289 NLRB 808
Waterbed World
808
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Omnix International Corporation d/b/a
Waterbed
World and Union Independiente de Supermerca-
dos y Tiendas Por Departamentos . Cases 24-
CA-5160 and 24-RC-6985
July 13, 1988
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
REOPEN RECORD AND FOR FURTHER
HEARING
BY CHAIRMAN STEPHENS AND MEMBERS
JOHANSEN AND BABSON
On September 30, 1987, the National Labor Re-
lations Board issued a Decision, Order, and Certifi-
cation of Representative in the above-entitled pro-
ceeding, finding that the Respondent had violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by threatening employ-
ees with unspecified reprisals for union activities
and by creating the impression of surveillance of
employees' union activities and had violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(3) of the Act by refusing to permit em-
ployee Marilu Marquez to rescind her resignation
and by discharging employee Gloria Garcia in re-
taliation for Marquez' union activities.' Thereafter,
on January 22, 1988, the Respondent filed a motion
to reopen the record and a separate motion for a
protective order. The General Counsel then filed
an opposition to the motion for a protective order,
but stated therein that she did not oppose the
motion to reopen the record.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegat-
ed its authority in this proceeding to a three-
member panel.
In its motion to reopen the record, the Respond-
ent contends that it has obtained newly discovered
evidence that should cause the Board to reverse its
findings of fact and conclusions of law and find
that the Respondent has not violated the Act. In
support of its motion, the Respondent has attached
an affidavit from witness
Raisa Musa Quinones
(Musa), in which she appears to recant certain tes-
timony that she gave at the unfair labor practice
hearing in this proceeding. At the hearing Musa
testified that on May 3, 1985, Jaime Rico, the Re-
spondent's treasurer and a supervisor of the Re-
spondent within the meaning of Section 2(11) of
the Act, told her that he had discovered that em-
ployees wanted to bring a union into the Company,
that Marilu Marquez was in charge of everything,
that he regarded Musa as a good employee, and
that she should not get involved in the union activ-
ity. In our decision, we used Musa's credited testi-
mony to find that the Respondent had violated
Section 8(a)(1) as detailed above and that it had
' 286 NLRB 425
knowledge of and animus toward Marquez' union
activities. The Respondent has appended a transla-
tion of Musa's affidavit to its motion to reopen the
record. The relevant parts of this translation, set
out verbatim, follow:
I testified in the administrative case # 24-
CA-5160 held on December 16, 17, and 18,
1985 because my personal well-being and secu-
rity were threatened by Marilu Marquez and
Gloria Garcia and I now wish to correct my
testimony declaring the following:
On May 1, 3, 1985 nor at any other time,
did Jaime Rico threaten me with retaliation or
with rewards in relation to my employment or
union activities.
Jaime Rico did not tell me that it was not
for my benefit to participate in union activities.
Jaime Rico did not tell me that Gloria
Garcia or Marilu Marquez were involved in
the union.
Jaime Rico nor any officer of Waterbed
World has pressured me nor has promised me
anything of value so that I would now make
these declarations nor have I been offered em-
ployment.
Jaime Rico did not tell me not to get in-
volved with the union.
The Respondent contends that reopening the
record is necessary because it argues that Musa's
testimony formed the Board's only basis for finding
that the Respondent had violated Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act. Regarding the 8(a)(3) finding, the Re-
spondent further contends that in the absence of
Musa's testimony, the Board could not have in-
ferred that the Respondent either knew of Mar-
quez' union activities or harbored animus toward
her for these activities at the time of the decision to
discharge Garcia and to refuse to permit Marquez
to rescind her resignation.
The evidence the Respondent now seeks to in-
troduce may tend to show, among other things,
that Marquez and Garcia threatened Musa's well-
being and security to induce her to testify falsely at
the unfair labor practice hearing; that Musa testi-
fied falsely at that hearing; that Jaime Rico did not
threaten Musa with retaliation or rewards with
regard to her employment; that Jaime Rico did not
tell Musa that it was not to her benefit to be in-
volved in union activities; and that Jaime Rico did
not tell Musa that Garcia or Marquez was involved
with the Union.
After carefully reviewing the record, the judge's
decision, the Board's decision, and the motion, we
find that Musa's affidavit raises substantial ques-
tions of whether an important witness testified
289 NLRB No. 101
WATERBED WORLD
809
falsely about material issues in this case. Accord-
ingly, we shall grant the Respondent's motion to
reopen the record and we shall remand the pro-
ceeding to the judge to reopen the record, to take
additional testimony to resolve the issues of credi-
bility raised by Musa's affidavit, and to issue new
findings of fact and conclusions of law in a supple-
mental decision consistent with his resolution of
the issues.
As noted above, the Respondent also seeks a
protective order from the Board in which the
Board would order the parties not to disclose the
information in the motion to reopen to Marilu Mar-
quez or Gloria Garcia. In support of this motion,
the Respondent cites portions of Musa's affidavit,
quoted above, contending that Garcia and Marquez
threatened her well-being and security to support
its contention that confidentiality is required to
protect Musa from "annoyance and oppression."
The General Counsel has opposed the motion, con-
tending that the Board is not empowered to grant
such a protective order and that the Board is em-
powered only under appropriate circumstances,
and for good cause shown, to petition the United
States district court for such an order. The General
Counsel also contends that the Respondent has not
shown "good cause" to warrant petitioning the
court for a protective order. Without passing on
the General Counsel's arguments, we deny the Re-
spondent's motion, without prejudice to a subse-
quent motion for appropriate relief. Our reasons for
denying the motion follow.
First, we do not believe that holding the con-
tents of the motion to reopen confidential would be
proper-or even possible--under the circum-
stances of this case. Musa's affidavit appended to
the motion has raised serious questions regarding
not only the factual bases of the Board's decision in
this case, but also the credibility of testimony taken
at the hearing. Such questions can only be resolved
through the hearing process. Second, we note that
Garcia and Marquez are not charging parties.
However, "[a] discriminatee who has not filed his
own charge is not a party within the Board's defi-
nition but . . . in a real sense has been regarded as
a party in a long line of Board decisions."
Unga
Painting Co., 237 NLRB 1306, 1307 (1978). In rec-
ognition of the strong interest of discriminatees in
Board proceedings, the Board recognizes only lim-
ited circumstances under which they can be pre-
vented from hearing the testimony of other wit-
nesses:
Specifically, alleged discriminatees should be
excluded only during that portion of the hear-
ing when another of the General Counsel's or
charging party's witnesses is testifying about
events to which the discriminatees have testi-
fied, or will or may testify, either in the case-
in-chief or on rebuttal, unless, in the judgment
of the Administrative Law Judge, there are
special
circumstances
warranting the unre-
stricted presence of discriminatees or total ex-
clusion when not testifying.
Ibid. (fn. omitted).
Therefore, in view of the Board's policy afford-
ing a discriminatee the right to hear testimony
except under certain circumstances, and in light of
the scanty and conclusory nature of the averments
in the Respondent's memorandum and supporting
affidavit on which the request for a protective
order is based, we view any relief in the nature of
a protective order foreclosing Garcia and Marquez
from knowing of the contents of the motion to
reopen as unwarranted at this time.2
Last, although we share our colleague's concern
for the seriousness of the allegations now before us,
we think it premature at this stage of the proceed-
ings to send the record to the Department of Jus-
tice. In our view, the better course is to await the
judge's supplemental decision with its further find-
ings of fact and credibility resolutions, and our
own disposition of that decision, before we consid-
er what possible future course, including the refer-
ral of this case to the Justice Department, to
pursue.
IT IS ORDERED that the proceeding is remanded
to Administrative Law Judge Elbert D. Gadsden
for the purpose of holding a hearing to receive ad-
ditional testimony from Raisa Musa Quinones and
other appropriate evidence relating to the credibil-
ity issues and other issues raised by Raisa Musa
Quinones' December 15, 1987 affidavit.3
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, at the conclusion
of the hearing, Judge Gadsden issue a supplemental
decision containing findings of fact, credibility res-
olutions, and conclusions of law. The supplemental
decision shall be served on the parties, after which
the provisions of Section 102.46 of the Board's
Rules and Regulations shall be applicable.
IT IS FURTHER
ORDERED
that
Respondent's
motion for a protective order is denied without
prejudice for the reasons stated above.
2 Our Order here, however, should not be construed as precluding the
judge upon a motion at the hearing for deciding in his discretion to se-
quester witnesses based on a showing that special circumstances exist
warranting sequestration under Unga Painting, supra.
2 Member Johansen views as most serious any allegation that witnesses
in Board proceedings are threatened in order to affect their testimony
and/or that witnesses have lied under oath either in Board hearings or in
affidavits presented to the Board. Accordingly , he would send the entire
record in this proceeding to the Department of Justice for whatever
action that agency may deem to be appropriate in light of all the circum-
stances in this case.