Laborers Local, 1140 (Cadet Construction)

564 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Construction and General Laborers Union No. 1140, Laborers International Union of North America, AFL-CIO (Cadet Construction Company) and Jay Underwood. Case 18-CB-1692 16 December 1987 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN DOTSON AND MEMBERS JOHANSEN AND BABSON On 14 July 1987 Administrative Law Judge Walter J. Alprin issued the attached decision. The General Counsel filed exceptions and a supporting brief. The National Labor Relations Board has delegat- ed its authority in this proceeding to a three- member panel. The Board has considered the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings, and conclusions only to the extent consistent with this Decision and Order. The questions presented here are whether: (1) the collective-bargaining agreement between the Respondent and Dan Paulson Construction Compa- ny was binding on Cadet Construction Company as the alter ego of Dan Paulson Construction; and (2) the Respondent violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) by causing Cadet to discharge an employee be- cause he had not been referred by the Respondent. We disagree with the judge's finding that Cadet was the alter ego of Dan Paulson Construction. Accordingly, we conclude, contrary to the judge, that the Respondent unlawfully caused Cadet to discharge employee Jay Underwood because Un- derwood had not been referred through the Re- spondent's hiring hall. In 1981 Dan Paulson formed Dan Paulson Con- struction Company with himself and his wife as the sole stockholders, officers, and directors. Its princi- pal office was in Paulson's home; and Paulson worked for and supervised all the corporation's op- erations. Dan Paulson Construction performed cement contracting work in the Omaha, Nebraska and Council Bluffs, Iowa areas. In April 1981 it re- ceived a contract to pour driveways on a housing project in which the general contractor had a con- tract with the Respondent. Dan Paulson Construc- tion signed a collective-bargaining agreement with the Respondent, agreeing to pay union scale, to contribute to union funds, and to obtain all its unit employees, including laborers, through the Re- spondent's hiring hall. The contract entitled - the Respondent to utilize economic recourse, including the right to picket, to enforce the assignment of work. The contract was effective through 31 May 1983 and thereafter from year to year unless either party gave 90 days' notice of intent to modify the agreement. _ Dan Paulson Construction's work on the project lasted approximately 3 months. Thereafter, it con- tinued doing concrete work on other jobs without abiding to the terms of the contract. It obtained workers outside the Respondent's hiring hall proc- ess and did not pay union scale. The Respondent did not attempt to enforce its contract with Dan Paulson Construction. Because of financial prob- lems, Paulson in 1983 had to sell his house, close the business, and seek employment as an hourly worker. In 1985 Paulson decided to go back into business as a cement contractor. Instead of reviving Dan Paulson Construction, which had never been -for- mally dissolved, Paulson started out of his new home a sole proprietorship called Cadet Construc- tion Company. He was the sole owner, and he worked and supervised operations. Cadet per- formed work in the Council Bluffs/Omaha area as had Dan Paulson Construction. Cadet did not use any of the equipment that Dan Paulson Construc- tion had owned. Nor did Cadet obtain employees through the Respondent's hiring hall. . On 13 November 1986 Cadet began concrete work on the Hy-Vee grocery store project. Cadet employed Otis and Steve Turner as concrete finish- ers) and Jay Underwood as a laborer on the project. They were not hired through the Re- spondent's hiring hall. The following day, the Re- spondent's business agent, Larry Lewis, observed Underwood doing laborer's work. Lewis then con- fronted Paulson about the failure to hire a laborer through the Respondent's hiring hall process, as re- quired by the contract with Dan Paulson Construc- tion. Lewis stated that if Underwood did not leave, the Respondent would picket the project and shut it down. Paulson discharged Underwood, and the next day the Respondent sent three laborers to the job. The judge concluded that Cadet was the alter ego of Dan Paulson Construction based on findings that the two enterprises had substantially identical common ownership, management, business pur- pose, and operation. He also noted that Cadet and Dan Paulson Construction served customers in the same market. In addition, the judge found that the lack of common equipment and union animus, as well as the 2-year involuntary hiatus between oper- ations, did not preclude an alter ego finding. Having found alter ego status, the judge concluded that Cadet was bound to the collective-bargaining 1 Steve Turner also performed some laborer work 287 NLRB No. 57 LABORERS LOCAL, 1140 (CADET CONSTRUCTION) 565 agreement between Dan Paulson Construction and the Respondent. Consequently, he found, that the Respondent's threat to enforce the contract by picketing Cadet, if Underwood remained on the project, was not unlawful . Accordingly, he dis- missed the complaint. We disagree. , In determining whether an alter ego relationship exists, the Board considers whether there was sub -, stantially identical management, business purpose, operation, equipment, customers, supervision,, and ownership, as well as whether the purpose behind the creation of the alleged alter ego was to evade responsibilities under the Act.' Another factor to be considered is whether there has been any hiatus in operations .3 None of these factors, is the sin qua non of alter ego status and each case must turn on its own facts.4 In applying the Board 's standards to the instant case, we agree with the judge that there has been substantially identical management, business pur- pose, operation , and ownership , and that these fac- tors tend to support a finding of alter ego. There are, however, other factors that militate against such a finding . There was a 2-year hiatus between the closing of Dan Paulson Construction and the formation of Cadet . Moreover, Paulson had had no dealings with the Respondent for approximately 18 months preceding the closing of Dan Paulson Con- struction, nor did he abide by the contract. Fur- ther, Cadet was not a disguised continuance of Dan, Paulson Construction . Paulson was not attempting to evade the Respondent when he shut Dan Paul- son Construction and subsequently opened Cadet. Rather, he was motivated by economic reasons. Furthermore , Cadet did not own any equipment that had previously been owned by Dan Paulson Construction . Finally, although they operated in the same market, the Respondent failed to establish that Cadet and Dan Paulson Construction served the same customers . Consequently, after consider- ing all the factors in this case, we find , contrary to the judge, that, based on the 2-year hiatus in oper- ations, and the lack of union animus, common equipment, and evidence of common customers, Cadet was not the alter ego of Dan Paulson Con- struction. Inasmuch as we have found that Cadet was not Dan Paulson Construction's alter ego, it was not bound to the contract between Dan Paulson Con- struction and the Respondent . Therefore, Cadet had no contractual obligation to seek its employees 2 Advance Electric, 268 NLRB 1001, 1002 (1984) 9 Continental Radiator Corp, 283 NLRB 234 (1987) Contrary to the judge, operational continuity is a factor in alter ego as well as successor- ship cases 4 Crawford Door Sales Co, 226 NLRB 1144 (1976) through the Respondent's exclusive hiring hall process It is well settled that, absent an exclusive hiring hall agreement, or other legitimate reasons, a union's interference with an employer, causing it to terminate an employee in violation of Section 8(a)(3), constitutes a violation,of Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act.5 We find,that the Respondent unlawfully caused Cadet to terminate Underwood because he had not been referred by the Respond- ent. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The 'Respondent, Construction and General Laborers Union No. 1140, Laborers International Union of North America, AFL-CIO, is,a labor or- ganization within 'the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 2. Cadet Construction Company is an employer within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act and is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. , 3. By causing and attempting to cause Cadet Construction Company to unlawfully terminate employee Jay Underwood on or about 14 Novem- ber 1986, the Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act. 4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. THE REMEDY Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, we shall order it to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain af- firmative action that is necessary to effectuate the policies of the Acts It having been found that the Respondent unlaw- fully caused Cadet Construction Company to ter- minate Jay Underwood, the Respondent shall make him whole for any loss of pay he may have suf- fered as a result of its having caused him to be de- prived of employment by making payment to him a sum of money, plus interest, to be computed in the manner prescribed in New Horizons for 'the Retard- ed,7 equal to that which he would have' earned but Combustion Engineering, 231 NLRB 1287, 1289 (1977) s The General Counsel's exceptions urge the inclusion in the Order of a provision fora visitatorial clause authorizing the Board, for compliance purposes, to obtain discovery from the Respondent under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure under the supervision of the United States court of appeals enforcing this Order Under the circumstances of this case, we find it unnecessary to include such a clause ' In accordance with our decision in New Horizons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987), interest on and after 1 January 1987 shall be computed at the "short-term Federal rate" for the underpayment of taxes as set out in the 1986 amendment to 26 US C § 6621 Interest on Continued 566 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD for the Respondent's discrimination against him, in accordance with the principles ennunciated in F. W. Woolworth Co, 90 NLRB 289 (1950). ORDER and any other jobsite in places where notices to employees are customarily posted. (e) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days from the date of this Order what steps the Respondent has taken to comply. The Respondent, Construction and General La- borers Union No. 1140, Laborers International Union of North America, AFL'=CIO, its officers, agents, and representatives, shall 1. Cease and desist from (a) Restraining or coercing employees of Cadet Construction Company or any other employer, in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A)'of the Act. (b) Unlawfully causing' and attempting to cause Cadet Construction Company to terminate the em- ployment of Jay Underwood or any other employ- ee in violation of Section 8(b)(2) of the Act. (c) In any like or related manner restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action neces- sary to effectuate the policies of the Act. (a) Make whole Jay Underwood for any losses in pay he may have sustained as a result of the Re- spondent's discrimination against him, computing the amount due in the manner set forth in the remedy section of this decision. (b) Notify immediately in writing Cadet Con- struction Company and Jay Underwood that it had no objection to the Company employing Jay Un- derwood. (c) Post at its business office in Council Bluffs, Iowa, its meeting hall, and all other places where notices to members are customarily posted, a copy of the notice attached hereto marked "Appendix."8 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Re- gional Director for Region 18, after being signed by the Respondent's authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to members are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (d) Promptly, on receipt of copies of the notice from the Regional Director, return to him signed copies for posting by Cadet Construction Compa- ny, it be willing, at its Council Bluffs, Iowa office amounts accrued prior to 1 January 1987 (the effective date of the 1986 amendment to 26 US C § 6621) shall be computed in accordance with Florida Steel Corp, 231 NLRB 651 (1977) 8 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Nation- al Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board " APPENDIX NOTICE To MEMBERS POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to post and abide by this notice. WE WILL NOT restrain or coerce employees of Cadet Construction Company, or any other em- ployee, in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. WE WILL NOT, unlawfully cause and attempt to cause Cadet Construction Company to terminate the employment of Jay Underwood or any other employee in violation of Section 8(b)(2) of the Act. WE WILL NOT in any like or related mariner re- strain or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act. WE WILL make whole Jay Underwood for any losses in pay he may have sustained as a result of our discrimination against him, plus interest. WE WILL notify immediately in writing Cadet Construction Company and Jay Underwood that we have no objection to the Company employing Jay Underwood. CONSTRUCTION AND GENERAL LA- BORERS UNION No. 1140, LABORERS - INTERNATIONAL UNION OF NORTH AMERICA, AFL-CIO Stanley D. Williams, Esq., for the General Counsel. David Weinberg and Mark C. Delmon, Esqs. (Weinberg & Weinberg), of Omaha, Nebraska, for the Respondent DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE WALTER J. ALPRIN, Administrative Law Judge. On charges filed 13 February 1987 by Jay Underwood, an individual, the General Counsel issued a complaint on 30 March 1987 alleging that Construction and General La- borers Union No 1140, Laborers International Union of North America, AFL-CIO (the Union) engaged in an unlawful labor practice to violation of Section 8(b)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act) by attempt- ing to cause and causing Cadet Construction Company to discharge Jay Underwood, an individual, in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. The matter was heard by LABORERS LOCAL 1140 (CADET CONSTRUCTION) 567 me at Omaha, Nebraska, on 30 April 1987, and briefs were submitted by the parties before the extended brief- ing date of 25 June 1987 On the entire record of the case, and from my obser- vation of the demeanor of the witnesses, I make the fol- lowing ship, under the name of Cadet Construction Company, from his then home. Only Paulson had any ownership in- terest in the business, and Paulson worked and super- vised operations. As previously, obligations imposed by the agreement regarding hiring practice, pay, and fund contribution were not met FINDINGS OF FACT I JURISDICTION Dan Paulson, doing business as a sole proprietorship under the name Cadet Construction Company, is a con- crete contractor with its principal office at his residence in Counsel Bluffs, Iowa During the 12 months ending 31 December 19861 he purchased and received at its princi- pal office, and at jobsites located in the State of Iowa, products, goods, and materials directly from points out- side the State of Iowa and valued in excess of $50,000. He was at all material times an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act The Union was at all material times a labor organiza- tion within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. II. BACKGROUND OF EMPLOYER Paulson comes from a family of concrete contractors, and his father and uncle each have their own business. In 1981 he organized a corporate entity known as Dan Paulson Construction Company (the corporation or Paul- son Construction) with its principal office at his resi- dence in Counsel Bluffs. Paulson and his wife were sole stockholders, officers, and directors, and Paulson worked for and supervised all the corporation's operations. On about four occasions he obtained employees through the union hiring hall, but usually just called individuals whom he knew until he had obtained a crew. Employees were paid about $1 per hour over union scale, but no contributions were made to the Union or its funds on their behalf. In April 1981 the corporation became a subcontractor on a job in which the general contractor had a bargain- ing agreement with the Union The Union contracted Paulson, and he agreed to also sign the union agreement, paying union scale and contributing to the various funds and to the Union, and obtaining all appropriate workers, including laborers, through the union hiring hall. That job lasted about 3 months Thereafter the corpo- ration continued doing concrete work, as before, obtain- ing workers outside the hiring hall process and not fol- lowing union requirements regarding pay The corpora- tion filed tax returns as such, and continued as described above until 1983 when, as a result of financial reversals, Paulson had to sell his home, give up his corporate busi- ness, and seek employment as a cement worker at an hourly wage After about 2 years, in 1985, Paulson went back into business as a concrete contractor. The corpora- tion had not been formally dissolved, so far as is known, and had not gone into bankruptcy, but Paulson chose not to reactivate it. Instead , he operated as a sole proprietor- ' All dates are in 1986 unless otherwise indicated III. TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT The agreement entered into by Paulson with the Union is a territorial labor contract . It provides, in perti- nent part, as follows The term of the contract is from date of execution, 30 September 19802 to 31 May 1983, "and thereafter from year to year unless changed in accordance with Article XV of this Agreement." Actually, article XV deals with protection of workers' rights should they refuse to cross a picket line. Article XVI, however, provides that Either party desiring change in the provisions to this Agreement shall notify the other in writing at least 90 days prior to June 1, 1983 Such notice shall set out the modifications or changes in the Agreement that such party desires to negotiate. The Agreement then shall be opened for discussion rela- tive to such change or changes desired. The agreement provides for all hirings to be through a hiring hall process, for conditions of employment, for pay and contributions to funds and to the Union . It also includes by reference a manual of jurisdiction for the as- signment of work, and the Employer "agrees that on no- tification of misassignment of work to another craft union . . . to immediately rectify the complaint or the Union will be entitled to use its economic recourse." The term "economic recourse" includes the right to station pickets The agreement is binding on the Employer and its as- signs and successors, and on any subcontractor. Any person, firm, corporation, joint venture, or other business entity becoming bound by the agreement becomes a member of the multiemployer collective -bargaining unit established by the agreement, though they may designate their own representatives for the purpose of collective bargaining Since 31 May 1983 there have been changes in the rates of pay and contributions on a year -to-year basis. Other than possibly the provisions of article XVI per- taining to modification or changes, the agreement has no specific provision for termination , cancellation, or repu- diation. IV. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE About 13 November 1986 Cadet obtained a subcon- tract, for a gross amount of about $30,000, to do con- crete work on a job at a location known as the Hy-Vee store in Counsel Bluffs. The general contractor was party to the union territorial agreement . The job was to run from November 1986 to about March 1987. Cadet 2 As stated in the contract, but sometime in April 1981 by the testimo- ny 568 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD utilized Paulson and Otis Turner for concrete finishing, Steve Turner for concrete finishing and some laborer work, and Jay Underwood, not a member of the Union, to do most of the laborer work. None of Cadet's employ- ees were obtained by the hiring hall process. I ' On 14 November Larry Lewis, the union business agent, visited the jobsite. Observing Underhill doing la- borer's work, Lewis went to Paulson and engaged in a conversation, the details of which are in dispute. Lewis' testimony was that he told Paulson that Paulson had an agreement with the Union, that Paulson was assigning work designated in the manual of jurisdiction to the "wrong craft," and that Paulson would have to correct it by putting a union laborer in the craft. Lewis testified that he did not refer to Underwood by name, and did not threaten to post pickets or close down the job. To the contrary, Paulson testified that Lewis carried on the conversation in the hearing of Underwood and of both Turners, and that he said, "Danny, you're going to have to get some laborers on the job. If you don't, I'm going to have to shut you down. Underwood has to go-he's never done anything for 'us." He also said, "Danny, you've got a contract with us." This testimony was generally supported by Underwood, who added that the conversation was also overheard by two employees of the general contractor. Underwood also testified that Lewis said "Underwood can't work here; if he does I'll take care of ,Underwood." Underwood contradicted him- self by testifying on direct examination that Lewis had referred to a contract with Paulson, and then on cross- examination denied that Lewis had mentioned a contract. After the conversation Paulson looked for the general contractor, but being unable to find him, told the general ,contractor's foreman to have him phone. When he did so, the general contractor told Paulson to take on a union laborer . Paulson told Underwood that he would have to let him go because it would otherwise cause problems with the general contractors that he could not afford to have. Paulson then phoned Lewis After Paulson apologized to Lewis for losing his temper, and Lewis apologized to Paulson for unspecified remarks he made in the conver- sation, Paulson asked Lewis to send three union laborers to the job the next morning, two of whom would be on the payroll of the general contractor and one, replacing Underwood, with Lewis' approval to be paid through Paulson's father's construction business Jack DeVault, a construction laborer member of the Union, testified that on 15 November he went to the hiring hall and was directed by Lewis to report to Paul- son Construction at the Hy-Vee jobsite. DeVault went to the site and, knowing Paulson, found him and presented himself for work. He worked on the job for 2-1/2 months, never heard of Cadet Construction Company, was directed in his work by both Paulson and the gener- al contractor's foreman, and was paid by checks from the general contractor. Another laborer, who did not testify, was assigned from the hiring hall to work for Paulson, to be paid by Paulson's father's company. That individual left after several weeks, and was not replaced. V. EVENTS AFTER THE CONSTRUCTION WAS COMPLETED After the Hy-Vee job was finished Paulson continued to operate as a concrete contractor, as a sole proprietor- ship under the name Cadet Construction Company.- He employed Underwood. He did not obtain, workers through the hiring hall process. On 23 February 1987, after Underwood had filed the charges herein, the Union directed a letter addressed to Dan Paulson Construction Company, advising that it wished to reopen the agreement for purposes of negotiat- ing wages, hours, and conditions of employment for future years. Paulson responded by letter on 26 February 1987, on letterhead of Cadet Construction Company, de- nying the existence of a collective-bargaining agreement or any interest in reviewing any kind of agreement. To this the Union replied on 3 April 1987, again to Dan Paulson Construction Company, reiterating the existence of the contract and its demand for collective bargaining. VI. DISCUSSION There are two issues to be resolved in this case. First, we must determine whether the union representative did in fact state that unless Underwood was taken off the job the Union would, resort to pickets and other forms of self-help. If that is decided to have been the case, it will be necessary to determine whether such demand and threat violated the Act. This in turn will depend on whether Cadet, Paulson's proprietorship, was an alter ego of Paulson Construction I do not credit the denial of the union representative that he threatened to picket the jobsite if Underwood, the nonunion laborer, was continued in his employment. The"Union had an obligation to its members to take action to see that the job was filled by a union member and, in its opinion, had a contractual right to take "eco- nomic recourse," including picketing. I therefore cannot believe it did not threaten to exercise its rights. The General Counsel's case rests on the assumption that Respondent Union had no right to threaten action against Cadet because Cadet had no obligation to the Union, not being a signator to any collective-bargaining agreement. I find to the contrary that Cadet was an alter ego entity of Paulson Construction. In deciding the issue, "we must consider a number of factors, no one of which, taken alone, is the sine qua non of alter ego status. Among these factors are. common management and ownership; common business purpose, nature of operations, and su- pervision; common premises and equipment; common customers, i.e , whether the employers constitute `the same business in the same market'; as well as the nature and extent of the negotiations and formalities surround- ing the transaction. We must also consider whether the purpose behind the creation of the alleged alter ego was legitimate or whether, instead, its purpose was to evade responsibilities under the Act." Fugazy Continental Corp., 265 NLRB 1301, 1301-1302 (1982).3 ' As indicated to counsel at the hearing , I have also given consider- ation to the effect of the 2-year hiatus between operations of the two en- Continued LABORERS LOCAL 1140 (CADET CONSTRUCTION) In the matter at hand the majority and the more im- portant of the indicia indicate an alter ego status of the two entities. In terms of ownership, though both Paulson and his wife owned shares in the corporation and only Paulson "owned" the sole proprietorship, the Board rec- ognizes that "substantial" ownership is sufficient. See, e.g., Crawford Door Sales Co., 226 NLRB 1144'(1976), in which husband and wife owned all shares in one corpo- ration entity while they were joined by two children in ownership of the shares of the other. Management and supervision for both entities were vested in Paulson, and though geographically different, Paulson's residence during each respective time period was the business office of the business entity The business purpose and operations for each, to perform concrete work directly or as a subcontractor, were the same for both entities, and customers in the same market were served by each. There are some indicia that tend to lean away from the alter ego concept. The corporation owned a dump truck and some power tools that are not in the arsenal of the sole proprietorship but, on the other hand, it appears that such lack of ownership does not interfere with the sole proprietorship operating in the same market as did the corporation. There was a 2-year involuntary hiatus between operations of the entities, indicating a lack of evil motive or union animus in activating the second entity. Finally there is the legal fiction of the viability of corporate life separate from the individual proprietor- ship. No single test or indicia is a sine qua non , and determi- nation of alter ego status requires a case-by-case compar- tities, referred to in a small number of cases, e g , Continental Radiator Corp, 283 NLRB 234 (1987) 1 find that this condition had been more generally used as a litmus test of operational continuity in successorship cases rather than as of ownership and supervisory continuity in alter ego cases See Canterbury Villa, Inc, 271 NLRB 144, 144-145 (1984) 569 icon and weighing of all factors. NLRB v. Campbell- Harris Electric, 719 F 2d 292, 296 (8th Cir. 1983). It is my finding that because of substantial similarities in owner- ship, management , supervision, operation, market, and office location, Paulson Construction and Cadet were alter ego employers. As such, Cadet and Paulson individ- ually were bound by the corporation's bargaining agree- ment with Respondent Union, pursuant to which contin- ued employment of a nonunion worker could result in lawful picketing As a result, I find no violation of the Act. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW I Construction and General Laborers Union No. 1140, Laborers International Union of North America, AFL- CIO is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act. 2. Cadet Construction Company and Dan Paulson Construction Company are alter ego employers, engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. 3. The General Counsel has not established by a pre- ponderance of the evidence that the Respondent has vio- lated the Act by attempting to cause and causing Cadet Construction Company to discharge Jay Underwood, an employee. On the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, I issue the following recommended4 ORDER The complaint is dismissed in its entirety. 4 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the Board's Rules and Regulations, the findings , conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec 102 48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur- poses