287 NLRB 796
Indiana Cal-Pro, Inc.
796
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Indiana Cal-Pro , Inc. and Laborers' Local Union
No. 741 , a/w Laborers International Union of
North America AFL-CIO. Case 25-CA-18182
16 December 1987
DECISION AND ORDER
By CHAIRMAN DOTSON AND MEMBERS
STEPHENS AND CRACRAFT
On 3 April 1987 Administrative Law Judge
Mary Ellen R. Bittner issued the attached decision.
The Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting
brief, and the General Counsel-'filed a brief in sup-
port of the judge's decision.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegat-
ed its authority in this proceeding to a three-
member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the
record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has
decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings,I and
conclusions, 2 as modified, 3 and to adopt the rec-
ommended Order as modified below.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the
recommended Order of the administrative law
judge as modified below and orders that the Re-
spondent, Indiana Cal-Pro, Inc., Ellettsville, Indi-
ana, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall take the action set forth in the Order as modi-
fied.
1. Substitute the following for paragraph 1(a).
"(a) Interrogating employees about whether they
desire
union representation and
whether they
would sign a petition disavowing support for the
Union; threatening to close the facility if the Union
I The Respondent asserts that the judge's credibility resolutions are the
result of bias
After a careful examination of the entire record, we are
satisfied that the allegation is without merit Further, it is the Board's es-
tablished policy is not to overrule an administrative law judge's credibil-
ity resolutions unless the clear preponderance of all the relevant evidence
convinces us that they are incorrect
Standard Dry
Wall Products,
91
NLRB 544 (1950), enfd 188 F 2d 362 (3d Cir 1951) We have carefully
examined the record and find no basis for reversing the findings
In light of our affirmance of the judge's finding that the majority of the
Respondent's employees executed valid authorization cards on behalf of
the Union, we disavow as irrelevant the judge's observation, at fn 23 of
her decision , that the Respondent's unfair labor practices herein are not
so outrageous and pervasive that they would justify a Gissel bargaining
order "irrespective of a union's majority status "
2 In adopting the judge 's finding that the Respondent engaged in un-
lawful employee interrogation, we do not rely on the incident involving
Superintendent Summit's questioning employee Kemp concerning wheth-
er Kemp was "at liberty" to say anything about the union meeting,
which the General Counsel neither alleged nor litigated as a-violation
We further find it unnecessary to rely on the judge's finding that Fore-
man Christy unlawfully questioned employees about "what their feeling
was" concerning union activity These additional findings of interroga-
tion would merely be cumulative and would not affect the remedy
3 We shall accordingly delete from the recommended Order and notice
the specific descriptions of interrogation which we have declined to
adopt
became the employees' representative; participating
in the preparation and dissemination of a petition
disavowing the Union; and soliciting employees to
sign that petition and to prepare another."
2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the
administrative law judge.
,
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found
that we violated the National Labor Relations Act
and has ordered us to post and abide by this notice.
WE WILL NOT ask you whether you desire union
representation or whether you will sign a petition
disavowing support for the Union.
WE WILL .NOT threaten to close our Ellettsville,
Indiana facility if the Union becomes your collec-,
tive-bargaining representative.
WE WILL NOT participate in the preparation or
dissemination of petitions disavowing the Union,
and WE WILL NOT ask you to sign or prepare such
petitions.
WE WILL NOT refuse to recognize or bargain
with Laborers' Local Union No. 741, a/w Labor-
ers International Union of North America, AFL-
CIO, as the exclusive representative of our employ-
ees in the following appropriate bargaining unit:
All production and maintenance employees at
our
Ellettsville,
Indiana facility,
excluding
office clerical employees, professional employ-
ees, guards, and supervisors as defined in the
Act.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner
interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the exer-
cise of the rights' guaranteed you by Section 7 of
the Act.
WE WILL, on request, recognize and bargain
with Laborers' Local Union No. 741, a/w Labor-
ers International Union of North America, AFL-
CIO, about the rates of pay, wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment of the
employees in the appropriate unit described above.
INDIANA CAL-PRO, INC.
Steve Robles, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Charles Hampton
White, Esq. (Cornelius & Collins), of
Nashville, Tennessee, for the Respondent.
287 NLRB No. 81
INDIANA CAL-PRO
797
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
MARY ELLEN R., BITTNER, Administrative Law Judge.
The original charge, in this proceeding was filed on 13
August 1986, by Laborers' Local Union No. 741, a/w
Laborers' International Union of North America, AFL-
CIO (the Union) against Indiana Cal-Pro, Inc. (the Re-
spondent). On 9 October 1986 the complaint issued, al-
leging, in substance, that the Union, as of 17 June 1986,
represented a majority of the Respondent's employees in
an appropriate bargaining unit; that the Respondent had
engaged in
numerous acts that interfered' with, re-
strained, and ' coerced 'its employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them in Section 7 of the National
Labor Relations Act, and had thereby violated Section
8(a)(1) of the'Act, and that the Respondent's conduct
precluded the holding of a fair election among the em-
ployees to determine whether they desire union represen-
tation. The complaint further alleged that the Respond-
ent's unfair labor practices warranted an order requiring
it to recognize and bargain with the Union as of July
.1986. The Respondent has denied the commission of any
unfair labor practices.,
-
-
A hearing was held before me on 12 and 13 January
1987 in Bloomington,
Indiana. Following the hearing,
the General Counsel and the Respondent filed briefs,
which have been considered.'
On the entire record in this case and from my observa-
tion of the witnesses and their demeanor, I make the fol-
lowing
,
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
The Respondent is a Tennessee corporation with its
principal office and place of business in Nashville, Ten-
nessee, and a facility in Ellettsville, Indiana, where it is
engaged in the mining and processing of high-calcium
limestone. During the 12-month period preceding the is-
suance of the complaint, a representative period, the Re-
spondent, in the course and conduct of its business oper-
ations, sold and shipped from the, Ellettsville facility
products,
goods, and materials valued in excess of
$50,000 directly to points outside the State of Indiana.
The answer admits and I find that the Respondent is an
employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
the Act, and I further find that it will effectuate the pur-
poses of the Act to assert jurisdiction here
Ii. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The Union is a labor organization within the meaning
of the Act.
' The General Counsel's unopposed motion to correct the record is
granted
III
THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background
1. The Respondent's operation and prior
relationship with the Union
The Respondent is headquartered in Nashville, Ten-
nessee, and maintains a facility in Ellettsville, Indiana,
where
it
mines limestone and crushes it into a fine
powder for use by glass manufacturers. As of 10 July
19862 there were 14 production and maintenance em-
ployees3 at the Ellettsville operation, plus at least 3 non-
unit
personnel:
the
plant's
superintendent,
Steven
Summit; the mine foreman, Lester Christy; and the office
manager, Jim Morris.4
The Ellettsville operation began in 1978 and, accord-
ing to the General Counsel's opening statement at the
hearing, which was not contradicted on this point, from
that time until 1984 the Union and a local of the Operat-
ing Engineers International Union were recognized as
point representatives of the production and maintenance
employees. The Respondent filed a petition for a Board-
conducted election in 1984; at that time the two unions
disclaimed any interest in continuing to represent the em-
ployees, and the employees remained unrepresented until
the events at issue in this case.
Following the decertification of the point representa-
tives, the Respondent met in early April 1985, with an
employee relations committee composed of employees
John Siniard and Don Anderson. An apparent result of
this meeting was a memorandum distributed to the em-
ployees on 25 April 1985 stating various terms and con-
ditions of employment; one of these was a provision that
wages would be reviewed annually in December It is
undisputed that this document- was the only written
statement of schedules, vacation pay, and so on that was
distributed to the employees after the decertification
It is also undisputed that during the summer of 1986
the Respondent was suffering from a decline in business,
although the extent of that decline is not indicated in the
record.,
2. The 1986 organizing campaign
Employee John Siniard credibly testified that on 15
June he went to the union hall to obtain blank authoriza-
tion cards, which he then passed out to the other em-
ployees. Nine of the employees signed cards, which were
returned to Siniard by 20 June.
On 8 July the Union filed a petition in Case 24-RC-
8360 seeking a Board-conducted election in a unit of pro-
duction and maintenance employees, and also wrote to
the Respondent, demanding recognition. The parties stip-
ulated that the Respondent received the letter 2 or 3
days later, i.e., by 11 July, and also stipulated that, as 'of
2 All dates here are 1986 unless otherwise indicated
s The parties stipulated at the hearing that a unit of production and
maintenance employees is appropriate for purposes of collective bargain-
ing
4 There are also some references in the record to a Richard Neil, who
worked in the office It is clear that he was not in the bargaining unit
798
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the date of the hearing, the Respondent had refused to
recognize the Union.
There is some dispute as to when the Respondent
learned about the union activity. Mine Foreman Christy
testified that employee
Don Thompson, with whom
Christy rode to work, had told him that the men had
been "talking union"; this was apparently the first con-
versation Christy had with any employee about the orga-
nizing campaign . Christy further testified that he did not
report this or other conversations he had with employees
about the Union to Plant Superintendent Summit and
that as far as he knew Summit became aware of the or-
ganizing campaign when the Union wrote to the Re-
spondent demanding recognition. Summit testified, how-
ever, that he first* became aware of the organizing 'cam-
paign when employee Gary Parker' asked him about a
union card, apparently about 2 weeks before the Union
formally requested recognition.
B The Events During the Union Campaign
1. The alleged misrepresentation as to the purpose
of the cards
The Respondent contends that the employees were not
advised that signing authorization cards would indicate
their desire for union representation, but, instead, were
told only that signing cards would enable a union repre-
sentative to talk to them. In support of this assertion,
Christy testified that .around the first of July some em-
ployees told him that Simard had approached them to
sign something that would entitle them to talk to a union
representative. Similarly, Summit testified that, shortly
before the Union filed its representation petition, he had
a conversation with employee Roger Kemp, who said,
among other things, that he had been misled about the
purpose of the 'authorization cards. However, the only
employee to testify in support of the Respondent's con-
tention was Kemp, who stated that he signed an authori-
zation card on 17 June "with the impression that the
Union was to come out and talk to us," and that he read
the card, but "not thoroughly."
Neither Christy, Summit , nor Kemp impressed me as
particularly credible witnesses.
Siniard , however, who
seemed to be candid and. to generally exhibit good recall,
credibly denied
telling , any employees that the card
would. enable a • union representative to talk to them.
Indeed, Siniard credibly testified that all he told the em-
ployees was that the card was "to bring the Union
back," and that none of the employees asked him the
purpose of the cards. Most of the employees who testi-
fied corroborated Siniard, and stated that there was no
misrepresentation about the purpose of the authorization
cards. Thus, Garry Shrum testified that Siniard asked
him if he would be interested in bringing the Union
back, and that when he replied in the affirmative, Siniard
asked him if he would sign a card, to which Shrum re-
plied that he would. Shrum signed a card on 17 June and
left it in Siniard's vehicle Similarly, Warren Walls testi-
fied that Siniard gave him a card and said that signing it
meant that he wanted union representation. Walls signed
the card and returned it to Siniard. Also corroborating
Siniard, employee Hershel Sparks testified that he was
off work between 8 June and 6 August with a broken
arm, and that he signed a union card on 17 June at Sin-
lard's home. According to Sparks, Siniard told him that
the men wanted to bring the Union back and asked him
how he felt about it, and Sparks replied that he would
"like to see it."
Shrum, Walls, and Sparks, as well as Siniard, appeared
to be forthright. I therefore credit all four witnesses and
find that Siniard did not misrepresent the purpose of the
authorization cards when he solicited employees to sign
them. I therefore further find that, as of 20 June, 9 of the
14 unit employees, a clear majority, had expressed a
desire for union representation.5
r2., The alleged threats and interrogations
a. The supposed June wage increase and Christy's
comments about lack of work
As noted above, the Respondent conducted a wage
review each December and,had notified the employees
of this practice in the memo posted in April 1985. None-
theless, Kemp testified that, at some point during the
summer of 1986, Siniard told him that the employees
were supposed to have received a raise a month or two
earlier and that the Respondent was not meeting its obli-
gation ,to the employees.
Both Kemp and Summit testified that
.Kemp later
asked Summit, about the-raise. According to Summit, he
told Kemp that the latter should know better because
wage reviews were in December, and Kemp said that
Siniard had told him that the employees were supposed
to have received a raise in June. In that same conversa-
tion, still according to Summit , Kemp told him that the
employees had been asked to sign union authorization
cards, and that he thought they had made a mistake be-
cause he had been misled about the purpose of,the cards.
Christy also testified about the rumors of a June raise.
According to him, after the Respondent received the
Union's representation petition he had a conversation
with Kemp and employee Gary Hoff about whether the
employees were supposed to have received a raise in
June. Christy testified that he told the employees that he
had not heard anything about it , and that they then
asked why Siniard would have lied to them about the
matter Christy further testified that Hoff also said that
Simard had told him a different story than he had told
Kemp and had said that the Respondent was ,breaking its
agreement with the employees
Christy further testified that in either that conversation
or another Hoff and Kemp asked him if the employees
would be making a mistake in seeking representation by
the Union, and that he replied that, "knowing because of
the slump in our sales, we were down to a 4-day week, I
couldn't really see any point, and I couldn't 'see what
5 1 include Kemp as one of the nine signers I do not credit his testimo-
ny that Siniard misrepresented the purpose of the card and, in any event,
Kemp read the card, which unambiguously designates the Union as the
,signer's collective -bargaining representative, and Kemp testified that it
was his "impression" that the Union was to talk to the employees, not
that Siniard told him that that was the only purpose of the card Kemp's
card is, therefore, valid Colonial Lincoln Mercury Sales, 197 NLRB 54, 66
(1972)
INDIANA CAL-PRO
799
their motive was for needing a Union as a bargaining
agent " Christy initially testified that he did not tell the
employees that they were going to be out of work, but
then conceded that the possibility of no work "may have
been mentioned." That concession was consistent with
the affidavit Christy had previously provided to a Board
agent, in which he stated that, "Hoff and Kemp asked
me what I thought would happen if the Union got back
in. I told them that given the slump we were in and the
drop in sales, it could mean that there's no work."s
Hoff did not testify, and although Kemp testified that
he talked to both Christy and Summit about the Union a
day or two after he signed his authorization card, he did
not detail the conversation with Christy. I find that
Christy did talk to Hoff and Kemp about the Union and,
in response to their question about what would happen if
the Union represented them, told them that with the
slump in the Respondent's business there might be no
work.
The General Counsel argues that this comment violat-
ed Section 8(a)(1) of the Act as a threat of plant closure.
I disagree. It is well established that predictions based on
economic circumstances, as opposed to threats of occur-
rences that are under the employer's control, are lawful,
and in this instance Christy tied his reference to the pos-
sibility of a lack of work to the Respondent's adverse
economic situation. In these circumstances, I find that
the comment did not violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.'
Christy also testified to another conversation about the
supposed June wage increase, testifying that at some
point he had a conversation with employees Ron Badg-
ley, Garry Shrum, Warren Walls, and someone identified
in the record as "Billy Parris,"8 that during this conver-
sation Badgley asked if there was any truth to the rumor
that there was supposed to have been a wage increase in
June, and that he replied that as far as he knew, there
was not.
Siniard, who I noted above I found to be a generally
credible witness, testified that he had never heard any-
thing from the Respondent about a June wage increase,
that the employees had received raises in December
1985, and that he did not tell any employees that there
would be an increase in June. The only employees to tes-
tify besides Simard and Kemp were Shrum, Walls, John
Sheppard, and Hershel Sparks, and none of these wit-
nesses were asked about the supposed rumors of a June
wage increase, although Christy testified that Shrum and
Walls were present on an occasion when he was asked
about the matter. In these circumstances I credit Siniard
and find that he did not tell other employees either that
the Respondent was supposed to have given the employ-
ees a wage increase in June or that the Respondent had
reneged on its agreement with the employees.
6 Christy's original affidavit, offered into evidence as a General Coun-
sel exhibit, was lost, and the court reporter therefore submitted a copy as
part of the record Counsel for the General Counsel and for the Respond-
ent have been informally advised of this procedure and have indicated
they have no objection, and the copy is therefore received into evidence
Walter Garson, Jr & Associates, 276 NLRB 1226, 1229 (1985)
It does not appear that anyone by that name was employed by the
Respondent at material times, and the individual to whom Christy re-
ferred was probably Billy Pierce, a unit employee
b Summers' comment, as repeated by Summit
Shrum testified9 that on some date he could not speci-
fy he was in the plant lunchroom and heard Summit say
that he had called Summers, the Respondent's president,
who worked out of the Respondent's headquarters in
Nashville, and told him that the men wanted to bring the
Union back. According to Shrum, Summit said that
Summers had been upset, and had said, "[F]ine, let them
bring the Union back in, but we will be closing the doors
down if they do." Shrum further testified that he men-
tioned this conversation to two or three other employ-
ees.
Summit denied that he ever discussed the Union with
Shrum, and I credit Shrum, and find that Summit made
the comment Shrum attributed to him. I further find that
the remark was a threat to close the facility if the em-
ployees selected the Union as their representative and
that it therefore violated Section 8(a)(1).
c. Summit's remarks to Kemp
Kemp testified that he attended a union meeting a few
days after he had signed a card, and that a day or two
after
the
meeting he initiated a conversation with
Summit at the facility by telling him that he had gone.
According to Kemp, Summit asked if he was "at liberty"
to say anything about the meeting, and Kemp replied, "I
guess." Then, still according to Kemp, Summit asked
what the Union was offering, and he replied that they
did not offer or guarantee anything, and that someone
had asked a question about insurance which had never
been answered.
Kemp further testified that he told
Summit that Short had said that if the employees did not
want to be represented the Union "would back out
gracefully." At some point in the conversation, Summit
said that he had been in the Union and did not derive
any benefit from it, and that he did not think the em-
ployees would benefit from union representation. Kemp
also testified that he did not remember if Summit said
anything about the plant closing, but later stated that
Summit had given his opinion that if the employees
struck, Summers might close the plant
Summit testified that in his conversations with Kemp
the latter said that he had "messed up," that he had been
misled , and that he had learned from attending a union
meeting that the Union could not guarantee anything.
Summit was not specifically asked if he made the state-
ment that Kemp attributed to him Although Kemp was
called as a witness for the General Counsel, it was clear
that his sympathies in this proceeding lay with the Re-
spondent, and he very reluctantly testified to Summit's
comment. I therefore credit Kemp that the comment was
made.
The complaint does not specifically allege that Sum-
mit's question to Kemp whether the latter was "at liber-
9 Shrum, who was no longer working for the Respondent at the time
he testified, impressed me as a highly credible witness He seemed to be
candid and forthright, and to try to recall events accurately I therefore
credit him
800
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ty" to talk about the union meeting was unlawful,1° and
counsel for the General Counsel does not urge in his
brief that a finding of an unfair labor practice should be
based on that inquiry. However, both participants in the
conversation testified, and the Respondent was fully af-
forded the opportunity to litigate the matter, and I thus
find it appropriate to consider it
In Rossmore House, 269 NLRB 1176 (1984), the Board
held that "all the circumstances" must be considered in
determining whether an interrogation violates the Act
The Board went on to note that
Some factors which may be considered in analyzing
alleged interrogations are. (1) the background; (2)
the nature of the information sought; (3) the identity
of the questioner; and (4) the place and method of
interrogation See Bourne v NLRB, 332 F.2d 47 (2d
Cir 1964) These and other relevant factors are not
to be mechanically applied in each case Rather,
they represent some areas of inquiry that may be
considered in applying in the Blue Flash test of
whether under all the circumstances the interroga-
tion reasonably tends to restrain, coerce, or inter-
fere with rights guaranteed by the Act 11
Applying this test to the instant situation, I note that
the inquiry occurred in a context of other unfair labor
practices, sought specific information as to the Union's
campaign, was undertaken by the highest official regular-
ly at the facility, and occurred at the employee's work-
place In these circumstances, and despite the fact that
Kemp initiated the conversation, I find that Summit's
questions were coercive and violated Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act
It is also not clear whether the complaint specifically
alleged that Summit's remark to Kemp about the conse-
quences of a strike was unlawful, and counsel for the
General Counsel did not discuss this conversation in his
brief. 12 Assuming that the legality of the remark is in
issue, I find that the comment was not so much a threat
of adverse consequences of unionization as a reasonable
prediction of what would happen if the Respondent were
required to withstand a strike on top of its other eco-
nomic problems I therefore conclude that the comment
did not violate Section 8(a)(1)
d. Summit's comment to Walls
Walls13 was off work due to illness from about 25
June to 20 July and credibly testified that during the first
week of July he went to the Respondent's office to get
some insurance forms According to Walls, while he was
in the office he told Summit that "Things are looking a
10 The complaint alleges that the Respondent, about 29 July, interro-
gated employees, but that allegation apparently refers to other conduct,
discussed below
11 269 NLRB at 1178 fn 20
12 The complaint's allegation that the Respondent, through Summit, on
an unknown date in July, threatened plant closure if the Union became
the employees' collective-bargaining agent may have been meant to refer
to other conduct, also discussed below
13 Walls also impressed me as a credible witness He appeared forth-
right and also appeared to try to recount events accurately I thus credit
him unless otherwise indicated
little slow around here," and Summit replied that that
was the case
Walls then said that he was surprised that
the operation had not closed, and Summit responded
that, "I know one thing for sure, if that Union gets in the
Company will close the doors."
Summit, denied that he had any conversation with
Walls in the office in which the Union was discussed, or
that he ever told Walls that if the Union came in the
plant would close For the reasons given above, I credit
Walls, and find that the conversation occurred as he de-
scribed it.
I further find that Summit's comment was a threat that
the facility would close if the Union succeeded in its or-
ganizing efforts, and that, unlike some of the other re-
marks discussed here, this comment was not a prediction
based on objective considerations, but a pure and simple
threat. I therefore find that it violated Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act.
e. Summit's comment to Shrum
Shrum credibly testified that on Friday, 18 July14 he
was working with Christy when Summit came tip to
them and said that, "You guys might think about looking
for another job," explaining that he had received a letter
from Summers, the Respondent's president, saying that if
the Union won the right to represent the employees
"they was going to close the doors down." Summit also
said that the Respondent had offered him a job "down
south,"15 and had told him to discuss the situation with
his family and see how they felt about moving. Accord-
ing to Shrum, Summit further said that the Respondent
either had sent or was going to send letters to its custom-
ers notifying them that the Ellettsville plant might close
and that they should start thinking about buying their
product elsewhere
Shrum further testified that after Summit left he ad-
vised Christy that he was going to start taking Fridays
off to look for another job The following Friday, July
25, Shrum accepted a new job, and formally resigned his
employment with the Respondent on 28 July
Summit flatly denied ever discussing the Union with
Shrum and testified that he was never present during any
conversation between Christy and Shrum in which the
Union was discussed Summit further testified that he
had never told Shrum that the Respondent had sent let-
ters advising customers that the operation would close if
the Union came in Similarly, Christy testified that he did
not recall ever being present when Summit discussed the
Union with Shrum, and also testified that Summit had
not said in his and Shrum's presence that the Respondent
had sent letters to customers and the plant would be
closed if the Union represented the employees Nonethe-
less, I credit Shrum, and find that Summit made the re-
marks Shrum attributed to him I further find that these
remarks constituted a threat of plant closure, which vio-
lated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
14 At that time, according to Shrum, because business was slow the
employees regularly worked Monday through Thursdays, and worked on
Fridays only if they so chose
15 Apparently in Nashville, the Respondent's headquarters
INDIANA CAL-PRO
801
f Summit's comment to Sparks
As noted earlier, Sparks returned to work on 6 August
after being off with a broken arm. He testified that on
that date he went to the office and spoke to Summit and
Richard Neil who worked in the office
According to Sparks, Summit asked him if he had a
job and said that Summers and Joe Arnold, the Respond-
ent's vice president of operations, had said that if the
Union "got, back in they was going to close the doors
down " Sparks further testified that he did not respond,
but that during that week Summit made similar com-
ments three or four times in his presence.
Summit denied having any conversation with Sparks
during the summer of 1986 about the Union, and testified
that he had checked the Respondent's payroll records
and that Sparks returned to work the week of 15 August
However, the payroll records were not introduced into
evidence I was more favorably impressed with Sparks'
demeanor than Summit's, and Neil did not testify. I
therefore find that the conversation occurred as Sparks
described it I further find that Summit's remark was a
threat to close the facility if the Union represented the
employees, that that threat violated Section 8(a)(1), and
that the repetitions of the threat were also unlawful.
g. Christy's alleged interrogation of employees
Testifying as a witness for the General Counsel,
Christy testified that he had had conversations with
other employees similar to the one he had with Kemp in
which he told Kemp, in response to the latter's question
about what would happen if the Union came in, that be-
cause of the slump in sales, it "could mean that there's
no work " Christy denied, however, that he ever asked
employees any questions abouf the union activity. At
that point, the General Counsel showed him his prehear-
ing affidavit, in which he stated, "I did ask employees
what their feeling was, why they didn't ask John Simard
the questions they were asking me about the once a year
with the Company," i.e, the annual wage review sched-
uled for December Christy attempted to explain this ap-
parent inconsistency between his affidavit and his testi-
mony by stating that the questions to which the affidavit
referred were not about union activity, but about why
the employees did not address their inquiries to Simard
instead of to him. I do not credit Christy on this point,
given his concession in the affidavit that he asked em-
ployees "what their feeling was," and thus find that he
did ask employees their views about the union activity.
Further, as it appears that Christy was interrogating
the employees precisely in order to ascertain whether
they supported the Union, I conclude that these ques-
tions violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act 16
3 The petitions disavowing interest in union
representation and related conduct
a Events prior to July 30
Kemp testified that a few days or a week before 31
July he went to the union hall with several other em-
ployees to tell the Union's representatives that they did
not want to be represented, and that while they were at
the union hall union representative Short and employee
Don Thompson had an argument, which resulted in
Short telling Thompson to leave
Kemp further testified that he thought that Simard
was one of the employees who went with him to the
union hall on that occasion However, Simard credibly
testified that he attended an evening union meeting in
late July, but that there was no discussion at that meet-
ing about the Union withdrawing its petition for an elec-
tion. Simard further credibly testified that the day after
this
meeting
Kemp told him that he thought "we
screwed up," and that when Simard asked him to ex-
plain, Kemp said that if the 'employees brought the
Union back, management would "shut the doors." Sin-
iard asked what made Kemp say that, and Kemp replied
that Simard had told some lies, and that Christy had said
the employees had the "best insurance that was going,"
and also referred to the supposed June raise Siniard re-
plied that he had not lied, because the employees' insur-
ance "wasn't worth the paper that it was wrote on." Ac-
cording to Siniard, Kemp then asked him to call the
Union and ask it to "back off," and he replied that he
would do S0.17
Kemp denied having any conversation with Simard in
which he accused the latter of lying to him For the rea-
sons given earlier, I credit Simard and find that the con-
versation occurred as he described it.
Simard credibly testified that the morning after this
conversation with Kemp, Summit called him into the
office and, in Kemp's presence, asked him if he had
called the Union or told the Union to "back off," and
Siniard said that he had not Summit then asked Simard
if the latter was going to call the Union and Simard said
that he would.,
Summit denied having this conversation with Simard,
but I credit Simard and find that Summit asked Simard if
he had called the Union and then asked him to do so. I
further find that this question was in effect an instruction
to Siniard to tell the Union to stop its organizing efforts,
that it was coercive, and that it therefore violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the Act
Also contrary to Smiard, Christy testified that on 29
July Simard asked him to be relieved from work long
enough to call union agent Hardy, saying that he wanted
to get the Union to "pull" the representation petition be-
cause he had been to a union meeting the night before
and he and the other men wanted to end their affiliation
with the Union. Christy further testified that in that same
conversation Simard told him that Kemp had started the
16 Robins Federal Credit Union, 273 NLRB 1352, 1335-1356 (1985),
Kona 60 Minute Photo, 277 NLRB 867 (1985)
17 On cross-examination , Simard testified that he offered to call the
Union I do not view this inconsistency as reflecting adversely on his
overall credibility
802
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
union campaign and he had gone along with him, and
that he hoped no one had any hard feelings toward him.
According to Christy, he told Siniard that he could call
the Union any time, and Siniard said that he would wait
until lunchtime.
Siniard denied having this conversation with Christy. I
credit Siniard.
b
The events of 30 or 31 July18
Summit testified that on 30 July employee Don Shep-
pard asked him to help him draft a petition to get rid of
the Union . Acording to Summit, he wrote at the top of a
piece of paper , "This is a petition to discontinue the rep-
resentation of the Laborers
[sic] Union Local 741 of
Bloomington," gave the paper to Sheppard, and Shep-
_ pard took it into the lunchroom Summit further testified
that at that point it was about 3:15 p.m ., close to quitting
time, and that he followed Sheppard into the lunchroom
and saw some of the employees sign the paper . Accord-
ing to Summit, Walls was the only employee to ask him
what the paper was.
Sheppard corroborated Summit , except that Sheppard
testified that Summit wrote the petition around noon and
that he picked it up and took it to the lunchroom before
quitting time.
Siniard and Walls testified that the petition was lying
on a table in the plant lunchroom at 3:30 in the afternoon
on 31 July, and that Summit was nearby. Both employ-
ees testified that Summit told them that the paper was a
petition to the Union that they could either sign or not,
and that they signed because they were afraid that failure
to do so would label them as union supporters . Siniard
and Walls further testified that , at the time they signed
the petition, Summit's name was at the bottom.
The parties stipulated that on 8 August Summers
wrote to Board agent Stanley Durnell in the Regional
Office for Region 25, enclosing a copy of a document al-
leged to be a petition signed by employees and a letter to
a
Field
Representative of the Laborers International
Union of North American asking his intentions regarding
representation of the Respondent's employees in light of
that petition . The copy sent to the Regional Office ap-
pears to be of a document which was torn across the top
and the bottom, contains the previously quoted heading,
and bears 12 signatures, including Siniard's, but not Sum-
mit's. The document also bears , the upper right-hand
corner, the notation "7-31-86," and, under that date, the
name "John Sheppard." Sheppard's name appears again
on the document as the first signature under the heading.
Summit, essentially corroborated by Sheppard , testi-
fied that , the day after the petition was signed in the
lunchroom it was on his desk, that he never signed it;
and that no portion of it was ever torn off, but that the
document as it appeared on his desk was a facsimile of
the one sent to the Regional Office . Summit further testi-
fied that he sent the petition to Summers , called him to
say he had done so, and that Summers asked him if the
petition had been written by one of the employees.
18 It is not clear from the record whether the events about to be de-
scribed occurred on 30 or 31 July I find it unnecessary to resolve the
issue
Summit replied that he,had written it, and Summers then
said that the petition was not legal. I credit Summit's
comment that the petition was "not legal," he sent it to
the International Union with which the Union is affili-
ated.
Simard and Walls testified that the copy of the petition
sent to the International was not a copy of the, one they
signed, that, in addition to displaying Summit's signature,
the petition they signed was not torn and did not have
Sheppard's name in the upper right-hand corner. I credit
the two employees and find that the petition they signed
was also signed by Summit.
Kemp testified about `the circumstances surrounding
his signing of the petition, but not about whether Summit
signed it. According to Kemp, he was in the office about
quitting time that day Summit asked him if he wanted
the Union to represent him, and when he replied that he
did not, Summit asked him if he wanted to sign a peti-
tion which so stated. Kemp replied that he would, and
did.. Kemp further stated that Siniard was present at the
time and that Summit asked Siniard if he had called the
Union yet to tell them that the employees did not want
representation. According to Kemp, Siniard said that he
had not yet called but would.19
I further credit Kemp's testimony that Summit asked
him if he wanted the Union to represent him and if he
wanted to sign the petition Both the inquiry as to an em-
ployee's desire to be represented and the solicitation to
sign the petition disavowing the' Union were coercive
and violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
I also find that Summit substantially participated in the
preparation of the petition; that because of that conduct
and Summit's presence when employees signed it, the pe-
tition cannot be considered an indication of the employ-
ees' views toward union representation, 2 0 and that Sum-
mit's involvement in the preparation of the petition, sepa-
rate and apart from his comments to Kemp, violated
Section 8(a)(1)
c Subsequent events
Siniard, essentially corroborated by Walls, credibly
testified that the day after he signed the petition several
of the employees were in the lunchroom when Christy
asked if someone would rewrite the petition because
,Summers had telephoned and advised that it was "not
legal" for Summit to sign it. Siniard further testified that
he told Christy that he would neither rewrite the petition
nor sign a new' one.
Christy denied that he told employees that the petition
was "not legal," and also denied that he talked to either
Siniard or Walls about signing another petition For the
reasons previously stated, I credit Walls and Siniard. I
therefore find that Christy solicited employees to prepare
a new antiunion petition, and that the Respondent there-
by violated Section 8(a)(1)
19 I have found above that Summit asked Siniard if he had called the
Union and that this question violated the Act Siniard referred to a con-
versation in the morning, while Kemp testified it occurred around quit-
ting time I find it unnecessary to resolve the discrepancy
20 Midwestern Mining, 277 NLRB 221 (1985), cited by the General
Counsel
INDIANA CAL-PRO
803
Simard testified that the -same day Christy advised the
employees that the petition was not legal ,
he ,called
union business agent Hardy and told him that the em-
ployees wanted him to "back off." Hardy asked why,
and Siniard said that Summit2I had presented the em-
ployees with the petition
At that point, according to
Siniard, Hardy said that he was going to file an unfair
labor practice charge with the Board , because the peti-
tion was "not legal '•'
It is undisputed that at least one more petition was
prepared . Kemp testified that a day or so after the peti-
tion discussed above was signed, Summit told him that
he did not think that that petition would do any good
and that he believed that the Union thought that he had
"filled it out" (i e , written the text ), and caused the em-
ployees to sign it. According to Kemp , he asked Summit
about writing a petition himself, and Summit said it was
up to Kemp. Summit similarly testified that Kemp asked
him if he should write a second petition and that he re-
plied that he did not know.
According to Kemp, he wrote a second petition, along
with Sheppard and employee Richard Crowe signed it,
and then left the petition on a table. According to Kemp,
he heard nothing more about that document , so he and
some of the other employees decided to send a registered
letter to the Union This letter was apparently signed by
some other employees and sent to the Union but was not
offered into evidence and is not alleged to be a basis for
the Respondent's refusal to recognize the Union. Both
Summit and Kemp testified that Kemp told Summit
about the letter after he had mailed it
4 The representation proceeding
As noted above, the Union filed a petition in Case 25-
RC-8360 on 8 July Subsequently, the parties entered
into a Stipulation for Certification Upon Consent Elec-
tion, setting an election date of 21 August However, the
instant charge was filed on 13 August, blocking further
processing of the representation proceeding Consequent-
ly, the election was not held
C The Propriety of a Bargaining Order
The, General Counsel urges that a majority of the em-
ployees had designated the Union as their collective-bar-
gaining representative in June, that the Respondent's
unfair labor practices eroded that majority and destroyed
any possibility of a fair election, and that in consequence
the Respondent should be ordered to recognize and bar-
gain with the Union . In support of this contention, the
General Counsel cites NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395
U.S. 575 (1969), for the proposition that where "the pos-
sibility of erasing the effects of past practices and of en-
suring a fair election (or a fair rerun) by the use of tradi-
tional remedies, though present , is slight and that em-
ployee sentiment once expressed through cards would,
on balance, be better protected by a bargaining order,
then such an order should issue . . ....22
The. Respondent, on the other hand , contends that any
unfair labor practices it committed were not serious
enough to warrant a bargaining order, citing various
cases in which, despite , finding that an employer engaged
in unlawful conduct, the Board, or the courts of appeals
concluded that a bargaining order was not a necessary
remedy
In the instant case, I have found that ( 1) a majority of
the employees (9 of 14) in the appropriate unit had desig-
nated the Union as their collective-bargaining representa-
tive as of 20 June; (2) the Union had demanded recogni-
tion by 11 July; (3) in July and August the Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by: (a) Summit's repe-
tition to Shrum of Summer's threat to close the facility if
the Union represented the employees ; (b) Summit's ques-
tions to Kemp about what happened at a union meeting;
(c) Summit's comment to Walls that "if that Union gets
in the Company will close the doors"; (d) Summit's 18
July remarks to Shrum that if the Union represented the
employees "they was going to close the doors down,"
and that the Respondent had advised or was about to
advise its customers that the plant might close, (e) Sum-
mit's threat to Sparks on 6 August that the plant would
close if the Union "got back in" (noting, also, that that
threat was repeated); (f) Christy's interrogation of em-
ployees as to "what their feeling was " about the Union;
(g) Summit's question of Siniard as to whether he had
called the Union to ask it to "back off' and then, after
Siniard replied in the negative , asking him to make the
call; (h) Summit's inquiry of Kemp as to whether he
wanted to be represented by the Union and solicitation
of him to sign the petition; (i) Summit's participation in
the preparation of the petition , signing of ,it, and presence
when employees signed it ; and (j) Christy's solicitation of
employees to sign a new petition after being advised that
the one signed by Summit was "not legal " Thus, the
question becomes whether this conduct is such that tradi-
tional remedies are not likely to ensure a fair election, so
that the employees' freedom of choice would be better
protected by a bargaining order than a representation
election.23
In Kona 60 Minute Photo, supra, cited by the General
Counsel , the Board found a bargaining order appropriate
where the respondent unlawfully interrogated three em-
ployees in a small unit , posted a notice in which it threat-
ened to cancel pay raises and to discharge some or all of
the employees because of their union activities , and, by
its general partner, threatened to fire any employees
found to be involved with the union and that seeking
union representation would be an exercise in futility be-
cause respondent would refuse any bargaining request
and would hire new employees if the employees struck
over its refusal to bargain in good faith. The Board
found that this conduct "struck at the very core of the
employees' organizational efforts," that the threats were
widely disseminated, and that "The seriousness of -the
23 In Gissel the court also referred to the possibility of issuing bargain-
21 The transcript stated "Dave " The General Counsel's motion to cor-
ing orders irrespective of the Union 's majority status in "exceptional"
rect the record to read "Steve" comports with my notes and is granted
cases "marked by 'outrageous ' and 'pervasive' unfair labor practices " 395
above
-
U S at 613 The Respondent 's conduct here does not fall into that cate-
22 395 U S at 614-615
gory
804
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Respondent's conduct is further underscored by the
small size of the unit and the high level of the manage-
ment officials involved Taken as a whole, the Respond-
ent's acts involve the type of severe and pervasive coer-
cion which has lingering effects not readily dispelled"
and that "[r]equiring the Respondent simply to refrain
from such conduct will not eradicate the lingering effects
of the violations Correspondingly, an election would not
reliably
reflect
genuine,
uncoerced employee senti-
ment.24
I conclude that similar considerations mandate a bar-
gaining order in the instant case. The two management
officials responsible for tpe day-to-day operation of the
Ellettsville facility made widely disseminated and repeat-
ed threats to the employees in a small bargaining unit
that the Respondent would close the facility if the Union
became the employees' collective-bargaining representa-
tive, interrogated employees about their feelings toward
the Union, and the plant superintendent drafted a peti-
tion for the employees to sign disavowing support for
the Union, signed that petition himself, solicited an em-
ployee to sign it, and stood nearby while other employ-
ees signed. Further, the member of management who
was second-in-command, after learning that that petition
was invalid, solicited employees to draft another. In
these circumstances, I find that it is unlikely that a fair
and free election would ever be conducted, and I there-
fore conclude that the best way to effectuate the employ-
ees' choice, as indicated by their signing of union author-
ization cards, is to order the Respondent to bargain with
the Union Inasmuch as the date that the Respondent
began its course of unlawful conduct is not clear in the
record and as in any event it appears that the unfair
labor practices began about the time that the Respondent
received the representation petition, I shall recommend
that the Respondent be ordered to bargain as of 11 July.
On the basis of the above findings of fact and the
entire record in this case, I make the following
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1
Indiana Cal-Pro, Inc. is an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and
(7) of the Act
2
Laborers' Local Union No. 741, a/w Laborers'
International Union of North America, AFL-CIO is a
labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
3
All production and maintenance employees of the
Respondent at its Ellettsville, Indiana, facility, excluding
office clerical employees, professional employees, guards
and supervisors, as defined in the Act, constitute a unit
appropriate for purposes of collective bargaining within
the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act
4 Since 20 June 1986, the Union has represented a ma-
jority of employees in the unit described above for pur-
poses of collective bargaining
5.
By ,interrogating employees about their feelings
about the Union and about what occurred at union meet-
ings, asking employees whether they desired union repre-
sentation and whether they would sign a petition dis-
24 277 NLRB 867, 870, 871
avowing support for the Union, threatening to close the
facility if the Union became the employees' representa-
tive, participating in the preparation and dissemination of
a petition disavowing the Union, and soliciting employ-
ees to sign that petition and to prepare another, the Re-
spondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
6
By failing and refusing to recognize and bargain
with the Union as the employees' collective-bargaining
representative, but instead attempting by means of unfair
labor practices to destroy its employees' support of that
labor' organization, the Respondent has violated Section
8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act.
7 The unfair labor practices found above warrant an
order requiring the Respondent to bargain with the
Union at the latter's request concerning rates of pay,
wages, hours, and other working conditions of the unit
employees
8 The record does not establish that the Respondent
has otherwise violated the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has committed vari-
ous unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that it be
ordered to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain
affirmative action designed to effectuate the purposes of
the Act.
Having found that the Respondent has violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(l) and (5) of the Act by refusing to recognize
and bargain with the Union as the representative of the
employees in an appropriate bargaining unit, I shall rec-
ommend that the Respondent be ordered to recognize
and bargain with the, Union, at the latter's request, con-
cerning the rates of pay, wages, hours, and other terms
and conditions of the employees in that unit
Further, as is customary in these cases, I shall recom-
mend that the Respondent be required to post an appro-
priate notice
Finally, the General Counsel has requested that the
remedy include a visitatorial clause I find such a clause
unnecessary in the circumstances of this case, and there-
fore deny the request
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and
on the entire record, I issue the following recommend-
ed25
ORDER
The Respondent, Indiana Cal-Pro, Inc, Ellettsville, In-
diana, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Interrogating employees about their feelings about
Laborers' Local Union No. 741, a/w Laborers' Interna-
tional Union of North America, AFL-CIO or any other
labor organization, and about what occurred at union
meetings, asking employees whether they desire union
representation and whether they would sign a petition
disavowing support for the Union, threatening to close
25 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the Rules
and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall,
as provided by Sec 102 48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all
objections to them shall be deemed waived for all purposes
INDIANA CAL-PRO
the facility if the Union became the employees ' repre-
sentative, participating in the preparation and dissemina-
tion of a petition disavowing the Union and soliciting
employees to sing that petition and to prepare another
(b) Failing and refusing to recognize and bargain with
the Union as the employees' collective-bargaining repre-
sentative.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) On request , recognize and bargain with Laborers'
Local Union No. 741, a/w Laborers' International Union
of North America, AFL-CIO as the representative of its
employees in the appropriate unit described above, con-
cerning unit employees' rates of pay, wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment
The appro-
priate unit for purposes of collective bargaining is-
All production and maintenance employees of the
Respondent at its Ellettsville, Indiana, facility, ex-
cluding office clerical employees, professional em-
805
ployees, guards , and supervisors as defined in the
Act
(b) Post at its premises in Ellettsville, Indiana, copies
of the attached notice marked "Appendix "26 Copies of
the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director
for Region 25, after being signed by the Respondent's
authorized representative, shall be posted by the Re-
spondent immediately on receipt and maintained for 60
consecutive days in conspicuous places including all
places
where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respond-
ent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by another other material
(c) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20
days from the date of this Order what steps the Re-
spondent has taken to comply.
26 if this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Nation-
al Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of
the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National
Labor Relations Board "