287 NLRB 851
Arlington Hotel Co., Inc.
ARLINGTON HOTEL CO
851
Arlington Hotel Company, Inc. and International
Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, AFL-CIO.
Cases 26-CA-8974 and 26-CA-9024
16 December 1987
SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION AND
ORDER
By CHAIRMAN DOTSON AND MEMBERS
STEPHENS AND CRACRAFT
On 12 December 1984 the Board issued its Deci-
sion and Order in this Case finding, inter alia, that
the Respondent had violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1)
of the Act by implementing "a striker recall policy
that restricted the recall of strikers to their pre-
strike positions and resulted in the preferential
hiring of new employees in jobs which, the parties
stipulated, the unrecalled strikers were qualified to
perform."' The Board ordered the Respondent,
inter alia, to reinstate and make whole numerous
strikers, including Frank Avant, Nathan Dendy,
and Frank Jones. 2 On 4 March 1986 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit en-
forced the Board's Order.3 On 20 October 1986 the
United States Supreme Court denied the Respond-
ent's writ of certiorari.4
Although initially there was disagreement over
the backpay amounts owed the strikers, by the start
of the hearing the parties had resolved their differ-
ences over the amounts due for all but Avant,
Dendy, and Jones. Regarding those three, on 27
May 1987 Judge Linton issued the attached supple-
mental decision. Thereafter, the General Counsel
filed exceptions and a supporting brief, the Charg-
ing Party filed a statement in support of the Gener-
al Counsel's exceptions, the Respondent filed cross-
exceptions with a supporting brief and a response
brief to the General Counsel's exceptions, and the
General Counsel filed an answering brief to the Re-
spondent's cross-exceptions.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegat-
ed its authority in this proceeding to a three-
member panel.
The Board has considered the judge's supple-
mental decision and the record in light of the ex-
ceptions, cross-exceptions, and briefs and has decid-
ed to affirm the judge's rulings, findings, and con-
clusions only to the extent consistent with this Sup-
plemental Decision and Order.
The judge concluded that discriminatee Frank
Avant was entitled to backpay only for the four
1 273 NLRB 210
2 273 NLRB at 218-219
3 785 F 2d 249
4 107 S Ct 314 (mem op), 123 LRRM 2672 (1986)
quarters from April 1981 through March 1982.5 In
reaching this conclusion the judge agreed with the
Respondent's contention that after
March 1982
Avant failed to exercise reasonable diligence in his
search for work. The General Counsel excepted to
this conclusion arguing that Avant did not fail to
exercise reasonable diligence in his search for work
and, therefore, that Avant is entitled to backpay
for the entire 68-month backpay period.6 We agree
with the General Counsel.7
In deciding this case we emphasize that the Re-
spondent has the burden of establishing that the
discriminatee failed to exercise reasonable diligence
in searching for work8 and that the applicable
standard is one of reasonable diligence, not the
highest diligence.9
At the beginning of the backpay period, Avant
was about 50 years old, had a seventh grade educa-
tion,
and
weighed approximately 300 pounds.
When he first went to register at the Arkansas Em-
ployment Security Division (ESD), a division em-
ployee interviewed him and assessed his job pros-
pects. The interviewer told Avant that with his
qualifications it was unlikely the ESD would be
able to find him a job.
The record establishes that Avant filed employ-
ment data sheets listing the employers he contacted
and the number of contacts made during the fol-
lowing periods: April 1981 through March 1983,
October 1983 through September 1984, and Janu-
ary 1985 through March 1985. The judge found
that Avant's reasonable search ended in March
1982 based on the decline in the number of con-
tacts Avant had with the potential employers after
that time 10 The reports show, however, that for
the last 3 months included in the judge's backpay
period (i.e., January, February, and March 1982)
for which time the judge implicitly found Avant
had made a reasonable search, Avant's number of
contacts were two, two, and one, respectively, and
that these numbers do not appreciably differ from
those in the months that followed. Thus, subse-
quent to the judge's backpay termination month of
March 1982 and through March 1983 the reports
5 The backpay for this period amounts to $10,687
6 This period extends from 26 March 1981 to 1 December 1986 and the
backpay amounts to $69,748
' The General Counsel also excepts to the judge's findings regarding
discriminatee Nathan Dendy Those findings, however, are based on the
credibility resolutions The Board's established policy is not to overrule
an administrative law judge's credibility resolutions unless the clear pre-
ponderance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incor-
rect
Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd 188 F 2d
362 (3d Cir 1951) We have carefully examined the record and find no
basis for reversing the findings
8 See Chem Fab Corp, 275 NLRB 21 (1985)
9 Ibid
10 A list of the contacts made during each month for which there was
a report filed is contained in the attached judge's decision
287 NLRB No. 87
852
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
show that Avant maintained a one-contact-per-
month rate ; and during the other months in 1983,
1984, and 1985 for which reports were filed, Avant
had one to three contacts per month . This evidence
of the gradual fluctuation in the number of contacts
made per month is insufficient to sustain the Re-
spondent's burden of showing a lack of reasonable
diligence, especially in view of the fact that the
gradual decline in contacts from 1981 into 1982 and
1983 was accompanied by a ,gradual increase in the
unemployment rate for Garland County, Arkansas,
the location of the Respondent 's facility."
The evidence also shows that Avant made no
contacts for a 6-month period from April 1983
through September 1983 and for a 3-month period
from October 1984 through December 1984. While
Avant's testimony indicates that all the contacts he
made prior to 31 March 198512 were listed in the
reports he filed, indicating that the lack of reports
is evidence of no contacts, "it does not necessarily
follow that the discriminatee during that [period]
has abandoned efforts to find suitable employment
and in effect has withdrawn from the labor
market." 13 As the Board has stated:
A discriminatee who has otherwise made rea-
sonable efforts to seek out new employment is
not required in each specific quarter to repeat
job applications which from her past efforts
she knows are foredoomed to futility in order
to protect her claim of backpay for that par-
ticular
quarter.
Rather,
the entire backpay
period
must be scrutinized to determine
whether throughout that period there was, in
the' light of all surrounding circumstances, a
reasonable continuing search such as to fore-
close a finding of willful loss.14
In this regard Avant 's employment data forms
show he routinely had made , repeated contacts at
several employers both before and after the months
for which no reports were filed. Avant also testi-
fied that he decided where to apply based on his
11 The annual averages of Arkansas labor force statistics were admit-
ted into evidence as G C Exh 6 These averages show the following un-
employment rate figures for Garland County 1981 -9 9 percent, 1982-
10 1 percent , 1983-10 4 percent , 1984-9 4 percent , 1985-8 9 percent
Cf Alfred M Lewis Y NLRB, 681 F 2d 1154, 1156 (9th Cir 1982) (Re-
spondent did not meet the burden of showing discrimmatee 's lack of rea-
sonable effort when period of unemployment coincided with substantial
unemployment in the relevant area )
12 Although there are no reports for the period after 31 March 1985,
the judge credited Avant 's testimony that he had made contacts with po-
tential employers after 31 March 1985 at the same rate as he had prior to
that date The judge figured that rate of contact to be approximately 18
contacts per month As with the periods when there were fewer than 1 8
contacts per month (see infra), the Respondent has failed to carry its
burden and establish that 1 8 contacts per month for the period after 31
March 1985 is an indication that Avant lacked diligence in his search for
work
13 Cornwell Co, 171 NLRB 342 , 343 (1968)
15 Ibid
knowledge of the job market in the Hot Springs
area. Thus, Avant may have known that the poten-
tial employers he had been contacting were not
hiring during the periods he failed to file employ-
ment data reports. In these circumstances and keep-
ing in mind that it is the Respondent 's burden to
establish Avant's lack of diligence, the Respond-
ent's failure to ascertain why Avant did not have
any contacts during certain months in 1983 and
1984 leads to the conclusion that the Respondent
has not carried its 'burden of proving a willful loss
of earnings. 15
Moreover, the Respondent's supposed showing
that numerous jobs were available is flawed. The
Respondent introduced evidence-in the form of
telephone directory yellow pages listing restaurants
in the Hot Springs area-that it contended proved
the existence of numerous job opportunities over-
looked by Avant. But, as the judge commented:
[A]lthough introducing evidence concerning
the total number of restaurants, [the Respond-
ent] did not show how many restaurants had
cook positions substantially equivalent to the
position Avant had enjoyed at AHC.- Neither
did Respondent show the wage rates for cooks
at other restaurants. Nor did Respondent show
how many cooks were hired in Hot Springs, at
what salary, nor how many applicants there
were. 16
An argument similar to the 'Respondent's, wherein
an employer sought to carry its burden based on a
showing of the mere existence of establishments in
the general category of the , one from which a dis-
criminatee was discharged , was rejected by the
Board in its decision , affirmed by the court of ap-
peals, in Nickey Chevrolet Sales,
195 NLRB 395,
396 (1972), enfd. 493 F.2d 103 , 108 (7th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied 419 U.S 834. There the Board, over-
ruling a trial examiner's finding of lack of reasona-
ble diligence on the part of an unlawfully dis-
charged automobile salesman, held that the mere
showing that there were 500 automobile dealer-
ships in the Chicago area and that the salesman had
failed to apply to most of them did not carry the
respondent's burden of showing lack of reasonable
diligence in the absence of any evidence that those
dealerships actually had jobs to offer.
The Respondent here relies on American Bottling
Co., 116 NLRB 1303 (1956), to conclude that it
need not show that jobs were available or that
Avant would have been selected for available posi-
15 Rainbow Coaches, 280 NLRB 166, 191 (1986) (respondent did not
carry burden where it did not ascertain why discrimmatees failed to
apply for any jobs during months encompassed in backpay period)
16 JD sec 11,A,3, par 4
ARLINGTON HOTEL CO
853
tions.17 However, we would view American Bot-
tling Co., when read in light of its facts, as holding
that job availability and likelihood of selection for
available positions is irrelevant only when a discri-
minatee makes no application for work with any
private employer in the face of numerous, substan-
tially equivalent job opportunities. In such circum-
stances, the discriminatee has not exercised reason-
able diligence in his search for work. Such is not
the case here. The credited findings are that Avant
did make approximately 128 contacts and applica-
tions for employment over a 68-month period, or
an average of approximately 2 contacts per month.
In light of these facts, we cannot conclude that the
Respondent has carried its burden merely by estab-
lishing the existence of potential employers.
Although evidence of advertisements for cook
jobs is somewhat more probative of job opportuni-
ties, we similarly are unable to conclude that the
evidence the Respondent offered in this regard was
sufficient to carry its burden of showing that Avant
lacked reasonable diligence in his job search. The
evidence shows a net total of six positions18 that
were advertised in the first quarter of 1982 for
which Avant, judging solely from the ads them-
selves, was qualified. A comparison of Avant's em-
ployment data reports for this same period estab-
lishes that Avant in fact applied for at least one of
the advertised positions 19 and most likely had an
application on file for another.20 Indeed, Avant's
employment data reports for the period indicate he
had five contacts with potential employers.21 In
17 The judge also appears to rely on American Bottling Co
for this
proposition by concluding that without regard to the availability of posi-
tions or whether Avant would have been hired for available positions,
Avant's search after March 1982 "falls below the Board's standard of rea-
sonable diligence "
1B This figure eliminates the positions that the advertisements indicate
would require Avant to work a different shift from the one he worked at
the Respondent's facility (e g , those requiring the applicant to work day
and night shifts or 12 to 8 p in )
In this regard the evidence is unclear as
to exactly what shift Avant worked prior to the strike, but because any
uncertainty in the evidence is resolved against the Respondent as wrong-
doer (see infra), we see no reason to disturb the judge's assessment that
Avant worked the day shift prior to the strike in calculating the net
number of advertisements, we also have eliminated jobs that fail to list
the name of the facility that has the opening since this prevents a check
against the employment data reports that Avant filed for the period in-
volved
19 The Downtowner Restaurant advertised for a cook on 12 February
1982 and Avant's employment data reports show he contacted the
Downtowner Restaurant on 13 February 1982
20 Avant contacted the Holiday Inn East on 5 January 1982 and an
advertisement for the Holiday Inn-Lake Hamilton appeared on 13 Febru-
ary 1982 The record gives no indication whether these two names refer
to the same facility
21 The record also indicates that an advertisement for jobs at the new
Sheraton appeared in the local newspaper on 23 July 1984 Avant's testi-
mony reveals that he did not contact the Sheraton until after 31 March
1985
Avant's employment data reports for July 1984 show, however,
that he contacted three potential employers that month and that he con-
tacted at least one of these employers (Coy's Steak House) as a result of
its newspaper ad Thus, Avant 's failure to respond to the Sheraton adver-
tisement in a timely manner is not sufficient evidence to carry the Re-
light of these other contacts and as the existence of
these advertisements did not establish that the jobs
would have been available had Avant applied or
that he would have been selected for any available
position, they are not sufficient to carry the Re-
spondent's burden of showing that Avant's search
for work manifested a lack of reasonable dili-
gence.22 Moreover, as stated previously, in assess-
ing Avant's diligence in searching for work we
must look at the backpay period in its entirety, not
only at one isolated period.
Finally, the
Respondent asserts that
Avant's
backpay should have been terminated or at least re-
duced based on Avant's refusal to accept an offer
of employment as a cook at the Park Hotel in June
1981.23 The Respondent argues that the judge
erred in comparing the pay of the cook's position
at the Park Hotel ($3.35 per hour-minimum wage)
to Avant's prestrike pay ($7.50 per hour) and by
concluding, implicitly, that the two positions were
not substantially equivalent. The Respondent notes
that the Board had found in the underlying unfair
labor practice case24 that Avant's prestrike posi-
tion of garde-manager was eliminated for legitimate
business reasons. Further, the unfair labor practice
that entitled Avant to backpay was the Respond-
ent's failure to offer Avant reinstatement to a
cook's position that paid $4 to $4.50 per hour.
Thus, the Respondent argues that the Park Hotel
cook's position paying the minimum wage of $3.35
per hour must be compared to the cook's position
at the Respondent's facility paying $4 to $4.50 per
hour
when determining substantial equivalency.
The Respondent concludes that such a comparison
shows the two positions to be substantially equiva-
lent. While we agree that the Park Hotel cook's
position must be compared to the cook's position at
the Respondent's facility for the purpose of decid-
ing the substantial equivalency question, we do not
agree with the Respondent's conclusion concerning
the result of such a comparison.
spondent's burden
Also, to the extent the Respondent is attempting to
undermine Avant's testimony that as part of his search for work he re-
viewed the want ads, the fact Avant contacted Coy's Steak House as a
result of its ad reinforces Avant's claim In any event , Avant's testimony
indicates that reviewing the want ads was merely one aspect of his search
for work
22 See O K Machine & Tool Corp, 279 NLRB 474, 479 (1986) See also
Airports Service Lines, 231 NLRB 1272, 1273 (1977), enfd 589 F 2d I I l5
(D C Cir 1978) (Respondent did not carry its burden of establishing the
affirmative defense of lack of reasonable diligence where the discrimma-
tee made a reasonable search for employment and newspaper cant ads
did not establish that the jobs would have been available if the discrimm-
atee had applied or that she would have been selected for any available
position)
23 This was the only job offered to Avant from the time he went out
on strike to the time of his reinstatement with the Respondent in Decem-
ber 1986
24 273 NLRB at 218-219
854
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
As stated, the Park Hotel cook position paid the
minimum wage of $3.35 per hour while the Re-
spondent's cook position paid between $4 and $4.50
per hour. Since it is well established that,any un-
certainty in the evidence ^is resolved against the Re-
spondent as the wrongdoer'25 we will assume that
the cook's, pay at the Respondent's facility was
$4.50 per hour. The difference between a position
paying $4.50 per hour and one paying $3.35 per
hour is a reduction in pay amounting to just over
25 percent.26 Further, the $3.35 per hour pay for
the Park Hotel position represents the Federal min-
imum wage for that period, which translates into
an entry level skill factor for the position. The evi-
dence shows and the Respondent admits, however,
that Avant was experienced in kitchen work and
the higher pay of the Respondent's 'cook position
reflects that higher level of skill and experience:
Based on these considerations, we conclude that
the Park Hotel cook position, which would have
required a 25-percent reduction in pay and which
paid, the Federal minimum wage representing an
equivalent minimal skill level, was not substantially
equivalent to the cook position at the Respondent's
facility., , _
,
Moreover, assuming arguendo that discriminatees
are required to "lower their sights" and take what-
ever job is-available to reduce a respondent's back-
pay obligation, they would only be required to do
so after a reasonable period has passed.27 Here, the
Park Hotel job offer was made in June 1981, about
3 months after the Respondent's employees ended
their strike and, more importantly, less than 2
months - after the discrimination against Avant oc-
curred. Under these circumstances, we do not find
that Avant in June 1981 would have been required
to "lower his sights" and. accept the Park Hotel
job.28 Although Avant would not have been re-
quired to "lower his sights" at the time of the Park
Hotel job offer, we conclude that his refusal to
accept that offer' does not evidence a willful loss of
employment requiring the termination of or a re-
duction in his backpay.29
2s Rainbow Coaches, supra at 180 fn 9
26 Cf
Waukegan-North Chicago Transit Co,
235 NLRB 802 fn 4
(1978) (Board found discriminatee not required to accept employment
that would reduce discriminatee's pay by approximately 33 percent)
27 See Rainbow Coaches, supra at 191
28 We note that the judge found that by the time Avant contacted the
Lakewood Convalescent Home much later in the backpay period he was
willing to accept the Federal minimum wage
2,0 The Respondent stipulated to the accuracy of the backpay period
and gross backpay calculations contained in the backpay specification for
each period of time during which the Respondent 's defense of willful loss
of employment or lack of reasonable diligence failed As we have found
that the Respondent has not carried its burden under these affirmative de-
fenses for any period in dispute, we shall adopt the calculations and time
periods contained in the backpay specification
Accordingly, we find that the Respondent has
not carried its burden of establishing that discrimin-
atee Avant willfully incurred a loss of employment
either by failing to exercise reasonable diligence in
his search for work or by refusing the Park Hotel's
offer of employment.30
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board orders that
the Respondent,, Arlington Hotel Company, Inc.,
Hot Springs, Arkansas, its officers, agents, succes-
sors, and assigns, shall make whole the employees
named below by paying them the sums indicated,
plus interest ,accrued to the date of payment, less
the tax withholdings required by law. Interest shall
be computed in the manner prescribed in New Ho-
rizons for the Retarded.3 i
Frank Avant
$69, 748
Nathan Dendy
2, 484
Frank Jones
4, 070
3° For the reasons stated by the judge, Chairman Dotson finds that dis-
crimmatee Avant did not engage in a reasonable job search after March
1982 and that he is therefore entitled to backpay only for the period from
April 1981 to March 1982 In all other respects he joins his colleagues in
adopting the judge's findings concerning discrimmatees Dendy and Jones
31 In accordance with our decision in New Horizons for the Retarded,
283 NLRB 1173 (1987), interest on and after 1 January 1987 shall be
computed at the "short-term Federal rate" for the underpayment of taxes
as set out in the 1986 amendment to 26 U S C § 6621
Interest on
amounts accrued prior to 1 January 1987 (the effective date of the 1986
amendment to 26 U S C § 6621) shall be computed in accordance with
Florida Steel Corp, 231 NLRB 651 (1977)
Bruce E. Buchanan, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Russell Gunter,
Esq. and Lester C.
Nail,
Esq. (House,
Wallace & Jewell), of Little Rock, Arkansas, for the
Respondent.
Chad Farris, Esq. - (Youngdahl & Youngdahl), of Little
Rock, Arkansas, for the Charging'Party.
SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
RICHARD J. LINTON, Administrative Law Judge. This
is .a backpay proceeding; involving three discrirrimatees•
Frank Avant, Nathan Dendy, and Frank Jones. Al-
though finding that Jones is entitled to full backpay of
$4070, I further find that Avant's backpay should be lim-
ited to $10,687 and Dendy's to $2484
This case was tried before me on 23 February 1987 in
Little Rock, Arkansas, pursuant to the 29 December
1986 backpay specification (BPS) issued by the Regional
Director for Region 26 of,the National Labor Relations
Board.
Arlington Hotel Company, Inc. (Respondent or AHC)
is a resort hotel in Hot Springs, Arkansas. On 12 March
1981 some 66 employees out of approximately 250 hotel
employees went out on a 4-day economic strike Most of
the strikers were recalled to their former jobs at the end
of the strike. Regarding those not recalled, litigation
ARLINGTON HOTEL CO
ensued with a trial in December 1981 before Administra-
tive Law Judge Robert A Gritta. In his decision of 9
August 1982, Judge Gritta principally found
against
AHC, and AHC filed exceptions with the Board.
Adopting Judge Gritta's decision in all respects materi-
al here, the Board, on 12 December 1984, held that AHC
violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act by implement-
ing a striker recall policy that restricted the recall of
economic strikers to their prestrike positions and resulted
in the preferential hiring of new employees in jobs that
the parties stipulated, the unrecalled strikers were quali-
fied to perform
Arlington Hotel Co.,
273 NLRB 210
(1984).
The Board ordered AHC to reinstate and make whole
more than 20 strikers, including Frank Avant, Nathan
Dendy, and Frank Jones. Id at 218-219 The Eighth Cir-
cuit enforced' and the Supreme Court denied certiorari.'
When the parties could not agree on the amount of
backpay due to 16 of the strikers, the Regional Director
(hereafter included in the term of General Counsel), on
29 December 1986, issued the BPS alleging the amounts
of backpay due under the Board's order to the 16, in-
cluding Frank Avant, Nathan Dendy, and Frank Jones.
At the beginning of the hearing (and in a prehearing
conference call) the parties announced agreement regard-
ing all but Avant, Dendy, and Jones (1:7). Concerning
those three the General Counsel seeks backpay plus in-
terest in the following sums under the BPS, as amended
at the hearing (1 8-9).
Frank Avant
$69,748
Nathan Dendy
11,054
Frank Jones
4,070
AHC defends on the following grounds. First, no
backpay is due Avant because he incurred a willful loss
of earnings during the entire backpay period Second,
Respondent asserts that Dendy is entitled to no backpay
because he rejected a reinstatement offer by attaching
preconditions to his acceptance
Regarding Jones, Re-
spondent asserts that he suffered from poor health which
prevented him from accepting any job other than the
one to which he subsequently was reinstated; therefore,
no backpay is due him
On the entire record, including my observation of the
demeanor of the witnesses, and after consideration of the
briefs filed by the General Counsel and the Respondent,
I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. APPLICABLE LEGAL PRINCIPLES
The applicable legal principles are well settled by nu-
merous cases. In summary they are as follows First,
when loss of employment is caused by a violation of the
Act, a finding by the Board that an unfair labor practice
was committed is presumptive proof that some backpay
is owed. Lord Jim's, 277 NLRB 1514 (1986); Laborers
' 785 F 2d 249 (8th Cir 1986)
2 107 S Ct 314, 123 LRRM 2672 (Oct 20, 1986) The parties also stip-
ulated (1 7) References to the single volume transcript of testimony are
by volume and page
855
Local 38 (Hancock-Northwest),
268
NLRB 167, 168
(1983), enfd in pertinent part 748 F.2d 1001 (5th Cir.
1984). Second, in a backpay proceeding the General
Counsel has the burden of showing the amount of gross
backpay due Third, the burden of establishing facts, that
would reduce the amount of gross backpay, such as in-
terim earnings or a willful loss of interim earnings, falls
on the Respondent Fourth, if a discriminatee incurred
any reasonable and necessary expenses in earning interim
income, it is the General Counsel's burden to establish
the amounts of those expenses. Chem Fab Corp:, 275
NLRB 21 (1985)
Although it is the Respondent's burden to establish a
discriminatee's interim earnings, if any, it is the General
Counsel's voluntary policy to assist in gathering informa-
tion on this topic and including that data in the BPS 3
NLRB Casehandling Manual,
Burden of Proof,
Secs.
10656.6 and 10737.2 (1984). The General Counsel did
that here.
Respecting the gross backpay formula, it is further
well established that any formula that approximates what
a discriminatee would have earned had he not been dis-
criminated against is acceptable if it is not unreasonable
or arbitrary in the circumstances. Moreover, any doubts,
uncertainties, or ambiguities are resolved against the Re-
spondent who is the wrongdoer
Chem Fab, supra.
Concerning Respondent's burden to demonstrate af-
firmatively that a discriminatee failed to make reasonable
efforts to find interim work, it is well established that the
discriminatee is held only to a reasonable assertion in this
regard and not to a standard of the highest diligence.
Nor is success the measure of the sufficiency of the dis-
criminatee's search for interim employment, for the law
requires only an honest and good-faith effort And in de-
termining the reasonableness of the effort, the discrimina-
tee's skills, experience, qualifications, age, and the labor
conditions in the area are factors to be considered. Chem
Fab 'at 21-22, Laborers Local 38, supra at 169. The em-
ployer's burden does not include the severe test of show-
ing whether the discriminatee would have found suitable
employment had he exercised a good-faith effort
Ameri-
can Bottling Co., 116 NLRB 1303, 1307 (1956).
Because the obligation to exercise reasonable diligence
in seeking substantially equivalent employment is found-
ed on the healthy public policy of promoting production
and employment, a discriminatee is not entitled to sit
idle, awaiting reimbursement for lost wages IBEW Local
401 (Stone and Webster Engineering Corp.), 266 NLRB
870, 875 (1983) To hold otherwise would run contrary
to the remedial purposes of the Act, encourage idleness,
and reward slothfulness.
But interim work means comparable work-substan-
tially equivalent employment Thus, it is well established
that a discriminatee's obligation to mitigate an employ-
er's backpay liability requires only that the discriminatee
accept substantially equivalent employment.
NLRB v.
Miami Coca-Cola Botting Co., 360 F 2d 569, 575 (5th Cir.
1966); Electrical Workers IBEW Local 401, supra; Wauke-
gan-North
Chicago
Transit Co.,
235 NLRB 802 fn. 4
(1978).
856
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
II. THE INDIVIDUAL CASES
A. Frank Avant
1. Introduction
Subject to its defense of willful loss of earnings, Re-
spondent admits the correctness of the allegations in the
BPS regarding Frank Avant's gross backpay period and
regarding the gross backpay computations (1:9; G.C.
Exh. 2). Respondent puts it thus (Br at 2-3)-
There is no credibility dispute with Frank Avant.
The Respondent accepts his testimony and does not
contest
his
credibility.
The issue, therefore, is
whether Avant's attempts at finding a job were rea-
sonably diligent. The Arlington does not contest
that Avant made the attempts he says he made, but
[contends that] the attempts he made do not amount
to
a reasonably diligent search
Although the
Board 's standard for a reasonably diligent search is
admittedly not very high, Avant failed to meet even
the Board's low standard for conducting a reason-
ably diligent search.
As I shall summarize in more detail, Avant's backpay
period begins 26 March 1981 and ends on 1 December
1986.
Avant was out of work the entire time-68
months! Thus, Avant's interim earnings are zero, and the
General Counsel seeks backpay totaling $69,748 plus in-
terest.
2. Evidence
At 56 years of age, Frank Avant has spent most of his
working life as a cook either at AHC or other restau-
rants in Hot Springs. He last attended school in the sev-
enth grade (1:40, 98).
Avant's cooking skill and experience covers most areas
of a commercial kitchen, including that of fry cook. For
example, he is skilled at cutting , preparing, and cooking
fish, chicken, beef, and other meats, and barbeque He is
skilled at preparing hors d'oeuvres ,
fruit, and cheese
plates. Although he can bake such items as cornbread
and rolls, he is not skilled as a baker ( 1:50-52, 82, 84).
At the time of the strike Avant was cooking and also
doing the work of garde-manger (1 47). As Judge Gritta
describes in the underlying decision, a garde-manger
"traditionally is in charge of cold production in the
kitchen,
including salads,
hors
d'oeuvres,
cold hors
d'oeuvres, canapes, and some cold meats such as corned
beef and turkey , also makes decorative pieces for buffets,
aspics, ice carvings, cheese mirrors, and cheese trays."
273 NLRB at 213. However, Avant never did ice carv-
ings (1:50)
Respondent offered in our case a page from the Dic-
tionary of Occupational Titles (R. Exh. 7). It describes the
function of a garde-manger in terms apparently more ex-
pansive (including possible supervisory duties) than the
facts actually characterize Avant . Thomas H. Strickland,
a certified vocational expert and Respondent's expert
witness in this case , testified that he understands Avant's
description of his duties to fit within the garde-manger
classification (1:116).3 I note that Judge Gritta found that
Respondent had bestowed the garde -manger title on
Avant more as an honor than as a classification or as a
description of his function. 273 NLRB at 218. It is not a
decisive point in our case.
On 16 March 1981, during the strike, Respondent de-
cided to abolish the position of garde-manager. Econom-
ic conditions caused this decision
At the end of the
strike Avant was not recalled even though Respondent
thereafter hired several cooks Judge Gritta describes the
essential details in the earlier case 273 NLRB 214, 218.
When he learned AHC was not going to recall him,
Avant filed for unemployment benefits with the Arkan-
sas Employment Security Division (ESD) (1:55) Docu-
ments in evidence reflect that he did so on 18 March
1981 and that he continued to register several times there
later in 1981 (R. Exh 1)
These documents are employment data sheets that
Avant received from Region 26 during most, but not all,
of the backpay period on a quarterly basis Avant testi-
fied that he received no report forms from Region 26
after March 1985 (1.55, 58, 60-63.) There is a similar
gap of 6 months in 1983. Avant recorded nearly all his
job search interviews on the forms he submitted to
Region 26. For the periods he submitted no reports, he
continued his search with the same frequency as before
and, with two exceptions, the same employers previously
listed (1.61-65, 68-69). There were two other employers
with whom he sought employment These were the
Sheraton Hotel and the Lakewood Convalescent Home.
He does not recall when he visited them except that it
was after 31 March 1985 (1:66-67).
The quarterly reports Avant submitted to Region 26
reflect that he visited 18 different employers, plus the
Arkansas EDS, in the 39 months covered by a report. If
we count the EDS itself, plus the Sheraton, the Lake-
wood Convalescent Home, and even his inquiry about
the Hilton Hotel, Avant contacted 22 different places
during the 68-month backpay period.
For the 39 months expressly covered by a report filed
by him, Avant made 72 contracts with employers and
the EDS. I exclude the partial month of March 1981
and, thus, Avant's initial registration with the EDS. The
72 contracts during the 39 months computes to an aver-
age of about 1.8461538 contacts per month.
As Avant's attempts during the 29 months not covered
by recorded listings were with the same frequency as
that shown in the recorded contacts (giving Avant the
benefit of any doubt), multiplication of the monthly aver-
age of 1.846538 by 68 months yields an extrapolated
125.53845 total contacts.
Increasing the total contacts by the visits to the Shera-
ton Hotel, Lakewood Convalescent, and an inquiry at
the ESD about the Hilton Hotel in Hot Springs, pro-
3 Sequestration of witnesses was invoked
Respondent designated its
general manager , Horst Fischer , to remain , and also moved to exempt
Strickland (19-10)
Over the General Counsel's objection,
I permitted
Strickland to remain in the hearing room in order to hear the evidence
and be able to offer opinion testimony
I chose this option rather then
extending the hearing by excluding Strickland and, thus, causing Re-
spondent to have to propound to him complicated and time-consuming
hypothetical questions (1 12-13)
ARLINGTON HOTEL CO
duces a grand total of 128.53845 contacts. That averages,
over the 68 months, to 1.8461536 contacts per month, or
22.153843 per year. If we exclude holidays and a' vaca-
tion, and simply choose to make the numbers easier, per-
haps it can be said that Avant averaged approximately
two contacts per month over the 68-month backpay
period.
Seeing the visits or contacts arranged in the form of a
chart (as Respondent provided in its brieff) or a list aids
in visualizing the data. The following list reflects the evi-
dence regarding Avant's contacts beginning with April
1981, the first full month of the backpay period All are
restaurants (or have a kitchen as in the case of the reha-
bilitation center), and most of the employers apparently
adjoin motels (1:110.)
1981
April
(1) Ark. EDS
(1) EDS
May
(2) Grand Central Rest.
(3) Royal Vista Inn
June
(1) EDS
July
Aug
(2) Grand Central
(4) Park Hotel
(5) Holiday Inn East
(1) EDS
(2) Grand Central
(6) Traveilier Rest.
(7) Stage Coach
(3) Royal Vista
(1) EDS
(8) Round Table Rest.
(6) Travelier
(7), Stage Coach
(9) Ramada Inn
September
'(1) EDS
(10) Avanelle Rest.
(11) Majestic Hotel
(9) Ramada Inn
October
(12) Quality Inn
(10) Avanelle
(5) Holiday Inn East
November
(12) Quality Inn
December
(10) Avanelle
(5) Holiday Inn East
(12) Quality Inn,
(10) Avanelle
(5) Holiday Inn East
1982
January
(5) Holiday Inn East
(12) Quality Inn
February
(13) Downtowner
(12) Quality Inn
March
(11) Majestic
April
(10) Avanelle
° Respondent 's chart reflects three minor errors
Mollie's is shown in
November 1981 rather than November 1982 Hamilton House is shown in
January 1982 rather than August 1982 , and Holiday Inn South should be
shown in July 1982 In addition, Avant's visits to the Arkansas ESD are
not shown
May
(8) Round Table
June
(11) Majestic
July
(14) Holiday Inn South
August
(15) Hamilton House
September
(12) Quality Inn
October
(12) Quality Inn
November
(16) Mollie's Rest.
December
(15) Hamilton House
1983
857
(3) Royal Vista
(10) Avanelle
(2) Grand Central ,
(No report filed.)
(No report filed.)
(No report filed )
(No report filed )
(No report filed.)
(No report filed.)
(17) Anthony Motel
(10) Avanelle
(8) Round Table
1984
January
(13) Downtowner
February
(12) Quality Inn
March
-
(3) Royal Vista
April
(18) Coy's Steak House
May
(19) Rehabilitation Center
June
(2) Grand Center
July
(18) Coy's
(19) Rehabilitation Center
(3) Royal Vista
August
(18) Coy's
(19) Rehabilitation Center
(3) Royal Vista
September
(18) Coy's
(19) Rehabilitation Center
(3) Royal Vista
October
(No report filed.)
November
(No report filed.)
December
(No report filed.)
1985
(10) Avanelle
(10) Avanelle
(3) Royal Vista
(5) Holiday Inn East
(3) Royal Vista
(5) Holiday Inn East
(no further reports filed for
1985.)
1986
January through
November
(No reports filed.)
On a yearly basis Avant's recorded figures show that
1981 was his most active year with an average of 3.44
contacts per month. His average dropped to 1 17 in 1982,
and to 1.00 for 1983. He increased his average to 1.67
858
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
contacts in 1984 and to 2.00 for the first quarter of 1985,
his last reported period.
As I described earlier, for the purposes of this deci-
sion, I shall use the average of two contacts per month
by Avant during the 68-month backpay period.
Avant was offered a job only once, by the Park Hotel
in Hot Springs in June 1981 , and he declined the offer.
He rejected it because the offer was for minimum wage
only (1.107-108)
When Avant went on strike, he was
earning $300 a week ($7.50 an hour on a 40-hour basis)
at AHC ( 1:97), or more than double the Federal mini-
mum hourly rate of $3.35 By the time he went to the
Lakewood Convalescent Home, much later in the back-
pay period, Avant was willing to accept even the Feder-
al minimum. Despite his application to work at Lake-
wood Convalescent for that sum , Avant never heard
from that employer (1.106-107).
During the backpay period Avant frequently read the
"Help Wanted" advertisements in the Hot Springs Senti-
nel-Recorded,
and he checked the telephone yellow
pages, for potential employment sources (1.64,71, 74, 77).
The evidence reflects that Avant apparently did not see
some of the ads However, he did respond several times
to help wanted ads for cooks ( 1.64, 69, 101-102). In addi-
tion to his own reading of these two sources, plus his
own knowledge of Hot Springs, Avant followed up on
all leads suggested by friends ( 1.99-100) Despite his ef-
forts, the only job he received was that extended by the
Park Hotel early in the backpay period (1 107).
Some of Avant's efforts to find work were untimely.
For example, the Sheraton's resort hotel on Lake Hamil-
ton placed a large want ad in the 23 July 1984 issue of
the Sentinel-Record The want ad announced that appli-
cations were being accepted , at a downtown location, for
" 100 jobs" in 24 classifications , including cooks (R. Exh.
4). As Avant did not go to the Sheraton until after 31
March 1985 ( 1:66, 67), he apparently did not see Shera-
ton's July 1984 want ad
He also was late in checking with the state employ-
ment (EDS) office concerning a new Hilton hotel in Hot
Springs, for he was told by the Arkansas EDS that the
Hilton already had filled the job openings ( 1:66). And he
concedes that he did not see an ad for a fry cook by a
Western Sizzlin Steak House in the Sentinel-Record issue
of 30 January 1982 (1.84). I observe, however, that the
Western Sizzlin notice advised that the applicant must be
willing to work either the day or night shift (R. Exh. 3).
If, as seems to be the case, Avant worked days at AHC,
a job opening conditioned on a willingness to work the
night shift is not substantially equivalent employment.
Teamsters Local 164, 274 NLRB 909, 913 (1985).
Over objections by the General Counsel and the
Charging Party, Respondent introduced copies of tele-
phone yellow pages covering the backpay period (1:90-
96; R. Exhs . 2, 5). The March 1982 edition lists roughly
130 restaurants of all types , from a Dairy Queen to a few
plush (as indicated by the ads) restaurants such as the
Hamilton House and Respondent 's own.5 AHC's 1982 ad
even provided a toll free 800 number AHC dropped the
800 number in later editions , and also reduced the size of
its ad space. The succeeding issues of the yellow pages
reflect increases in the numbers, with the August 1986-
1987 edition listing approximately 150 restaurants.
Respondent 's general manager , Horst Fischer, testified
that he hopes AHC is the most prestigious hotel in Hot
Springs . Many years ago, he testified , it ranked as one of
the finest, if not the grandest, in the United States. With
490 rooms, AHC hosts the annual convention of the Ar-
kansas Bar Association (1:247-249). In light of the pay
difference between Avant' s approximately $7 50 an hour
in March 1981 , and the $3.35 offer he encountered at the
much smaller Park Hotel in June 1981, it seems doubtful
whether many of the restaurants in Hot Springs pay
wage rates close to the $300 a week Avant had been
earning at AHC. In any event, Respondent failed to
show the wage rates of any of the 130 to 150 restaurants
in Hot Springs or adduce any other evidence that would
assist in showing whether the jobs as cooks there were
substantially equivalent to the position Avant held at
AHC. Respondent also failed to show how many appli-
cants there were for the advertised jobs or the wage
rates paid to the successful applicants
Early February to mid -April is the horseracing season
in
Hot Springs
(1:100-101, 243)
During the racing
season there are
many additional temporary jobs
(1:101).6 AHC itself hires around 120 temporary employ-
ees for the racing season (1:245). During the summer
months hotels at nearby Lake Hamilton hire employees
temporarily (1:246-247). Although Avant is aware that
some of those hired as temporary employees are retained
as regular employees , he testified that he looked only for
"steady" employment (1:106-107). I understand Avant to
use "steady" in the sense of regular , full-time employ-
ment.
Strickland , the certified
vocational expert called by
Respondent, testified that there is a direct correlation be-
tween a successful job hunt and the number of employer
contacts made by the job seeker The job seeker must
maintain a certain degree of "intensity"
in, his search
(1.148). Translating this concept into a numbers formula,
Strickland testified that ideally the applicant should make
10 employer contacts a week, with a minimus of 5 to 6
contacts, including contacts of new employers or recon-
tacts (even if just a telephone call) with employers previ-
ously visited (1:149).
In Strickland's professional opinion, Avant did not un-
dertake an intensive job search effort. " By `intensive,' I
mean geared to obtain employment " (1-149). Nor were
Avant's efforts, in Strickland's opinion, reasonable. On
this point I overruled the General Counsel 's objection
that the question calls for a legal conclusion (1:150). Rule
702, FRE, permits opinion testimony when that opinion
testimony will assist the trier of fact to determine a fact
in issue, and , under FRE 704, opinion testimony "is not
objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be
decided by the trier of fact "
5 The count can vary slightly depending on whether one counts each
location a single employer may list
8 The evidence fails to show how many, if any, of these are for cooks
ARLINGTON HOTEL CO
859
Following my ruling on the point, Strickland testified
(1.151):
By Mr. Gunter. (Resuming)
Q. In your opinion, were Mr. Avant's attempts,
were those attempts a reasonable attempt to find
employment given his skill and job availability?
A No, sir, they were not
Q Were those, in your opinion ; were those at-
tempts, the attempts that would be made in your ex-
perience , by a person who is attempting to be dili-
gent in finding employment?
A. No, sir.
I again overruled the General Counsel 's objection and
motion to strike ( 1:151). Finally, Strickland testified that
as far as the number of employer contacts , "it would be
my opinion that his [Avant's] job search was not really
geared to finding employment " (1'.152)
On cross-examination by the General Counsel , Strick-
land conceded that he had not reviewed the unemploy-
ment rate of Garland County (in which Hot Springs is
situated) because, he testified, in his work unemployment
is presumed and is simply an obstacle that must be over-
come (1.156-157, 172). Garland County's unemployment
rate during the backpay period averaged 9 68 percent
(G.C. Exhs. 6, 7)
Strickland also admitted , on cross-examination by the
Charging Party, that a middle age or older person prob-
ably has a tougher time finding employment., Although
the applicant's educational level had a positive effect as a
general proposition, the applicant's skill level is a more
important factor (1.173-174).
,At least to some extent Strickland's opinions were
based on employment or job opportunity ;data for areas
outside Hot Springs and even Garland County.' Indeed,
some of his data extended to Russellville, Arkansas (R.
Exh. 10).
As an Arkansas map reflects ,
Russellville
would involve a daily one-way trip for Avant of 73
miles-146 miles roundtrip . Strickland testified that he
did not check a map to determine that distance ( 1.158-
159). Whether a one-way commuting distance of 60 miles
would be unreasonable , he testified , would depend on
the standards under Worker's Compensation (1:171-172).
Avant testified that he had to change his way of living
during the backpay period . At the beginning he weighed
over 300 pounds, and he lost over 100 pounds by 1 De-
cember 1986. During that period he lived off his savings
and his wife's earnings ( 1:98-99).
3. Discussion and Conclusions
Did Frank Avant make a 'good-faith effort to find sub-
stantially
equivalent employment?
Vocational expert
Thomas H. Strickland says he did not. But Strickland's
opinion is flawed to some extent because it rests in part
on employment data extending 73 miles from Hot
Springs to Russellville, Arkansas. I would find that dis-
tance to be unreasonable for daily commuting. Big Three
Industrial Gas, 263 NLRB 1189, 1211 fn 77 (1982) (50
miles one way unreasonable),
WHLI Radio, 233 NLRB
326 (1977) (35 miles one way unreasonable);
Nickey
Chevrolet. Sales, 160 NLRB 1279, 1280 (1966) (50 to 55
miles one way unreasonable)
Strickland testified that six employer contacts a week
would be the minimum to constitute an "intensive"
search., Although Strickland defined that to mean a
search geared to obtaining employment, it seems that the
6 to 10 contacts a week converts, in terms of a legal
standard, to a high degree of diligence in the circum-
stances of this case
Even if, as I find, the 6 to 10 contacts a week would
require a greater degree of diligence by Avant than that
required by the law, the real question is whether the ef-
forts he did put forth may be classified as reasonably dili-
gent
Even in his best year, 1981, Avant contacted just 11
different employer, plus the EDS, with an average of
only 3 44 contacts per month-something less than a vig-
orous effort. One of the problems in assessing the reason-
ableness of Avant's efforts is that AHC, although intro-
ducing evidence concerning the total number of restau-
rants, did not show how many restaurants had cook posi-
tions substantially equivalent to the position Avant had
enjoyed at AHC. Neither did Respondent show the
wage rates for cooks at other restaurants Nor did Re-
spondent show how many cooks were hired in Hot
Springs, at what salary, nor how many applicants there
were
Except for the Park Hotel, none of the potential em-
ployers"offered Avant a job In 1981 Avant would have
been about 50 Age can make a difference, an adverse
one, as Respondent's own vocational expert confirms. To
paraphrase Judge Ricci's Board-approved words from
Woonsocket Health Centre, 263 NLRB 1367, 1373 (1982),
when an employer commits an unfair labor practice by
failing to recall a 50-year old man with a seventh grade
education from a recently concluded strike, the employer
runs the risk the 50-year old man may not be able to find
a substantially equivalent job as easily as a younger
person. Indeed, the Arkansas ESD sent Avant to few
places, if any. The ESD representative told him that
with Avant's qualifications he could not find Avant a
job. Avant does not know what the representative meant
(1.108-109).
Respondent argues that if Avant is entitled to any
backpay at all (and it contends that none is justified), it
should be limited to either (1) full backpay until June
1981 when he declined the Park Hotel's job offer, for a
backpay total of $3,094, or (2) full backpay to June 1981
and thereafter the difference between what he would
have earned at the Park Hotel and that outlined in the
BPS, through the first quarter of 1982, and no backpay
thereafter in light of his failure to be reasonably diligent
in searching for work, yielding a backpay total of $58638
(Br. at 17).
In its second suggested formula, Respondent would
close the backpay period as of 31 March 1982 on the
'
I overruled the General Counsel's objection to opinion testimony
based in part on employment data for areas outside Hot Springs (1 144)
8 Respondent's computations are based on a 12-week quarter rather
than a quarter of 13 weeks (Br App B)
860
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
basis, apparently, that beginning in March 1982 Avant's
employer contacts dropped to one per month until July
1984 (when they again increased to about two a month).
A third possible alternative, not suggested by Re-
spondent, would be a percentage formula similar to the
concept , utilized in comparative negligence cases. If
Avant's efforts were found to be less than reasonable,
rather than being denied all backpay,. Avant would be
awarded a percentage for the period his efforts were
deemed short of reasonable. Thus, if his efforts were
found to be 50 percent of a reasonable standard for, say,
1983, then he would be,awarded 50 percent of the back-
pay otherwise due for that year. As it now stands, the
prevailing rule -results in an award of all or nothing.
Clearly Avant did not exercise the diligence in seeking
work that he might have. But he is not,required to exer-
cise a high degree of, diligence. Avant registered immedi-
ately with the Arkansas ESD and began contacting the
larger motels for work as a cook in their restaurants
Eventually he contacted about three establishments ap-
parently not connected with a hotel or motel: Hamilton
House, Mollie's, and Coy's Steak House. There are many
other restaurants in Hot Springs, but the record does not
disclose whether any of them had cook positions substan-
tially equivalent to that Avant held at AHC. For his part
Avant could give no reason why he did not contact
more of the restaurants (1:109-110)
-
, ,
Avant visited some 20 , restaurants, or commercial
kitchens, not counting the ESD or his inquiry about the
Hilton
Among the 110 to 130 other restaurants in Hot
Springs, there may be several that have substantially
equivalent jobs to that which Avant enjoyed at AHC.
Was it Respondent's burden to offer evidence that
among these other restaurants a significant number had
jobs substantially equivalent to that Avant enjoyed at
AHC? Or was it the General Counsel's burden to show
that Avant went to several (or many) only to learn that
the cook positions paid barely more than the Federal
minimum wage9
In- American Bottling Co., 116 NLRB 1303 (1956), dis-
criminatee Pedro Alvarez registered, and thereafter re-
ported, only at the Texas Employment Commission
Ruling that such a limited effort did not rise to the level
of reasonable diligence, the Board wrote, 116 NLRB at
1307, "This being so, with such diligence lacking, the
circumstance- of a scarcity 'of work and the possibility
that none would have been found even with the use of
diligence is irrelevant."
After the first quarter of 1982 Avant's efforts dropped
off to one contact a month through much of the remain-
der of the, backpay period. In the first year of the back-
pay period (through March 1982) Avant visited 12 em-
ployers plus reporting to the EDS. Over the next 4 years
and 8 months he managed to contact only 8 more em-
ployers, plus inquiring at the ESD about the Hilton. As I
have summarized, Avant contacted most of these em-
ployers several times. '
Without regard to whether the jobs at the other res-
taurants in the Hot Springs area were substantially equiv-
alent, whether there were any vacancies, 'or whether
Avant would have been hired if there had been vacan-
cies, I find that Frank Avant's job search after March
1982 falls below the Board's standard of reasonable dili-
gence. Accordingly, I find that Avant's backpay is limit-
ed to the four quarters of April 1981 through March
1982 and the sum of $10,687, plus interest.
B Nathan Dendy
1. Introduction
The'BPS alleges that Nathan Dendy's backpay period
begins 28 March 1981 and ends 1 March 1985 At the be-
ginning of the hearing the parties stipulated as follows
(1 9; G.C. Exh. 2)•
Concerning Nathan Dendy, Respondent admits that
if his backpay period is from April 8, 1981, to
March 1, 1985, then the gross backpay computa-
tions as set forth in' Appendix B' and reflected in
Appendix H-5 of the Backpay Specification are cor-
rect.
The issue in Dendy's case centers on when the back-
pay period ended . The General Counsel says it ended 1
March 1985 . Respondent contends that it closed 5 Febru-
ary 1982 when Dendy placed unacceptable conditions on'
Respondent's offer to return to part -time work at AHC.
Resolution of the question turns on what was said in a
conversation between' Dendy and Head Bellman Joe
Langford in February 19.82 Needless to say, there is a'
credibility dispute.
Before the March 1981 strike at AHC, Dendy only
moonlighted there as a part-time bellman
His regular,
full-time job was, and is, at Weyerhaeuser Company,
where he has worked for 15 years (1:175-177, 180-181).
There is a dispute, however, concerning whether Dendy
worked at the Arlington before the strike on an "as
needed," or flexible, basis
(Respondent's position),
or
whether he worked there on a weekend schedule, which
he supplemented at other times when his Weyerhaeuser
schedule permitted
(the General Counsel's position). I
shall address that dispute shortly
2. Evidence
When the strike ended, Dendy and the other strikers
made an unconditional offer to return to work Arlington
Hotel, 273 NLRB 210, 211. Dendy testified before me
that when he went to ' the hotel and asked for his job
back, General Manager Horst Fischer replied that'his job
had been taken Fischer inquired whether Dendy would
accept another job if offered, and Dendy said he would
as long as the job did not interfere with his position at
Weyerhaeuser (1.262-263).
Head Bellman Langford testified that within a couple
of weeks after the March 1981 strike ended (or about
late March to early April 1981) Fischer instructed him to
recall Dendy (1:202, 219). Pursuant to Fischer's instruc-
tion, Langford telephoned Dendy and asked him to
come back to work According to Langford, Dendy
came to the Arlington where a brief discussion ensued
(1.204).
'
,In the hotel conversation, Langford testified, Langford
asked Dendy if he would come back to work. "Yes,"
ARLINGTON HOTEL CO
Dendy said, "But I can only work weekends." Langford
replied that the job would not be available to Dendy if
he was available to work weekends only. That ended the
conversation, and Dendy never returned to work (1.205-
206)
Dendy testified that about February 1982 he tele-
phoned Langford and asked when he was going to be
called back to work Langford said he would come by
and talk to him about that. (1:182-184, 266-267.) Around
7 p in that day Langford came to Dendy's home and
stated that Respondent had a current, job (opening) on
the bell stand, but that it was a rotating job. He asked if
Dendy would be able to work rotating shifts, for AHC
was "requiring all of us" to work rotating shifts. Dendy
replied that he could not work a rotating shift, for that
would interfere with his swing shift job (at Weyer-
haeuser), unless the' rotating shift was on the weekends
Saying he would see if he could work it in, Langford re-
turned to his car and left Dendy never heard from him
afterwards (1.184, 197, 264-268.)
At the time, and for several years before that, Dendy
had been working the 2 to 10 p m. shift at Weyerhaeuser,
Monday through Friday (1.181, 197). About 3 to 4 years
ago, which would be after the Langford conversation,
Dendy changed to the day shift at Weyerhaeuser
(1.176) 9
Langford does not expressly deny having a conversa-
tion with Dendy at the latter's home ' Langford's timing
of the conversation (about early April 1981) apparently
is off base, for on 8 December 1986 he wrote a "To
Whom It May Concern" memorandum outlining his job-
offer conversation with Dendy (G C. Exh 4). In that
1986 memo Langford places the starting date for the job
offer as 5 February 1982. In his testimony Langford did
not address the subject of the starting date set forth in
his memo
Payroll clerk Wanda Benson does address the date.
Benson identified an exhibit that includes a W-4 form
and an AHC "Payroll Entry Card" for Nathan L.
Dendy and bearing his apparent signature (1224-225; R
Exh. 11) The parties stipulated that the signatures on the
forms are Dendy's (1.239) Although Dendy agrees that
the signature is his (1 263), he testified that he cannot
recall signing the card or the circumstances in which he
signed, other than he knows it was not done when Lang-
ford came to his home. Although Dendy cannot recall
whether he went to the hotel after his home conversa-
tion with Langford, he denies having any conversation at
the hotel with Langford (1.263-264).
Benson testified that Dendy would have signed the
forms (W-2 and payroll entry card) for Langford and
that
Langford
would have forwarded them to her
(1.238) When she did not receive a timesheet on Dendy,
9 At one point Dendy responded in the affirmative to the question of
whether he had changed shifts "prior to" the Langford conversation
(1 184-185)
At another he did not correct a question that included a
statement that the change before the Langford conversation (1 197) 1 do
not think Dendy understood Dendy is specific that Langford's offer of
rotating shifts, if not confined to weekends, would interfere with his
swing shift, 2 to 10 p in , at Weyerhaeuser (1 185, 197, 265, 267) For our
case it is immaterial which shift he worked at Weyerhaeuser because ro-
tating shifts at the hotel during the week would interfere with whatever
shift he worked at Weyerhaeuser
861
Benson asked Langford why not and he informed her it
was because Dendy never came to work So she in-
scribed "Never came to work " on the payroll entry card.
(1 225-226.)
I find that on Friday , 5 February 1982, Dendy filled
out the time forms at the Arlington Although that could
have been after the home conversation described by
Dendy, it seems a bit more consistent with Langford's
version that the disputed conversation occurred at the
hotel
Langford did not cover Dendy's signing of the
forms (W-2 and payroll entry card) in his testimony, and
that would indicate that Langford does not recall, or
never knew , the circumstances of the signing.
The General Counsel simply argues that the "never
came to work" remark on the payroll form is irrelevant
because the job offer was invalid . (Br at 19 fn. 21) That
begs the question , for if Langford 's version is credited
the job offer was valid. The question is whose version is
to be credited In that respect the dated forms are rele-
vant I find their existence more consistent with Lang-
ford 's version than with Dendy's
That brings us to the subsidiary dispute concerning the
nature of Dendy's work schedule before the March 1981
strike
When he was hired in March 1980 Respondent
wrote "Extra Help" on Dendy's payroll data card 10 (R.
Exh 11) That inscription does not assist in resolving
whether Dendy was subject to call on an "as needed"
basis or, whether he worked a weekend schedule that he
supplemented as his Weyerhaeuser schedule permitted.
Langford testified that it was the former
( 1.201, 219) It
was the latter, Dendy testified , explaining that he nor-
mally reported Friday nights for the 11 p.m. to 7 am
graveyard shift, and then he usually worked the swing
shift, 3 to 11 p.m., on Saturdays and Sundays. (1:177-
180, 188, 198) Dendy would advise AHC whenever he
had an upcoming vacation or holiday at Weyerhaeuser
and request work at the hotel during those occasions He
would work those extra occasions. (1.261, 265-266.) The
head bellman before the strike was Macio Butler Lang-
ford, then a bell captain, succeeded Butler on the latter's
death in October
1981
It is the head bellman (Butler
before October 1981) who does the scheduling . ( 1.200,
218)
To impeach Dendy's version Respondent introduced
several timesheets for different payroll periods before the
strike (R. Exh 12 ) I rejected those pages not showing a
contradiction (1.231, 233-234, 253 , R Exh. 13 ) That is,
I particularly rejected those pages showing work on
weekends 11
The timesheets reflect that at various times Dendy
worked one or more shifts at the hotel other than on
weekends. Dendy credibly explained how that could be.
For example, the employees at Weyerhaeuser went on
strike from early March through June 1980 During the
10 Actually , Dendy was rehired in March 1980 He first started at
AHC in 1966 working part-time in the mornings as a lobby porter He
worked in that position until 1980 when he temporarily quit because of a
divorce proceeding (1 176-177)
I I A few of the pages in the reflected exhibit (R Exh 13) should be in
the received exhibit (R Exh 12) since they reflect hours worked on a
weekday Because of the view I take of this subject , that discrepancy is
immaterial
862
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
weeks he was on strike from his Weyerhaeuser job,
Dendy worked many weekday shifts at AHC, as the
timesheets reflect (1:181, 260) I find nothing in the time-
sheets inconsistent with Dendy's testimony.
Langford testified that Respondent has no part-time
employees who work only weekends, and that he simply
wanted Dendy to be flexible as he was before the strike
at AHC (1 201, 205). Conceding that he knows of no one
at AHC who works weekends only, Dendy testified that
he at no point, in the February 1982 conversation, told
Langford that he would work only weekends or not
work a shift during the week when that shift would not
interfere with his job at Weyerhaeuser. (1:198-199, 268-
269.)
Dendy testified that he understood rotation of shifts to
mean days one week, swing the next, graveyard after
that, and back through the cycle repeatedly. At the same
time he testified that in the past he worked whatever
shift on the weekends that he was needed. (1 198, 265.)
Dendy's real concern with the reference to rotating
shifts was not with any rotation on weekends, but a rota-
tion that would progress into the weekdays. He ex-
pressed that concern, under his version, when he told
Langford that he could rotate on the weekends but not
during
the
weekdays. (1.267) According to Dendy,
Langford, saying he would see if he could work it in, re-
turned to his car and left Dendy never heard from him
again
During his testimony Langford never specifically
denied telling Dendy, whether at the hotel or at Dendy's
home, that the job offer was for a rotating shift basis.
3. Discussion and conclusions
The disputed February 1982 conversation between
Dendy and Langford occurred 5 years before they testi-
fied here. I would think it unusual if they enjoyed per-
fect recall of that event. Perhaps the passage of time ex-
plains why neither witness offered a satisfactory story on
the first telling. Langford's initial efforts were conclu-
sionary, and Dendy's incomplete Resolving the dispute
is difficult
And, unfortunately, the prophet does not
grant me, for even a moment, the power to "probe the
mind and test the heart." (Jer. 17.10.)
The first question is where did the conversation be-
tween Dendy and Langford occur. It seems strange that
Langford would go to Dendy's home to discuss business.
There is no evidence that Langford chose to do so as a
personal convenience to himself. For example, there is
no evidence that Langford passes near Dendy's home as
Langford returns home after work. Nor is there any evi-
dence that Langford had ever made social visits to
Dendy's home so that a visit on this occasion might not
seem so unusual . I consider this aspect a negative factor
adverse to the General Counsel.
The strongest factor seems to be the forms Dendy
signed on 5 February 1982. Langford apparently recalled
nothing about the forms or he would have described
giving them to Dendy for signing, in accordance with
Respondent's procedure, when Dendy arrived at the
hotel
Nevertheless, Dendy could offer no explanation
for the existence of his signature on these forms
I am persuaded that the disputed conversation oc-
curred at the hotel. That does not necessarily mean that
Langford's version of the contents of the conversation is
to be credited.
Langford's version leaves a nagging question. If Lang-
ford simply asked Dendy whether he would come back
to work, would Dendy not assume it would be as before?
Why would Dendy, after answering yes, inject the issue
of weekends only? Dendy is a man of boundless energy,
and he has demonstrated this by many years of working
40 hours a week for Weyerhaeuser followed by working
another 16 hours or more most every weekend at the
hotel
As the poet would phrase it "while his compan-
ions slept," Dendy "was toiling upward in the night."
Longfellow, The Ladder of St. Augustine, st. 10 (1850).
There is no record evidence of any reason for Dendy
to limit his availability to the weekends. Respondent of-
fered no evidence of a change in Dendy's lifestyle by
which Dendy no longer was willing to work at AHC
during the week when he had a holiday, vacation time,
or other time off from his full-time job at Weyerhaeuser.
In short, I view this factor (Dendy's supposed injection
of weekends only) as detracting from the credibility of
Langford's version.
On the other hand, Dendy's testimony raises a couple
of questions
According to Dendy, Langford said that
they all are now required to work rotating shifts. Neither
party offered any evidence to support or refute Dendy's
testimony on this point If at some point since March
1981 Respondent adopted a policy that bellmen (and per-
haps others) had to rotate shifts, evidence of that change
would corroborate Dendy's version
Evidence of no
change would detract from Dendy's version The Gener-
al Counsel had the most to gain by offering corroborat-
ing evidence, and the most to lose by failing (or being
unable) to do so. I consider the lack of corroborating
evidence a factor that detracts from Dendy's version
Another question raised by Dendy's version is the fol-
lowup factor. According to Dendy, Langford said he
would see if he could accommodate Dendy's needs
When Dendy did not hear from Langford, a normal re-
action would be for Dendy to call Langford to inquire.
As there is no evidence that Dendy called, I infer he did
not call I count that as a negative
Although the forms are objective evidence, they offer
less help than they could because they are not accompa-
nied by any testimony of Dendy or Langford describing
the circumstances in which Dendy signed. Even if I try
to resolve the dispute on the basis that Dendy was hon-
estly mistaken on the location of the conversation, I have
to speculate on why the forms were signed
Would
Langford have given him the forms to sign even though,
according to Dendy, Langford would have to check on
whether Dendy could be accommodated? Perhaps yes if
Langford gave him the forms as soon as Dendy arrived.
But that becomes speculation rather than a permissible
inference from established facts.
How do the forms fit with Langford's version? The
same questions arise Did they get signed because Lang-
ford gave them to Dendy at the start of their conversa-
tion? That is a possible explanation, but is it a likely one?
ARLINGTON HOTEL CO
863
The forms reflect that Dendy was to begin work that
very day, Friday , 5 February 1982. Again, he could have
signed when he first arrived at Langford 's office. But if
the conversation occurred first, with Langford informing
him that there would be no job for weekends only, it
seems unlikely that Dendy would have signed and then
arose and left Yet he could have. He could have signed
reluctantly , changed his mind, got up and left.
The problem with trying to use the forms as the key
to resolving the conversation is that the process involves
too much speculation The forms are useful in determin-
ing the date and location of the conversation , but not in
clarifying the contents directly
In the final analysis, particularly with the location of
the conversation being at the hotel, and the existence of
the signed forms, Langford's version is more credible
than Dendy's.
I therefore find that Dendy's backpay
period ended on 5 February 1982 and that his backpay
award should be $2484 , plus interest 12
C. Frank Jones
1. Introduction
The parties stipulated that if Frank Jones ' backpay
period is from 25 March 1981 to 4 February 1982, then
the gross backpay computations are correct (1:9; G C
Exh. 2).
Although Respondent raised several defenses or argu-
ments concerning Jones, it apparently has settled on
one-that Jones is not entitled to any backpay because
he was properly recalled to the only position he would
have accepted (Br. at 2). Respondent confines its argu-
ment regarding Jones to three sentences of its brief (Br.
at 20)•
Frank Jones was only available for part-time em-
ployment, and only as a bellman . Jones was not
physically able to perform any other position than
part-time bellman . Jones was offered the first avail-
able part-time bellman position; therefore , he is not
entitled to any backpay.
2. Evidence and conclusions
Resident Officer Thomas H Smith Jr credibly testi-
fied that he calculated Jones' backpay to begin 25 March
1981 because on that date Respondent hired a part-time
busman named Duggan (1.19, 27) It appears that the
ending date of 4 February 1982 is established by Jones'
recall on that date to his part-time bellman position (120,
31)
At transcript pages 115 to 116 of the underlying case
the parties stipulated that all the discriminatees, with
normal instructions and orientation, would have been
qualified to perform several jobs, including that of bus-
person, or bus (G.C Exh. 5). The thrust of the Board's
underlying decision is that Respondent should have re-
called the discrimmatees to the first available position
that they were qualified to perform
Jones, by stipulation , was qualified to perform the bus
position
Respondent failed to offer him a part -time bus
position when one opened on 25 March 1982 . 1 find that
the General Counsel correctly sets that date as the begin-
ning point of the backpay period.
Respondent argues that Jones was not physically able
to perform any position other than bellman It points to
no evidence supporting this argument . Jones did not tes-
tify. Head Bellman Langford testified that Jones is over
65 years of age and suffers health problems
(1:212)
Langford concedes ,
however, that Jones is a good
worker and that his health problems did not impair his
ability to perform his bellman job (1 222)
Respondent's
argument is without merit
Respondent's argument also is without merit to the
extent it is based on a position it expressed at the hearing
concerning no intent by Jones to work at any job besides
bellman
This position is based on Lanford's testimony
that Jones never expressed any interest to Langford in
working at any job besides that of bellman ( 1 216, 222).
That issue was foreclosed by the underlying decision
when Judge Gritta wrote , 273 NLRB at 215:
Further, I reject Respondent 's reliance on the fail-
ure of any striker to express an interest in a job
other than his or her own prestrike job
Respondent's raising of this issue again before me is im-
proper.
I find that the backpay due Frank Jones is correctly
set forth in the BPS in the sum of $4070, 13 plus interest.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Because Frank Avant failed to exercise reasonable
diligence beginning April 1982 in searching for substan-
tially equivalent employment , his backpay period ends on
31 March 1982.
2. Because Nathan Dendy set conditions on accepting
a job recall offer extended to him on 5 February 1982,
his backpay period ends on that date
3. Frank Jones is entitled to the full amount of back-
pay, plus interest, set forth in the backpay specification,
as amended.
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]
12 1 would compute the backpay due for the first quartet of 1982 as
$113 ($338 divided by 3)
13 As rounded to the nearest dollar