Ecker Manufacturing Corp.

470 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Ecker Manufacturing Corp . and Gerardo Walker. Case 2-CA-20845 30 September 1987 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN DOTSON AND MEMBERS JOHANSEN AND BABSON On 16 October 1985 Administrative Law Judge Joel P. Biblowitz issued the attached decision. The General Counsel and the Respondent filed excep- tions and supporting briefs, and the Respondent filed a brief in opposition to the General Counsel's exceptions. The National Labor Relations Board has delegat- ed its authority in this proceeding to a three- member panel. The Board has considered the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings, and conclusions only to the extent consistent with this Decision and Order. The judge found that the Respondent did not violate Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act by dis- charging employee Gerardo Walker in accordance with the collective-bargaining agreement's union- security clause. After careful review of the record, we disagree with the judge for the reasons below. The Respondent is engaged in the wholesale manufacture and nonretail sale of glass windows and related products. Employee Walker was hired on or about 21 May 1984. Pursuant to the 1 March 1982 to 28 February 1985 collective-bargaining agreement, the Respondent deducted union dues from Walker's pay. In September 1984 Walker asked the Respondent about these deductions and was told that the agreement's security clause re- quired this of all employees. On 17 February 1985 Walker called the union office, seeking an appointment with the union phy- sician. Walker was denied the appointment because his name was not on the union membership records. Walker stated that he had paid his initi- ation fee and that his dues had been deducted and asked what he could do. The Union told Walker to resolve this problem with the Respondent. Walker returned to work the following day and sought an explanation from the Respondent why he was not on the union rosters even though the Re- spondent had been deducting union dues from his paycheck. Walker asserted that the Respondent was stealing his money. Walker demanded return of his money and generally spoke in a raised voice. Although the Respondent told Walker that it would examine its records and show Walker that the money had been deducted from his pay as a union member, Walker continued to question the Respondent's motives and demanded a refund of his dues. On the afternoon of that day, the Re- spondent tendered Walker two checks-one for ac- crued pay due and one in an amount of the union dues deducted. Based on Walker's credited testimo- ny, the judge found that the Respondent then told Walker he was discharged because he did not want to be a member of the Union. The Respondent's contention at the hearing that Walker was dis- charged for insubordination was found by the judge to be without merit.I The judge found, nonetheless, that Walker was lawfully discharged because he successfully de- manded that the Respondent return his union dues. We disagree because the facts do not support a conclusion that Walker was in default of his dues obligations. There is no evidence that the Union re- quested Walker's discharge for any reason. The record is unclear whether Walker's dues, which had been withheld from his pay by the Respond- ent, were forwarded to the Union. The fact that the Union informed Walker that he was not on its roster does not place Walker in default, nor was Walker in default by demanding and accepting the money withheld from his wages from the Respond- ent. 2 i The judge discredited evidence that Walker was told he was dis- charged for insubordination Although we agree with the judge's rejec- tion of the Respondent's argument that Walker was fired for insubordina- tion, our analysis goes further Under NLRB v City Disposal Systems, 465 U S 822 ( 1984), an employee's attempt to assert and protect rights arising from a collective-bargaining agreement is concerted activity, for which the employee may not be discharged unless his conduct is so egregious as to lose the Act's protection It is apparent that Walker's inquiries and protests about the disposition of his wages allegedly withheld as dues to satisfy the union-security provision in the parties' collective-bargaining agreement were the core basis for his discharge We further find Walk- er's conduct was not so egregious (much less insubordinate) as to be beyond the Act's protection Consequently, Walker could not lawfully have been discharged for invoking his contract rights 8 If Walker's dues were forwarded to the Union, then Walker was not in default on his dues obligations . If, on the other hand, his dues had not been forwarded to the Union, the fault was with the Respondent and not Walker, as it is admitted that the deductions were taken from Walker's pay In adopting the judge's crediting of Walker's testimony over that of Respondent Vice President Katz and Executive Vice President Ecker, Member Babson relies on the judge's findings with respect to the de- meanor of the witnesses He therefore finds it unnecessary to pass on the judge's additional reliance on the failure of Katz and Ecker, or their at- torney, to inform the Board agent of alleged inaccuracies in their un- signed affidavits Member Babson further notes that although Supervisor Escovedo testified that he told Walker that he was discharged for insub- ordination, the judge did not specifically credit this portion of Escove- do's testimony and it is clear that the judge credited Walker's version over all others that he was discharged for successfully demanding the return of his back dues Additionally, Member Babson does not join his colleagues in finding a violation here based on City Disposal In so doing, he notes that the Gen- eral Counsel did not advance this theory at the hearing He, however, agrees for the other reasons set forth in this decision that the Respondent violated the Act by discharging Walker 286 NLRB No. 42 ECKER MFG. CORP. 471 Assuming, arguendo, that Walker was in arrears, the Respondent failed to give Walker adequate notice of his obligations under the union-security clause.3 The judge stated Walker had been ap- prised previously that payroll deductions were being made as required by the contract. The judge found this to be sufficient notice to Walker that employment turned upon union membership. Al- though this conclusion is, at the least, arguably in- correct, we need not address it further as the judge also erred regarding the lack of any need to notify Walker to pay his dues directly to the Union. The judge concluded that this notification was not nec- essary as Walker clearly indicated he wanted his dues back for that period and that any notice given to him would have gone unheeded. We disagree. It cannot be concluded without more that Walker would not have paid dues directly to the Union, es- pecially when in the circumstances here Walker had a reasonable and good-faith doubt that the Re- spondent was fulfilling its obligation by forwarding the withheld funds to the Union. Accordingly, we find that Walker's discharge was unlawful. AMENDED CONCLUSION OF LAW Substitute the following for Conclusion of Law 3. "3. The Respondent discharged Gerardo Walker in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act." REMEDY Having found that the Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act, we shall order it to offer Gerardo Walker immediate and full rein- statement to his former job or, if that job no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position, with- out prejudice to his seniority or any other rights and privileges previously enjoyed, and make him whole for any loss of earnings or other benefits suf- fered as a result of the discrimination against him as prescribed in F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950), with interest as computed in the manner prescribed in New Horizons for the Retard- ed.4 5 There is no showing that the refund given Walker was obtained from the Union by the Respondent Assuming, then, that the Respondent prop- erly forwarded Walker 's moneys to the Union, it follows that Walker would not have been in arrears simply by receiving the refund from the Respondent * In accordance with our decision in New Horizons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 ( 1987), interest on and after 1 January 1987 shall be computed at the "short-term Federal rate" for the underpayment of taxes as set out in the 1986 amendment to 26 U S.C i§ 6621 Interest on amounts accrued prior to I January 1987 (the effective date of the 1986 amendment to 26 U.S C § 6621) shall be computed in accordance with Florida Steel Corp, 231 NLRB 651 (1977) ORDER The National Labor Relations Board orders that the Respondent, Ecker Manufacturing Corp., New York, New York, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall 1. Cease and desist from (a) Discharging employees for asking about the disposition of funds deducted from their pay pursu- ant to the union-security clause. (b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the ex- ercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action neces- sary to effectuate the policies of the Act. (a) Offer Gerardo Walker immediate and full re- instatement to his former job or, if that job no longer exist, to a substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to his seniority or any other rights or privileges previously enjoyed, and make him whole for any loss of earnings and other bene- fits suffered as a result of the discrimination against him, in the manner set forth in the remedy section of the decision. (b) Remove from its files any reference to the unlawful discharge and notify Gerardo Walker that this has been done and that the discharge will not be used against him in any way. (c) Preserve and, on request, make available to the Board or its agents for examination and copy- ing, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this Order. (d) Post at its facility in New York, New York, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."5 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Re- gional Director for Region 2, after being signed by the Respondent's authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent immediately upon re- ceipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where no- tices to employees are customarily posted. Reason- able steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (e) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days from the date of this Order what steps the Respondent has taken to comply. 5 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Nation- al Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board " 472 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to post and abide by this notice. WE WILL NOT discharge employees for asking about money deducted from their pay pursuant to the union-security clause. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the exer- cise of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act. WE WILL offer Gerardo Walker immediate and full reinstatement to his former job or, if that job no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent posi- tion, without prejudice to his seniority or any other rights or privileges previously enjoyed and we will make him whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits resulting from his discharge, less any net interim earnings, plus interest. WE WILL notify him that we have removed from our files any reference to his discharge and that the discharge will not be used against him in any way. ECKER MANUFACTURING CORP. Marisel M. Ayabarreno, Esq., for the General Counsel. Edmund P. D'Elia, Esq., for the Respondent. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE JOEL P. BIBLOwrrz, Administrative Law Judge. This case was tried before me in New York, New York, on 9 and 23 May 1985.1 The complaint, which issued on 8 March and was based on an unfair labor practice charge filed by Gerardo Walker, an individual, alleges that Ecker Manufacturing Corp. (Respondent) violated Sec- tion 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act by discharging Walker on 18 January because it believed that he was not a member of International Production Employees Union, Local 72 (the Union), "notwithstanding that at no time prior to discharging him did Respondent advise Walker of the amount of dues he allegedly owed to the Union, the method of computation, the consequences of non-pay- ment and of the deadline as to paying the monies alleg- edly owed." Respondent, while admitting that it dis- charged Walker on 18 January, alleges that it was solely due to insubordination, i.e., the disruption he caused at its facility when he demanded the return of the dues pre- viously deducted from his salary and paid to the Union. I Unless otherwise indicated, all dates referred to are for the year 1985. On the entire record, including my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses and the briefs received, I make the following FINDINGS OF FACT 1. JURISDICTION Respondent, a New York corporation with its office and place of business located in New York, New York (the facility), is engaged in the wholesale, manufacture, and nonretail sale of glass windows and related products. In the course and conduct of these business operations, Respondent derives gross revenues in excess of $50,000 directly from the sale of its products to firms located outside the State of New York. Respondent admits, and I find, that it is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. II. LABOR ORGANIZATION STATUS Respondent admits, and I find, that the Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. FACTS AND ANALYSIS Walker commenced his employment with Respondent on about 21 May 1984. In about September 1984 he no- ticed that union dues and/or initiation fees had been de- ducted from his pay. On seeing this he asked Juan Esco- vedo, his supervisor (and an admitted supervisor within the meaning of the Act) why this was done. "He told me that I received a raise and they take in Union dues be- cause I was not a member of the Union." Admittedly, between that time and 18 January, Walker was a member of the Union and dues were deducted from his wages. The collective-bargaining agreement between Respond- ent and the Union, effective 1 March 1982 through 28 February 1985, provides that all employees hired after the effective date of the agreement will become members of the Union on the 30th day following the beginning of such employment. The agreement also provides that all new employees shall receive a 15-cent-per-hour wage in- crease after 30 days' employment. On 17 January Walker was ill and did not report to work; he called the union office that day and asked the woman who answered the phone to make an appoint- ment for him with the union doctor. After he gave her his name and social security number she returned to the phone and said that she could not make an appointment for him because the Union's records did not list him as a member. Walker said that he had paid his initiation fee and his dues had been deducted and he asked what he could do. She told him to speak to the Respondent, as there was nothing she could do as his name was not listed on their records. He then called Respondent and told Luis Rodriguez, a "supervisor," what had occurred; Rodriguez told him that Escovedo was not at work that day and told him to speak to Escovedo about it the fol- lowing day. There are credibility issues regarding the events of 18 January; Walker testified that about 10:30 that morning, at his work station, he informed Escovedo that on the ECKER MFG. CORP. 473 prior day the Union told him that he was not a member of the Union. "I told Mr. Escovedo that if I was not a member of the Union, that I want all the dues that I was paid-back to me, because I want all the money for the time I was not covered." Escovedo told him that he would check Respondent's records and inform him of the results. He testified further that he then returned to work and about 1 p.m., "Juanito ... the person that they call the shop steward, the supervisor downstairs," approached him and Walker repeated for him what had occurred the prior day and asked him "to find out if I was in the Union or not, because if I was not, I wanted my money back." Walker gave Juanito his pay slip con- taining the deduction for union dues and Juanito went into the office. A few minutes later , Juanito returned the pay slips to Walker and told him that there appeared to be a mistake; his name was not on the Union's list and "they" would give him his money back. About 4:30 p.m. that day (a regular pay day). Tony-a "supervisor from another department"-2 gave him two checks, his regu- lar paycheck and a check reimbursing him for all previ- ously deducted union dues and initiation fee. He wished him good luck and told him that he can't "work any- more there because if I don't want to be a member of the Union they can't have me working there." Walker then went to see Escovedo and asked him what happened; Es- covedo told him, "that if I don't want to be a member of the Union I can't work anymore." Escovedo said that he would fight for his rights and left. Escovedo's testimony of the events of 18 January is somewhat different; he testified that on that morning, about 10 o'clock Walker approached him and said that he had called the Union the prior day and was told that he was not a member of the Union. Escovedo told him he was a member of the Union and he could prove it. Walker said, "I am not in the Union and I want my money back. I want every penny that I paid or they took it from me. I want it back." Escovedo asked him to give him some time and he would prove that 'Walker was a member of the Union. Escovedo then went to see Re- spondent's bookkeeper and told her of the problem; she checked the records and told Escovedo that all the money that was deducted from Walker's pay was paid to the Union and he was a member of the Union. She showed him the payroll slips for Walker beginning in September 1984 which list deductions of $12.50 and $14 a week for "Initiation" and made copies of these slips. At that time (about 11 a.m.), Escovedo returned to Walker who (in a raised voice) said that Escovedo and Respond- ent were stealing his money and he was not in the Union. Escovedo testified: "he was so excited . . . he put me and the company in a position that we were stealing his money." Escovedo said that they were not stealing his money and he could prove that the money was deducted and sent to the Union, and that he was a member of the Union. Escovedo then returned to the office and about 1 p.m. spoke to Respondent's vice presi- dent Sheldon Katz. He told Katz that Walker was claim- ing that they had stolen his money; Katz told him to give Walker a check to reimburse him for all moneys de- 2 He testified that Tony did not normally give him his paycheck ducted from his pay. Escovedo then told the bookkeeper to prepare a check to Walker in the full amount of the deductions; later that day the foreman gave Walker that check together with his regular paycheck. About 4:30 that day, after Walker was given his checks, Escovedo told him that he was discharged for insubordination; Walker said that he was fired because he wanted his money that was deducted; Escovedo denied this and walked away. Escovedo testified that the decision to discharge Walker was his and he made this determination about 4 p.m. because Walker was insubordinate in their earlier discussions. Escovedo also testified that on that same day, at about noon, he observed Walker carrying a pock- etknife in his back pocket; he feared that something would occur so he approached Walker and informed him that Respondent's rules and regulations prohibit carrying a knife or weapons inside the plant.3 He told Walker that he wanted the knife; Walker gave it to him and took it to the office. He testified that about 10 or 15 minutes later he brought the knife to his boss, Howard Ecker, and later threw it away. Walker testified that he was not car- rying a knife on that day or any day. Ecker, Respond- ent's executive vice president, testified that he was not present at the facility at the time these events occurred; however, on the following workday, 21 January, Esco- vedo showed him a knife that he said Walker was carry- ing. Katz testified that he often walks through the plant and, on 18 January, he heard Walker and Escovedo having a loud, heated conversation; Walker raised his voice and cursed, saying that the Company was com- posed of crooks and thieves and were taking his money. Later, Escovedo told him of his conversation with Walker and that the bookkeeper told him that Walker's dues and initiation fee had been deducted and transmitted to the Union. Katz then spoke to the bookkeeper to verify this and then told Escovedo to reimburse Walker for the amount. He testified, "It was getting out of hand. It was a very emotional situation. To calm the situation and to resolve it as far as clearing the air, I told Juan, 'Let's pay him his money back and bring him back."' Re- spondent never requested, or received, reinf ursement from the Union for this amount. On 21 February Katz was interviewed by a Board agent. The unsigned, uninitialed statement, in the Board agent's handwriting, states, inter alia, that Katz told the bookkeeper to reimburse Walker for his dues and initi- ation fee, "and that since this was a union shop, Walker would have to be terminated." The statement continues I then instructed Escovedo to tell Walker that since he wanted his union dues and initiation fees back, and that since this was a union shop, that Walker could not be an employee of the company . .. Walker was discharged because he was insist- ent that Ecker and the Union were crooks, even S Actually there is no such specific prohibition in Respondent's rules and regulations The rules do provide for warnings for "any employee who behaves in a manner that is deemed to impair the safety of himself or any other employee " 474 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD though we offered to check into the matter and in fact informed Walker that the matter was merely a clerical mistake. If Walker had not insisted on his union dues reimbursement, even after Escovedo told Walker there was a clerical mistake, then Walker would not have been discharged. Katz testified that the above portion which states that Walker was discharged because he had demanded the return of his union dues and initiation fee and that neces- sitated his discharge as Respondent was a union shop is not correct and he never so informed the Board agent. That is the reason he did not sign the statement-"there were inaccuracies in there." He testified that he was not given or shown this statement when he met with the Board agent; he received it in the mail sometime thereaf- ter. After reading it, he informed his attorney that the statement contained a number of inaccuracies, although neither he, nor his attorney, ever informed the Board of these inaccuracies. Ecker testified that on 21 January Katz told him of the incident and that Walker demanded the return of his ini- tiation fee and dues, but he did not tell Ecker that Walker was discharged for that reason. He also testified that on 21 January he called Union President George Ibanez to inform him of the situation, but he never told Ibanez that Walker had to be a member of the Union to work at Respondent and therefore he had to be dis- charged because he demanded the return of his dues and initiation fee. Ecker was also interviewed by the Board agent. His statement, also unsigned and uninitialed , states inter alia, that on 21 January, Katz told him of the 18 January inci- dent, and said that Walker was loud and boisterous, and said that the company and the union were crooks and he demanded the return of his union dues and initiation fees immedi- ately. I then called George Ibanez, President of the Union. I explained to Ibanez exactly what Katz told me . . . I told him we explained to Walker that he had to be in the union to work here, and that by refusing to be in the union, or pay dues, that he could no longer work here. Ecker testified that he first read the Board agent's statement sometime after meeting with him and what he read "did not accurately describe the entire conversa- tion." He did not inform the Board agent of these inac- curacies, nor did he direct his attorney to do so; "He's my attorney and I just told him that I didn't feel that this was 100% accurate." The General Counsel also subpoenaed documents from Respondent in an attempt to establish disparate treat- ment. These documents, together with Ecker's testimo- ny, establish that a certain employee of Respondent was given a warning and suspended for 1 day in January for fighting with a fellow employee; 3 weeks later he re- ceived another warning for lateness; the following day he received another warning for failing to punch his timecard. He received another warning 2 weeks later be- cause he refused to clean his area "and a loud verbal agrument ensued and Howard Ecker went over to see the problem. [The employee] got even louder and even more abusive." A few days later he received another warning for abusing his timecard. Over the next month he received three additional warnings for lateness. About a week later, his last warning states: "Walked out of his job at 11:35. He did not punch his time card. He said I'm going home. He refused to follow instructions. The man was called to do a job and refused." To rebut this testi- mony, Respondent produced a file of an employee who was "summarily discharged for unprovoked insubordina- tion and threatened a fellow worker and supervisor," without previously receiving a warning. I found Walker to be a credible witness who generally appeared to be testifying in an honest and forthright manner; I found Katz and Ecker less convincing and credible witnesses. Most troubling in this regard was their testimony regarding their unsigned affidavits, the contents of which differ substantially from their testimo- ny in a crucial area, why Walker was discharged. Al- though such unsigned affidavits are clearly not affirma- tive evidence to be used to support an allegation, Stanley M. Feil, Inc., 250 NLRB 1154 (1980), testimony regard- ing such statements is admissible regarding credibility. After receiving their statements, neither Katz nor Ecker, nor their attorney, informed the Board agent of the al- leged errors in the statements so they could be corrected and signed. This troubled me because I feel that an honest and forthright witness, who discovers major inac- curacies in a statement he gave to a Government agent, would contact the Government agent to correct those in- accuracies. That Katz and Ecker did not do so casts a cloud over their credibility, in my mind. I therefore credit Walker's testimony over all others and find that he was told that he was discharged because he did not want to be a member of the Union. Walker testified that after he first spoke to Escovedo about 10:30 that morning, he did not speak to him again until after he was informed that he was discharged, that afternoon. Escovedo testified that following his morning discussion with Walker, he met with the bookkeeper and examined Walker's payroll slips which established that deductions for the Union were taken from Walker's pay. At that time, about 11 a.m., he informed Walker that Re- spondent was not stealing his money (as Walker was al- leging) and he could prove that the money was deducted from his pay and sent to the Union and that he was a member of the Union. I credit Escovedo' s testimony in this regard as he appeared to be a fairly credible witness and the testimony is more "believable" than Walker's; after hearing Walker's complaint it was reasonable for Escovedo to investigate it and, on determining that Walker was a member of the Union, it was reasonable for him to inform Walker that he was a member of the Union in order to defuse the situation. Considering the nature of Walker's complaint and the words he used (even according to his testimony), I credit Escovedo's testimony (not denied by Walker) that Walker's allega- tions and demands were made in a raised voice. I also credit Escovedo's testimony that even after he told Walker that he was in the Union and offered to prove it, Walker continued to question Respondent's motive and ECKER MFG CORP. 475 demanded the return of his dues . If he had not done so, I can see no reason why Respondent would have repaid him, out of its own pocket, for the dues deducted. The General Counsel, in her brief, states that Board law requires that certain prerequisites be met before an employee may be lawfully discharged for failure to pay his proper dues. These prerequisites include notice of the amount of dues owed, the consequence of nonpayment, and an opportunity to comply with the union -security re- quirements in order to maintain his employment. The General Counsel also correctly cites McDowell Mfg. Co., 198 NLRB 1229, 1234 (1972), and Brilliant Electric Signs, 258 NLRB 82 (1981 ), for an employer's obligation in this regard. McDowell states: For its part an employer has an obligation of es- tablishing that employees discharged under a union- security clause have been fully and unmistakenly notified of their obligations thereunder . . . or that the employer has reasonable grounds for believing that they have been so notified . . . . Here the Company purported to act, at least in part, because the Union failed to act , and in that sense it stands in the shoes of the Union. Brilliant Electric Signs states at 84: It is well established that an employee cannot be terminated for failure to pay union dues under a valid union-security contract unless he is given ad- vance notice and adequate opportunity to comply with his contract obligations. The Board has also held that it is the employer's responsibility to give the employees such advance notice if the Union does not do so. Having credited Walker's testimony I find that he was discharged because he successfully demanded the return of his back dues . The ultimate question therefore is whether Respondent satisfied the dictates of Philadelphia Sheraton Corp., 136 NLRB 888 (1962), and McDowell and Brilliant Electric Signs. I find that it did. The General Counsel in her brief would impose certain responsibilities on Respondent before it could lawfully discharge Walker: The record is devoid of any evidence demonstrating that Respondent advised Walker of the conse- quences of his nonpayment of dues, how much he owed or that Walker could pay his dues within a specified period of time in order to avoid his dis- charge. As regards the initial proposed obligation , I believe that when Escovedo informed Walker in September 1984 that dues were being deducted from his wages because he previously was not a member of the Union, that was adequate notification that union membership was a requi- site of employment at Respondent (after 30 days' em- ployment). As regards the latter two proposed obliga- tions, there was no need to inform Walker of the amount he owed, as it was the amount of the check Respondent gave him to reimburse him for the dues previously de- ducted from his pay. Finally, it would have served no purpose for Escovedo to tell Walker that he could satisfy the union-security requirements by paying his dues di- rectly to the Union, as Walker's statements to him clear- ly indicated that he wanted his dues back for that period; such a warning would obviously have gone unheeded. I therefore find that Walker was not discharged unlawful- ly. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent is an employer within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. 2. The Union is a labor organization within the mean- ing of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. Respondent has not engaged in any conduct in vio- lation of the Act as alleged. [Recommended order for dismissal omitted from publi- cation.]