Roofers Local 2 (Biebel Bros.)

ROOFERS LOCAL 2 (BIEBEL BROS.) United Union of Roofers , Waterproofers and Allied Workers, Local Union No. 2, AFL-CIO (Biebel Bros., Inc.) and Barnes Hospital United Union of Roofers, Waterproofers and Allied Workers, Local Union No. 2, AFL-CIO and South Side Roofing Co., Inc. United Union of Roofers , Waterproofers and Allied Workers, Local Union No. 2, AFL-CIO and Lorenz & Associates, Inc. Cases 14-CP-476, 14-CP-478, and 14-CP-479 September 18, 1989 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN STEPHENS AND MEMBERS HIGGINS AND DEVANEY On March 23, 1989, Administrative Law Judge Claude R. Wolfe issued the attached decision. The General Counsel filed exceptions and a supporting brief. 1 The National Labor Relations Board has delegat- ed its authority in this proceeding to a three- member panel. The Board has considered the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and brief and has decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings, and conclusions and to adopt the recommended Order as modified.2 ORDER The National Labor Relations Board adopts the recommended Order of the administrative law judge as modified below and orders that the Re- spondent, United Union of Roofers , Waterproofers and Allied Workers, Local Union No. 2, AFL- CIO, St. Louis, Missouri, its officers, agents, and representatives, shall take the action set forth in the Order as modified. 1. Substitute the following for paragraph 1(a) and reletter the subsequent paragraph. "(a) Picketing or causing to be picketed Lorenz & Associates, Inc. for a period of 1 year from De- ' The Respondent also filed exceptions and a supporting brief, to which the General Counsel riled a response On June 2, 1989 , however, the Respondent filed a motion to "withdraw appeal ," to which the Gen- eral Counsel filed an answering brief. We grant the Respondent's motion to withdraw its exceptions Thus, in the absence of exceptions, we adopt the judge's findings that the Respondent was not the 9(a) representative of employees of Biebel Bros , Inc. and South Side Roofing Co., Inc and therefore violated Sec. 8(b)(7)(C) by picketing them with a recognitional and organizational object without a petition being filed under Sec 9(c) within 30 days of the commencement of the picketing 2 The General Counsel has filed limited exceptions to the judge's fail- ure to specify in his recommended Order and proposed notice that the Respondent will not picket or cause to be picketed Lorenz & Associates, Inc. for a period of 1 year from December 19, 1988 , the date on which the Respondent ceased its picketing . As this clarification will effectuate the purpose of the Act, we shall modify the Order and notice according- ly 585 cember 19, 1988, when an object is forcing or re- quiring it to recognize or bargain with Roofers Local Union No. 2 as the representative of its em- ployees or to force or require its employees to accept or select Local 2 as their collective -bargain- ing representative. "(b) Picketing or causing to be picketed Lorenz & Associates for any of the above -mentioned ob- jects when within the preceding 12 months a valid election has been held which Local 2 did not win." 2. Delete paragraph 1(c). 3. Substitute the attached notice for that of the administrative law judge. APPENDIX NOTICE To MEMBERS AND To ALL EMPLOYEES OF LORENZ & ASSOCIATES, INC., BIEBEL BROS., INC., AND SOUTH SIDE ROOFING CO., INC. POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to post and abide by this notice. WE WILL NOT picket or cause to be picketed Lorenz & Associates, Inc., for a period of 1 year from December 19, 1988, when an object of the picketing is to force or require the employer to recognize or bargain with us as the representative of its employees or to force or require its employ- ees to accept or select us as their collective-bar- gaining representative. WE WILL NOT picket or cause to be picketed Lorenz & Associates for any of the above-men- tioned objects when in the preceding 12 months a valid election has been held that we did not win. WE WILL NOT picket or cause to be picketed Biebel Bros., Inc. or South Side Roofing Co., Inc., when an object of the picketing is forcing or re- quiring either of the employers to recognize or bar- gain with us as the representative of its employees in violation of Section 8(b)(7)(C) of the Act. UNITED UNION OF ROOFERS, WATER- PROOFERS AND ALLIED WORKERS, LOCAL UNION No. 2, AFL-CIO Dorothy D. Wilson, Esq., for the General Counsel. Jeffrey E. Hartnett, Esq., for the Respondent Union. Mark W. Weisman, Esq., for the Charging Parties. 296 NLRB No. 83 586 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE CLAUDE R. WOLFE, Administrative Law Judge. This consolidated proceeding was litigated before me at St. Louis, Missouri, on January 19, 1989, pursuant to charges timely filed and consolidated complaint issued December 28, 1988.1 The complaint alleges United Union of Roofers, Waterproofers and Allied Workers, Local Union No. 2, AFL-CIO (variously referred to as the Union, Local 2, or Respondent) violated Section 8(b)(7)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act) by picketing Lorenz & Associates, Inc. (Lorenz), and Section 8(b)(7)(C) by picketing Biebel Bros., Inc. (Biebel) and South Side Roofing Co., Inc. (South Side). Respond- ent denies the commission of unfair labor practices. On the entire record,2 and after considering the able posttrial briefs of the parties, I make the following find- ings and conclusions of law. 1. JURISDICTION Barnes Hospital is, and has been at all times material herein, a Missouri corporation engaged at its office and place of business in St. Louis, Missouri, as a health care institution operating a hospital providing in- and out-pa- tient medical and professional services for the general public, and, during the 12 months ending November 30, derived gross revenues in excess of $250,000 from this business, and purchased and received at its St. Louis, Missouri facility products, goods, and materials valued in excess of $50,000 directly from points located outside the State of Missouri. Barnes Hospital is, and has been at all times material herein , an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act, and a health care institution within the meaning of Section 2(14) of the Act. Biebel is, and has been at all times material herein, a Missouri corporation with office and place of business in St. Louis, Missouri, and various construction jobsites in the St. Louis, Missouri metropolitan area including one at Barnes Hospital where it has been engaged as a roof- ing contractor in the building and construction industry. During the 12-month period ending November 30, 1988, Biebel, in the course and conduct of these business oper- ations, purchased and received at its various jobsites lo- cated in the State of Missouri products, goods, and mate- rials valued in excess of $50,000 directly from points out- side the State of Missouri. South Side is, and has been at all times material here, a Missouri corporation with an office and place of business in St. Louis, Missouri, and various construction jobsites in the St. Louis, Missouri metropolitan area, including a construction jobsite at Cleveland High School in St. Louis, Missouri, where it has been engaged in the build- ing and construction industry. During the 12-month period ending November 30, 1988, South Side, in the course and conduct of these business operations, pur- chased and received at its various jobsites located in the ' All dates are 1988 unless specifically noted otherwise. 2 Absent objection, General Counsel' s motion to correct the official transcript of record is granted. State of Missouri products, goods, and materials valued in excess of $50,000 directly from points outside the State of Missouri. Lorenz is, and has been at all times material here, a Missouri corporation with its principal offices in St. Louis, Missouri, and various construction jobsites located in the St. Louis metropolitan area including jobsites at Schnucks Supermarket , St. Louis, Missouri, Mid-Rivers Plaza, St. Peters, Missouri, and the Jewish Community Centers Association, St. Louis County, Missouri. At all times material here Lorenz has been engaged in business primarily in the building and construction industry as a roofing contractor engaged in the installation and repair of roofing systems. During the 12-month period ending November 30, 1988 , Lorenz, in the course and conduct of these business operations, purchased and received at its various jobsites located in the State of Missouri prod- ucts, goods, and materials valued in excess of $50,000 di- rectly from points located outside the State of Missouri. Biebel, South Side, and Lorenz each is now , and has been at all times material here, an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. II. LABOR ORGANIZATION Respondent is, and has been at all times material here, a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES3 Biebel, South Side, and Lorenz, as members of the Roofing Contractors of Greater St. Louis and the South- ern Illinois Roofers Association (the Association), were party to a collective-bargaining agreement with Local 2 covering their journeymen roofers, apprentice roofers, and kettlemen from June 23, 1986, to April 30, 1988. All three of these employers had also been party to several collective-bargaining agreements with Local 2 preceding the one expiring on April 30, 1988. The parties to this proceeding stipulated and I find that the Association disbanded before any negotiations for a new contract in 1988, and each member employer reclaimed its individual bargaining rights. A pattern com- mittee of various roofing employers was then formed to negotiate a pattern agreement, but each roofing contrac- tor reserved the right to accept, modify, or reject any pattern agreement that might be negotiated. Respondent went on strike on May 2, 1988, and pick- eted with signs identifying the Union as Local 2 and stat- ing "On Strike." At some point, it is not clear when, the signs also identified the employer at whom the picketing was directed. Respondent concedes that it has continued to picket Biebel and South Side with on-strike picket signs. Negotiations with the pattern committee were un- successful, and South Side, by letter to the Union dated July 15, withdrew the authority of the pattern committee to negotiate on its behalf. On August 11, Biebel notified Respondent that the Company declined to recognize it as the representative of any of its employees, and asked that a The facts related are undisputed ROOFERS LOCAL 2 (BIEBEL BROS.) all picketing cease. Prior to these actions by Biebel and South Side, Lorenz filed a petition with the Board's Re- gional Office on June 9 requesting a representation elec- tion. An election in a unit of journeymen and apprentice roofers and kettlemen employed by Lorenz was conduct- ed by Board agents on August 1. Respondent lost, and the Board issued its Certification of Results of Election on October 17 certifying that no labor organization was the exclusive representative of Lorenz' employees de- scribed above. Inasmuch as the complaint alleges Re- spondent violated one section of the Act with regard to Lorenz and another with regard to Biebel and South Side, these two situations are discussed separately below. Lorenz The parties stipulated and I find that the Union picket- ed Lorenz with "on strike" signs until October 17. The complaint alleges, Respondent admits, and I find Re- spondent picketed or caused Lorenz to be picketed from November 7 through November 30 at the Schnuck's job- site; since December 9 at the Mid-Rivers Plaza jobsite; and from December 19 at the Jewish Community Center Association . The picket signs employed at the Schnuck's jobsite referred to substandard wages . Paul Lorenz, the president of Lorenz, credibly testified the Mid-Rivers Plaza picketing lasted 1 day, December 9, and there were two picket signs, one reading "official observer" and the other reading "substandard wages." Lorenz is corroborated by Richard Mueller, project superintendent for R. G. Ross Construction , the general contractor at Mid-Rivers Plaza . Mueller testified there were two pick- ets at the site, and identified a photograph placed in evi- dence as a picture of one of the pickets. The photograph portrays a man wearing a sign reading: OFFICIAL OBSERVER ROOFER'S UNION LOCAL NO. 2 Mueller spoke to the other picket, who was wearing a sign bearing the names of Lorenz and Respondent. Mueller does not recall what else the sign said, but credi- bly related his conversation with this picket. When Mueller asked what the picketing was for, the picket told Mueller that Lorenz had not signed a contract with Re- spondent and was probably hiring men off the street and paying substandard wages. Respondent denies the pickets at Mid-Rivers were its agents . The fact that pickets with Local 2 signs were present at the jobsite is sufficient to establish prima facie the pickets were agents of Respond- ent.4 Moreover, the admission that the picketing at Mid- Rivers was union-sponsored establishes the pickets' agency. Accordingly, I find Respondent is responsible for the conduct of the two pickets at the Mid-Rivers Plaza above referred to. The complaint alleges that the picketing at the Schnuck's, Mid-Rivers, and Jewish Community Center 4 Service Employees Local 87 (Pacific Telephone), 279 NLRB 168, 177 (1986) 587 projects was designed to force or require Lorenz to rec- ognize or bargain with it as the representative of em- ployees in the unit covered by the Board's October 17 certification, and thus violated Section 8(b)(7)(B) of the Act. That section of the Act provides it shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents: [8(b)](7) to picket or cause to be picketed, or threaten to picket or cause to be picketed, any em- ployer where an object thereof is forcing or requir- ing an employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the representative of his em- ployees, or forcing or requiring the employees of an employer to accept or select such labor organiza- tion as their collective bargaining representative, unless such labor organization is currently certified as the representative of such employees. (B) where within the preceding twelve months a valid election under section 9(c) of this Act has been conducted... . The picket's statement to Mueller at Mid-Rivers that an object of the picketing was to secure a contract is a clear admission that an object of the picketing was to secure recognition," and his speculation that Lorenz was "probably" hiring men off the street and paying sub- standard wages is, as is the reference to substandard wages on other picket signs, unsupported by any evi- dence. Paul Lorenz credibly testified Respondent made no inquiry regarding wages paid after the expiration of the Association contract. Respondent proffered no evi- dence of any such inquiry or any reason at all to warrant the substandard wage claim, and makes no claim in its posttrial brief at all relating to the alleged unfair labor practice involving Lorenz. The failure of Respondent to show a basis for its substandard wage claim brings the Lorenz issue squarely within the rule in West Coast Cycle Supply Co.6 where a failure by the Union to show it had reason to conduct area standards picketing after it had lost an RM election compelled an inference the claim of area standards picketing was a device to avoid the provi- sions of the Act, warranted a finding the picketing was for a recognitional object, and merited the conclusion such conduct within 12 months after a valid election under Section 9(c) of the Act had been conducted violat- ed Section 8(b)(7)(B) of the Act. It is rare that two cases so similar to each other in terms of fact as that case and the Lorenz case occur, and I find West Coast Cycle Co. controlling in the matter before me. Accordingly, for this reason and the picket 's admission of a proscribed object, I conclude and find that Respondent violated Section 8(b)(7)(B) of the Act by picketing Lorenz for a recognitional object within 12 months after the election 5 See Fed R.Evid 801 (d)(2)(D) The statement of the picket regarding the purpose of his picketing is plainly a matter within the scope of his employment as a picket and thus an agent of the Union, and was made during the existence of that relationship. 5 Teamsters Local 88 (West Coast Cycle), 208 NLRB 679 (1974), and see Delaware Building Trades Council, 230 NLRB 42, 45 (1977) 588 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD conducted by the Board among certain of Lorenz em- ployees on August 1.7 Biebel and South Side Respondent admits the following complaint allega- tions, the evidence supports the admissions , and I find them to be true and accurate: Since on or about August 11, 1988, Respondent, acting through various individuals . . . commenced picketing Biebel at its various jobsites in the St. Louis, Missouri metropolitan area through approxi- mately November 25, 1988, including Biebel's job- site at Barnes Hospital, with picket signs which stated: ON STRIKE BIEBEL BROTHERS UNION LOCAL NO. 2 Since on or about July 15, 1988, Respondent, acting through various individuals . . . commenced picketing South Side at its various jobsites in St. Louis, Missouri metropolitan area including South Side's jobsite at Cleveland High School, with picket signs which stated: ON STRIKE SOUTH SIDE ROOFING UNION LOCAL NO. 2 The General Counsel alleges this conduct violated Sec- tion 8(b)(7)(C) of the Act which provides: [8](b) . . . It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents- (7) to picket or cause to be picketed, or threaten to picket or cause to be picketed, any employer where an object thereof is forcing or requiring an employer to recognize or bargain with a labor orga- nization as the representative of his employees, or forcing or requiring the employees of an employer to accept or select such labor organization as their collective-bargaining representative, unless such labor organization is currently certified as the repre- sentative of such employees. (C) where such picketing has been conducted without a petition under section 9(c) being filed within a reasonable period of time not to exceed thirty days from the commencement of such picket- ing:... Provided further, That nothing in this sub- paragraph (C) shall be construed to prohibit any picketing or other publicity for the purpose of truthfully advising the public (including consumers) that an employer does not employ members of, or r Although unnecessary to the resolution of this case, I conclude the "Official Observer" was also picketing with his fellow member and there- fore for a recognitional purpose Plumbers Local 274 (Stokely-Van Camp), 267 NLRB 1111, 1114 (1983) have a contract with, a labor organization, unless an effect of such picketing is to induce any individual employed by any other person in the course of his employment, not to pick up, deliver or transport any goods or not to perform any services. Respondent has picketed Biebel and South Side for more than 30 days without a petition under Section 9(c) of the Act being filed, and is not currently certified as the representative of employees of Biebel or South Side, none of whom are currently Respondent's members. The outstanding issue is whether or not an objective of the picketing is recognitional or organizational. Respondent argues it is the collective-bargaining repre- sentative selected by a majority of the unit employees of Biebel and South Side; these employers have recognized Respondent as said representative within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act;8 and the picketing is therefore economic in nature and not in violation of Section 8(b)(7)(C). Respondent asserts its status under Section 9(a) came about in 1986 when all of the employees struck for a new contract because, by striking , a majority of the unit employees gave notice to the struck employers that Re- spondent was their 9(a) representative . According to Re- spondent, the employers, including Biebel and South Side, recognized this 9(a) status by executing a new con- tract and by continuing to employ the strikers. More- over, argues Respondent, the February 1988 giving of an 8(d)9 notice of a desire to amend or terminate the then existing contract on April 30 to Respondent and Federal and state authorities is evidence Biebel and South Side had recognized Respondent's 9(a) status. The contention that the February notices are some evi- dence of recognition of 9(a) status has no merit because the collective-bargaining agreement, which was clearly a construction industry agreement and thus an 8(f) agree- ment, requires, at article XLII, written notice at least 60 days before contract termination date of any desire to amend or terminate . Compliance with this contract pro- 8 Sec. 9(a) provides Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective- bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representative of all the em- ployees in such unit for the purposes of collective -bargaining in re- spect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other condi- tions of employment Sec 8(d) provides in relevant part [w]here there is in effect a collective -bargaining contract cover- ing employees in an industry affecting commerce, the duty to bar- gain collectively shall mean that no party to such contract shall terminate or modify such contract , unless the party desiring such ter- mination or modification- (1) serves a written notice upon the other party to the contract of the proposed termination or modification sixty days prior to the ex- piration date, sixty days prior to the time it is proposed to make such termination or modification, (2) offers to meet and confer with the other party for the purpose of negotiating a new contract or a contract containing the proposed modifications, (3) notifies the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service within thirty days after such notice of the existence of a dispute , and simul- taneously therewith notifies any State or Territory agency estab- lished to mediate and conciliate disputes within the State or Terri- tory where the dispute occurred ROOFERS LOCAL 2 (BIEBEL BROS.) vision is nothing more than the fulfillment of a contrac- tual obligation neither denoting nor connoting anything more. Similarly, compliance with the statute which on its face refers only to procedures to be followed in terminat- ing or modifying "a collective-bargaining contract cover- ing employees in an industry affecting commerce," and does not differentiate between 8(f) and 9(a) agreements, cannot reasonably be considered evidence of a 9(a) obli- gation. In the absence of a certification following a Board election or recognition by the employer on the basis of an affirmative showing of majority support,1° i.e., evi- dence the Union expressly requested and was granted recognition as the 9(a) representative of an employer's employees,) 1 full 9(a) status will not be found by the Board. The burden of proving a 9(a) relationship rests on the Union. 12 Respondent has presented no evidence it expressly requested or was expressly granted recognition as a 9(a) representative by Biebel, South Side, or the As- sociation. The only probative evidence on the matter is the credible testimony of Douglas Jones, the vice presi- dent of South Side and a member of the Association's negotiating team during the negotiations leading to the 1983 to 1986 and 1986 to 1988 contract. Jones testified there was never any discussion of recognition of Re- spondent during these negotiations, and Respondent never made any specific requests for recognition, made any claim of majority status, or offered any proof of such status. The recognition clause in these agreements as well as the 1988 proposals of the pattern committee has apparently been routinely included in each succeed- ing contract for many years without change or discus- sion, and reads as follows: ARTICLE II Exclusive Recognition The Employer agrees to and does hereby recog- nize the Union as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all its employees performing the types of work hereinafter set forth and described in ARTI- CLE III hereof.13 Article II does not establish a 9(a) relationship. That Respondent has been recognized as party to an 8(f) con- tract is made clear by the union-security clause14 requir- ing union membership not later than 8 days after em- ployment or the execution of the contract, whichever is later. Respondent contends that the strike and return to work of Biebel and South Side employees in 1986 and the retention of employment by many of them until they again went on strike constitutes clear notice Respondent was their 9(a) representative , and the subsequent execu- tion of the 1986 contract by the Association constituted 9(a) recognition. Respondent correctly notes that the 1° Brannan Sand & Gravel Co., 289 NLRB 977 (1986) 11 J & R Tile, 291 NLRB 1034 (1988) 12 John Deklewa & Sons, 282 NLRB 1375 In 41 (1987) 12 Art . III sets forth the types of work and geographical area covered by the agreement 14 Art IV of the contract 589 Board concluded in J & R Tile, supra, that a 9(a) rela- tionship could be established where there was an express demand by the Union for recognition based on a "con- temporaneous showing of union support among the ma- jority of the unit employees," and then argues, "There can be no greater contemporaneous showing of union support than where a clear majority of unit employees have elected to demonstrate their adherence to the Union by walking off their job . See State Electric Supply Co., 187 N.L.R.B. 73 at 80." The strike by all of the em- ployees at South Side and Biebel in 1986 was clear notice to the employers that the Union was the 9 (a) rep- resentative. See Spitzer Akron, Inc.,15 supra at 120, "and their execution was a recognition of this fact ." Respond- ent's argument ignores the fact there is a total absence in this case of an "express demand" or "express grant" of recognition which J & R Tile specifically set forth as in- dispensable elements to determination of 9(a) status. This does not permit reliance on facts such as Respondent presents to establish such a relationship . Respondent simply has not met its burden of proving an "express demand" or "express grant," and its argument cannot prevail . Furthermore, reliance on State Electric and Spitzer Akron is misplaced. Both are inapposite because the former involves a majority status established by signed authorization cards and express demands for rec- ognition, and the latter involves a certified union and a question of good-faith doubt of the Union's majority status. Respondent's position that its 1988 picketing was un- dertaken because it was unable to reach a collective-bar- gaining agreement is indicative of an object of forcing Biebel and South Side to enter into a new contract with the Union . In order to do so, these employers would of course have to recognize Respondent as the representa- tive of its employees. Respondent has not shown any lawful reason for the picketing . Moreover, as the Gener- al Counsel points out, the use of "on strike" signs has in certain circumstances been found to be evidence of a re- cognitional or organizational objective. 16 That is also the case here. There is no evidence the signs were designed or utilized for any of the purposes permitted by the pro- viso to Section 8(b)(7)(C) of the Act, and I am persuaded they were directed at employees of Biebel and South Side with an object of forcing or requiring them, all non- union members, to accept the Union as their representa- tive, and were also directed at unionized employees of other employees on jobsites with Biebel and South Side as an effort to induce them not to perform services for their employees and thus exert pressure on Biebel and South Side to recognize Respondent . Inasmuch as Re- spondent was never the 9(a) representative of employees of Biebel and South Side , but nevertheless picketed them with a recognitional and organizational object without a petition being filed under Section 9(c) of the Act within 30 days of the commencement of said picketing, Re- spondent has violated Section 8 (b)(7)(C) of the Act. Is 195 NLRB 114 (1972 ), enfd 470 F 2d 1000 (6th Cir 1972) 16 Carpenters Local 1849 (Robert Young Developments), 208 NLRB 461 (1974), Operating Engineers Local 18 (Cookson, Inc). 291 NLRB 797 (1988), Hotel & Restaurant Employees Local 568, 147 NLRB 1060 (1964) 1 590 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD The violations of Section 8(b)(7)(B) and (C) of the Act found hereinabove are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. On these findings of fact and conclusions of law, I issue the following recommended t 7 ORDER The Respondent, United Union of Roofers, Water- proofers and Allied Workers, Local Union No. 2, AFL- CIO, St. Louis, Missouri, its officers, agents, and repre- sentatives, shall 1. Cease and desist from (a) Picketing or causing to be picketed Lorenz & As- sociates, Inc., where an object thereof is forcing or re- quiring it to recognize or bargain with Respondent as the representative of its employees in violation of Section 8(b)(7)(B) of the Act. (b) Picketing or causing to be picketed Biebel Bros., Inc., or South Side Roofing Co., Inc., where an object thereof is forcing or requiring said employer to recog- nize or bargain with Respondent as the representative of 17 If no exceptions are filed as provided in Sec. 102 46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board , the findings, conclu- sions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and become its find- ings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all purposes its employees in violation of Section 8(b)(7)(C) of the Act. (c) In any like or related manner engaging in conduct here found unlawful. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act. (a) Post at its business office and meeting halls copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 18 Copies of said notice on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 14, after being signed by Respondent's au- thorized representative, shall be posted by it immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to members are customarily posted . Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to ensure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (b) Furnish the Regional Director with signed copies of the aforesaid notice for posting by Lorenz & Associ- ates, Inc., Biebel Bros., Inc., and South Side Roofing Co., Inc., if those companies are willing to post them. (c) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days from the date of this Order what steps the Re- spondent has taken to comply. 1s If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Nation- al Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board "