Shangri-La Health Care Center, Inc.

334 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Shangri-La Rest Home, Inc., d/b/a Shangri-La Health Care Center, Inc. and United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastics Workers of Amer- ica, AFL-CIO. Cases 8-CA-19789 and 8-CA- 19789-2 March 31, 1988 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN STEPHENS AND MEMBERS JOHANSEN AND CRACRAFT On October 30, 1987, Administrative Law Judge Harold Bernard Jr. issued the attached decision. Thereafter, the General Counsel filed limited ex- ceptions and a supporting brief, and the Respond- ent filed cross-exceptions and a supporting brief and an answering brief to the General Counsel's exceptions. The National Labor Relations Board has delegat- ed its authority in this proceeding to a three- member panel. The Board has considered the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings,' and 1 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge's credibihty find- ings. The Board's established policy is not to overrule an administrative law judge's 'credibility resolutions unless the clear preponderance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing the findings. The Respondent has requested oral argument. The request is denied as the record, exceptions, and briefs adequately present the issues and the positions of the parties. Additionally, we correct the following typographical errors in the judge's decision: (I) in sec. II of his decision the judge states that by withdrawing recognition and refusing to bargain with the Limon before a reasbnable period of time had passed, the Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)(3) of the Act. It should read Sec. 8(a)(5) of the Act; and (2) the mis- spellings throughout the Judge's decision of the Union's bargammg repre- sentative, SOmo. 2 In agreeing with the judge that the parties had not bargained for a reasonable period of time as of December 8, 1986, we disavow any reli- ance on delays and postponements caused by the Respondent's reschedul- ing of the negotiation sessions. We do agree, however, that the reasonable time determination proper- ly looks at the period following the settlement agreement. In that settle- ment the Respondent agreed to resume bargaining after having earlier broken off negotiations because it questioned the Union's majority and withdrew recognition In return for this renewed commitment to recogni- tion and bargaining, the Union withdrew the unfair labor practice charges through which it had challenged the withdrawal of recognition Under these circumstances, the Respondent could not again question union majority until it had bargained for a reasonable time; and the rea- sonableness of that bargaining cannot be determined simply by adding the months of bargaining presettlement to the postsettlement bargaining time and deciding whether the total is sufficient. Even accepting the fact that in some cases presettlement negotiations might cast light on the signifi- cance of postsettlement negotiatmg developments and that at some point the passage of tune without agreement might itself establish that the Re- spondent had bargained for a reasonable time, we agree with the judge that where, as discussed infra, the parties had met five times in about 3 months after reconnnencing negotiations and were making sufficient progress to warrant scheduling a sixth session, the Respondent had not satisfied the reasonable time standard so as to warrant its breaking off ne- gotiations at that point on the basis of loss of union majonty conclusions2 and to adopt the recommended Order.3 1. In its exceptions, the Respondent claims that it was at an impasse with the Union over the noneco- nomic issues of union security and dues checkoff prior to withdrawing recognition from the Union on December 8, 1986. The Respondent argues that this "impasse," in combination with what it asserts was an agreement between the parties to dispose of noneconomic issues prior to discussing economic contractual terms, establishes that the parties had bargained for a reasonable period of time as of De- cember 8. We disagree. We agree with the judge that there was no clear and explicit agreement by the parties to dispose of noneconomic issues first; we further agree that such an agreement is not to be lightly inferred. Union Bargaining Representative Somo denied any knowledge of such an agreement prior to the No- vember 24, 1986 bargaining session—at which he presented part of the Union's economic proposa1.4 Further, the record reveals that the parties dis- cussed the Union's economic proposal at the No- vember 24 session. Thus, the parties' actions and stated understandings dispel any notion of a clear agreement to resolve noneconomic issues before discussing economic terms. Absent such an agree- ment, the asserted impasse over union security and dues checkoff, although a factor in determining whether the parties had reached an overall bargain- ing impasse, is not determinative. In addition, the record shows that the parties scheduled a negotiat- ing session for December 8, 1986. This evidences a lack of any contemporaneous understanding by the parties that further negotiation would be futile and is inconsistent with agreement that an impasse had been reached.5 The Respondent's reliance on Somo's testimony that the Union "absolutely" wanted the union secu- rity and dues-checkoff clauses does not advance the Respondent's argument. The Respondent's at- torney on cross-examination asked Somo if he wanted the security and checkoff provisions, to which Somo replied "absolutely." Somo also testi- fied, however, that he never insisted on the provi- sions and that he never received instruction from the Union to insist on these items. Thus, the fact that the Union desired these clauses does not, by 3 The General Counsel's request for a visitatonal clause is dented as the circumstances of this case do not "demonstrate a likelihood that [the] [R]espondent will fail to cooperate or otherwise evade compliance" See Cherokee Marine Terminal, 287 NLRB 1080, 1083 (1988). 4 Somo stated he made only a partial economic proposal because the Respondent had not responded to the Union's request for updated em- ployee wage information 5 See Colfor, Inc., 282 NLRB 1173, 1174 (1987), enfd. 838 F.2d 164 (6th Cir. 1988) (per cunam). 288 NLRB No. 44 SHANGRI-LA HEALTH CARE CENTER 335 itself, indicate that there was a steadfast insistence which would result in an impasse. Nor does the Respondent's bargaining representative's para- phrase of a statement allegedly made by Soma at the November 24, 1986 bargaining session—that impasse "may be close"—support its argument. Here again, even assuming impasse was close, the surrounding circumstances, including the fact that the parties had scheduled another session for De- cember 8, 1986, support the judge's finding that im- passe had not yet been reached. Accordingly, considering all the circumstances, we agree with the judge that the parties had not bargained for a reasonable time after the Respond- ent agreed to recognize and bargain with the Union in return for the Union's withdrawing its unfair labor practice charge. 2. We also agree with the judge that the Re- spondent violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act by not providing the Union with an updated employee se- niority and wage list. While the judge found it rea- sonable to assume the Union had made an oral re- quest for this information at the October 17, 1986 negotiation session, we conclude that even in the absence of such a request the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) by not providing the list. The Union made a November 10, 1986 written request for these items, which Respondent's attorney Kastner received on November 12 and forwarded to the Respondent's offices, where it was received on November 14. The Union reminded the Re- spondent of its request at the November 24 bar- gaining meeting and the Respondent's own wit- nesses testified that Kastner told the Union at that time that the information would be provided at or before the next scheduled negotiating session, i.e., December 8, 1986. In a February 25, 1987 letter to the Board's Regional Office, Kastner stated that most of the requested information had been com- piled by December 1, 1986, but that the Respond- ent suspended completing its response to the re- quest after learning that some employees were cir- culating a decertification petition. Given Kastner's own answer that the information would be provid- ed on or before December 8, it is apparent that the Respondent failed to provide the information by that date because of the employee petition activity. The decertification petition is no justification for failing to provide the Union with the requested in- formation, however, when, as here, the parties had not bargained for a reasonable period of time. Moreover, the Respondent stated that it had complied with several of the Union's requests throughout the negotiating period within 2 or 3 weeks from the request. Even assuming the oral re- quest was not made, the Respondent had close to 4 weeks (approximately 25 days; November 14-De- cember 8) to comply with the written request, but failed to do so. The nature of the requested infor- mation (employee seniority list with wage rates) is conducive to a relatively quick response. In this regard, we note that the judge discredited the testi- mony of Vandevelde, the Respondent's administra- tor, that the compilation of the information was de- layed because it was stored on separate computer programs. Accordingly, we agree with the judge that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) by failing to provide the Union with the requested information. ORDER The National Labor Relations Board adopts the recommended Order of the administrative law judge and orders that the Respondent, Shangri-La Rest Home, Inc., d/b/a Shangri-La Health Care Center, Inc., Medina, Ohio, its officers, agents, suc- cessors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Order. Steven D. Wilson, Esq., for the General Counsel. James P. Wilkins, Esq., of Akron, Ohio, for the Respond- ent. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE HAROLD BERNARD JR., Administrative Law Judge. I heard this case 7 July 1987 in Cleveland, Ohio, on com- plaint alleging Respondent unlawfully refused to furnish the Union with information necessary to its collective- bargaining responsibilities and withdrew recognition of the Union as the employees' representative in early De- cember 1986 thereby violating Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. On the entire record, including consideration of well- written briefs filed by the parties, I make the following FINDINGS OF FACT I. JURISDICTION AND LABOR ORGANIZATION STATUS Respondent is engaged as a health care institution in the operation of a nursing home in Medina, Ohio, where it annually derives from the operation gross revenues in excess of $100,000 and annually purchases products valued in excess of $50,000 directly from sources outside Ohio. I find, as admitted, that Respondent is a health care institution employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), (7), and (14) of the Act. The Union is admittedly a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. The appropriate bargaining unit of Respondent's em- ployees within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act, as admitted, and SO found, is: All full-time and regular part-time Registered Nurses, Nurses' Aides, Licensed Practical Nurses, 336 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Dietary Personnel, Beauticians, Laundry and Housekeeping Personnel, Field Aides, Receptionists, Maintenance Employees, Therapy Assistants, Ward Secretaries, Activities Aides, Medicare-Medicaid Coordinators, but excluding certified technical em- ployees, office clerical employees, other profession- al employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. II, THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES The Union became the certified bargaining representa- tive for employees in the unit on 6 February 1985 in Case 8-RC-12796. 1 At the hearing Respondent admitted that the Union remained such representative until 30 June 1986, and the record shows that the parties negoti- ated towards an initial contract unsuccessfully during this period. Then, on 30 June 1986, Respondent with- drew its recognition by letter to the Union on that date. (G.C. Exh 2.) The Union filed refusal-to-bargain charges. in Case 8-CA-19322 on 14 July 1986 and, in response thereto, Respondent offered to settle the matter by agreeing to recommence bargaining with the Union to- wards an agreement. Respondent's 26 August 1986 letter to the Union read, in part, "we have decided to recom- mence negotiations with the URW in exchange for the agreement of the URW to withdraw the unfair labor practice Charge No. 8-CA-19322. Provided that the charge is withdrawn, we are available to meet at 10:00 a.m. on Tuesday, September." (G.C. Exh. 4.) Pursuant thereto, the Union withdrew its charges with the Re- gional Director's approval on 29 August 186. (G.C. Exh. 5.) The parties met thereafter in five meetings between early September and November, but their scheduled meeting on 8 December canceled out when Respondent again withdrew recognition, claiming that the Union lacked support from a majority of its bargaining unit em- ployees, and informing the Union by phone and letter it intended to cease bargaining. (G.C. Exh. 17.) There is no dispute between the parties over the validity of the Re- spondent's basis for questioning the Union's majority status; rather, the issue is whether the parties were ac- corded a reasonable period for negotiating an initial con- tract following their settlement of the earlier unfair labor practice charge in August 1986 under Board law, which provides, in part, that during such reasonable period a question concerning the Union's majority representative status cannot be raised. Poole Foundry & Machine Co., 95 NLRB 34 (1951). It is well established that this principle applies to non- Board private settlements, as noted on brief by counsel for the General Counsel, "Where, as here, the quid pro quo for a union's withdrawal of an unfair labor practice charge was the Respondent's agreement to recognize and bargain with it. VIP Limousine, Inc., 276 NLRB 871, 876 (1985), and cases cited therein, Straus Communications, Inc., 246 NLRB 846, 847 (1979)." (Br. 4.) There is no question but that the Union's withdrawal of the 8(a)(5) 1 Counsel for the General Counsel's posthearing motion on brief, agreed to by Respondent, to correctly show 1985 as the year of the Union's certification is granted. refusal-to-bargain charges here was in exchange for Re- spondent's agreement to recognize and bargain with it, as outlined above, and I so fmd, leaving the question whether such a reasonable period of time for bargaining had elapsed since the 30 August settlement and the 8 De- cember withdrawal of recognition and cessation of bar- gaining by Respondent for resolution. A. The Parties' Bargaining Efforts At the outset, the idea advanced by Respondent on brief that the parties' presettlement negotiations and the period of time consumed thereby before the settlement of the Respondent's unlawful refusal to bargain in August 1986 should be assessed and pooled together with the time they spent in renewed bargaining after the settle- ment in determining whether a reasonable time for bar- gaining had elapsed before Respondent's second and thus arguably permissible withdrawal of recognition on 8 De- cember 1986 is rejected. The sandwiching of both peri- ods is contrary to established Board law concerning the remedying of refusal-to-bargain cases. In Federal Pacific Electric Co., 215 NLRB 861 (1974), the Board, in com- menting on the appropriateness of a general bargaining order over one according the parties a specific length of time constituting only the balance of time left in a 12- month period of required bargaining in the certification year commented, "That remedy [general bargaining order] requires bargaining for a reasonable period of time, determinable in each case by the bargaining issues and the circumstances which evolve once negotiations have been resumed." (Emphasis added.) Further, in a later case citing this principle with approval, the Board or- dered bargaining for a reasonable time under all the cir- cumstances, "after all unfair labor practices have been rem- edied." (Emphasis added.) San Antonio Portland Cement Co., 277 NLRB 309 (1985). Given these clarifying in- sights it follows that Respondent cannot be "credited" with presettlement period bargaining time under the spe- cific pronouncement in the Federal Pacific decision that the reasonable period starts "once negotiations have been resumed," and by the holding in the Alamo Cement deci- sion that the period is determined under all the circum- stances and after the unfair labor practices have been reme- died which, in the present case could not possibly have occurred presettlement. I have examined into the parties' presettlement negotiations on specific subjects, such as union security, where such has been useful to determine the question of possible impasse as well as other subjects where background negotiating efforts of the parties is relevant to the question, for example, whether such ef- forts postsettlement would be fruitful. It is clear that no single factor governs in the determi- nation whether the parties bargained for a reasonable period of time between August and the December 1986 cessation in their negotiations, certainly the passage of time, alone, is an insufficient circumstance in such assess- ment; rather, the results of the parties' efforts and other factors such as partial agreements, whether the parties were seeking an initial agreement, and the presence of impasse are Viewed in a blended focusing analysis. Bren- SHANGRI-LA HEALTH CARE CENTER 337 nan's Cadillac, 231 NLRB 225 (1977); and N J. Mac- Donald ci Sons, Inc., 155 NLRB 67, 71. B. The Negotiations Between 16 September and 24 November Negotiations on 16 September produced an impressive number of areas of agreement between the parties, in- cluding recognition clauses, no-strike/no-lockout provi- sions, probationary period and employer rights of dis- charge, union solicitation rules, grievance procedures, and representation therein coverage, and arbitration. (G.C. Exh. 8.) In addition, there was agreement on lan- guage in a variety of contract clauses, agreement on se- niority provisions governing rehires, information requests regarding new hires, less required shop time for union stewards, grievance filing requirements were liberalized and response time tightened, and agreement over sharing arbitration expenses was reached. (G.c. Exh. 9.) The meeting ended with inconclusive discussion concerning a general seniority provision. Their meeting on 29 September produced union ap- proval and acceptance of Respondent's revised proposals or amendments on arbitration time guidelines, and em- ployee leaves of absences' restrictions. In addition, the Union marked a "hold" on the proposal withholding pay for such absences. Significantly, the Union's drafted pro- posal for establishing seniority, according to union repre- sentative and negotiator Stanley Somo, was introduced at this meeting and was going to be accepted by Re- spondent. This six-page-long proposal covered defini- tions, job classifications, creation and duration * of seniori- ty rights, bumping, bidding, recalls, transfers, service in the armed forces, and president's rights in fulsome detail. (G.C. Exh. 11.) On 17 October Respondent presented the Union with an updated proposed contract including terms agreed to by the Union and other provisions still open. (G.C. Exh. 12.) A review ensued on the open items, and agreements on some were reached, viz, failure to report for work provisions; a language change regarding performance of duties by a bumping employee, more liberalized report- ing requirements for laid-off employees, and leave of ab- sence seniority rights were enlarged. Between then and the following meeting on 23 October the Union prepared a further response to General Counsel's Exhibit 12 and presented it to management representatives at this meet- ing. (G.C. Exh 13.) That proposal, as testified to by Somo, shows union approval to some 37 management proposals and the need for several other proposals to be on "hold" for further discussion. In addition the parties agreed further to changes expanding the date for filing grievances, to delete the exclusion of arbitrability for dis- missals due to nonreporting by employees on expired leaves of absences, and to provide for notice to the Union's president of employee discharges. The foregoing substantial number of agreements constitute still further gathering evidence of substantial headway in the parties' negotiations notwithstanding disagreement over union se- curity. Verbally on 17 October and in a letter between this meeting and the following meeting on 24 November, the Union requested information from Respondent in the form of an updated seniority list and wage rates for Re- spondent's employees (G.C. Exh 14), discussed further below, so that it could prepare an economic proposal be- forehand. At the 24 November meeting Respondent tendered re- vised contract proposals on certain contract paragraphs. (G.C. Exh 15.) The Union accepted Respondent's provi- sions concerning union representative plant access and reconfirmed and finalized earlier agreements reached the previous meeting. The Union submitted economic pro- posals (G.C. Exh 16), spanning some 28 items but left out the details of its position on any wage increase be- cause, as Cumo put it "I had no information to guide me on what I should be requesting." Cumo repeated a re- quest for the seniority and wage rate information made earlier and noted above and was told that a company of- ficial just about had it and would give it to the Union before the end of the week. The parties scheduled a meeting for 8 December, which canceled out when Re- spondent informed the Union it refused to bargain with it because "the Union does not represent a majority of the bargaining unit employees at Shangri-La," by letter (and earlier phone call) dated 8 December 1986. Analysis A more clear case to support the view that the parties had not yet bargained for a reasonable period of time when the employer pulled the plug on negotiations can hardly be imagined. In the first place, Respondent's con- tention that the earlier presettlement period should be tacked on to the September-November 5 meetings is to- tally without merit for the reasons already noted. Re- spondent's further contention that a dispute over a union- security clause evidenced an unproductive impasse is without support in the record given the obviously, equal- ly plausible view that such topic was a bargaining chip which the Union might have chosen to cash in for a fa- vorable economic settlement, a prospect impaired and rendered difficult by the Respondent's refusal, hereafter found unlawful, to provide the Union with requested in- formation clearly relevant to the negotiations. Respond- ent's unlawful action is slowing down, even halting, the natural course in negotiations is hardly a basis to support its argument that a reasonable time for bargaining had elapsed and it was therefore justified in ceasing to recog- nize and bargain with the Union. Its argument that the parties were somehow bound by an agreement to com- plete noneconomic bargaining before getting to econom- ics and because they could not get beyond the union-se- curity roadblock matters were hopeless is a self-serving assertion unsupported by the facts or by law—which favors the view that parties may defer some items, while trading on other significant subjects progresses, with the view that a tradeoff paving the way for an overall agree- ment will follow and the benefits of collective bargaining be secured. The record, in any event, does not support the view that any such clear and explicit agreement was reached by the parties and one will not lightly be in- ferred. See Pillowtex Corp., 241 NLRB 40, 47 (1979); Nansemond Convalescent Center, 255 NLRB 563, 564 338 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (1981); and Bartlett-Collins Co., 230 NLRB 144, 173 (1977). Even were plausibility tendered to Respondent's posi- tion such would tend to support the view that since the parties had not even had a chance beyond the 24 No- vember meeting to discuss a core subject matter—the 28 economic items in the Union's first-time presented pro- posal on 26 November—it would be obvious the parties had not yet been accorded a reasonable time to consum- mate an agreement fully one-half or more of which they had not yet addressed under Respondent's view because of a somehow binding procedural understanding. Bren- nan's Cadillac, supra at 227. Moreover, there were delays and postponements on Respondent's part slowing progress further. It is the positive characteristics in what the parties did achieve that supports my views here. The record is clear that their agreements during the September, October, and November meetings were substantial in number, im- portant in nature, and were followed in successive efforts after each one of the meetings by spinoff agreements, re- confirmations in writing, organized, identifiable, dated further proposals in writing building on earlier under- standings and agreements, carefully narrowing the areas needing further discussions while noting and preserving the agreed-on subjects, and widening the areas of agree- ment. All was not sweetness and light given the union- security disagreement, but there was substantial, gratify- ing momentum towards an agreement before Respondent abruptly aborted their movement towards a contract. There was surely much to be optimistic about, many rays of hope so that it cannot be concluded that an im- passe was even in the wings during these negotiations, which were too steadily productive to base such a prog- nosis on—a further factor to consider. Taft Broadcasting Co., 163 NLRB 475, 478 (1967), enfd. 395 F.2d 622 (D.C. Cir. 1968), and N .1. MacDonald & Sons, supra. Further, the new union bargaining representative, and the post- settlement restart and continuation of bargaining both created new changes for productive discussions even when background presettlement meetings are considered. Gulf States Mfr. v. NLRB, 704 F.2d 1390 (5th Cir. 1983); and PRC Recording Co., 280 NLRB 615 (1986). When all the above is viewed in light of the reality that this was bargaining for a first or initial contract be- tween the parties, requiring, as it does, the hammering out of fundamental procedures, rights, basic wage scales, and fringe benefit plans without prior established prac- tices on which to rely for starters, the parties' progress and the resulting outlook for success were excellent and it is understood that such first contract negotiations are entitled to a longer time to succeed and the "reasonable period" as noted by the General Counsel on brief is longer. VIP Limousine, supra at 877, and Blue Valley Ma- chine Co., 180 NLRB 298, 304 (1970). The parties them- selves scheduled a meeting for 8 December in harmony with the view that theirs was a positive outlook favoring the ongoing negotiations and prospects for an agreement, a view well supported by the impressive progress before- hand. Given the absence of impasse, the fact that this was bargaining towards an initial agreement, and espe- cially the nature of their progressive, productive bargain- ing propelled by a momentum of prior successful agree- ments in many areas of negotiations scheduled to contin- ue onward, Respondent's sudden foreclosing of any fur- ther bargaining emerges as a premature precipitous solely unilateral unwarranted extinguishment of the reasonable prospects for an agreement then confronting the parties. Based thereon, I find that by withdrawing recognition from the Union as bargaining representative for unit em- ployees on 8 December 1986 and refusing to bargain fur- ther with the Union before a reasonable period of time had elapsed since the parties' August 1986 settlement of a refusal-to-bargain charge against Respondent„ Respond- ent violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. C. The Union's Information Request Union witness Sumo testified he verbally requested Respondent to provide information in the form of updat- ed seniority lists and wage rates for employees at one of the two October meetings held on the 17th and 23d, the Respondent's representative, Attorney Kastner, turning the request over to Harry VanderVelde, administrator for Respondent. Kastner did not recall, nor did Vander- Velde, such a request but did not deny Sumo's account. Because VanderVelde was present at the meeting on 17 October, but not present on 23 October, it is reasonable to assume that Cumo's credited account would place the date for the request as 17 October, Be that as it may, absent a response the Union followed up with a written request for such information by letter dated 10 Novem- ber, noted above, seeking an updated seniority list and wage scales for employees. This is considered presump- tively relevant information required by the Union to dis- charge its collective-bargaining responsibilities on behalf of Respondent's employees, even more relevant than nor- mally so, it is noted, due to the advent of the parties' ef- forts to discuss economics about the time the requests were made, or soon to arrive. 15th Avenue Iron Works, 279 NLRB 643 (1986), and Helca Mining Co., 248 NLRB 1341, 1343 (1980). Respondent's duty clearly was "to fur- nish as promptly as practical any information properly requested." Aero-Motive Mfg. Co., 195 NLRB 790, 792 (1972). No valid reason was advanced why there was not ample time to produce the requested information be- tween 17 October and the following meeting on 23 Octo- ber; even placing the request as of the 10 November union letter requesting the information, there was ample time to produce it by 24 November—the information being the simple and readily available basic data general- ly available in the personnel office: names, dates of hire, and wage rates for employees. Even if some of the data, according to unconvincing testimony by VanderVelde, who dodged, improvised, and tailored his account in close to a stonewalling fashion, was not on the computer tapes, it would normally remain readily accessible to rea- sonable access. For the witness to declare it would take 2 months to provide, then admit he really did not know because he would not be the one doing it, revealed a Re- spondent explanation that invites disbelief and gets it. Nor would there be any obstacle to providing such lists with checkmarks next to the names of any persons Re- "r7 -.7tZ3 SHANGRI-LA HEALTH CARE CENTER 339 spondent may have harbored questions about concerning possible supervisory status, a further transparent excuse for the Respondent's failure to produce such information offered on its brief, viz, that more time was needed to exclude "supervisors" from the list. By failing to furnish the Union with the requested in- formation at any time since its requests were communi- cated to it, I find that Respondent further violated Sec- tion 8(a)(5) of the Act. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), (7), and (14) of the Act. 2. The Union is a labor organization within the mean- ing of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. The employees in the unit described above in para- graph 1 constitute a unit appropriate for collective bar- gaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. 4. At all times material the Union has been and is cur- rently the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit for the purpose of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act. 5. By withdrawing recognition from the Union and re- fusing to bargain collectively with it as the exclusive col- lective-bargaining representative of employees in the unit found appropriate, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(I) and (5) of the Act. 6. By failing and refusing to furnish the Union with an updated seniority list and wage scale covering its em- ployees on the Union's request, Respondent violated Sec- tion 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. 7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices have a close, in- timate, and adverse effect on the free flow of commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. On these fmdings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the following recommend- ed2 ORDER The Respondent, Shangri-La Rest Home, Inc., d/b/a Shangri-La Health Center, Inc., Medina, Ohio, its offi- cers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall 1. Cease and desist from (a) Refusing to bargain collectively with United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastics Workers of America, AFL-CIO as the exclusive bargaining representative of its employees in the aforesaid appropriate bargaining unit with respect to wages, hours of work, and any other terms and conditions of employment of such employees. (b) Failing and refusing to provide an updated seniori- ty list and wage rates of employees to the Union. (c) In any like or related manner interfering with, re- straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of any 2 I see no reasons warranting a broadly based visdatorial discovery- type remedial order in the circumstances of this case If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board's Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all purposes. rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act. (a) On request, recognize and bargain collectively with United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastics Workers of America, AFL-CIO as the exclusive representative of the employees in the bargaining unit found appropriate above, with respect to their wages, hours of work, and other terms and conditions of employment and, if an agreement is reached, embody it in a signed contract. (b) Provide the Union with an updated seniority list and wage scales of employees. (c) Post at Respondent's facility copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."3 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 8, after being signed by the Respondent's authorized repre- sentative, shall be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other materi- al. (d) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days from the date of this Order what steps the Re- spondent has taken to comply. 3 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words m the notice readmg "Posted by Order of the Nation- al Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." APPENDIX NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the National Labor Relations Act and has or- dered us to post and abide by this notice. WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively regarding wages, hours of work, and any other terms and condi- tions of employment with United Rubber, Cork, Linole- um & Plastics Workers of America, AFL-CIO as the ex- clusive bargaining representative of our employees in a bargaining unit consisting of All full-time and regular part-time Registered Nurses, Nurses' Aides, Licensed Practical Nurses, Dietary Personnel, Beauticians, Laundry and Housekeeping Personnel, Field Aides, Receptionists, Maintenance Employees, Therapy Assistants, Ward Secretaries, Activities Aides, Medicare-Medicaid Coordinators, but excluding certified technical em- ployees, office clerical employees, other profession- al employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. 340 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of any rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. WE WILL, on request, bargain collectively with United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastics Workers of America, AFL-CIO as the exclusive representative of the employ- ees in the unit described above, with respect to their wages, hours of work, and any other terms and condi- tions of employment and, if an agreement is reached, embody it in a signed contract. WE WILL furnish the Union with an updated seniority list and the wage scales covering our employees in the unit. SHANGRI-LA HEALTH CARE CENTER, INC.