King Soopers, Inc.

KING SOOPERS, INC. 35 King Soopers, Inc. and Delivery Drivers, Ware- housemen & Helpers Local Union No. 435, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauf- feurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, AFL-CIO.' Cases 27-CA-10176 and 27-CA- 10227 June 15, 1989 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN STEPHENS AND MEMBERS JOHANSEN AND CRACRAFT Upon charges filed by the Union on July 14, 1987, in Case 27-CA- 10176 and on September 1, 1987, in Case 27-CA- 10227, the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board issued com- plaints on August 21 and October 5, 1987, respec- tively, against the Respondent , King Soopers, Inc., alleging in each complaint that the Respondent vio- lated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act. The first complaint alleges that about June 1, 1987, the Respondent failed and refused to recog- nize and bargain with the Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of an appropri- ate unit of employees by withdrawing recognition from the Union; by failing and refusing to recog- nize the Union as the collective-bargaining repre- sentative of the unit employees ; and by making changes in the wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment in the unit, including but not limited to changes in wage premiums for night and Sunday work, elimination of birthday and anni- versary holidays, and changes in medical insurance provisions, without notice to or bargaining with the Union. The second complaint alleges that about June 1, 1987, the Respondent unilaterally assigned supervi- sors to do unit work that was previously per- formed by unit employees; and that the Respondent unilaterally transferred employee Louise Madden out of the unit, laid off employee Vicki Herdt, and altered the schedule of employee Carol Paugh, without notice to or bargaining with the Union. On November 2, 1987 , the parties jointly moved the Board to transfer the proceedings to the Board, without benefit of a hearing before an administra- tive law judge, and submitted a proposed record consisting of the formal papers and the parties' stip- ulation of facts with attached exhibits. On January 14, 1988, the Executive Secretary, by direction of the Board, issued an order granting the motion, ap- proving the stipulation, and transferring the pro- ceedings to the Board. Thereafter, on February 4, 1988, the General Counsel filed a brief. On Febru- ary 4, 1988, the Respondent filed a brief, in which it, inter alia, requested an evidentiary hearing. On February 16, 1988, the General Counsel filed an opposition to the Respondent's request for an evi- dentiary hearing. On February 16, 1988, the Re- spondent filed a response to the General Counsel's opposition. On March 8, 1988, the General Counsel filed an additional statement. The National Labor Relations Board has delegat- ed its authority in this proceeding to a three- member panel. On the entire record in the case, the Board makes the following FINDINGS OF FACT I. JURISDICTION The Employer, King Soopers, Inc., a corpora- tion, with an office and place of business in Denver, Colorado, is engaged in the retail sale of groceries and related items. In the course and con- duct of its business operations in Colorado, the Re- spondent annually purchases and receives goods, materials, and services valued in excess of $50,000 directly from places outside the State of Colorado. The Respondent annually derives gross revenues in excess of $500,000. We find that the Employer is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. We fur- ther find the Union, Delivery Drivers, Warehouse- men & Helpers Local Union No. 435, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehouse- men and Helpers of America, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES The issues presented are whether the Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by refusing to recognize and bargain with the Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the unit employees and by making unilateral changes in the terms and conditions of the unit em- ployees' employment without bargaining with the Union. A. Facts On September 27, 1985, the Union was certified as the collective-bargaining representative of an ap- propriate bargaining unit of warehouse clerical em- ployees.2 On March 6, 1986, the Union filed ' On November 1, 1987, the Teamsters International Union was read- mitted to the AFL-CIO. The caption has been amended to reflect that change. 2 The following employees of the Respondent were found to constitute an appropriate unit: Continued 295 NLRB No. 5 36 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD charges against the Respondent on behalf of the employees in the unit. A complaint issued on May 9, 1986, in Case 27-CA-9576, alleging in pertinent part, that the Respondent had violated Section 8(a)(5) and (3) of the Act by making unilateral changes in working conditions in the unit . Thereaf- ter, settlement negotiations took place. On Juiy 31, 1986, the Union signed the settlement agreement. After the end of the certification year , on January 14, 1987, the Respondent signed the agreement and the Regional Director approved the informal settle- ment agreement on February 3, 1987 . The settle- ment provided, inter alia, that the Respondent would, on request, bargain with the Union with regard to the wages, hours, and working conditions of employees in the unit. While the charge and complaint were pending in Case 27-CA-9576, the Respondent and the Union engaged in negotiations for a collective-bargaining agreement covering the unit employees . Between March 4 and September 11, 1986 , the parties en- gaged in 10 negotiating sessions . No collective-bar- gaining agreement was reached. On November 4, 1986, the Respondent sent the Union a letter stat- ing that it had a good-faith doubt that the Union had the majority support of the unit employees. The day after the Respondent signed the settle- ment agreement in Case 27-CA-9576, the Union requested that the Respondent bargain with it for a collective-bargaining agreement . On January 21, 1987, the Respondent sent the Union a letter stat- ing that it would send the Union a proposal and that "any proposals previously made by the em- ployer are hereby withdrawn ." On January 26, 1987, the Union sent the Respondent a letter stat- ing that it had received the January 21, 1987 letter. On February 18, 1987, the Respondent sent its pro- posed agreement to the Union . From February 18 to June 25, 1987, there was no communication be- tween the parties. Since about June 1 , 1987, the Respondent's su- pervisors have performed work that was usually done by unit employees, including employee Louise Madden. The work was doing batch refills and labor accounting, relieving unit employees for breaks, breaking out invoices , and logging purchase orders on the computer. About June 2, 1987, the Respondent transferred unit employee Louise Madden to the nonunit produce warehouse and laid off employee Vicki Herdt. Herdt was recalled to the same position on June 14, 1987. On June 19, 1987, the Respondent distributed documents to the employees concerning changes and modifications, effective July 1, to their health insurance plans. On June 22, 1987 , the employees received a memorandum issued by the Respondent's vice president of industrial relations, Ed Behlke, de- scribing upcoming changes, to be effective June 28, in wage rate premiums for night and Sunday work, birthday and anniversary day holidays , sick pay, holiday wage rates, and health and welfare bene- fits. On June 22, 1987, the Respondent changed the work schedule of unit employee Carol Paugh. The Respondent made all the aforementioned changes in wages, benefits, and working conditions without notice to or consultation with the Union and without providing the Union an opportunity to bargain about these changes. On June 25, 1987, the Union sent the Respondent a mailgram stating that the Union viewed the Re- spondent's unilateral changes as unfair labor prac- tices. The Respondent did not reply to the Union's mailgram. B. Contentions of the Parties 1. The General Counsel's contentions The General Counsel urges the Board to find the 8(a)(5) violations alleged in the complaints. The General Counsel's first argument is that a reasona- ble period of time for bargaining had not elapsed following the settlement agreement, and therefore the Respondent was precluded in June 1987 from questioning the Union's majority status because of the existence of an irrebuttable presumption of ma- jority status. The informal settlement agreement was approved by the Regional Director on Febru- ary 3, 1987, and the Respondent has stipulated to making unilateral changes starting on June 1, 1987. A period of approximately 4 months elapsed be- tween February and June. The General Counsel contends that 4 months is too short a time to con- stitute a reasonable period for bargaining and that certain factors militate in favor of such a finding. According to the General Counsel, the factors are that the parties were bargaining for a first contract, the parties had barely begun negotiations, and no impasse had been reached.3 The General Counsel's alternative argument is that the Respondent could neither withdraw recog- nition nor make unilateral changes because it did not have a good-faith doubt based on objective considerations of the Union 's majority status. All clerical workers employed in the general merchandise warehouse located at 5025 Kalamath Street, Denver, Colorado, but excluding temporary clerical workers, office managers, all other employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. a In support of this argument , the General Counsel relies on Van Ben Industries, 285 NLRB 77 (1987), and on VIP Limousine, 276 NLRB 871 (1985). KING SOOPERS, INC. 37 The General Counsel argues that the only fact on which the Respondent can rely to justify its withdrawal of recognition, the 4-month hiatus in communications, is not a sufficient objective con- sideration to support a good-faith doubt of the Union's majority status. The General Counsel argues that in cases involving similar lapses in com- munication, the Board has not found an abandon- ment of the unit by the union.4 2. The Respondent's contentions Regarding the General Counsel 's first argument, the Respondent maintains that it has not violated the Act because a reasonable period of time for bargaining had elapsed between the signing of the settlement agreement and the Respondent's with- drawal of recognition from the Union. The Re- spondent maintains that 4 months was a reasonable period of time in which to effectuate bargaining be- cause the Union failed to respond to the Respond- ent's February 18, 1987 proposal and failed to com- municate with the Respondent between February 18 and June 25, 1987. Consequently, the Respond- ent argues that its withdrawal of recognition from the Union in June 1987 was lawful. The Respondent also argues that the certification year was not extended by the unfair labor practice charges in the settled case because the litigation did not suspend the collective-bargaining negotiations in the present cases. Regarding the General Counsel's alternative ar- gument, the Respondent maintains that it had a good-faith doubt of the Union's majority support when it withdrew recognition from the Union and made unilateral changes in the employees' terms and conditions of employment. Further, the Re- spondent contends it reasonably believed that the Union had abandoned its members because of the Union's lack of response to the Respondent's bar- gaining proposals. 3. The Respondent's request for an evidentiary hearing The Respondent argues that it failed to include facts pertinent to its good-faith doubt of majority status in the stipulation because it was misled by the General Counsel. According to the Respond- ent, the General Counsel pursued this case solely on a theory of irrebuttable presumption and there- fore facts relevant to a theory of rebuttable pre- sumption were not included in the stipulation. If the Board is to resolve the issues regarding a theory of rebuttable presumption, the Respondent 4 In this regard, the General Counsel cites Ashe Brick Ca, 280 NLRB 1383 (1986), and Akron Novelty Mfg. Ca, 224 NLRB 998 (1976). argues that an evidentiary hearing should be held so that it might adduce evidence to rebut the Union's presumption of majority status as of June 1987. The General Counsel opposes the Respondent's request for an evidentiary hearing. The General Counsel argues that it did not mislead the Re- spondent and that the Respondent had ample op- portunity to present facts in the stipulation about the grounds for its purported good-faith doubt of majority support. C. Discussion The allegations in the complaints are that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by refusing on and after June 1, 1987, to rec- ognize and bargain with the Union as the collec- tive-bargaining representative of the unit employ- ees, by thereafter making unilateral changes in the terms and conditions of employment of the unit members, by assigning unit work to supervisors, by transferring employee Louise Madden out of the unit, by laying off employee Vicki Herdt, and by unilaterally altering the schedule of employee Carol Paugh, all without notice to or bargaining with the Union. It is well settled that a settlement agreement con- taining bargaining provisions must be complied with for a reasonable period of time.5 The test for determining what is and what is not a reasonable period of time "is what transpires during the time period under scrutiny rather than the length of time elapsed . ..."6 The Board has considered various factors in determining what is a reasonable period of time. Among those are whether the par- ties are bargaining for a first contract; whether the employer engaged in meaningful good-faith negoti- ations over a substantial period of time; and wheth- er an impasse in negotiations had been reached.? Applying each of these factors to the instant facts, the conclusion is warranted that a reasonable period of time for bargaining had not elapsed when the Respondent withdrew recognition and com- menced its unilateral changes .8 The parties were bargaining for a first contract; the Respondent's January 21 , 1987 letter withdrew all presettlement contract proposals made before the Respondent's November 4, 1986 withdrawal of recognition; the Respondent's February 18, 1987 bargaining propos- Poole Foundry & Machine Ca, 95 NLRB 34 (1951), enfd. 192 F.2d 740 (4th Cit. 1951). 6 Van Ben Industries, 285 NLRB at 79. 7 VIP Limousine, supra at 877 8 In the stipulation, the Respondent admits it no longer recognizes the Union as the collective-bargaining representative of the employees in the unit. 38 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD al was therefore merely a starting point for negoti- ations; the parties never met in face-to-face negotia- tions after the settlement agreement ; and no im- passe in bargaining had been reached. Under Poole Foundry, supra, and its progeny, we find that the 4- month period of time between the signing of the settlement agreement and the Respondent 's with- drawal of recognition from the Union did not con- stitute a reasonable period of time.9 Accordingly, the Respondent was not privileged to question the Union's majority status in June 1987 and thus the Respondent's withdrawal of recognition and imple- mentation of unilateral changes violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. Assuming arguendo, that in June 1987, when the Respondent withdrew recognition and instituted its unilateral changes, the Union enjoyed only a rebut- table presumption of majority support, we nonethe- less find that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.10 The Respondent argues that it has not violated the Act because it had a good-faith doubt based on objective consid- erations that the Union lacked majority support. A union's rebuttable presumption of majority support can be rebutted if- [T]he employer affirmatively establishes either (1) that at the time of the refusal the union in fact no longer enjoyed majority representative status, or (2) that the employer's refusal was predicated on a good-faith and reasonably grounded doubt of the union's continued ma- jority status. As to the second of these, i.e., `good-faith doubt,' two prerequisites for sus- taining the defense are that the asserted doubt must be based on objective considerations and it must not have been advanced for the pur- pose of gaining time in which to undermine the union. [Footnotes omitted.] 11 In requesting an evidentiary hearing , the Re- spondent alleges that the General Counsel misled it into believing that the General Counsel was pursu- ing this case solely on a theory of irrebuttable pre- sumption, when in fact the General Counsel was 9 In light of our conclusion that a reasonable period of time for bar- gaining had not elapsed, we need not pass on the Respondent's argument that the certification year was not extended. 1 O Member Cracraft finds it unnecessary to pass on the Respondent's alternative good-faith doubt argument. See Van Ben Industries, 285 NLRB at 78-79 (evidence of good-faith doubt irrelevant when reasonable period of time has not elapsed prior to withdrawal of recognition). i i Terrell Machine Co., 173 NLRB 1480, 1481 (1969), enfd. 427 F.2d 1088 (4th Cir. 1970). The evidence before us fails to establish that at the time of the Respondent's refusal to bargain, in June 1987, the Union in fact lacked majority support or that the Respondent had a reasonably based good-faith doubt of the Union's majority status The 4-month hiatus is not a sufficient objective consideration on which to base a good- faith doubt of majority support Additionally, there is no basis for finding abandonment by the Union of the unit. also pursuing a theory of rebuttable presumption. In support of this allegation, the Respondent refers specifically to an August 13, 1987 letter informing it of the Regional Director's decision to issue a complaint in Case 27-CA- 10176. The letter stated: "Case law in support of the Regional Office's posi- tion includes Colfor, Inc., 282 NLRB No. 160 citing Mar-Jac Poultry, Co., 136 NLRB 785. See also Van Ben Industries, Inc., 285 NLRB No. 18." Accord- ing to the Respondent, because of being misled by the General Counsel, it failed to include facts in the stipulation that would rebut the rebuttable pre- sumption that the Union enjoyed majority status at times material . Thus, the Respondent contends that an evidentiary hearing should be held to adduce evidence regarding its basis for questioning the Union's majority status in June 1987. The Respondent's request for a hearing is denied. Initially, we note that the precomplaint letter on which the Respondent relies is not a part of the stipulated record. Even if it were, however, and even assuming that a precomplaint letter could estop the General Counsel from thereafter litigat- ing a particular theory, the General Counsel 's cita- tion of cases in the subject letter was not mislead- ing. In the cited cases and in this case, the ultimate issue to be decided was whether the Respondent Employer was privileged to withdraw recognition from the Union and to make unilateral changes. In order for the Respondent Employer to prevail on this ultimate issue, the Board must find not only that the incumbent Union's majority status was open to challenge (i.e., there was no irrebuttable presumption of majority status based on the certifi- cation year or a recent settlement agreement), but also that the Employer has met its affirmative burden under Terrell Machine, supra, of rebutting the Union's continuing presumption of majority support. Nothing in the precomplaint letter, the com- plaints' pleadings, or the parties' stipulation indi- cates that the General Counsel has admitted that the Union had lost its majority status on and after June 1, 1987, or that the Respondent had objective considerations supporting a good -faith doubt of the status, or that the General Counsel has waived the Respondent's evidentiary obligation to rebut the Union's presumptive majority status. All parties were free to pursue the theories and defenses rele- vant to the issue to be decided. The Respondent has thus failed to establish that in June 1987 it had a good-faith doubt of the Union's majority status based on objective consid- KING SOOPERS, INC. 39 erations.12 Accordingly, assuming the Union en- joyed only a rebuttable presumption at times mate- rial, we find that the Respondent nonetheless vio- lated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. 10. The aforesaid labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. REMEDY CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. King Soopers, Inc. is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. The following employees of the Respondent constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining: All clerical workers employed in the general merchandise warehouse located at 5025 Kala- math Street, Denver, Colorado, but excluding temporary clerical workers, office managers, all other employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. 4. The Respondent, by failing and refusing to recognize and bargain with the Union, as the col- lective-bargaining representative of the unit em- ployees, violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. 5. The Respondent made changes in the wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employ- ment of the unit employees, including but not limit- ed to changes in wage premiums for night and Sunday work, elimination of birthday and anniver- sary holidays, and changes in medical insurance provisions, in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. 6. The Respondent unilaterally assigned supervi- sors to do unit work in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. 7. The Respondent transferred employee Louise Madden out of the unit without notice to or bar- gaining with the Union in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. 8. The Respondent unilaterally altered the sched- ule of employee Carol Paugh without notice to or bargaining with the Union, in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. 9. The Respondent laid off employee Vicki Herdt on June 2, 1987 (recalling her on June 14, 1987, to the same position), without notice to or bargaining with the Union, in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. 12 In its February 4, 1988 brief the Respondent stated , "[o]n June 9 [1987], the Company, convinced that the Union had abandoned its mem- bers, announced its changes in conditions of employment . . " The Re- spondent failed to offer any evidence of this alleged June 1987 abandon- ment of the unit in the stipulation The Respondent has also failed to make an offer of proof about its ob- jective considerations that the Union lacked majority support. Having found that the Respondent has engaged in an unfair labor practice in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act, we shall order it to cease and desist and take certain affirmative action de- signed to effectuate the policies of the Act.13 Having found that the Respondent has unlawful- ly refused to recognize the Union, we shall order that it recognize the Union and, on request, bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive bar- gaining representative of the employees in the ap- propriate unit described above. Having further found that the Respondent un- lawfully changed the wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment of the unit employees, including but not limited to changes in wage premiums for night and Sunday work, elimi- nation of birthday and anniversary holidays, and changes in medical insurance provisions ; and as- signed unit work to supervisors , transferred em- ployee Louise Madden to nonunit work, and al- tered the work schedule of employee Carol Paugh, we shall order the Respondent (1) on request to re- scind these changes, and (2) to notify and bargain with the Union concerning any contemplated changes in the terms and conditions of employment of the bargaining unit employees. 14 We shall order the Respondent to make the bar- gaining unit employees whole for any loss in wages or other benefits they may have suffered as a result of the above-mentioned unfair labor practices, as prescribed in Ogle Protection Service, 183 NLRB 682 (1970), with interest to be computed in the manner prescribed in New Horizons for the Retard- ed. 15 Regarding employee Vicki Herdt, who was laid off on June 2, 1987, and recalled on June 14, 1987, to the same position, we direct that Herdt's current employment be without prejudice to her seniority or other rights and privileges previously enjoyed, and that she be made whole for any loss of earn- ings, and other benefits, suffered as a result of the discrimination practiced against her, with backpay to be computed in the manner prescribed in F. W. 18 The General Counsel requested a visitatorial provision Under the circumstances of this case , we find it unnecessary See Cherokee Marine Terminal, 287 NLRB 1080 ( 1988). 14 See generally Kansas City Riverboat, 285 NLRB No 65 (Aug. 31, 1987) (not reported in Board volumes); and Cincinnati Enquirer, 279 NLRB 1023 (1986). 16 283 NLRB 1173 (1987). 40 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Woolworth, 90 NLRB 289 (1950),16 with interest to be computed in the manner prescribed in New Ho- rizons for the Retarded, supra, and to post an appro- priate notice. ORDER The National Labor Relations Board orders that the Respondent, King Soopers, Inc., Denver, Colo- rado, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall 1. Cease and desist from (a) Refusing to recognize and bargain with De- livery Drivers, Warehousemen & Helpers Local Union No. 435, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, AFL-CIO as the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit by unilaterally making changes in wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment of the unit employees, including but not limited to changes in wage premiums for night and Sunday work, elimination of birthday and anni- versary holidays, and changes in medical insurance provisions. (b) Unilaterally assigning bargaining unit work, which had previously been done by unit members, to supervisors. (c) Unilaterally transferring employees out of the unit. (d) Unilaterally altering employees' work sched- ules. (e) Unilaterally laying off employees. (f) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action neces- sary to effectuate the policies of the Act. (a) Recognize and, on request, bargain with the Union as the exclusive representative of the em- ployees in the appropriate bargaining unit concern- ing terms and conditions of employment , and any contemplated changes in the job duties , hours, and wages and other terms and conditions of employ- ment of the unit employees, including but not limit- ed to changes in wage premiums for night and Sunday work, elimination of birthday and anniver- sary holidays, and changes in medical insurance provisions; assigning bargaining unit work to super- visors; transferring employees out of the unit; laying off unit employees; altering the work sched- ules of unit employees; and, if an understanding is 16 See generally MIS. Inc., 289 NLRB 491 (1988), Lapeer Foundry Be Machine, 289 NLRB 952 (1988); and Indian Mining, 287 NLRB 114 (1987). reached, embody the understanding in a signed agreement. (b) Rescind, on request, the changes in wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employ- ment of the unit employees, made after June 1, 1987, including but not limited to changes in wage premiums for night and Sunday work , elimination of birthday and anniversary holidays, and changes in medical insurance provisions. (c) Rescind, on request, the assignments of bar- gaining unit work to supervisors , made after June 1, 1987. (d) Rescind, on request, the transfer of employee Louise Madden out of the bargaining unit. (e) Rescind, on request, the alterations in the work schedule of employee Carol Paugh. (f) Make whole with interest any bargaining unit employee who lost wages or employment benefits as a result of the changes made in the duties, hours, or wages of the employees in the unit in the manner set forth in the remedy section of this deci- sion. (g) Make whole with interest employee Vicki Herdt, who was laid off from June 2 to 14, 1987, for any loss of pay or other employment benefits suffered as a result of its unlawful conduct in the manner set forth in the remedy section of this deci- sion. (h) Preserve and, on request , make available to the Board or its agents for examination and copy- ing, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this Order. (i) Post at its facilities in Denver, Colorado, copies of the attached notice marked "Appen- dix."17 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 27, after being signed by the Respondent's authorized representa- tive, shall be posted by the Respondent immediate- ly upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (j) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days from the date of this Order what steps the Respondent has taken to comply. 14 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Nation- al Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." KING SOOPERS, INC. 41 APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to post and abide by this notice. WE WILL NOT refuse to recognize and bargain with Delivery Drivers, Warehousemen & Helpers Local Union No. 435, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, AFL-CIO as the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees in the bargaining unit. WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain about'changes in wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment of unit employees, including but not limited to changes in wage premiums for night and Sunday work, elimination of birthday and anniver- sary holidays, and changes in medical insurance provisions. WE WILL NOT unilaterally assign bargaining unit work, which has previously been done by unit members, to supervisors. WE WILL NOT unilaterally transfer employees out of the unit. WE WILL NOT unilaterally change the work schedules of our employees. WE WILL NOT unilaterally lay off employees. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the exer- cise of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act. WE WILL recognize and, on request, bargain with the Union as the exclusive bargaining repre- sentative of the employees in the unit concerning rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other terms and conditions of employment and on any contemplated changes, and WE WILL put in writing and sign any agreement reached on the terms and conditions of employment for our em- ployees in the following bargaining unit: All clerical workers employed in the general merchandise warehouse located at 5025 Kala- math Street, Denver, Colorado, but excluding temporary clerical workers, office managers, all other employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. WE WILL, on request, rescind the changes made with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, made after June 1, 1987, including but not limited to changes in wage pre- miums for night and Sunday work, elimination of birthday and anniversary holidays, and changes in medical insurance provisions. WE WILL, on request, rescind the assignment of unit work to supervisors, made after June 1, 1987. WE WILL, on request, reinstate the former work schedule of employee Carol Paugh. We will make whole, with interest, all bargaining unit employees, who lost wages or employee bene- fits as a result of changes in their duties, hours, work, 'or other terms and conditions of employ- ment. WE WILL make whole, with interest, employee Vicki Herdt who lost wages or employee benefits due to being laid off from June 2 to 14, 1987. KING SOOPERS, INC.