Jakel Motors, Inc., Jakel Manufacturing Co. Inc., And Jakel , Inc. Single Employer

730 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Jakel Motors, Inc„ Jakel Manufacturing Company, Inc., and Jakel, Incorporated Single Employer and International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America-UAW. Cases 14-CA-18021, 14- CA-18153, 14-CA-18195, and 14-RC-10005 April 29, 1988 DECISION, ORDER, AND DIRECTION BY CHAIRMAN STEPHENS AND MEMBERS JOHANSEN AND CRACRAFT On January 13, 1987, Administrative Law Judge Peter E. Donnelly issued the attached decision. The Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, the Charging Party filed cross-exceptions and a supporting brief, and the General Counsel filed cross-exceptions and a supporting brief. The National Labor Relations Board has delegat- ed its authority in this proceeding to a three- member panel. The Board has considered the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings,' and conclusions, 2 as modified, to adopt the remedy as modified, 3 and to adopt the recommended Order4 as modified. The election was held on October 4, 1985. The tally of ballots shows 73 ballots for and 71 ballots against the Union with 18 challenged ballots, a suf- The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge's credibility find- ings The Board's established policy is not to overrule an administrative law judge's credibility resolutions unless the clear preponderance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F 2d 362 (3d Cir 1951) We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing the findings 2 The General Counsel has excepted to the judge's dismissal of an alle- gation that the Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)(1) on June 25, 1985, when Patrick Jakel questioned employee Rodney O'Bryan about the circulation of authonzation cards and suggested that O'Bryan should replace his union button with a Jakel button The Respondent has excepted to the judge's findings that it violated Sec. 8(a)(1) through interrogations of em- ployees on numerous other occasions, including his finding that such a violation occurred on July 12, 1985, when Daniel Jakel questioned Debbie Leroy about why she supported the Union In view of our adop- tion of the judge's findings of numerous interrogation violations, the Order would not be affected by a decision with respect to either of these two exceptions and we find it unnecessary to pass on them In agreeing with the judge that the Respondent placed unlawful re- strictions on distribution of union literature, we note that solicitation for other purposes was a common practice in the plant On numerous occa- sions cheese, sausage, dolls, Avon products, Girl Scout cookies, and raffle tickets were sold without the Respondent's interference. 3 In accordance with our decision in New Horizons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987), interest on and after January 1, 1987, shall be computed at the "short-term Federal rate" for the underpayment of taxes as set out in the 1986 amendment to 26 U S C § 6621 Interest on amounts accrued prior to January 1, , 1987 (the effective date of the 1986 amendment to 26 U S C § 6621), shall be computed in accordance with Florida Steel Corp. 231 NLRB 651 (1977) 4 The General Counsel has requested a visrtatonal provision subject to the supervision of the United States court of appeals enforcing this Order Under the circumstances of this case, we find it unnecessary See Cherokee Marine Terminal, 287 NLRB 1080 (1988) ficient number to affect the results. We adopt the judge's recommendations concerning the chal- lenged ballots, except as modified below.3 The judge sustained the challenge to Loren Hol- zinger's ballot, fmding that Holzinger was a super- visor under Section 2(11) of the Act. Contrary to the judge, we do not find the evidence sufficient to establish that Holzinger manifested any of the stat- utory indicia of supervisory authority. Holzinger has been employed by the Respondent since 1952. In 1982, Holzinger was classified as a tool-and-die worker and was reclassified as assist- ant supervisor to Supervisor Oestringer in 1983. At the time of the reclassification, the Respondent's vice president told Holzinger that the reclassifica- tion did not affect duties as a tool and die maker and that he would be in charge only if Oestringer was on vacation or off because of an extended ill- ness. Holzinger is a highly trained and experienced tool and die maker, whose primary task is the oper- ation of machines in the tool-and-die room. We are not satisfied that Holzinger's title as assistant super- visor or his instruction of less experienced employ- ees is sufficient to confer supervisory status. The appropriate test for determining the status of em- ployees who substitute for supervisors is whether they spend a regular and substantial portion of their working time performing supervisory tasks.6 The record reveals no such regularity. The sporad- ic assumption of supervisory duties during annual vacation periods of regular supervisors is not suffi- cient to establish supervisory status. 7 Although Holzinger occasionally gives less experienced em- ployees instructions in the performance of their jobs, it appears that this is the result of his experi- ence as a tool-and-die worker and does not in itself amount to evidence of supervisory authority. 8 Ac- cordingly, we find that Holzinger is not a supervi- sor under Section 2(11) of the Act and conclude that the challenge to his ballot should be overruled. 5 In adopting the judge's recommendation that the challenge to the ballot of Ludwig Ulrich be sustained, we find it unnecessary to rely on the judge's finding that Ulrich was a temporary employee We rely in- stead on the record evidence that demonstrates Ulnch did not share a community of Interest with the unit employees because he was paid on a different basis, kept track of his own hours rather than punching a time- clock, did not receive fringe benefits enjoyed by the other employees, and performed no unit work. 6 Aladdin Hotel, 270 NLRB 838, 840 (1984), Honda of San Diego, 254 NLRB 1248, 1249 (1981) 7 Stewart & Stevenson Services, 164 NLRB 741, 742 (1967), enfd. in per- tinent part 414 F 2d 232 (5th Cir 1969) 8 See Health Care Logistics, 273 NLRB 822 (1984), enfd in pertinent part 784 F.2d 232 (6th Cir 1986), Clear Lam Packaging, 265 NLRB 701 (1982); and Teamsters Local 564, 259 NLRB 344 (1981) 288 NLRB No. 84 JAKEL MOTORS 731 ORDER The National Labor Relations Board adopts part A of the recommended Order of the administrative law judge and orders that the Respondent Jakel Motors, Inc., Jakel Manufacturing Company, Inc., and Jakel, Incorporated, a single employer, High- land and Palestine, Illinois, its officers, agents, suc- cessors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Order; the Board adopts part B of the rec- ommended Order as modified below. DIRECTION IT IS DIRECTED that the Regional Director for Region 14 shall, within 10 days from the date of this Decision, Order, and Direction, open and count the ballots of Loren Holzinger, Theresa Buzick, Cynthia Strowmatt, Claralea Beckering, Jo Ann Pryor, Sabra Rench, Elizabeth Nye, Deborah Westbrook, and Rodney O'Bryan and prepare and serve on the parties a revised tally of ballots. Thereafter, the Regional Director shall issue the appropriate certification. Bradley a Kafka, Esq., for the General Counsel. Mark W. Weisman, Esq., of Si. Louis, Missouri, for the Respondent. Irving M. Friedman, Esq., and John Truffa, of Chicago, Illinois, for the Charging Party. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE PETER E. DONNELLY, Administrative Law Judge. The original charge in Case 14-CA-18021 was filed by the International Union, United Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America-UAW (Union, Charging Party, or Petitioner), on 26 January 1985. Thereafter, at various dates, additional charges were filed and com- plaints issued, which culminated in the issuance of a second order consolidating cases, second amended com- plaint and notice of hearing dated 10 December 1985. An answer thereto was timely filed. That complaint contains 45 separate paragraphs reciting 8(a)(1) interference by Jakel Motors, Inc., Jakel Manufacturing Company, Inc., and Jakel, Incorporated, a single employer' (Respondent, Employer, or Company), with employee rights, as well as 21 separate acts of unlawful discrimination by Re- spondent, including discharges, transfers, and failures to hire and recall, in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. The second amended complaint was amended on 27 De- cember 1985 and an answer thereto was timely filed by Respondent. 2 In addition to the unfair labor practices set It was stipulated at the heanng that the name Jakel Motors, Inc was changed in November 1985 to Jakel, Incorporated and, accordingly, the latter name was added to the case caption. 2 The complaint also alleges that the transfers of Jo Ann Thompson and Debbie Graham as well as the refusal to consider for employment or hire Kate Dunn at the Highland facility violate Sec. 8(a)(3) of the Act; out in the second amended complaint, that complaint also provides for the resolution of 18 ballots that were challenged at a representation election on 4 October 1985 in a related representation case (14-RC-10005). Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held before me on 7 to 10 January 1986; 19 to 21 February 1986; 3 to 5 March 1986; 31 March through 4 April 1986. Briefs have been timely filed by the General Counsel, Respondent, and Charging Party, which have been considered. FINDINGS OF FACT I. EMPLOYER'S BUSINESS Jakel Motors, Inc., Jakel Manufacturing Company, Inc., and Jakel, Incorporated are Illinois corporations en- gaged as a single-integrated business enterprise in the manufacture and sale of small electric motors with pro- duction facilities in Highland, Illinois, and in Palestine, Illinois. During the 12-month period ending 31 July 1985, the Employer sold and shipped from its Highland and Palestine facilities products, goods, and materials valued in excess of $50,000 directly to points outside the State of Illinois. The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find Jakel Motors, Inc., Jakel Manufactur- ing Company, Inc., and Jakel, Incorporated are a single employer and that each is now, and has been at all times material, engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. II. LABOR ORGANIZATION The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find that the Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Facts, Discussion, and Analysiss 1. Supervisory status of Patrick Jakel and Brian Jakel Patrick and Brian Jakel are 2 of the 10 children of the deceased founder and owner of Respondent, Otto Jakel. Otto Jakel's estate provides for the distribution of 1750 shares of class B nonvoting stock to Otto's wife, Patricia Jakel, with the rest in equal shares to his 10 children either outright or, as in the cases of Patrick and Brian Jake', in further trust. It is undisputed that neither Pat- rick nor Brian are officers or directors of Respondent. Apart from the duties performed by Patrick and Brian, however, these allegations were amended out of the complaint on motion by the General Counsel. 3 There is conflicting testimony regarding sonic allegations of the com- plaint. In resolving these conflicts, I have taken into consideration the ap- parent interests of the witnesses. In addition, I have considered the inher- ent probabilities, the probabilities in light of other events, corroboration or lack of it; and consistencies or inconsistencies within the testimony of each witness and between the testimony of each and that of other wit- nesses with similar apparent interests In evaluating the testimony of wit- nesses, I rely specifically on their demeanor and have made my findings accordingly. While apart from considerations of demeanor, I have taken into account the above-noted credibility considerations; my failure to detail each of these is not to be deemed a failure on my part to have fully considered it. Walker's, 159 NLRB 1159, 1161 (1966) 732 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD neither of whom testified at the hearing, it is clear that their interests were associated in the minds of the em- ployees with the openly hostile antiunion position of Re- spondent's hierarchy, including their brothers, some of whom are found to have coerced and intimidated em- ployees in violation of the Act. In these circumstances, particularly since they are part owners in the family- owned operation, I conclude that Brian and Patrick are agents of Respondent and, as such, Respondent is respon- sible for their antiunion activities, including the coercive statements found to have been made by them. Hillside Avenue Pharmacy, 265 NLRB 1613, 1621 (1982). 2. The 8(a)(1) allegations4 In March l985,, Buzick contacted a repre- sentative of the Union with a view toward organizing the Respondent's Highland facility, and a meeting of em- ployees to discuss this matter was arranged to take place after work at 5:30 p.m. on Friday, 12 June, at a recrea- tion area inside Silver Lake Park, located on the out- skirts of Highland. The gathering place was a recreation area about 1 mile from the main highway and accessible only by a two-lane dead-end road. Buzick and several other employees testified that they observed Richard Rit- tenhouse, Respondent's human resources administrator, and Daniel Jakel, production manager and part-owner of Respondent, in a car driven by Rittenhouse pass the gathered employees and then come back again passing the meeting area again. Although both Rittenhouse and Jakel testified, neither testified concerning this matter and, accordingly, I conclude that Rittenhouse and Jakel did in fact drive to the park and did observe at least some of those in attendance at the union meeting. It was not coincidence or chance that brought them there. The only reasonable explanation for their presence is that having learned of the time and place of the meeting, they went there for the purpose of surveilling the union activ- ity of those employees present. Such activity is clearly inhibitive and constitutes unlawful employer interference with the union activity of employees under Section 7 of the Act. Amason, Inc., 269 NLRB 750 (1984). On the following day, 13 June, Jo Ann Pryor, a qual- ity control inspector working in one of the production areas, asked Bill Peppers, one of the foremen, about a particular job. Peppers asked her if she had attended the union meeting the prior day at Silver Lake. Pryor re- sponded that she had not, whereupon Peppers asked her if she was for the Union, and Pryor responded affirma- tively. Peppers concedes asking her if she had attended a union meeting but denies asking her about her union sen- timents; however, a careful evaluation of the testimony persuades me that Pryor's account is more reliable, and I credit her in this respect, and conclude that the interro- gation was, under the circumstances, unlawful under the principles enunciated in Rossmore House, 269 NLRB 1176 (1984), particularly since here the organizational effort was in its infancy, Pryor's union sentiments were 4 The General Counsel, in brief, concedes that the evidence does not support the allegations contained m pars. 5(e) and (u) of the complaint I agree, and these will be dismissed. 5 All dates refer to 1985 unless otherwise indicated. unknown, and Respondent committed other serious and flagrant unfair labor practices set out below. On 17 June, at the end of the workday, Robert Jake', president and part-owner of Respondent, delivered an antiunion speech to the assembled employees of the Re- spondent. During the course of the speech Jakel told the employees that he was aware of the union organizing campaign and that the Company had fought other orga- nizing efforts and would fight this one. He told them that the Union would do them no good and could only cause a loss of jobs and that the Respondent would not negotiate or sign a contract with the Union. Robert Jakel did not testify at the hearing. In these circumstances, I credit the General Counsel's witnesses and conclude that the remarks were made and, further, that they were co- ercive as interference with the organizational rights guar- anteed to employees under Section 7 of the Act.6 On the same day, 17 June, Dan Jakel was distributing antiunion buttons to employees reading "JAKEL EQUALS JOBS SAVED, UNION EQUALS?" He ap- proached employee Michelle Herzberg and asked her if she had decided to wear the "company" button. Herz- berg said that she did not care, and Jakel said, "Well, I don't know if you like your job or not, but it is your job." Jakel, on the other hand, testified that he only told her that it was her decision. Based on the credibility con- siderations set out above, however, and particularly be- cause Herzberg is a current employee testifying against her own interests, I credit her account and conclude that Jake', certainly by implication, threatened Herzberg with discharge if she declined to wear a company button, and that by asking Herzberg if she had decided to wear a company button, Jakel violated the Act by interrogating her unlawfully. On 20 June, Patrick Jakel approached Rodney O'Bryan, a quality control inspector, and asked O'Bryan if he thought the Union was going to do them any good. O'Bryan said that he thought it would and Jakel replied, "Well, if the Union gets in, we are going to close down the factory." When O'Bryan asked why, Jakel replied, "because we don't want them here." Jakel did not testify it the hearing. I credit the uncontradicted testimony of O'Bryan and conclude that Jakel's remarks constituted an unlawful interrogation and threat of discharge for ex- ercising the organizational rights guaranteed to employ- ees in Section 7 of the Act. On the same day, 20 June, Ernest Priesmeyer, 7 a su- pervisor, approached employee Wanda Stanley while she was working and told her that if the employees went union, they would close the place. Although Priesmeyer did testify at the hearing, Stanley's testimony in this regard is not rebutted and I credit her. As noted above, threats of closure in reprisal for union organizational ac- tivity violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. The evidence does not, however, support the General Counsel's alle- gation that Jakel told the employees that they should not sign authonza- non cards. The evidence discloses only that they were told they were not obliged to sign authorization cards, which I conclude is not coercive. 7 The spelling of Pnesmeyer's name was corrected by amendment to the complaint at the hearing JA10EL MOTORS 733 Again on 20 June shortly after 5 p.m., Rodney O'Bryan was distributing union leaflets to employees at the rear entrance of the plant as they left work. While so engaged, he was approached by Richard Jakel, treasurer and part owner of Respondent, who told him that he did not want him handing out leaflets any more because he did not want employees congregating after work. About this same time, Elizabeth Nye, another employee, was distributing union leaflets in the employee parking lot and on the street. She had returned from the parking lot when she was approached by Art Kuhlman, Respond- ent's vice president of operations, who told her she would have to leave the premises because it was after 5 p.m. The record does not reflect, however, that she was distributing pamphlets when approached by Kuhlman, and Kuhlman did not allude to the pamphlets nor inter- fere with any distribution. Nor does it even appear that Kuhlman was even aware that Nye had been distributing them. In these circumstances, I cannot conclude that Kuhlman violated the Act by simply directing her to leave the premises because it was after 5 p.m. As to Jakel, however, it is clear that he did interfere with O'Bryan's distribution of union leaflets. Since the record discloses from the testimony of several employees that solicitation on Respondent's premises for numerous other purposes had taken place in the past with the knowledge and occasionally the participation of supervisors, Re- spondent was not free to restrict the solicitation of em-, ployees by leaflet for the purpose of soliciting their sup- port for the Union. Such disparate treatment constitutes interference with the organizational rights of employees protected by Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Bluebonnet Ex- press, 271 NLRB 433 (1984). On 21 June, Priesmeyer again approached Stanley while she was working. He told her that "they" had just had a meeting in the office with Respondent's lawyer arid that there was no way the place would go union; that if it did they would close the doors. Priesmeyer did not testify about this incident, and I accept Stanley's ver- sion as accurate. As noted above, such threats constitute interference with employee rights as set out in Section 7 of the Act. On 21 June, Art Kuhlman visited the Respondent's fa- cility in Palestine. The Respondent planned to reopen the Palestine operation and Kuhlman was there to conduct job interviews of ex-employees who had indicated a desire to return to work. Among those interviewed were Vivian Cox, Janet Franklin, and Diana Hanger. Cox tes- tified that she was interviewed in the presence of Steve Bailey and Dick Gullett who were introduced to her, re- spectively, as the production manager and plant manag- er. Kuhlman did most of the talking. He explained that Palestine was going to be reopened because business had improved. He further advised her that the employees at Highland were attempting to organize and that he wanted her to know the company's views in the matter. He went on to say that the Company had never had a union, were not going union, and would not operate a plant under a union. He asked Cox how she felt about the Union and Cox responded that she felt that "They have their place." When pressed to explain, she said, "If you can make a decent wage to support your family—if you have communication with your employer as to any problems that might arise and you can work them out to an agreement then I would see no need for a union," adding, "Back in 1981 when the Palestine plant was trying to organize a union that they had a lot of com- plaints." Similarly, in his interview of Franklin, Kuhlman said that the Respondent had never been union; "were never going to be union"; and "would not operate the plant under any union." Kuhlman asked Franklin for her opin- ion about unions and she responded: I told him that I figured they would find out that my husband had been a construction worker under unions for approximately 30 years but he had been out of work for about a year and a half and that the union hadn't help put a roof over our head or food in our mouths, but they still wanted their dues. And then he said, "I don't think I quite explained myself right" and I said "Oh you want a yes or no answer as to whether I will vote for the Union" and he said "Yes" and I said, "Probably no." And he said 'Probably no isn't good enough.' And I said "no." Then he asked me if I thought it would cause me any trouble at home and I asked him "What do you mean?" And he said, "Well, since your husband has been union for so many years" and I said "No, I don't think so. My husband is aggravated with the unions right now because he has been out of work. And he is out applying for $4.00 and $5.00 an hour jobs." During the interview of Diana Hanger, also on 21 June, Kuhlman explained the union organizational effort at Highland, telling her that Respondent would refuse to sign a union contract and that they would "close the plant before they'd let a union in." Kuhlman also asked her how she would vote as to a union and she respond- ed, "I said there is some good and some bad points about- a union. I had been connected with unions at previous jobs and that I had also been a union steward. I had also said that one time I worked with a person that couldn't do the job and I had had to work twice as hard because the union refused to let them hire—or fire them." Also, "and that as long as I could go to my supervisor when a rate was wrong and they would do something about it or at least check into the matter that I didn't see any need for a union. And he said 'Well, I just want a straight answer from you. Would you vote for a union yes or no.' And I said 'no, I don't think Jakel is ready for a union.' And he then said that people would be putting pressure on me but he once again stated that they were required to negotiate but that they would refuse to sign a contract." Kuhlman testified that he advised all the inter- viewees of the union organization at Highland and recit- ed to them the history of failure in the many previous organizational efforts. He conceded that he expressed to them that Respondent did not feel that a union was nec- essary. Kuhlman denied discussing with any interviewee how they would vote in a union election or telling em- ployees that either Palestine or Highland would close before it would go union. Despite Kuhlman's denials, I 734 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD fmd the testimony of Cox, Franklin, and Hauger to be more persuasive, and I credit their versions of these interviews and conclude that Kuhlman's remarks consti- tute unlawful coercion, threats, and interrogation within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. On 25 June at the plant, Patrick Jakel approached Rodney O'Bryan, who was at the time wearing a union button, and asked him how they were doing on the green cards (authorization cards). O'Bryan told him to stop asking him about the Union. Jakel asked if he would take off the union button and put on his Jakel button. O'Bryan told him that he would if Jakel would take off the Jakel button and put on his union button, but Jakel declined. Jakel also asked how soon the election would be, and O'Bryan said he did not know. The criteria for determining whether remarks made to employees are co- ercive requires a consideration of all the circumstances. Rossmore House, 269 NLRB 1176 (1984). In my view, the content of Jakel's remarks in the context of having been made to a button-wearing union adherent, was es- sentially innocuous rather than coercive and did not vio- late the Act. On 26 June, Priesmeyer again spoke to Stanley, ob- serving that she had removed the union button that she had been wearing. Priesmeyer asked whether this meant that she had changed her mind. Stanley said that she had not, and testified that Priesmeyer said that "he was just wanting to know how people were going to vote." On 27 June, Priesmeyer again approached her and observed that she was not wearing a button and again asked if she had changed her mind. Stanley told him that it was ille- gal for him to ask her how she was going to vote or any- thing about the Union and Priestneyer responded that they were trying to fmd out how people were going to vote. She also asked if it made any difference which button you wore and Priestneyer said, "Yes." She asked, "In the type of jobs they give you?" and Priesmeyer said "Yes." Priesmeyer denied telling Stanley that wearing a union or company button would make a difference in job assignment. He concedes that he asked her if taking the button off meant that she had changed her mind, but can recall only that she did not give him a direct answer. However, a review of the probative testimony persuades me that Stanley's recollections of these conversations is more accurate and should be credited. The questions about union buttons were clearly an effort by Respond- ent to find out how Stanley was going to vote. Pries- meyer's comments concerning the wearing of buttons also implied discriminatory job treatment for those wear- ing union buttons. Thus, I conclude that these remarks constitute both an interrogation and a threat in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. On 27 June, Quality Control Manager Bill Sunderland and Quality Control Coordinator Hazel Biggs spoke to Rodney O'Bryari concerning a production problem that had occurred on the previous Saturday involving O'Bryan when a wrong blueprint had been used and some defective coils were produced. Sunderland told him to be more careful, and a warning letter dated 27 June was placed in O'Bryan's file. O'Bryan also testified that later that day in the afternoon Sunderland came back and told him to be more careful on his inspections, "They are looking for a reason." Sunderland admits meeting with O'Bryan and telling him to be more careful but denies any second conversation telling O'Bryan that "They were looking for a reason." Nonetheless, I credit O'Bryan as the more reliable witness and conclude not only that that remark was made, but that it was coercive, particularly since O'Bryan was an open, button-wearing union supporter. The only reasonable implication to be drawn is that Sunderland was warning O'Bryan to be more careful because Respondent was looking for a reason to discharge him because of his union activity. Such a message is clearly inhibitive and constitutes un- lawful restraint on the employees' organizational rights provided in Section 7 of the Act. On 28 June, Patrick Jakel approached Kelly Kuhn at her work station. She was wearing a union button. Jakel asked her if she wanted to take off her UAW button and put on his Jakel button. She said no. Jakel then asked her if she had heard the rumors going around that the plant was going to close down if the Union came in and asked her if she thought they were bluffing or not. Kuhn re- plied that she thought they were bluffing and Jakel said that he thought so too but that he heard a man in the office say that "If a union got in they would definitely close the plant down." Even though Jalcel was only re- lating what he had heard someone else in management say, Jakel's repetition of the remark, as an agent of the Respondent, was unlawfully coercive. Jakel also unlaw- fully interfered with Section 7 employee organizational rights by asking Kuhn if she wanted to substitute a Jakel button for the union button since this was essentially a request to support the Respondent and withdraw her support for the Union. On 1 July, when O'Bryan was working in the quality control area, he was approached by Sunderland who asked, "Are you sure you want to be this way with the Union?' and I said 'Yes, anything to better my job would be worth working for' and he said 'Well, I don't want you to get in something too deep that you can't get yourself out of' and he said 'I want you to think about this' and I said 'Yes, I have thought about it and I had made my decision." Sunderland's version of this conver- sation is not substantially different and, while I find that the question portion was innocuous, particularly in view of O'Bryan's openly prounion posture, I find that Sun- derland's warning, however well-intentioned, was inhibi- tive and interfered with the organizational rights of em- ployees guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. On 2 July, O'Bryan was at the union hall in Granite City, Pennsylvania, giving an affidavit to an NLRB agent. During a pause in the interview, O'Bryan looked out the window and saw what he thought was Chris Jakel's car pass by, stop, and come back past again. O'Bryan was not able to see the driver clearly, only a profile. Chris Jakel testified that he drove a different type of car than the one identified by O'Bryan and was not in Granite City on 2 July. In these circumstances, I conclude that the evidence is not sufficient to identify Jakel, and this contention of surveillance of union activi- ty should be dismissed. JAKEL MOTORS 735 On 10 July, employees Lea Ann Wigginton, Vicki Wilken, and Connie Smith distributed union leaflets at various locations on Respondent's property or on a nearby employee parking lot. It is undisputed that Dan Jakel approached each of them at various times and told them, in essence, that they were not permitted to distrib- ute leaflets at these locations. Whatever merit this posi- tion might have in other circumstances, it is undisputed that Respondent permitted solicitation and distribution for many other purposes on company premises during worktime, with the apparent knowledge and occasional participation of supervisors, hi these circumstances, to selectively apply such a restriction on the distribution of union materials violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Blue- bonnet Express, supra. On 12 July about 10 a.m., employee Debbie Leroy en- countered Dan Jakel. She was wearing a union button. Jakel asked if he could talk to her and then said, "I know you are for the Union, but why are you for this Union stuff." Leroy responded that she believed they needed it. Jakel asked why and she said she really did not want to discuss it with him, whereupon Jakel said that he was just trying to get to the root of the problem as to why this union stuff had begun. Despite the fact that Leroy's personal prounion sentiments were obvious, such general interrogation concerning the beginnings and development of the union organizational effort consti- tutes unlawful interrogation and interference with em- ployee rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. On 23 July, Robert Jakel came to O'Bryan in the qual- ity control lab and asked if he had read the artiCle "Norma Rae" in the newspaper. This was an apparent reference to a prounion letter to the editor that had ap- peared in a local newspaper. O'Bryan said he had not and Jakel said, "Well, I thought maybe you were one of them that helped write it." In view of the fact that O'Bryan was an open union adhereni, I cannot conclude that simply asking O'Bryan if he had read the article and opining that O'Bryan may have helped with it constitutes coercion within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1). On 27 June, Robert Jakel approached employee Jo Ann Thompson at her machine. He told her that he had heard that she had been spreading rumors to the effect that stockroom and shipping employees had been given raises to keep them from voting for the Union. Thomp- son said she had not spread any rumors but had just re- peated what she had heard. Jakel said that this was not true and Thompson said "Whatever." Jakel then told her that before he would allow a union at the Company, "I will shut it down and there will be no more Jakel Motors." Contrary to the General Counsel, I cannot con- clude that Jake's remarks amount to creating an impres- sion of surveillance of employee activity, since spreading rumors of company raises cannot fairly be defined as , union activity. Of course, threatening to close the plant if it became organized is coercive and a violation of Sec- tion 8(a)(1) of the Act, and I so find. On 15 August, the day of the representation case hear- ing, Brian Jakel approached Thompson and asked her where her coworker, Deborah Graham, was. Thompson told him that she was in court in a hearing, and Jakel said that he did not want to hear it. Jakel then offered his Opinion of unions saying, "'Well, I think the union representatives and people around here that wear union buttons are nothing but a bunch of pimps and whores' and he said 'They are out to take your money' and he said that—just a minute he said they was out to take our money and that people that would be affected by it would be the people in there that didn't want a union." He also told her, "I don't have to worry about that, be- cause my brothers will take care of it for me. They will shut the place down before they will allow it to go union." In examining these remarks, I cannot conclude that any questioning by Jakel nor expressing his decidely derogatory opinion about union representatives and sup- porters was unlawful. This may be denigrating, but it is not unlawful. However, in stating that his brothers would close the plant before allowing it to be unionized, constitutes an unlawful threat and interference with the employee rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. On 20 September, 8 Bob Petermeyer, a supervisor, ap- proached Thompson and Graham at their work stations. He asked them what it would take to get them to back off from the Union. Both suggested substantial pay raises. Petermeyer asked if the other employees would go along with that, and Graham said she did not know, he would have to ask them. Later in the day, Petermeyer returned and told them that if the employees continued to work for the Union, they would shut down the High- land plant, and make Palestine the main plant and the Highland employees would be out of a job. 8 Peter- meyer's interrogation was in my opinion coercive be- cause of the implication that Respondent might offer wage increases to head off the organizational effort. Such interference with the free choice contemplated by the Act is coercive and, clearly, Petermeyer's other statements to the effect that the plant would close and jobs be lost are threats that violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. On 5 September, Deborah Leroy and Vicki Wilken were distributing union leaflets at the rear parking lot of the Highland plant. While so engaged, they were ap- proached by Petermeyer 'who told them that they were not permitted to distribute leaflets on company property and that it was a violation of state law to do so. When they maintained that they had a right to distribute the leaflets, Petermeyer told them, "They will terminate you," and went into the plant. Leroy and Wilken then went to the front of the plant to consult with a union representative who told them that they had a right to pass out leaflets, whereupon they returned to the rear of the plant and resumed distributing leaflets. Thereafter, Although the complaint sets the date of this allegation as 20 August, the record discloses that 20 September is the correct date. Petermeyer testified to one conversation with Thompson and Graham on about 10 October in which he asked them what they wanted a union to do for them and they mentioned job security and wages. He also generally denied any discussion about employees being discharged over union activity. However, most of the testimony elicited from the General Counsel's witnesses, i.e , Jo Ann Thompson, Deborah Graham, Deborah Leroy, and Vicki Wilken is unrebutted and Petermeyer's genet, al denials are insufficient to overcome that 4stimony. Accordingly, whenever conflicts occur, I credit the accounts 81- the General Counsel's witnesses. 736 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Art Kuhlman and Bob Petermeyer came out of the plant and spoke to Leroy, Wilken, and also Lea Ann Wiggin- ton who had joined them. Kuhlman told them that they had no right to distribute leaflets because they were on company, not union, property and that if they did not stop they would pay the consequences. In light of the fact that solicitations and distributions for various and sundry commercial and charitable organizations had long been permitted at the plant on company property and even in work areas, and, further, because supervisors were also aware and participated in these activities, Re- spondent was not then privileged to prevent solicitation for union organizational purposes, even though such so- licitation was being conducted on a company-owned parking lot. Accordingly, because Leroy, Wilken, and Wigginton were employed in lawful union activity, the threats to discharge in retaliation made by Petermeyer and Kuhlman violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. On 26 September, 1° a union meeting had been set for 5 p.m. at the Knights of Columbus Hall in Highland. About 4:55 p.m., as employee Jenny Wiegand arrived at the Knights of Columbus parking lot, the car driven by Patrick Jakel passed her on its way out. Several cars were already in the lot and some employees were in the hall as he drove in. In these circumstances, I cannot con- clude that Jakers presence was either coincidental or in- nocuous; rather, I conclude that Jakel was engaged in an unlawful surveillance of employee union activity in vio- lation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. On 27 September, about 9:30 a.m., Petermeyer ap- proached production employee Debbie Leroy and told her that he wanted to speak to her at the 10 o'clock break. They met on the production floor and were alone since the other employees were on break. Petermeyer told her that he had something to say between the two of them and that if she told anyone he would deny it. Petermeyer then told her that the Union would not get in and that a lot of people would be fired, and that he wanted a say in who stayed and who did not. He asked her if it would bother her to switch sides. Leroy re- sponded that she could not do that because she felt that the employees needed a union and that she was surprised that she had not been fired already. Petermeyer told her that he had told Dan Jakel that she had been misguided. Petermeyer then said that he kept hearing that the em- ployees needed a union, but no one would tell him why. Leroy mentioned security and they discussed the case of an employee with 5 years' seniority who had been dis- charged in 1984. Petermeyer then spoke about the dis- charges of Elizabeth Nye, Cynthia Strowmatt, and The- resa Buzick. He said that he did not agree with the dis- charges of Nye and Strowmatt but that Buzick had "a mouth," but that did not bother him. He also said that Nye was fired because Respondent thought she was "high up" in the Union but that he did not think so. Pe- termeyer told Leroy that even assuming that the Union would get in, that there would be a strike because the Company would not sign a contract and that the Compa- ny could hold out longer than the employees and that 10 The complaint iAlas amended at the hearing to reflect a change in the date of this allegation from 20 to 26 September. the Palestine plant could produce the work normally done at Highland. Petermeyer asked Leroy if she had ever stopped to think what would happen if she had to look for another job and Jakel was called as a reference. Petermeyer told her that although she would not be blacklisted Respondent could tell them something off the record. Many aspects of this conversation are unlawfully coercive, i.e., telling Leroy union supporters would be fired; promising to help Leroy to keep her job if she stopped supporting the Union and supported Respond- ent; telling Leroy that other employees had been fired for union activity; telling Leroy that selecting a union would be fruitless since Respondent would not sign a contract, a strike would result, and the work would be transferred to the Palestine plant; and impliedly threaten- ing that Respondent might give Leroy a bad reference if she continued to support the Union. On 2 October, Thompson and Graham were working together and they were approached by Petermeyer who told them that they had better hope that the Union got in because if it did not, some of them would be going. This threat to discharge in event Respondent became unionized is clearly interference with the organizational rights of employees set out in Section 7 of the Act. On 3 October, the day before the representation elec- tion, Daniel Jakel called leadman employee Clyde Hentz into his office. No one else was present. Jakel told Hentz that he had been asked how Hentz would vote in the election and that he needed to know. When Hentz did not reply, Jakel observed that his failure to respond told him that Hentz was not supporting the Company. Jakel again told Hentz that he needed to know how Hentz would vote and told him that if he did not vote for the Company he would be replaced. Hentz said that he would have to discuss the matter with his family and let Jakel know in the morning what he had decided. Hentz left and returned to his department where the phone was ringing. It was Jakel who said that he would appreciate it if Hentz did not speak to anyone about their conversa- tion, and Hentz agreed. About 5 minutes later they met again and Jakel told Hentz that he could get into in a lot of trouble over the conversation, but observed that it was Hentz' word against his and that he would deny every word of it. Dan Jakel testified, but did not dispute Hentz' testimony concerning this incident. This interro- gation about Hentz' vote and the threat of replacement for not supporting the Company are clearly interference with Section 7 rights of the employees to organize and constitute 8(a)(1) violations. On 4 October, election day, about 9 a.m., Hentz wore a union button to the plant for the first time. While he was working, Daniel Jakel approached him and said, "What's this Union button stuff." Hentz replied that he did not like to be threatened about his job. On Monday, 7 October, Hentz was transferred from his leadman job to a production job. While so engaged, about 1:30 p.m., Robert Jakel approached him and asked how things were going. He answered "All right" and Robert Jakel said, "I hope you understand that I can't have somebody that is in a management position not for the Company." None of Hentz' testimony is disputed and Robert Jakel did not JAKEL MOTORS 737 testify at the hearing. Accordingly, I credit Hentz' ver- sion of all his conversations with either Daniel Jakel or Robert Jakel. Clearly, telling Hentz that he had been transferred for having supported the Union is coercive within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, and I so find. About 14 October, Respondent established a new set of company rules and regulations that were posted on - various billboards at the plant. Among them was a no- solicitation rule providing: VI. The following acts are prohibited on Company property. . . W. Unauthorized solicitation of any kind or the distribution of handbills or other printed matter without prior approval. Although certain types of no-solicitation rules are valid, rules that are so broad as to restrict any solicita- tion or distribution whatever without prior approval, as in the instant case, are not lawful and constitute interfer- ence with employee organizational rights provided in Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Our Way, Inc., 268 NLRB 394 (1983).11 3. The 8(a)(3) allegations (a) Transfers and discharges of Theresa Buzick, Cynthia Strowmag and Claralea Beckering The organizational effort at Respondent's Highland plant began when Buzick contacted UAW organizer Polly Connelly and a meeting was set for Wednesday, 12 June, at 5::30 p.m. at the UAW's office in Granite City. Because it appeared that the union hall would be too small for the number of employees expected to attend, the meeting place was changed to a recreational area inside Silver Lake Park on the outskirts of Highland. Buzick, Strowmatt, and Beckering attended and signed authorization cards at that meeting. As noted above, Pro- duction Manager Dan Jakel and Personnel Manager Richard Rittenhouse engaged in an unlawful surveillance of the employees attending this meeting. A second meeting of employees was scheduled for the evening of Monday, 17 June, with Union Representatives John Truffa and Jerry Cichon. On this same day, about 4:40 p.m., Robert Jakel, company president as noted above, delivered an unlawfully coercive antiunion speech to the employees. Just before this meeting, Production Manager Daniel Jakel asked Strowmatt and Beckering to report to his office after the speech." Buzick had left 11 The General Counsel has alleged in addition to those numerous 8(a)(I) findings specifically made herein, several other allegations of 8(a)(1) dealing with conversations between Daniel Jakel, Robert Jakel, and Richard Rittenhouse and certain employees. Because treatment of those matters would be essentially cumulative and would not affect the terms of the remedy or the order recommended, they are not treated here. 12 Employees To Ann Pryor and Sabra Rench, whose discharges are discussed below, were also called in at that time. early this day for a doctor's visit. Strowmatt and Becker- ing spoke individually to Rittenhouse and Daniel Jakel. Jakel told them both that they were being transferred to the Respondent's Palestine facility and were to report there to work the following morning. The Palestine plant is located some 150 miles from the Highland plant. When Buzick came to work the following day, 18 June, she was told that she was also being transferred to Palestine and was to report there the following day, 19 June. As Buzick left Daniel Jake's office, she gave him the union pamphlet captioned "Know Your Rights." Although they had been advised that they were being transferred to Palestine to do production work, it ap- pears that when they arrived there was no production work being done at Palestine. In fact, the plant was closed and had been closed for about a month, although due to improved business Respondent did have plans to reopen the Palestine plant. Apart from Buzick, Strow- matt, and Beckering, there were no production employ- ees at the Palestine plant. The only persons there, in con- templation of the reopening, were Plant Manager Dick Gullett, a supervisor named Steve Bailey, and a mainte- nance employee Brian Turner. With no production work to do, they were assigned janitorial-type cleanup work. When they arrived and for the first few days at Pales- tine, the transferees took pictures of themselves at the Palestine plant for the purpose of both showing that they were reporting there, and to show that although they were sent to Palestine to do production work, the plant was closed and no production work was being done. On 19 June, the day Buzick arrived, she told Turner, in Gullett's presence, that they were organizing the Highland plant and that they were going to organize Pal- estine. In the evening of the same day they met with a laid-off Palestine employee named Janet Franklin, who had been active in an earlier effort to Palestine plant and, on 20 July, the three transferees met at Franklin's home where they taped their conversation with Franklin about the Union and conditions at the Palestine plant with a view toward using it to inform Highland employees of those matters. The tape was played at a union meeting of Highland employees on the night of 21 June. On Tuesday of the following week, 25 June, about 2 p.m. Gullett called each of the three transferees into his office and advised them that they were being discharged. In each case he read from a piece of paper telling each that she was being discharged for taping supervisors' conversations and taking pictures. The record, however, makes it clear that no supervisory conversations were taped, the only tape being the tape made at Franklin's house and later played to the Highland employees. As for the picture taking, it does not appear that any compa- ny rule prohibited this activity and it had occurred in the past without disciplinary action being imposed. With respect to the transfers, I note that these trans- fers were made precipitously, without notice to any of the transferees, notification to them being made shortly after Respondent learned of the Union's organizational effort and just after an unlawfully coercive speech by Robert Jakel. Further, the transfers were suspect because these were production line employees and there was no 738 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD production work being done at Palestine. Moreover, no real business justification for the transfer was ever made by Respondent. Indeed, Daniel Jakel did not testify about either the transfers or the discharges at the hear- ing. In these circumstances, I am satisfied that the trans- fers of Buzick, Strowmatt, and Beckering were accom- plished to remove them from the organizing effort being conducted at the Highland plant in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. With respect to the discharges, which occurred about 1 week after the transfers, it appears that Respondent of- fered picture taking and the making of tapes of supervi- sors' conversations as the reason for the discharges. The testimony adduced no evidence that any of Respondent's supervisors' conversations were taped. 13 As to the pic- ture taking, it was not a prohibited or uncommon activi- ty, and none of the three were warned or advised against it. In view of the unlawful motivation for the original transfers, and in a context of the other flagrant employer unfair labor practices as found herein, I am satisfied that the discharges of Buzick, Strowmatt, and Beckering were discriminatory in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. (b) Discharge of Jo Ann Pryor Pryor was employed on 12 June 1984 as a production worker. About 3 months later, she became a quality con- trol inspector where she was employed until her dis- charge on 17 June 1985. Pryor did not attend the first union meeting at Silver Lake Park on 12 June because of a daughter's dental ap- pointment; however, she had indicated her support for a union in a conversation with O'Bryan on 10 June. On 13 June, as noted above, she was unlawfully inter- rogated by a production supervisor named William Pep- pers about attending a union meeting and asked whether she was for the Union. At this time Pryor disclosed her support for the Union. Also, on 13 June, Rodney O'Bryan asked Pryor if she would be interested in join- ing the union organizing committee. Pryor said she would and O'Bryan solicited her to talk to some winding department employees about joining the organizing com- mittee since her work as quality control inspector took her to that department. Later the same day, she asked winding department employees Jenny Wiegand and Sharon Trane about their interest in joining a union or- ganizing committee. Wiegand responded positively and Trane said she would have to think about it. On the following day, 14 June, union activist-employ- ee Lea Ann Wigginton asked Pryor to get a list of names in the winding department for use in organizing. To this end, Pryor, with Wiegand and leadman Clyde Hentz, went and looked at efficiency reports for the winding de- partment, containing the names of all winding depart- ment employees. While so engaged, Production Manager Daniel Jakel came by and instructed Hentz not to let Pryor look at the efficiency reports since they were for the use of production employees rather than Pryor, a quality control inspector. It appears that in the past any Gullett did not testify at the hearing employee, including Pryor herself, had looked at these efficiency reports without interference by management. On the next workday, Monday, 17 June, Daniel Jakel responded to the organizational campaign by passing out antiunion buttons and Robert Jakel delivered a coercive antiunion speech. It was on this day that Pryor was called to Dan Jakel's office. Human Resources Adminis- trator Richard Rittenhouse was also present. Jakel told Pryor that in the previous few weeks she had demon- strated a "poor attitude" about her work and that she was being discharged. Pryor said that it was his decision; that she would see her "lawyer," referring to union rep- resentative John Truffa, and told Daniel Jakel that she knew her discharge had something to do with union or- ganizing. Daniel Jakel did not respond and Pryor left. As to the matter of Pryor's work record, she had been eval- uated twice. Those evaluations disclose a satisfactory work performance. Pryor's job as a quality control inspector took her to various production departments where she inspected the various motor components for defects in workmanship. These duties occasionally produced disagreements with foremen within those production departments. Respond- ent cites disagreements with production foremen Robert Petermeyer and David Kampwerth. These disputes were job related, normally having to do with the quality of the work, and disagreement over whether it should be rejected. It appears that during their discussions, Pryor would sometimes become agitated and somewhat emo- tional, both Petermeyer and Kempwerth complained to Quality Control Manager William Sunderland. In evaluating the possible motives for Pryor's dis- charge, however, I am persuaded that it was done in re- sponse to her union activity. First, despite not attending the first union meeting, she became active shortly there- after and solicited others on the Union's behalf, and Re- spondent was aware of her union sentiments because she had, prior to her discharge, on being questioned, dis- closed them to :foreman Peppers. Respondent contends that "attitude" was the reason for her discharge, mainly in her relationships with production supervisors. Howev- er, in this regard, I note first that the nature of her job was confrontational. She was evaluating and sometimes rejecting the work of these departments, and the tension and disputes involved in such relationships is normal. Al- though it appears that Pryor at times overreacted and used abusive or vulgar language, her appraisal suggests that she was otherwise a good employee, and I cannot conclude that these were the reasons she was discharged. The facts disclose that without warning she was precipi- tously discharged, during an organizing effort shot through with illegal Respondent misconduct; immediate- ly after a coercive antiunion speech; and just prior to the unlawful transfer of three other employees. In these cir- cumstances, I conclude that it was not Pryor's lack of di- plomacy, verity, or bad attitude that caused her employ- ment to be terminated, but rather her prounion senti- ments and activities. JAKEL MOTORS 739 (c) Sabra Rench Rench was employed as a production employee on 19 March 1984. Although her work on the bruning line was satisfactory, it appears that given the Respondent's stand- ard of 100-percent efficiency, Rench's production statis- tics at various times fell below the 100-percent standard. Beginning with the week ending 6 April 1985 until her discharge 17 June 1985, Respondent's efficiency statistics disclose week ending 4/6-90.84 percent, 4/13-86.1, 4/20-88.75, 4/27-71.55, 5/4-74.27, 5/11-75.95, 5/18- 74.81, 5/25-73.34, 6/1-90, 6/8-91.27, and 6/15-108.24. For approximately 9 hours during the week ending 22 June 1985, Rench's efficiency was 97.74. This poor pro- ductivity prompted Daniel Jakel to call Rench to his office about 31 May and explain to her that they wanted to keep her, but that it would be necessary for her to im- prove to keep her job. Rench's testimony, which I credit in this respect, was that Jakel told her that she was being given a 3-month probationary period to get her produc- tion up to 100-percent standard. Thereafter came the first employee union organization- al meeting at Silver Lake Park on 12 June and Rench at- tended this meeting. As noted above, Daniel Jakel and Rittenhouse engaged in an unlawful surveillance of this meeting and Rench was clearly observable to them during that surveillance and was also identifiable since her automobile make and license plate number were on file with Respondent. On 17 June, as noted above, Robert Jakel delivered an unlawfully coercive speech to employees; Strowmatt and Beckering were unlawfully and discriminatorily trans- ferred to the Palestine facility; and Pryor was unlawfully discharged. In the 17 June discharge conversation be- tween Rench, Jakel, and Rittenhouse, Rench was told by Jakel that because her efficiency was down for some time she was going to be terminated. Rench testified that when she tried to point out to Jakel that her efficiencies had improved, he ignored her and wished her good luck. Respondent contends that Rench was discharged be- cause of an employment history of low efficiency while the General Counsel alleges that she was discharged be- cause of her union activity. Respondent's contention, on its face, would appear supportable; however, a review of the proffered evidence convinces me that Rench was fired because of her union sentiments. Rench's attend- ance at the 12 June organizational meeting under Re- spondent's surveillance, together with her precipitous discharge shortly thereafter, suggests that rather than allow the 3 months to improve, she was being dis- charged after just a couple of weeks, and most impor- tantly, at a time when her week ending efficiencies had improved to over 100 percent. Jakel testified that those efficiencies were not available to him at the time of Rench's discharge. However, other information was available to determine her performance for the week ending 15 June, and Jakel made no effort to learn them. It seemed strange to allow Reach time to improve her performance and then to discharge her immediately after she had done so, without knowing or attempting to dis- cover what her efficiencies had been for the week pre- ceding her discharge. Other factors suggest that Rench's discharge was unlawfully motivated. The timing of the discharge was especially suspect, occurring as it did im- mediately after Robert Jakel's unlawful speech on the same day and in context with the unlawful discharge and transfers 'noted above, all in the context of an antiunion campaign shot through with illegality. In summary, I conclude that Rench's discharge was motivated by an- tiunion considerations in violation of the Act. (d) Failure to recall Vivian Cox, Janet Franklin, and Diana Hauger As the need for production increased, Respondent -found it expedient to reopen the Palestine plant, which it had closed on 24 May 1985. To this end, Art Kuhlman, -vice president for operations, arranged to interview some 20 former employees of the Palestine plant, including Vivian Cox, Janet Franklin, and Diana Hauger. The interviews took place on 21 June 1985 in the plant man- ager's office at the Palestine plant. Plant Manager Dick Gullett and Supervisor Steve Bailey were present, but Kuhlman did most of the talking. Most of what he said had to do with union organizational efforts in Highland. The unlawful portions of Kuhlman's remarks and the re- sponses of Cox, Franklin, and Hauger are set out above and will not be repeated here. I have concluded that Kuhlman's remarks during these interviews with Cox, Franklin, and Hanger constituted unlawful threats and interrogation. It is undisputed that Cox, Franklin, and Hauger had been among those employees retained until the closing of the Palestine plant. Cox and Hanger worked until the day the plant closed and Franklin until a week before it closed. All three had production levels over 100 percent, had no disciplinary records or warnings, and were suffi- ciently versatile to be retained in various jobs as the Pal- estine operation wound down. The written layoff notices of all three specifically noted that they were recom- mended for reemployment. After the 21 June interviews, Respondent began the rehiring process at Palestine. On 21 June, Cox, Franklin, and Hanger were apprised by letter from Gullett: I would you like to thank you for coming on June 21, 1985 for the recall interview with Mr. Kuhlman. You were not selected for recall at this time, however we shall keep you in mind. If an opportu- nity arises where we can use your expertise, you will be notified. As the employment process progressed, Respondent was employing some 56 employees (46 production workers) by the end of August, even adding a night shift in August that ran until February 1986. During July and August Respondent hired about 18 new employees, i.e., not previously employed at Palestine. In addition, several former employees with disciplinary records who had been identified as not recommended for recall were re- called. Others who had received disciplinary warnings were recalled. Among the 20 employees interviewed by Kuhlman on 21 June, only one former employee, apart from Cox, Franklin, and Hanger, who wanted to return to work, was rejected. However, it is undisputed that 740 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD none of them was ever contacted about recall and were never recalled. Respondent does not dispute the competence of these individuals, but rather takes the position that they were rehired because of the negative impressions made on Kuhlman during the interviews. Thus, as to Cox, Kuhl- man testified "Vivian during the—during the short inter- view that I had was extremely nervous in her actions and she was highly—she appeared to be highly upset and I just felt that the state that she appeared in there I didn't feel she would make a good, safe employee." As to Franklin, Kuhlman testified that when she mentioned that her husband was a construction worker looking for work in Indiana, "I felt the fact that her husband was a construction worker and he was off in Indiana looking for work that in all probability she was transient and would be—would leave us to follow her husband." Kuhlman testified that Hauger's appearance caused him to reject her. Thus he testified, "Diane when she came in as far as I am . concerned did not make an appearance that would want me to have her in Jakel's employ. She was—she was a—I would guess somewhere between 40 and 50 years old. She was heavily—her hair was heavily dyed, she was heavily painted with makeup, and she wore very, very tight fitting white slacks, and a black tee shirt of sorts that had a phosphorous emblem of sorts over her breast and she just—she just didn't look like an employee that I felt Jakel deserved." Despite Respondent's contention, I am satisfied that Respondent's failure to recall Cox, Franklin, and Hauger was because they disclosed what appeared to Kuhlman to be prounion sentiments during their employment inter- views and that the rationale offered by Kuhlman was simply a pretext to disguise Respondent's unlawful moti- vation. Apart from the direct evidence disclosed by the interviews themselves and the 8(a)(1) findings based thereon, it defies credulity to accept Respondent's expla- nations in circumstances where three obviously well- qualified, experienced, former employees were denied re- employment, while at the same time Respondent was re- calling virtually all other former employees who wanted work, including less desirable ones and even hiring new employees. Accordingly, I conclude that the failure to rehire Cox, Franklin, and Hauger was motivated by an- tiunion considerations in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. (e) Discharges of Elizabeth Nye and Deborah Westbrook Nye and Westbrook were production employees em- ployed by Respondent at the Highland facility until they were discharged on 2 July 1986. Nye and Westbrook were both active in their support for the Union. Nye at- tended the first union meeting at Silver Lake on 12 June. During the unlawful automobile surveillance by Jakel and Rittenhouse, she was standing only 35 feet away as they passed. Nye attended all the union meetings on 2, 17, and 21 June, and beginning 18 June wore a union button on a daily basis. Nye signed a union authorization card at the 12 June meeting and thereafter distributed au- thorization cards to several employees. Nye also distrib- uted union leaflets to employees on two occasions and signed an anticompany letter that appeared in the High- land News Leader on 29 June 1985. Westbrook, although she missed the Silver Lake meet- ing, attended union meetings on 17 June, where she signed an authorization card, and 21 June. Westbrook also solicited other employees to sign authorization cards and gave one employee an authorization card. Like Nye, she wore a union button daily from 18 June until she was discharged. Both Nye and Westbrook were competent employees, operating consistently at levels over 100 percent of the production standard. Nye had been given a certificate designating her as the "Quality Employee of the Month" in January 1985. Neither Nye nor Westbrook had ever previously been discharged or disciplined nor did they have any records of written or oral warnings with the exception of Nye who testified that she she did have an attendance and an oral warning in 1982 or 1983. On 2 July, Nye and Westbrook were called separately to the conference room at the Highland facility Each met with Human Resources Manager Bill Ernest and Personnel Manager Richard Rittenhouse, and each were told they were being discharged because they had been interfering with production by harassing and intimidating employees about the Union, although no specifics of such harassment or intimidation were provided. The record discloses no evidence that either Nye or West- brook had previously been warned about the alleged har- assment nor was there any evidence of such harassment of employees adduced. In fact, neither Ernest nor Ritten- house testified concerning these discharges. Based on the uncontested, probative evidence, it is clear to me that Nye and Westbrook were not discharged for harassing or intimidating employees. Indeed, evidence to support this position is totally lacking, but rather they were dis- charged because they were engaged in the legally pro- tected pursuit of supporting the Union's organizing effort. Accordingly, I conclude that the discharges of Nye and Westbrook violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. (f) Rodney O'Bryan O'Bryan was employed as a quality control inspector from 25 October 1984 until he was discharged 23 July 1985. O'Bryan attended the first union meeting at Silver Lake Park on 12 June and was among the most active union adherents after that. He wore a union button or union hat daily and solicited other employees to join the Union, distributed authorization cards to some, which were signed and returned to him O'Bryan's union efforts did not go unnoticed. Thus, as noted above in my 8(a)(1) findings, I conclude that Respondent on 27 June, by Quality Control Manager Sunderland, impliedly warned O'Bryan to be careful because the Respondent was look- ing for a reason to fire him Again, on 1 July, Sunder- land coercively warned O'Bryan that he should not get into "something" so deep that he could not get out. On 23 July at the end of the day, O'Bryan was summoned to the personnel office where he met with Sunderland and Ernest. Reading from a piece of paper, Ernest advised O'Bryan that he was being discharged for failing to com- plete his job. JAKEL MOTORS 741 Respondent contends that O'Bryan was discharged be- cause of a sudden deterioration in the quantity and qual- ity of his work, rather than because of his activity on behalf of the Union. I do not agree. It is undisputed that O'Bryan had been a competent employee. He had been described by Sunderland as his best employee. In an evaluation dated 25 April, prepared by Quality Control Coordinator Hazel Biggs, and re- viewed by Sunderland, O'Bryan is rated excellent or good in every category. Under "Remarks," it reads: "Rodney works very well with people. And he has a good attitude about his job and encourages quality work. Keeps his area caught up and in good shape." Beginning 27 June, a series of eight memos signed by Sunderland found their way into O'Bryan's personnel file. Prior thereto, O'Bryan had received no written warnings or reprimands of any kind. It is also undisputed that O'Bryan was never made aware of the existence of these memos prior to his discharge. Several of these memos cite O'Bryan's failure to produce what Sunder- land testified was a production quota of 18 inspections during an 8-hour day and 20 inspections during a 9-1/2- hour day. Such assessments are suspect, however, be- cause there are many factors that affect the number of inspections performed that are not readily ascertainable on the face of the production records. For example, a quality control inspector may not work a full day, or spend a part of the day doing other work; some types of inspections are more time-consuming than others; and at times there is a lack of material to be inspected. Finally, it appears that while the other quality control employees failed to produce up to Sunderland's standard, only O'Bryan was ever issued a written reprimand, sus- pended, or discharged on that account. In summary, a careful review of the probative testimony persuades me that the flurry of memos appearing in O'Bryan's file after the union organizational effort had begun and O'Bryan had become one of the activists, was not prompted by any precipitous decline in the quantity or quality of O'Bryan's work, but rather to fabricate documentary jus- tification to support his discharge. Accordingly, I con- clude that O'Bryan was discharged in violation of Sec- tion 8(a)(3) of the Act.' 4 (g) Transfer of Clyde Hentz Hentz was first employed by Respondent in June 1983 as a material handler. In November 1984 he was made a leadman in the winding department where he worked until 7 October 1985 when he was transferred to the coil prep department, where he was assigned to reworking or repairing motors, and doing other production work. The facts are not in dispute. Hentz attended a union meeting on 24 September 1985 and signed a union card at that time. On 3 October, he was called into the office of Dan Jakel where Jakel unlawfully interrogated him by demanding to know how Hentz intended to vote and " Although it appears that some of the memos reflect that O'Bryan was responsible in part for rejecting work due to improperly Set calibra- tors and a misread blueprint, these were essentially inconsequential and certainly no legitimate basis for discharge in a context of the entire record. threatening him with replacement if he did not vote for the Company. In another conversation shortly thereafter, Daniel Jakel asked Hentz not to tell anyone about their conversation and that Jakel could get into a /at of trou- ble, also adding that it was his word against Hentz' and that he would deny every word of it. On 4 October, election day, Hentz wore a union button to work and Daniel Jakel asked him "What is this Union button stuff." Hentz replied that he just did not like to be threatened about his job. A fuller account of these conversations is set out above wherein I conclude that Hentz was unlawfully interrogated and threatened. It is equally clear, based on the undisputed testimony in the record, that Hentz' transfer to production work from the leadman position on 7 October was discriminatorily motivated because it was done to retaliate against Hentz for his failure to support Respondent.15 Respondent's contention that the leadman job and the production work to which he was transferred were simi- larly labor intensive is not sufficient to nullify the dis- criminatory nature of the transfer which is supported by the record. The fact that Hentz' leadman designation was not changed and that his pay was not reduced does not compel a different result Accordingly, I conclude that Hentz' transfer violates Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. 4. Challenged ballots At the election the ballots of 18 employees were chal- lenged. Of those 18 employees, I have concluded above that 8 were discharged in violation of the Act prior to the election. Their ballots should be opened and counted. Mike Wessel's challenged ballot was resolved by stipula- tion of the parties that this challenge be sustained. There remains for consideration therefore the remaining nine challenged ballots. (a) Loren Holzinger Holzinger was employed by Respondent in 1952. Hol- zinger's employee history form shows that from 1974 through December 1982, Holzinger was classified as a tool-and-die worker. Like most production employees, he punched a timecard and was hourly paid progressing to a rate of $7 per hour in 1981. Beginning 2 January 1983, Holzinger was reclassified to assistant supervisor to Toolroom Supervisor Don Oestringer. At that time he became a salaried employee, and no longer punched a timeclock. At the time of the election on 4 October, Hol- zinger was salaried at $18,500 a year. A personnel file memo dated 27 December 1982 from Vice President Art Kuhlman states that Holzinger was to "be in charge if Don Oestringer was on vacation or off on extended ill- ness," and Holzinger did substitute for Oestringer at those times. The record discloses that Holzinger was given written evaluations as a manager on "management appraisal" forms in categories that included "supervi- sion" and "training." It also appears that in Oestringer's absence, Holzinger was responsible for the training of apprentices. As to work done for other companies, he in- 15 As noted above, there is no dispute about the facts because Daniel Jakel did not testify concerning this matter at the hearing. 742 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD spected the work and returned defective work to em- ployees for repair. Despite the fact that Holzinger spends a substantial portion of his workday doing production work, the record herein discloses that he exercises suffi- cient indicia of supervisor authority, particularly in Oes- tringer's absence, to conclude that Holzinger is a super- visor within the meaning of the Act and that his ballot should not be counted. (b) Brian Petermeyer Petermeyer, nephew of Respondent's supervisor Robert Petermeyer, was hired by Respondent in July 1985 as a summer employee in a probationary status. At the time of his employment, Petermeyer spoke to Rich- ard Rittenhouse, personnel manager, advising him that he would be returning to school full time in the fall but if it were possible, he would like to work nights while attending school. There was no night shift in operation at that time nor was there a night shift in operation at the time Petermeyer left on 26 August to return to school. Prior to his leaving, no commitment was made to reemploy Petermeyer on any contemplated night shift, only "to see if he [Rittenhouse] could get me on." After departure, a night shift was begun and Petermeyer was hired on 30 September to work on it. The payroll cutoff date for eligibility to vote was 30 August. Thus, Peter- meyer was a student employed only for the summer with no understanding or reasonable expectancy of continuing employment with Respondent and he was not employed on the night shift until after the payroll eligibility date had passed. Accordingly, I conclude that he was not eli- gible to vote and that the challenge to his ballot should be sustained. (c) Marie Rehg Rehg was hired in 1981 as a sales secretary at $5 per hour. She became salaried at $12,500 per year in August of 1983 and at the time of the election on 4 October was earning $14,850 per year. On 17 August 1985, her job title was changed to "Order Entry Clerk" although the nature of the work she performed did not change. It ap- pears that Rehg was responsible for the paperwork in- volved in the receipt processing and delivery of custom- er orders. In addition, Rehg had worked as secretary to Robert Jakel when he was regional sales manager and apparently retained duties as Richard Jakel's secretary even after her title was changed to "Order Entry Clerk," inasmuch as there appears on the "Change of Status" form a notation by Eastern Regional Sales Manager Gordon Jakel that "In addition to Marie's duties as order entry clerk she will continue with Bob Jake's work re- quiring secretarial duties." Rehg does all the typing for Robert Jakel that pertains to sales and sometimes an- swers the telephones and takes messages for him. The record also discloses that as secretary to Robert Jakel, Rehg was involved in the Respondent's antiunion cam- paign in taking dictation from Respondent's labor attor- ney in connection with the instant case, and in preparing and typing antiunion propaganda, and assembling and copying leaflets generated by the Respondent to propa- gandize its antiunion position. Thus Rehg was active in a confidential capacity to both the president of the Company and the Company's labor attorney in Respondent's vigorous antiunion cam- paign. Whatever other duties she may have had, her par- ticipation at the highest level in these labor relations ac- tivities of Respondent constitute her a confidential em- ployee and, as such, not eligible to vote, and the chal- lenge to her ballot should be sustained. (d) Deborah Mama mama was hired 20 August 1985 as a data entry clerk. Her work included obtaining various daily production reports from the production floor reflecting work done the day before. These are put into a computer which makes up a daily operating report that is distributed to the various production departments. She also makes up process sheets and manufacturing orders. mama does visit some production areas although it does not appear that she performs any production work in the course of gathering and distributing information. mama's desk and computer terminal are located in the main office, apart from the production office, where she is supervised by John Dickerson, manager of material control. mama's hours, overtime, salary structure, break schedule and lunch breaks are all different from those of production employees. Clearly mama's work is essential- ly office clerical in nature and unlike the work per- formed by production employees. Despite the fact that her clerical work involves production statistics and that she visits production areas in collecting and distributing information, she shares little, if any, community of inter- est with production employees. Accordingly, I conclude that mama is an office clerical employee and that the challenge to her ballot should be sustained. (e) Al Grapperhaus, Frances Wilke, and Art Mettler These individuals are employed in both custodial and security functions on a night shift. They work in rota- tion, each working 3 nights followed by 6 days off. Re- spondent's "Position Description" lists the title as "Night Custodian." The "Position Scope" reads "Cleans and maintains all plant facilities and grounds and notifies company management and community police and/or fire department of any instance of fire, theft, vandalism, and illegal entry." Following that, listed under "Position Duties and Responsibilities" there are custodial and secu- rity duties. The security duties listed are: 1.Checks all doors and windows twice during a shift and assures that they are locked and secure. 2. Requires anyone entering the plant to sign the log indicating name, reason, time in and time out. 3.Turns off all lights except as needed. Turns off any machines that have been left on in error and notes in log book the machine and its location. 4. Checks the mill building and offices at the be- ginning and midway during a shift. 5. Records any unusual events that occur on the premises in the log book. JAKEL MOTORS 743 6. Notifies the police or fire department and com- pany management of any emergency requiring their attention. Performs other security duties as needed or as- signed. It is clear that these individuals perform both custodial and security work. The Board has held that in circum- stances where employees perform security work in addi- tion to their maintenance work, they are excluded from the unit as statutory guards under Section 9(b)(3) of the Act which provides the Board shall not "(3) decide that any unit is appropriate for such purposes if it includes, together with any other employees, any individual em- ployed as a guard to enforce against employees and other persons rules to protect property of the employer or to protect the safety of persons on the employer's premises." A. W. Schlesinger Geriatric Center, 267 NLRB 1363 (1983). In the instant case the security functions performed by these individuals are substantial, and fit the statutory def- inition of a guard-employee. This is true despite the fact that they do not wear uniforms, carry guns, or have any special training as guards. Accordingly, the challenges to these ballots should be sustained. (f)Ludwig Ulrich Ulrich was a 75-year old social security recipient at the time Respondent hired him in June 1985. He was hired by Chris Jakel to do a remodeling project, which involved the installation of lighting and building work- stands. He was advised by Chris Jakel when he was hired that his employment would terminate when the projects were completed, and Ulrich was terminated shortly before Thanksgiving Day in 1985. During his employment Ulrich was paid at the rate of $5.25 per hour; however, he did not punch a timeclock, but kept track of his own hours for which he was paid by check from Chris Jakel. Unlike the production employees, he had no paid holidays or vacations, received no health in- surance or profit-sharing benefits. In these circumstances, it is clear that Ulrich was hired as a temporary employee for a limited period for a specific project and he has since been terminated. As a temporary employee, he was not entitled to vote in the election and, accordingly, the challenge to his ballot should be sustained. (g) Carl Brindley Brindley's first period of employment with Respondent was from 1974 to 1978 when he was the production con- trol manager at the Highland plant. He returned to the Company at the Highland plant in September 1984. After a few weeks of reindoctrination, he went to the Palestine plant and, according to his personnel file, became the production manager, a salaried supervisory position at $21,000 a year. When the Palestine plant closed in May 1935, Brindley was told by President Robert Jakel and Vice President Art Kuhlman that he would be employed at Highland as a production supervisor. His file shows the transfer on 28 May 1985 to Highland as assistant pro- duction manager (to Production Manager Dan Jakel) at the same salary. On Brindley's first day at Highland, he suffered a disabling injury to his foot and was off work until July 1985 at which time he returned working half- days on crutches on a special project known as the "rock tumbler project." Throughout this entire period, Brind- ley continued to draw his full salary. On the rock tum- bler project Brindley supervised and trained some 3 to 10 employees and reported to Production Manager Dan Jakel. When the rock tumbler project ended in late Sep- tember, Brindley was instructed by Dan Jakel to follow him around and become acquainted with how he (Jakel) operated and to do special assignments. Brindley as- sumed that he was being groomed for a job in produc- tion supervision. His salary was increased to $21,850 per year on 23 September 1985. One of Brindley's assign- ments was to investigate complaints about the discrimina- tory assignment of two employees, which affected their earnings. After an investigation, Brindley recommended the transfer of those employees to Vice President Kuhl- man, and that recommendation was followed. On 4 November 1985, 13rindley replaced Daniel Jakel in the capacity of acting production manager. On this record, I am satisfied that Brindley was hired in 1984 as a supervisor and is, and has remained a super- visor throughout his entire employment. Accordingly, the challenge to Brindley's ballot should be sustained. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES ON COMMERCE The activities of Respondent as set forth in section III, above, in connection with the Respondent's operations described in section 1, above, have a close and intimate relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burden- ing and obstructing commerce and the free flow of com- merce. V. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirm- ative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Having found that Theresa Buzick, Cynthia Strow- matt, and Claralea Beckering were transferred and subse- quently discharged; Jo Ann Pryor, Sabra Rench, Eliza- beth Nye, Deborah Westbrook, and Rodney O'Bryan discharged; Clyde Hentz transferred; and Vivian Cox, Janet Franklin, and Diana Hauger not recalled; all for reasons that offend the provisions of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, I shall therefore recommend that Respondent make the above discriminatees whole for any loss of pay they may have suffered as a result of the discrimination practiced against them. The backpay and reimbursement provided herein with interest to be computed in the manner described in F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950), and Florida Steel Corp., 231 NLRB 561 (1977).16 16 See generally Isis Plumbing Go, 138 NLRB 716 (1962). 744 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Jakel Motors, Inc., Jakel Manufacturing Company, Inc., and Jakel, Incorporated constitute a single employ- er engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. International Union, United Aerospace and Agricul- tural Workers of America-UAW is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. Patrick Jakel and Brian Jakel are agents of Re- spondent within the meaning of Section 2(13) of the Act. 4. By interfering with the rights guaranteed to employ- ees in Section 7 of the Act, Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices. 5. By engaging in the following unlawful acts, Re- spondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act: transferring and discharging Theresa Buzick, Cynthia Strowmatt, and Claralea Beckering; discharging Jo Ann Pryor, Sabra Rench, Elizabeth Nye, Deborah Westbrook, and Rodney O'Bryan; transferring Clyde Hentz; and failing to recall Vivian Cox, Janet Franklin, and Diana Hauger. On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the following recommend- edi7 ORDER The Respondent, Jakel Motors, Inc., Jakel Manufac- turing Company, Inc., and Jakel, Incorporated, a single employer, Highland and Palestine, Illinois, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall I. Cease and desist from (a) Discharging, transferring, failing to recall or other- wise discriminating against any employee for engaging in union activity. (b) Interrogating employees concerning their union sentiments or activities. (c) Surveilling the union activity of employees. (d) Threatening employees with loss of jobs for sup- porting union representation. (e) Telling employees that union organization would be futile. (0 Threatening to close the plant if the employees voted for union representation. (g) Prohibiting employees from distributing union liter- ature. (h) Telling employees that Respondent would refuse to negotiate with the Union even if they voted for union representation. (i) Threatening employees with less desirable working conditions if they supported union representation. (j) Telling employees that union supporters would be discharged. (k) Promising to assist employees to retain employ- ment if they withdrew their union support. (1) Threatening to transfer work to another location if the employees voted for union representation. 17 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102.46 of the Board's Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur- poses (m) Threatening to give employees unfavorable refer- ences if they supported the Union. (n) Threatening to transfer employees for supporting the Union. (o) Maintaining and enforcing an unlawfully broad no- solicitation/distribution rule. (p) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of their rights under Section 7 of the Act.18 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act. (a) Offer to Theresa Buzick, Cynthia Strowmatt, Clar- alea Beckering, Jo Ann Pryor, Sabra Rench, Elizabeth Nye, Deborah Westbrook, and Rodney O'Bryan immedi- ate and full reinstatement to their jobs or, if those posi- tions no longer exist, to substantially equivalent positions without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges previously enjoyed, and make them whole for any loss of pay they may have suffered in the manner set forth in the remedy section of this decision. (b) Remove from its files any reference to the dis- charges of Theresa Buzick, Cynthia Strowmatt, Claralea Beckering, Jo Ann Pryor, Sabra Rench, Elizabeth Nye, Deborah Westbrook, and Rodney O'Bryan and notify them in writing that this has been done and that evi- dence of these unlawful discharges will not be used as a basis for future personnel action against them. (c) Recall and rehire Vivian Cox, Janet Franklin, and Diana Hauger to employment at the Palestine plant in their former jobs or, if those positions no longer exist, to substantially equivalent positions without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges previously. enjoyed, and make them whole for any loss of pay they may have suffered in the manner set forth in the remedy section of this decision. (d) Restore Clyde Hentz to his former leadman job in the winding department or, if that position no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position without prej- udice to his seniority or other rights and privileges previ- ously enjoyed, and make him whole for any loss of pay he may have suffered in the manner set forth in the remedy section of this decision. (e) Preserve and, on request, make available to the Board or its agents for examination and copying, all pay- roll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records nec- essary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this Order. (f) Post at its facilities in Highland and Palestine, Illi- nois, copies of the attached notice marked "Appen- dix." 19 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the 18 In view of the flagrant and numerous unfair labor practices found, a broad cease-and-desist order is warranted. Hickmott Foods, 242 NLRB 1357 (1979). 19 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Nation- al Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." JAKEL MOTORS 745 Regional Director for Region 14, after being signed by the Respondent's authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are cus- tomarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, de- faced, or covered by any other material. (g) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days from the date of this Order what steps the Re- spondent has taken to comply. IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the challenges to the ballots of Loren Holzinger, Brian Petermeyer, Marie Rehg, Deborah mama, Al Grapperhaus, Frances Wilke, Art Mettler, Ludwig Ulrich, and Carl Brindley be sus- tained and that the challenges to the ballots of Theresa Buzick, Cynthia Strowmatt, Claralea Beckering, Jo Ann Pryor, Sabra Rench, Elizabeth Nye, Deborah West- brook, and Rodney O'Brian be overruled and that the Regional Director be directed to open and count those challenged ballots and issue a revised tally of ballots. In the event that the revised tally of ballots shows that the Union has received a majority of the valid votes count- ed, it is recommended that the Union be certified as the collective-bargaining representative of the unit employ- ees. APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the National Labor Relations Act and has or- dered us to post and abide by this notice. WE WILL NOT discharge, transfer, fail to recall or oth- erwise discriminate against any employee for engaging in union activity. WE WILL NOT interrogate employees concerning their union sentiments or activities. WE WILL NOT surveil the union activity of employees. WE WILL NOT threaten employees with loss of jobs for supporting union representation. WE WILL NOT tell employees that union organization would be futile. WE WILL NOT threaten to close the plant if the em- ployees vote for union representation. Wt. WILL NOT prohibit employees from distributing union literature. WE WILL NOT tell employees that Respondent would refuse to negotiate with the Union even if they voted for union representation. WE WILL NOT threaten employees with less desirable working conditions if they support union representation. WE WILL NOT tell employees that union supporters would be discharged. WE WILL NOT promise to assist employees to retain employment if they withdraw their union support. WE WILL NOT threaten to transfer work to another lo- cation if the employees vote for union representation. WE WILL NOT threaten to give employees unfavorable references if they support the Union. WE WILL NOT threaten to transfer employees for sup- porting the Union. WE WILL NOT maintain and enforce an unlawfully broad no-solicitation/distribution rule. WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, re- strain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. WE WILL offer Theresa Buzick, Cynthia Strowmatt, Claralea Beckering, Jo Ann Pryor, Sabra Rench, Eliza- beth Nye, Deborah Westbrook, and Rodney O'Bryan im- mediate and full reinstatement to their jobs or, if those positions no longer exist, to substantially equivalent posi- tions without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges previously enjoyed, and make them whole for any loss of pay they may have suffered with interest. WE WILL remove from our files any reference to the discharges of Theresa Buzick, Cynthia Strowmatt, Clara- lea Beckering, Jo Ann Pryor, Sabra Rertch, Elizabeth Nye, Deborah Westbrook, and Rodney O'Bryan, and notify them in writing that this has been done and that evidence of these unlawful discharges will not be used as a basis for future personnel action against them. WE WILL recall and rehire Vivian Cox, Janet Franklin, and Diana Hanger to employment at the Palestine plant in their former jobs or, if those positions no longer exist, to substantially equivalent positions without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges previously enjoyed, and make them whole for any loss of pay they may have suffered with interest. WE WILL restore Clyde Elentz to his former leadman job in the winding department or, if that position no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position with- out prejudice to his seniority or other rights and privi- leges previously enjoyed, and make him whole for any loss of pay he may have suffered with interest. JAKEL MOTORS, INC., JAKEL MANUFAC- TURING COMPANY, INC., AND JAKEL, IN- CORPORATED