290 NLRB 975
Taino Paper Co., Inc.
TAINO PAPER CO.
975
Taino Paper Company, Inc. and Union de Tronquis-
tas de Puerto Rico, Local 901, affiliated with
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauf-
feurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America,
AFL-00.1 Case 24-CA-5551
August 25, 1988
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN STEPHENS AND MEMBERS
JOHANSEN AND CRACRAFT
On March 3,
1988, Administrative Law Judge
William N. Cates issued the attached decision. The
Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief,
and the General Counsel filed limited cross -excep-
tions and an answering brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has consid-
ered the decision and the record in light of the ex-
ceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the
judge's rulings, findings, and conclusions and to
adopt the recommended Order. 2
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the
recommended Order of the
administrative law
judge and orders that the Respondent, Taino Paper
Company, Inc., Bayamon, Puerto Rico, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action
set forth in the Order.
(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (Act). 2 The gra-
vamen of the complaint is that the Company laid off 24
specifically named employees on 18 March without
notice and without having afforded the Union an oppor-
tunity to bargain, as the exclusive representative of cer-
tain of the Company's employees, regarding the layoff
and its effects. The Company answered, admitting many
background and jurisdictional contentions made in the
complaint, but denied all claimed wrongdoings.
All parties were given full opportunity to participate,
introduce relevant evidence, examine and cross-examine
witnesses, argue orally, and file briefs. Briefs filed by the
Company and the General Counsel have been carefully
considered.
I conclude below, after examining the relevant evi-
dence and applicable legal principles , that the Company
violated the Act substantially as alleged in the complaint.
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
The Company is a Puerto Rico corporation with an
office and place of business located at Bayamon, Puerto
Rico, where it is engaged in the manufacture and distri-
bution of paper bags . Annually, the Company purchases
and receives goods and products valued in excess of
$50,000 directly from suppliers located outside the Com-
monwealth of Puerto Rico . The parties admit, and I find,
that the Company is, and at all times material has been,
an employer engaged in commerce and in a business af-
fecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2),
(6), and (7) of the Act.
i On November 1, 1987, the Teamsters International Union was read-
mitted to the AFL-CIO: Accordingly, the caption has been amended to
reflect that change.
2 The General Counsel excepts to the judge's failure to recommend
that the notice be posted in English and Spanish. We agree and order
posting in both languages.
Efrain Rivera-Vega, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Manuel A. Nunez Esq., of Hato Rey, Puerto Rico, for
the Company.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
WILLIAM N. CATES, Administrative Law Judge. This
case was heard at Hato Rey, Puerto Rico, on 16 Novem-
ber 1987. 1 The case arose when Union de Tronquistas de
Puerto Rico, Local 901, affiliated with International
Brotherhood of Teamster, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen
and Helpers of America, AFL-CIO (Union) filed an
unfair labor practice charge against Taino Paper Compa-
ny, Inc. (Company) on 27 March. The charge was
amended on 31 March and 22 May . Acting on behalf of
the Board's General Counsel, the Regional Director for
Region 24 investigated the charge and thereafter, on 27
May, issued a complaint and notice of hearing (com-
plaint) alleging the Company violated Section 8(a)(5) and
' All dates are 1987 unless otherwise indicated.
II. LABOR ORGANIZATION
The parties admit, and I find, the Union is, and at all
times material has been, a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Issues
The issues may be generally summarized for discussion
as follows:
1. Whether the Union was the collective-bargaining
representative of the production and maintenance em-
ployees of the Company at the time of the 18 March
layoff.
2. Whether the Company's decision to have a layoff
was a mandatory subject of bargaining.
3. Whether the Company's failure to give notice to,
and bargain with, the Union about the decision to have a
layoff and its effects on unit employees violated the Act.
If it is decided the Company violated the Act, that
would constitute an appropriate remedy . Each of the
generalized issues may and, in most cases, will have
s I granted counsel for the General Counsel 's unopposed motion to
delete the 8(aXl) allegations set forth at par. 9 of the complaint inasmuch
as the parties had executed, and the Regional Director for Region 24 had
approved, an informal settlement agreement remedying all 8(aXl) allega-
tions in that paragraph of the complaint.
290 NLRB No. 117
976
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
intertwined therewith certain subissues that will also be
considered.
B. Background and Operative Facts
The following chronological account of the back-
ground and operative facts is for the greater part admit-
ted, stipulated to, or uncontested
The Company commenced operations in 1984 and has
from its inception been managed by Edgar Rodriguez
(Rodriquez), its president. The Company manufactures
paper and bread bags and obtains the basic raw materials
for its production from either the United States or cer-
tain South American countries. The Company, at rele-
vant times, employed approximately 35 or 36 production
and maintenance employees. Prior to the March layoff,
which is the only layoff at issue, the Company had three
layoffs, each of which was brought about by an excess of
finished products. The there pre-March layoffs occurred
in October/Novermber 1984 (involving 20 employees),
September/October 1985 (involving 10 employees), and
January/February 1986 (involving 15 employees). Each
of the pre-March layoffs lasted approximately I week.
The employees were selected for the layoffs in 1984,
1985, and 1986 based on seniority and in accordance
with the Unjust Dismissal Law of Puerto Rico Public Law
No. 80 of 1976 (Pub. L. No. 80).3
Pursuant to a Board-conducted election held on 13
March, to which no objections were filed by the Compa-
ny, the Union was selected as the bargaining representa-
tive for certain employees in an appropriate unit at the
Company.4
On 16 March, the Company began contemplating the
need to lay off certain unit employees. It is somewhat
unclear whether the actual decision to have the March
layoff was made on 16 or 17 March; however, it is undis-
puted the Company notified the employees involved in
writing late in the work shift on the afternoon of 17
March that they would be laid off effective the next day,
' Sec 185(b) "Just Cause For Discharge" states in pertinent part
"Good cause for the discharge of an employee of an establishment shall
be understood to be: (f) Reductions in employment made necessary by a
reduction in the volume of production, sales or profits, anticipated or
prevalent at the time of the discharge " Sec 185(c) "Order of Retaining
Employees" states
In any case where employees are discharged for the reasons indicat-
ed in subsections (d), (e), and (f) of the preceding section, it shall be
the duty of the employer to retain with preference in the job those
employees of greater senionty provided there are positions vacant or
filled by employees of less senionty in the employment within their
occupational classification which may be held by them, it being un-
derstood that preference shall be given to the employees discharged
in the event that within the 6 months following their layoff the em-
ployer needs to employ a person in like or similar work to that
which said employees were doing prior to the time or their dis-
charge and within their occupational classification, following also
the seniority order in the reinstatement , except, and in both situa-
tions, in those cases in which there is a clear and conclusive differ-
ence in favor of the efficiency or capacity of the workers compared,
in which case the capacity shall prevail
The unit description is as follows
Included All production and maintenance employees including oper-
ators, bonders (empacadores),
machine tenders , and janitors em-
ployed by Respondent at Urbanizacion Industrial Minillas, Bayamon,
Puerto Rico
Excluded All other employees, office clerical employees , guards and
supervisors as defined in the Act
18 March.5 Twenty-four of the Company's 35 or 36 unit
employees were actually laid off on 18 March.'
The employees were laid off according to seniority
with certain exceptions.'
Portions of the first-shift and all the second-shift oper-
ations were discontinued during the March layoff. None
of the laid-off employees received any wages or econom-
ic remunerations while they were on layoff status. The
Company did provide medical coverage for the laid-off
employees until the end of March. It also provided medi-
cal coverage for most, if not all, the employees that were
returned to work during the month of April.
The Company did not notify the Union of the March
layoff. Company President Rodriguez testified the Union
was not notified because (1) the layoff was routine in
that similar layoffs had occurred in the past, (2) the
Union had not been certified and he did not know he
needed to notify the Union, and (3) the layoff was un-
avoidable in that the Company could not pay employees
when it had no work for them to perform.
It is undisputed that after the layoff occurred, the
Union did not request, either orally or in writing, that
the Company bargain with in concerning the layoff.8
On 23 March, the Board certified the Union as the col-
lective-bargaining representative for the employees in the
above-descnbed appropriate unit.
President Rodriguez testified that all those laid off in
March were recalled except for five or so who voluntari-
ly resigned their employment with the Company.9
It is undisputed that following the March layoff, the
Company laid off certain unit employees on 8 July and 9
September because of a surplus in finish products The
Company notified the Union, both telephonically and in
writing, before the post-March layoffs took place. A rep-
6 The written notification, which was signed by President Rodriguez,
stated in pertinent part
We regret to inform you that as of March 18, 1987 you are partially
suspended from employment without pay until further notice due to
lack of raw materials
6 The 24 employees involved were Herminio Arroyo Pantoja, Miguel
Class
Davila,
Antonio Conde, David Colon, Carlos Cruz Pastrana,
Ramon Huertas Rodriguez , David Lopez Ojeda, Efrain Lozada Fuentes,
Edwin Maysonet Rivera, Ruben Marcano Reyes, Juan Merced Rosado,
Nelson Nieves Ruiz, Hector Nieves Ruiz, Juan Ortiz Marcano, Carlos
Pacheco,
Manuel Padilla Ortiz, Carlos Ramos Ferrer ,
Juan
Rivera
Rivera, Luis M Reyes Rosado, Luis A Reyes Rosado, Ramon Rodri-
guez Reyes, Luis Rodriguez Coira, Juan Sanchez, and Saul Ventura
Viera
' All employees from No 35, the least senior employee on a company-
prepared seniority list, to No 9 inclusive were subject to layoff Marvin
Rodriguez, a maintenance adjustor (No 35 on the list), Jose A Gonzalez
de Jesus (No 30 on the list), a maintenance tool-and -die maker, and Jesus
Laureano Gonzalez (No 11 on the list), a mechanic, were not laid off
Company President Rodriguez contends these three were needed to
maintain equipment Ivan Ajenjo Laureano, the least senior employee at
the Company, was not laid off The Company contends he was not in-
cluded on its senionty list nor was he laid off because the Union had
challenged his vote in the Board-conducted election on 13 March as
being an administrative employee Employee Ruben Marcano testified
Baureano worked as a unit employee during the time of the March layoff
and has thereafter continued to perform unit work
8 As is noted elsewhere in this decision , the Union did file the refusal-
to-bargain charge against the Company on 27 March
9 The General Counsel was unable at trial to stipulate that all the laid-
off employees had in fact been recalled In his posttrial brief, however,
he concedes most, if not all, have been recalled
TAINO PAPER CO.
resentative of the Union informed the Company on both
occasions it saw no problems with the layoffs and told
the Company it could proceed with the layoffs. t °
C. Contentions of the Parties
Highlights of the parties' contentions are briefly sum-
marized as follows: t t
The General Counsel contends the Union was the col-
lective-bargaining
representative of the employees in
question at the time of the March layoff, that the Com-
pany acted without notice to or bargaining with the
Union concerning the layoff, that the layoff was a man-
datory subject of bargaining, that the layoff constituted a
material, substantial, and significant change in the terms
and conditions of employment of the unit employees, and
that, as such, the Company was obligated to notify and
bargain with the Union about the layoff. The General
Counsel contends the Company's failure to do so violat-
ed Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
The Company denies it had- an obligation to bargain
with the Union or that it violated the Act. More specifi-
cally, the Company contends its decision to have a layoff
on 18 March was a managerial one of the sort that is at
the core of entrepreneurial control and not subject to
mandatory bargaining. The Company also contends it
followed its past practice of laying off by seniority and
of being in compliance with the laws of the Common-
wealth of Puerto Rico and, as such, the layoff was rou-
tine and its actions were unavoidable. The Company fur-
ther contends the Union waived any right it may have
had with respect to bargaining because it did not make a
request to do so.
D. Discussions
Inasmuch as the underlying representation proceeding
resulted in certification, the Union was the collective-
bargaining representative of the laid-off employees on
the date they were laid off. Not only had the Union won
the 13 March representation election prior to the layoff,
but the Company had not filed objections to the election
results. Therefore, at the time of the 18 March layoff the
Company knew the Union would be, and it thereafter on
23 March was, certified as the collective-bargaining rep-
resentative of its production and maintenance employees.
When an employer,
such as the Company, makes
changes in terms and conditions of employment of unit
employees after an election, but before a union is certi-
fied, it does so at its peril in the absence of compelling
economic considerations . See GMC Ca, 209 NLRB 701
(1974), enf. denied on other grounds 512 F.2d 684 (8th
Cir. 1975). See also Clements
Wire & Mfg. Ca, 257
NLRB 1058 (1981).
I am persuaded the Company has failed to demonstrate
`.compelling economic considerations" that would have
absolved it from being required to notify the Union and
10 Seven unit employees were laid off on 8 July and the second shift
was temporarily discontinued as a result of the 9 September layoff.
11 I have not attempted to summarize all contentions made by the par-
ties at this point in the decision ; however, all contentions and arguments
of the parties have been considered and, to the extent necessary, fully dis-
cussed.
977
to bargain concerning the layoff. It would appear the un-
derlying rationale for not requiring bargaining when
there are "compelling economic considerations" is those
situations in which an unforeseen occurrence having a
major economic effect is about to happen that requires
immediate
action.
Angelica
Healthcare
Services,
284
NLRB 844 (1987). Such might, for example, be the case
when a major piece of machinery breaks down and there
is no time to notify the Union before a temporary layoff
is necessary. In the case sub judice, however, the Com-
pany knew as early as 16 March that a layoff was emi-
nent, and on 17 March it notified the employees in ques-
tion that there would be a layoff the next day, but did
not notify the Union. Thus, the Company had time to
notify the Union and, if requested, to bargain about the
layoffs. The Company has made no showing that the sit-
uation was so urgent it could not have notified the Union.
The law is settled that an employer violates its duty to
bargain with the exclusive representative of its employ-
ees by unilaterally implementing changes in terms and
conditions of their employment. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S.
736 (1962). A layoff of unit employees, such as the one
herein, falls within the scope of terms and conditions of
employment over which an employer has an obligation
to bargain. See, e.g., U.S. Gypsum Ca, 94 NLRB 112 114
(1951), and Southern Coach & Body Co. 141 NLRB 80, 81
(1963). The Company's contention that for it to have
maintained its entire work force any longer than it did
would have been "an unsound business practice" that
would have made it "less competitive" and "hurt its eco-
nomic stability" are insufficient defenses to justify the
unilateral changes it made in the terms and conditions of
employment of its unit employees. See Van Dorn Ca,
265 NLRB 864, 865 (1982), enfd. in part as modified 736
F.2d 343 (6th Cir. 1984).
The Company's contention that the March layoff, due
in part to a lack of raw materials was not a mandatory
subject of bargaining because it was an economically mo-
tivated decision within the meaning of Otis Elevator Ca,
269 NLRB 891 (1984), and First National Maintenance
Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981), is without merit.
First, in order for the teachings of Otis Elevator Co. or
First National Maintenance Corp. to be applicable, the
Company would have had to have established that the
layoff was a result of a change in the scope, nature, or
direction of its business. This it failed to do. The fact the
Company recalled the laid-off employees (except those
who resigned) refutes any contention on its part that the
layoff was a change in the scope, nature, or direction of
its business. The Company's motivation for the layoff
was an attempt to avoid labor costs. As Company Presi-
dent Rodriguez testified, the decision to have the layoff
was based in part on a lack of available raw materials,
but also in part because the Company did not wish to
pay wages for its entire work force without work for all
its employees to perform. Thus, the layoff was a manda-
tory subject of bargaining.
Even when, as in this case, the change involves a man-
datory subject of bargaining, it does not completely re-
solve the issue of an employer's bargaining obligation.
For a statutory bargaining obligation to arise regarding
978
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
any particular unilateral change that an employer imple-
ments, such must be a material, substantial, and signifi-
cant one affecting terms and conditions of employment
of bargaining unit employees. United Technologies Corp.,
278 NLRB 306 (1986). I find the layoff at issue had a
material, substantial, and significant impact on unit em-
ployees. The layoff adversely affected 24 of the Compa-
ny's 35 or 36 production and maintenance employees.
Those laid off did not receive any wages or economic re-
munerations (except health coverage) during the time
they were laid off. Additionally, the layoff caused the
Company to cease its second shift operations altogether
during the layoff.
In light of the above, it is clear the General Counsel
has established a prima facie showing of an 8(a)(5) viola-
tion. The General Counsel has demonstrated, (1) the
Union was the bargaining representative of the laid-off
employees at the time of their layoff, (2) the layoff was a
mandatory subject of bargaining, (3) the Company did
not give notice to, nor did it bargain with, the Union
about the decision to have a layoff or its impact on unit
employees, and (4) the layoff constituted a material, sub-
stantial , and significant change in the terms and condi-
tions of employment of unit employees.
After the General Counsel establishes a prima facie
case, as he has done herem, it is incumbent on the Com-
pany to demonstrate that its refusal to bargain was privi-
ledged. See Van Dorn Co., supra. This it has failed to do.
The Company's contention that the March layoff was
routine and that it followed past practice regarding im-
plementing the layoff is no defense to its unilateral
action. In the 3 years prior to the March layoff, the
Company only had three other layoffs, each of which re-
sulted from an excess of inventory and not as a result of
a lack of available raw materials. Thus, in my opinion,
the Company has not had a sufficient number of layoffs
to demonstrate a past practice even if layoffs for exces-
sive inventory were analogous to layoffs for a lack of
available raw materials . Furthermore the pre-March lay-
offs took place before the Union was the collective-bar-
gaining representative of the employees in question. The
Company's past practices, prior to the Union being the
representative of its employees, does not relieve it of its
obligation to give notice to and bargain with the Union
concerning laying off unit employees. See Amsterdam
Printing Litho Corp., 223 NLRB 370 (1976), enfd. 559
F.2d 188 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Furthermore, the Company
may not justify its unilateral action in March by show-
ing, as it did, that it thereafter, in two subsequent layoffs,
gave notice to the Union concerning those layoffs. Such
post-March layoff conduct is irrelevant regarding the le-
gality of the Company's actions in March. It would be
speculative to infer that because the Union did not re-
quest bargaining on the two post-March layoffs that it
would not have requested bargaining concerning the
layoff at issue.
The Company's contention that, because it complied
with Pub. L. No. 80 and followed strict seniority in the
March layoff, there was nothing the Union could have
done to have avoided the layoff or those selected for
layoff and it would have made "no sense" for it to have
notified or bargained with the Union is without merit
First, Pub L. No 80 governs the discharge and not the
layoff of employees in those cases when the layoff is for
3 months or less. t 2 Because the Company contends all
(except those who voluntarily resigned) were called
before 3 months, Pub. L. No. 80 would not have gov-
erned or been applicable to the layoff. Second, even if
Pub. L. No. 80 applied, it does not require strict compli-
ance with seniority in that it allows an employer to
retain less senior, but more efficient, employees. In this
regard, the evidence demonstrates the Company did not
follow strict seniority in selecting employees for the
layoff. It explained it needed Marvin Rodriguez, Jose A.
Gonzalez de Jesus, and Jesus Laureano Gonzalez to
maintain its equipment, but it did not adequately explain
why it retained Ivan Ajenjo Laureano, the least senior
employee at the plant, to perform unit work during and
after the layoff. Thus, the Company was not required to
follow Pub. L. No. 80, nor did it select the employees
for layoff by strict seniority.
I reject the Company's argument, alluded to above,
that it would have made "no sense" to have notified the
Union or to have bargained with it about the layoff be-
cause there was nothing the Union could have done to
have changed the outcome. The Board has long held
that the statutory duty to give notice and bargain is not
limited to those situations in which mutually acceptable
solutions are guaranteed or even reasonably likely. See
Awrey Bakeries, 217 NLRB 730, 733 (1975), enfd. per
curiam 548 F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1976).
Finally, I find no merit to the Company's contention
that the Union waived its right to bargain over the layoff
because it made no request either orally or in writing to
do so. It is undisputed the Union was confronted with a
fait accompli at the time it learned of the March layoff.
It is clear Board precedent does not require a union to
request bargaining when confronted with a fait accompli.
See Migali Industries, 285 NLRB 820 (1987).
Accordingly, I find the Company violated Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by unilaterally laying off cer-
tain of its employees on 18 March without prior notice
to the Union and without having afforded the Union an
opportunity to negotiate and bargain regarding such acts
and conduct and the effects of such acts and conduct.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Company, Tanio Paper Company, Inc., is an
employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. Union de Tronquistas de Puerto Rico, Local 901, af-
filiated
with
International
Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and Helpers of America,
AFL-CIO is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
12 This interpretation of Pub L No 80 appears to be supported by the
"Guidelines for the Interpretation and Application of Law No 80," ap-
proved 30 May 1976 by the Office of the Solicitor, Department of Labor
and Human Resources of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico I grant the
General Counsel's unopposed motion to supplement the record to include
as an exhibit applicable portions of the above-described document I have
labeled the Spanish translation as G C. Exh 4(a) and the English transla-
tion as G C Exh 4(b)
TAINO PAPER CO.
3. All production and maintenance employees, includ-
ing operators, bonders (empacadores), machine tenders,
and janitors employed by the Company at Urbanizacion
Industrial Minillas, Bayamon, Puerto Rico, but excluding
all other employees, office clerical employees, guards,
and supervisors as defined in the Act constitute a unit
appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining
within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act.
4. The Union is now, and at all times material has
been, the exclusive collective-bargaining representative
of the above unit employees within the meaning of Sec-
tion 9(a) of the Act.
5. On or about 18 March, by unilaterally laying off
certain of its unit employees without prior notice to the
Union and without having afforded the Union an oppor-
tunity to bargain regarding the layoff and its effects, the
Company has engaged in unfair labor practices within
the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
6. The unfair labor practices affect commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found the Company violated Section
8(a)(5)
and (1) of the Act by laying off employees Herminio
Arroyo Pantoja, Miguel Class Davila, Antonio Conde,
David Colon, Carlos Cruz Pastrana, Ramon Huertas Ro-
driguez, David Lopez Ojeda, Efrain Lozada Fuentes,
Edwin Maysonet Rivera, Ruben Marcano Reyes, Juan
Merced Rosado, Nelson Rosado, Nelson Nieves Ruiz,
Hector Nieves Ruiz, Juan Ortiz Marcano, Carlos Pa-
checo, Manuel Padilla Ortiz, Carlos Ramos Ferrer, Juan
Rivera Rivera, Luis M. Reves Rosado, Luis A. Reyes
Rosado, Ramon Rodriguez Reyes, Luis Rodriguez Coira,
Juan Sanchez, and Saul Ventura Viera without notice to
and bargaining with the Union, I shall order the Compa-
ny, on request, to bargain with the Union concerining
the 18 March layoff. I shall further order that the Com-
pany make whole the employees laid off on 18 March by
paying them their normal wages from the date of their
layoff until they were recalled to work. 13 Backpay shall
be computed in the manner set forth in F. W. Woolworth
Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950), with interest as computed in
New Horizons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987).14
In the absence of special circumstances, the General
Counsel's request for a visitatorial clause is denied. See
Cherokee Marine Terminal, 287 NLRB 1080 (1988).
111 Any dispute concerning when any particular employee was returned
to work can be resolved at the compliance stage of this case. Further,
any dispute whether certain employees resigned rather than accept recall
shall also be left to the compliance stage of this case. I reject the Compa-
ny's contention that any remedy requiring backpay in the circumstances
of this case would be punitive rather than remedial. See, e.g., Intersystems
Design Corp, 278 NLRB 759 (1986).
14 In accordance with our decision in New Horizons for the Retarded,
283 NLRB 1173 (1987), interest on and after January 1, 1987, shall be
computed at the 'short-term Federal rate" for the underpayment of taxes
as set out in the 1986 amendment to 26 U.S.C. § 6621. Interest on
amounts accrued prior to January 1, 1987 (the effective date of the 1986
amendment to 26 U.S.C. § 6621), shall be computed in accordance with
Florida Steel Corp., 231 NLRB 651 (1977).
979
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law, and
on the entire record, I issue the following recommend-
ed"
ORDER
The Company, Taino Paper Company, Inc., Bayamon,
Puerto Rico, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Unilaterally laying off employees without notice to
or bargaining with the Union as the exclusive representa-
tive of its employees in the below-described appropriate
bargaining unit prior to making such changes.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) On request, bargain collectively and in good faith,
with the Union as the exclusive representative of its em-
ployees in the below-described bargaining unit concern-
ing the 18 March layoff. The appropriate unit is:
Included: All production and maintenance em-
ployees including operators, bonders (emplaca-
dores), machine tenders, and janitors employed by
Respondent at Urbanizacion Industrial Minillas, Ba-
yamon, Puerto Rico.
Excluded: All other employees, office clerical
employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the
Act.
(b) Make whole those employees laid off on 18 March
for any loss of pay suffered as a result of this unlawful
conduct in the manner set forth in the remedy section of
this decision.
(c) Preserve and, on request, make available to the
Board or its agents for examination and copying all pay-
roll records, social security payment records, timecards,
personnel records and reports, and all other records nec-
essary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the
terms of this Order.
(d) Post at its Bayamon, Puerto Rico facility copies of
the attached notice marked "Appendix."16 Copies of the
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 24, after being signed by the Respondent's au-
thorized representative, shall be posted by the Respond-
ent immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60 con-
secutive days in conspicuous places including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. Rea-
sonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure
'
If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board's
Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended
Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur-
poses
16If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Nation-
al Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of
the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National
Labor Relations Board."
980
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by
any other material.
(e) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20
days from the date of this Order what steps the Re-
spondent has taken to comply.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated the National Labor Relations Act and has or-
dered us to post and abide by this notice.
Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.
To organize
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choice
To act together for other mutual aid or protec-
tion
To choose not to engage in any of these protect-
ed concerted activities.
WE WILL NOT unilaterally without notice to or bar-
gaining with the Union layoff employees in the following
bargaining unit, which is represented for the purposes of
collective bargaining by Union de Tronquistas de Puerto
Rico, Local 901 , affiliated with International Brother-
hood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and
Helpers of America, AFL-CIO:
Included: All production and maintenance em-
ployees including operators, bonders (empacadores),
machine tenders, and janitors employed by Re-
spondent at Urbanizacion Industrial Minillas, Baya-
mon, Puerto Rico.
Excluded: All other employees, office clerical
employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the
Act.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, on request, bargain collectively and in good
faith with Union de Tronquistas de Puerto, Local 901,
affiliated with International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and Helpers of America,
AFL-CIO as the exclusive bargaining representative of
our employees in the above-described unit concerning
the layoff on 18 March 1987.
WE WILL make Hermmio Arroyo Pantoja, Miguel
Class Davila, Antonia Conde, David Colon, Carlos Cruz
Pastrana,
Ramon Huertas Rodriguez, David Lopez
Ojeda, Efrain Lozada Fuentes, Edwin Maysonet Rivera,
Ruben Marcano Reyes, Juan Merced Rosado, Nelson
Nieves Ruiz, Hector Nieves Ruiz, Juan Ortiz Marcano,
Carlos Pacheco, Manuel Padilla Ortiz, Carlos Ramos
Ferrer, Juan Rivera Rivera, Luis M. Reyes Rosado, Luis
A. Reyes Rosado, Ramon Rodriguez Reyes, Luis Rodri-
guez Coira, Juan Sanchez, and Saul Ventura Viera
whole for any loss of pay they may have suffered as a
result of their being laid off on 18 March 1987, with in-
terest.
TAINO PAPER COMPANY, INC.