Christopher Street Owners Corp.

CHRISTOPHER STREET CORP. 253 Christopher Street Owners Corp. and Local 32B- 32J Service Employees International Union, AFL-CIO and Local 2, New York State Inde- pendent Union of Building Service Employees and Factory Workers N.F.I.U., ]Party to the Contract. Case 2-CA-21055 30 September 1987 DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS JOHANSEN, BABSON AND STEPHENS On 31 July 1986 Administrative Law Judge Howard Edelman issued the attached decision. The Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief. The National Labor Relations Board has delegat- ed its authority in this proceeding to a three- member panel. The Board has considered the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and brief and has decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings,' and conclusions2 and to adopt the recommended Order as modified. 1. The judge found, and we agree, that the Re- spondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by refusing to recognize and bargain with the Charging Party Union (the Union). In its excep- tions, the Respondent argues, inter alia, that this finding is barred by Section 10(b) of the Act. The judge rejected the Respondent's 10(b) con- tention. He found that the Respondent's 10(b) argu- ment lacked merit and, in the alternative, had been waived. The Respondent contends that the 10(b) period commenced on 7 August 1984. On that date, ac- cording to the judge's findings, the Union sent a letter to the Respondent stating that it represented the employees, offering to the Respondent the in- dustrywide agreement or, in the alternative, offer- ing to negotiate a new agreement. According to the Respondent, inasmuch as no charge alleging a i The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge's credibility find- ings The Board's established policy is not to overrule an administrative law judge's credibility resolutions unless the clear preponderance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd 188 F 2d 362 (3d Cir 1951) We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing the findings 2 We agree with the judge's finding the Respondent's three new hires must be presumed to support the Charging Party Union In so doing, we rely on Laystrom Mfg. Co, 151 NLRB 1482 (1965), which involved new hires, rather than Pennco. Inc, 250 NLRB 716 (1980), cited by the judge which involved strike replacements See Station KKHJ, 284 NLRB 1339 (1987) Member Stephens finds it unnecessary to rely on any specific presump- tion concerning the views of new employees He simply concludes that the general presumption of continuing union majority status (see Fall River Dyeing v NLRB, 482 U S 27 (1987)) is not rebutted merely by evi- dence of employee turnover after the successorship obligation has at- tached violation of Section 8(a)(5) was filed until 20 May 1985, a finding of a violation-based on the events of August 1984-is barred. However, in the circumstances of this case, the Respondent's defense is without merit. The Re- spondent did not reply to the Union's 7 August letter. Thus, it was not clear at that time that the Respondent was refusing to bargain. Though the Union might have been well advised to follow up sooner on its 7 August letter, we cannot find that it failed to exercise due diligence. Given the language of its 7 August letter, the Union could reasonably believe that the Respondent needed time to consid- er whether to sign the industrywide contract. Thus, we find, as alleged in the complaint, that a violation occurred about 30 April 1985, a date within the 10(b) period.3 On that date, the Union sent another letter to the Respondent and explicitly requested negotiations. The Respondent again did not respond, and a charge was filed on 20 May 1985. In any event, the judge found, and we agree, that the Respondent waived any 10(b) defense by failing to plead it or litigate it at the hearing. NLRB v. Penn Corp., 630 F.2d 561, 563 (8th Cir. 1979), and cases there cited. In excepting to the judge's rejection of its de- fense as neither pleaded or litigated, the Respond- ent cites Consolidation Coal Co., 277 NLRB 545 (1985). Consolidation Coal Co. is readily distinguish- able. In that case, the Board agreed with the judge's consideration of a 10(b) defense. However, that finding turned on the unique facts present in Consolidation Coal. There, the complaint itself an- ticipated the 10(b) defense; the respondent's cross- examination of the General Counsel's witnesses-as part of an effort to establish the 10(b) defense-was not objected to by the General Counsel or the charging party; and, on brief, the General Counsel conceded that the 10(b) argument was viable. Thus, the Board adopted the judge's reasoning that: "In these circumstances, where the issue was litigated sub silentio . . . the defense may properly be entertained." Here, the 10(b) defense was not pleaded or liti- gated sub silentio or otherwise. Accordingly, the judge properly ruled that the Respondent's 10(b) defense had been waived.4 2. The judge found that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (2) by promising its employees a In light of our finding, we need not pass on the judge's reasoning, i.e, that the violation was a continuing one, in rejecting the Respondent's 10(b) argument 4 Member Babson, in rejecting the Respondent's contention that the 8(a)(5) and (1) allegation of the complaint is time barred under Sec 10(b), relies solely on the finding that the Respondent waived such a defense 286 NLRB No. 22 254 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD improved medical benefits and a wage increase to induce them to become and remain members of Local 2, New York State Independent Union of Building Service Employees and Factory Workers, N.F.I.U. In our view, the promise of medical benefits and the promise of the wage increase warrant different treatment under the circumstances . The credited testimony shows that in November 1984 the Re- spondent's owner and vice president, Chaim Babad, told an employee who had inquired about medical benefits that he would have to join Local 2 in order to obtain such benefits . This evidence clearly warrants a conclusion that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(2) and (1) of the Act by promising im- proved medical benefits in order to induce employ- ees to become members of Local 2. The grant of the wage increase occurred 3 months later, after the Respondent had succeeded in unlawfully inducing three employees to sign Local 2 authorization cards and after it had entered into a collective-bargaining agreement with Local 2. The record and the judge's findings show only that an employee asked his superintendant, Mario Santiago, if the employees could have a raise; San- tiago then asked Babad; and Babad said they could all have a raise . There was no pending election or other representation related event, and there is no evidence that either Santiago or Babad linked the granting of the raise to union membership status or sentiments. Hence, we see no basis for finding that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(2) and (1) by "promising a wage raise" in order to "induce" em- ployees to "remain members of Local 2." We ac- cordingly revise Conclusion of Law 8 and para- graph 1(d) of the Order by eliminating the refer- ences there to the wage increase. We note, however, that insofar as the promise of the wage increase was-as the Respondent now claims-merely made pursuant to the terms of the agreement with Local 2, it amounts to an instance of maintaining and enforcing an agreement execut- ed at a time when Local 2 did not enjoy an un- coerced majority. It is therefore covered by Con- clusion of Law 6 and paragraph 1(b) of the Order. ORDER The National Labor Relations Board adopts the recommended Order of the administrative law judge as modified below and orders that the Re- spondent, Christopher Street Owners Corp., New York, New York, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Order as modified. 1. Delete from paragraph 1(d) of the Order the reference to "wage increases." 2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the administrative law judge. APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to post and abide by this notice. WE WILL NOT refuse to recognize and bargain collectively with Local 32B-32J, Service Employ- ees Internatinal Union, AFL-CIO as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of our employ- ees in the following appropriate unit: All service employees employed by us at our 165 Christopher Street building. WE WILL NOT maintain, enforce, or give effect to any collective-bargaining agreement between ourselves and Local 2, New York State Independ- ent Union of Building Service Employees and Fac- tory Workers, N.F.I.U. WE WILL NOT offer to pay union dues on behalf of our employees to Local 2 or any other labor or- ganization. WE WILL NOT promise our employees improved medical benefits or other improvements in their working conditions in order to induce them to become or remain members of Local 2 or any other labor organization. WE WILL NOT warn our employees not to join the Union or any other labor organization. WE WILL NOT threaten our employees with dis- charge if they become or remain members of the Union or any other labor organization. WE WILL NOT interrogate our employees about their membership in, or activities on behalf of, the Union or any other labor organization. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the exer- cise of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act. WE WILL recognize and bargain , on request, with the Union as the exclusive bargaining repre- sentative of the employees in the appropriate unit described above with respect to wage, hours, and other conditions of employment and, if an under- standing is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement. WE WILL withdraw recognition from Local 2 as the exclusive bargaining representative of our em- ployees in the appropriate unit described above. CHRISTOPHER STREET OWNERS CORP. CHRISTOPHER STREET CORP. 255 Leonard Grumbach, Esq., for the General Counsel. Brenda Strashum, for the Respondent. DECISION HOWARD EDELMAN, Administrative Law Judge. This case was tried before me on October 23, 24, and 28, 1985, in New York, New York. On May 20, 1985, Local 32B-32J, Service Employees International Union, AFL-CIO (the Union) filed a charge against Christopher Street Owners Corp. (Re- spondent). On July 3, 1985, a complaint issued and on September 4 and 13, 1985, the complaint was amended. The complaint alleged violations of Section 8(a)(1), (2), and (5) of the Act. The thrust of the complaint was that Respondent violated the Act by executing a collective- bargaining agreement with Local 2, New York State In- dependent Union of Buiding Service Employees and Factory Workers, N.F.I.U. (Local 2) at a time when they did not represent an uncoerced majority of employ- ees and failed to recognize and bargain With the Union as the exclusive bargaining representative of Respond- ent's employees. Briefs were filed by the General Counsel and by coun- sel for Respondent. On my consideration of the entire record, the briefs, and my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, I make the following FINDINGS OF FACT Respondent is a New York corporation engaged in the operation of a residential apartment building located at 165 Christopher Street, New York, New York. In con- nection with the operation of this building, Respondent annually derives gross revenues in excess of $500,000 and purchases and receives, at the above facility, goods and materials valued at in excess of $50,000 directly from points outside the State of New York. Respondent admits and I find that Respondent is an employer en- gaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. Respondent further admits and I find that the Union and Local 2 are labor organizations within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. The testimony of Chiam Babad, owner and vice presi- dent of Respondent, establishes that on July 16, 1984, Respondent purchased the apartment building located at 165 Christopher Street from Mishcom & Company (Mishcom). The building was thereafter managed by Bat- tery Park Management, a partnership of which Babad is a partner. In any event, following the purchase of the building by Respondent from Mishcom, Babad, whether in his capacity with Respondent, or with Battery Park, personally was in charge of every facet of Respondent's day-to-day operations. Mishcom, during its period of ownership of the Chris- topher Street building, had a collective-bargaining agree- ment with the Union covering its service employees, which was effective from April 21, 1982, until April 20, 1985. Following the purchase on July 16, 1984, of the above building, Respondent continued to operate the building as a residential apartment, with the same tenants. At the time of the sale Mishcom employed four service employ- ees who were covered by the Union's collective-bargain- ing agreement . Following the purchase, Respondent con- tinued to employ the same employees in the same capac- ities until October 1984, when three of them left volun- tarily. The General Counsel contends that Respondent is a "successor" to Mishcom. Respondent denies this allega- tion. The Board in determining whether an employer is a "successor" employer has applied such criteria as wheth- er: (1) there has been a substantial continuity in the same business operations; (2) the new employer uses the same plant; (3) the same or substantially the same work force is employed; (4) the same jobs exist under the same working conditions; (5) the same supervisors are em- ployed; (6) the same machinery, equipment, and methods of production are used; and (7) the same product is man- ufactured or the same service offered. In resolving the successorship issue, the Board has not accorded control- ling weight to any single factor but has evaluated all the circumstances present in any given case in arriving at the ultimate conclusion. In determining successorship, how- ever, the keystone is whether there was a substantial continuity of the employing industry. See Saks Fifth Avenue, 247 NLRB 1047 (1980), enfd. in pertinent part 634 F.2d 681 (2d Cir. 1980); Premium Foods, 260 NLRB 708, 714-715 (1982), enfd. 709 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1983). In this instant case the only change to take place was that the employees were now supervised by Babad rather than by a Mishcom supervisor. I therefore conclude Re- spondent was a "successor" to Mishcom. Whether, under all the circumstances, Respondent was under an obliga- tion to bargain with the Union will be discussed below. Babad admits that on July 16, 1984, on purchase from Mishcom he was aware that the four service employees then in his employ were represented by the Union and were being paid union rates in the area. He further admits that a unit of service employees is an appropriate unit for bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. Thomas Latimer, union contractor director, testified that on August 7, 1984, the Union, having become aware of the sale of the Christopher Street facility, sent Re- spondent a letter offering Respondent the present indus- trywide agreement or in the alternative, offering to nego- tiate a new agreement. I find this letter constitutes notice to Respondent that the Union represented Respondent's service employees and requested Respondent to bargain for a new collective-bargaining agreement. Babad denied receiving this letter. I credit the testimony of Latimer. I was generally im- pressed with Latimer's demeanor. His responses to ques- tions put to him on direct and cross-examination were forthright. On the other hand, I was unimpressed with the demeanor of Babad. His responses to questions put to him on cross-examination were at times evasive and he impressed me as less than forthright. For example he denied being aware of the existance of a collective-bar- 256 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD gaining agreement between the Union and Mishcom. Yet, he admits that he was aware that the Union repre- sented the employees employed by Mishcom at the Christopher Street facility. Moreover, in a plan submit- ted by Babad at the time of purchase of the Christopher Street facility to a state agency concerning the conver- sion of the apartment building to a cooperative, he listed among the outstanding contracts the collective-bargain- ing agreement with the Union. Further, I take note of a history of similar unfair labor practices committed by Board as an officer of other corporations and similar ad- verse credibility resolutions by administrative law judges. J.R.R. Realty Co., 273 NLRB 1523 (1985); Tilden Arms Management Co., 276 NLRB 1111 (1985). The Union took no further action following Respond- ent's refusal to reply to its August 7 letter until April 30, 1985, when the Union sent Respondent a letter asserting their representation of Respondent's service employees and requesting negotiations. Respondent did not respond to this letter. Respondent had in the interim period, exe- cuted a collective-bargaining agreement with Local 2 which, as discussed below, I conclude to be violative of Section 8(a)(1) and (2). As set forth above, I have concluded that Respondent was a successor to Mishcom. The law is clear that a suc- cessor is obligated to recognize and bargain with the labor organization that represented the employees of the predecessor employer. Premium Foods and Saks Fifth Avenue, supra. Thus on August 7, when the Union re- quested bargaining, Respondent was at that time obligat- ed to bargain. That the Union took no action in further- ance of its August 7 request for negotiations until April 30, 1985, is not alone sufficient to remove such bargain- ing obligation from Respondent. Flex Plastics, 262 NLRB 651, 656, 657 (1982); Pioneer Inn, 228 NLRB 1263, 1265 (1977), enfd. 578 F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1978). Respondent submitted no evidence to establish that the Union no longer enjoyed a majority status, or that Respondent had a good faith and reasonably grounded doubt of the Union's majority status based on objective considerations and in a context free of unfair labor practices. Pioneer Inn, supra. Terrell Machine Co., 173 NLRB 1480, 1481 (1969), enfd. 427 F.2d 1088 (4th Cir. 1970). Clearly Re- spondent cannot contend that the Union lost its majority status when three of the four service employees retained by Respondent from Mishcom voluntarily quit and Re- spondent hired replacements because new employees are presumed to support the Union in the same ratio as those whom they have replaced. Pennco Inc., 250 NLRB 716 (1980). Respondent cannot contend that its doubt of the Union's continuing majority was based on a majority of its employees who signed cards for Local 2 in November 1984 because, as set forth below, I find such cards were obtained as a result of Respondent's coercion. Respondent contends that because the initial demand for negotiation was made on August 7, 1984, any unfair labor practice based on such demand would be time barred under Section 10(b) must be pleaded or litigated at the hearing, or is waived. Flex Plastics, supra at fn 6; Mckesson Drug Co., 257 NLRB 468 fn. 1 (1981). This de- fense was neither pleaded nor litigated. Accordingly, I conclude that the Union was and is presently the designated bargaining representative of Re- spondent's employees and that Respondent , by failing to recognize and bargain with the Union, violated Section 8(axl) and (5) of the Act. Sometime in October 1984, three of the four service employees represented by the Union voluntarily left Re- spondent's employ. Babad hired three replacements as a result. In mid-October 1984, Babad hired replacement em- ployee Mario Santiago as the superintendent and Tito Pagan. Babad spoke with Santiago on his hire. Pagan was present but does not speak English . Babad credibly testified that during the interview he asked Santiago if he was a member of the Union. Santiago indicated he was not. He told Babad he had been a member of Local 2, but that he did not like Local 2 and did not want to be represented by it. Babad replied that Local 2 was a good union and that he need not worry about joining it be- cause he would pay the employees dues. Babad then told Santiago that he would not deal with the Union and that he was going to get rid of Juan Nieves (the remaining holdover employee who was represented by the Union). Babad denied this conversation . I credit the testimony of Santiago. I was generally impressed with the demean- or of Santiago . As set forth above, I do not find Babed to be a credible witness. Moreover, his prior history in connection with the Union and Local 2 supports Santia- go's testimony. Tilden Arms Management Co. and J.R.R. Realty Co., supra. I find Babad's question concerning whether he was a member of the Union to be unlawful interrogation in vio- lation of Section 8(a)(1). In this connection Santiago was not an open supporter of the Union and the interrogation occurred in connection with other unlawful statements. Rossmore House, 269 NLRB 1176 (1984). I also find Babad's offer to pay the employees dues to Local 2 to be violative of Section 8(a)(1) and (2). Busi- ness Envelope Manufacturers, 227 NLRB 280 (1976); Sweater Bee by Banff, 197 NLRB 805 (1972). I further find Babad's statement that he was going to get rid of Nieves to be an unlawful threat of discharge in violation of Section 8(a)(1). Devon Blake was hired by Respondent sometime about mid-October as the third replacement employee. Blake credibly testified that shortly after his hire Babad came over to him while he was working and asked him if any of the employees had spoken to him about the Union. Blake said Nieves had spoken to him about the Union. Babad told him he must not join the Union. Blake and Santiago testified that several times during the period of February and March, Babad asked them whether a union representative had visited the building. Babad denied these conversations. For the reasons set forth above, I do not credit Babad. I find Babad's questions to Blake concerning whether employees had spoken to him and his questions to Blake and Santiago whether a union representative had visited the building to constitute unlawful interrogation and to be violative of Section 8(a)(1). Rossmore House, supra. I also find Babad's statement to Blake that he must not CHRISTOPHER STREET CORP 257 join the Union an unlawful warning in violation of Sec- tion 8(a)(1). Sometime in November 1984, Blake credibly testified that he spoke to Babad and asked him if the job provided for medical benefits. Babed told him if he wanted medi- cal benefits he would have to join Local 2. Babad denied this conversation. For the reasons set forth above, I do not credit Babad. I further find such statement to be a promise of medical benefits to induce employees to prefer Local 2 and violative of Section 8(a)(1) and (2). Mego Corp., 254 NLRB 369, (1981). Santiago credibly testified that sometime in February 1985, Pagan requested that he, Santiago, ask Babad for a raise. (Presumably Pagan acted through Santiago because he did not speak English and Santiago did.) Santiago thereafter asked Babad about a raise for the employees and Babad said he would give all three employees raises. In view of Babad's conduct in this case described above and below, and his prior conduct in other cases Tilden Arms and J.R.R Realty, supra, I find such promise to grant a wage increase violative of Section 8(a)(1) and (2). Mego Corp., supra. Santiago credibly testified that sometime around the middle of December 1984 Babad called him into his office. He gave Santiago three Local 2 authorization cards. He instructed him to sign one and to obtain signed cards from Blake and Pagan. Babad denied this conversation For the reasons set forth above, I do not credit Babad. Moreover, such in- struction is consistent with his past practice of attempt- ing to avoid bargaining with the Union. Tilden Arms and J.R.R. Realty, supra. Santiago credibly testified that later that day, follow- ing the instructions of Babad, he gave Local 2 authoriza- tion cards to Blake and Pagan and told them that Babad told him that they had to sign them. Both Blake and Pagan expressed reluctance to sign the cards but signed them and gave the signed cards to Santiago based on his assurance that Babad had issued such order. Santiago's testimony is corroborated by both Blake and Pagan. Santiago thereafter gave to Babad his signed card and those of Blake and Pagan. On January 31, 1985, Babad executed a collective-bar- gaining agreement with Local 2. Babad admits that Local 2 agreed to delay the execution of the collective- bargaining agreement as an accomodation to Babad. Babad testified he signed the collective-bargaining agreement pursuant to a demand by a representative from Local 2, who showed him signed authorization cards by a majority of his employees. In view of my prior credibility resolution I do not credit this testimony. Moreover, in an investigatory affidavit, Babad stated he granted recognition on the Local 2 representative's oral representation that he had signed cards from a majority of employees. The affidavit does not indicate that the Local 2 representative actually showed l3abad the au- thorization cards as Babad had testified at trial. The evidence establishes that Santiago signed a Local 2 card solely because he was ordered to by Babad. Babad then instructed him to obtain signed cards from Blake and Pagan. In obtaining these signed cards San- tiago made it clear to the employees that he was acting pursuant to Babad's instructions. His status as the build- ing superintendent would naturally lend credibility in the minds of Blake and Pagan as to his agency status. In view of Babad's specific instructions to Santiago con- cerning his obtaining signed cards from Blake and Pagan, I conclude Santiago was acting as Babad's agent in this connection within the meaning of Section 2(13) of the Act. Jacobo Marti & Sons, 264 NLRB 30, 33 (1982). In view of my finding, discussed above, that Respond- ent was obligated to bargain with the Union, I find that Respondent, by executing a collective-bargaining agree- ment with Local 2 at a time it was under an obligation to bargain with the Union violated Section 8(a)(1) and (2) of the Act. Harbor Cartage, 269 NLRB 927 (1984); Elias Mallouk Realty Corp., 265 NLRB 1225 (1982). Moreover, assuming it were concluded that Respondent was not ob- ligated to bargain with the Union, in view of Respond- ent's coercion in obtaining signed cards on behalf of Local 2, I would conclude that Respondent unlawfully assisted Local 2 in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) to such an extent that Respondent be ordered to withdraw recognition from Local 2. Elias Mallouk Realty Corp., supra; Ford Brothers, 263 NLRB 92 (1982). CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent is an employer within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. The Union and Local 2 are labor organizations within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. All service employees employed by Respondent at its Christopher Street building is an appropriate unit for bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. 4. At all times material, the Union has been the exclu- sive bargaining representative of the employees in the above unit within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. 5. By refusing to recognize and bargain with the Union, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act. 6. By executing and maintaining a collective-bargain- ing agreement with Local 2 at a time when Local 2 did not represent an uncoerced majority of Respondent's em- ployees, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (2) of the Act. 7. By offering to pay union dues for its employees, Re- spondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (2) of the Act. 8. By promising its employees improved medical bene- fits and a wage increase to induce them to become and remain members of Local 2, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (2) of the Act. 9. By warning its employees not to join the Union, Re- spondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 10. By threatening its employees with discharge if they became or remained members of the Union, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 11. By interrogating its employees concerning their membership in, or activities on behalf of the Union, Re- spondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 258 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD THE REMEDY It is recommended that Respondent cease and desist from its unfair labor practices and take certain affirma- tive action deemed necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act. Respondent shall be ordered to recognize and bargain with the Union on request, and if an understanding is reached, embody it in a signed collective-bargaining agreement. Respondent shall be further ordered to withdraw rec- ognition from Local 2 as the exclusive bargaining repre- sentative of its employees and to cease giving effect to any collective-bargaining agreement between it and Local 2. On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the following recommend- ed' ORDER The Respondent, Christopher Street Owners Corp., New York, New York, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall 1. Cease and desist from (a) Refusing to recognize and bargain collectively with Local 32B-32J, Service Employees International Union, AFL-CIO as the exclusive collective-bargaining repre- sentative of its employees in the following appropriate unit: "All service employees employed by Respondent at its 165 Christopher Street building." (b) Maintaining, enforcing, or giving effect to any col- lective-bargaining agreement between Respondent and Local 2, New York State Independent Union of Building Service Employees and Factory Workers, N.F.I.U. (c) Offering to pay union dues on behalf of its employ- ees of Local 2, or any other labor organization. (d) Promising its employees improved medical benefits, wage increases, or other improvements in their working 1 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102.46 of the Board's Rules and Regulations , the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec 102 48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur- poses. conditions in order to induce them to become or remain members of Local 2 or any other labor organization. (e) Warning its employees not to join the Union or any other labor organization. (f) Threatening is employees with discharge if they become or remain members of the Union, or any other labor organization. (g) Interrogating its employees about their membership in, or activities on behalf of, the Union or any other labor organization. (h) In any like or related manner interfering with, re- straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act. (a) Recognize and bargain, on request, with the Union as the exclusive bargaining representative of the employ- ees in the appropriate unit described above, with respect to wages, hours, and other conditions of employment, and if an understanding is reached, embody such under- standing in a signed agreement. (b) Withdraw recognition from Local 2 as the exclu- sive bargaining representative of its employees in the ap- propriate unit described above. (c) Post at its 165 Christopher Street apartment build- ing, and at Respondent's office, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."2 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 2, after being signed by the Respondent's authorized repre- sentative, shall be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other materi- al. (d) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days from the date of this Order what steps the Re- spondent has taken to comply. 2 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Nation- al Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board "