Destileria Serralles, Inc.

DESTILERIA SERRALLES Destileria Serralles, Inc. and S.I.U. de Puerto Rico, Caribe & Latin-America affiliated with Seafar- ers International Union of North America, AFL-CIO. Case 24-CA-5335 June 13, 1988 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN STEPHENS AND MEMBERS JOHANSEN AND BABSON On March 2, 1987, Administrative Law Judge Arline Pacht issued the attached decision. The Re- spondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and the General Counsel filed an answering brief to the Respondent's exceptions. The National Labor Relations Board has delegat- ed its authority in this proceeding to a three- member panel. The Board has considered the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings,' and conclusions and to adopt the recommended Order. In this case, the Respondent, an admitted succes- sor employer, withdrew recognition from the Union January 22, 1986. To justify that withdraw- al, the Respondent had to show that on that date "the union had in fact lost its majority status . . . or that the refusal to bargain was grounded on a good-faith doubt based on objective factors that the union continued to command majority sup- port." Harley-Davidson Co., 273 NLRB 1531 (1985) (emphasis added; citation omitted). The Respond- ent attempted to prove the second prong of this disjunctive test, i.e., that it had a good-faith doubt based on objective factors that the Union contin- ued to command majority support. It argues, how- ever, based on certain statements that the judge made in her decision that the judge erroneously re- quired it to prove the first prong of the test, i.e., actual loss of majority status, in support of its reli- ance on the second prong of the test. We have closely reviewed the judge's decision, and we are satisfied that, although the judge made at least one i The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge's credibility find- ings The Board's established policy is not to overrule an administrative law judge's credibility resolutions unless the clear preponderance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd 188 F 2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951) We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing the findings We note that the judge found that the Respondent hired all four of the employees who had served as union delegates while employed by the Re- spondent's predecessor Although the Respondent accurately points out in its exceptions that Jorge Gonzalez and Juan Alvarez were the only two employees that it hired who had served as union delegates, we do not find that the judge's misstatement is sufficient to affect the validity of her ultimate conclusions In adopting the judge's decision, we do not rely on her finding, based on Union Delegate Alvarez' testimony at the hearing, that "less than a majority of employees opposed union representation " 51 finding that has no bearing on the issue of the Re- spondent's good-faith doubt (a finding concerning the accuracy of employee Gonzalez' trial testimony concerning what he knew about employee senti- ment regarding the Union, as distinct from what he told the Respondent's agents about such sentiment), the judge nonetheless directly addressed the second prong of the test. She did not, in her analysis, im- properly require the Respondent to prove actual loss of majority in order to establish good-faith doubt. Furthermore, after carefully reviewing the record ourselves, we have also reached the conclu- sion that the Respondent has failed to meet either prong of the test for the lawful withdrawal of rec- ognition. In so concluding, we have taken account of the various bases relied on by the Respondent and discussed by the judge, as well as Attorney Chevere's testimony concerning Union President Hernandez' January 21, 1986 comments to him, and we have also considered the cumulative force of the Respondent's offered reasons for withdrawing recognition. But we have not considered any post- withdrawal-of-recognition events offered by the Respondent. Additionally, while not necessarily agreeing with them, we find that the present case is factually dis- tinguishable from J & J Drainage Products Co., 269 NLRB 1163 (1984), and Sofco, Inc., 268 NLRB 159 (1983), on which the Respondent relies, in which the Board found that the employers had lawfully withdrawn recognition. In this regard, we note that in J & J Drainage the Board cited, as a factor jus- tifying withdrawal of recognition, a statement by one of the union stewards to the employer's gener- al manager that a majority of the employees were not interested in the union. Contrary to the Re- spondent, however, we do not see a close analogy in Union Delegate Gonzalez' remarks to Plant Manager Esteva. Gonzalez and Esteva each testi- fied that there were two occasions on which Gon- zalez conveyed to Esteva certain views regarding the Union-once after a representative of a rival union appeared outside the plant distributing cards and on another occasion after Gonzalez took a tele- phone call at the plant from union representatives, who requested that he come to San Juan to partici- pate in contract negotiations with the Respondent. According to Gonzalez' testimony, he told Esteva on the first occasion that "people were negative to- wards the [rival Union] or the S.I.U. I told him on my own and notified him just as something person- al of mine." Esteva's testimony about this occasion indicates that Gonzalez "commented that he didn't want to get involved in any kind of union." Gonza- lez testified that on the second occasion, following 289 NLRB No. 10 52 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD the phone call from union representatives that he received at the plant, he told Esteva that no em- ployee wanted to travel to San Juan to participate in negotiations with the Union. Esteva character- ized Gonzalez' comments as signifying that Gonza- lez was not interested in going to the negotiating meeting and "he wasn't going to San Juan." Nei- ther Gonzalez nor Esteva testified that Esteva overheard the actual phone conversation. We conclude that Gonzalez' own testimony re- garding the first incident is subject to many inter- pretations and is ambiguous. The testimony could indicate that he told Esteva that his personal opin- ion was that employees were negative to the Union. It could also indicate that he was conveying only his personal opinion to Esteva without so stat- ing that fact. Further, it can be read to indicate that he was conveying a sentiment that applied to a number of employees, or that he was conveying a sentiment that applied to him only.2 Gonzalez' tes- timony about the second incident only shows em- ployee disinterest in attending a negotiating session and nothing more. Moreover, we stress that the above-quoted testimony by Esteva clearly shows that he viewed Gonzalez on both occasions as speaking only of his own sentiments. We therefore conclude that none of these remarks purports to represent whether a significant number of employ- ees wanted to rid themselves of union representa- tion. In Sofco, the Board found that the respondent had a reasonably based doubt of the union's contin- ued majority status based on evidence that 23 of 24 bargaining unit employees made the following kinds of comments to the plant manager: they wanted "to do away with the union, get away from the union, and be on our own"; they indicated "[if] Sofco [bought the predecessor], we could make out better without a union"; and they indicated "they were dissatisfied with the present union and that there was a lot of them that just plain wanted out." During his testimony in this case, the Respondent's plant manager, Esteva, named eight employees who he said had told him that either they were "dissatisfied with the [Union]" or "were not inter- ested in any Union." Sofco Inc., 268 NLRB 159. However, two of the men whom Esteva identified, Rivera and Arce, expressly stated at the hearing that they did not inform Esteva of their union sen- timents. Furthermore, when Esteva was asked if he could recall other employees who made similar 2 Indeed regarding the last possibility , we note that the followup ques- tion and answer to Gonzalez ' testimony was Q. You told him your own personal feelings regarding the unions? A Well, I told him that I did not, in other words, that I was giving him this because I did not want to get involved again or any- more comments to him, he simply replied that he would have to name most of the employees in the plant. On these facts, we find that Esteva's testimony re- garding the unit employees' union sentiments is not as definite and detailed as the evidence of the em- ployees' statements to the plant manager in Sofco. As the judge noted here, Esteva offered no details on his conversations and his comments that em- ployees were "dissatisfied" with the Union or "not interested in any union" are vague. The judge aptly stated that "without a more precise description of what individual employees may have said, it is im- possible to determine from Esteva's comments whether employees actually expressed anything more than disenchantment with the Union's past performance or a disinclination to be active Union members, as distinguished from a current desire to be rid of Union representation," or how many em- ployees made such statements . We further note that in Sofco, the Board also relied on the presence of a number of antiunion signs posted in the plant and the employees' hostility toward the union steward as corroboration of the employees' dissatisfaction with the union. No such indicators are present here. ORDER The National Labor Relations Board adopts the recommended Order of the administrative law judge and orders that the Respondent, Destileria Serralles, Inc., Camuy, Puerto Rico, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Order. Simao J. Avila, Esq., for the General Counsel. Francisco Chevere, Victor M. Comolli, and Radames Tor- ruella, Esgs. (McConnell Valdes Kelley Sifre Griggs & Ruiz-Suria), of San Juan, Puerto Rico, for the Re- spondent. Ginoris Vizcarra De Lopez-Lay, Esq., of Santurce, Puerto Rico, for the Charging Party. DECISION ARLINE PACHT, Administrative Law Judge. Based on an unfair labor practice charge filed by the S.I.U. de Puerto Rico, Caribe & Latin-America (the Union or S.I.U.), on 14 March 1986, a complaint issued on 30 May 1986 alleging that the Respondent, Destileria Serralles, violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act) by refusing to recognize and bar- gain with the Union since on or about 1 November 1985 and continuously thereafter. Alternatively, the complaint alleges that on 8 November 1985 and on various dates thereafter, the Respondent recognized and agreed to bar- gain with the Union but on or about 22 January 1986 withdrew recognition from the Union in bad faith. At the hearing in this case held in Hato Rey, Puerto Rico, on 17, 18, and 19 November 1986, all parties were af- DESTILERIA SERRALLES forded full opportunity to participate. On the entire record,' from my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and with careful consideration of the posttrial briefs submitted by counsel for the General Counsel (the General Counsel) and the Respondent, I make the fol- lowing FINDINGS OF FACT 1. JURISDICTION The complaint alleges and the answer admits that the Respondent is a corporation with its principal office and place of business at Mercedita in Ponce, Puerto Rico, and with other places of business in Puerto Rico, includ- ing a facility at Camuy. At all material times, Respond- ent has engaged in distilling, processing, bottling, distrib- uting, and selling alcoholic beverages, liquors, distilled spirits, and related products. During the past calendar year, which is representative of its annual operation, Re- spondent produced, sold, and distributed from its facili- ties products valued in excess of $50,000 directly to points outside the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Ac- cordingly, the complaint alleges, the Respondent admits, and I find that the Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the National Labor Relations Act. The Union is now, and has been at all times material, a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. II. BACKGROUND A. The Union's Representation Under P.R.D. On 18 October 1985, Respondent purchased the assets, business, and goodwill of the Puerto Rican Distilleries (P.R.D.) pursuant to a contract in which Seralles dis- claimed liability for a collective-bargaining agreement between its predecessor and the S.I.U., the bargaining agent for employees at the Camuy facility since 1964.2 On that same date and without prior notice to the work force, P R.D. ceased operations at its facilities in Camuy and Arecibo and discharged the employees. The S.I.U. was last certified as the unit's exclusive bar- gaining representative in January 1982. Prior to and for a brief period of time after P.R.D. closed, Camuy employ- ees were involved in union activities. For example, sev- eral employees participated in negotiations leading to the most recent collective-bargaining agreement effective from 2 March 1985 to 1 March 1988; a large percentage i By order dated 21 November 1986, the parties were directed to submit preliminary briefs on the question of whether Respondent could properly claim privilege for and refuse to produce a letter written by its vice president while acting in a legal capacity which had been disclosed inadvertently to the General Counsel prior to the hearing Subsequently, the Respondent released the letter voluntarily It was marked R Exh 11 and is admitted into evidence Respondent and the General Counsel also submitted a joint motion to correct the transcript The motion is granted and made a part of this record as Jt Exhs 3 a-e Hereinafter, the General Counsel's exhibits will be referred to as G C Exh, Respondent's exhibits as R Exh, the Charg- mg Party's exhibits as C P Exh, and joint exhibits as Jt Exh 2 The S I U contract with P R D provided that the union agreement would be binding on any successor 53 of the unit voted for four delegates (shop stewards) in early October 1985 and all unit members continued paying union dues through October 1985 pursuant to a checkoff provision in the contract. After P.R.D. was sold, six or seven employees joined union representatives in bargaining about the effects of the plant's closure, with a final accord reached on 7 November. B. The Union Requests Recognition On 18 October 1985, after learning of Respondent's ac- quisition of P.R.D., S.I.U. President Conrado Hernandez, wrote to Alberto Torruella, Respondent's vice president and secretary, to request that Serralles recognize the Union as the exclusive bargaining representative for the Camuy employees and honor its collective-bargaining agreement with P.R.D. Hernandez also proposed that the parties meet on 21 October. Receiving no response, Hernandez again wrote to Torruella on 30 October re- newing his earlier request that the Respondent recognize the Union and honor the collective-bargaining agree- ment. Before Respondent received this second letter, Ra- dames Torruella, Respondent's counsel, 3 telephoned the Union's counsel, Ginoris Vizcarra, explaining that Ser- ralles recently retained him to represent the Company on labor law matters. He also stated that the Respondent had not yet decided how or to what extent, if any, it would operate the former P.R.D. facilities. In a followup letter to Hernandez dated 1 November, Attorney Tor- ruella repeated these remarks and promised to contact the Union as soon as he had reviewed the situation. (G.C. Exh. 4.) Several days later on 4 November, Alberto Torruella met with Attorney Torruella to discuss the Company's legal obligations in light of its indefinite long-range plans for the Camuy facility and consider S.I.U.'s request for recognition, given the possibility of a competing claim from another union, the U.G.T., which represented a bargaining unit at Serralles' facility in Ponce. According to Torruella, Respondent had not yet decided whether it would continue all operations previously performed at Camuy and, if it did, whether it would employ a work force composed of both Camuy and Arecibo employees or with Camuy employees alone. Alternatively, Re- spondent also was considering transferring the former P.R.D. bottling operations to its Ponce facility which had a sufficiently large production capacity, leaving only aging and storing operations intact at Camuy. Torruella further testified that after the acquisition, Respondent discovered that the inventory for certain P.R.D. brands was low. Consequently, Respondent de- cided to commence operations in Camuy at least on a short-term basis and began hiring former P.R.D. employ- ees under temporary employment contracts. Production started on 11 November 1985 with a work force of 17 former Camuy employees, a number that the parties agreed constituted a representative complement. 2 Hereinafter, Respondent's counsel will be referred to as Attorney Torruella to distinguish him from the Company's vice president 54 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD At the conclusion of their 4 November meeting, Re- spondent's vice president authorized counsel to meet with the S.I.U. and to commence bargaining, if he be- lieved that a sound relationship was feasible. Several days later Attorney Torruella telephoned Ms. Vizcarra and arranged an exploratory meeting for 8 November. To prepare for this meeting, Alberto Torruella compared the S.I.U. labor contract with the U.G.T. agreement covering the Ponce employees. After completing this review, he identified for Attorney Torruella 11 provi- sions in the S.I.U. contract that he wished to renegotiate in order to conform them with the U.G.T. labor agree- ment. C. The 8 November Meeting As agreed, Vizcarra and Hernandez met with Attor- ney Torruella and his associate, Francisco Chevere, on 8 November. At the outset, Attorney Torruella handed Vizcarra and Hernandez duplicate letters which respond- ed to the Union's written requests for recognition and acceptance of its P.R.D. labor contract in the following noncommittal terms:4 "At least for the moment said meetings . . . must not be considered as one of negotia- tion, nor necessarily as evidence that we have already recognized S.I.U. as the exclusive representative of any employee who is hired in Camuy." (G.C. Exh. 6.) Attorney Torruella next outlined the alternatives that Respondent was weighing with regard to continuing op- erations at Camuy or transferring them to Ponce. How- ever, he indicated that employees would be hired at Camuy on a temporary basis to deal with a depleted in- ventory. He further informed them that the U.G.T. had requested certain information about Respondent's pur- chase of P.R.D. and might assert a representational claim at Camuy under an accretion clause in its collective-bar- gaining agreement. Attorney Torruella then outlined specific clauses in the S.I.U./P.R.D. labor contract that the Respondent wanted to alter. Attorney Vizcarra did not oppose modi- fying the contract. In fact, without signifying assent, she stated that many of the proposed changes were not un- reasonable. She then raised some concerns and sugges- tions about other terms in the agreement At Vizcarra's request, Attorney Torruella agreed to reduce Respond- ent's proposals to writing and directed Chevere to pre- pare a draft that would be used as a basis for future ne- gotiations. Vizcarra mentioned that although the S.I.U. constitution did not require employee ratification of col- lective-bargaining agreements, she preferred having members of the bargaining unit involved in negotiations. D. Communications Between the Parties After 8 November After some weeks had elapsed without further word from the Respondent, Vizcarra wrote to Torruella on 15 December reminding him that she had previously re- quested recognition and asked him to send the promised document without delay. Noting that the employees 4 Attorney Torruella explained that his letter had been completed in time for delivery prior to the meeting were working under temporary contracts, Vizcarra urged that the parties act quickly to formalize and stabi- lize their labor-management relations. (R. Exh. 5(b).) At- torney Torruella did not respond specifically to the re- quest for recognition. Instead, at some undefined time, he told Vizcarra that recognition would be settled in the collective-bargaining agreement. Chevere mailed a complete draft agreement to Viz- carra on 23 December. Apart from the modifications proposed by the Respondent, the contractual terms were identical to those in the S.I.U.-P.R.D. labor agreement, including a standard recognition clause. Vizcarra wrote to Respondent's counsel once again on 7 January seeking information about Respondent's current negotiations with the U.G.T. so she could compare S.I.U.'s bargaining po- sition with those proposed for the Ponce employees. Chevere mailed the requested material to her on 16 Janu- ary and included a copy of an authorization card that the U.G.T. organizer recently had attempted to distribute to Camuy employees. In a cover letter accompanying these materials, Chevere confirmed a previous telephone con- versation with Vizcarra in which he offered to discuss the proposals over the weekend. Chevere explained that Respondent was interested in reaching an agreement with the Union as soon as possible, preferably before the employees' temporary contracts expired on 24 January. On 17 January, Hernandez, Vizcarra, Chevere, and Torruella participated in a conference call to discuss ar- rangements for forthcoming negotiations. Attorney Tor- ruella testified that during this exchange he mentioned that Respondent had heard rumors that the employees were not interested in union representation and were un- willing to attend a bargaining meeting. Chevere, whose recollection of this exchange was similar to that of At- torney Torruella's in most respects, explained that earlier in the week, a Serralles official told him that "an em- ployee or some employees" had refused to attend the ne- gotiations. Vizcarra insisted that such rumors were false and said that if there were any truth to them she would not continue bargaining. She assured Respondent's coun- sel that employee representatives would attend the nego- tiations. Either during this conversation or possibly a few days later, Hernandez asked Attorney Torruella if he could enter the plant to speak to the employees as S.I.U. agents had done under P.R.D. management.5 Torruella denied this request, relying on the fact that Respondent had re- fused to allow the U.G.T. to enter the plant and that no collective-bargaining agreement was yet in place to justi- fy such visitation rights. On Monday, 20 January, during extended telephone calls, Vizcarra and Chevere discussed the contract terms, clause by clause, omitting only matters such as the rec- ognition clause, about which there was no dispute. Inter- mittently, Chevere conferred with Attorney Torruella or the Respondent's vice president about specific language to be included 6 Vizcarra testified that she insisted that 8 The parties disagree about the date of Hernandez' request but not that it was made 6 Vizcarra believed that her protracted telephone discussions with Chevere about the terms of the proposed collective-bargaining agreement Continued DESTILERIA SERRALLES any contract for the Camuy bargaining unit must contain the same benefits offered to the Ponce employees. She also disagreed with the Respondent's position on a no- strike clause. After an exchange lasting some 4 hours, the attorneys reached tentative agreement on most items with only a few matters left unresolved. The parties scheduled 22 January to meet with two employee repre- sentatives present in the hope of concluding an agree- ment. E. The Respondent Asserts Doubts as to the Union's Majority The January 22 meeting never came to pass; it was canceled at the Union's request when Hernandez was unable to persuade any employee to attend. Hernandez testified that he and Marcos Cordero, the union's service representative, traveled to Camuy on 21 January in order to personally invite S.I.U. delegates, Juan Alvarez and Jorge Gonzalez, to the bargaining meeting set for the following day. According to Hernan- dez, as employees left the plant for their lunchbreak, they greeted the union agents but seemed fearful when Alvarez approached. Over lunch, Hernandez told Alva- rez of the bargaining meeting scheduled for the next day. Alvarez purportedly asked them if Seralles had recog- nized the Union and on learning that recognition had not been granted, said "that many of his workers were trau- matized because of what had been done to them." Her- nandez further testified that Alvarez feared reprisals by Serralles and asked them to obtain written recognition before he or Gonzalez attended a bargaining meeting. Cordero testified that Alvarez simply declined the invita- tion to attend the 22 January meeting by saying "he was not sure he would go since they were in a probationary period and it would be difficult for them to attend a meeting with us." Alvarez, offering a wholly different reason for declin- ing to attend the bargaining session, testified that he told the union officials his health prevented him from partici- pating.7 Relying on his credible testimony, I find it un- likely that Alvarez would have insisted on formal recog- nition as a prerequisite to attending the negotiations be- cause he had decided to withdraw from union activities for personal reasons.8 Moreover, if Alvarez had asked for some guarantee of recognition, Hernandez could have pointed to the unchallenged recognition clause in the collective-bargaining agreement which lacked little more than employee ratification to become final and binding. Hernandez stated that he informed Vizcarra later that day that the employees were afraid to attend the negotia- tions unless Serralles recognized the S.I.U. On Vizcarra's occurred on Friday, 17 January Since she did not receive the U G T materials until 16 January, it seems more likely that their lengthy ex- change occurred on 20 January after Vizcarra had time over the week- end to review them Alvarez explained at the hearing that the union agents knew he suf- fered from epilepsy 8 Although Alvarez spoke in Spanish, a language with which I am un- familiar, I nevertheless found that he communicated much by way of de- meanor He was a sincere and unassuming witness who I am convinced would not distort the facts as he knew them 55 advice, Hernandez then telephoned Chevere notifying him that the meeting on the following day would have to be canceled; that in fear of losing their jobs, the em- ployees did not want to attend until they were certain that Respondent had granted recognition. Chevere re- portedly replied that working with antagonistic employ- ees was difficult and that he would communicate with his superiors to see what could be done. Chevere offered a somewhat different account of his telephone call with Hernandez. Recalling the exact word that Hernandez used, Chevere stated that the union president told him that the employees were "trancados", that is, "dead set" against coming to the meeting. When Chevere assured Hernandez that Respondent had author- ized the employees to attend the meeting with pay, Her- nandez replied "as a responsible union leader, I can do no more, if they have no interest." Attorney Torruella also testified to a similar telephone call with Hernandez who repeated that the employees did not want to come to a bargaining session and did not want to get involved. Neither attorney indicated that Hernandez specifically referred to a problem with recognition or the employees' insecurity about their jobs.9 Chevere testified without dispute that, later the same day, he was privy to a telephone conversation in which Alberto Torruella told Vizcarra that the employees' re- fusal to attend the bargaining meeting confirmed all the rumors management had received about employee dissat- isfaction with the Union. Consequently, he advised her that Respondent had formed a good-faith doubt that the S.I.U. had the support of a majority of the Camuy em- ployees. At this time, the work force consisted of 55 em- ployees. Both Attorneys Vizcarra and Torruella recalled an en- counter several days later while they were working on another legal matter In Torruella's opinion Vizcarra ap- peared frustrated that the Camuy employees refused to be involved in negotiations. Vizcarra recalled, however, that her comments to Torruella were far more adversar- ial in nature. She insisted that Respondent had to recog- nize and bargain with the Union and that by refusing to allow Hernandez entry to the plant, Respondent was making it very difficult to reach any agreement Attor- ney Torruella then asserted that the Respondent had in- formation that the S.I.U. had lost majority support. The Union did not request recognition or further bargaining after this date. On 24 January the Respondent offered the Camuy em- ployees regular employment contracts starting with a 90- day probationary period and, unilaterally instituted other terms and conditions of employment. i o 9 Hernandez may have alluded to his belief that the employees were fearful for this would explain why Chevere mentioned that the Respond- ent was willing to subsidize the delegates' attendance at the bargaining meeting 10 On 23 December Respondent hired a number of employees to staff a second bottling line in response to increased Christmas sales Many of these workers were laid off on 27 January 56 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD F. The Respondent's Grounds for Withdrawing Recognition In marshaling evidence to show the objective grounds on which it relied to form a good-faith doubt of the Union's majority, the Respondent called on four employ- ees, each of whom testified about his own and his co- workers' attitude toward the Union. Jose Gonzalez was a pivotal witness in this regard for he was the only em- ployee to testify about his direct contacts with both Union and management. Apparently, because Gonzalez had been elected by his peers to serve as one of four union delegates since Octo- ber 1985, his fellow workers came to him with their complaints. Thus, he testified that when Serralles re- opened the Camuy plant, employees told him "they did not want to be members of any union." In mid-Decem- ber, after a U.G.T. representative from Ponce began to distribute authorization cards, the employees commented that "they did not want U.G.T. or S.I.U. because they were in temporary employment and in a new industry ... they did not want to get involved with any labor union." Gonzalez showed one of the U.G.T. leaflets to his supervisor, Jaime Ayende, and to plant manager, Lorenzo Esteva, telling them that he no longer wished to be involved with the Union and that other employees also were "negative" to any union. Gonzalez also testified about several telephone conver- sations with Hernandez. The first call came to his home some time in mid-December. On this occasion, Hernan- dez told him that the Respondent was going to recognize or negotiate with the Union. Gonzalez advised the union president that his coworkers were "negative" or "skepti- cal" toward the Union and assured Hernandez that these attitudes were not the result of pressure from the Re- spondent. Attorney Vizcarra then took the telephone and, in essence, asked Gonzalez how the employees could be so disloyal after the Union had worked so ef- fectively for them and obtained severance benefits from the P.R.D. Gonzalez merely repeated what he had told Hernandez; that the employees were negative. On a subsequent occasion, Hernandez contacted him at the plant, reaching him on a telephone in the plant man- ager's office. Esteva personally summoned Gonzalez to his office to take the call. When Hernandez invited him to a bargaining meeting to be held with Serralles, Gonza- lez replied that "people were negative and nobody was willing to go to San Juan." Afterwards, Gonzalez report- ed this conversation to Esteva who assured him that the Company had authorized and would pay for the employ- ees' attendance at the meeting."' Three other employees, Angel Cortes, Rafael Arce, and Isidro Rivera,12 testified that they and their fellow employees were dissatisfied with S.I.U. representation even before P.R.D. was sold, principally because they believed the Union was too slow in resolving their prob- 11 Although Hernandez did not remember calling Gonzalez at the plant, Gonzalez' and Esteva's testimony about this communication was too specific to be discounted 12 In accordance with Spanish custom , the metronymic surname of each employee also appears in the transcript lems.13 They also asserted that neither they nor their fellow workers wanted to be represented by any union after Serralles reopened the company facility. Specifically, Cortes, an employee with 21 years' expe- rience working for P.R.D., stated that when operations started under Serralles "since we were new there ... . all of the employees said that we would not belong to any union." Although Cortes said that many of the em- ployees complained about union representation, he could not recall any particular problem. Rivera also heard "plenty" of his fellow employees comment that they did not want to be represented by any union. Both Cortes and Rivera were certain they had not shared their views with any member of management. Arce too, said that "several" employees did not want union representation . In fact, Arce stated that he could think of no employee who favored the Union or lauded its accomplishments . When asked why the employees were dissatisfied, Arce explained that the employees had problems that the Union could not solve and, therefore, they preferred to "remain without a union." Arce was the only employee besides Gonzalez who testified that he aired his antiunion views directly with members of management . He stated that he spoke with his foreman and supervisor, but not with Esteva. In addi- tion, both Arce and Rivera testified that their fellow workers expressed unfavorable opinions about the Union at times and places in the plant where they could have been overheard by management. However, I do not find Rivera's testimony reliable in this regard for he avowed in his pretrial affidavit that he knew of no instance when his or other employees' remarks reached management. His attempts to reconcile these contradictory statements at the hearing were unpersuasive. Respondent presented one other witness, Camuy Plant Manager Esteva, who testified that he had heard either directly or indirectly from most of the Camuy workers that they did not want representation. Esteva named eight employees who told him that either they were "dissatisfied with the S.I.U." or "were not interested in any Union." Two of the men who Esteva identified, Rivera and Arce, expressly stated, however, that they did not speak about such matters with Esteva. When asked if he could recall other em- ployees who made similar comments to him, Esteva re- plied that he would have to name most of the employees in the plant. Esteva added that three of his supervisors also conveyed the employees' antiunion feelings to him and that he, in turn, transmitted such information to his superiors in Ponce.14 To refute Esteva's claims, the General Counsel called on Alvarez, the chief employee delegate, who testified that his coworkers' views toward the Union fell into three categories: some 20 to 25 employees told him they 13 One employee also mentioned some difficulty in obtaining a medical plan, but admitted that the Union resolved this matter in 1978 14 In lieu of presenting testimony from two or three additional em- ployees, Respondent offered to stipulate that their testimony would be cumulative to that of the four employees whom it already had called The record does not clearly show whether the other parties agreed to this stipulation Therefore, I can make no finding that this stipulation was admitted as evidence DESTILERIA SERRALLES were not interested in being represented by any union; another 8 to 10 were indifferent about union representa- tion; a third group of some 15 to 20 employees indicated that they preferred to withhold any comment that might affect their jobs. Although Alvarez did not specify into which category he fit, he acknowledged that he and other employees believed that the S.I.U. had represented the Camuy employees adequately. Soon after the Respondent had withdrawn recognition from the Union, Hernandez prepared a letter addressed to Alvarez and Gonzalez containing the following rele- vant passages: As you know, we made many efforts to continue representing you and to negotiate a collective bar- gaining agreement that would give you protection and job security. I assured you that you would not have any problems with your new employer, Desti- leria Serralles, Inc., and that we could guarantee you a reasonable collective-bargaining agreement. By the same token, I told you that I would obtain permission for one of you and another em- ployee to attend the negotiations without any prob- lem. We are surprised that employees who have en- joyed the benefits of their labor organization for years have reacted this way, not realizing that it is preferable to be represented by a union than to be defenseless and without any kind of representa- tion. . . . I hope that you will reconsider it and that you will do it in time, since really, even though we are willing to represent you, I don't think you should make the Union incur additional expenses if you are not interested at all. Hernandez concluded this message by urging the em- ployees to sign and return a union authorization form printed at the bottom of the letter. Cordero hand-delivered 50 copies of this letter to Al- varez who attempted unsuccessfully to distribute them to some of his coworkers. When these efforts failed, Alva- rez left the copies inside the plant where the employees had access to them. He subsequently retrieved the copies finding that none had been taken. No authorization forms were returned to the Union Nevertheless, the union agents remained in contact with the Serralles employees and after a complaint in this case issued, wrote to them outlining the allegations therein.' 5 III. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS A. The Respondent Granted De Facto Recognition to the Union The complaint, which is framed in the alternative, first alleges that at no time did the Respondent accede to the Union's repeated requests for recognition . In determining 15 Respondent points out that Hernandez omitted informing the em- ployees of an allegation that Serralles had refused to recognize the Union I do not regard the failure to include every allegation in the com- plaint as a serious omission . It appears that the Union President simply wanted to communicate some of the complaint's essential elements. 57 the merits of this allegation, the parties do not dispute the applicable legal principles. Thus, they agree that NLRB v. Burns Security Services, 406 U.S. 272 (1972), the definitive statement of a successor's legal obligation to the bargaining representative of its predecessor employ- ees, requires that a new employer must bargain with the union "when it selects as its work force the employees of the previous employer," but it is not bound by the terms of the predecessor's labor agreement. Id. at 278, 281- 282.16 The bargaining duty arises when the Union has made a demand for recognition and a representative complement composed of a majority of the predecessor's employees has been hired. Fall River Dyeing Corp., 272 NLRB 839, 840 (1984), enfd. 775 F.2d 425 (1st Cir. 1985). Respondent admits that it was a successor to P.R.D. and that a representative complement of S.I.U. employ- ees was working at the Camuy plant by 13 November 1985. Accordingly, Respondent acknowledges that its duty to recognize and bargain with the Union was fixed on that date. The General Counsel contends that the Respondent disregarded its legal duty and consistently ignored the Union's repeated requests for recognition. Counsel fur- ther submits that the meeting on 8 November may not be regarded as valid evidence of recognition for Respond- ent's letter to the Union on that date expressly restricted the purpose of the meeting. The Respondent states to the contrary that its conduct at the 8 November meeting demonstrates that it implicitly recognized the Union and commenced bargaining. The Board has no prescribed formula governing the manner in which a Respondent must grant recognition, and, in appropriate circumstances, will find that an em- ployer's deeds speak louder than words as evidence of recognition. For example, in Harley-Davidson Co., 273 NLRB 1531 (1985), the employer refused to acknowl- edge that the union represented a majority of employees in the bargaining unit and did not explicitly grant recog- nition. However, it did agree to bargain. The Board con- cluded that "by conceding its obligation as a successor and agreeing to negotiate the Respondent voluntarily recognized the Union." Ibid. Similarly, in Landmark International Trucks, 257 NLRB 1375, 1379 (1981), vacated and remanded on other grounds 699 F.2d 815 (6th Cir. 1983), the adminis- trative law judge ruled, with Board approval, that by meeting with the union that had requested recognition and bargaining and agreeing to a date for subsequent meetings, the employer indicated "a recognition of the Union . . . [and] demonstrated an undertaking . . . to negotiate with the Union." These precedents compel the conclusion that by its be- havior the Respondent granted de facto recognition to the Union at the 8 November meeting. On that occasion, the Respondent presented specific proposals to modify the S.I.U.'s former labor agreement, agreed to prepare a written draft contract to be used at subsequent meetings 16 Thus, as a matter of law, the S.I U -P RD contract could not bind Respondent to the substantive terms of the predecessor 's labor agree- ment 58 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD and discussed other matters affecting the manner in which negotiations would be conducted. By these ac- tions, which cannot be viewed as anything less than bar- gaining, Respondent waived the qualifications expressed in its 8 November letter. As Harley-Davidson and Land- mark make clear, when, as here, a respondent engages in even the preliminary steps of collective bargaining, rec- ognition is assumed." Respondent's subsequent actions were consistent with and lend weight to the conclusion that it impliedly rec- ognized the Union on 8 November. As promised, Re- spondent prepared the draft contract and forwarded it to the Union on 23 December; provided requested informa- tion to the Union without protest or hesitation on 7 Jan- uary; offered to negotiate over a weekend, and engaged in earnest bargaining on 20 January, ultimately reaching tentative agreement on that date about most terms of a revised contract. The recognition clause in the S.I.U.- P.R.D. agreement was never disputed and was preserved intact. Respondent indicated that it was willing to exe- cute the agreement on 22 January, regarding the pres- ence of employee representatives at this final session as a formality. On these facts, I conclude that the Respondent recog- nized the Union on 8 November 1985, and continued bargaining with the S.I.U. until on or about 22 January. Accordingly, the allegation that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by unlawfully refusing to recognize and bargain with the Union shall be dis- missed. B. Respondent withdrew Recognition without Sufficient Objective Criteria By impliedly recognizing the Union, Respondent ac- knowledged that the S.I.U. presumptively represented a majority of its employees. See Harley-Davidson Co., supra at 1535. Respondent's subsequent challenge to that pre- sumption as a basis for withdrawing recognition must be assessed in accordance with well-established precedent that holds that after the certification year, an employer may withdraw recognition of an incumbent union at any time if it affirmatively establishes either that (1) the union has lost majority support, or (2) had a reasonably grounded good-faith doubt based on objective, verifiable considerations, untainted by unfair labor practices, that the Union no longer enjoyed majority status. Id. at 1531;18 Terrell Machine Co., 173 NLRB 1480 (1969), enfd. 427 F.2d 1088 (4th Cir. 1970). The General Counsel maintains that by withholding recognition from the Union, denying the union agents access to the plant, and retaining employees under tem- porary contracts, the Respondent instilled fear in the workers causing them to detach themselves from the Union to appease their new employer. Consequently, counsel contends that Respondent is precluded from i7 See General Electric Co, 173 NLRB 253, 257 (1968), in which the Board ruled that preliminary arrangements for negotiations are mandato- ry subjects of bargaining and "are just as much a part of the process of collective bargaining as negotiations over wages , hours, etc " 18 Harley-Davidson overrules prior case law that required a successor employer to bargain for a reasonable time even it alleged a good faith doubt of the union's majority support withdrawing recognition from the S.I.U. because its doubt of majority support was not asserted in good faith or raised in an atmosphere untainted by unfair labor practices. The record leaves little doubt, and the General Coun- sel correctly observes, that the employees were fearful about the permanence of their employment. Alvarez may have expressed it best when he said that the employees were traumatized by what happened to them. But P.R.D. was as responsible for that trauma as Serralles. Without any formal notice, P.R.D. abruptly closed its facilities and discharged the entire work force. Although the Union succeeded in negotiating severance benefits for the discharged employees, it was unable to prevent the plant's closure and the Employer's exodus to the United States. After Serralles resumed operations at Camuy, the work force was reduced by more than 50 percent. Surely some employees feared that the Union could not prevent a future closure. It is in this context that the employees' ambivalence toward the Union must be examined. In its 4 February letter to the employees, the Union implicitly acknowledged the employees' apprehension and attempt- ed to allay their fears by assuring them that the Re- spondent was cooperating in the bargaining process. At least at that time, the Union did not accuse the Respond- ent of bad faith. Further, and contrary to the General Counsel's con- tention, Serralles did not unlawfully withhold recogni- tion. As discussed above, Respondent constructively rec- ognized and began to bargain with the Union as early as 8 November. It is true that Respondent did not extend recognition in an overt manner. Nevertheless, the em- ployees had reason to know that their employer had agreed to bargain. Hernandez told union delegate Gonza- lez as much. If the employees were unaware of the Re- spondent's willing participation in the collective-bargain- ing process, perhaps the responsibility lay in part with the Union's failure to better inform them. The General Counsel and Charging Party submit that the Union's ability to reach and reassure the employees was impeded by Respondent's refusal to admit the S.I.U. agents into the plant. Clearly, Respondent could have au- thorized such a visit; the reasons offered to justify the Union's exclusion were meritless. By the same token, Re- spondent had no legal duty to grant access and did not violate the Act by refusing entry. 1 9 Moreover, Respondent did not interfere in any other way with the Union's efforts to contact the workers. The record shows that Hernandez and Cordero met freely with the employees just outside the plant on a few occa- sions; the plant manager made his office available to Gonzalez to speak by phone with the union president, and Alvarez apparently did not hesitate to leave union literature in the plant where employees had access to it. Thus, even if Respondent's refusal to admit the union representatives into the plant was unreasonable, that act alone could not have affected "the Union's status, cause employee disaffection or improperly affect the bargain- 19 Here, unlike the situation described in Triangle Plastics, 191 NLRB 347 (1971), denial of access to the plant did not prevent the S I U agents from effectively serving the employees in collective bargaining DESTILERIA SERRALLES ing relationship itself." Hotel & Restaurant Employees Local 19 (Burger Pits) v. NLRB, 785 F.2d 796, 800 (9th Cir. 1986). The General Counsel relies on Alberto Torruella's 15 October letter to a credit institution as proof that Re- spondent had decided to hire 65 employees for the Camuy facility. From this, counsel reasons that Respond- ent was committed to operating the Camuy facility per- manently, and, therefore, had no legitimate excuse for hiring workers under temporary employment contracts other than to breed fear and underscore their depend- ence on a new employer whose disposition toward the Union was unknown. Counsel attaches more significance and finality to this letter than is warranted. It is true that Torruella expressed an intent to open the Camuy plant. However, he also projected a work force composed of former P.R.D. employees from both Arecibo and Camuy. In fact, the Camuy facility reopened with a work force composed solely of former S.I.U. members. This departure from the plan set forth in Torruella's letter, supports Respondent's argument that decisions about Camuy's future were not cast in concrete at the time that operations began there. The 15 October letter did not expressly state that clo- sure was one of the options being considered for the Camuy plant. However, the letter does refer to future consolidation of operations. Further, as Torruella testi- fied and as Plant Manager Esteva confirmed, the Ponce facilities were large enough to house the Camuy bottling operation. Therefore, transferring portions of the Camuy enterprise to Ponce was not out of the question. In fact, Esteva spontaneously volunteered that Respondent had experimented with performing certain bottling operations at Ponce that traditionally were accomplished at Camuy. Respondent abandoned the experiment after determining that these functions could be performed more efficiently at Camuy. Torruella and Esteva agreed that Respondent decided to start production at Camuy on a trial basis after finding that the inventory there was low.20 Under these circum- stances, offering temporary employment contracts to em- ployees whose skills were then unknown, does not seem to be an aberrant business decision. The 15 October letter also refers to the possibility that the U.G.T. might seek to represent the Camuy employ- ees. Thus, Respondent's concern about competing claims between the U.G.T. and S.I.U. was not bogus or recent- ly invented to serve its ends in this litigation. Whether the U.G.T. would have prevailed had it pursued repre- sentational rights at Camuy is an altogether different question than whether such a claim would be asserted. Having determined that the Respondent did not with- draw recognition in bad faith, a final question remains 20 The General counsel suggests that Torruella and Esteva contradict- ed each other about when the Respondent determined that the inventory was depleted In fact, no contradiction exists Both men agreed that pro- duction started at Camuy in November, after Respondent determined that the inventory had to be replenished Esteva explained that a second bot- tling line was opened at Camuy when increased sales required even greater production immediately prior to Christmas In other words, I construe their testimony to mean that the inventory was insufficient in November and continued to fall short of demand , particularly as sales in- creased during the peak holiday season 59 whether Respondent presented sufficient objective evi- dence that a majority of the 55 employees in the unit no longer desired union representation. 21 In rebutting the Union's presumption of continued ma- jority support, an employer bears a heavy burden of pre- senting "clear, cogent and convincing evidence" that in- dicates that a union's support has declined to a minority. Hotel & Restaurant Employees Local 19 v. NLRB, supra at 799. The Respondent has failed to meet its consider- able burden. In evaluating the numerous factors that Respondent has proffered to justify belief in a union's loss of majority support, the Board regards employee statements made di- rectly to the employer as particularly probative. See Glosser Bros., 271 NLRB 710, 715 (1984). In the present case, Respondent predicates its doubt on the testimony of four employees and the Camuy plant manager. Careful scrutiny reveals that their statements are far from clear, convincing, or cogent. Only two of the four employee witnesses acknowledge speaking directly with managerial personnel. Esteva re- called the names of no more than eight individuals with whom he spoke directly. Of these eight, two denied having talked to him. Thus, in a unit of 55 employees, Respondent's evidence, viewed in its best light, estab- lishes that a small minority, six to eight employees in all, spoke individually and directly to management officials about their union sentiments. Through the testimony of a few witnesses, however, Respondent attempted to prove that many other employ- ees rejected union representation. Thus, Gonzalez testi- fied that he informed Esteva that other employees joined in his decision to reject union representation, but he failed to discuss specific incidents or identify a single em- ployee who shared his view. The Board does not favor such testimony. First, such comments are hearsay. See Roza Watch Corp., 249 NLRB 284, 287 (1980). In addi- tion, the Board has observed that employees' statements "which purport to convey sentiments of employees other than themselves" might lead to a few antiunion employ- ees providing "the basis for withdrawal of recognition when in fact there is actually an insufficient basis for doubting the Union's continued majority support." Dalewood Rehabilitation Hospital, 224 NLRB 1618, 1619- 1620 (1976). J & J Drainage Products Co., 269 NLRB 1163 (1984), is a departure from the Board's traditional rejection of such testimony. In that case, the Board adopted the adminis- trative law judge's ruling that that an employer could rely in part on the comments of one of two union stew- ards who said that several of the 32 unit employees were disinterested in the union. Id. at 1171. I do not find that Gonzalez' remarks about the views of other employees deserves the same deference. Gonzalez, one of four dele- gates in a 55-man unit, attributed a single, uniform posi- tion to the unidentified, unenumerated employees for whom he purportedly spoke. Consequently, I had little confidence that he accurately presented the diversity of 21 The Respondent did not attempt to prove that the Union did not actually represent a majority of unit employees 60 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD opinion that invariably exists in any group of 55 individ- uals. Alvarez, the main union delegate, testified in a more reliable manner, categorizing his fellow workers' views into three separate schools of thought. If Alvarez' estimates were correct, then less than a majority of em- ployees opposed union representation. Supervisory reports to Esteva, involving double hear- say problems, were equally unreliable evidence on which to premise doubt of the Union's continued majority. As the Board found in Thomas Industries, 255 NLRB 646, 647 (1981), "supervisors' subjective estimates that a ma- jority of the employees did not want a union add little, if anything, to the probative force of the employees' state- ments which constituted the only concrete evidence on which the supervisors' estimates were based." Esteva's testimony regarding the alleged antiunion atti- tudes of most of the employees in the plant is equally troublesome. Like Gonzalez, Esteva offered no details. Instead, he stated generally that employees were "dissat- isfied with the S.I.U." or "were not interested in any union." Without a more precise description of what indi- vidual employees may have said, it is impossible to deter- mine from Esteva's comments whether, or how many, employees actually expressed nothing more than disen- chantment with the Union's past performance or a disin- clination to be active union members, as distinguished from a current desire to be rid of union representation. Thus, by invoking and relying on such conclusory testi- mony, Respondent failed to clearly delineate which em- ployees may have unequivocally repudiated the Union. See Thomas Industries, supra at 647;22 Dalewood Reha- bilitation Hospital, supra. The Respondent also based its doubt of continued ma- jority support on the Union's failure to persuade any em- ployees to attend the 22 January bargaining meeting. The Board consistently has rejected evidence of employee disinterest in union activity as an accurate index of the majority's union sentiments. Employee attendance at union meetings, like membership in or financial support of a union, does not necessarily signify that a majority of the work force opposes union representatron.23 Conse- quently, the Respondent may not rely on the employees' unwillingness to appear at negotiations as objective evi- dence that justifies withdrawing recognition. In sum, Respondent has not adduced concrete and un- equivocal expressions of antiunion sentiment from a suffi- cient number of employees or managerial personnel to support a reasonable doubt that the Union no longer en- joyed majority support on or about 22 January 1986. Id. at 653. Accordingly, the Respondent's withdrawal of recognition from the Union on that date was unwarrant- ed and violates Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent Destileria Serralles , Inc., is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. The S.I.U. is a labor organization within the mean- ing of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. All production and maintenance employees includ- ing mechanics, messengers, and truckdrivers employed by the Respondent at its redistilling and bottling plant in Camuy, Puerto Rico, excluding all other employees, ex- ecutive, administrative, and professional personnel, the chemist, the shipping and receiving clerks, office and plant clerical employees, foremen, guards, and supervi- sors, constitute a unit appropriate for the purpose of col- lective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. 4. At all times material, the Union has been and is now the exclusive representative of all employees in the afore- said appropriate unit for the purpose of collective bar- gaining within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act. 5. On 8 November 1985, the Respondent recognized the Union and bargained with it from that date until 22 January 1986. 6. By withdrawing recognition and refusing to bargain with the Union as the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees in the above-described appropriate unit, since on or about 22 January 1986, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. 7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. THE REMEDY Having found the above-cited violation of the Act, I shall recommend that Respondent be required to cease and desist therefrom. Affirmatively, Respondent will be required to recognize and, on request, bargain with the Union and post an appropriate notice. The General Counsel submits that a visitatorial clause is required in this case so that the Board may engage in discovery to properly monitor Respondent's compliance with the Board's Order. Based upon all of the circum- stances in this case, and particularly on my finding that the Respondent did not act in bad faith, I do not agree that a visitatorial provision is necessary. Accordingly, the General Counsel's motion to include such a provision in the Order is denied. On these findings of fact and conclusions of law, and on the entire record in this proceeding, I issue the fol- lowing recommended24 ORDER The Respondent, Destileria Serralles, Inc., Camuy, Puerto, Rico, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall 1. Cease and desist from 22 The vagueness of Esteva's reports about the employees' antiunion attitudes may explain why the Respondent discounted them and remained willing to execute a collective-bargaining agreement with the Union until 21 January, just 1 day before it withdrew recognition 23 See, e g., Cut & Curl, 277 NLRB 1869, 1873 (1977); Orion Corp , 210 NLRB 633 (1974), enfd 515 F 2d 81 (5th Cir 1975) 24 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102.46 of the Board's Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec 102 .48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur- poses DESTILERIA SERRALLES (a) Refusing to recognize and bargain collectively with the S.I.U. de Puerto Ricco, Caribe & Latin America af- filiated with Seafarers International Union of North America, AFL-CIO as the collective-bargaining repre- sentative of its employees in the following appropriate unit: All production and maintenance employees includ- ing mechanics, messengers, and truckdrivers em- ployed by the Respondent at its redistilling and bot- tling plant in Camuy, Puerto Rico, excluding all other employees, executive, administrative and pro- fessional personnel, the chemist, the shipping and receiving clerks , office and plant clerical employees, foremen, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act. (b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re- straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act. (a) On request, bargain collectively with the S.I.U. de Puerto Rico, Caribe & Latin-America affiliated with Sea- farers International Union of North America, AFL-CIO as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of its employees in the above-described unit and, if an agree- ment is reached, embody that agreement in a signed con- tract. Post at its Camuy, Puerto Rico facilities, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."25 Copies of said notice on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 24 of the National Labor Relations Board, after being signed by Respondent's representative, shall be posted by it immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or cov- ered by any other material. (b) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days from the date of this Order what steps have been taken to comply. IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that allegations of the complaint that allege unfair labor practices not specifical- ly found in this decision be dismissed. 25 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Nation- al Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board " APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government 61 The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the National Labor Relations Act and has or- dered us to post and abide by this notice. Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights. To organize To form, join, or assist any union To bargain collectively through representatives of their own choice To act together for other mutual aid or protec- tion To choose not to engage in any of these protect- ed concerted activities. WE WILL NOT refuse to recognize and bargain collec- tively with the S.I.U. de Puerto Rico, Caribe & Latin- America affiliated with Seafarers International Union of North America, AFL-CIO as the exclusive representa- tive in the bargaining unit described below. WE WILL recognize and upon request bargain with the S.I.U. de Puerto Rico, Caribe & Latin-America affiliated with Seafarers International Union of North America, AFL-CIO as the exclusive representative of employees in the bargaining unit which includes: All production and maintenance employees includ- ing mechanics, messengers, and truckdrivers em- ployed by Respondent at its distilling and bottling plant in Camuy, Puerto Rico, but excluding all other employees, executive, administrative and pro- fessional personnel, the chemist, the shipping and receiving clerks, office and plant clerical employees, foremen, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed under Section 7 of the Act. WE WILL recognize and on request bargain with S.I.U. de Puerto Rico, Caribe & Latin-America affiliated with Seafarers International Union of North America, AFL- CIO as the exclusive representative of our employees in the bargaining unit described above with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employ- ment and, if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement. DESTILERIA SERRALLES, INC.