Telex Communications, Inc.

1136 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Telex Communications, Inc. and International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local No. 2047, AFL-CIO. Cases 18-CA-10438 and 18- CA-10483-1 June 14, 1989 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN STEPHENS AND MEMBERS CRACRAFT AND DEVANEY On December 7, 1988, Administrative Law Judge' Jay R. Pollack issued the attached decision. The Charging Party filed exceptions and a support- ing brief, and the Respondent filed a brief in oppo- sition to the Charging Party's exceptions. The National Labor Relations Board has delegat- ed its authority in this proceeding to a three- member panel. The Board has considered the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings," and conclusions and to adopt the recommended Order. ORDER The National Labor Relations Board adopts the recommended Order of the administrative law judge and orders that the Respondent, Telex Com- munications, Inc., Rochester, Minnesota, its offi- cers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Order. April 5, 1988. The charge in Case 18-CA-10483-1 was filed by the Union on May 3, 1988. Thereafter, on June 17, 1988, the Regional Director for Region 18 of the Na- tional Labor Relations Board issued an order consolidat- ing cases, consolidated complaint and notice of hearing alleging violations by Telex Communications, Inc., (Re- spondent) of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (the Act). The parties have been afforded full opportunity to appear, to introduce relevant evidence, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to file briefs. Upon the entire record, from my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and having considered the posthearing briefs of the parties, I make the following FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS I. JURISDICTION At all times material herein , Respondent, a Delaware corporation, has been engaged in the manufacture of hearing aids at its Rochester, Minnesota plant. During the 12 months prior to issuance of the complaint, Re- spondent sold and shipped goods and products valued in excess of $50,000 directly to customers located outside the State of Minnesota. Accordingly, Respondent admits and I find that it is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. The parties stipulated and I find that at all times mate- rial herein the Union has been a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES ' The Charging Party has excepted to some of the judge's credibility ,tidings. The Board's established policy is not to overrule an administra- tive law judge's credibility resolutions unless the clear preponderance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect . Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cit. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for re- versing the findings. The judge erroneously reported the citations to Arkansas Lighthousefor the Blind, 284 NLRB 1214 (1987), and Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980). In adopting the judge's finding that the Respondent did not violate Sec. 8(aX3) and (1) of the Act by discharging employee Rubin, we find it unnecessary to rely on his discussion at fn . 4 of his decision concerning employee Coop's testimony. Warren D. Kaston, Esq. and Marlin O. Osthus Esq., for the General Counsel. Kenneth E Ristau, Esq. (Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher), of Newport Beach, California, for the Respondent. Mary Harrigan, of St. Paul, Minnesota, for the Charging Party. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE JAY R. POLLACK, Administrative Law Judge. This case was tried before me at Rochester, Minnesota, on July 20 and 21, 1988. The charge in Case 18-CA-10438 was filed by International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local No. 2047, AFL-CIO (the Union) on A. Background and Issues Respondent manufactures hearing aids at its Rochester plant and at five other locations including nearby Le Sueur, Minnesota. Local 949 of the IBEW represented the employees at Respondent's plant until Local 949 was decertified in January 1987. The Union, a sister local of Local 949, began organizing at the Rochester plant in early 1988. The Rochester plant employs approximately 350 employees. The complaint alleges that in its response to the orga- nizing campaign, Respondent threatened employees with total or partial plant closure, rescission of previously granted wage increases, damage to their automobiles, and minimum wages and benefits. Further the complaint alleges that Respondent discharged employee Vickie Rubin because of her union activities and disciplined em- ployee Anna Finger because of her protected concerted' activity. Respondent denies all such allegations . Further, Respondent contends that Rubin and Finger were disci- plined because of violations of nondiscriminatory compa- ny policies. B. The Company Meetings On March 31 , 1988, Randy Lacey, Respondent's as- sembly manager, held six meetings in which he an- nounced a general wage increase to groups of Respond- ent's employees. All hourly employees had received a 294 NLRB No. 87 TELEX COMMUNICATIONS 1137 wage increase of 2 percent effective May 9, and a chance to receive another 3-percent merit increase after their next performance review. Lacey used a three-page flip chart to explain how employees would progress up the wage scale. Employees at the high end of the scale could receive a maximum increase of 5 percent, while employ- ees at the low end could receive as much as 11 percent, assuming they were not scheduled for a merit review until 11 months later and progressed up the wage scale in the meantime . Lacey further explained that the proba- tionary period was modified. After a formal presentation of approximately 20 minutes, the employees were permit- ted to ask questions. It was the employees, and not Lacey, who first raised the topic of the Union. Lacey re- sponded to employees' questions about the Union at each of the six meetings. Anna Finger testified that she attended a meeting of the BTE department employees at approximatley 7:30 a.m According to Finger, Lacey responded to employee questions by saying Respondent "would not stand for an- other union, to work with another union, and would just move the product to Le Sueur and other sister plants." Lacey said there was a 10-percent unemployment rate in Le Sueur and only a 3-percent rate in Rochester. Re- spondent could have hearing aids made in Le Sueur at a cheaper rate or at minimum wage . John Cinelli, Re- spondent's plant manager, lived in Le Sueur and would be more than willing to stay there rather than move to Rochester. In response to a question about bargaining, Lacey said that the employees would have to start from scratch if the Union got back in and he would take the employees' benefits away. In notes written shortly after the meeting, Finger noted that Lacey answered a question by saying work had been transferred to Le Sueur to keep employees working, but if the Union got in, the Le Sueur employ- ees would be trained because Respondent would not stand for a union. Lacey continued that Respondent was nonunion and did not want to work with any union. There was no mention in these notes of minimum wage or bargaining from scratch. In a pretrial affidavit, Finger stated that work had been transferred to Le Sueur to keep employees working and that Lacey said that if the Union got in these employees would be trained because Respondent would not stand for a union. Lacey contin- ued that Respondent was nonunion and did not want to work with any union. Lacey testified that he did not say if the Union got in, Respondent would move the plant to Le Sueur. Rather, Lacey explained that the Company had to remain com- petitive and could only pay competitive wages. That if the Union came in and the Company was forced to pay more than competitive wages, the Company might have to move. Lacey told the employees that work had been transferred from all of Respondent's plants in order to keep employees at Le Sueur working. Lacey admitted mentioning the unemployment rate at Le Sueur and that Cinelli lived there but denied giving that as a reason for moving the plant. Lacey told employees that bargaining was a give-and-take kind of thing, wherein the employ- ees could "win, lose or draw," but that would not neces- sarily start bargaining from what they were currently earning. Lacey denied saying employees would be re- duced to minimum wages or lose wages or benefits if the Union was voted in. Lacey did not recall if he used the words "bargaining from scratch." Lacey told the em- ployees that a union could not guarantee wage increases and Respondent thought it could do better without a union because a union contract placed too many restric- tions on the Company Timothy Helmgarn testified that he attended the meet- ing of the 28AC department at approximately 9 a.m. Ac- cording to Helmgarn, Lacey was asked a question about a rumor that the plant would close and move to Le Sueur if the Union came in. Lacey responded by saying Cinalli lived in-Le Sueur and was the manager for both plants. Cinelli would rather be living in Le Sueur and would rather just close up the plant in Rochester and not have to move his family. Lacey mentioned the high un- employment rate in Le Sueur compared to Rochester and said Respondent would be more than willing to find employees in Le Sueur and that those employees would be nonunion. As mentioned earlier, Lacey testified that he explained to employees that Respondent needed to remain competitive but never said that if the Union won the election, Respondent would move the plant to Le Sueur. Rather he said if the Union forced Respondent to pay wages higher than the competition, Respondent might have to move. Lacey denied saying Respondent would move because of Cinelli's residence or the high unemployment rate. Karla Wencl testified that she attended a meeting of the shell lab and auditory trainer departments. Accord- ing to Wencl, Lacey replied to a question about union- ization by stating that in his opinion Respondent would not stand for it. He said that in a year the plant would shut down. Lacey said employees would not necessarily get higher wages, rather they would have to bargain from minimum wage and bargain up for wages and bene- fits. Wencl clarified this testimony and said that Lacey said the employees would bargain from scratch. The fact that work had been transferred to Le Sueur was men- tioned and Lacey said that Cinelli lived there and would be more than willing not to transfer to Rochester. The unemployment rate was high in Le Sueur and that Re- spondent could find employees there willing to work for the minimum wage Finally, Lacey said that his job was on the line if the plant closed and if that happened due to the Union, "he would be the first one out there throwing rocks at our car windows." Wencl testified that this last remark was made "in a joking manner " Lacey testified that it was a rank-and-file employee and not he who said "well if the Union gets in and forces us on the unemployment line, I'll be out there throwing rocks at their cars." Lacey jokingly replied, "I'll be on the unemployment line with you." This remark was accompanied by laughter from the audience. Lori Rueb testified that she attended the meeting for the employees of the 28A's department.' According to ' This department is different that the 28AC department that Helm- gram works in The 28A's meeting was separate from those previously mentioned 1138 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Rueb, in response to a question, Lacey said if the Union got in Respondent was thinking of moving the plant to Le Sueur. Lacey said there was high unemployment in Le Sueur and there would be no problem finding em- ployees there. Lacey mentioned that Cinelli lived in Le Sueur and that the Le Sueur plant would be more con- venient for Cinelli. C. The Warning Given to Anna Finger Anna Finger has been a group leader at the Rochester plant for 8 years. The parties agree that Finger is an em- ployee and not a statutory supervisor. At the request of a former coworker, Sherry Peterson, Finger wrote a letter of recommendation for Peterson in early March. The letter stated that Peterson had been a good worker on the assembly line and that finding a good replacement would be no easy task. Finger signed the letter with the designation "group leader" after her name. Apparently Peterson presented Finger's letter at an unemployment compensation hearing. On March 22, Finger was summoned to a meeting in Lacey's office. Mary Parker, Finger's supervisor, was also present. Lacey told Finger that she was being disci- plined for violating a company policy enunciated in a memorandum issued by John Howe , Respondent's presi- dent, in October 1986. Finger had not previously seen this memorandum. Finger then received a documented warning, the first step in Respondent's progressive disci- pline system. The warning stated that Finger had acted as a representative of management without having such authority. On March 23, Finger requested a copy of the company policy under which she had been disciplined. Lacey told Finger, and the warning so states, that no further discipline would be taken if Finger thereafter complied with the policy. Lacey told Finger that the reason for the warning was because her recommendation could get the Company in trouble. Lacey said he did not agree with Cinelli's position that Dayton Rued, a super- visor, be disciplined for writing a similar letter, and Finger should be treated the same.2 Lacey told Finger that he had no objection to her testifying at Peterson's unemployment hearing as an employee. What Lacey ob- jected to was the giving of a recommendation, acting as management, when she had no management authority to give one. On October. 8, 1986, John Howe, Respondent's presi- dent, implemented a policy stating: Our Company policy on providing written or verbal information about former employees shall be limited to the period of employment and occupa- tion. No other information should be provided. The policy was distributed to members of management. Finger and the other rank-and-file employees received no notice of the policy. The purpose of the policy was to avoid possible lawsuits by former employees. D. The Discharge of Vickie Rubin Rubin had been employed by Respondent for 9 years and had recently been promoted to lead assembler in the TCA department. Rubin was not a supervisor. Rubin was one of the most active union supporters in early 1988. She attended union meetings, solicited union au- thorization cards, and distributed union literature. In the spring of 1988, Rubin posted a greeting card at her work station from Mary Harrigan, a union organizer, thanking Rubin for her work on behalf of the Union. This card was observed by several supervisors. On April 25, Rubin distributed union literature in the employee lunchroom prior to work. She was observed by at least one supervi- sor. On April 27, Rubin had an incident with fellow em- ployee Carmen Sexton for which Rubin was eventually discharged. The various and conflicting versions of this incident will be discussed in detail below. On April 28, Rubin was called into Lacey's office with her supervisor, Mike Boysen. According to Rubin, Lacey said he had received a complaint that Rubin had pulled Sexton's hair and had jerked her neck. Lacey said the Company had a strict policy against employees touching one another. Rubin explained to Lacey that she had merely turned Sexton's head and urged her to get back to work. According to Rubin, Lacey told her that if she had touched a male, she could be charged with sexual harassment. Lacey said he was going to talk to other witnesses and was going to confer with Cinelli before deciding whether to terminate Rubin. On the morning of April 29, Respondent distributed an informational letter to employees alleging that the Union was refusing to return authorization cards to employees who had changed their minds . In the presence of em- ployees and her supervisor, Mike Boysen, Rubin took issue with the letter and called it a "crock." That afternoon, Rubin was called into a meeting with Boysen and Cindy Lund, Respondent's personnel direc- tor. Boysen told Rubin that she was being terminated for gross misconduct. When asked by Rubin if he thought the termination was fair, Boysen refused to respond. . Carmen Sexton testified that on April 26 she had a conversation with Rubin about Sexton's absences. The conversation ended with Rubin stating "I wouldn't laugh because I can make your life miserable here." The next day Sexton was working with employee Angie Thomas. Thomas was showing Sexton how to cut and buff a hear- ing aid. That morning after Sexton turned to her left to ask Thomas a question, Rubin came from behind her and grabbed her head, twisted it, and shoved it toward .the machine. Rubin told Sexton to get back to' work. Sexton complained to her supervisor, Boysen, about Rubin's threat of the previous day and acted out the twisting and shoving of her head. Sexton was concerned that her hair could have been caught in the buffmg ma- chine, causing serious injury. 3 Later that afternoon Sexton complained to Lacey. a Based on the physical demonstration at the hearing and the credible $ Rued, a supervisor, also wrote a letter of recommendation for Peter- evidence of several witnesses, I find that the buffing machine can cause son and received a warning for doing so. serious injury and could pull out a large section of one's hair. TELEX COMMUNICATIONS Rubin denied that she had done anything other than gently direct Sexton's head towards her work. Accord- ing to Rubin, she lightly turned Sexton's head and rotat- ed it towards the work station and said "Let's get back to work." Rubin testified that Sexton's hair was in no danger. However, Thomas, whom I credit, corroborated Sexton's testimony. Thomas testified that while Sexton was asking a work-related question, Rubin put her hands on each side of Sexton's head and pushed it towards the machine. Contrary to Rubin's testimony, Thomas testi- fied that this was not a gentle maneuver. On the day fol- lowing the incident, Boysen questioned Thomas and she reported what she had seen. Based on the credible testi- mony of Thomas, a disinterested witness, I credit Sex- ton's version of this incident over the testimony of Rubin.4 Lacey testified that he decided to terminate Rubin, with Cinelli's approval, based on Boysen's investigation. Boysen reported that Sexton complained on April 27 that Rubin had physically grabbed her head, twisted it, and shoved it forward. Boysen questioned Thomas who confirmed Sexton's story "exactly." Boysen had Sexton act out the incident for him, outside of Thomas' pres- ence. He then had Thomas act out the incident outside of Sexton's presence. Based on these statements and dem- onstrations, Boysen concluded that "Rubin was grossly negligent in physical [sic] reprimanding an employee." Lacey testified that he decided to terminate Rubin, rather than give her a written warning, because her ac- tions constituted willful misconduct. Respondent's employee handbook contains a policy prohibiting sexual harassment . It further provides for progressive discipline with "willful misconduct" as an exception. Although the handbook gives theft and dis- honesty as examples of willful misconduct, it is clear that those are not the exclusive definitions of willful miscon- duct. General Counsel argues that Respondent had previous- ly condoned casual touching of employees. Assuming such a policy, that does not help General Counsel's case. The instant case does not involve casual or consensual contact. Rather the credible evidence establishes a physi- cal attack deemed violent by the recipient. General Counsel argues that Respondent condoned other forms of willful misconduct. However there is no evidence that Respondent condoned action such as took place here. Respondent did not terminate employees in- volved in sexual harassment claims because persons com- plaining did not want to be identified but Respondent at- tempted to take corrective action. Respondent did not terminate an employee engaged in misconduct while in- toxicated. Lacey believed that Respondent had to at- tempt to offer. counseling before discharging such an em- ployee In sum, there was no credible evidence that a similar incident had occurred or that Respondent had condoned such conduct. Finally, I find no support for General Counsel's case in the reinstatement of two employees who had been dis- 4 The testimony of employee Sharon Coop further indicates that Rubin was angry with Sexton on the dates in question This anger may well ex- plain the threat of April 26 and the incident of April 27 1139 charged for falsifying timecards in April. The evidence established that Cinelli reinstated the employees because they convinced him that prior to their discharge the company policy was inconsistent. Cinelli immediately re- instated the policy and announced that, in the future, fal- sification of timecards would result in termination. Analysis and Conclusions 1. The statements to employees The Supreme Court in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969), established certain standards for de- termining whether an employer's statements about the ef- fects of unionization are permissible. The Court stated that any evaluation of employer's statements must take into account the economic dependence of the employees on their employers, and the necessary tendency of the employees to pick up implications that might be more readily dismissed by a more disinterested person. .. an employer is free to communicate to his em- ployees any of his general views about unionization or any of his specific views about a particular union so long as the communications do not contain a "threat of reprisal or promise of benefit." He may even make a prediction as to the precise effects he believes unionization will have on his company. In such a case, however, the prediction must be care- fully phrased on the basis of objective facts to convey an employer's belief as to demonstrably probable consequences beyond his control or to convey a management decision already arrived at to close the plant in case of unionization. . . If there is any implication that an employer may or may not take action solely on his own initiative for reasons unrelated to economic necessities and known only to him, the statement is no longer a reasonable pre- diction based on available facts but a threat of retal- iation based on misrepresentation and coercion and as such without the protection of the First Amend- ment. Id. at 618 Based on the credited testimony of Lacey, I find that Lacey said that if the Union won and Respondent were forced to pay higher wages than it could afford, then Respondent might have to move. Under Gissel, Lacey was free to give his belief as to the economic conse- quences of unionization. The question here is whether Lacey implied that mere unionization would result in a move to Le Sueur. Lacey's reference to the high unem- ployment and Cinelli's residence in Le Sueur imply that Respondent would move based on these already existing facts if the employees added the Union to the equation. Thus, put in context, Lacey's remarks imply that Re- spondent has not moved in the face of these factors but would do so because it "would not stand for a union." Under Gissel, such remarks will be deemed to be threats rather than permitted predictions See Arkansas Light- house for the Blind, 284 NLRB 1214 (1987); Standard Products Co, 281 NLRB 141 (1986). The credible evidence establishes that Lacey told the employees that a union could not guarantee a wage in- 1140 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD crease and that he thought Respondent could do better without a union contract with its restrictions on manage- ment. Lacey told employees that bargaining was a give- and-take situation and that employees would not neces- sarily receive more wages and benefits as a result of the Union. Lacey told the employees bargaining would not necessarily start from the current levels of wages and benefits. I discredit the testimony alleging that Lacey said employees would receive minimum wage or that employees would be hired in Le Sueur at minimum wage In S. E. Nichols, Inc., 284 NLRB 556, 577 (1987), the Board stated as follows: It is well established that "bargaining from ground zero" or "bargaining from scratch" state- ments by employer representatives violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act if, in context, they reasonably could be understood by employees as a threat of loss of existing benefits and leave employees with the impression that what they may ultimately re- ceive depends upon what the union can induce the employer to restore. On the other hand, such state- ments are not violative of the Act when other com- munications make it clear that any reduction in wages or benefits will occur only as a result of the normal give and take of negotiations. Lacey told the employees that bargaining involved give and take. He indicated that employees did not nec- essarily receive higher wages and benefits He said em- ployees might "win, lose or draw." I find such comments to be permissible expression of opinion and not a threat that the employer would automatically reduce wages. See UARCO, Inc., 286 NLRB 55 (1987). As to the allegations concerning a threat to throw rocks, I find that such threat was made by an employee. Lacey's facetious remark that he too would be on the unemployment line was greeted by laughter. I cannot find by such conduct that Lacey threatened employees with physical harm. I shall recommend dismissal of this complaint allegation. 2. The warning given to Anna Finger It is well settled that "an employee's action in aid of a fellow employee's attempt to obtain unemployment com- pensation benefits is concerted activity for the purpose of mutual aid or protection within the meaning of Section 7 of the Act." S & R Sundries, Inc., 272 NLRB 1352, 1357 (1984); Supreme Optical Co., 235 NLRB 1432, 1433 (1978). In the instant case, Finger's letter of recommendation was not limited to the unemployment hearing. Rather it was a general letter of recommendation addressed "to whom it may concern." The letter was contrary to com- pany policy. However it is undisputed that employees such as Finger had no notice of the policy. Under these circumstances, Finger's warning indicated that she had improperly held herself out as a supervisor and that she had no authority to give recommendations as a supervi- sor: In my view, whatever technical violation might have occurred was cured by Lacey's explanation to Finger that she could testify on behalf of employees at unem- ployment hearings but could not hold herself out as a su- pervisor or give recommendations that appeared to be on behalf of the Company. Further, Finger was told that nothing would happen if she did not violate the policy again. The evidence on the whole indicates that Respondent was not motivated by Finger's participation in the unem- ployment hearing but rather the writing of a letter of recommendation which implied that Finger was a super- visor or manager. The company policy existed before the incidents of this case and was not intended to interfere with employee Section 7 rights. Lacey did his best to communicate the distinctions involved herein. Under all of the circumstances, I shall recommend dismissal of this allegation of the complaint. 3. The discharge of Vickie Rubin In Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), enfd. 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 989 (1982), the Board announced the following causation test in all cases alleging violations of Section 8(a)(3) or violations of 8(a)(1) turning on employer motivation. First, the Gener- al Counsel must make a prima facie showing sufficient to support the inference that protected conduct was a "mo- tivating factor" in the employer's decision. Upon such a showing, the burden shifts to the employer to demon- strate that the same action would have taken place even in the absence of the protected conduct. The United States Supreme Court approved and adopted the Board's Wright Line test in NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 399-403 (1983). - Assuming that Respondent had knowledge of Rubin's activities, I cannot find that General Counsel has estab- lished a prima facie case. The evidence indicates that after a complaint from Sexton, Boysen attempted to in- vestigate. He questioned Sexton and Thomas separately and asked Rubin for her version. Based on corroboration by Thomas, Boysen concluded that Sexton had truthfully related the events. Based on this investigation , Respond- ent quickly discharged Rubin. Against this business reason for the discharge, the General Counsel has not established by credible evidence that the discharge was motivated by antiunion consider- ations. General Counsel argues that Rubin was treated disparately but there is no evidence to support that con- tention. There is no evidence of similar conduct by any other employee. While casual touching has been con- doned, the credible evidence establishes that this incident involved more than casual contact. The threat made the day before gives' reason to believe that willful miscon- duct was involved. There was no animus shown against Rubin for her union activities. The remarks made by Lacey at the employee meetings do not support a finding that Respondent's opposition to the Union was so strong as to impel it to violate the law to keep the-Union out. Moreover, even if the General Counsel were deemed to have established a prima facie case, the evidence over- TELEX COMMUNICATIONS whelmingly establishes that Rubin would have been dis- charged even in the absence of her union activities CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The Respondent, Telex Communications, Inc., is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. 2. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local No. 2047, AFL-CIO is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. By impliedly threatening employees with moving or closing the Rochester plant if employees chose the Union, Respondent engaged in conduct in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 4. Respondent engaged in no other conduct violative of the Act. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the following recommend- eds ORDER The Respondent, Telex Communications, Inc., Roches- ter, Minnesota, its officers, agents, successors, and as- signs, shall 1. Cease and desist from (a) Threatening employees that Respondent would move or close its Rochester plant for the purpose of dis- couraging union activities. (b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re- straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights protected by Section 7 of the Act. 2 Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act. (a) Post at its Rochester, Minnesota plant copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix "s Copies of the 5 All outstanding motions inconsistent with this recommended Order are denied If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the Board's Rules and Regulations , the findings , conclusions, and recom- mended Order shall, as provided in Sec 102 48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all purposes 6 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Nation- 1141 notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 18, after being duly signed by its authorized rep- resentative, shall be posted immediately upon receipt and be maintained for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in con- spicuous places, including all places where notice to em- ployees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to ensure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (b) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days from the date of this Order what steps Respondent has taken to comply. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint is dis- missed in all respects other than that specifically found. al Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board " APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the National Labor Relations Act and has or- dered us to post and abide by this notice. Section 7 of the Act gives all employees these rights. To organize To form, join, or assist any union To bargain collectively through representatives of their own choice To act together for other mutual aid or protec- tion To choose not to engage in any of these protect- ed concerted activities WE WILL NOT threaten employees with moving or closing our Rochester plant in order to discourage their union activities WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. TELEX COMMUNICATIONS, INC.