Orange Memorial Hospital Corp.

ORANGE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL Orange Memorial Hospital Corporation and Texas Golden Triangle Employees, Local 385, Ameri- can Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO. Case 23-CA-8756 25 September 1987 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN DOTSON AND MEMBERS JOHANSEN AND STEPHENS Upon a charge filed on 18 December 19811 and amended 25 February 1982 by Texas Golden Tri- angle Employees, Local 385, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL- CIO, the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board issued on 20 January 1982, and amended on 26 February 1982, a complaint against the Respondent, Orange Memorial Hospital Corpo- ration, alleging that the Respondent violated Sec- tion 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act. By answers dated 22 January 1982 and 1 March 19.82, the Respondent denied having com- mitted any unfair labor practices. The parties thereafter entered into a stipulation of facts that, on 5 March 1982, they submitted to the Board. The parties agreed that certain formal papers filed in the proceeding and the stipulation of facts, together with attached exhibits, constitute the entire record in this case. The parties waived a hearing before an administrative law judge, the making of findings of fact and conclusions of law by an administrative law judge, and the issuance of an administrative law judge's decision. They sub- mitted this proceeding directly to the Board for findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the entry of an appropriate order. On 8 April 1982 the Board issued an order ap- proving stipulation and transferring proceeding to the Board. The Respondent and the General Coun- sel filed briefs. The National Labor Relations Board has delegat- ed its authority 'in this proceeding to a three- member panel. On the entire record in the case, the Board makes the following findings. I. JURISDICTION 1. The Respondent is now, and has been at all material times, a Texas corporation, with its place of business in Orange, Texas, where it is engaged as a healthcare institution in the operation of a hos- pital providing in-patient and out-patient medical and professional care and services to the aged- infirm and/or sick persons. The Respondent in the ' All dates are 1981 unless otherwise indicated 1099 course and conduct of its business operations de- rives gross revenues in excess of $250,000, and pur- chases and receives at its Orange, Texas facility products, goods, and materials valued in excess of $50,000 directly from points outside the State of Texas. 2. The Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act, and is a healthcare institution within the meaning of Section 2(14) of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Texas Golden Triangle Employees, Local 385, American Federation of State, County and Munici- pal Employees, AFL-CIO is now, and has been at all material times, a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. IIL THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES The issues presented are whether the Respond- ent's rule denying off-duty employees entry to the Respondent's hospital premises and its issuance of written disciplinary warnings pursuant to the rule to certain employees for distributing union litera- ture in outside nonwork areas of the hospital prem- ises at times when they were not scheduled to work violated Section 8(a)(1)2 of the Act, and whether the Respondent's suspension (pursuant to the same rule) of certain employees for distributing union literature in outside nonwork areas of the hospital premises violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. Based on the following facts, and for the reasons set forth below, we find that, by the above conduct, the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. A. The Stipulated Facts On 4 December the Respondent, by oral -an- nouncement to employees, promulgated a rule pro- hibiting employees from entering or remaining on hospital premises, including nonwork areas outside the facility, during their off-duty hours, and requir- ing them to report for and leave duty within 5 min- utes of their scheduled worktime, unless otherwise authorized by a supervisor. This rule had existed since at least 18 February, but was not communi- cated to employees until 4 December.3 In December, after the Respondent announced the rule, employees Loretta Meadows, Helen Pi- lette, Lillie Hunter, Annie May Hanks, and Rebec- ca Moore distributed union literature on the Re- 2 The complaint did not allege that the Respondent violated Sec 8(a)(3) by this conduct 3 On 24 November the Union had filed a petition seeking an election among certain of the Respondent's employees 285 NLRB No. 136 1100 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD spondent's property. These employees, who were distributing in nonwork areas outside the Respond- ent's facility,4 were not scheduled' to work at the times of distribution-some arrived 20 'minutes before they were scheduled to work to distribute, while others were not scheduled to work on the days they distributed. Pursuant to its rule, the Re- spondent ordered the employees to leave its prem- ises. It also issued disciplinary warnings to Mead- ows, Pilette, Hunter, Hanks, and Moore5 advising them that they had violated the Respondent's rule and that their jobs ' were' in jeopardy. Future viola- tions, they were told, would "result in stronger dis- cipline action up to and including discharge." On 4 December 'and on 19 December employee Rayma L. Sanford, and on 20 December employee Hanks, distributed union literature on the Respond- ent's property in nonwork areas outside the hospi- tal facility at times when they' were not scheduled to work. On each occasion agents of the Respond- ent instructed them' that they could not distribute the literature and ordered them to leave the Re- spondent's property. Pilette on 18 December, and Hanks on 20 De- cember, again distributed union literature in outside nonwork areas of the hospital premises at a time when they were not scheduled to, work. On 22 De- cember the Respondent suspended them for 3 days without pay for violating the Respondent's rule. The Respondent permits business callers to ' enter its premises only by -appointment or announcement at the reception area, and has established visiting hours to limit 'the -times patients may receive visi- tors. The Respon'dent'maintains this policy in order to insure security' of patients. For at least 2 years, the Respondent has allowed a retired employee to sell various items to -employees on its 'property. B. Discussion and Conclusions The Respondent by stipulation admits promul- gating and maintaining a rule that prohibited em- ployees from, entering and remaining on its prem- ises, including nonwork areas outside its facility, during off- iuty hours and required them to report for and leave within 5 minutes of their scheduled worktime, unless otherwise authorized by a super- visor. An employer may not deny off-duty employ- ees entry to outside nonwork areas of its premises, unless the employer provides an adequate business justification for so doing. Presbyterian Medical Center, 227 NLRB 904, 905 (1977), enfd. 586 .17.2d 4 It is clear in view of the parties' briefs that in all instances the em- ployees were distributing in nonwork areas outside the Respondent's fa- cility 5 The Respondent destroyed the' written warning issued to Moore on learning that she left the premises when so instructed 165 (10th Cir. 1978); -Tri-County 'Medical- Center, 222 NLRB 1089 (1976). Obviously, the Respond- ent's rule denies off-duty employees entry to out- side nonwork' areas, and it is therefore invalid, unless justified by legitimate business consider- ations. s The Respondent claims that' its rule insures pa- tient security, but it has failed to provide an ade- quate factual basis for this asserted business justifi- cation. The parties' stipulation, contains the general assertion that the Respondent maintains an access policy in order to insure the security of patients at the hospital. But, the record reveals no evidence showing that patients frequent the outside nonwork areas. Thus, the Respondent's contention that its rule denying off-duty employees access to outside nonwork areas somehow addresses the concern of patient security is without any factual support. The Respondent's brief elaborates. that vandalism, theft, damage to private property, assaults, and patient abuse can occur outside as easily as within ,a struc- ture. But, there is,no showing here that the crime problem (which is speculative oh ,this record) could not adequately be controlled by ' denying off-duty employees access to the interior of the hospital fa- cility. Presbyterian Medical Center, supra, 227 NLRB at 905. Accordingly, we find that the Respondent, having failed to show adequate business justifica- tion for denying off-duty employees entry to out- side nonwork areas of its premises, violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by promulgating 7 and' maintain- ing a rule that denies employees entry to outside nonwork areas of the hospital premises at times when they are not scheduled to work, and by issu- ing written disciplinary warnings to employees Meadows, Pilette, Hunter, Hanks, and Moore for distributing union literature in out-side nonwork areas of the hospital premises at times when they were not scheduled to work, The Respondent also 6 Contrary to our dissenting colleague, we do not view Diamond Shamrock Co. v NLRB, 443 F 2d 52 (3d Cir 1971), and Republic Alumi- num Co v NLRB, 394 F 2d 405 (5th Cir 1968), as inconsistent. Diamond Shamrock, a pre-Tri-County case, dealt only with a rule denying off-duty employees access to production areas and secured nonproduction areas The Diamond Shamrock rule did not apply to the parking lot, the walk- way from the parking lot, and the plant road, It is only the latter outside areas that Tn-County holds an employer may not deny off-duty employ- ees entry to without adequate business justification Moreover, we note that the only courts of appeals that have passed on the propriety of the Tn-County rule itself, have accepted it NLRB v Clark Manor Nursing Home Corp, 671 F 2d 657, 660 (1st Cir 1982), NLRB v Presbyterian Med- ical Center, 586 F 2d 165, 170 (10th Cir. 1978) P Although the access rule has existed since at least 18 February-- some 10 months before the filing of the charge-l0(b)'s 6-month period for filing a charge does not begin to run until the employees affected by such a rule are put on notice of it. Florida Steel Corp, 235 NLRB 1010 (1978) Since the stipulation concedes that the rule was not published or brought to the employees' attention until 4 December, we find that the charge was timely filed as to the unlawful promulgation allegations ORANGE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by sus- pending employees Pilette and Hanks for distribut- ing union literature in outside nonwork areas of the hospital premises at times when they were not scheduled to work.8 ' CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. By promulgating and maintaining a rule that, in the absence of legitimate business considerations justifying it, denies employees entry to outside non- work areas of the hospital premises at times when they are not scheduled to work, the Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 2. By issuing written disciplinary warnings to employees Loretta Meadows, Helen Pilette, Lillie Hunter, Annie May Hanks, and Rebecca Moore for distributing union literature in outside nonwork areas of the hospital premises at times when they were not scheduled to work, the Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 3. By suspending Helen Pilette and Annie May Hanks for distributing union literature in outside nonwork areas of the hospital premises at times when they were not scheduled to work, the Re- spondent has violated' Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. 4. The unfair labor practices found affect com- merce within the meaning of the Act. REMEDY Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, we shall order it to cease and desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Having found that the Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) by promulgating and maintaining a rule that, in the absence of legitimate business con- siderations justifying it, denies employees entry to outside nonwork areas of the hospital premises at times when they are not scheduled to work, we shall order that the Respondent rescind the rule. Having found that the Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) by unlawfully issuing written disci- plinary warnings to employees Meadows, Pilette, Hunter, Hanks, and Moore, we shall order that it remove from its files the unlawful warnings it issued and any references to those warnings.9 Having found,that the Respondent violated Sec- tion 8(a)(3) and (1) by unlawfully suspending em- ployees Pilette and Hanks, we shall order it to 8 Having found the violations described above, we find it unnecessary to pass on the General Counsel's additional theory that the Respondent enforced its access rule in a disparate manner 9 As indicated, the parties stipulated that the Respondent destroyed the warning issued to Moore 1101 remove from its files any reference to the unlawful suspensions . The Respondent shall also provide written notice to the employees that evidence of the unlawful warnings and suspensions have been removed from their files and will not be used as a basis for future personnel actions against them. Sterling Sugars, 261 NLRB 472 ( 1982). The Re- spondent shall make Pilette and Hanks whole for any loss of pay, benefits, or other rights and privi- leges they may have suffered as a result of their unlawful suspensions, with backpay computed in the manner prescribed in F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950), and interest as prescribed in New Horizons for the Retarded. ' o ORDER The National Labor Relations Board orders that the Respondent, Orange Memorial Hospital Corpo- ration, Orange, Texas, its officers, agents, succes- sors, and assigns, shall 1. Cease and desist from (a) In the absence of legitimate business consider- ations, promulgating and maintaining a rule that denies employees entry to outside nonwork areas of the hospital premises at times when they are not scheduled to work. (b) In the absence of a valid rule based on legiti- mate business considerations, issuing written disci- plinary warnings to employees for distributing union literature in outside nonwork areas of the hospital premises at times when they 'are not sched- uled to work. (c) In the absence of a valid rule based on legiti- mate business considerations, suspending employees for distributing union literature in outside nonwork areas of the hospital premises at times when they are not scheduled to work. (d) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the ex- ercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action neces- sary to effectuate the policies of the Act. (a) Rescind the rule orally announced to employ- ees on 4 December 1991 that prohibited employees from entering or remaining on hospital premises, including nonwork areas outside the facility, during their off-duty hours, and that required employees to report for and leave duty within 5 minutes of 10 In accordance with our decision in New Horizons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987), interest on and after 1 January 1987 shall be computed at the "short-term Federal rate" for the underpayment of taxes as set out in the 1986 amendment to 26 US C. § 6621 Interest on amounts accrued prior to 1 January 1987 (the effective date of the 1986 amendment to 26 US C § 6621) shall be computed in accordance with Florida Steel Corp, 231 NLRB 651 (1977) 1102 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD their scheduled worktime, unless otherwise author- ized by a supervisor. (b) Remove from it files the unlawful written warnings and any reference to the unlawful written warnings and suspensions and notify the employees in writing that this has been done and that the warnings and suspensions will not be used against them in any, way. (c) Make Helen Pilette and Annie May Hanks whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits suffered as a result of the discrimination against them, in the manner set forth in the remedy section of the decision. (d) Preserve and, on request, make available to the Board or its agents for examination and copy- ing, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this Order. (e) Post at its Orange, Texas facility, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."" Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 23, after being signed by the Respondent's authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent immediately upon re- ceipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where no- tices to employees are customarily posted. Reason- able steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (f) Notify the Regional Director in 'writing within 20 days from the date of this Order what steps the Respondent has taken to comply. CHAIRMAN DOTSON, dissenting. Relying on the Board's holding in Tri-County Medical Center, 222 NLRB 1089 (1976),' my col- leagues find that the Respondent's no-access rule, which denies off-duty employees access to its prop- erty for any purpose during their nonworking time,2 is presumptively unlawful and that, conse- 11 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Nation- al Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board " i My colleagues also cite in support of their position the Board's deci- sion in Presbyterian Medical Center, 227 NLRB 904 (1977), which relies on the Tri-County holding z According to the parties' stipulation of facts, the rule in question pro- hibits employees from "entering or remaining on the public and outside nonworking areas of the Respondent 's premises during their off -duty hours" and requires that they "report and leave duty within five minutes of their scheduled work time unless otherwise authorized by their super- visor." quently, its enforcement of that rule through disci- plinary warnings and suspensions against off-duty employees who sought to enter the ` Employer's premises during their nonworking time to distribute union literature violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. I disagree. In Tri-County, the Board held that a no-access rule that denied off-duty employee's entry to park- ing lots, gates, and other outside nonworking areas of an employer's property would be considered presumptively invalid. Prior to its Tri-County deci- sion, the Board in GTE Lenkurt, Inc., 204 NLRB 921, 922 (1973), had held that "where an employ= er's no-access rule is nondiscriminatory, i.e., it denies off-duty employees access to the premises for any purpose and is not disparately applied against union activities, it is presumptively valid absent a showing that no adequate alternative means of communication are available." Under Lenkurt, an employer could therefore lawfully deny off-duty employees entry to any and all areas of its property during their nonworking time pro- vided the above criteria were satisfied. In Tri- County, however, the Board stated that the holding in Lenkurt had to be narrowly construed so as, to avoid interference with the Section 7 right of em- ployees to freely communicate their interest in union activities to those who work on different shifts. Thus, under Tri-County, a no-access rule is valid only if it limits access solely with respect to the interior of an employer's plant and other work- ing areas, is disseminated to all employees, and ap- plies to off-duty employees seeking access for any purpose, not just to those desiring to engage in union activity. The question of whether a no-access rule for off- duty employees should be considered presumptive- ly valid or invalid has received different responses from various courts of appeals. In Diamond Sham- rock Co. Y. NLRB, 443 F.2d 52 (3d Cir. 1971), for example, the court denied enforcement of the Board's decision and order in Diamond Shamrock Co:, 181 NLRB 261- (1970), which had held that such a rule was presumptively invalid. In its deci- sion, the court drew a distinction between an off- duty employee seeking entry to an employer's property during his nonworking hours and an on- duty employee lawfully on the premises `pursuant to the work relationship, noting that the rights of each were governed by different considerations and - that the Board's holding had failed to distin- guish between the rules of law applicable to off- duty employees and those applicable to on-duty employees. The court reasoned that application of a presumption of invalidity to a no-access rule would "intrude far into the Company's property ORANGE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL rights . . . without any showing that such intrusion is necessary to facilitate the exercise of the employ- ee's organization rights."3 It further reasoned that since an employer's property rights are constitu- tionally protected, it would be improper to apply a presumption of invalidity to a rule that restricted access to the employer's property by employees during their off-duty hours. The Fifth Circuit, however, has taken a different approach.4 In the underlying Board proceeding in Republic Aluminum v. NLRB, supra, the Board found unlawful an employer's rule that prohibited off-duty employees from entering its premises with- out permission noting, in agreement with the trial examiner, that the employer had made no showing that the rule was necessary to maintain discipline and production. In Republic Aluminum v. NLRB, the court agreed with the Board that the burden had been correctly placed on the employer to show that special circumstances made its rule nec- essary. Relying on the Board's rule in Peyton Pack- ing'Co., 49 NLRB 828 (1943), as upheld by the Su- preme Court in Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945), the court in Republic Alumi- num, above, stated that a prohibition on union so- licitation by an employee outside of working hours on company property must be presumed to be an unreasonable impediment to self-organization and, therefore, discriminatory absent a showing by the employer that special circumstances make the rule necessary to maintain production and discipline.5 The Fifth Circuit's position was further -clarified in NLRB v. Roney Plaza Apartments, above, wherein it stated that rules which prohibit employees from being on the premises after work hours are pre- sumed to be invalid. In its Lenkurt decision, the Board implicitly adopted the Third Circuit's rationale in Diamond Shamrock Co. v. NLRB, supra. Thus, in finding that a no-access rule for off duty employees was presumptively valid, the Board reasoned that "the interests to be balanced in determining the validity of such a rule are very different as between an em- ployee on the premises in connection with his work and an off-duty employee who seeks to enter" the employer's property during his non- working time. 204 NLRB at 921. While the former requires that the employees' statutory right to self- organize be balanced only against the employer's need to maintain discipline, safety, and production, * 443 F 2d 52 at 58 s See Republic Aluminum Co v NLRB, 394 F 2d 405 (5th Cir 1968), NLRB Y. Roney Plaza Apartments, 597 F 2d 1046 (5th Cir 1979) 5 Contrary to the Fifth Circuit, the Third Circuit is of the opinion that the Peyton Packing presumption is not applicable where a no-access rule for off-duty employees is involved See Diamond Shamrock v NLRB, above 1103 the latter, the Board opined, called for a balancing of the employees' statutory rights against the em- ployer's constitutionally derived private property rights. I find the Board's reasoning in Lenkurt to be sound. An off-duty employee who has left the em- ployer's premises on completion of his work clear- ly does not stand on the same footing as an em- ployee who is lawfully on the premises ,pursuant to the terms of his work relationship.6 The off-duty employee's status was aptly described by the trial examiner in Diamond Shamrock who noted, supra at 269, that; When the daily work relationship is completed and [the employee] leaves the plant, he has no right of access to the employer's property, in- cluding the plant unless there is a legal basis for such access. By reason of the fact that the employee was properly in the plant during the day pursuant to the work relationship does not mean that private property, the plant, was converted into employer-employee community property, particularly not after the daily work relationship ended with the employee's depar- ture from the plant. [sic] . . . Neither the fact that the individual is an employee on the day shift, nor the fact that he is on his own time, nor the exercise of his stat- utory or constitutional right, accord him any right to be in the plant at night unless the em- ployer grants him such a right. Thus, the right of an off-duty employee to re- enter the employer's property to engage in union solicitation after he has completed his work and de- parted the premises must, as pointed out in Len- kurt, be weighed against the employer's constitu- tional right to control access to its property. In this limited respect, his status, as suggested by the Board in Lenkurt, is not unlike that of a nonem- ployee whose right of access is similarly contingent on a balancing of employee statutory rights and employer property rights. Clearly, while lawfully on the employer's prem- ises pursuant to the work relationship, employees are free to communicate their union desires to other employees without employer interference subject, of course, to the employer's need to main- tain discipline and production. This being so, the employer should not be compelled, once the em- ployee has ended his daily work and departed the premises, to assist them in their organizational ef- forts by providing additional means of communica- 6 In Tri-County, the Board did not disagree with the distinction drawn in Lenkurt between an off-duty employee and an on-duty employee 1104 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD tion during their off-duty hours. The imposition of such a requirement without justification constitutes, in my view, an unwarranted intrusion into an em- ployer's private property rights. For this reason, I adhere to the Board's view in Lenkurt that a no- access rule that is nondiscriminatory is presump- tively valid absent a showing that no adequate al- ternative means of communication exist.' Here, the General Counsel has not shown that off-duty employees are prohibited from engaging in union solicitation or other protected activity during the time that they are lawfully on the Respondent's premises pursuant to the work relationship. Indeed, in, its brief to the Board, the Respondent states, without contradiction, that employees are "left completely unregulated with respect to solicitation and distribution of union literature while on work- ing time, whether this occurred in outside non- working areas, in the interior of the facility, or even in patient care areas." In the absence of such a showing, I find, contrary to my colleagues, that the Respondent's no-access rule for off-duty em- ployees is valid and that the Respondent lawfully disciplined-the employees in question here for vio- lating its no-access rule. I would, accordingly, dis- miss the complaint. 7 Clearly, off-duty employees have an alternative means of commum- catmg with other employees during their normal working hours. Off-duty employees desiring to communicate with employees on other shifts should bear the burden of showing that they are unable to do so through means other than entry to the employer's property. APPENDIX NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to post and abide by, this notice. WE WILL NOT, in the absence, of legitimate busi- ness considerations, promulgate and maintain a rule that denies you entry to outside nonwork areas of the hospital premises at times When you are not scheduled to work. WE WILL NOT, in the absence of a valid rule based on legitimate -business considerations, issue written disciplinary warnings to you for distribut- ing union literature in outside nonwork areas of the, hospital premises at times' when you are not sched- uled to work. WE WILL NOT, in the absence of a valid rule based on legitimate business considerations, suspend you for distributing union literature in outside non- work areas of the hospital premises at times when you are not scheduled to work. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the exer- cise of the- rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act. WE WILL rescind the rule we orally announced to you on 4 December 1981 that prohibited you from entering or remaining on hospital premises, including nonwork areas outside the facility, during your off-duty hours, and that required that you report for and leave within 5 minutes of your scheduled worktime, unless otherwise authorized by a supervisor. WE WILL make Helen Pilette and Annie May Ranks whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits resulting from their suspensions, less any net interim earnings, plus interest. WE ,WILL remove from our files any, unlawful written warnings and any reference to the written disciplinary warnings issued to Loretta Meadows, Helen Pilette, 'Lillie Hunter, -Annie May Hanks, and Rebecca Moore, and we will remove from our _ files any reference to the suspensions of Helen Pi- lette and Annie May Hanks, and we will notify them that we have removed from our files the un- lawful written warnings we issued to them and any reference to their unlawful written warnings or sus- pensions and that these warnings and suspensions will not be used against them in any way. ORANGE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL CORPORATION