Bickerstaff Clay Products, Co., Inc.

BICKERSTAFF CLAY PRODUCTS 295 Bickerstaff Clay Products, Co., Inc. and Laborers' Local Union No. 246. Case 10-CA-21681 30 September 1987 DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS BABSON, STEPHENS, AND CRACRAFT On 15 December 1986 Administrative Law Judge J. Pargen Robertson issued the attached de- cision. The Respondent filed exceptions and a sup- porting brief. The National Labor Relations Board has delegat- ed its authority in this proceeding to a three- member panel. The Board has considered the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and brief and has decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings, i and conclusions, 2 as modified, 3 and to adopt the rec- ommended Order as modified. ORDER The National Labor Relations Board adopts the recommended Order of the administrative law judge as modified below and orders that the Re- spondent, Bickerstaff Clay Products, Co., Inc., Phenix City, Alabama, its officers, agents, succes- sors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Order as modified. Insert the following as paragraph 2(e) and relet- ter the subsequent paragraphs accordingly. "(e) Preserve and, on request, make available to the Board or its agents for examination and copy- ing, all payroll records, social security payment ' The judge states that the record does not show what portion of the 304 employees working on 9 April 1986 was made up of replacements, returning strikers, or employees that did not engage in the strike We note, however, that R Exh. 29 shows that on 4 April 1986 there were 304 employees at work, of whom 93 were replacements, 133 strikers who had returned to work, and 78 employees who had not struck 8 In agreeing with the judge that the Respondent has not shown that it had a good-faith doubt based on objective considerations that the Union represented a majority of its employees when it withdrew recognition on 9 April 1986, we find that the total evidence presented by the Respond- ent is insufficient to rebut the presumption of the continued majority status that the Union enjoyed as the incumbent bargaining representative We find it unnecessary to apply any presumption whether the employees who replaced the strikers supported or did not support the Union See Station KKHI, 284 NLRB 1339 (1987) Moreover, in accepting the judge's conclusion that the Respondent has not met its burden of estab- lishing a good-faith doubt, we note that the evidence does not show any linkage between the changes that took place in the Union 's leadership and any employee dissatisfaction with the Union s We add to the remedy section of the judge's decision the provision that interest on any monetary award be computed in accordance with our decision in New Horizons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987) Interest on and after 1 January 1987 shall be computed at the "short-term Federal rate" for the underpayment of taxes as set out in the 1986 amend- ment to 26 U S C § 6621 Interest on amounts accrued prior to 1 January 1987 (the effective date of the 1986 amendment to 26 U S C § 6621) shall be computed in accordance with Florida Steel Corp, 231 NLRB 651 (1977) records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records necessary to analyze the amounts due under the terms of this Order." Mary L Bulls, for the General Counsel. Richard Y. Bradley, for the Respondent. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE J. PARGEN ROBERTSON, Administrative Law Judge. This case was heard in Columbus, Georgia, on 16 July 1986. The complaint alleged that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) by withdrawing recognition from Laborers' Local Union No. 246 on 9 April 1986; by re- fusing to sign a collective-bargaining agreement with the Union; and by refusing to provide the Union with re- quested information regarding bargaining unit employees from 9 April 1986. In its answer Respondent denied that it is an Alabama corporation as alleged in the complaint. However, Respondent admitted that it is engaged in the manufacture and sale of brick and concrete products at its Phenix City, Alabama operations and that it meets the Board's commerce standards and is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. Although Respondent answered that it has insufficient information to respond to the allegation that the Union is a labor organization, the entire record showed that Respondent and the Union have negotiated various collective-bargaining agreements regarding wages, hours, and other conditions of employment for employees of Respondent on regular occasions since 1965. Respondent and the Union last met for the purpose of negotiating a contract on 13 January 1986. Subse- quently, as shown below, the Union offered to accept a collective-bargaining agreement proposal of Respondent on 8 April 1986. In view of that evidence I find that the Union is, and has been at all times material here, a labor organization engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. The General Counsel also alleged that Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act since 8 April 1986, by refusing to reinstate employees that engaged in a strike. However, by motion included in her brief, the General Counsel moved to withdraw complaint para- graphs 17 and 19, which alleged that Respondent has re- fused to reinstate striking employees. The General Coun- sel asserted in that motion that the evidence presented by Respondent during the hearing here, "established that it had hired permanent replacements to fill the positions of striking employees; . . . and striking employees who sought reinstatement are being reinstated as openings occur." In view of the record, I grant the General Coun- sel's motion to withdraw paragraphs 17 and 19 of the complaint. Since 1965 the Union, Laborers' Local No. 246, has represented certain of Respondent's employees. At that time the Union was certified as the exclusive bargaining representative for employees in one of Respondent's three plants. Subsequently, in 1966, Respondent voluntar- ily recognized the Union as the exclusive representative 286 NLRB No. 27 296 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD for all employees in the below-described unit, after Re- spondent consolidated its operations into a single corpo- rate entity: All production and maintenance employees em- ployed by Respondent at its Plants 1 and 2, Ceram- ic, Alabama; Plant 3, Dixieland, Alabama; and Plant 4 at Brick Yard, Alabama, including the Sample Department (Ceramic, Alabama), but exlcuding the Material Handling Division, plant clerical employ- ees, supervisors, office clerical and professional em- ployees as defined in the Act. Respondent and the Union negotiated several collec- tive-bargaining agreements and their most recent agree- ment expired on 31 October 1985. On 29 August 1985 the Union advised Respondent of its plan to negotiate changes in the existing collective-bargaining agreement. Respondent and the Union met, and negotiated on sever- al occasions beginning on 17 September 1985. Respondent made a "final offer" on 6 November 1985. On 11 November 1985, the Union struck. Out of the bar- gaining unit of 304 employees, 195 employees originally participated in the strike against Respondent . Respondent did not cease operations. One hundred and nine unit em- ployees did not engage in the strike, and Respondent im- mediately began hiring permanent replacements for the striking employees. On 20 January 1986 those unit employees actually working totaled 300. Respondent offered evidence that before 20 January and continuing thereafter, it was at "full strength" of bargaining unit employees. On 23 January 1986, Respondent advised the Union that negotiations were at an impasse and that it was insti- tuting increased "wages and other benefits for those working in the plants in accordance with the company's final proposal which was made on November 6, 1985." By 8 April 1986 letter, the Union advised Respondent that it accepted "the final offer made by the company on November 6, 1985." In that letter, the Union asked for a listing of all employees currently working, along with various matters regarding each working employee. On 9 April 1986 Respondent wrote the Union: This will acknowledge receipt of your letter of April 8, 1986 regarding your union and Bickerstaff Clay Products Company, Inc. Based upon facts and circumstances which have oc- curred since the strike at our client's plant, we seri- ously doubt that your union represents a majority of our employees. Under these circumstances we do not believe that we can recognize your union as the bargaining agent for our employees. Therefore, our last offer is no longer outstanding to your union and your offer to sign a collective bargaining agreement with our client is declined. Furthermore, your re- quest for information about our employees is re- fused. On 9 April 1986 at least 147 former striking employees had abandoned the strike and returned to work with Re- spondent. I At the hearing, Respondent's chief executive officer responded to questions regarding matters that he consid- ered in determining to withdraw recognition from the Union. That testimony, which is paraphrased below, in- cluded: (1) To the question did the significant number of replacements of former strikers that came back to work in spite of "the violence," indicate whether the employees desired to have the union continue to represent them, Richard Bickerstaff, replied that that factor indicated to him that the employees had no interest in the Union representing them and it further indicated to him that the people that had gone on strike were beginning to feel that they had been totally mislead, intimidated, and harrassed. (2) To the question what part if any, did the re- ceipt by Respondent of some 38 "written resigna- tions either from membership or from the checkoff" have to do with your decision to withdraw recogni- tion, Bickerstaff replied that was an indication that some of the employees had taken close enough notice of the situation to actually resign in writing. However, he went on to say that the other employ- ees "didn't see the need to turn in a resignation," in view of the fact that there was no dues checkoff and the employees "all felt that they were out of the union because they were working." (3) To the question whether the fact that the Union did not involve itself in grievances on behalf of employees after the strike commenced have any significance in the determination to withdraw rec- ognition, Richard Bickerstaff responded that he as- sumed that the union had "abandoned." Richard Bickerstaff also testified that his daily routine carried him past the union hall on his way home, and that he noticed a drop off in activity around the hall from the time the strike began until he decided to withdraw recognition. (4) Richard Bickerstaff testified that some of the returning employees expressed disillusionment and dissatifaction with the Union because, to his knowl- edge, no strike funds were made available to strik- ing employees. (5) Bickerstaff testified that he was also impressed with his understanding that under the circumstances similar to those existing with Respondent at the time he withdrew recognition, another local of the national union had abandoned a bargaining unit at a nearby employer in the same industry as Respond- ent. (6) In response to his attorney's questions, Bicker- staff testified that he was also influenced in deter- mining to withdraw recognition, by local newspa- per articles indicating that one of the striking em- ' Respondent's records show that 147 former stnkers had returned by the period ending 6 April 1986 The next reporting period ended on 13 April As of that date 149 former strikers had returned to work BICKERSTAFF CLAY PRODUCTS 297 ployees had said that he and most of the others on strike would never go back to work for Bickerstaff unless the employees won a favorable settlement. That newspaper article was dated 8 January 1986. (7) In making his decision to withdraw recogni- tion Bickerstaff testified that he was also influenced by the fact that an NLRB unfair labor practice charge against Respondent in March 1986 was filed by an individual rather than the Union, and by the fact that on 6 March 1986, an unfair labor practice charge was filed against the Union alleging that the Union had failed in its duty to fairly represent Bick- erstaff employees. (8) Bickerstaff testified that he was also influ- enced in determining to withdraw recognition by the fact that the number of pickets at Respondent's facilities dropped off considerably from the time near the beginning of the strike until the period shortly before he withdrew recognition. In that regard Respondent offered evidence showing that the total number of pickets at Respondent's facilities fluctuated between 14 and 39 until 22 December 1985. Subsequently, during March 1986, the total number of pickets did not exceed eight and during the week ending 30 March 1986 there were only two employees picketing Respondent's facilities. Since 30 March 1986 there have been no pickets at Respondent's facilities. Conclusions Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act pro- vides to employees the exclusive right "to bargain collec- tively through representatives of their own choosing" or "to refrain from any or all such activities .. . ." In view of those provisions it is important to exercise caution where, as here, the determination as to representation or lack of representation is made by an employer. NLRB v. Koenig Iron Works, 681 F.2d 130, 137, 138 (2d Cir. 1982). Both the Board and the courts have historically pro- ceeded cautiously in cases of this type. In instances where the employer and the Union were parties to one or more collective-bargaining agreements it is presumed that the Union continued to serve pursuant to the wishes of a majority of the employees in the bargaining unit. At- lanta Hilton & Towers, 278 NLRB 474 (1986). That pre- sumption continues after the collective-bargaining agree- ment expires (Carmichael Construction Co., 258 NLRB 226 (1981)), and may be rebutted by evidence showing either; (1) That the Union actually lost its majority sup- port; or (2) That the employer had a good-faith doubt based on objective considerations of the continued existence of majority support for the Union. Aquas- lide N' Dive Corp., 281 NLRB 219 (1986); Pennco, Inc., 250 NLRB 716 (1980), enfd. 684 F.2d 240 (6th Cir. 1982). In the instant case the record does not show that the Union actually lost majority support. Instead Respondent argues that it had a good-faith doubt based on objective considerations that the Union maintained majority sup- port. Concerning the General Counsel' s allegation that the parties reached a collective-bargaining agreement that Respondent refused to sign on 9 April 1986, the record offers support for that complaint allegation. On 6 No- vember 1985, Respondent made a final offer of a new collective-bargaining agreement. On 11 November 1985 the Union struck Respondent's operations. Thereafter, on 23 January 1986 Respondent notified the Union, in part: The Company is desirous of increasing wages and other benefits for those working in the plants in ac- cordance with the Company's final proposal which was made on November 6, 1985. After due consideration, we have concluded that negotiations are and have been at an impasse and accordingly, the Company will put its final proposal into effect as of January 27, 1986. Subsequently, by 8 April 1986 letter, the Union wrote Respondent as follows: This is to inform you that Laborers' Local 246, affiliated with the Laborers' International Union of North America, AFL-CIO, has accepted the final offer made by the Company on November 6, 1985. It is my understanding that the Company has im- plemented the terms of that final proposal on Janu- ary 27, 1986. We will be available to meet and sign the Agreement on Monday, April 21, 1986 if this meets with your schedule. Please contact the under- signed at 404-325-0006 to confirm this date. If you need assistance in preparing the document for signa- ture please contact me. Additionally, please forward to me a listing of all employees currently working at your Phenix City, Alabama operations. Along with their name, please include the following information: address, phone number, social security number, date of hire, job as- signment, rate of pay, marital status, shift, and number of dependants. By this letter we are offering an unconditional return to work for all striking employees and re- quest you provide me with a listing of all employees you place on the preferential hiring list. I look forward to seeing you on the 21st of this month. On the following day, 9 April 1986, as shown above, Respondent informed the Union that its final offer was no longer outstanding and that it would not sign a col- lective-bargaining agreement. On 8 April 1986 Respondent had taken no action to withdraw its contract offer of 6 November. The 8 April letter stated categorically that the Union accepted Re- spondent's 6 November offer. At that time Respondent had not questioned the Union's majority status. Respondent's chief operating officer, President Herbert Fuller, testified that in negotiations before 6 November 1985, Respondent and the Union had reached agreement on all but a few points, such as "probationary period, 298 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD bulletin board use, call in pay . . . (w)e were still drasti- cally apart on the economic issues." Regarding econom- ics Fuller's testimony shows that the parties had failed to agree on wage increases, increased pension and insurance contributions and holidays. Respondent's 6 November "final offer" covered all the outstanding issues mentioned by Fuller and, in combination with the other issues pre- viously agreed to by Respondent and the Union, consti- tuted a complete contract. On 10 November 1985 Respondent was advised by the local's business agent that the "Union has voted to reject the offer and to strike effective 6 a.m., Monday morning, November 11." Before the strike, Respondent and the Union had nego- tiated with the assistance of a Federal mediator. After the strike Respondent and the Union met again on 18 November and 9 December and negotiated with the as- sistance of the Federal mediator. On 12 December Re- spondent's chief executive officer, Richard Bickerstaff, met with a representative of the International Union, Paul Chappelear. Finally, Respondent and the Union met and negotiated with the assistance of the Federal media- tor on 13 January 1986. On 23 January 1986 Respondent notified the Union that in its view negotiations were at an impasse and it was implementing increased "wages and other benefits ... in accordance with the company's final proposal which was made on November 6, 1985." Jurisprudence indicates that Respondent's 6 November final offer may have remained outstanding despite origi- nal rejection of that offer. In Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 659 F.2d 87, 90 (8th Cir. 1981), the court held: Under the policy (of the National Labor Relations Board), an offer, once made, will remain on the table unless explicitly withdrawn by the offeror or unless circumstances arise which would lead the parties to reasonably believe that the offer had been withdrawn. [See also the underlying Board Deci- sion, Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 251 NLRB 187, 189 (1980); Pennasquitos Gardens, 236 NLRB 994 (1978), enfd. 603 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1979); Shawn's Launch Service, 261 NLRB 866 (1982).] The facts in Pepsi-Cola, were similar to those here in that the Union engaged in an economic strike and reject- ed the Company's final offer. Here Respondent did not withdraw its final offer before acceptance by the Union and the evidence reveals no "circumstances . . . which would lead the parties to reasonably believe that the offer had been withdrawn." In fact, Respondent's 23 January letter expressed its intent to implement the provisions of that offer. Re- spondent contends that the Union abandoned its role as representative of the unit employees. However, that ar- gument must be rejected. Respondent offered evidence showing that it was aware of continued picketing in sup- port of the Union's strike through 30 March 1986, and Respondent was aware of involvement by the Interna- tional Union. Respondent presented evidence regarding an unfair labor practice charge filed against the Union on 6 March 1986. In his letter dismissing that charge, which was sent to the Union and Respondent, the National Labor Relations Board's Regional Director mentioned findings that, although the Union's local business agent had resigned, the local was placed under trusteeship of the International and the "International Union's Regional Office sent a number of representatives to the local in an effort to assist the local members who were participating in a strike against Bickerstaff Clay Products." Respond- ent was aware of the International Union's activities. Re- spondent negotiated with the representives from the International and it was to those representatives from the International that Respondent sent its 23 January 1986 letter. Finally, even though Respondent's "final offer" was accepted by the Union's business agent without a sup- porting vote of the numbers, the record evidence illus- trated that the business agent had constitutional authority to accept Respondent's contract proposal. I find that from 8 April 1986, Respondent and the Union were parties to a new collective-bargaining agree- ment as finally proposed by Respondent to the Union on 6 November 1985. Cowles Publishing Co., 280 NLRB 903 (1986). Respondent defends the allegation that it also violated Section 8(a)(5) by withdrawing recognition of the Union on 9 April, on the grounds that it had a good-faith doubt of the Union's majority status. Respondent contends that it was justified in withdraw- ing recognition because of a presumption that new hires and former strikers who cross a picket line in an atmos- phere of violence do not support the Union. As of 9 April 1986, 304 employees were actually working in the bargaining unit. However, there was no showing that a substantial number of those employees initially crossed the picket line while there were ongoing incidents of vi- olence flowing from the strike. The record does show incidents of violent activity. However, those incidents occurred at the very beginning of the strike. On 15 November Respondent, with the consent of the Union, secured an injunction prohibiting violence. A newspaper article reported that on 14 No- vember a "shotgun blast was fired into the home of a Bickerstaff Clay Product's Co., employee who had con- tinued to work during the strike. .. ." That article, which was dated 17 November 1985, reported that shot- gun blast was the second shooting incident since the strike and that other incidents including slashed tires, had been reported to police. Subsequently, the same newspa- per, the Columbus, Georgia "Ledger-Enquirer," pub- lished a calendar of events in the "Bickerstaff strike." The only incidents of violence mentioned in that 10 No- vember through April calendar of events were the two shooting incidents mentioned above. The calendar listed those shooting events as occurring 13-14 November. Fi- nally, affidavits filed with the Respondent's 15 Novem- ber 1985 petition for a writ of injunction included only some of the incidents of violence mentioned above, along with some threats against employees. The 17 November newspaper article reported two cut tires on Monday night, 11 November. BICKERSTAFF CLAY PRODUCTS 299 All the reported violent activity occurred from the evening of 11 November through the evening of 14 No- vember. There were no incidents of violence after Re- spondent was granted an injunction of 15 November. According to Respondent's records, 85 replacements were hired before the close of business on 15 November 1985. As shown above, 109 employees did not participate in the strike. On 17 November, which is the first date shown on records in file, four strikers had returned to work. When Respondent withdrew recognition on 9 April, 304 employees were working in the bargaining unit. At that time at least 147 strikers had returned to work and a total of 227 replacements had been hired. The record does not show what portion of the 304 employees work- ing on 9 April was made up of replacements, returning, or employees that did not engage in the strike. Nor does it show how many of the employees that were working on 15 November remained at work on 9 April. In a recent case the Board found that an employer was justified in withdrawing recognition from a Union on the grounds of good-faith doubt concerning continued ma- jority status. However, in that case, Stormor, Inc., 268 NLRB 860 (1984), the credited evidence showed that re- placements and returning strikers crossed the picket line despite "continued violent strike activity over an ex- tended period-approximately 3-1/2 months" and that "approximately 20 percent of the nonstriking employees, speaking for themselves and in some instances purporting to speak for other nonstrikers" repudiated or rejected the Union. Here the period of violent activity was brief and the evidence regarding rejection or repudiation was limited to 15 employees who resigned from the Union. Although Richard Bickerstaff testified that "people" indicated "dis- illusionment and dissatisfaction with the Union because the Union failed to provide the promised strike benefits," Bickerstaff was unable to recall the name of any of those people. The instant case is closely aligned with the facts in NLRB v. Pennco, Inc., 684 F.2d 240 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied 459 U.S. 994 (1982). There the court enforced a Board order holding that an employer violated Section 8(a)(5) by withdrawing recognition. Although there was picket line violence in Pennco, the Board refused to en- dorse the employer's action when the picket line vio- lence occurred 3-1/2 months before the withdrawal of recognition. Here, the violence occurred almost 5 months before Respondent withdrew recognition (See also the Board's Decision in Pennco, Inc., 250 NLRB 716 (1980). Respondent argues that it received 38 withdrawals from employees. The record shows that of the 38 with- drawals of dues-checkoff deduction authorization, only 15 employees expressed a desire to resign from the Union. Additionally, Richard ]Bickerstaff testified that employees other than the 38 that submitted dues-deduc- tion withdrawals all felt that they were out of the Union. Respondent offered no objective evidence supporting Bickerstaff's testimony that other employees felt they were out of the Union. His "belief" without some foun- dation is entitled no weight. The 38 cues-deduction with- drawals do not evidence withdrawal of support, and the 15 resignations do not constitute a substantial withdraw- al. (See NLRB v. Koenig Iron Works, 681 F.2d 130, 138 (2d Cir. 1982).) Respondent's argument that the Union abandoned its representative role does not find support in the record. Even though the contact between the Union and Re- spondent lapsed between Respondent's 23 January letter and the Union's letter of 8 April, the Board has consist- ently found that longer periods do not justify a finding that the Union has abandoned its role. Cowles Publishing Co., 280 NLRB 903, 912 (1986). Here the Union's pres- ence was apparent by its picketing activity through 30 March-some 8 days before the Union accepted Re- spondent's final contract offer. Bickerstaffs testimony that he did not see sustained activity when he drove by the union hall does not establish absence of union activi- ty. Moreover, even though the union business agent re- signed in early December 1985, the Union was in trustee- ship under direction of the same business agents from before the Union's and Respondent's last negotiating ses- sion on 13 January, until after Respondent withdrew rec- ognition. Therefore, the change in business agents does not contribute to a valid good-faith doubt Cowles Publish- ing Co., supra. As in Cowles Publishing Co., the Union's involvement in grievance activity lapsed following the 11 November strike. However, Respondent did not advise the Union of any grievances after 11 November and the one unfair labor practice charge against the Union alleging failure of representation, was dismissed by the Regional Director. Contrary to Respondent's contention, the record does not show any relationship between the instant circum- stances and the fact that another local of the Internation- al abandoned its representation duties at another unrelat- ed employer in central Georgia. Although picketing activities dropped off until it ceased on 30 March, that action shows only that those employees finally abandoned the strike. That abandon- ment was admitted by the Union's 8 April letter offering, on behalf of the striking employees, to return to work. That offer also mitigates the affects of newspaper articles pointed to by Richard Bickerstaff indicating that some employees vowed not to return to work until they re- ceived a favorable settlement. The letter offered to return to work all strikers. See NLRB v. Koenig Iron Works, 681 F.2d 130, 144 (2d Cir. 1982). The decision in NLRB v. Randle-Eastern Ambulance Service, 584 F.2d 720 (5th Cir. 1978), which was cited by Respondent, must be distinguished. In Randle-Eastern, the Union did not agree to a contract before the employ- er withdrew its final offer. As in this case, Randle-East- ern hired replacements during an economic strike and several returning strikers resigned from the Union. How- ever, the record does not show substantial repudiation or factors permitting an inference of repudiation of the Union to the extent found in Randle-Eastern. In Randle- Eastern, 19 of the 46 returning strikers resigned from the Union. Here only 15 of 147 resigned. In Randle-Eastern some of the 47 permanent replacements indicated disin- terest in the Union. Here the record does not show the 300 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD number of replacements that were actually working on 9 April, but there was no probative evidence showing that a substantial number of the replacements expressed disin- terest in the Union. Finally, although one striker indicat- ed that he would not return absent an acceptable settle- ment, there was no evidence showing that anyone de- clined the right to reinstatement. On 8 April the Union made an unconditional offer on behalf of all strikers to return to work. In Randle-Eastern, the Union told the employer that 20 percent of the strikers would not return to work. The facts here demonstrate and I find that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) by withdrawing recogni- tion from the Union. The Union's 8 April letter requested that Respondent furnish a listing of all unit employees along with informa- tion regarding each of those employees. That informa- tion is necessary for the Union to accomplish its duties as bargaining representative. As an employer, the Respond- ent has an obligation to provide information that is needed by the bargaining representative for the proper performance of its duties. In view of my other findings here, it is apparent, and I find, that Respondent also vio- lated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) by refusing to supply the Union with the requested information (Cowles Publishing Co., 280 NLRB 903 (1986), and cases cited therein). CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. The Union is a labor organization within the mean- ing of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. All production and maintenance employees em- ployed by Respondent at its Plant 1 and 2, Ceramic, Ala- bama; Plant 3, Dixieland, Alabama; and Plant 4 at Brick Yard, Alabama, including the sample department (Ce- ramic, Alabama), but excluding the material handling di- vision, plant clerical employees, supervisors, office cleri- cal and professional employees as defined in the Act con- stitute a unit appropriate for the purpose of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. 4. By refusing to sign the agreement designated by Re- spondent's final offer and agreed to on 8 April 1986, Re- spondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. 5. By withdrawing recognition from the Union as the representative of the employees in the aforementioned bargaining unit, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. 6. By failing and refusing to furnish the aforesaid labor organization with the information requested by it on 8 April 1986 regarding employees in the bargaining unit, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. 7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. The record is unclear whether Respondent instituted all the added benefits included in its final offer. If neces- sary, that question may be resolved in compliance pro- ceedings and, if it is determined that Respondent failed to implement all added benefits, the remedy here shall act to restore the status quo ante in accord with the terms of the agreed to collective-bargaining agreement effective 8 April 1986, as shown in Turnbull Enterprises, 259 NLRB 934 (1982); and Ogle Protection Service, 183 NLRB 682 (1970).2 On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the following recommend- ed3 ORDER Respondent, Bickerstaff Clay Products, Co., Inc., its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall 1. Cease and desist from (a) Refusing to execute the collective-bargaining agree- ment with the Laborers' Local Union No. 246, which was agreed to on 8 April 1986. (b) Withdrawing recognition on 9 Apirl 1986 and re- fusing to recognize and bargain with Laborers' Local Union No. 246 as a representative of the following unit: All production and maintenance employees em- ployed by Respondent at its Plants 1 and 2, Ceram- ic, Alabama; Plant 3, Dixieland, Alabama; and Plant 4 at Brick Yard, Alabama, including the Sample Department (Ceramic, Alabama), but excluding the Material Handling Division, plant clerical employ- ees, supervisors, office clerical and professional em- ployees as defined in the Act. (c) Refusing to furnish the aforesaid labor organization with the information requested by it on 8 April 1986. (d) In any like or related manner interfering with, re- straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act. (a) Execute forthwith the collective-bargaining agree- ment with the Union, which was agreed on 8 April 1986. (b) Implement all the terms of the aforesaid collective- bargaining agreement and, if necessary, restore the status quo ante in accord with the provisions of the remedy section of this Decision. (c) On request, bargain with the aforenamed labor or- ganization as the exclusive representative of all employ- ees in the aforesaid bargaining unit regarding rates of pay, wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of em- ployment. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent engaged in, and is en- gaging in, certain unfair labor practices, I shall recom- mend, pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, that it cease 2 See generally Isis Plumbing Co, 138 NLRB 716 (1962). 8 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the Board's Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec 102 48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur- poses BICKERSTAFF CLAY PRODUCTS 301 (d) On request, furnish the above-named labor organi- zation with the information it requested on 8 April 1986. (e) Post at its offices and places of business copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."'°Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 10, after being signed by the Respondent's au- thorized representative, shall be posted by the Respond- ent immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60 con- secutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Rea- sonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (f) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days from the date of this Order what steps the Re- spondent has taken to comply. * If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Nation- al Labor Relations Board " shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board " APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the National Labor Relations Act and has or- dered us to post and abide by this notice. Section 7 of the Act gives employees these: rights. To organize To form, join, or assist any union To bargain collectively through representatives of their own choice To act together for other mutual aid or protec- tion To choose not to engage in any of these protect- ed concerted activities. WE WILL NOT refuse to recognize Laborers' Local Union No. 246 as the exclusive bargaining representative of our employees in the followng described appropriate bargaining unit: All production and maintenance employees em- ployed by Respondent at its Plants 1 and 2, Ceram- ic, Alabama; Plant 3, Dixieland, Alabama; and Plant 4 at Brick Yard, Alabama, including the Sample Department (Ceramic, Alabama), but excluding the Material Handling Division, plant clerical employ- ees, supervisors, office clerical and professional em- ployees as defined in the Act. WE WILL NOT refuse to execute the collective- bargain- ing agreement with the Union, which was agreed on 8 April 1986. WE WILL NOT refuse to furnish the above-named labor organization with information requested by it, by letter, on 8 April 1986. WE WILL, on request, bargain collectively with the Union as exclusive representative of the employees in the appropriate unit described above regarding wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment. WE WILL execute forthwith the collective-bargaining agreement with the Union, which was agreed on 8 April 1986. WE WILL, on request, furnish the above-named labor organization the information it requested on 8 April 1986. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act. BICKERSTAFF CLAY PRODUCTS, INC.