Blue Diamond Co.

BLUE DIAMOND CO. 1007 The Blue Diamond Company and Freight Drivers and Helpers Union No. 557; International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Ware- housemen and Helpers of America, AFL-CIO. Case 5-CA-19291 July 17, 1989 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN STEPHENS AND MEMBERS CRACRAFr AND HIGGINS On September 20, 1988, Administrative Law Judge David S. Davidson issued the attached deci- sion. The Respondent filed exceptions and a sup- porting brief. The National Labor Relations Board has delegat- ed its authority in this proceeding to a three- member panel. The Board has considered the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and brief and has decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings, and conclusions and to adopt the recommended Order. We agree with the judge's finding that there is a sufficient showing of relevance to warrant the con- clusion that the Respondent has an obligation to furnish the names of E & M Express, Inc. (E & M) and H & K Equipment Company , Inc. (H & K) employees. As the judge found, there is "an objec- tive factual basis for the Union to believe that bar- gaining unit work was being performed by employ- ees of E & M and H & K, that H & K and E & M together with Respondent might constitute a single employer, and that the assignment or subcontract- ing of loads to their drivers violated both the rec- ognition clause of the agreement and the subcon- tracting clause." See JD sec. II,B, 3d par. That ob- jective factual basis makes the Union's request here a legitimate one and clearly not, as urged by our dissenting colleague, a fishing expedition. As the judge noted, the E & M and H & K employees "are legitimate sources from which further infor- mation can be sought relating to the possible griev- ance and with whom information obtained from other sources may be checked for corroboration or contradiction." A union is not required , as our dissenting col- league suggests, to establish in advance exactly how the information these employees might pro- vide would be helpful in pursuing a possible griev- ance, that the employees in fact have knowledge that would aid the Union, or that any information the employees might provide is reliable. Nor is it necessary, in the circumstances here, to establish that the E & M and H & K employees have access to "insider" information. Any information these employees may provide on the trips they are as- 295 NLRB No. 111 signed and on the customers to whom they make deliveries will obviously assist the Union in deter- mining whether bargaining unit work is being di- verted and whether the nature of the relationship among the Respondent, E & M and H & K, is that of a single employer. Thus, the Union's request for information is merely part of an investigatory proc- ess through which it determines whether or not there exists a basis for a grievance against the Re- spondent. ) We therefore adopt the judge's conclusion that the Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by failing or refusing to provide the names of the employees of E & M and H & K. ORDER The National Labor Relations Board adopts the recommended Order of the administrative law judge and orders that the Respondent, The Blue Diamond Company, Baltimore, Maryland, its offi- cers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Order. CHAIRMAN STEPHENS, concurring and dissenting in part. I agree with the finding that the Respondent un- lawfully delayed in furnishing information to the Union concerning the structure, operations, and interrelationship between itself, and H & K Equip- ment Company, Inc. (H & K), and E & M Express, Inc. (E & M). I dissent, however, from the finding that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by refusing to furnish the Union the names and addresses of the employees of H & K and E & M, as requested in the Union's July 26, 1987 letter. The Respondent has submitted all other items of information requested by the Union, but refuses to furnish the names and addresses of employees, ar- guing that this information is not relevant to the Union's duties and responsibilities as the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees in the unit. As the information sought here pertains to employees and operations other than those repre- sented by the Union, the Union has the burden of establishing the relevance of the information. Ohio Power Co., 216 NLRB 987, 991 (1975), enfd. 531 F.2d 1381 (6th Cir. 1976). The Union has failed to meet that burden. As the judge notes, at the hearing the Union never answered the question why the Union needs the names and addresses of these employees and in its brief to the judge, it states only that, as its col- lective-bargaining agreement with the Respondent ' We note there is no indication or contention that the Respondent does not have access to the requested information. 1008 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD may be applicable to the H & K and E & M em- ployees, a list of their names and addresses would be "helpful." Although the standard of relevance to be applied here is a liberal one, the Union still bears the burden of demonstrating "the reasonable and probable relevance of the requested informa- tion." Southern Nevada Builders Assn., 274 NLRB 350, 351 ( 1985). In my view, the reasons advanced by the Union for its request for the nonunit employees' names and addresses fail to demonstrate such relevance. The Union does not explain how such information would be "helpful" in establishing whether H & K and E & M together with the Respondent consti- tute a single employer, or that bargaining unit work was being performed by employees of H & K and E & M . Further, neither the Union nor the General Counsel has come forward with evidence that would indicate that the employees of these two companies have knowledge that would aid the Union in determining the relationship between the Respondent and H & K and E & M, or whether the former was diverting unit work to the latter two in violation of its contract; and my colleagues' assertion that the employees might provide the Union with useful information rests on nothing more than conjecture. Surely, the reliability of any information supplied by these employees is suspect absent evidence indicating they have access to "inside" information concerning the corporate af- fairs of their employers . No such evidence has been presented. This seems little more than a fishing ex- pedition in which the fish appear to be the employ- ees and not their employers or the Respondent. Accordingly, I would find that the Respondent's obligation to furnish this information has not been established and thus that its refusal to do so does not violate the Act. Angela S. Anderson, Esq., for the General Counsel. Robert B. Pearlman, Esq., of Greensboro, North Caroli- na, for the Respondent. H. Victoria Hedian, Esq. (Abato, Rubenstein & Abato), of Lutherville, Maryland, for the Charging Party. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE DAVID S. DAVIDSON, Administrative Law Judge. This case was tried at Baltimore , Maryland, on June 6, 1988. The Union filed the charge on December 9, 1987, and the Regional Director issued the complaint on January 22, 1988 . The sole issue is whether, as part of its obliga- tion to bargain with the Union, Respondent was obliged to furnish information about the structure and operations of two other corporations and particularly the names of the employees of those corporations. On the entire record, including my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and after consideration of the briefs filed by the parties, I make the following FINDINGS OF FACT I. JURISDICTION Respondent, a Maryland corporation , has a facility in Baltimore, Maryland, from which it transports freight interstate and annually derives gross revenues in excess of $50,000. I find that Respondent is an employer en- gaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. I find further that the Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The Facts Since 1955, the Union and the Teamsters National Freight Industry Negotiating Committee have been the exclusive collective-bargaining Representative of a unit consisting of all drivers employed by Respondent at its Baltimore facility. The Union and Committee have en- tered into a series of collective-bargaining agreements. The agreement in effect at the times material to this case was effective from April 1, 1985, to March 31, 1988. In article 3 of the agreement Respondent recognized the Union and Committee as exclusive representative of all covered employees. It provides further: This provision shall not apply to wholly-owned and wholly independently operated subsidiaries which are not under contract with local unions . "Wholly independently operated "means, among other things, that there shall be no interchange of freight, equipment or personnel , or common use, in whole or in part, of equipment, terminals, property, per- sonnel or rights. Article 27 of the agreement provides with respect to sub- contracting: Section 1. Work Preservation For the purpose of preserving work and job op- portunities for the employees covered by this Agreement, the Signatory Employer agrees that no operation, work or services of the kind , nature or type covered by, or presently performed, or hereaf- ter assigned to the collective bargaining unit by the Signatory Employer will be subcontracted, trans- ferred, leased, diverted, assigned or conveyed in full or in part (hereinafter referred to as "divert" or "subcontract"), by the Employer to any other plant, business, person, or non-unit employees, or to any other mode of operation , unless specifically provid- ed and permitted in this Agreement. In addition, the Signatory Employer agrees that it will not, as hereinafter set forth, subcontract or divert the work presently performed by, or hereaf- ter assigned to, its employees to other business enti- BLUE DIAMOND CO. 1009 ties owned and/or controlled by the Signatory Em- ployer, or its parent , subsidiaries or affiliates. Section 2. Diversion of Work-Parent or Subsidiary Compa- nies The parties agree that for purposes of this Article it shall be presumed that a diversion of work in vio- lation of this Agreement occurs when work present- ly and regularly performed by, or hereafter assigned to, employees of the Signatory Employer has been lost and the lost work is being performed in the same manner by an entity owned and/or controlled by the Signatory Employer, its parent, or a subsidi- ary within sixty (60) days of the loss of the work. The burden of overcoming such presumption in the grievance procedure shall be upon the Employer. Section 3 Subcontracting The Employer may subcontract work when all of his regular employees are working, except that in no event shall road work presently performed or runs established during the life of this Agreement be farmed out. No dock work shall be farmed out except for existing situations established by agreed- to past practices. Overflow loads may be delivered by drivers other than the Employer's employees provided that this shall not be used as a subterfuge to violate the provisions of this Agreement and is done in accordance with this provision and Article 25. Loads may also be delivered by other agreed-to methods or as presently agreed to. Owner -operators or other persons performing subcontracted work which is permitted herein shall receive no less than the equivalent of the economic terms and conditions of this Agreement and the applicable Supplement. In the case of permitted subcontracting to a Fleet Owner. The Signatory Employer shall be responsi- ble for the Fleet Owner's failure to maintain the equivalent of the economic terms and conditions of this Agreement for the individuals performing the subcontracted work. The normal, orderly interlining of freight for peddle on occasional basis, where there are parallel rights, and when not for the purpose of evading this Agreement may be continued as has been permitted by past practice provided it is not being done to defeat the provisions of this Agreement. Henry Schultz has been employed by Respondent as an over-the-road driver out of its Baltimore facility since 1982. He became assistant shop steward in April 1987 and shop steward in August 1987. Over a period of time Schultz observed that work which he believed was originally done by bargaining unit emloyees was being done by employees of E & M Express, Inc. (E & M), a company which he described as being started by Respondent in 1983 . It appeared to him that over a period of time the problem became progres- sively worse and also involved assignments to employees of H & K Equipment Company, Inc. (H & K), another employer. Schultz began with the aid of other drivers to collect instances of what he believed to be improper as- signments of bargaining unit work to employees of these companies. Schultz became a steward in order to try to do something about it, and in May 1987 presented Union President McDonald with written grievances protesting violations of articles 3 and 27 based on subcontracting, diversion, and assignment of bargaining unit work to em- ployees of E & M and H & K. After consulting union attorneys, the Union decided to try to obtain additional information before filing the grievance. Drivers gathered information based on their observa- tion of drivers wearing E & M or H & K hats and driv- ing similarly marked tractors to haul loads of merchan- dise from customers of a kind normally hauled by Re- spondent's drivers. They also collected some freight bills which showed Respondent as the designated carrier but reflecting loads hauled by E & M drivers. Schultz and McDonald were concerned for several reasons. Even with enough work for Respondent's driv- ers, they were concerned that employees could lose better paying trips to the drivers of the other companies as well as trips which would bring them back to their homes rather than to a destination away from home. They were also concerned that nonunit drivers did not pay union dues, as required by the union-shop provisions of the agreement and that the Company was not making contributions to the pension, health, and welfare plans on their behalf as required by the agreement. On July 21 , 1987, McDonald wrote Respondent's gen- eral manager, Roy Franta, as follows: As you knew, the contract between Blue Dia- mond and Lccal 557 will expiring [sic] March 31, 1988. In order to prepare for our negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement, we need cer- tain information. We also require this information in order to police the collective bargaining agreement between Lccal 557 and Blue Diamond . I request therefore that you reply in writing to the following questions within thirty (30) days after you have re- ceived this letter. There followed a list of 61 items concerning the struc- ture, operations, interrelation , and identities of officers, directors, shareholders, managers, supervisors, and em- ployees of Respondent, H & K Company , and E & M Express. On July 31 , 1987, Franta replied as follows: In response to your letter of July 21, 1987, to enable you to prepare for contract negotiations for our collective bargaining agreement as well as po- licing the agreement currently in effect , the follow- ing information will meet your needs. The correct name of the company is "The Blue Diamond Company," a Maryland corporation, which was incorporated on December 18, 1962. The Blue Diamond Company is registered to do business in the State of Maryland and was last regis- tered with the Department of Assessments and Tax- ation for the State of Maryland on April 15, 1987. 1010 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Enclosed, you will find the names and addresses of all employees within the bargaining unit as well as a copy of the current contract between The Blue Diamond Ccmpany and Teamsters Local #557. The information furnished was responsive to the first four items and part of the eighth item listed in McDon- ald's July 21 letter. On August 17, 1987, McDonald wrote Franta further: I have received your letter dated July 31, 1987. The information which you have provided is not sufficient for our needs. We believe that the collec- tive bargaining agreement between Local 557 and Blue Diamond is being violated , and that work be- longing to members of Local 557 is being diverted to the H & K and E & M companies. We have reason to believe that Article 27 of the collective bargaining agreement is being repeatedly violated. Federal labor law requires you to supply us with the information we have requested . That informa- tion is necessary to ascertain that the Company is abiding by the collective bargaining agreement. The information is also necessary to prepare for negotiations on a new collective bargaining agree- ment. As you know, the current contract will expire in less than eight months. If you do not supply the information we have re- quested, we will have no choice but to take further legal action. Please supply this information within 10 days from the date of this letter. On August 31, 1987, Respondent's labor counsel Robert Pearlman replied to the August 17 letter as fol- lows: In reply to your letter to Mr. Roy Franta of Blue Diamond Company dated August 17, 1987, con- cerning H & K and E & M Companies both are Corporations. As neither H & K nor E & M have any bargaining relationship with your Union it is not our intention to supply you with any informa- tion concerning these two Corporations. With regard to your contention that Blue Dia- mond is in violation of Article 27, Subcontracting, of its collective bargaining agreement with Local 557, this is incorrect . As you know Blue Diamond has a standing request with your Local to send them qualified drivers. In addition the Blue Diamond Company has be- tween one hundred and fifty and two hundred doc- umented refusals of Blue Diamond Employees and members of your Local who have refused or "marked off" loads without good cause . These re- fusals span a period of approximately the past six months. The current contract between Blue Diamond and your Local has eight months before expiration. Blue Diamond will await your request to begin negotia- tions on a new contract at an approximate time. On September 29, 1987, Pearlman's letter was an- swered by H. Victoria Hedian, counsel for the Union: I have received a copy of your August 31, 1987 letter to Clifton McDonald, President of Local 557. This office represents Local 557. The response which you have given to Local 557's information request is insufficient and unsatis- factory. Blue Diamond is evading legitimate Union questions. Local 557 is entitled to receive this infor- mation from Blue Diamond, in order to police the collective bargaining agreement and protect the work of its members and to prepare for negotia- tions. Several NLRB cases have upheld exactly this type of request. If Blue Diamond does not furnish the information which Local 557 has requested in its July 21, 1987 letter within the next 15 days, we will have no choice but to file charges at the National Labor Re- lations Board. On January 21, 1988, Pearlman replied to Hedian: On January 14th Blue Diamond met with the N.L.R.B. on the investigation of the refusal to bar- gain charges you filed. We answered substantially all the questions put to us. In addition we gave the Baltimore Region permission to disclose this infor- mation to you. They have declined our request to disclose to you our responses to your questions. Attached are the board agent's notes on our re- sponses to your questions and Exhibit II which is the grievance filed by Mr. Schultz. After receiving the information enclosed by Pearlman, on April 19, 1988, Hedian wrote Pearlman listing items from the July 17, 1987 letter which remained unan- swered. On April 21, 1988, Pearlman replied furnishing some additional information, but stating that Respondent would not submit the names of H & K or E & M em- ployees. As of that time and as of the time of the hearing the names of these employees were the only items on the list in McDonald's original letter which Respondent had not purported to furnish the Union. B. Conclusions There is no dispute as to the principles which govern this case. As set in Bohemia, Inc., 272 NLRB 1128, 1129 (1984), they are: It is well established that an employer must pro- vide a union with requested information "if there is a probability that such data is relevant and will be of use to the union in fulfilling its statutory duties and responsibilities as the employees' exclusive bar- gaining representative." Associated General Contrac- tors of California, 242 NLRB 891, 893 (1979), enfd. 633 F.2d 766 (9th Cir. 1980); NLRB v. Acme Indus- trial Co., 385 U.S. 432 (1967). The Board uses a lib- eral, discovery-type standard to determine whether information is relevant, or potentially relevant, to require its production . NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956). Information about terms and condi- tions of employment of employees actually repre- sented by a union is presumptively relevant and BLUE DIAMOND CO. 1011 necessary and is required to be produced. Ohio Power Co., 216 NLRB 987 (1975), enfd . 531 F.2d 1381 (6th Cir. 1976). Information necessary for processing grievances under a collective -bargaining agreement, including that necessary to decide whether to proceed with a grievance or arbitration, must be provided as it falls within the ambit of the parties' duty to bargain. NLRB v. Acme Industrial, supra; Bickerstaff Clay Products, 266 NLRB 983 (1983). However, when a union's request for information concerns data about employees or operations other than those represented by the union, or data on fi- nancial, sales, and other information, there is no presumption that the information is necessary and relevant to the union's representation of employees. Rather, the union is under the burden to establish the relevance of such information . Ohio Power, supra. While Respondent has not conceded the relevance of any of the information requested by the Union pertaining to the H & K or E & M, it has furnished information in response to all requested items except the names of the employees of these companies and has not singled out any other items for focus. Here, unlike the situation in Bohemia, there was an ob- jective factual basis for the Union to believe that bar- gaining unit work was being performed by employees of E & M and H & K, that H & K and E & M together with Respondent might constitute a single employer, and that the assignment or subcontracting of loads to their drivers violated both the recognition clause of the agree- ment and the subcontracting clause. I find that the evi- dence is sufficient to establish the general relevance of the information sought by the Union relating to the structure, operations and interrelationships of Respond- ent, E & M, and H & K. Boyd-Mulford Construction, 277 NLRB 1631 ( 1986); Walter N. Yoder & Sons, 270 NLRB 652 (1984). While Respondent ultimately furnished infor- mation in response to all but two items in the Union's re- quest, the bulk of the information was not sent to the Union until January 21, 1988, 5 months after it was sought, 6 weeks after the charge was filed, and 1 day before the complaint issued. By belatedly furnishing in- formation in response to the bulk of the request Re- spondent did not satisfy its obligation to bargain. CRST, Inc., 269 NLRB 400, 406 (1984). Accordingly, an order is warranted based on Respondent's refusal to furnish the requested information promptly. The principal question in this case is whether Re- spondent was obligated to furnish the names of the em- ployees of E & M and H & K even assuming the general relevance of the requested information. At the hearing, Schultz was asked why the Union needed the names of the E & M and H & K employees but never responded to the question. He conceded that he knew everyone in Respondent's bargaining unit and that if someone outside the Union drove a truck he would know it. He also testified that most of the time if he asked strange drivers for their names, they would give them to him . McDonald also testified that he usual- ly recognized drivers who were members of the Union and that he would question those who were strange to him. He testified that the names of those driving the trucks were important to him so that he could determine whether the Union was collecting dues and benefit fund payments for them. In her brief, counsel for the General Counsel argues that the employees of H & K and E & M were legitimate sources of information to the Union and notes that an order is needed particularly in view of Franta's testimo- ny as to the number of drivers employed by H & K which is inconsistent with the information ultimately fur- nished by Respondent with its January 21 letter. Counsel for the Union adds that since E & M and H & K may be alter egos of Respondent, the agreement may be applica- ble to their employees, and "It would be helpful to know who these potential bargaining unit members are." Respondent argues that the names of H & K and E & M employees are not necessary to investigate grievances or represent the bargaining unit and that the General Counsel has failed to demonstrate their relevance. Re- spondent points out that the Union can file a grievance without knowing the names and has done so, and that the testimony of both Schultz and McDonald fails to es- tablish the relevance of the names . Respondent contends that the Union's true purpose in seeking the names is to use them as an aid to an organizing drive. The issue to be decided is whether under the applica- ble liberal discovery standard of relevance the General Counsel and the Union have shown the relevance of the requested information. The general purpose for which all requested information was sought was to investigate claimed contract violations in the diversion of work from Respondent to H & K and E & M and to prepare for contract negotiations. While no one has shown that the names of E & M and H & K employees have a direct bearing on either a potential grievance or future negotia- tions, the General Counsel correctly points out that these employees are legitimate sources from which further in- formation can be sought relating to the possible griev- ance and with whom information obtained from other sources may be checked for corroboration or contradic- tion. I find that there is a sufficient showing of relevance under a liberal discovery standard to conclude that Re- spondent is obligated to furnish the requested names to the Union. I find therefore that by failing or refusing to provide the information requested in the Union's July 21, 1987 letter, Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent, The Blue Diamond Company, is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. 2. Freight Drivers and Helpers Union No. 557; Inter- national Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Ware- housemen and Helpers of America, AFL-CIO is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 1012 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 3. At all times material the Union and the Teamsters National Freight Industry Negotiating Committee have been the exclusive collective-bargaining representative within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act for the fol- lowing appropriate unit: All drivers employed by Respondent at its Balti- more, Maryland, location, but excluding all other employees, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act. 4. By failing and refusing to furnish the Union with certain information requested by it, Respondent has en- gaged in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sections 8(a)(5) and (1) and 2(6) and (7) of the Act. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that it be ordered to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative action to effectuate the purposes of the Act. Based on the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the entire record, I issue the following recommended" ORDER The Respondent, The Blue Diamond Company, Balti- more, Maryland, its officers, agents, successors, and as- signs, shall 1. Cease and desist from (a) Refusing to bargain collectively with Freight Driv- ers and Helpers Union No. 557; International Brother- hood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, AFL-CIO, and the Teamsters Na- tional Freight Industry Negotiating Committee, as the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees in the following appropriate unit, by refusing to furnish the Union the information requested in items 5 through 61 of the Union's letter to the Respondent dated July 17, 1987: All drivers employed by The Blue Diamond Com- pany at is Baltimore, Maryland, location, but ex- cluding all other employees, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act. (b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re- straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act. (a) On request, furnish to the Union in writing the in- formation requested by items 5 through 61 of the Union's letter to the Respondent dated July 17, 1987, not previ- ously furnished. 1 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102 .46 of the Board's Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102 48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur- poses. (b) Post at is facility in Baltimore, Maryland, copies of the attached notice marked, "Appendix."? Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 5, after being duly signed by the Respondent's authorized representative, shall be posted by the Re- spondent immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respond- ent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (c) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days from the date of this Order what steps the Re- spondent has taken to comply. 8 If this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the word in the notice reading "Posted By Order of the Nation- al Labore Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the National Labor Relations Act and has or- dered us to post and abide by this notice. WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with Freight Drivers and Helpers Union No. 557; Internation- al Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, AFL-CIO, and the Teamsters National Freight Industry Negotiating Committee, as the exclusive bargaining representative of our employees in the following appropriate unit, by refusing to furnish the Union those items of information requested in its July 17, 1987, letter not previously or promptly furnished by us: All drivers employed by The Blue Diamond Com- pany at its Baltimore, Maryland, location, but ex- cluding all other employees, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act. WE WILL, on request, furnish the Union the informa- tion requested in its July 17, 1987 letter, not previously furnished by us, that is relevant and necessary to its role as the exclusive bargaining representative of our employ- ees in the bargaining unit. THE BLUE DIAMOND COMPANY