Longshoremen Ila Local 3033 (Smith Stevedoring)

798 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD General Longshore Workers, International Long- shoremen's Association, AFL-CIO, Local Union No. 3033 and Cooper/T. Smith Stevedoring, Inc. Case 15-CB-3280 4 November 1987 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN DOTSON AND MEMBERS JOHANSEN AND BABSON On 30 June 1987 Administrative Law Judge Richard J. Linton issued the attached decision. The Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and the General Counsel and the Charging Party filed answering briefs. The National Labor Relations Board has delegat- ed its authority in this proceeding to a three- member panel. The Board has considered the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings, i and conclusions and to adopt the recommended Order. ORDER The National Labor Relations Board adopts the recommended Order of the administrative law judge and orders that the Respondent, General Longshore Workers, International Longshoremen's Association, AFL-CIO, Local Union No. 3033, Darrow, Louisiana, its officers, agents, and repre- sentatives, shall take the action set forth in the Order. i The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge's credibility find- ings The Board's established policy is not to overrule an administrative law judge's credibility resolutions unless the clear preponderance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd 188 F 2d 362 (3d Cir 1951) We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing the findings Angela S. Anderson, Esq., for the General Counsel. Louis L. Robein Jr., Esq. (Gardner, Robein & Healey), of Metairie, Louisiana, for the Respondent. William F Banta, Esq. and Keith D. Frazier, Esq. (Kull- man, Inman, Bee & Downing), of New Orleans, Louisi- ana, for the Charging Party. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE RICHARD J. LINTON, Administrative Law Judge. In this refusal to bargain case, I find that the Union, ILA Local 3033, and the Employer, Cooper/T. Smith Steve- doring, created a complete collective-bargaining agree- ment on 17 October 1986 when they reached a meeting of the minds on all substantive terms for a 1986-1989 contract. Thus, when ILA Local 3033 refused on and after 28 October 1986 to sign unconditionally a docu- ment embodying the agreement of 17 October, the Union violated Section 8(b)(3) of the Act. I order the Union to sign the new contract unconditionally. This case was tried before me in New Orleans, Louisi- ana, on 4 March 1987 pursuant to the 28 January 1987 complaint issued by the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board through the Regional Director for Region 15 of the Board. The complaint is based on a charge, filed 15 December 1986 and amended on 21 Jan- uary 1987, by Cooper/T. Smith Stevedoring, Inc. (CTS or Cooper) against General Longshore Workers, Interna- tional Longshoremen's Association, AFL-CIO, Local Union No. 3033 (Respondent or Local 3033).1 Adopting the spelling of Cooper's name as listed on the charge, the complaint render's Cooper's full name without a "Co." after Stevedoring. Yet in some of the exhibits, and in Cooper's posthearing brief, the full name is shown with "Co." after Stevedoring. In light of these differences, and in the absence of any motion to correct the spelling, I make no change. In the complaint the General Counsel alleges that the Respondent violated Section 8(b)(3) of the Act on or about 28 October by refusing to sign a written contract embodying an agreement reached on or about 17 Octo- ber. By its answer Respondent admits certain factual mat- ters but denies violating the Act. On the entire record, including my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and after due consideration of the briefs filed by the General Counsel,2 the Respondent, and the Charging Party, I make the following FINDINGS OF FACT 1. JURISDICTION A Louisiana corporation with an office in Darrow, Louisiana, CTS is a stevedoring firm that loads and un- loads seagoing ships. During the past 12 months CTS de- lved gross revenue in excess of $50,000 from its steve- doring operations. Over the same period CTS purchased and received goods and materials valued in excess of $50,000 directly from points outside the State of Louisi- ana. Respondent admits, and I find, that CTS is an em- ployer within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. II. LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Respondent admits , and I find, that ILA Local 3033 is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Background Unlike most other stevedoring facilities, the business of CTS at Darrow, Louisiana, is a midstream bulk oper- ation. Darrow is situated on the Mississippi River about halfway between New Orleans and Baton Rouge. Ships ' All dates are for 1986 unless otherwise indicated 2 Errors in the transcript have been noted and corrected 286 NLRB No. 87 LONGSHOREMEN ILA LOCAL 3033 (SMITH STEVEDORING) anchor in the middle of the Mississippi at Darrow. CTS surrounds the vessels with floating cranes and transfers the cargoes from the vessels to river barges or from barges to the ships . Employees represented by ILA Local 3033 handle the Company's shipboard work as well as the barge and tractor duties. CTS also uses em- ployees represented by Operating Engineers Local 406. (1:27-28.)3 CTS purchased the stevedoring operation at Darrow from Hobit Marine Services about 10 years ago. At that time CTS adopted the existing collective-bargaining agreement (CBA) that Hobit had with ILA Local 3033, and since then the parties have negotiated three 3-year renewal contracts with Respondent . The latest CBA (G.C. Exh. 2) was effective , by its terms, from 1 October 1983 until midnight of 30 September 1986 (1:28-34). As admitted in the pleadings, the bargaining unit is de- scribed as All employees employed at the Employer 's terminal at Darrow, Louisiana, working on the docks or aboard ships or barges as longshoremen , laborers and gear shopmen, excluding all operation and main- tenance personnel, work boat captains and deck hands, office clerical employees, confidential em- ployees, watchmen, guards, professional employees and all supervisors as defined in the Act. In the CBA itself, the language describes the authority of the supervisors rather than referring to them as de- fined in the Act. The pleadings suggest that the parties apparently make no distinction . As of 1 October 1986 CTS employed approximately 125 employees in the bar- gaining unit ( 1:33). The pleadings also establish that since about January 1977 Respondent has been the recognized exclusive bargaining representative of the employees in the bargaining unit. The evidence establishes that the bargaining relation- ship generally has been very good and distinguished by cooperation and trust (1:53, 76, 93, 127, 142). B. The Disputed 1986-1989 Document 1. Introduction In 1986 the parties met for nine bargaining sessions in an attempt to obtain a renewal CBA. Their efforts pro- duced a document that is the subject of this proceeding. A 10th meeting, held on 9 December, was conducted after the parties reached an apparent agreement on 17 October. When the agreement began to unravel , the par- ties met on 9 December in an unsuccessful effort to re- solve the dispute ( 1:81-82, 117, 144-145). The stipulated (1:7-8; G.C. Exh. 18) dates of these meetings are: 30 July 25 September 26 August 30 September-- 1 October 3 September 7 October 10 September 17 October 12 September 9 References to the one-volume transcript of testimony are by volume and page 799 At the bargaining table CTS was represented by Vice President Harold David Wilkins Sr ., the spokesman for Cooper at all the meetings . Mark L. Young Sr . was the principal spokesman for Respondent at the meetings. Young is president of Respondent . Wilkins and Young were assisted by others ( 1:34-37, 138). Two witnesses-Wilkins and Young-testified before me. Wilkins was the General Counsel 's only witness. CTS called no witnesses ,4 and Respondent called Young and also Wilkins. Wilkins testified with more specificity, better recall, and more directness . Except where I state otherwise on some detail , I credit Wilkins over Young. By the summer of 1986 CTS was feeling the heat of competition from nonunion stevedoring firms, and for the industry in general , business apparently was not bright. Faced with that twin problem , CTS approached bargaining with the twofold goal of obtaining cost reduc- tion and flexibility concessions from Local 3033. CTS described the problem to the Union at the first meeting, 30 July, and explained its need for concessions (1:35-38; 105). One other factor distinguishing the 1986 negotiations is that it was the first time the parties were to negotiate a complete contract "cover to cover" on the local level. In the past, several "master" proposals had come from the International Union (1:84-85). The 1983- 1986 CBA was scheduled to expire at mid- night (2400 hours in military language ) on 30 September (1:33-34). The seventh bargaining session began on 30 September and lasted until about 4 a.m. the next day, 1 October ( 1:59). At that time Respondent announced that its members had decided to strike ( 1:60). The 1983-1986 CBA was not extended beyond its 30 September expira- tion date (1:143, 148-149). Picket lines were established on 1 October ( 1:61). The strike lasted 17 days , through Friday, 17 October, and on Monday, 20 October , the employees returned to work (1:62, 184). Respondent's strike was unsuccessful. Hiring from the 150 to 250 daily job applicants , Cooper continued to operate throughout the strike ( 1:61). The parties met twice during the strike, or- 7 and 17 October ( 1:62). By 17 October CTS held a commanding position. Local 3033 President Young describes Wilkins' approach at the meeting of 17 October as presenting a contract proposal by ultimatum (1:145). The meeting of 17 October produced an apparent agreement, the subject of the dispute here (1:69, 119, Wilkins; 161, Young). Respondent's members ratified the agreement the following day, Saturday, 18 October. The strike ended and, as noted, the employees returned to work (1:71, 176, 184). Within a few days the dispute over the agreement surfaced. From the Union's standpoint, Young admits, the rati- fied agreement is a concessionary contract (1:159-160). For example, the hourly wage rate , instead of being in- creased, was cut from $16 to $11, and the benefit fund 4 Cooper apparently subpoenaed J H "Buddy" Raspberry, a vice president of the International Longshoremen's Association and president of the South Atlantic and Gulf Coast District of the ILA. I allowed CTS to rest subject to calling Raspberry if he appeared Raspberry never ap- peared ( 1 8-12, 64, 135, 194) 800 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD contributions dropped from $6.61 to $4.46 (1:163-164). That is a reduction of $7.25 on the total cash package ($22.61 to $15.36). Those reductions compute to 31.25 percent for the wage rate, 34.04 percent for the benefit funds, and 32.07 percent overall. And that is on top of a $1 concession in the wage rate and a reduction in gang size in September 1985 (1:160). The wage rate had been scheduled to increase from $16 to $17 effective 1 Octo- ber 1985 (G.C. Exh. 2 at 7). As one of several items cov- ered by a one-page agreement of 12 September 1985, that wage increase was deferred. The one-page document, de- nominated addendum A, by its terms became part of the CBA on 1 October 1985 and carried an effective term of 1 October 1985 to 30 September 1986 (G.C. Exh. 2a). 2. Source of the dispute; contentions of the parties a. Overview Two topics are the real stumbling blocks here. One of these is sympathy strikes, and the other is the "call out" clause covering Cooper's right to call out additional em- ployees. Some background is necessary to understand the cur- rent events. The "Disputes and Arbitration" provisions of the 1983-1986 CBA appear there as article XI. The first two sentences of article XI, section 1, of the 1983- 1986 CBA (G.C. Exh. 27-28) prohibited lockouts and strikes, including "sympathy strikes" (1:41, 108). CTS Vice President Wilkins testified that the intent (Cooper's intent, at least) was to prevent the ILA International (ILA) from acting in concert or sympathy with Operat- ing Engineers Local 406 at Cooper's Darrow facility (1:114). Wilkins testified that when negotiations were occur- ring for the 1983-1986 CBA the parties extended the predecessor contract until the 1983-1986 CBA was signed on 5 March 1984. About 40 days later Local 3033 President Young telephoned Wilkins requesting help in extracting him from a tight spot with the International over the presence of a prohibition against sympathy strikes in the new CBA (1:76). Because he and Young enjoyed a very good relation- ship, Wilkins agreed to help. The discussion led to a two-sentence agreement dated 10 April 1984.5 In the side "letter" the parties agree that the prohibition against sympathy strikes applies only to Operating Engineers Local 406 and not to the ILA, the ILA district, or any ILA local (G.C. Exh. 14). Wilkins testified that this side letter was never physically attached to the 1983-1986 CBA (1:130). In the 1986-1989 document, the "Disputes and Arbi- tration" provisions appear under article VII. The first two sentences under section 1 are identical to the ones in the 1983-1986 CBA and read (G.C. Exh. 12a at 9): 5 I do not credit Young 's version that Wilkins agreed to this during the regular negotiations, that Wilkins dragged his feet after 5 March 1984, and that Young finally had to telephone Wilkins and urge him to follow through on his earlier promise (1 178-179) Section 1. During the term of this agreement the Employer will not lock out employees from performing work covered by this Agreement. Work stoppages of all forms including strikes, sympathy strikes, and any other refusal to work by the employees are prohib- ited by this agreement. [Emphasis added.] The callout clause appears in the "Hiring" provision of the 1983-1986 CBA, article IV, section 4. The relevant sentence reads (G.C. Exh. 2 at 11): All hiring will be conducted at the "shape up" area of the Employer except for those jobs filled by call- out labor. The "shape up," Wilkins testified, means the daily re- porting to work in a single area for (hiring and) the as- signment of work. As Wilkins explains, the callout provi- sion gives Cooper the right to call out additional person- nel outside the shapeup (1:104). It is clear that the callout right gives Cooper flexibility. However, in 1985 Cooper gave up the callout right in exchange for other considerations (1:104-107). The change is embodied in numbered paragraph 3 of adden- dum A (G.C. Exh. 2a). In paragraph 3 the parties agreed that all employees "will make shape-up." Wilkins testi- fied that this modification meant there would be no call- out (1:104). Addendum A was effective by its terms from 1 October 1985 to 30 September 1986. Wilkins testified that there was no agreement to extend Addendum A (1.89). Although Young concedes that the Union never submitted a proposal in writing to extend it, he also testified that he saw no need to propose an exten- sion of anything (1:149). Like the April 1984 side letter on sympathy strikes, Addendum A was never physically attached to the 1983-1986 CBA (1:130, Wilkins). The callout clause appears in the 1986-1989 document, at article IV, section 4 (G.C. Exh. 12a at 7), in a sen- tence identical to that, quoted above, which appears in the 1983-1986 CBA. Cooper and the General Counsel contend that the 1986 negotiations followed a format that resulted in all agreements being reduced to one instrument, the 1986- 1989 document. Under their theory, all addendums to the 1983-1986 CBA are out. Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the pertinent side agreements became part of the 1986-1989 document. This flows from the fact, ad- mitted by Wilkins, that during the 1986 negotiations nei- ther Wilkins nor Young ever specifically referred, by name, to the side letter modifying the sympathy strike language or to addendum A (that contains the restriction on callouts). The real question, therefore, is whether the parties had a "meeting of the minds." b. Sympathy strikes As previously noted, Cooper approached the 1986 bar- gaining table determined to reduce its costs and to in- crease its flexibility. In the proposal it submitted at the first meeting (30 July), CTS, in slightly over two legal size pages, listed changes it wanted from the 1983-1986 CBA (G.C. Exh. 3). No reference was made in the list to LONGSHOREMEN ILA LOCAL 3033 (SMITH STEVEDORING) 801 article XI that contains the language prohibiting sympa- thy strikes. Neither does the Union mention the topic in its initial counterproposal (G.C. Exh. 4), dated 7 August and submitted at the second meeting on 26 August (1:38- 39). However, at the third meeting, held 3 September, Young requested that the new CBA not contain a refer- ence to sympathy strikes. Wilkins replied that the refer- ence would not be removed (1:40-41, 43, Wilkins). Young acknowledges making the request, although he does not pinpoint the meeting. Young testified he pro- posed that the reference to sympathy strikes be removed because the provision was "useless" (1:152). According to Young, Wilkins replied (1:142). We'll leave it like it is. So leave it like it is; leave it with the letter and all. [Emphasis added.] Despite Young's testimony in that breath that Wilkins mentioned the "letter" (the 10 April 1984 side agree- ment), in the next he asserts that the letter was never brought up during the negotiations (1:142). Wilkins agrees that the letter itself was never expressly men- tioned during the negotiations (1:78-79, 108, 188-189). I find that the "letter" agreement of 10 April 1984 was never expressly mentioned during the 1986 bargaining sessions. At the fourth bargaining session (10 September) the Union presented its four-page amended proposal to CTS (1:43-44). The Union's amended proposal of 10 Septem- ber expressly calls for deletion of the reference to sympa- thy strikes (G.C. Exh. 6; 1:44). Wilkins said that removal of the prohibition against sympathy strikes would be a strike issue with CTS and that CTS would have no strikes or lockouts during the term of the new CBA. Wilkins said CTS did not care what happened in other ports, that CTS was concerned only with its own oper- ation in Darrow. Young made no response (1:45-46). Young testified that he "never worried" about the topic again (1:153). At the fifth session (12 September) CTS submitted an amended proposal in two parts, the first being four pages (G.C. Exh. 7) and the second (G.C. Exh. 7a) being two pages (1:48-51). Apparently spurred by the Union's demand that the symypathy strike language be removed from article XI, section 1, CTS expressly stated in its 12 September amended proposal as follows (G.C. Exh. 7 at 3): the "whole" contract, with all addendums and side agreements, or is it limited to the language appearing only in the base document? The ambiguity could have been clarified by a refer- ence to the 10 April 1984 side agreement "letter." As I have found, there was no express mention of the "letter" during the negotiations. Wilkins admits that he never expressly repudiated the 1984 "letter" either orally or in writing (1:108, 110, 132, 187). Wilkins contends that the repudiation was effected through the negotiations. That is, the elimination of the 10 April 1984 side agreement implicitly resulted from his repeated statements in bargaining that there would be no lockouts, no strikes, no sympathy strikes, and that the sympathy strike language would not be removed (1:187- 189). At the sixth meeting (25 September) Wilkins presented Cooper's five-page "Last and Final Offer" (G.C. Exh. 8; 1:51). Once again CTS proposed that article XI remain "Same as 1983-86 Agreement" (G.C. Exh. 8 at 4). When the parties reached this proposal Wilkins went through the "scenario" that Cooper would not lock out the em- ployees, nor would the Union be able to have work stop- pages of any nature (1:52). Young replied, Wilkins testified, that they had never had a work stoppage. Wilkins agreed, and he agreed when Young reminded him that they had always had a good relationship. But, Wilkins countered, neither he nor Young might be around in 3 years. They therefore needed to put their understanding in writing to save their replacements from having to resolve any problem, for their two successors might not enjoy as good a relation- ship as he and Young had. Therefore, Wilkins added, CTS wanted it made clear that it did not want Core- mier,6 president of ILA Local 3000 in New Orleans, or the ILA locals in Houston, Mobile, or anywhere else, coming to Darrow and shutting CTS down (1:52-53, 108, 114). The seventh meeting (30 September-1 October) was the last one before the 17-day strike began on 1 October. This is the first meeting attended by the parties' lawyers (1:56, 60-61). As I already have mentioned, the parties bargained all night. Cooper's no-strike language re- mained as before in proposing (G.C. Exh. 9 at 4): ARTICLE XI Disputes and Arbitration Same as 1983-86 Agreement ARTICLE XI Same as 1983-86 Agreement At the 12 September session Wilkins again advised Young that CTS considered this a strike issue. Wilkins does not report whether Young responded (1:49). At this point we can see the source of the dispute which subsequently arose on this topic. The 1983-1986 CBA, taken as a whole (that is, including the 10 April 1984 "letter"), exempts the ILA, the ILA District, and all ILA locals from the sympathy strike prohibition. The problem arises because Cooper's 12 September proposal is ambiguous. Does "Same as 1983-86 Agreement" mean At one point the no-strike/no-lockout clause was men- tioned. Young said, "I guess there's no sense in even talking about that anymore." "You're right, Mark," Wil- kins replied, "That's a dead issue. You know our stand on that question." They passed to another topic (1:57). The strike began 1 October. By summarizing mainly the two ultimate issues, I do not suggest that the Union struck over the sympathy 6 Although the name is spelled Coremier in the record, the General Counsel spells it Cormier (Br at 4) The General Counsel did not list the spelling as an item to be corrected in her unopposed motion to correct the record I leave the spelling as it appears in the record 802 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD strike language and the callout provision. No evidence was offered concerning the reasons the Union went on strike. Several issues divided the parties. As late as 17 October money items, Wilkins testified, were prominent among the issues dividing the parties (1:65). The meeting of 7 October (the eighth session) was very short, ending when CTS learned that the Union was not ready to accept the major terms of Cooper's last offer (1:62). In a 7 October letter to Young, Wilkins lists the dates they have met (but not 7 October),' withdraws Cooper's last and final offer as presented 30 September, and assures Young that CTS remains available to meet. The last paragraph reads (R. Exh. 6): For now we shall continue working under our present, in place, wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment. Wilkins testified that the quoted sentence included ad- dendum A and the no-strike letter (1:186). As I men- tioned earlier, addendum A bears on the callout provi- sion. The ninth meeting, held 17 October, was decisive. CTS had retyped its proposal for changes and Wilkins presented the four-page document (G.C. Exh. 11). ILA District President J. H. "Buddy" Raspberry attended. Young said Raspberry was there to assist in settling the strike (1:65). I credit Wilkins in this respect even though Young may be correct in his testimony that Raspberry attended for the purpose (not announced to Wilkins) of assisting primarily in relation to the issue of trust fund contributions (1:161). The only change in Cooper's no-strike clause proposal was that the closing year was given in full. Thus (G.C. Exh. 11 at 4): ARTICLE XI Disputes and Arbitration Same as 1983-1986 Agreement The record does not show whether the topic of sym- pathy strikes arose at this meeting. Eventually the par- ties, resolving the issues that had been dividing them, were at the threshold of reaching an apparent agreement. Raspberry asked, "Do we have an agreement." "Yes, we do," replied Wilkins. Hedging, Young said, "David, yes we do, based on some interpretation clarification and wordings." Wilkins stated there could not be any of that after that night, and that CTS could not have the matter dragging on for a few more weeks (1:68). Raspberry reinforced Wilkins on this point and told Young to ask Wilkins whatever he wanted to in order to clarify the issues. Raspberry urged Young to get the matter settled "tonight." After thumbing through Coo- per's proposal for another 10 minutes or so, Young looked up and said (1:69): "We have an agreement." Wilkins got up, walked around the bargaining table, shook hands with Raspberry, and then with Young (1:69). Young testified, without contradiction, that the In the letter Wilkins records the time as 2 45 a.m (rather than 4 a in ) when the Union informed him it was rejecting Cooper's last and final offer and that there would be a strike (R Exh 6) meeting concluded about 11 p.m. (1:177). The parties made brief statements to the waiting press and television news reporters that an agreement had been reached sub- ject to ratification the following day (1:69-70, 166-167). CTS gave the Union only until "1800 hours" (6 p.m.) the following day to obtain ratification (1:70, Wilkins). Young testified that at a 3-hour ratification vote meeting that Saturday, 18 October, he distributed copies of Coo- per's 17 October proposal (G.C. Exh. 11) and two or three other papers relating to some of the other issues. Because there was no time to integrate everything into a complete, typed document, what was distributed were documents merely showing changes in the recently ex- pired contract (1:73-77). Although the members were upset with the terms of the new contract, they voted to ratify after the 3-hour discussion (1:164, 174). There is no evidence concerning whether the subject of sympathy strikes was mentioned at the ratification meeting. Wilkins received word from Port Agent Leroy Hymel about 3 p.m. that Saturday of the ratification. At the same time, Hymel asked for a meeting. Because it was Wilkins' first recent opportunity to relax he begged off unless the matter was important Hymel said they could discuss it the following week (1:71). Wilkins' clerical staff typed the new CBA on Monday, 20 October. On that date he proofread the document (G.C. Exh. 12a), signed two originals, and CTS began applying the terms of the new agreement (1:71, 109, 120, 128). Wilkins sent the signed documents by messenger to Young with a cover letter (G.C. Exh. 12), dated 21 Oc- tober, requesting that a signed copy be returned (1:71, 72, 74, 128-130). On looking through the document Wilkins had sent by messenger, Young told the messenger that the document was incomplete because certain addendums had been omitted and that he could not sign (1:140). The messen- ger returned and informed Wilkins that Young would not sign (1:129-130). Young took the copies to the office of his attorney, Louis L. Robein Jr (1:141). In three subsequent telephone calls between Wilkins and Young, Wilkins was told that Young was reading the document (the first call), that he had sent it to Attor- ney Robein (the second call), and that he had signed it (the third call). In one of the calls Young referred to the addendums. Wilkins assumed he meant addendum A which, to Wilkins, meant the callout provision, although Young did not say there was a problem centering on callout (1:110-111). These calls were followed by a tele- phone conversation between Wilkins and Attorney Robein in which Robein informed Wilkins that Young, agitated because the contract was not good for the Union, was coming to his office to discuss the matter (1:112). A few days later Wilkins received a letter (G.C. Exh. 13), dated 28 October, from Young (1:75, 112). In the letter Young advises that he is enclosing a copy of the 1986-1989 CBA, signed by him. The letter, however, lists several addendums as having been discussed in the telephone conversation between Robein and Wilkins as effectively incorporated into the new CBA. The items Young listed are: LONGSHOREMEN ILA LOCAL 3033 (SMITH STEVEDORING) 803 1.) Attachment "C"(work and safety rules); 2.) Attachment "D" (Work Now-"Grieve Later"); 3.) Addendum "A," effective October 1, 1985, rati- fied September 12, 1985, (except for the floating rig manning provision and $1 increase for grain commodities based in New Orleans decision); 4.) April 10, 1984 letter agreement on meaning of sympathy strike under article XI. The antepenultimate paragraph of the letter asserts that Young understands Wilkins has no objection to in- serting the phrase "as required by law" at one point in the management-rights article. Wilkins credibly denies there was any discussion about the management-rights clause (1:121). CTS did agree with Attorney Robein to insert that language in a contract recently agreed to in- volving another firm, apparently a subsidiary of Cooper's (1:121-128). Young, in the penultimate paragraph, advises that both execution and ratification are contingent on "the accom- panying agreement on these addenda and letter agree- ments." Finally, Wilkins was asked to signify his assent by signing at a space indicated at the bottom of Young's letter. The copy of the 1986-1989 contract forwarded by Young, now signed by Wilkins and Young, bears this condition under Young's signature of 28 October 1986 (G.C. Exh. 12a; 1:75, 99): Conditioned upon assent to all prior negotiated ad- denda as stated in October 28, 1986 letter. There was an exchange of correspondence between Wilkins and Young concerning the benefit fund contribu- tions. In his letter of 5 November (R. Exh. 1) responding to Wilkins' letter of 30 October, Young also reasserts that the addendums listed in his letter of 28 October are part of the new contract.8 Young asserts that any attempt by CTS to withdraw from the final agreement would be bad-faith bargaining. Young states that he awaits a copy of Wilkins' execution of the assent (R. Exh. 1). By a two-page letter (G.C. Exh. 15) dated 11 Novem- ber, Wilkins wrote Young concerning the confusion and dispute that had developed. In paragraph 1, Wilkins re- minds Young that the parties reached a full agreement on 17 October for a new contract that Wilkins thereafter had typed. Paragraphs 2 and 3 read: 2. On October 21 I executed the new contract on behalf of the Company. On October 28 you also signed the new agreement but submitted a letter to me requesting that certain "addenda" be included in the contract. During the negotiations for the new agreement-including the final evening when agree- ment was reached-there was no understanding that these addenda would be included in the contract. In 8 I received certain letters (R Exhs 1-4) over the objections of the General Counsel and CTS that they are irrelevant because they postdate the 17 October agreement and because they relate to other matters (197- 01) Wilkins' letter of 30 October was not identified or offered fact, the addenda were not even discussed during our final meeting! 3. We strongly feel that the only provisions going into the contract are those that we discussed, nego- tiated, and agreed to during our final meeting. Your attempt to add to the contract after the negotiations ended is untimely and improper . We simply will not accept into the contract these or other provisions which were not negotiated and agreed to during the bargaining process. In paragraph 4 Wilkins states , in effect, that the matter must be resolved by 14 November or CTS will take "ap- propriate action." Wilkins added a postscript reading: PS: Should you decide to notify us of your accept- ance of the signed contract as the only provisions, without any addenda, we shall-as in the past-be available to meet and discuss with you the possi- bility of clarification letters or side memoranda of understanding pertaining to terms and conditions of employment. By letter dated 13 November Attorney Robein wrote Wilkins as follows (G.C. Exh. 16): Dear Mr. Wilkins: Yesterday, Mark L. Young, Sr., Pesident of ILA Local 3033, contacted me by telephone concerning your most recent letter relative to the collective bargaining agreement between Local 3033 and Cooper/T. Smith Stevedoring Co., Inc. It is my un- derstanding from what was read to me over the phone that you are contending that there will be no bargaining agreement between the parties as of the close of business on November 14, 1986, unless Local 3033 concedes to your version [of] what oc- curred are [or] did not occur at the bargaining table. Please be advised of the following: 1.) The parties have a final, binding collective bargaining agreement; 2.) The "sympathy strike" letter is the only out- standing letter agreement or addenda that is not in- cluded, word for word, in the actual draft of the most recent collective bargaining agreement; 3.) It is obvious from conversations with you and William Banta, your attorney, that your past assent to the "sympathy strike" letter (although you don't mention such in your most recent letter) is causing you some consternation, which you are now trying to remedy through the threat of an attempted with- drawal of the final bargaining agreement; 4.) Cooper/T. Smith has not repudiated this "sympathy strike" letter, dated April 10, 1984; 5.) Accordingly, Local 3033 considers the letter to be in effect and legally binding on both parties. Mark will be returning from an out-of-town trip next week. I suggest that the parties get together as soon as possible to further discuss this matter. In this regard, bargaining is demanded. 804 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Finally, the $4.36 contribution issue shall also be discussed. You did in fact guarantee that that level of contribution would provide the current pension and welfare benefits to bargaining unit employees. This is a legally binding commitment which must be fulfilled by your company. We look forward to hearing from you. Very truly yours, /s/Louis L. Robein, Jr. The parties met for a 10th time on 9 December at a Holiday Inn in Gonzales, a town near Darrow. At this meeting CTS presented an "Affirmation" to the Union for Young to sign. Young refused to sign the affirmation as well as new copies of the 1986-1989 contract bearing only the (new) signature of Wilkins (1:81, 117, 144-145). That is, the new copies were purged of the conditions Young had inserted above his signature on the initial copies. The affirmation reads (G.C. Exh. 17): AFFIRMATION As an agent for and representative of the ILA, Local 3033, and as the principal negotiator for the union during the 1986 bargaining with Cooper/T. Smith Stevedoring Company, I hereby state and affirm as follows: 1. The collective bargaining agreement between the company and union that was negotiated on or about October 17, reduced to writing, and execut- ed by David Wilkins on October 21 and by me on October 28 has 12 Articles and is 14 pages long. 2. There are no terms, conditions, or provisions to the contract other than those that are set forth in the 12 Articles above the signatures on page 14. 3. Any side agreements or addenda, written or oral, which may have existed in the past that were not expressly placed in the 14 page contract were waived and are not part of the new agreement. (Date) Mark Young, ILA Local 3033 The final item of evidence in this series is a 15 Decem- ber letter (R. Exh. 2) from Attorney Robein to Attorney Banta in which Robein reiterates Respondent's position and suggests that the parties arbitrate the matter if there is still a dispute. c. Callout In its first written proposal (G.C. Exh. 3) submitted at the first meeting, 30 July, Cooper made no specific refer- ence to callout. By the time of the fifth meeting on 12 September Cooper was phrasing its suggestions for no changes as "Same as the 1983-86" Agreement. For that meeting its proposal regarding the entire section 4 of ar- ticle IV, in which the callout provision appears in the 1983-1986 CBA, reads (G.C. Exh. 7): Section 4. Same as 1983-86 Agreement The same language and format is used in Cooper's "Last and Final Offer" submitted at the sixth meeting on 25 September (G.C. Exh. 8 at 3). It remained so for the seventh meeting on 30 September-1 October (G.C. Exh. 9). The only change made by Cooper's written proposal submitted at the ninth session on 17 October was to add the full year for 1986 (G.C. Exh. 11 at 3): ARTICLE IV Section 4. Same as 1983-1986 Agreement Wilkins testified without contradiction that at the meetings he read aloud the section of the contract as he was proposing it, and that this procedure included the callout language (1:107). Moreover, during negotiations Wilkins stressed that CTS needed flexibility, including the ability to start (loading, apparently) a ship at 10 a.m. or 2 p.m. (1:105). During the bargaining sessions along the way neither party made a specific reference to addendum A. Reading down the list of items in addendum A, Wilkins testified that each was expressly included in articles IV and VI of the new, 1986-1989 CBA. He places item 3 under section 4 of article IV (1:89-90, 132-134). As a reading of the 1986-1989 document reflects, and as I mentioned earlier, the callout sentence appearing there (G.C. Exh. 12a at 7) is the very same as that appearing in the 1983-1986 CBA (1:106, 134). d. Integration of the attachments The 1983-1986 CBA consisted of a base document that contained, even to the extent of sequential paging, at- tachment "B" (JSP tonnage assessment), attachment "C" (work and safety rules, including drugs and alcohol), and attachment "D" (adding the principle of "Work now- Grieve later"). Presumably there was an attachment A that was dropped or rejected before the final agreement in March 1984. Attachment B, which pertained to tonnage definitions, apparently was not incorporated into the 1986-1989 con- tract (G.C. Exh. 12a). Attachments C and D became part of article X, safety and security, of the new contract (1:91, Wilkins). Wilkins testified that he orally made clear in the negotiations that attachments C and D were being built into the new contract and would no longer be designated as attachments (1:131). Indeed, as Attorney Robein wrote in numbered para- graph 2 of his letter of 13 November to Wilkins (the letter is reproduced above): 2.) The "sympathy strike" letter is the only out- standing letter agreement or addenda that is not in- cluded, word for word, in the actual draft of the most recent collective bargaining agreement. By "most recent collective bargaining agreement," Robein presumably refers to the 1986-1989 document. Although that statement is a bit puzzling (the callout re- striction from addendum A is not included, for example), LONGSHOREMEN ILA LOCAL 3033 (SMITH STEVEDORING) 805 the relevance at this point of Robein's observation is that there is no dispute that the attachments (at least C and D) are included. Thus, the only former "side" agreements left open are the ones here in dispute-(1) The April 1984 sympathy strike letter, and (2) the callout restriction appearing as item 3 of addendum A. Before reaching conclusions on the evidence, fairness requires me to note that this dispute has not deterred the Union from cooperating with Cooper on the callout pro- vision. Thus, Wilkins testified that CTS has exercised the callout provision since the provisions of the 1986-1989 document were implemented and that the Union has co- operated (1:120-121). For that matter, even when the re- striction of addendum A was in effect (October 1985 through September 1986), the Union permitted CTS to exercise callouts during emergencies (1:106, 107, 143). Young testified that the Union has always cooperated with CTS (1:143). C. Analysis and Conclusions 1. Discussion The phrase "Same as 1983-1986 Agreement" is ambig- uous outside its context. Standing alone the phrase could refer simply to the base document, as Cooper and the General Counsel contend, or it could refer to the overall agreement consisting of an integration of the base docu- ment plus the April 1984 side letter (on sympathy strikes) and addendum A, as Respondent argues. One factor favoring Respondent's interpretation of the evidence is the absence of any specific reference during the negotiations to the April 1984 side letter or to adden- dum A. Young contends (1:145), and Wilkins denies (1:188), that Wilkins overlooked these items; that is, that Wilkins made a mistake. Because of that oversight in fail- ing expressly to negotiate those documents out of the new contract, Young contends, they became part of the new 1986-1989 contract (1:143, 147-148, 171-172). When otherwise addressing the concept of what the 1983-1986 CBA consisted of, Wilkins clearly recognized, as common sense requires, that the CBA included the 1984 side letter and addendum A. This is shown by his testimony that the last sentence of his 7 October letter to Young (in which sentence he advises that for the moment CTS would continue in place current "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment") encompassed addendum A and the 1984 side letter (1:186; R. Exh. 6). It must also be remembered that during the negotia- tions CTS never submitted a self-contained proposal for a new contract. All CTS submitted were pages with the various article and section numbers followed by language for proposed changes, or where (one reasonably would suppose) no change was proposed, "Same as 1983-1986 Agreement." When that fact is coupled with the admit- ted fact that there was never a specific reference to the 1984 side letter or to addendum A, it is easy to see that confusion could result from Wilkins, in his mind, consid- ering that his proposed changes would represent the entire new contract, and Young thinking that Wilkins' proposals about "Same as the 1983-1986 Agreement" meant the base document only. Cooper (Br. at 7-8) and the General Counsel (Br. at 10) counter by pointing to Wilkins' uncontradicted testi- mony on cross-examination that Williams read the new language during the negotiations (1:106-107, 132). To a large extent that process simply begs the question. What good did it do to read the language that was to be the "Same as the 1983-1986 Agreement" with no accompa- nying remarks9 that addendum A and the April 1984 side letter would no longer apply? Although Wilkins testified that the items 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6 of addendum A were now covered by article VI, gang sizes, of the new contract, with items 3 (the callout re- striction) and 7 being covered under article IV, hiring (1:89-90, 134), that is merely his interpretation. It is a reasonable interpretation, and perhaps the more reasona- ble one, but it is not the only interpretation. Young's in- terpretation, on its face, is not unreasonable. Even though Wilkins did not specifically mention ad- dendum A and the 1984 side letter, it can be argued, as CTS essentially does (Br. at 8), that the "zipper" clause nullified any collateral agreements and that Young, being an experienced negotiator, would have recognized that since he is familiar with such clauses (1:168-169). The first two sentences of the clause read (G.C. Exh. 12a at 2): INTEGRITY OF THE AGREEMENT This agreement constitutes the only and entire agreement between I.L.A. Local 3033 and the Em- ployer. There are no other agreements , written or verbal. Was Young really confused, or did he recognize that Cooper's proposals would result in the nullification of addendum A and the 1984 side letter? At the 17 October meeting did Young, under the pressure of an unsuccess- ful strike, simply decide to say nothing, lie behind the log, and hope for some favorable development? Recall that at the decisive meeting of 17 October, after Raspberry asked if there was an agreement and Wilkins said yes, Young hedged. Young said, "David, yes we do, based on some interpretation clarification and wordings." (1:68.) After pressure from Raspberry and Wilkins to ask Wilkins any questions he had, Young finally gave an un- qualified yes. As shown by his letter to Wilkins of 28 October (G.C. Exh. 13), Young reveals that on 17 October he was thinking of four of the five attachments, addendums, or side agreements . Robein's letter of 13 November does not mention the callout restriction, but Respondent's po- sition at the hearing, and on brief, raises that as well as the sympathy strike side letter. On cross-examination Wilkins testified that in his opin- ion Young made a knowing agreement to the new con- tract. And in Wilkins' view there was no misunderstand- ing by Young concerning addendum A and the April 9 Such as are contained in the affirmation presented to Young on 9 De- cember at the Holiday Inn in Gonzales, Louisiana 806 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1984 side letter on sympathy strikes (1:119-120). That is Wilkins' perception. But as Demosthenes orated over 23 centuries ago when warning the Athenians against the Macedonian danger, perception can be self-deception, "For what each man wishes , that he also believes to be true." Third Olynthiac, section 19. 2. Conclusions A collective-bargaining agreement arises only after a meeting of the minds on all material (substantive) terms. Koenig Iron Works, 282 NLRB 717 (1987); Lithochrome Corp., 276 NLRB 1190 fn. 1 (1985). However, the term "meeting of the minds" does not mean that both parties must have an identical subjective understanding of the effect of material terms of the contract. Furniture Work- ers Local 36 (Telescope Furniture), 281 NLRB 1263 (1986); Teamsters Local 287 (Reed & Graham), 272 NLRB 348, 351 ( 1984). The agreement may be oral, i ° and each party is obliged to assist in reducing the agreement to writing. Kennebec Beverage Co., 248 NLRB 1298 (1980). Al- though correctable discrepancies appearing in the typing or integration process do not relieve a party from the duty to assist in assembling a document that reflects the agreement reached by the parties, i i terms or conditions missing as a result of the parties' failure to agree about substantive terms cannot be supplied by the Board or an administrative law judge . Interprint Co., 273 NLRB 1863 (1985); Mercedes-Benz, 258 NLRB 803 (1981). The matters in dispute here are clearly substantive. Was there a meeting of the minds? Yes. Answering the question in the affirmative , I particular- ly rely on Young's words of hedging at the decisive meeting of 17 October. I find those words reflect that he realized the addendums had not been specifically re- ferred to . I need not determine his reasons for agreeing moments later that there was a contract . It is enough that I find, as I do, that Wilkins' interpretation of the bargaining process is a reasonable one (that at the bar- gaining sessions the language was read for the new con- tract, thereby superseding all separate documents and side agreements), and that Young recognized that such was Wilkins' intent. A case quite similar to ours is that of Teamsters Local 287 (Reed & Graham), 272 NLRB 348 (1984). There, like here, the parties had a side agreement , or addendum, to their 1980-1983 contract. The addendum was called the "ten truck" agreement. The "ten truck" addendum had resulted from an attempt to maintain parity between the number of owner-operators and employee drivers in 1974 by the employer's maintaining at least 10 company- owned trucks. 272 NLRB at 349 fn. 4. Since 1974 the company had converted to all company-owned trucks. Thus, the 10-truck limitation was without any current practical effect aside from some theoretical protection. During the 1983 negotiations for a new contract, the parties in Teamsters Local 287, as here, submitted con- 10 Electra-Food Machinery, 241 NLRB 1232 (1979), enfd 621 F 2d 956 (9th Or 1980) 11 Georgia Kraft Co, 258 NLRB 908, 911 -912 (1981 ), enfd. 696 F 2d 931 (11th Cir 1983), Kennebec Beverage, supra tract proposals, and they used the 1980-1983 CBA (which expired by its terms on 30 June 1983) as a base. For articles or sections on which they sought no change, they noted "o.k." or "same as contract." (272 NLRB at 349). As here, the base document the parties used there did not have a copy of the "ten truck" addendum physically attached. There, as here, neither party specifically re- ferred to the "ten truck" addendum during the negotia- tions. However, unlike the negotiations there, in which the parties did not discuss the subject matter of the ad- dendum, here the parties repeatedly discussed sympathy strikes, and Wilkins read aloud the language for sympa- thy strikes and callouts. Teamsters 287 prepared a typed copy of the new 1983-1986 contract for signing . In doing so the union at- tached a copy of the "ten truck" addendum. The em- ployer, Reed & Graham, removed the addendum and signed the base document . Explaining in a cover letter to the union that the addendum had not been mentioned in the negotiations, Reed & Graham sent the new contract to Teamsters 287 for the union to sign without the ad- dendum. When the union refused to sign without the ad- dendum, Reed & Graham, as Cooper did here, filed an 8(b)(3) charge. As here, the essential facts in Teamsters Local 287 were undisputed, and each party insisted there was a binding contract-but a contract set in a configuration based on each party's own interpretation of the facts. We have the same situation here . CTS and ILA Local 3033 each contends there is a binding CBA. But each sees a different configuration for the CBA because each inter- prets the same facts differently. In Teamsters Local 287 Judge Clifford H. Anderson, with Board approval, concluded there was no 8(b)(3) violation because he found that the parties had labored under a mutual mistake (272 NLRB at 350, 352 fn. 8). In reaching his conclusion , Judge Anderson found that each party had overlooked the "ten truck" addendum, and that such omission did not result from any bargaining strategy. Contrasted to the administrative law judge 's mutual mistake finding in Teamsters Local 287, I find that both parties in our case deliberately chose not to mention the two side documents or addendums. Wilkins , I find, chose not to mention them by name because he was able to cast the new contract in the language he wanted. For Wilkins to mention, the addendums by name would have served only to wave a red flag in Young's face. Whatever Young's awareness, or lack thereof, before 17 October, I find that on 17 October Young's remark about necessary "interpretation clarification and word- ings" was a reference to the two addendums. For what- ever reason, Young chose not to mention the addendums by name. Instead, he joined Wilkins in accepting the new contract. Young made a choice, and the choice was not based on any mistake , mutual or unilateral, of fact. Any mistake that was made was one of strategy, or tactics, based on facts known to both parties. A strategy that misfires does not nullify a meeting of the minds I find there was a meeting of the minds in our case. LONGSHOREMEN ILA LOCAL 3033 (SMITH STEVEDORING) 807 Accordingly, because I find there was a meeting of the minds at the meeting of 17 October 1986, I find that Re- spondent's refusal on and after 28 October 1986 to un- conditionally sign the document'' embodying that agree- ment constitutes a refusal to bargain in violation of Sec- tion 8(b)(3) of the Act as alleged. Respondent's position that the matter should be de- ferred to arbitration is rejected. Deferral is inappropriate when the existence of a contract is the nature of the dis- pute. The question presented is not one of contract inter- pretation, but of statutory obligation. CONCLUSIONS OP LAW 1. Cooper, the Charging Party here, is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. 2. Respondent ILA Local 3033 is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. The following employees of Cooper constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act: All employees employed at the Employer's terminal at Darrow, Louisiana, working on the docks or aboard ships or barges as longshoremen, laborers and gear shopmen, excluding all operation and main- tenance personnel, work boat captains and deck hands, office clerical employees, confidential em- ployees, watchmen, guards, professional employees and all supervisors as defined in the Act. 4. Since on or about January 1977 ILA Local 3033 has been the exclusive representative of all the employees in the unit described above for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act. 5. At the meeting of 17 October 1986 a collective-bar- gaining agreement was created when Respondent and Cooper reached a meeting of the minds on all substantive terms of the new 1986-1989 contract. 6. General Counsel's Exhibit 12a, without signatures or conditional signatures, submitted to Respondent by Cooper on 21 October 1986 for signing, embodies in writing the agreement reached on 17 October 1986 be- tween Respondent and Cooper. 7. Respondent has violated Section 8(b)(3) of the Act on and after 28 October 1986 by refusing to sign uncon- ditionally a written document embodying, as in General Counsel's Exhibit 12a, the collective-bargaining agree- ment reached on 17 October 1986 between Respondent and Cooper. 8. Respondent's unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the following recommend- edis ORDER The Respondent, General Longshore Workers, Inter- national Longshoremen's Association, AFL-CIO, Local Union No. 3033, Darrow, Louisiana, its officers, agents, and representatives, shall 1. Cease and desist from (a) Failing or refusing to bargain collectively and in good faith with Cooper/T. Smith Stevedoring, Inc., by failing and refusing, on request, to sign unconditionally the collective-bargaining agreement reached 17 October 1986 with Cooper/T. Smith Stevedoring, Inc. covering wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employ- ment for employees in the bargaining unit. (b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re- straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act. (a) On request of the Employer, sign the written con- tract submitted to the Union by Cooper on 21 October 1986, or in the absence of such a request, to sign, negoti- ate collectively and in good faith with the Employer, on its request, concerning wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment of employees in the ap- propriate unit and, if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement. The appropriate unit is: All employees employed at the Employer 's terminal at Darrow, Louisiana, working on the docks or aboard ships or barges as longshoremen, laborers and gear shopmen, excluding all operation and main- tenance personnel, work boat captains and deck hands, office clerical employees, confidential em- ployees, watchmen, guards, professional employees and all supervisors as defined in the Act. (b) Preserve and, on request, make available to the Board or its agents for examination and copying, all pay- roll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records nec- essary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this Order. (c) Post at its office in Port Allen, Louisiana, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." i 4 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 15, after being signed by the Respondent's au- thorized representative, shall be posted by the Respond- THE REMEDY Having found that the Respondent has engaged in cer- tain unfair labor practices, I find it necessary to order it to cease and desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. 12 G C Exh 12a minus the conditions Young added above his signa- ture 13 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the Board's Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec 102 48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur- poses 14 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Nation- al Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board " 808 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD ent immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60 con- secutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to members are customarily posted. Rea- sonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (d) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days from the date of this Order what steps the Re- spondent has taken to comply. (e) Sign and return to the Regional Director sufficient copies of the notice for posting by Cooper, if willing, at all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES AND MEMBERS POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the National Labor Relations Act and has or- dered us to post and abide by this notice. WE WILL NOT fail or refuse to bargain collectively and in good faith with Cooper/T. Smith Stevedoring, Inc. by failing and refusing, on request, to sign the collective- bargaining agreement reached with Cooper/T. Smith Stevedoring, Inc. on 17 October 1986 covering your wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employ- ment. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act. WE WILL, if requested by Cooper/T. Smith, sign un- conditionally the written contract Cooper/T. Smith sub- mitted to us on 21 October 1986, or in the absence of such a request to sign, we will negotiate collectively and in good faith with Cooper/T. Smith, on its request, con- cerning wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment of employees in the appropriate unit and, if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement. The appropriate unit is: All employees employed at the Employer's terminal at Darrow, Louisiana, working on the docks or aboard ships or barges as longshoremen, laborers and gear shopmen, excluding all operation and main- tenance personnel, work boat captains and deck hands, office clerical employees, confidential em- ployees, watchmen, guards, professional employees and all supervisors as defined in the Act. GENERAL LONGSHORE WORKERS, INTER- NATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN'S ASSOCIATION, AFL-CIO, LOCAL UNION No. 3033