princeton Health Care Center and District 1199, WV/KY/OH National Union of Hospital and Health Care Employees, AFL-CIO and Lor- raine R. Agee. Cases 9-CA-21252-1, -2, -4, 9- CA-21516-1, -2, 9-RC-14396, and 9-CA- 21495 23 September 1987 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN DOTSON AND MEMBERS JOHANSEN AND BABSON On 30 June 1986 Administrative Law Judge Karl H. Buschmann issued '.the attached decision, The Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief. The General Counsel filed cross-exceptions and- a supporting brief. The National Labor Relations Board has delegat- ed its authority in this proceeding to a three- member panel. The Board has considered the decision and the record in light of the exceptions' and briefs and has decided'to affirm the judge's rulings, findings,2 ' The General Counsel excepts to the judge's failure to find certain ad- ditional unfair labor practices. We conclude that it is unnecessary to pass on these exceptions because the remedy for the alleged violations would be cumulative to the remedy ordered for the violations found by the judge 2 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge's credibility find- ings The Board's established policy is not to overrule an administrative law judge's credibility resolutions unless the clear preponderance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd 188 F 2d 362 (3d Cir 1951) We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing the findings 3 We agree with the judge's conclusion that Princeton Health Care Center is not itself a political subdivision exempt from jurisdiction under the Act See NLRB v Natural Gas Utility District, 402 U.S 600 (1971). The judge also concluded that the nursing home is not exempt from Board jurisdiction as a "joint employer" with Princeton Community Hos- pital (PCH) by virtue of the relationship between PCH and Princeton Memorial Hospital Co (PMH), the owner of the home The judge cited National Transportation Service, 240 NLRB 565 (1967), in support of this conclusion Our recent decisions in Res-Care, Inc, 280 NLRB 670 (1986), and Long Stretch Youth Home, 280 NLRB 670 (1986), issued after the judge's deci- sion , clarified the principles under which the Board may decline to assert' jurisdiction over an employer because of its relationship to an entity statutorily exempt from Board jurisdiction The Board will decline juris- diction if the employer does not retain sufficient control over terms and conditions of employment to make collective bargaining meaningful In making this determination, the Board looks at the degree of control over the employer's labor relations exercised by the exempt entity, as well as the control retained by the employer See Long Stretch, supra Assuming arguendo that PCH is an exempt political subdivision, we adopt as con- sistent with Res-Care and Long Stretch the judge's conclusion that the re- lationship between the nursing home and PCH does not support declining jurisdiction over the home First, there is scant evidence that PCH exercises any control over the nursing home We agree with the judge that the addition by the PMH board of directors of a requirement to its own bylaws that board mem- bers be approved and subject to removal by PCH is not persuasive evi- dence that PCH in fact exercises control See Southwest Texas Public Broadcasting Council, 227 NLRB 1560 (1976) Second, it is clear from the record that the day-to-day labor relations of the nursing home are deter- mined by the management company that contracted with PMH to run it and conclusions,3 to modify his remedy,4' and to adopt the recommended Order. ORDER The National Labor Relations. Board adopts the recommended Order of the administrative law judge and orders that the Respondent, Princeton Memorial Hospital, d/b/a Princeton Health Care Center, Princeton, West Virginia, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Order. CHAIRMAN DOTSON, dissenting. I would remand this proceeding for further con- sideration of whether the Board has jurisdiction over the Respondent. See Res-Care, Inc., 280 NLRB 670 (1986), and Long Stretch Youth Home, 280 NLRB 678 (1986). PMH retains only overarching authority to approve the overall budget and general changes in employee policies or benefits. This overarching authority would not constitute control over labor relations sufficient to preclude jurisdiction even if PCH were in the shoes of PMH. See Long Stretch, supra Accordingly, we conclude that Board jurisdiction over the nursing home is appropriate 4 In accordance with our decision in New Horizons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987), interest on and after 1 January 1987 shall be computed at the "short-term Federal rate" for the underpayment of taxes as set out in the 1986 amendment to 26 U.S C § 6621 Interest on amounts accrued prior to 1 January 1987 (the effective date of the 1986 amendment to 26 US C § 6621) shall be computed in accordance with Florida Steel Corp, 231 NLRB 651 (1977) Andrew L. Lang and Anthony Sheehan, Esqs., for the General Counsel. Fred F. Holroyd, Esq., of Charleston, West Virginia, for the Respondent. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE KARL H. BUSCHMANN, Administrative Law Judge. These cases were tried in Princeton, West Virginia, 17- 19 September 1985. Charges were filed by District 1199 WV/KY/OH National Union of Hospital and Health Care Employees AFL-CIO (the Union) in Cases 9-CA- 21252-1, -2, -4 and 9-CA-21516-1, -2 on 13, 21, 24 Sep- tember, 26 October, and 23 November 1984, and by Loi- raine R. Agee, an individual, in Case 9-CA-21495 on 16 November 1984, that Princeton Memorial Hospital, d/b/a Princeton Health Care Center had violated the National Labor Relations Act. The consolidated com- plaint issued 7 January 1985 and a second amended con- solidated complaint issued on 25 January 1985. On 17 July 1985 the cases were further consolidated with Case 9-RC-14396 to resolve the issue raised by Re- spondent's motion to dismiss on the ground that it is not an `employer within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act. The primary issues raised by the consolidated com- plaints are whether the Respondent is an employer as de- fined in Section 2(2) of the Act, and whether the Re- 285 NLRB No. 130 PRINCETON HEALTH CARE CENTER spondent; (a) violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by nu- merous acts of interference and coercion and (b) violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the-Act by various acts of un- lawful discrimination against its employees, Francis O'Dell, Brenda Shrader, Kathy Fortner, Sandy Aurric- chio, and Willa Wagner Whetsel. On the entire record, including by observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and after consideration of the briefs filed by the General Counsel and the Company, I make the following FINDINGS OF FACT 1. JURISDICTION The Company, Princeton Memorial Hospital d/b/a Princeton Health Care Center, is a West Virginia corpo- ration located in Princeton, West Virginia, where it is engaged as a health care institution in the operation of a nursing home providing medical and professional care services. Respondent admitted that in the course and conduct of its business it purchased and received prod- ucts, goods, and materials in excess of $10,000 directly from outside the State, and that in the course and con- duct of its business, it derived gross revenues in excess of $100,000. Although the Respondent has admitted the commerce allegations of the complaint, it has specifically denied that it is an employer within the meaning of Sec- tion 2(2) of the Act, and moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. At the trial and in its brief the Respondent has taken the position that it is a political subdivision of the State of West Virginia. Section 2(2) of the Act specifically excludes from the definition of employer "the United States or any wholly owned government corporation, or any Federal Reserve Bank, or any State or political subdivision thereof . .. . "Determining whether an organization is an exempt `political subdivision' or a non exempt independent pri- vate entity can be a thorny issue." Morris, The Develop- ing Labor Law, p. 1447. It is an exempt political subdivi- sion if it (1) was created directly by the state, so as to constitute a department or administrative arm of the gov- ernment, or (2) is administered by individuals responsible to public officials or the general electorate. NLRB v. Natural Gas Utility, 402 U.S. 600 (1971). The Respondent submits that Princeton Memorial Hospital Co., d/b/a Princeton Health Care Center, is a corporation totally owned and controlled by Princeton Community Hospital, whose board of directors "is se- lected by the community members with the approval and right to reject by the City Council of the City of Prince- ton" (R. Br. 2). Respondent's argument is' that the rela- tionship between the Respondent, operating as a nursing home, and the Princeton Community Hospital requires the Board to decline jurisdiction, and even if the Re- spondent is considered a separate entity from the Prince- ton Community Hospital, it should still be exempt as a joint employer with a political subdivision. The General Counsel's position is that any connection between the city of Princeton and the Respondent is too remote to be of any practical significance and that there is no factual or legal basis for the Board to decline juris- diction. 1017 The record shows that Princeton Health Care Center (Nursing Home or PHCC) is a nursing home owned by Princeton Memorial Hospital Co. (PMH). These two en- tities are the Respondent. PMH had been an inactive corporation without employees for several years, after it ceased operating as a hospital in 1970. Since then, its sole function has been to assist the Princeton Community Hospital in physician recruitment or other minor support activity. Princeton Community Hospital (PCH) com- menced its operation about the time PMH discontinued to function as a hospital. In addition to the interrelation- ship between these three entities and their connection with the city of Princeton, a fourth operation is in- volved. Health Care and Retirement Corporation of America (HCR), an independent contractor, has man- aged and conducted the day-to-day operations of the Nursing Home (PHCC). The scenario that the Community Hospital (PCH) is owned and , controlled by the city of Princeton and that the Nursing Home (PMH d/b/a PHCC) is owned and controlled by PCH is not supported by the record, al- though some degree of relationship existed between these entities. Initially, that is prior to the first union election on March 27, 1984, the Board's jurisdiction over the Re- spondent was admitted. Indeed, by "Stipulation for Cer- tification Upon Consent Election" an election was con- ducted on January 27, 1984. The parties entered into a settlement agreement on 13 June 1984 concerning Re- spondent's objections to conduct affecting the election and the alleged unfair labor practices. A-second election was conducted on 21 August 1984. The Respondent filed objections to conduct affecting the election and a hearing officer filed a report on 7 November 19,84. During these proceedings, the Respondent submitted'to and used the Board's jurisdiction. Respondent raised the' jurisdictional issue for the first time in its exceptions to the hearing of- ficer's report. Respondent's claim of lack of jurisdiction is based on certain recent changes made'by,the Respond- ent in the bylaws of both, the Princeton Memorial Hos- pital and the Princeton Community Hospital. The Princeton Community Hospital was incorporated in 1966 as a nonprofit corporation to provide health care. According to its original certificate of incorporation, the management of the institution was vested in a board of nine directors, three of which consisted of the mayor of Princeton, the chief officer of the medical staff, and the president of the Chamber of Commerce. The only limita- tions for the six remaining members were that they had staggered terms. (R. Exh. 22). The bylaws of the Prince- ton Community Hospital, as revised on September 28, 1982, provide for a board consisting of not less than 18 nor more than 23 directors, of whom the chief executive officer of the hospital, the mayor of Princeton, and the president of the county chamber of commerce were "ex-' officio Directors with votes" (G.C. F,xh. 3). At that time, the Community Hospital's sole connection with the city of Princeton was the provision requiring the mayor of Princeton to be one of the board members. On 27 March 1984 the bylaws were changed by adding section 3.3, which, in substance, requires that the names of the directors, on election, be filed with the 1018 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Princeton municipal council for its ratification. If a direc- tor failed to be ratified, the remaining directors must choose a replacement. The provision further authorizes the municipal council to remove a director for gross in- efficiency, immoral conduct, or other malfeasance (R. Exh. 7). PCH is also required to file periodic reports with the municipal council. Respondent relies on this bylaw for the argument that the community hospital is a political subdivision and at- tempts to buttress its position by a letter dated July 25, 1984, from the chief of the individual income tax branch of the Internal Revenue Service. Responding to the re- quest of the Hospital's administrator, William Sheppard, that PCH is "an instrumentality of the City" (R. Exh. 3), the branch chief expressed his agreement with that con- clusion on the basis of the bylaw providing for the ratifi- cation of the elected board of directors by the municipal council, its power to remove a director for cause and the requirement that the Hospital's administration submit periodic reports to the council. However, the record does not show whether the changes in the bylaws were actually consummated between PCH and the city or even adopted by it. The new provision may be no more than a unilateral paper change. PCH's administrator and secretary of its board of di- rectors is William Sheppard. He also serves as corporate officer and secretary of PMH, Princeton Memorial Hos- pital. PMH which prior to 1970'operated as a hospital in Princeton and which after PCH was established, became essentially a dormant entity until it commenced the oper- ation of the Nursing Home, had no relationship with the city of Princeton prior to 1984. The testimony of Shep- pard established that PCH established the Nursing Home under PMH intentionally and advisedly as a separate entity from the Community Hospital (PCH) even though the certificate of need was issued by the State to PCH. Sheppard explained that the State had issued the certifi- cate of need to PCH to operate a nursing home. Howev- er, he was advised "to separate it from the hospital in any way that [he] could, for the simple reason of audit- ing conflicts between the Department of Welfare and the Department of Health" (Tr. 27). This facilitated a more favorable financial situation for the elderly under the De- partment,of Welfare, as opposed to the Medicare or Blue Cross responsibility to PCH. The record therefore shows that the Mercer County building commission sponsored the issuance of bonds for the building of the Nursing Home (R. Exh. 1). Sheppard's testimony indicates that PMH proposed the bonds and sold them to eight banks in the county. The Nursing Home initially operated under the certificate of need that the state had issued to the Community Hospital (PCH). In 1982 a petition for the transfer of the certificate of need from PCH to PMH became necessary to bring the Nursing Home into com- pliance with state law. At that point, PCH and the Nurs- ing Home had no formal ties and there was no indication of any connection between the municipality and the Nursing Home. However, William L. Sheppard contin- ued as the administrator and secretary of the board of PCH and the chief operating officer and secretary of PMH. On 1 February, 1985, the bylaws of PMH were amended to provide that its board of directors of not less than five and not more than nine "be selected from the Board of Directors of Princeton Community Hospital" (R. Exh. 6). Three directors had to include the chief ex- ecutive officers of the Nursing Home, the chief executive of the Hospital, and the legal counsel for the Hospital. Moreover, Respondent's directors had to be approved by PCH's board and were subject to removal by them. On the basis of this amendment, requiring Respondent's board to be selected from the Community Hospital's board and empowering it to approve and remove PMH's directors, Respondent sought to establish a connection with the city of Princeton, although Sheppard was not sure whether the change in the bylaws were made for social security reasons or not. The General Counsel argues "that a more plausible explanation is that Re- spondent was simply carrying out its plan to evade the Labor Board's jurisdiction." PMH's Board is not regularly involved in the day-to- day operation of the Nursing Home. Pursuant to a man- agement agreement between PMH and Health Care and Retirement Corporation of America (HCR), the Nursing Home is administered by HCR, an agent to PMH. Shep- pard signed the agreement on behalf of the Respondent (I'MH). According to the agreement, HCR is required to furnish a licensed nursing home administrator who must employ qualified competent personnel on behalf of the owner. Sheppard testified that HCR became the manager of the Nursing Home not only because of its technical expertise but also to keep it separate from PCH, the Hos- pital. Personnel matters are generally handled by HCR. PMH is generally involved in such matters when negoti- ating the management contract and hearing final appeals of employee grievances. For example, PMH negotiates personnel policies and general pay increases. In addition, Sheppard played an advisory role in the selection of Pat- rick Smith as the administrator of the Nursing Home. Smith who was in the employ of HCR at another loca- tion was put in charge of the Princeton facility by Brian Allen, regional manager of HCR. However, Sheppard and his assistant, Tom Benoit, had interviewed and rec- ommended Smith and advised Allen when he made that decision. In sum, PMH is a corporation which is controlled by five directors who are private individuals. PMH has em- ployed HCR to manage the Nursing Home in the day-to- day affairs. PMH maintains a supervisory posture mainly through William Sheppard, the chief executive at PMH. The sole connection between the Nursing Home and the city of Princeton is the current requirement that PMH's five member board be selected from and approved by the Board of PCH whose directors may be subject to ratifi- cation and removal by the municipal council and whose membership must include the mayor of Princeton. How- ever, PMH's Board consists of five' private citizens who are not answerable to the city in their capacity as'PMH directors. William Sheppard has assumed the most prominent, role both in the administration of PCH and PMH or the Nursing Homer However, Sheppard is not an official of the city and is answerable to the city only PRINCETON HEALTH CARE CENTER in his capacity as one of the directors of PCH. On bal- ance, it appears that there is no formal connection be- tween the municipality of Princeton and PMH or the Nursing Home, and that the indirect connections, namely, the interrelationship of the two boards, the ac- tivities of William Sheppard and his assistant Tom Ben- noit, as well as the obvious similarity in the functions of a hospital and a nursing home are insufficient to charac- terize the Respondent as a political subdivision of Prince- ton. Cape Girardeau Care Center, 278 NLRB 1018 (1986). It also cannot be said that the Respondent was created by the city, since the bylaws of PCH had not been amended at the time the Nursing Home was established, moreover, the county, not the city, sponsored the bond- ing. Nor was the board of directors of PMH appointed by or responsible to the city of Princeton. Truman Medi- cal Center, 641 F.2d 570 (8th Cir. 1981), enfd. 239 NLRB 1067 (1978); see also Northern Community Mental Health Center, 241 NLRB 323 (1979). The connection between PCH whose exemption from the Act is doubtful and PMH is not sufficient to be regarded as joint employers. National Transportation Service, 240 NLRB 565 (1979). HCR, which actually is involved in the day-to-day per- sonnel management, has obviously no relationship to the city of Princeton. The parties cannot have it both ways, on the one hand, intentionally and advisedly separate PMH from PCH to take advantage of certain Federal and state laws, and on the other, argue that the two enti- ties are one and the same in order to evade the Federal jurisdiction of the Board. I therefore conclude that the Respondent is not' exempt under Section 2(2) of the Act.1 II. INDEPENDENT 8 (A) (1) VIOLATIONS Joseph Szaller. The Complaint alleges that in August 1984 Joseph Szaller, supervisor for housekeeping and laundry, violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act when he re- quested that an employee cease wearing a union button, threatened two employees that they were not to mention the Union, and announced to an employee that two em- ployees had been fired because of their union activities. The record contains the testimony of employees Brenda Shrader, Freda Harry, and Kathy Fortner. Szaller was not called as a witness. Accordingly, the testimony of the three employees is uncontroverted. Shrader testified that I week before the election on 21 August 1984, Szaller approached her in the laundry room stating that the Company had given them what they needed, that the employees did not need a union and to vote"no." He also asked her to take off her union button. Shrader re- plied, "no" and said that she had voted in favor of the Union in the first election and would do so again in the second election. On 22 August, 1 day after the election, Szaller came into the laundry room and told her that if she said the word, "union," she was fired. Freda Harry, another employee, similarly testified about Szaller's conduct on 22 August. Harry related that she was singing a union song while walking the hallway to the laundry room, when Szaller appeared and told her ' This finding is also dispositive of Respondent' s motion in the repre- sentation case (9-RC-14396) 1019 that she was verbally abusing patients or employees, and that she could be dismissed for doing that. Szaller fol- lowed her to the lounge and said (Tr. 217): "I want you to listen. You could be dismissed, if you, or Brenda Shrader, or any of [you] mentioned union in the laundry room on his time, that [you] could and would be dis- missed." On 3 September a conversation ensued in the dining room between employee Kathy Fortner and Joe Szaller. Joan Collins, another employee, was also present. Szaller stated: "Well, she did it to me . . . . Connie fired Brenda and Frances . . . . I tried to warn them . . . . The last inservice I had, I really got mean with them, and I tried to warn them that she was going to ford a reason to fire them." (Tr. 223.) Szaller's reference to discharges related to the terminations from employment of two employees by Connie Tolley, director of nursing. According to the General Counsel, Szaller's conduct amounted to "attempted intimidation, threats to dis- charge employees on mention of the Union, as well as announcing that Respondent has fulfilled a prior determi- nation to discharge union adherents," in violation of Sec- tion 8(a)(1) of the Act. I agree that the Respondent's conduct of threats to discharge about the time of the union election violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, espe- cially because Szaller, an admitted supervisor, made these remarks to the employees at their work station in a manner that demanded their attention. The Nursing Home's rules did not regulate similar conversations or expressions by employees. A threatened loss of employ- ment because of an employee's mention of the word "union" is clearly coercive and intimidating. Further- more, Szaller's prohibition against the wearing of union buttons by employees, absent special circumstances, also violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. The Court in Repub- lic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945), has upheld the right of employees, to wear union buttons at work, unless special circumstances , such as safety or ad- verse effect on patients in a health care institution, can be shown. Such special circumstances were not shown to exist here. Szaller's final comments did not convey any indication that the employees were fired for their union activity. I therefore disagree with the General Counsel with any further fording of violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Supervisor Connie Tolley. The complaint alleges -that Connie Tolley, director of nursing, had unlawfully inter- rogated and threatened employees because of their union activities, warned them against association with union sympathizers, requested an employee to interrogate others, ordered another employee to write a letter to the Board to protest the union election, promised benefits to employees if they rejected the Union, and directed that assistance be withheld from certain employees because of the Union. In this regard, the record contains the testimony of employees Lorraine Agee, Drema Keaton, Joan Collins, Willa Whetsel, and Sandy Aurricchio. Agee, who was employed as a- receptionist at the Princeton Health Care Center, testified that during the union election just prior to 21 August 1984, Tolley became acting administrator 1020 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD of the Nursing Home because the current administrator had left. Tolley had a conversation about 2 weeks prior to the election with Agee in her office. Tolley asked Agee whether any of the employees had approached her about the Union. Agee denied such conversations and stated that most employees knew that she could not vote and wanted nothing to do with the Union. Tolley re- quested, her to talk to some of the employees who were wearing union buttons to find out whether they wore the buttons to indicate their support of the Union or because they were afraid of being harassed if they did not. Agee responded that-she did not want to get involved, but Tolley reminded her that she was the boss and the acting administrator. About a week later, Tolley interrupted a conversation between Agee and fellow employee Barbara Cochran in the office. Stating that she had overheard the word "union," she inquired what they were talking about. When Agee responded evasively, Tolley remarked that it did not look good for Agee to associate with union em- ployees, and that she should not be influenced by them. During the election on 21 August, Tolley expressly urged Agee to vote in the election, because, in Tolley's opinion, Agee's vote would not be challenged. Agee-re- fused, reminding Tolley that the previous administrator had told her that she could not vote or have anything ,to do,with the election. On the day after the election, Tolley called Agee into her office and told her and fellow employee Sandra Woods to write letters to the Board requesting an inves- tigation regarding why they were not allowed to vote in the election. Agee and Woods complied. Agee drafted a one-page letter addressed to the Board in which she expressed her sentiment against-the Union and the opinion that she was denied the opportunity to vote for discriminatory reasons (G.C. Exh. ^ 18). Agee handed the letter to Tolley who then insinuated that she, like Bonita Belcher, a former business manager, who re- fused to have anything to do with management and the Union, might end up without a job. Drema Keaton was a nursing technician at the Nursing Home. About 2 weeks prior to the union election, Tolley called her into the office and explained that her review of the personnel files disclosed fluctuations in Keaton's pay. Tolley suggested that Keaton address a meeting of the PMH -board, file a grievance about, it, and get her regular payscale back. Tolley, offering her assistance in filing the grievance, asked her about her union senti- ments and told her that she should give the board of di- rectors of PMH a chance to make improvements., If things did not improve, Tolley continued, she would per- sonally assist her in getting the Union into the facility.2 Joan Collins, who was a housekeeping employee, testi- fied that she overheard a conversation between Joseph Szaller and Connie Tolley on 3 September. Collins told Szaller that employee Brenda Shrader, a laundry union employee, was no longer employed and that Szaller 2 With the exception of this last comment, Tolley did not deny in her testimony any of the above conversations Tolley's testimony was evasive at times and occasionally not responsive I have therefore not credited her denial of the last statement should not help the other employees in the laundry room with their work because she wanted to teach them a lesson. Collins' testimony, however, did not specifically disclose whether Tolley's conversation with Szaller was about the union or whether the lessons she wanted the employees to learn were union related. Sandra Aurric- chio, also a laundry room employee, testified that follow- ing Shrader's discharge from her job, Aurricchio asked Tolley to get some help in the laundry area. Tolley, however, slammed her fist on the desk and' said, "Do the best you can." Willa Whetsel, a nursing technician prior to her dis- charge, testified that she had heard Tolley on numerous occasions make such remarks as "anyone who voted for the Union would be sorry later-" Because Whetsel was an open union supporter who regularly wore a union badge, she felt that Tolley's comments were directed at her. The record, as summarized above, supports the allega- tions in the complaint to the extent that the Respondent, through Tolley, an admitted supervisor, violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act in several respects. Tolley threatened employees with loss of employment or other adverse consequences because they voted for the Union or merely if they failed to oppose the Union. She repeatedly interrogated employees in a coercive atmosphere and en- couraged an employee to interrogate fellow employees about the extent of their union support. She solicited an employee to file a grievance accompanied by an implied assurance that it would be, successful and warned them against associating with union sympathizers, as well as ordering employees to protest a union election. Alleged Discriminatory Conduct Brenda Shrader and Frances O'Dell. According to the complaint, both employees were discharged and subse- quently reinstated with 30-day suspensions, because of their union support. The record shows, in substance, that both employees were discharged on 3 September 1984, ostensibly for violating company policy prohibiting an employee to clock in another employee. Brenda Shrader had in fact clocked in fellow employees Frances O'Dell and Eula Dye who had to move their cars in the parking lot to make room for a picnic. Because both employees were prominent union supporters, and because the prac- tice of an employee clocking in another was widespread, the record is overwhelming that Respondent's- reasons for the discharges were pretextual. Respondent subse- quently converted the discharges into 6-week suspen- sions' Principal witnesses were Shrader and O'Dell, who had been employed for more than 2 years, Shrader in the laundry room and O'Dell in housekeeping. Their super- visor was Joseph Szaller. On the morning of 3 Septem- ber, as the employees arrived for work and were in line to punch their timecards about 7 a.m., they were told that a picnic would be held in the parking lot that day. Employees O'Dell and Dye decided\ to move their cars and asked Shrader to punch their timecards on their behalf. As the employees returned, they reentered the fa- cility with Diana Mills, assistant nursing director, who PRINCETON HEALTH CARE CENTER _ 1021 overheard O'Dell saying, "I hope Brenda has clocked us in, we're going to be late." Mills reported the comment to Tolley who in turn re- ported it to Brian Allen, HCR's regional manager. Tolley conducted an investigation that included written statements from employees O'Dell, Mills, and Shrader and in which the employees had admitted the_ incident (R. Exhs. 13 and 14). Tolley, referring to the personnel policy handbook, told the employees that the practice violated company policy; she reprimanded them and in- formed O'Dell and Shrader to leave the facility at once. Allen, in consultation with Tolley, decided to fire the employees and so informed them by letter, dated 9 Sep- tember 1984. Tolley's testimony, albeit evasive, indicates that she had recommended to Allen to follow company policy and to discharge the employees. Following their discharge, O'Dell and Shrader con- tacted and met with Ed Muse, a PMH board member, and related the incident to him. His reaction was, "I felt like the woman's made a liar out of me" because he had earlier assured the employees that no one would be fired for their union activities. After the employees filed griev- ances, the terminations were reduced to suspensions for 6 weeks without pay. The record is clear that the employees had not intend- ed to circumvent the Company's policy for fraudulent purposes. They had arrived well in advance of their starting time. Because of the picnic that day, they had momentarily returned to the parking lot to move their cars and had openly asked another employee to clock them in. Moreover, the record contains numerous inci- dents of one employee clocking in another. Supervisors, including Szaller, were aware of the practice. Indeed, Assistant Nursing Director Mills and Szaller had person- ally engaged in that practice. It would be redundant to list the consistent testimony in the, record showing a widespread practice in which one employee would clock in another for the sake of convenience. Yet, no one had been penalized for such practices in the past. In the in- stant episode, employees had informed Tolley and Allen during their investigation of this incident that the prac- tice was widespread. The particular employees had not even attempted to be secretive about it and had no de- ceptive intentions when they did it. The explanation for Respondent's discriminatory con- duct is obvious. Both employees, Shrader and O'Dell, were prominent union supporters, Shrader became in- volved with the Union as early as December 1983, when she began to wear union buttons and spoke up in meet- ings with employees and in the presence of supervisors, including Szaller, Tolley, and Mills. Shrader also served as the Union's observer during the second, election on 21 August. O'Dell was also an early union supporter who regularly wore union buttons and attended cookouts and dinners arranged in support of the Union. They were clearly among the most prominent union supporters. Re- spondent's conduct of unlawful interference and coercion in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act has demonstrat- ed its, union animus. Accordingly, I have no difficulty in finding that Respondent violated also Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. Sandy Aurricchio. The complaint next alleges that the Respondent withheld work assistance from its employee Sandy Aurricchio who was also an outspoken union sup- porter. According to the record, Aurricchio regularly wore a union button at work, attended union meetings, and spoke in support of the Union at the interservice meetings. She and Freda Harry, a laundry room employ- ee, testified that the union support was strongest in her own department, the laundry room, as well as in the die- tary and the housekeeping departments. She considered herself, along with Brenda Shrader and Kathy Fortner, as the most outspoken employees in favor of the Union. On the day when Brenda Shrader, an employee in the laundry room, was discharged, Aurrichio had two brief conversations with Director of Nursing Tolley. As Tolley ushered Shrader out of the facility, Aurricchio asked Tolley for help with the laundry because the work was too much to handle for one employee. Tolley re- plied that she would take care of it. When Tolley re- turned, Aurricchio repeated her request for help. Tolley emphatically told her: "Do the best you can. Leave the rest for the next shift. Is that clearly understood." (Tr. 278.) During the next 2 days, Aurricchio worked alone in the laundry room but was unable to catch up with the workload. Aurricchio confronted Supervisor Szaller with the rumor that Tolley had specifically informed Szaller not to replace Shrader or to provide help in the laundry room in order to teach the employees a lesson. Szaller replied: "Well, Sandy, why should I try to deny it if another employee overheard it?" (Tr. 283.) Indeed, Joan Collins, the employee who had overheard this con- versation between Szaller and Tolley, as described above, offered Szaller her help in the laundry room, be- cause she was aware that the work there was getting backed up. But Szaller refused stating, "to go on back to her room to dust that Connie wouldn't let nobody' back there, that she wants to teach the girls a lesson." (Tr. 263.) Aurricchio- testified that the second-shift employees were also unable to catch up and that there were clothes everywhere. Tolley admitted in her testimony that she observed Aurricchio working alone and crying in the laundry room, and that Szaller had "one person in laundry short." However, she felt that it was Szaller's duty to handle the situation. Tolley attempted indirectly to refute the testimony that she had intentionally withheld assistance to the em- ployee, but Szaller did not deny Aurricchio's testimony in this regard. In any case, Tolley's testimony was so vague and evasive on this point that I credit Collins' and Aurricchio's testimony to the extent that Szaller, at the behest of Tolley, intentionally withheld assistance to Aurricchio, a prominent and outspoken union supporter. Tolley, having engaged in simultaneous 8(a)(1) miscon- duct had displayed her union animus. I, therefore, find that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. Kathy Fortner. The complaint alleges that contrary to past practice, Respondent failed to return its employee Kathy Fortner to work at the conclusion of her sick leave. The record shows that Fortner was a nursing 1022 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD technician, at Respondent's facility for 4 years. Connie Tolley, director of nursing, was her supervisor. Fortner had a back problem diagnosed as a pinched nerve. As a result of a medical examination on 5 September and, on the advice of her physician, she took sick leave on that day for the duration of 2 weeks. Fortner called Connie Tolley on that day and informed her that she had to take medical leave for 2 weeks and was scheduled for a doc- tor's appointment on 20 September and would report the results. On 20 September her physician advised her to stay off work for an additional 3 or 4 weeks. On that day, Fortner reported again to her supervisor, Tolley. At her next medical appointment on 15 October, her physi- cian wrote an excuse for 1 week, clearing her return to work for 22 October. Fortner placed a call from the home of fellow employee Ruth Huffman, that she was ready to return to work on 22 October and would work any available shift. She reported that she needed to return on that day because her medical benefits would expire. Tolley assured Fortner that she would work her into the schedule and let her know. When Tolley failed to call Fortner within a couple of days, Fortner called the Nursing Home and talked to the receptionist, Lorraine Agee, who assured her that she would leave a message with Tolley. Still not having heard from the facility, Fortner went to the office on 22 October with a written doctor's excuse. She talked ini- tially with Agee and was subsequently , assured by Tolley that she would work her into the schedule. Again Tolley failed to contact Fortner. When further efforts to contact Tolley failed, Fortner on 29 October, met with James Carter, the administrator, and explained to him the fre- quent attempts to contact Tolley and her efforts to return to work. Carter assured her that he would talk to Tolley. However, Fortner was not scheduled for work until 5 or 6 November. Lorraine Agee, Respondent's re- ceptionist, confirmed in her testimony Fortner's repeated telephone calls and the numerous messages for Tolley. Tolley testified that during the time Fortner wanted to return to work, she was overstaffed and was confined by a limited budget. She also explained that when an em- ployee is on extended leave, "PRNs" or "as needed" em- ployees are assigned to work for the duration of the schedule. James Carter, the acting administrator, similarly testi- fied, albeit evasively and vaguely, that employees who want to return to work are normally not put back to work during an existing schedule but must wait for the next schedule. His testimony, however, was too argu- mentative and unresponsive to be of any probative value. Other testimony shows that the Respondent has in the past put such employees to work almost as soon as they were ready to return to work. Fortner testified, that a year prior to this incident, she was on a medical leave of absence for about 8 to 10 weeks. At that time, Tolley called Fortner and asked whether she was ready to return to work almost immediately after the expiration of the leave. Drema Keaton, a nursing technician, similarly testified that in October 1983, after she had taken a medi- cal leave of absence, she was put back to work as soon as she was released to return to work, even though she returned in the middle of the schedule. Again, when she took a medical leave of absence from 5 April to 5 May 1985, she was able to return to work on 5 May. According to the General Counsel, Respondent's fail- ure to allow her to return to her job almost 2 weeks after her release amounted to discriminatory conduct, be- cause of-her prominent union involvement. The record shows that Fortner was an early union supporter going back to the union campaign in 1983. She attended union meetings, brought union literature into the building, and regularly wore union buttons. She was also a member of the union organizing committee with three or four other employees, whose names were known by the Respond- ent. , I find the record in support of Respondent's disparate treatment of Fortner's request to return to work some- what weak. Although she and the other employee may have experienced no problems in promptly returning to their jobs in the past, it is plausible that a returning em- ployee may have to await the preparation of a new schedule. Here, Fortner was ready to report on '22 Octo- ber and was finally returned on 5 or 6 November 1984, causing a delay of about 2 weeks. However, because the testimony of Carter impressed me as unusually defensive, 'evasive, and unconvincing, and, because the Respondent had independently demon- strated its union animus, including the Section 8(a)(1) misconduct involving Fortner, I conclude that the Re- spondent'discriminated against her in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of theAct. Willa Wagner Whetsel. Employed as a nursing techni- cian since 29 August 1983, Willa Wagner Whetsel took a leave of absence, from her job in July 1984 because her husband had become seriously ill and required immediate hospitalization. Whetsel called Connie Tolley about 16 July, the day she was scheduled for work, and explained that her husband had cancer of the spine, which required surgery and hospitalization in Richmond, Virginia. Be- cause his convalescence period was expected to last at least 6 months, she requested a 6-month leave of absence. When Tolley told Whetsel that she had to take personal leave because she herself was not ill, Whetsel replied that she was undergoing treatment for depression by her own physician. Nevertheless, Tolley insisted on a written excuse from her husband's surgeon, Dr. Hammesfahr. Tolley expressed her sympathy and offered her help in finding a place to stay in Richmond. Whetsel moved to Richmond to be with her husband. Even though it was difficult for her to meet Dr. Hammesfahr, she finally ob- tained his assurance in late 'July that he would send a written excuse to her employer. Whetsel returned to Princeton in August and voted for the Union in' the second union election at the Nursing Home. Whetsel spent several hours at the Nursing Home, talked to David Mott, the union organizer, and then associated with the union supporters who were standing apart from the other employees in the facility while waiting for 'the ballot count. Tolley noticed Whetsel but did not speak to her. On 11 September Whetsel received a certified letter, dated 9 September 1984, from Tolley, informing her (G.C. Exh. 10): PRINCETON HEALTH CARE CENTER 1023 This letter is in ` reference to your employment status of Princeton Health Care Center. I have tried numerous times to reach you by phone. Your last working day at this facility was July 10. I have not received a written excuse for any of your absences. If I do not receive a response to this letter by September 12, 1984, I will assume you have quit. Whetsel called Tolley on the following day, 12 Septem- ber. She expressed her surprise at the letter and inquired whether Tolley had received Dr. Hammesfahr's letter. Tolley replied that she had not received such a letter and insisted that she needed a written excuse. Whetsel prom- ised to deliver a written excuse from her own doctor be- cause she had difficulty getting Hammesfahr's statement. Whetsel obtained a written excuse from Dr. Brook, dated 13 September 1984, and delivered it on the same day to the facility (G.C. Exh. 11). Because Nursing Su- pervisors Tolley and Mills were not there, Farrel, acting supervisor, told her to slip the statement under the door of Tolley's office. On 30 October Whetsel obtained her doctor's certifi- cate for return to work, because her husband was at home recuperating, and because it was decided that it was in her best interest to return to work. She went to the facility and informed Tolley that she wanted to come back to work. Tolley, who appeared reluctant to talk with Whetsel, said: "Well, you don't have a job. You voluntarily quit." When Whetsel questioned that she had never called in to quit and was not notified that she was fired, Tolley simply referred to the employee handbook and pointed to the Company's leave policy. Whetsel was ultimately successful in getting Dr. Hammesfahr to send to Tolley written excuses, dated 20 November 1984. Dr. Hammesfahr expressed, inter alia, his apology for the delay in sending his statement to Whetsel's employer' (G.C. Exh. 13 and 14). However, Whetsel has never heard from Tolley or the Respondent. The General Counsel argues that the Respondent actu- ally discharged Whetsel because of her union support and points not only to Whetsel's extensive union activity but Respondent's inconsistent and implausible explana- tions of its discriminatory conduct. The record fully sup- ports the General Counsel's position. Whetsel became a union supporter within months of her employment in the fall of 1983. She attended union meetings and since No- vember 1983 regularly wore a union button to work. During one of her performance evaluations in November 1983, Tolley appeared pleased with Whetsel's perform- ance and suggested that she attended the "LPN" school. Tolley also said that everybody ought to have a second chance; she wanted a second chance to obtain for the employees whatever they wanted if they would vote against the Union. Tolley also asked Whetsel to "per- suade the girls to vote no." In December 1983, following a meeting, Tolley asked her what she thought the issue was over the Union. Whetsel "said more help, more money and better benefits" (Tr. 337-38). Whetsel also testified that Tolley would make the following remark, "anyone who voted for the union would be sorry later," on several occasions when she walked past the nurse's station. Tolley's 8(a)(1) misconduct, including threats directed at Whetsel, and her open hostility towards the Union are obvious indications of her union animus and her identifi- cation of Whetsel as a principal union sympathizer. When Tolley's implausible rationalization of Whetsel's loss of employment and Tolley's inconsistent conduct are analyzed, the conclusion is inescapable that the Respond- ent was searching for a pretext to rid itself of a union supporter. The record shows that Whetsel had kept Tolley fully and regularly informed about her intentions. Moreover, Whetsel's request for a leave of absence was certainly not for any frivolous reasons. To the contrary, Whetsel's predicament would ordinarily provoke an employer's sympathy and full cooperation. Yet, Tolley based her conclusion on a contrived and undocumented technical- ity. Although Tolley denied that Whetsel had contacted her in the middle of July, she admitted that she talked to Whetsel in the latter part of July when she explained the requirement for a written statement from the physician. Tolley was certainly aware of Whetsel's predicament at that time. Tolley then testified that she had not heard from Whetsel until the exchange of letters in September. Yet, the record shows that Tolley saw, but avoided, Whetsel at the union election in August. Tolley then, at the direction of employee consultant Fred Holroyd, wrote a letter, dated 9 September, to Whetsel requiring a response by 12 September. Giving Whetsel effectively 2 days in which to respond, knowing that she was in Rich- mond, was certainly not allowing for a reasonable time. Moreover, Tolley admitted receiving the written physi- cian's excuse but could not remember the date of receipt. The record indicates that Whetsel supplied it on 13 Sep- tember, so that the Respondent even under its own theory "processed the employment record of this em- ployee . . . as a voluntary quit" on the basis of a delay by 1 day (Tr. 443). Respondent, having discharged Whetsel, because it considered her "a voluntary quit," never notified her of that decision, and significantly con- tinued to keep her attendance records but marked them as if she were merely absent. Finally, the Respondent could have, but obviously failed to reprocess her em- ployment status when it finally received Dr. Hammes- fahr's written excuses in November 1984, which ex- plained the delay of his statement and that again explain the reasons for Whetsel's leave of absence. In short, Tol- ley's scenario of the events is implausible and inconsist- ent with her conduct; moreover, her testimony appeared evasive at times and unconvincing. I cannot credit her testimony to the extent it differs with that of Whetsel whose recollection of the events was consistent and clear. Considering all the surrounding events, including Tolley's express prediction that "union supporters would be sorry," the record compels a finding of violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The Respondent, Princeton Memorial Hospital Co. d/b/a Princeton Health Care Center, is now, and has 1024 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD been at all times material, an employer engaged in com- merce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act and a health care institution within, the meaning of Section 2(14) of the Act. 2. By discriminatorily discharging its employees, Frances O'Dell and Brenda Shrader, 3 September 1984, which discharges were converted to suspensions, and by discriminatorily discharging its employee Willa Wagner Whetsel, 30 October 1984, because of their support of the Union, the Company engaged in unlawful practices affecting commerce within the meaning of - Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. 3. By withholding work assistance from its employee Sandy Aurricchio and by refusing promptly to return its employee Kathy Fortner to work because of their sup- port of the Union and contrary to past practice, Re- spondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. 4. By coercively interrogating employees or requesting an employee to interrogate other employees concerning their union activities, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. - 5. By threatening its employees with discharge or other reprisals because of their union involvement, by, warning them against association with union sympathiz- ers, by ordering employees to write letters to the Board to protest the union election, by promising benefits to employees if they reject the Union and by directing em- ployees to remove their union buttons, Respondent vio- lated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. REMEDY Having found that the Respondent has engaged in cer tain unfair labor practices, I find it necessary to order it to cease and desist and to take certain- affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. The Respondent having discriminatorily discharged its employee, Willa Wagner Whetsel it must offer her rein- statement and make her whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits, computed on a quarterly basis from date of discharge to date of proper offer of reinstate- ment, less any net interim earnings, as prescribed in F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950), plus interest as computed in Florida Steel Corp., 231 NLRB 651 (1977). Further having discriminatorily discharged its employees Frances O'Dell and Brenda Shrader, which discharges were converted into 30 working day, suspensions, and having discriminatorily failed to promptly return its em- ployee-Kathy Fortner at the conclusion of her sick leave, and having discriminatorily withheld work assistance from its employee Sandy Aurricchio, Respondent must make them whole for any loss of earnings and other ben- efits, as prescribed above. On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the following recommend- eds ORDER The Respondent, Princeton Memorial Hospital Co. d/b/a Princeton Health Care Center, Princeton, West -Virginia, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall 1. Cease and desist from (a) Discharging or otherwise discriminating against any employee for supporting District 1199, WV/KY/OH, National Union of Hospital and Health Care Employees, AFL-CIO or any other union. (b) Withholding, contrary to past practice, work assist- ance from its employees because of the Union. (c) Refusing, contrary to past practice, to return em- ployees to work at the conclusion of a period of sick leave because of the Union. - (d) Coercively interrogating any employee or request- ing an employee to interrogate other employees about union support or union activities. (e) Threatening its employees with discharge or other reprisals because of their union activities; warning them against association with union sympathizers;, ordering employees to write letters to the National Labor Rela- tions Board to protest union elections; promising benefits to employees if they reject the Union; and directing em- ployees to remove their union insignia. (f) In any like or related manner interfering with, re- straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. , 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act. . (a) Offer Willa Wagner Whetsel and Kathy Fortner immediate and full reinstatement to their former jobs or, if those jobs no longer exist, to a substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to their seniority or any other rights or privileges previously enjoyed, and make them and employees Frances O'Dell, Brenda Shrader, and Sandy Aurricchio whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits suffered as a result of the discrimination against them, in the manner set forth in the remedy sec- tion of the decision. (b) Remove from its files any reference to the unlawful discharges and notify the employees in writing that this has been done and that the discharges will not be used against them in any way. (c) Preserve and, on request, make available to the Board or its agents for examination an d copying, all pay- roll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records nec- essary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this Order. (d) Post at, its facility in Princeton, West Virginia, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."4 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 9, after being signed by the Re- spondent's authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including 3 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the Board's Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur- poses, 4 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a Umted States court of appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Nation- al Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board " PRINCETON HEALTH, CARE ,CENTER 1025 all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respond- ent to ensure that the notices are not altered , defaced, or covered by any other material. (e) Notify the Regional Director for in writing within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps have been taken to comply. For the purpose of determining or securing compliance with this Order, the Board, or any of its duly authorized representatives, may obtain discov- ery from the Respondent, its officers, agents, successors, or assigns, or any other person having knowledge con- cerning any compliance matter, in the manner provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure .- Such discovery shall be conducted under the supervision of the United States court of appeals enforcing this Order and may be had .on any matter reasonably related to compliance with this Order, as enforced by the Court. IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the complaint be dismissed insofar as it alleges violations of the Act not specifically found. APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the - National Labor Relations Act and has or- dered us to post and abide by this notice. Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights. To organize/ To form, join, or assist any union To bargain collectively through representatives of their own choice To act together for other mutual aid or protec- tion To choose not to engage in any of these protect- ed concerted activities. WE WILL NOT discharge or otherwise discriminate against any of you for supporting District 1199 WV/KY/OH, National Union of Hospital and Health Care Employees, AFL-CIO or any other union. WE WILL NOT, contrary to past practice, withhold work assistance from you because of the Union. WE WILL NOT, contrary to past practice , refuse to return you to work at the conclusion of a period of sick leave because of the Union. WE WILL NOT coercively question you or request you to interrogate others about your union support or activi- ties. WE WILL NOT threaten you with discharge or other reprisals, because of your union activities; (b) warn you against association with union sympathizers ; (c) order you to write letters to the National Labor Relations Board to protest union elections; (d) promise you bene- fits if you reject the Union and (e) direct you to remove your union buttons. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act. WE WILL offer Willa Wagner Whetsel and Kathy Fortner immediate and full reinstatement to their former jobs or, if those jobs no longer exist, to substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority or any other rights or privileges previously enjoyed, and WE WILL make them and employees Frances O'Dell, Brenda Shrader, and Sandy Aurricchio whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits resulting from their discharge or other discrimination against them, less any net interim earnings, plus interest. WE WILL notify each of them that we have removed from our files any references to their discharge and that the discharge will not be used against them in any way. PRINCETON HEALTH CARE CENTER I