290 NLRB 975

Taino Paper Co., Inc.

Last amended: 1988Year: 1988Length: 5,688 wordsOfficial source
TAINO PAPER CO. 975 Taino Paper Company, Inc. and Union de Tronquis- tas de Puerto Rico, Local 901, affiliated with International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauf- feurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, AFL-00.1 Case 24-CA-5551 August 25, 1988 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN STEPHENS AND MEMBERS JOHANSEN AND CRACRAFT On March 3, 1988, Administrative Law Judge William N. Cates issued the attached decision. The Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and the General Counsel filed limited cross -excep- tions and an answering brief. The National Labor Relations Board has consid- ered the decision and the record in light of the ex- ceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings, and conclusions and to adopt the recommended Order. 2 ORDER The National Labor Relations Board adopts the recommended Order of the administrative law judge and orders that the Respondent, Taino Paper Company, Inc., Bayamon, Puerto Rico, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Order. (1) of the National Labor Relations Act (Act). 2 The gra- vamen of the complaint is that the Company laid off 24 specifically named employees on 18 March without notice and without having afforded the Union an oppor- tunity to bargain, as the exclusive representative of cer- tain of the Company's employees, regarding the layoff and its effects. The Company answered, admitting many background and jurisdictional contentions made in the complaint, but denied all claimed wrongdoings. All parties were given full opportunity to participate, introduce relevant evidence, examine and cross-examine witnesses, argue orally, and file briefs. Briefs filed by the Company and the General Counsel have been carefully considered. I conclude below, after examining the relevant evi- dence and applicable legal principles , that the Company violated the Act substantially as alleged in the complaint. FINDINGS OF FACT I. JURISDICTION The Company is a Puerto Rico corporation with an office and place of business located at Bayamon, Puerto Rico, where it is engaged in the manufacture and distri- bution of paper bags . Annually, the Company purchases and receives goods and products valued in excess of $50,000 directly from suppliers located outside the Com- monwealth of Puerto Rico . The parties admit, and I find, that the Company is, and at all times material has been, an employer engaged in commerce and in a business af- fecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. i On November 1, 1987, the Teamsters International Union was read- mitted to the AFL-CIO: Accordingly, the caption has been amended to reflect that change. 2 The General Counsel excepts to the judge's failure to recommend that the notice be posted in English and Spanish. We agree and order posting in both languages. Efrain Rivera-Vega, Esq., for the General Counsel. Manuel A. Nunez Esq., of Hato Rey, Puerto Rico, for the Company. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE WILLIAM N. CATES, Administrative Law Judge. This case was heard at Hato Rey, Puerto Rico, on 16 Novem- ber 1987. 1 The case arose when Union de Tronquistas de Puerto Rico, Local 901, affiliated with International Brotherhood of Teamster, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, AFL-CIO (Union) filed an unfair labor practice charge against Taino Paper Compa- ny, Inc. (Company) on 27 March. The charge was amended on 31 March and 22 May . Acting on behalf of the Board's General Counsel, the Regional Director for Region 24 investigated the charge and thereafter, on 27 May, issued a complaint and notice of hearing (com- plaint) alleging the Company violated Section 8(a)(5) and ' All dates are 1987 unless otherwise indicated. II. LABOR ORGANIZATION The parties admit, and I find, the Union is, and at all times material has been, a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The Issues The issues may be generally summarized for discussion as follows: 1. Whether the Union was the collective-bargaining representative of the production and maintenance em- ployees of the Company at the time of the 18 March layoff. 2. Whether the Company's decision to have a layoff was a mandatory subject of bargaining. 3. Whether the Company's failure to give notice to, and bargain with, the Union about the decision to have a layoff and its effects on unit employees violated the Act. If it is decided the Company violated the Act, that would constitute an appropriate remedy . Each of the generalized issues may and, in most cases, will have s I granted counsel for the General Counsel 's unopposed motion to delete the 8(aXl) allegations set forth at par. 9 of the complaint inasmuch as the parties had executed, and the Regional Director for Region 24 had approved, an informal settlement agreement remedying all 8(aXl) allega- tions in that paragraph of the complaint. 290 NLRB No. 117 976 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD intertwined therewith certain subissues that will also be considered. B. Background and Operative Facts The following chronological account of the back- ground and operative facts is for the greater part admit- ted, stipulated to, or uncontested The Company commenced operations in 1984 and has from its inception been managed by Edgar Rodriguez (Rodriquez), its president. The Company manufactures paper and bread bags and obtains the basic raw materials for its production from either the United States or cer- tain South American countries. The Company, at rele- vant times, employed approximately 35 or 36 production and maintenance employees. Prior to the March layoff, which is the only layoff at issue, the Company had three layoffs, each of which was brought about by an excess of finished products. The there pre-March layoffs occurred in October/Novermber 1984 (involving 20 employees), September/October 1985 (involving 10 employees), and January/February 1986 (involving 15 employees). Each of the pre-March layoffs lasted approximately I week. The employees were selected for the layoffs in 1984, 1985, and 1986 based on seniority and in accordance with the Unjust Dismissal Law of Puerto Rico Public Law No. 80 of 1976 (Pub. L. No. 80).3 Pursuant to a Board-conducted election held on 13 March, to which no objections were filed by the Compa- ny, the Union was selected as the bargaining representa- tive for certain employees in an appropriate unit at the Company.4 On 16 March, the Company began contemplating the need to lay off certain unit employees. It is somewhat unclear whether the actual decision to have the March layoff was made on 16 or 17 March; however, it is undis- puted the Company notified the employees involved in writing late in the work shift on the afternoon of 17 March that they would be laid off effective the next day, ' Sec 185(b) "Just Cause For Discharge" states in pertinent part "Good cause for the discharge of an employee of an establishment shall be understood to be: (f) Reductions in employment made necessary by a reduction in the volume of production, sales or profits, anticipated or prevalent at the time of the discharge " Sec 185(c) "Order of Retaining Employees" states In any case where employees are discharged for the reasons indicat- ed in subsections (d), (e), and (f) of the preceding section, it shall be the duty of the employer to retain with preference in the job those employees of greater senionty provided there are positions vacant or filled by employees of less senionty in the employment within their occupational classification which may be held by them, it being un- derstood that preference shall be given to the employees discharged in the event that within the 6 months following their layoff the em- ployer needs to employ a person in like or similar work to that which said employees were doing prior to the time or their dis- charge and within their occupational classification, following also the seniority order in the reinstatement , except, and in both situa- tions, in those cases in which there is a clear and conclusive differ- ence in favor of the efficiency or capacity of the workers compared, in which case the capacity shall prevail The unit description is as follows Included All production and maintenance employees including oper- ators, bonders (empacadores), machine tenders , and janitors em- ployed by Respondent at Urbanizacion Industrial Minillas, Bayamon, Puerto Rico Excluded All other employees, office clerical employees , guards and supervisors as defined in the Act 18 March.5 Twenty-four of the Company's 35 or 36 unit employees were actually laid off on 18 March.' The employees were laid off according to seniority with certain exceptions.' Portions of the first-shift and all the second-shift oper- ations were discontinued during the March layoff. None of the laid-off employees received any wages or econom- ic remunerations while they were on layoff status. The Company did provide medical coverage for the laid-off employees until the end of March. It also provided medi- cal coverage for most, if not all, the employees that were returned to work during the month of April. The Company did not notify the Union of the March layoff. Company President Rodriguez testified the Union was not notified because (1) the layoff was routine in that similar layoffs had occurred in the past, (2) the Union had not been certified and he did not know he needed to notify the Union, and (3) the layoff was un- avoidable in that the Company could not pay employees when it had no work for them to perform. It is undisputed that after the layoff occurred, the Union did not request, either orally or in writing, that the Company bargain with in concerning the layoff.8 On 23 March, the Board certified the Union as the col- lective-bargaining representative for the employees in the above-descnbed appropriate unit. President Rodriguez testified that all those laid off in March were recalled except for five or so who voluntari- ly resigned their employment with the Company.9 It is undisputed that following the March layoff, the Company laid off certain unit employees on 8 July and 9 September because of a surplus in finish products The Company notified the Union, both telephonically and in writing, before the post-March layoffs took place. A rep- 6 The written notification, which was signed by President Rodriguez, stated in pertinent part We regret to inform you that as of March 18, 1987 you are partially suspended from employment without pay until further notice due to lack of raw materials 6 The 24 employees involved were Herminio Arroyo Pantoja, Miguel Class Davila, Antonio Conde, David Colon, Carlos Cruz Pastrana, Ramon Huertas Rodriguez , David Lopez Ojeda, Efrain Lozada Fuentes, Edwin Maysonet Rivera, Ruben Marcano Reyes, Juan Merced Rosado, Nelson Nieves Ruiz, Hector Nieves Ruiz, Juan Ortiz Marcano, Carlos Pacheco, Manuel Padilla Ortiz, Carlos Ramos Ferrer , Juan Rivera Rivera, Luis M Reyes Rosado, Luis A Reyes Rosado, Ramon Rodri- guez Reyes, Luis Rodriguez Coira, Juan Sanchez, and Saul Ventura Viera ' All employees from No 35, the least senior employee on a company- prepared seniority list, to No 9 inclusive were subject to layoff Marvin Rodriguez, a maintenance adjustor (No 35 on the list), Jose A Gonzalez de Jesus (No 30 on the list), a maintenance tool-and -die maker, and Jesus Laureano Gonzalez (No 11 on the list), a mechanic, were not laid off Company President Rodriguez contends these three were needed to maintain equipment Ivan Ajenjo Laureano, the least senior employee at the Company, was not laid off The Company contends he was not in- cluded on its senionty list nor was he laid off because the Union had challenged his vote in the Board-conducted election on 13 March as being an administrative employee Employee Ruben Marcano testified Baureano worked as a unit employee during the time of the March layoff and has thereafter continued to perform unit work 8 As is noted elsewhere in this decision , the Union did file the refusal- to-bargain charge against the Company on 27 March 9 The General Counsel was unable at trial to stipulate that all the laid- off employees had in fact been recalled In his posttrial brief, however, he concedes most, if not all, have been recalled TAINO PAPER CO. resentative of the Union informed the Company on both occasions it saw no problems with the layoffs and told the Company it could proceed with the layoffs. t ° C. Contentions of the Parties Highlights of the parties' contentions are briefly sum- marized as follows: t t The General Counsel contends the Union was the col- lective-bargaining representative of the employees in question at the time of the March layoff, that the Com- pany acted without notice to or bargaining with the Union concerning the layoff, that the layoff was a man- datory subject of bargaining, that the layoff constituted a material, substantial, and significant change in the terms and conditions of employment of the unit employees, and that, as such, the Company was obligated to notify and bargain with the Union about the layoff. The General Counsel contends the Company's failure to do so violat- ed Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. The Company denies it had- an obligation to bargain with the Union or that it violated the Act. More specifi- cally, the Company contends its decision to have a layoff on 18 March was a managerial one of the sort that is at the core of entrepreneurial control and not subject to mandatory bargaining. The Company also contends it followed its past practice of laying off by seniority and of being in compliance with the laws of the Common- wealth of Puerto Rico and, as such, the layoff was rou- tine and its actions were unavoidable. The Company fur- ther contends the Union waived any right it may have had with respect to bargaining because it did not make a request to do so. D. Discussions Inasmuch as the underlying representation proceeding resulted in certification, the Union was the collective- bargaining representative of the laid-off employees on the date they were laid off. Not only had the Union won the 13 March representation election prior to the layoff, but the Company had not filed objections to the election results. Therefore, at the time of the 18 March layoff the Company knew the Union would be, and it thereafter on 23 March was, certified as the collective-bargaining rep- resentative of its production and maintenance employees. When an employer, such as the Company, makes changes in terms and conditions of employment of unit employees after an election, but before a union is certi- fied, it does so at its peril in the absence of compelling economic considerations . See GMC Ca, 209 NLRB 701 (1974), enf. denied on other grounds 512 F.2d 684 (8th Cir. 1975). See also Clements Wire & Mfg. Ca, 257 NLRB 1058 (1981). I am persuaded the Company has failed to demonstrate `.compelling economic considerations" that would have absolved it from being required to notify the Union and 10 Seven unit employees were laid off on 8 July and the second shift was temporarily discontinued as a result of the 9 September layoff. 11 I have not attempted to summarize all contentions made by the par- ties at this point in the decision ; however, all contentions and arguments of the parties have been considered and, to the extent necessary, fully dis- cussed. 977 to bargain concerning the layoff. It would appear the un- derlying rationale for not requiring bargaining when there are "compelling economic considerations" is those situations in which an unforeseen occurrence having a major economic effect is about to happen that requires immediate action. Angelica Healthcare Services, 284 NLRB 844 (1987). Such might, for example, be the case when a major piece of machinery breaks down and there is no time to notify the Union before a temporary layoff is necessary. In the case sub judice, however, the Com- pany knew as early as 16 March that a layoff was emi- nent, and on 17 March it notified the employees in ques- tion that there would be a layoff the next day, but did not notify the Union. Thus, the Company had time to notify the Union and, if requested, to bargain about the layoffs. The Company has made no showing that the sit- uation was so urgent it could not have notified the Union. The law is settled that an employer violates its duty to bargain with the exclusive representative of its employ- ees by unilaterally implementing changes in terms and conditions of their employment. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962). A layoff of unit employees, such as the one herein, falls within the scope of terms and conditions of employment over which an employer has an obligation to bargain. See, e.g., U.S. Gypsum Ca, 94 NLRB 112 114 (1951), and Southern Coach & Body Co. 141 NLRB 80, 81 (1963). The Company's contention that for it to have maintained its entire work force any longer than it did would have been "an unsound business practice" that would have made it "less competitive" and "hurt its eco- nomic stability" are insufficient defenses to justify the unilateral changes it made in the terms and conditions of employment of its unit employees. See Van Dorn Ca, 265 NLRB 864, 865 (1982), enfd. in part as modified 736 F.2d 343 (6th Cir. 1984). The Company's contention that the March layoff, due in part to a lack of raw materials was not a mandatory subject of bargaining because it was an economically mo- tivated decision within the meaning of Otis Elevator Ca, 269 NLRB 891 (1984), and First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981), is without merit. First, in order for the teachings of Otis Elevator Co. or First National Maintenance Corp. to be applicable, the Company would have had to have established that the layoff was a result of a change in the scope, nature, or direction of its business. This it failed to do. The fact the Company recalled the laid-off employees (except those who resigned) refutes any contention on its part that the layoff was a change in the scope, nature, or direction of its business. The Company's motivation for the layoff was an attempt to avoid labor costs. As Company Presi- dent Rodriguez testified, the decision to have the layoff was based in part on a lack of available raw materials, but also in part because the Company did not wish to pay wages for its entire work force without work for all its employees to perform. Thus, the layoff was a manda- tory subject of bargaining. Even when, as in this case, the change involves a man- datory subject of bargaining, it does not completely re- solve the issue of an employer's bargaining obligation. For a statutory bargaining obligation to arise regarding 978 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD any particular unilateral change that an employer imple- ments, such must be a material, substantial, and signifi- cant one affecting terms and conditions of employment of bargaining unit employees. United Technologies Corp., 278 NLRB 306 (1986). I find the layoff at issue had a material, substantial, and significant impact on unit em- ployees. The layoff adversely affected 24 of the Compa- ny's 35 or 36 production and maintenance employees. Those laid off did not receive any wages or economic re- munerations (except health coverage) during the time they were laid off. Additionally, the layoff caused the Company to cease its second shift operations altogether during the layoff. In light of the above, it is clear the General Counsel has established a prima facie showing of an 8(a)(5) viola- tion. The General Counsel has demonstrated, (1) the Union was the bargaining representative of the laid-off employees at the time of their layoff, (2) the layoff was a mandatory subject of bargaining, (3) the Company did not give notice to, nor did it bargain with, the Union about the decision to have a layoff or its impact on unit employees, and (4) the layoff constituted a material, sub- stantial , and significant change in the terms and condi- tions of employment of unit employees. After the General Counsel establishes a prima facie case, as he has done herem, it is incumbent on the Com- pany to demonstrate that its refusal to bargain was privi- ledged. See Van Dorn Co., supra. This it has failed to do. The Company's contention that the March layoff was routine and that it followed past practice regarding im- plementing the layoff is no defense to its unilateral action. In the 3 years prior to the March layoff, the Company only had three other layoffs, each of which re- sulted from an excess of inventory and not as a result of a lack of available raw materials. Thus, in my opinion, the Company has not had a sufficient number of layoffs to demonstrate a past practice even if layoffs for exces- sive inventory were analogous to layoffs for a lack of available raw materials . Furthermore the pre-March lay- offs took place before the Union was the collective-bar- gaining representative of the employees in question. The Company's past practices, prior to the Union being the representative of its employees, does not relieve it of its obligation to give notice to and bargain with the Union concerning laying off unit employees. See Amsterdam Printing Litho Corp., 223 NLRB 370 (1976), enfd. 559 F.2d 188 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Furthermore, the Company may not justify its unilateral action in March by show- ing, as it did, that it thereafter, in two subsequent layoffs, gave notice to the Union concerning those layoffs. Such post-March layoff conduct is irrelevant regarding the le- gality of the Company's actions in March. It would be speculative to infer that because the Union did not re- quest bargaining on the two post-March layoffs that it would not have requested bargaining concerning the layoff at issue. The Company's contention that, because it complied with Pub. L. No. 80 and followed strict seniority in the March layoff, there was nothing the Union could have done to have avoided the layoff or those selected for layoff and it would have made "no sense" for it to have notified or bargained with the Union is without merit First, Pub L. No 80 governs the discharge and not the layoff of employees in those cases when the layoff is for 3 months or less. t 2 Because the Company contends all (except those who voluntarily resigned) were called before 3 months, Pub. L. No. 80 would not have gov- erned or been applicable to the layoff. Second, even if Pub. L. No. 80 applied, it does not require strict compli- ance with seniority in that it allows an employer to retain less senior, but more efficient, employees. In this regard, the evidence demonstrates the Company did not follow strict seniority in selecting employees for the layoff. It explained it needed Marvin Rodriguez, Jose A. Gonzalez de Jesus, and Jesus Laureano Gonzalez to maintain its equipment, but it did not adequately explain why it retained Ivan Ajenjo Laureano, the least senior employee at the plant, to perform unit work during and after the layoff. Thus, the Company was not required to follow Pub. L. No. 80, nor did it select the employees for layoff by strict seniority. I reject the Company's argument, alluded to above, that it would have made "no sense" to have notified the Union or to have bargained with it about the layoff be- cause there was nothing the Union could have done to have changed the outcome. The Board has long held that the statutory duty to give notice and bargain is not limited to those situations in which mutually acceptable solutions are guaranteed or even reasonably likely. See Awrey Bakeries, 217 NLRB 730, 733 (1975), enfd. per curiam 548 F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1976). Finally, I find no merit to the Company's contention that the Union waived its right to bargain over the layoff because it made no request either orally or in writing to do so. It is undisputed the Union was confronted with a fait accompli at the time it learned of the March layoff. It is clear Board precedent does not require a union to request bargaining when confronted with a fait accompli. See Migali Industries, 285 NLRB 820 (1987). Accordingly, I find the Company violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by unilaterally laying off cer- tain of its employees on 18 March without prior notice to the Union and without having afforded the Union an opportunity to negotiate and bargain regarding such acts and conduct and the effects of such acts and conduct. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The Company, Tanio Paper Company, Inc., is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. 2. Union de Tronquistas de Puerto Rico, Local 901, af- filiated with International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, AFL-CIO is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 12 This interpretation of Pub L No 80 appears to be supported by the "Guidelines for the Interpretation and Application of Law No 80," ap- proved 30 May 1976 by the Office of the Solicitor, Department of Labor and Human Resources of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico I grant the General Counsel's unopposed motion to supplement the record to include as an exhibit applicable portions of the above-described document I have labeled the Spanish translation as G C. Exh 4(a) and the English transla- tion as G C Exh 4(b) TAINO PAPER CO. 3. All production and maintenance employees, includ- ing operators, bonders (empacadores), machine tenders, and janitors employed by the Company at Urbanizacion Industrial Minillas, Bayamon, Puerto Rico, but excluding all other employees, office clerical employees, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act. 4. The Union is now, and at all times material has been, the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the above unit employees within the meaning of Sec- tion 9(a) of the Act. 5. On or about 18 March, by unilaterally laying off certain of its unit employees without prior notice to the Union and without having afforded the Union an oppor- tunity to bargain regarding the layoff and its effects, the Company has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. 6. The unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. THE REMEDY Having found the Company violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by laying off employees Herminio Arroyo Pantoja, Miguel Class Davila, Antonio Conde, David Colon, Carlos Cruz Pastrana, Ramon Huertas Ro- driguez, David Lopez Ojeda, Efrain Lozada Fuentes, Edwin Maysonet Rivera, Ruben Marcano Reyes, Juan Merced Rosado, Nelson Rosado, Nelson Nieves Ruiz, Hector Nieves Ruiz, Juan Ortiz Marcano, Carlos Pa- checo, Manuel Padilla Ortiz, Carlos Ramos Ferrer, Juan Rivera Rivera, Luis M. Reves Rosado, Luis A. Reyes Rosado, Ramon Rodriguez Reyes, Luis Rodriguez Coira, Juan Sanchez, and Saul Ventura Viera without notice to and bargaining with the Union, I shall order the Compa- ny, on request, to bargain with the Union concerining the 18 March layoff. I shall further order that the Com- pany make whole the employees laid off on 18 March by paying them their normal wages from the date of their layoff until they were recalled to work. 13 Backpay shall be computed in the manner set forth in F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950), with interest as computed in New Horizons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987).14 In the absence of special circumstances, the General Counsel's request for a visitatorial clause is denied. See Cherokee Marine Terminal, 287 NLRB 1080 (1988). 111 Any dispute concerning when any particular employee was returned to work can be resolved at the compliance stage of this case. Further, any dispute whether certain employees resigned rather than accept recall shall also be left to the compliance stage of this case. I reject the Compa- ny's contention that any remedy requiring backpay in the circumstances of this case would be punitive rather than remedial. See, e.g., Intersystems Design Corp, 278 NLRB 759 (1986). 14 In accordance with our decision in New Horizons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987), interest on and after January 1, 1987, shall be computed at the 'short-term Federal rate" for the underpayment of taxes as set out in the 1986 amendment to 26 U.S.C. § 6621. Interest on amounts accrued prior to January 1, 1987 (the effective date of the 1986 amendment to 26 U.S.C. § 6621), shall be computed in accordance with Florida Steel Corp., 231 NLRB 651 (1977). 979 On these findings of fact and conclusions of law, and on the entire record, I issue the following recommend- ed" ORDER The Company, Taino Paper Company, Inc., Bayamon, Puerto Rico, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall 1. Cease and desist from (a) Unilaterally laying off employees without notice to or bargaining with the Union as the exclusive representa- tive of its employees in the below-described appropriate bargaining unit prior to making such changes. (b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re- straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act. (a) On request, bargain collectively and in good faith, with the Union as the exclusive representative of its em- ployees in the below-described bargaining unit concern- ing the 18 March layoff. The appropriate unit is: Included: All production and maintenance em- ployees including operators, bonders (emplaca- dores), machine tenders, and janitors employed by Respondent at Urbanizacion Industrial Minillas, Ba- yamon, Puerto Rico. Excluded: All other employees, office clerical employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. (b) Make whole those employees laid off on 18 March for any loss of pay suffered as a result of this unlawful conduct in the manner set forth in the remedy section of this decision. (c) Preserve and, on request, make available to the Board or its agents for examination and copying all pay- roll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records nec- essary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this Order. (d) Post at its Bayamon, Puerto Rico facility copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."16 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 24, after being signed by the Respondent's au- thorized representative, shall be posted by the Respond- ent immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60 con- secutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Rea- sonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure ' If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board's Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur- poses 16If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Nation- al Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." 980 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (e) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days from the date of this Order what steps the Re- spondent has taken to comply. APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the National Labor Relations Act and has or- dered us to post and abide by this notice. Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights. To organize To form, join, or assist any union To bargain collectively through representatives of their own choice To act together for other mutual aid or protec- tion To choose not to engage in any of these protect- ed concerted activities. WE WILL NOT unilaterally without notice to or bar- gaining with the Union layoff employees in the following bargaining unit, which is represented for the purposes of collective bargaining by Union de Tronquistas de Puerto Rico, Local 901 , affiliated with International Brother- hood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, AFL-CIO: Included: All production and maintenance em- ployees including operators, bonders (empacadores), machine tenders, and janitors employed by Re- spondent at Urbanizacion Industrial Minillas, Baya- mon, Puerto Rico. Excluded: All other employees, office clerical employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act. WE WILL, on request, bargain collectively and in good faith with Union de Tronquistas de Puerto, Local 901, affiliated with International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, AFL-CIO as the exclusive bargaining representative of our employees in the above-described unit concerning the layoff on 18 March 1987. WE WILL make Hermmio Arroyo Pantoja, Miguel Class Davila, Antonia Conde, David Colon, Carlos Cruz Pastrana, Ramon Huertas Rodriguez, David Lopez Ojeda, Efrain Lozada Fuentes, Edwin Maysonet Rivera, Ruben Marcano Reyes, Juan Merced Rosado, Nelson Nieves Ruiz, Hector Nieves Ruiz, Juan Ortiz Marcano, Carlos Pacheco, Manuel Padilla Ortiz, Carlos Ramos Ferrer, Juan Rivera Rivera, Luis M. Reyes Rosado, Luis A. Reyes Rosado, Ramon Rodriguez Reyes, Luis Rodri- guez Coira, Juan Sanchez, and Saul Ventura Viera whole for any loss of pay they may have suffered as a result of their being laid off on 18 March 1987, with in- terest. TAINO PAPER COMPANY, INC.
290 NLRB 975: Taino Paper Co., Inc. | Justis AI