Amoco Oil Co.

460 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Amoco Oil Company and Francis C. Thill and Robert B. Schalkle and George Hagerott, Jr. Cases 18-CA-6651, 18-CA-6651-2, and 18- CA-6651-3 30 September 1987 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN DOTSON AND MEMBERS JOHANSEN AND BABSON On 21 October 1981 Administrative Law Judge Donald R. Holley issued the attached decision. The Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief. The National Labor Relations Board has delegat- ed its authority in this proceeding to a three- member panel. The Board has considered the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and brief and has decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings, and conclusions only to the extent consistent with this Decision and Order. The General Counsel and the Respondent (Amoco) stipulated the relevant facts and docu- mentary evidence here. Briefly, Amoco and Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union (OCAW) and its Local 6-10 (collectively the Union) were parties to a collective-bargaining agreement effective from 8 January 1979 to 7 Janu- ary 1981, covering approximately 116 operating and maintenance employees at Amoco's Mandan, North Dakota refinery, the only location involved here. Pursuant to contract "reopener" provisions, the parties bargained about certain economic items not otherwise involved here. When the parties failed to reach agreement, the Union commenced a lawful economic strike as of 11:59 p.m. on 8 Janu- ary 1980,1 which continued until 29 March. Amoco maintained a "closed-gate" policy for the entire period of the strike, whereby no member of the bargaining unit was permitted to work, irre- spective of whether he or she was willing and able to do so. Thus, no bargaining unit employees per- formed or were permitted to perform any work for the Company from 8 January until 29 March, and the Company operated the refinery solely with su- pervisors and other nonbargaining unit employees throughout this period.2 i All dates hereafter are 1980 unless otherwise designated 2 In Amoco Oil Co, 285 NLRB 918 (1987) (Case 14-CA-13423 et al) and Amoco Oil Co., 286 NLRB 369 (1987) (Case 5-CA-12159 et al., Amoco II), we noted that Amoco's closed-gate policy had its genesis, in part, in strikes at two facilities in the late 1950s, during which Amoco had permitted unit employees to cross picket lines and work Uncontro- verted testimony in the above cases showed that violence ensued and that friction and ostracism of employees who crossed those picket lines still existed at the time of the hearings in those cases As we further noted there, the closed-gate policy was also designed to ensure that the refinery can schedule personnel to "safely and efficiently" run the around-the- In addition to contractual provisions, the Re- spondent provides several benefit plans that are maintained by Amoco's parent company and are available to employees of the parent company and its subsidiaries, including Amoco. Included among those are the Sickness and Disability (S&D) and Occupational Illness and Injury (OI&I) Plan. A booklet on "Employee Benefit Plans" summarizes the plans for employees' convenience, although it specifically does not fully describe all their provi- sions.3 The collective-bargaining agreement specifi- cally provides that the benefit plans "shall not in any instance be or become a part of this Agree- ment." Regarding the eligibility under the S&D and OI&I plan involved here, the judge found: To become eligible to receive benefits under either plan, three conditions must be satisfied: (1) the employee must be verifiably injured or ill; (2) the employee must not have exhausted the benefit plans in question; and (3) the em- ployee must be scheduled to work. There must be a disability-related loss of compensation. All employees are advised in the employee booklet that they are not eligible to receive S&D and OI&I benefits while they are on vacation, leave of absence, suspension or layoff, but will become eligible for these benefits at the time they are otherwise due to return to work. Consequently, by example, these benefits would be suspended for an employee who had been receiving them when placed on layoff as of the time the employee immediately below him on the seniority list is laid off. In the event of continued disability, benefits would resume when the employee just below in se- niority is recalled by Respondent. Amoco suspended the benefits of the three charging party employees concurrent with imple- mentation of its closed-gate policy on 9 January.4 The judge found that the Respondent thereby vio- lated the Act, relying on the Board's decision in Emerson Electric.5 For the reasons indicated below, we do not adopt the judge's analysis, and shall dis- miss the complaint.6 clock operation during a strike Amoco II, supra, fn 4 As in those cases, the General Counsel does not contend that the "closed gate policy" or lockout is in any manner unlawful and we express no opinion on the law- fulness of this policy or its application to the Mandan refinery 3 The judge inadvertently stated that the plans were fully described in the booklet 4 The Respondent's suspension of other benefits or suspension of cer- tain company-paid insurance premiums is not alleged to be unlawful 5 Emerson Electric Co, 246 NLRB 1143 (1979), enfd as modified 650 F 2d 463 (3d Cir 1981), cert denied 455 U S 939 (1982) 6 The Respondent in its exceptions contends, inter alia, that the judge erred in failing to find Emerson Electric inapposite to the factually distin- guishable situation in this case, and that the judge erred in failing to find Continued 286 NLRB No. 40 AMOCO OIL CO. 461 In Texaco, Inc., 285 NLRB 2.41 (1987), the Board extensively reviewed the analyses of both Board and court cases in this area and expressly overruled the "coercive effects" theory of Emerson Electric. Rather, the Board concluded that the "question of whether an employer violates Section 8(a)(3) or (1) by refusing to continue benefit payments to a dis- abled employee on commencement of a strike will be resolved by application of the Great Dane test for alleged unlawful conduct."7 More recently, in Amoco Oil Co., 285 NLRB 918 (1987) (Case 14-CA-13423 et al., noted in fn. 2, supra), the Board, applying the principles articulat- ed in Texaco to basic facts virtually indistinguish- able from those in this case, reversed the judge's findings that the Respondent violated the Act and dismissed the complaint. In concluding there that the Respondent had come forward with legitimate and substantial busi- ness justification for its suspension of benefits suffi- cient to rebut a prima facie case made out by the General Counsel, the Board relied on the follow- ing. The Respondent's S&D and 01& 1 Plan is de- signed to protect wages that disabled employees would otherwise have earned. The employee bene- fit handbook notes certain situations in which pay- ments are discontinued, including, inter alia, leaves of absence, vacations, and layoffs; and provides that benefits will resume when a disabled employee is "otherwise due to return to work." The Board concluded that the listed events illustrated the gen- eral requirement that "work must be available in order for a disabled employee to be entitled to con- tinued payment of disability benefits." (Amoco, supra.) The Board further cited undisputed testimo- ny there by the director of benefits plans and per- sonnel policy for the Respondent and its parent that the strike settlement agreements negotiated by the employees ' desig- nated exclusive bargaining representative, including the withdrawal of all pending unfair labor practice charges, was not binding on the represented employees. In view of our grounds for dismissal set forth infra, we find it unnecessary to pass on these contentions in detail As the Board noted in Texaco, supra at fn 12, citing 388 U S at 34 The Court in NLRB v. Great Dane [Trailers, 388 U S. 26 (1967),] ar- ticulated the following test for alleged unlawful motivation First, if it can reasonably be concluded that the employer's dis- criminatory conduct was "inherently destructive" of important em- ployee rights, no proof of an antiunion motivation is needed and the Board can find an unfair labor practice even if the employer intro- duces evidence that the conduct was motivated by business consider- ations Second, if the adverse effect of the discriminatory conduct on employee rights is "comparatively slight," an antiunion motivation must be proved to sustain the charge if the employer has come for- ward with evidence of legitimate and substantial business justifica- tions for the conduct Thus, in either situation, once it has been proved that the employer engaged in discriminatory conduct which could have adversely affected employee rights to some extent, the burden is upon the employer to establish that he was motivated by legitimate objectives since proof of motivation is most accessible to him company that "this general requirement has been applied by the Respondent consistently in the past on a corporatewide basis to various situations in- cluding lockouts." (Ibid.) Finally, the Board found that the Respondent's implementation of the plan's dual eligibility require- ments, i.e., of being both disabled and scheduled to work, was not discriminatory. Rather, it was con- sistent "with the terms of the plan and the Re- spondent's past practice with respect to disabled employees for whom no work was available both due to lockouts and for reasons other than a lock- out." (Amoco, supra.) Finally, the Board found that there was no record evidence to support a conclu- sion that the Respondent's conduct was inherently destructive of employee rights. (Ibid.) That deci- sion is controlling here.8 As in that case, no work was available to represented employees pursuant to the closed-gate policy, which has not been alleged to be unlawful, regardless of employees' union membership or participation in the strike. Accord- ingly, we shall dismiss the complaint in its entirety. ORDER The complaint is dismissed. 8 As noted above, the basic facts here are virtually indistinguishable from those in Amoco, supra The events here involve the same corpor- atewide plan (with minor details not relevant here) and the same applica- tion of the Respondent's closed-gate policy during a nationwide strike called by OCAW International and its Locals at several facilities of the Respondent, as well as certain other employers Nancy Gossell Lagaard, Esq., for the General Counsel. John J. McGirl, Esq. and Lisa M. Hurwitz, Esq. (Doherty, Rumble & Butler), of Minneapolis, Minnesota, for the Respondent. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE DONALD R. HOLLEY, Administrative Law Judge. On charges filed by Francis C. Thill (Thill), Robert B. Schalkle (Schalkle), and George Hagerott, Jr. (Hagerott) in Cases 18-CA-6651(1-3), the Regional Director for Region 18 of the National Labor Relations Board (the Board) issued a complaint on July 9 , 1980, alleging, inter alia, that Amoco Oil Company (Respondent) violated Section 8(a)(l) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act), by discontinuing the payment of sickness and disability benefits and/or occupational illness and injury benefits to Thill, Schalkle, and Hagerott from Jan- uary 8, 1980, until March 29, 1980, because they were employees in a bargaining unit that engaged in a strike against Respondent during the period described. Re- spondent filed a timely answer denying that it had en- gaged in the unfair labor practices alleged in the com- plaint. The case was tried before me in Bismarck, North Dakota, on January 14, 1981 On the entire record, in- 462 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD cluding posthearing briefs filed by the parties and the tes- timony of the witnesses and my observation of their de- meanor, I make the following FINDINGS OF FACT I. JURISDICTION Respondent, a Maryland corporation, is a wholly owned subsidiary of Standard Oil of Indiana and is en- gaged in the operation of a refinery at Mandan, North Dakota. During the 12-month period ending December 31, 1979, it, in the course and conduct of its Mandan op- erations, sold and shipped from its Mandan facility prod- ucts, goods, and materials valued in excess of $50,000 to customers located outside the State of North Dakota. It is admitted, and I find, that Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. II. STATUS OF LABOR ORGANIZATION The complaint alleges, Respondent admits, and I find that Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union, Local 6-10, AFL-CIO (the Union) is a labor or- ganization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Facts 1. Chronology of events Respondent manufactures light fuel at its Mandan re- finery, which is operated 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Some 191 persons are employed at the facility; approxi- mately 127 are hourly paid employees. The Union has represented the hourly paid employees for an undis- closed period of time, and the collective-bargaining agreement in effect at the time of the commission of the alleged unfair labor practices was placed in the record as Joint Exhibit 2. The contract, which was effective during the period January 8, 1979, through January 7, 1981, contains a "reopener" clause that entitled the Union to elect to reopen for the purpose of renegotiating wages, revision of a medical plan, and vacation schedules on or after November 1, 1979.1 By letter dated Novem- ber 1, 1979, the Union exercised its option to reopen the contract noting therein that if no agreement was reached by January 8, 1980, it had the right to strike "without further notice."2 Negotiating sessions were held on December 19 and 22, 1979, and January 4 and 7, 1980. No agreement was reached. Consequently, the Union indicated at the Janu- ary 7 session that it would strike at midnight on January 8. When the Union indicated on January 7 that it intend- ed to strike, James J. Cowley, manager of employee rela- tions at the Mandan facility and Respondent 's chief spokesman at the negotiations, advised representatives of the Union that: Amoco intended to continue to operate during any strike; that a staff program had been estab- ' See memorandum of understanding attached to the agreement 2 See R Exh. 1. lished with supervisors and personnel not represented by the Union so that operations would continue safely, effi- ciently, and without interruption; and that no work would be made available during the strike to employees in the Union's bargaining units who might want to work.3 Cowley also advised the union representatives that wages and certain benefits, including sickness and disability benefits (S & D benefits) and occupational ill- ness and injury benefits (01 & I benefits), normally pro- vided by Amoco, would be discontinued for union-repre- sented employees if a work stoppage occurred and no work was scheduled for union-represented employees during the work stoppage. On that date, the representa- tives of the Union did not specifically object to a suspen- sion of S & D and 01 & I benefits, but instead stated that only the three items under negotiation could be terminat- ed by the Company. On January 8, Respondent notified bargaining unit em- ployees by letter that it intended to operate the refinery with supervisors and unrepresented personnel during the strike, which was scheduled to begin on January 9.4 The letter indicated that no work would be made available, at the outset of the strike, to bargaining unit employees who might desire to work. The letter advised that em- ployees who desired to work during the strike could telephone a given number to indicate such desire to enable Respondent to contact them if it decided in the future to make work available to bargaining unit employ- ees. Finally, the letter advised employees that certain benefits, including S & D benefits and 01 & I benefits, would be discontinued during the strike, and that em- ployees should take designated action to assure that other benefits (medical plan and life insurance) would remain in effect while they were not working. When the strike started at midnight on January 8, em- ployees Robert Schalkle and Francis Thill were on sick leave and were receiving S & D benefits. By separate let- ters dated January 9, 1980, Respondent notified both em- ployees, inter alia, that the refinery would be operated by supervisors and unrepresented personnel during the strike; that at that time no work would be made available to bargaining unit employees during the strike; and that S & D benefits would be discontinued until "such time as the strike ends or work is made available to employees in the bargaining unit, whichever occurs sooner."5 Shortly before the strike began, bargaining unit em- ployee George Hagerott Jr. was injured on the job. It is undisputed that Respondent 's manager of employee rela- s When work is not made available by the Repondent and employees are not scheduled to work, the Respondent defines this as its "closed gate" policy The Respondent's witnesses testified that the adoption of its "closed gate" policy was solely out of its concern for potential violence and animosity among the employees The Respondent wished to avoid the repetition of strike-related violence and animosity it had experienced in 1959 at its refineries in Sugar Creek , Missouri, and Texas City, Texas. No written policy dictating when a facility should implement a closed gate exists Rather, companywide discussion occurs when a strike is an- ticipated The final decision is made by each facilities ' manager. The deci- sion to implement the closed gate policy at the Mandan refinery was made by Respondent's refinery manager, William A Burns, several days before January 8 4 See it Exh. 4 See it Exhs 5(A) and (B) AMOCO OIL CO. 463 tions, Cowley, informed Hagerott that 01 & I benefits would be discontinued during the strike and closed gate. The parties stipulated that no work was made avail- able to employee Schalkle, Thill, or Hagerott during the strike; that each employee remained a member in good standing in the Union at all times; and that before discon- tinuing the S & D benefits and failing to implement the 01 & I benefits, Respondent did not first investigate whether the above-named employees were still sick, dis- abled, or whether they engaged in public support of the strike. During the strike, employee Thill was released by his doctor and engaged in picketing on behalf' of the Union on January 28. Hagerott was released by his doctor on March 6. Schalkle had not recovered when the strike ended on March 29. On March 28, the Respondent and the Union entered into strike settlement agreements entitled "'Memorandum of Agreement and a Return to Work Agreement." Pur- suant to these agreements, the closed gate policy was lifted, the strike ended, and the employees returned to work on March 29 at 4 p.m. In accord with a provision in the memorandum of understanding, the Union request- ed that the unfair labor practice charge it filed with the Board on January 31 be withdrawn. The Union's charge alleged, among other things, that Respondent's discon- tinuation of S & D and 01 & I benefits during the strike constituted an unfair labor practice.' The Regional Di- rector for Region 18 of the Board approved the with- drawal of the Union's unfair labor practice charge on April 8.8 2. TheS&Dand0I&Ibenefitsplans The record reveals the S & D and 01 & I benefit plans are in effect at all of Respondent's facilities and are appli- cable to represented as well as unrepresented employees. The S & D plan provides employees with benefits when their illness or disabilities are not job related, and the 01 & I plan provides benefits for injury or illness that are occupationally caused or related. Employees are not re- quired to make contribution to either plan and while issues pertaining to the plans may be processed through the grievance procedure set forth in the collective-bar- gaining agreement, the agreement specifically provides the plans shall not be part of the agreement and that issues pertaining to the plans are not subject to referral to arbitration.9 The plans are not funded. Instead, they are financed by Respondent from current earnings. Respondent's benefit plans, including the S & D and 01 & I benefit plans, are fully described in Joint Exhibit 3 entitled "Employee Benefit Plans." Thus, the booklet reveals an employee must be employed by Respondent for 1 year before he or she is covered by the S & D ben- efit plan. After 1 year, an employee is entitled to receive up to 2 weeks of full pay and 4 weeks of half pay if eligi- bility requirements are met. Thereafter, S & D benefits increase yearly until the maximum benefit of 12 weeks of 6 See Jt Exhs 9 and 10 7 See Jt Exh 11(A) 8 See Jt Exh 11(B) 8 it Exh 2, art XII, p 31 full pay and 40 weeks of half pay is reached with 10 or more years of employment with Respondent. In contrast, 01 & I eligibility begins immediately on employment with Respondent. 01 & I benefits do not in- crease with continued employment. If an employee is eli- gible, the benefits provide for 12 weeks of full pay and 40 weeks of half pay. To become eligible to receive benefits under either plan, three conditions must be satisfied: (1) the employee must be verifiably injured or ill; (2) the employee must not have exhausted the benefit plans in question; and (3) the employee must be scheduled to work. There must be a disability related loss of compensation. All employees are advised in the employee booklet that they are not eli- gible to receive S & D and 01 & I benefits while they are on vacation, leave of absence, suspension, or layoff, but will become eligible for these benefits at the time they are otherwise due to return to work. Consequently, by example, these benefits would be suspended for an employee who had been receiving them when placed on layoff as of the time the employee immediately below him on the seniority list is laid off. In the event of con- tinued disability, benefits would resume when the em- ployee just below in seniority is recalled by Respondent. Employee eligibility under each plan is further refined in companywide guidelines used by each facility's employee relations manager. i ° In these guidelines, each plan has a subsection entitled "Circumstances Under Which Bene- fits Shall Not Be Given." The section under S & D states. Benefits shall not be given while an employee is on vacation, lay-off, or approved absence, or would not have otherwise worked [R. Exh. 3, sec. 3620]. The guidelines for 01 & I indicate that No benefits shall be given while an employee would not have otherwise worked or after an employee leaves the service of the Company under the Retire- ment Plan [R. Exh. 3, sec. 37.15]. Finally, employees receive nothing from the S & D and 01 & I benefit plans when they die or retire and unused benefits do not accrue or convert and cannot otherwise be claimed. B. Analysis and Conclusions Recently, in Emerson Electric Co., 246 NLRB 1143 (1979), the Board found an employer had violated Sec- tion 8(a)(l) and (3) of the Act by discontinuing, during a strike, sickness and accident benefits of employees who had been receiving them when the strike began, stating, inter alia (at 1143 and 1144): [A]n employer may no longer require its disabled employees to disavow strike action during their sick leave in order to receive disability benefits. To allow the termination of such benefits to certain em- ployees as a result solely of the strike activities of 'OR Exh 3 464 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD others is to penalize the employees who have not yet acted in support of the strike. To the extent that Southwestern Electric Power Co. . . . is inconsistent with our decision herein, it is hereby overruled. [W]e now hold that for an employer to be justified in terminating any disability benefits to employees who are unable to work at the start of a strike it must show that it has acquired information which indicates that the employee whose benefits are to be terminated has affirmatively acted to show public support for the strike. Barring such affirmative action . . . we agree . . . that the disabled employ- ees found herein to have been discriminated against are entitled to (sickness and accident) benefits for the full length of their sickness or disability. In the instant case, Respondent made no attempt to show that it acquired information that indicated that em- ployees Schalkle, Thill, and Hagerott had affirmatively acted to show public support for the strike before they were denied S & D and/or 10 & I benefits for the length of the strike and/or the closed gate period. Consequent- ly, it would appear Respondent has failed to satisfy its burden of proof and the violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) has been established. For the reasons discussed below, Respondent contends no violation of the Act was committed. Respondent's principal defense is a contention that Emerson Electric is not applicable because the instant case is factually distinguishable. Thus, Respondent ob- serves that in Emerson Electric the sickness and disability benefits were part of the collective-bargaining agreement and the employer decided to deprive employees of such benefits during a strike because it assumed they support- ed the strike. Turning to the instant situation, Respond- ent observes that S & D and OI & I benefits are not part of the collective-bargaining agreement and the alleged discriminatees were deprived of benefits during the strike because Respondent lawfully decided for valid business reasons, that it would not make them available to bar- gaining unit employees during the strike. Respondent contends the factual difference should cause me to con- clude that specific proof of an intent to discriminate is necessary if the violations alleged are to be found. I reject the contentions. Inspection of Emerson Electric reveals the Board was faced in that case with a situation wherein employees had earned the right to receive sickness and disability benefits before a strike occurred. In that instance, the in- volved employees were deprived of such benefits during the strike because their fellow bargaining unit members elected to strike. The Board necessarily concluded that the action of the employer was inherently discriminatory as no specific evidence of antiunion animus was offered. In the instant case, each of the alleged discriminatees were entitled, at the time the strike began, to receive S & D and/or 01 & I benefits. They were entitled to receive such benefits for the same reason the employees involved in Emerson Electric were entitled to receive such bene- fits, i.e., past service and/or job-related injury. Why conclude the answer must be that they were deprived of the benefits because their fellow bargaining unit employ- ees elected to strike. Here, Respondent simply accom- plished indirectly precisely the same object accomplished directly in Emerson Electric. In sum, I find the underly- ing rationale of Emerson Electric is applicable to the in- stant case and conclude that the General Counsel was not obligated to offer specific proof of union animus to establish the violation alleged. Remaining for discussion is Respondent's contention that the alleged discriminatees were bound by the Union's agreement to withdraw charges that alleged that Respondent's discontinuation of S & D benefits and 01 & I benefits during the strike and the closed gate violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. The claim is clearly without merit as a union cannot waive the right of em- ployees to file charges under the Act. l' For the reasons stated, I find that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act by depriving employ- ees Robert B. Schalkle and Francis C. Thill of S & D benefits and by depriving employee George Hagerott Jr. of OI & I benefits because their fellow bargaining unit employees elected to strike. By notifying the named employees they would be de- prived of such benefits before ascertaining whether they supported the strike, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES ON COMMERCE The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III, above, found to constitute unfair labor practices oc- curring in connection with its operations described in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow thereof. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The Respondent is an employer engaged in com- merce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. 2. Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union, Local 6-10, AFL-CIO is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. The Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by withholding payment of sickness and dis- ability and occupational illness and injury benefits during a strike from the three employees named below in the remedy section of this decision for periods when these emloyees were not participants in the strike. 4. The Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by announcing to employees that during a strike by the above-named Union, sickness and disability and occu- pational illness and injury benefit payments would be withheld from employees then receiving same who were not strike participants. were they deprived of the benefits they had earned? I 11 See Sec 10(a) of the Act and Emerson Electric, supra at 1149 AMOCO OIL CO. 465 5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. THE REMEDY Having found that the Respondent has engaged in cer- tain unfair labor practices, it will be recommended that the Respondent be required to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectu- ate the policies of the Act. It having been found that the Respondent unlawfully withheld sickness and disability and occupational illness and injury benefit payments from the three employees listed below during a strike at times when they were not strike participants, these employees should be reimbursed for benefits lost under these plans for January 8, 1980, the date the strike began, when these benefits payments were discontinued, until the dates shown below next to the names of the respective employees: t 2 Robert B. Schalkle March 30, 1980 Francis C. Thill January 28, 1980 George Haggerott Jr. March 6, 1980 [Recommended Order omitted from publication.] 12 Interest shall be computed in accordance with Florida Steel Corp.. 231 NLRB 657 (1977)