Illinois-American Water Co.

ILLINOIS-AMERICAN WATER CO. Illinois-American Water Company, Southern Divi- sion and Office and Professional Employees International Union, Local 13, AFL-CIO. Cases 14-CA-18981, 14-CA-19148, 14-CA- 19234, and 14-CA-19237 September 22, 1989 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN STEPHENS AND MEMBERS CRACRAFT AND DEVANEY On September 22, 1988 , Administrative Law Judge Donald R. Holley issued the attached deci- sion. The Respondent filed exceptions and a brief in support of its exceptions. The National Labor Relations Board has delegat- ed its authority in this proceeding to a three- member panel. The Board has considered the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and brief and has decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings,' and conclusions, and to adopt the recommended Order as modified.2 ORDER The National Labor Relations Board adopts the recommended Order of the administrative law judge as modified below and orders that the Re- spondent, Illinois-American Water Company, Southern Division, Alton, East St. Louis, and Belleville, Illinois, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Order as modified. 1. Insert the following as paragraph 2(b) and re- letter subsequent paragraphs accordingly. "(b) Furnish the Union, in convenient form, with the information requested in its letter dated March 30, 1987." I The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge's credibility find- ings. The Board's established policy is not to overrule an administrative law judge's credibility resolutions unless the clear preponderance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 ( 1950), enfd 188 F 2d 362 (3d Cir 1951) We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing the findings. The Respondent argues that Scrantontan Publishing Co, 215 NLRB 296 (1974) (and not Bay Shipbuilding Corp, 263 NLRB 1133 (1982), enfd 721 F 2d 187 (7th Cir 1983) and Rice Food MarAets, 255 NLRB 884 (1981), relied on by the judge) is dispositive of the issue of whether its refusal to bargain about , and apply the contract to , the computer center employees violated the Act. We find Scraniontan inapplicable for the reasons set out by the Seventh Circuit in enforcing the Board 's decision in Bay Shipbuild- ing Corp. See 721 F 2d 187, 191 And, as further support for the judge's decision on this issue, we note the Board's recent decisions in Untied Technologies Corp., 287 NLRB 198 ( 1987), and 292 NLRB 248 (1989) We adopt in the absence of exceptions the judge 's finding that bargain- ing unit employees' social security numbers, requested by the Union, are presumptively relevant information z The judge inadvertently failed to include in the Order an affirmative order requiring the Respondent to furnish the Union , in convenient form. the information requested in its letter dated March 30, 1987 We modify the recommended Order accordingly 715 2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the administrative law judge. APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to post and abide by this notice. WE WILL NOT refuse to recognize Office and Professional Employees International Union, Local 13, AFL-CIO as the exclusive bargaining repre- sentative of the employees in the appropriate unit, including those employed at the Belleville, Illinois computer center. WE WILL NOT refuse to apply the terms and con- ditions of the collective-bargaining agreement with the Union to our computer center employees. WE WILL NOT refuse to supply the Union with requested information that is relevant to its per- formance of its duties as a collective-bargaining representative. WE WILL NOT threaten to terminate unit employ- ees if the Union insists on applying the collective- bargaining agreement to computer center employ- ees. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. WE WILL, on request, honor the subsisting col- lective-bargaining agreement, and any extensions thereof, applying the terms thereof to computer center employees who are within the appropriate bargaining unit. WE WILL furnish the Union, in convenient form, the information requested in its letter dated March 30, 1987. WE WILL make the computer center employees whole for any losses suffered by reason of our fail- ure to apply the subsisting collective-bargaining agreement, and make all fringe benefit payments and contributions required thereby or any exten- sions thereof. ILLINOIS-AMERICAN WATER COMPA- NY, SOUTHERN DIVISION Mary J. Tobey, Esq., for the General Counsel. R. Michael Lowenbaum and Robert L. Broderick, Esqs. (Thompson & Mitchell), of St. Louis, Missouri, for the Respondent. 296 NLRB No. 92 716 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE DONALD R. HOLLEY, Administrative Law Judge. Upon an original charge filed by the above-named Union in Case 14-CA-18981 on June 2, 1987,1 a complaint was issued on July 2 which alleged, in substance, that by re- fusing to furnish the Union with requested information, Illinois-American Water Company, Southern Division (Respondent) had violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act). Respondent filed a timely answer denying it had engaged in the unfair labor practices alleged . Thereafter, the Union filed the original charge in Case 14-CA-19148 on September 14. Subsequently, on October 28, an amended complaint was issued and the above-indicated cases were consoli- dated for trial. The amended complaint realleged a refus- al-to-furnish information violation, and additionally al- leged that employees performing customer service work at Respondent's Belleville, Illinois computer center con- stituted an accretion to a defined bargaining unit repre- sented by the Union, and that Respondent had violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act by refusing to recog- nize and bargain with the Union as the exclusive bargain- ing agent of such employees. Respondent filed a timely answer denying it had engaged in the unfair labor prac- tices alleged in the October 28 complaint . Finally, the original charge in Case 14-CA-19234 was filed by the Union on November 2, and it filed a similar charge in Case 14-CA-19237 on November 5. After the charge in Case 14-CA-19237 was amended on December 2, a con- solidated amended complaint was issued on December 4 and the four above-named cases were consolidated for trial. The December 4 complaint realleged the matter set forth in the two earlier complaints and alleged that Re- spondent had engaged in further violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act by subcontracting work which had been performed by employees in two bargaining units represented by the Union without notifying the Union or affording it an opportunity to bargain with re- spect to the effects of such action, and that it violated Section 8(a)(1) by threatening employees with loss of employment because of their support of the Union. The case was heard in St. Louis, Missouri, on Febru- ary 8 and 9, 1988. All parties appeared and were afford- ed full opportunity to participate in the proceeding. Upon the entire record, including the posthearing briefs filed by the parties, and from my observation of the de- meanor of the witnesses who appeared to give testimony, I make the following FINDINGS OF FACT 1. JURISDICTION Respondent, an Illinois corporation, is engaged as a public utility in the distribution and sale of water to the general public with business offices in East St. Louis, Granite City, Alton, and Cairo, Illinois, and a computer center in Belleville, Illinois. It admittedly derived gross I All dates herein are 1987 unless otherwise indicated revenues in an amount exceeding $250,000 during the 12- month period ending June 30, 1987, and during the same period it received at its Illinois facilities products , goods, and materials valued in excess of $50,000 from points outside the State of Illinois . It is admitted, and I find, that Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. II. STATUS OF LABOR ORGANIZATION It is admitted, and I find, that the Union is a labor or- ganization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Background Respondent, Illinois-American Water Company, is one of approximately 50 wholly owned subsidiaries of Ameri- can Water Works Company. The parent corporation has divided its holdings into regions, and Respondent is in its mid-American region, which encompasses operations in Ohio, Missouri, Indiana, Iowa, and Illinois. The parent corporation's mid-American region is headquartered in Richmond, Indiana. Respondent supplies water services to customers in several areas of Illinois. Thus, it has district offices in Pekin, Peoria, Alton, Granite City, East St. Louis, and Cairo. It has subdivided its operations and the district of- fices in Pekin and Peoria are designated as its Northern Division, while the district offices in Alton, Granite City, East St. Louis, and Cairo are designated as its Southern Division. Its corporate office is located in Belleville, Illi- nois, a city that housed a district office until that office was closed in early April 1987. Thomas Conner, a Respondent vice president and manager of its Southern Division, indicated his division has 10-11 bargaining agreements with various unions. The Charging Party is one of those unions. Thus, the record reveals the Union involved herein has represented employees employed in two separate bargaining units within the Southern Division for a number of years. One unit is composed of "clerical employees, excluding man- agement staff and supervisors" employed in the Alton district office. The Union has represented the described employees for 20 years, and its subsisting agreement became effective on April 20, 1987, and it expires April 1990.2 The second unit is composed of "all office em- ployees . . . exclusive of supervisory employees and con- fidential employees, including those employees perform- ing group insurance and/or pension duties" employed in the Belleville, East St. Louis, and Granite City district offices.3 The Union has represented the employees in the described unit (frequently referred to as the East St. Louis unit) since 1948. Since opening its corporate office in Belleville in March 1986, Respondent has implemented a number of organizational changes which have impacted on the two 2 G C Exh. 2 8 G.C. Exh. 3. At the time of the hearing, all district office unit em- ployees were working in the East St. Louis district office. ILLINOIS-AMERICAN WATER CO. bargaining units represented by the Union. The first or- ganizational change occurred when Respondent imple- mented a decision to transfer four employees who per- formed payroll and accounts receivable work in the East St. Louis district office to the corporate headquarters in Belleville. While Respondent initially contended such employees were no longer in the Union's East St. Louis bargaining unit, it eventually agreed those employees, who performed the same duties at headquarters that they had performed while employed in the district office, would be included in the East St. Louis bargaining unit.4 Two subsequent organizational and/or operational changes within the Southern Division prompted the Union to file charges which led to the issuance of the consolidated amended complaint in the instant case. One involved Respondent's implementation of its decision to close the Belleville district office in early April 1987; its transfer of unit employees in that office to East St. Louis; and the remodeling of that district office to acco- modate a computer center, which was opened on Sep- tember 28, 1987 . While the Union did not contest Re- spondent's right to close the Belleville district office and transfer its unit employees to the East St. Louis district office, it filed a charge when the computer center was staffed with 11 clerical employees previously employed in the East St. Louis district office and Respondent thereafter treated such employees as nonunion employ- ees. The second change to be considered is Respondent's October 1, 1987 implementation of its decision to cause its Illinois customers to send their monthly remittance to a bank in Indiana rather than to the district office which serviced their accounts. B. The Issues 1. Did Respondent engage in a refusal to bargain by refusing to recognize the Union as the exclusive bargain- ing agent of clerical employees employed at its Belleville computer center by refusing to apply the terms of the East St. Louis bargaining agreement to such employees? 2. Did Respondent threaten employees with loss of employment because of their support of the Union on or about March 17, 1987? 3. Did Respondent engage in a refusal to bargain by changing the address for customer remittance from dis- trict offices to an Indiana bank without giving notice to the Union and affording it an opportunity to bargaining concerning the decision and the effects of implementa- tion of it upon unit employees? 4. Did Respondent unlawfully refuse to furnish the Union with information it requested on March 30, 1987? C. The Computer Center Situation Respondent first explored the feasibility of storing in- formation in a computer and handling customer inquiries and requests for services with the aid of a computer system in late 1985 . At that time, Southern District Man- ager Conner and Robert McMillian, then customer serv- ice superintendent in the East St. Louis district office, 4 The dispute was compromised when it was agreed such employees would not have certain bidding rights afforded by the contract 717 visited a sister company which was utilizing a computer- ized system to handle customer inquiries and requests for services. In June 1986, Herbert Goodrick, the Union's business representative, learned through a steward that Respond- ent was considering the creation of a computer center. By letter dated June 17, 1986, Goodrick requested bar- gaining concerning changes the Company was consider- ing which would impact on employees in the bargaining units it represented.5 By letter dated June 23, 1986, Re- spondent replied the program referred to in the Union's letter was still in the "embryo stage" but Conner would meet with Goodrick during the week of July 7, 1986.6 The record reveals the parties met on November 25, 1986. Management was represented by Conner and McMillian and the Union was represented by Goodrick and additional unidentified persons . McMillian testified Conner explained the Company's long-range plans for the creation of a computer center during the meeting, in- dicating employees used in the facility would not be cov- ered by either of its contracts with the Union . McMillian claimed, and Goodrick denied, that Goodrick responded by stating he would have to organize the facility if Re- spondent refused to recognize the Union as the repre- sentative of its employees.' From the time of the above-mentioned meeting for- ward, Goodrick testified he urged Conner to change his position with respect to representation of computer center employees almost every time they met to discuss a problem. He indicated that in January or February 1987 Conner told him when they met individually in the breakroom at the East St. Louis district office that if he persisted in his demand to represent computer center em- ployees he would not staff the center with bargaining unit employees, but would hire 12 employees off the street and lay off 12 bargaining unit employees.8 Goo- drick testified during direct examination that around March 10, he and union stewards Mary Allen and Caro- lyn Hudson met with Conner and several supervisors whose names he did not recall in the East St. Louis dis- trict office to discuss the transfer of three bargaining unit employees to Respondent's corporate headquarters. He claims that the subject of the computer center came up during the meeting and that Conner again stated that if they insisted on them hiring union employees he would have to hire 12 people off the street and lay off 12 people in their bargaining unit . The General Counsel sought to corroborate Goodrick's testimony concerning the March meeting through steward Mary Allen. Allen testified the meeting occurred on March 17 and Conner made the comment attributed to him by Goodrick when Goodrick handed an NLRB charge to Conner. No charges were pending before the Board at the time. S G C Exh. 9 S G C. Exh. 10 ° I credit McMillian, a positive witness who exhibited the ability to recall when events occurred and what was said Goodrick indicated he took no notes during the meetings, could not recall dates of contacts with Respondent, and otherwise appeared unable to recall , in detail, what had occurred 2 years before the hearing. a Conner did not deny that he made such comments to Goodrick indi- vidually 718 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD When he appeared as a witness, Conner testified the meeting he attended on March 17 was a meeting with employees during which he described Respondent's plans for staffing the computer center, indicating it would be nonunion and not covered by a Local 13 contract. With- out indicating whether he made the above-described threat in the presence of stewards Allen and Hudson at some meeting at which headquarters employees were dis- cussed, he simply testified Goodrick did not attend the March 17 meeting. Finally, as a rebuttal witness, Goo- drick testified he had consulted an appointment book after giving his direct testimony and it revealed the date of the meeting concerning headquarters employees was March 17. Additionally, he indicated he did not attend any meeting Conner held with employees on March 17, 1987. Careful consideration of the testimony given by the three witnesses named causes me to conclude that, in the absence of a denial by Conner that he told Goodrick in the presence of union stewards Allen and Hudson that he would hire 12 people off the street and lay off 12 bar- gaining unit employees if the Union insisted on the com- puter center being union, I credit Goodrick's claim that the threat was voiced in the presence of the stewards at some meeting held during the month of March 1987. During the first week of April, the Belleville district office was closed. Its employees were transferred to the East St. Louis district office. During the ensuing 5 to 6- month period, the building was gutted, remodeled, and furniture and equipment was installed. Total cost of the renovation approximated $465,000, and some $700,000 was spent on equipment. When the work was completed, it housed 2 IBM System 36 computers, and 30 computer stations.9 Respondent's long range plan was to store all information concerning its 65,000 Illinois customers in the computers and handle all of its customers' requests for services and information, except those matters which required the customer's physical presence, at the center. The operation was to be autonomous in that it was to be separate from the Southern District administratively, was to have its own budget, and was to handle its own pay- roll and insurance matters. By June 10, nine East St. Louis district office employ- ees had been selected for positions at the computer center. Immediately prior to their selection they had worked in various jobs classifications in the district office.' 0 All were to hold the job classification of "cus- tomer inquiry representative" when they started to work at the computer center. Training was commenced on June 16 and by on or about October 5 each customer in- quiry representative (CIR) had received approximately 62 hours of training on the IBM System 36 computers and the "3180 work stations" which are positioned in each of the center's 30 cubicles and/or work stations. The nine CIRs were removed from the East St. Louis bargaining unit on September 26. They actually reported to the computer center on September 28, and the 800 phone lines which are used by customers to request serv- 9 See photos placed in the record as R Exits. 3(a) through 3(i). 10 Three were classified as "customer service clerks," one was a "relief & general clerk," one (1) was a "guarantee deposit & relief clerk," one was an "entry-credit comb. clerk," one was a "teller," one was a "switch- board operator," and the last was an "entry & guarantee clerk " ice or make inquiry were activated on October 5. There- after, during October and November, CIRs received ad- ditional "hands on" training which was administered by a so-called "A Team," which was composed of computer experts employed by the parent company. During the period CIRs were receiving their training, three supervisors from the East St. Louis district office, and six unit employees in that office also received train- ing. The supervisors each received approximately 40 hours of training, and each of the unit employees in- volved received an average of 8 hours training. The training received by the unit employees was limited to training on the "3180 work stations" which were in- stalled in the district offices to permit customer payment information to be entered into a computer located at the computer center. The district office supervisors and unit employees were also given "hands on" training by the "A Team" during October and November. When the computer center was activated on October 5, all customer service requests and customer inquiries arising in the areas previously handled by the East St. Louis, Belleville, and Granite City district offices were handled by the CIRs stationed in the computer center. Respondent planned to incorporate Alton and Cairo into the computerized system on April 11, 1988, and Peoria and Pekin were to be incorporated into the system on August 1, 1988. Prior to the opening of the computer center, a number of unit employees in various job classifications were in- volved in the process of handling customer inquiries and requests for water service. Customers visited the district offices personally and contacted the office which serv- iced their account by telephone. If the visit was in person, a receptionist would normally refer the customer to a customer service clerk. A switchboard operator would do the same thing if the customer telephoned. Matters handled by the customer service clerks included handling requests for: turn on or off of water service; billing information (lost, too high or low, replacement bill, or final billing); meter check or replacement; trans- fer of service; and leaks in the street. To handle custom- er requests or inquiries, the customer service clerks were required to physically obtain and view customer account records prepared by other unit employees. Those records were maintained in service files, route books, on micro- fiche, l I and in a radix computer. After the computer center was opened, the customer service and inquiry work performed in the district offices was limited to accepting customer remittance (whether in person or by processing payments made at stores and other concerns authorized to accept payment), prepara- tion of deferred payment agreements, and acceptance of occupancy permits required before water service could be turned on in the East St. Louis area. As transactions were completed, the information was keyed into the computer to bring the customer's account up to date. If a customer appeared at a district office and desired water service or voiced an inquiry, the customer was informed I I Microfiche is a sheet of transparent plastic which contains financial information on accounts and is read when placed in a viewing machine ILLINOIS-AMERICAN WATER CO. to use a phone connected to the computer center which was located in the lobby of each district office. All cus- tomer contact with the computer center was by tele- phone as the building was closed to all except employ- ees. At the time of the hearing 16 individuals worked at the computer center. McMillian is the manager of the fa- cility, and Colleen Bromley, who previously supervised unit employees at the East St. Louis district office, is the assistant manager. Harry Hubler and Norman Saunders are computer operators, and former East St. Louis unit employee Ernestine Briley is McMillian's secretary.12 Eleven employees previously employed in the Union's East St. Louis bargaining unit round out the staff. The record reveals that the CIRs perform all the func- tions which had been performed by district office cus- tomer service clerks prior to the opening of the comput- er center. They obtain their calls through an automatic system that directs a call to whoever is available. The procedure employed to handle a call differs from that previously utilized in the district offices as the CIRs call up customer records by utilizing some 17 screens avail- able in the computer to obtain the information needed to handle the request for water service or the inquiry. Thus, the CIRs do not have to leave their work stations to in- spect customer service records, route books, or micro- fiche as all the information is in the computer. Similarly, the CIRs do not manually complete orders to accomplish the service required by any given call. Instead, they simply key the action to be taken into the computer, and the order is then transmitted to the appropriate district office where it is printed out and delivered to the serv- iceman who accomplishes the task required. In addition to performing all work previously per- formed in the district offices by customer service clerks, computer center employees perform the work previously performed in the district offices by unit employees in other job classifications. Thus, before the change, entry clerks entered information retrieved from filled orders into route books and put the same information on data processing forms which were sent to parent corpora- tions's mid-American office in Richmond, Indiana. Now, the former East St. Louis entry clerk and another com- puter center employee (both classified as CIRs) perform the above-described work at the computer center by simply keying the information into the computer. Addi- tionally, two CIRs, who are given computer printouts of all accounts read on particular days, now investigate ac- counts that are coded as having readings which appear to be too high or too low. Previously, district office em- ployees used what is described in the record as a radix computer to perform the work under discussion in the district office. As is the case with all service handled in the computer center, the CIRs accomplish the work without leaving their computer station by calling neces- sary information upon the screen and issuing an order to a meter reader or other service man through the comput- er. 12 The record reveals Briley handles, inter alia, pension and insurance matters for computer center employees 719 McMillian and Conner jointly determine the wages, hours, and benefits to be received by computer center employees. At the time of the hearing, the CIRs were paid a semimonthly salary which, when computed on an hourly basis, slightly exceeded their hourly rates when working in the district office.13 They enjoy one holiday more than district office employees, and their vacation entitlement is slightly different. Their hours of work are from 7:30 a.m. to 6 p.m. while district office employees worked from 8 a.m. to 4:30 p.m.14 McMillian reports di- rectly to Conner in the latter's capacity of vice president of Respondent rather than manager of the Southern Di- vision. While McMillian has authority to fire or disci- pline employees, Conner is normally consulted in dis- charge situations and in those situations where the disci- pline could be classified as severe. Conner executes all collective-bargaining agreements which apply to South- ern District employees, and he participates in grievance proceedings which involve his division. While computerization of the customer service and in- quiry functions has resulted in considerable integration of the functions accomplished in the computer center and the district offices, there is no interchange of employees between the district offices and the computer center. Daily personal contact between the facilities is limited to CIR telephone calls to district office employees to obtain information which is not in the computer, and to daily visits of a messenger who delivers messages to district offices, Respondent's corporation headquarters, and the East St. Louis district office. Each of the district offices is equipped with computer keyboards and screens, and the employees working in those offices use the computer to ascertain what customers owe for service, and cus- tomer remittance handled by the division offices is keyed into the computer . As orders are filled by field person- nel, district offices key such information into the comput- er. District office employees' access to computer screens is limited to those screens they need to view to accom- plish their work. Discussion and Conclusions The General Counsel 's contention that Respondent is legally obligated to apply the subsisting East St. Louis contract to clerical employees employed in the computer center presents a hybrid accretion issue which is appro- priately labeled a "converse" accretion issue in Respond- ent's brief. Rice Food Markets, 255 NLRB 884 (1981 ), and other cases cited by the General Counsel, ' 5 reveal that normal accretion principles have only peripheral rather than direct application in cases such as the one under consid- eration. In Rice Food Markets, liquor departments of a food operation were spun off to separate stores, and the liquor stores were staffed with bargaining unit employ- 's District office employees receive an hourly rate and are paid each week. 14 While the computer center is open 10-1/2 hours per day, the record fails to reveal whether CIRs work more than 40 hours per week . As they are salaried employees, the likelihood is they work 40 hours per week. is Bay Shipbuilding Corp., 263 NLRB 1133 (1982); and Seven-Up/ Canada Dry Bottling Co., 281 NLRB 943 (1986) 720 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD ees. Such employees performed the same functions in the separate stores, worked the same hours and received the same wages and benefits, but were separately supervised by an individual who continued to report to a supervisor who was responsible for the management and supervi- sion of both the liquor stores and the grocery stores. Noting that the employer's operations were functionally integrated but no interchange of employees had been shown, the administrative law judge, with subsequent Board approval, found the employer was obligated to apply the grocery store contract to liquor store employ- ees as the bargaining unit that existed prior to the changes remained a viable unit. In reaching his decision, the administrative law judge observed (255 NLRB at 887): [A] division of an existing facility cannot and should not be viewed in precisely the same manner as the addition of a new facility or facilities. Even in cir- cumstances where a new facility would not be viewed as an accretion, because of factors such as the distance from other facilities, lack of inter- change, autonomy in labor relations, and other fac- tors considered relevant to a determination vel non of accretion, it would not necessarily follow that the spunoff portion of an existing facility would no longer be considered part of the overall existing unit. In practical effect, there is a heavy burden on a party seeking to prove "accretion" to show that the group sought to be added to an existing unit is an "accretion" within the meaning of the Board's long- standing use of that term . . . . When, as here, an employer attempts to justify removing a particular group or groups from the coverage of a collective- bargaining agreement or relationship, it has the burden of showing that the group is sufficiently dis- similar from the remainder of the unit so as to war- rant that removal. The above-described evidentiary burden of an employ- er who fragments a bargaining unit during the term of a subsisting bargaining agreement was applied in Bay Ship- building Corp., supra. There, certain lofting employees, who determined how various components of a ship were to be cut from flat pieces of metal, were given computer training. Afterward, they were removed from the manual lofting department and were placed in a separate depart- ment. After the change, the employer refused to apply the contract which had governed the wages, hours and conditions of employment of employees in the manual lofting department to the employees in the computerized lofting department. The Board found the employer vio- lated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by its actions. In enforcing the Board's Order, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals stated: [I]f the bargaining unit is appropriate, the Act re- quires an employer to recognize and bargain with the union as the exclusive representative of all em- ployees in the unit. . . . This obligation does not expire automatically when technological innova- tions affect the jobs of some of the employees in the unit. Rather the employer's obligations depend on whether the changes in job structure are so signifi- cant that the existing bargaining unit, including the affected employees, is no longer appropriate. [NLRB v. Bay Shipbuilding, 721 F.2d 187, 190 (7th Cir. 1983).] Respondent contends the principles applied in BASF v. Wyandotte Corp., 276 NLRB 1576 (1985), rather than those enunciated in Rice Food Markets and Bay Ship- building are controlling. In BASF, the employer built a fully automated steam facility to supply its steam genera- tion. It thereafter created a new job description titled "utilities technician" and transferred four boiler opera- tors to fill the utilities technician positions at the new fa- cility. The boiler operators selected met certain educa- tional requirements for the new position, and were given technical training. Thereafter, the employer refused to treat the utilities technicians as unit employees. Noting the parties had previously agreed to exclude technicians from the unit, the administrative law judge, with subse- quent Board approval, found the utilities technician posi- tions were true technician positions and the employees occupying such positions were excluded from the unit. Accordingly, the employer's refusal to consider them to be unit employees did not amount to a refusal to bargain. Patently, the principles applied in BASF are of limited relevance in the instant case as the applicable bargaining agreement does not specifically exclude customer inquiry representatives from the unit. The record in the instant case reveals Respondent fragmented the East St. Louis bargaining unit in Septem- ber 1987, by transferring nine unit employees to its newly created computer center in Belleville, Illinois. While the bargaining history of the parties reveals the Union had represented Respondent's clerical employees employed in the Granite City, Belleville, and East St. Louis areas of Illinois for some 40 years, Respondent an- nounced that the employees transferred to the computer center would not be covered by the subsisting collective- bargaining agreement. ' As noted supra, the unit employees who were trans- ferred to the computer center were classified as customer inquiry representatives. While they performed what had previously been unit work by responding to customer re- quests for water service and answering customer inquir- ies, Respondent contends it has shown they are suffi- ciently dissimilar from unit employees because: they re- ceived extensive training and now perform their work through use of a computer; they are separately super- vised; there is no interchange between the groups; they are stationed 10 miles from the East St. Louis district office; the computer center is an autonomous operation in that it handles its own payroll and similar administra- tive matters; and the terms and conditions of employ- ment of computer center employees differ from those of district office clerical employees. I find Respondent's contention to be without merit for the reasons set forth below. The ultimate issue to be determined is whether the changes in job structure of employees in the two groups ILLINOIS-AMERICAN WATER CO. has produced a situation wherein a bargaining unit com- posed of both groups would be inappropriate. Phased differently, do the computer center clerical employees enjoy sufficient community of interest with East St. Louis bargaining unit employees to be included in the unit? Capsulized, the instant record reveals that CIRs em- ployed at the computer center perform the same basic functions which were performed by unit employees em- ployed in the district offices before the change-they re- spond to customer inquiries for water service and answer customer inquiries. Although they utilize a computer to accomplish their functions rather than methods previous- ly employed in the district offices, the end result of their endeavors remains the same . It is clear that the oper- ations-the computer center and the district offices-are functionally integrated to a marked degree as the district offices were also computerized at the time the computer center was opened, and both groups of employees place data in the computer and retrieve data from it to permit them to accomplish their functions, which are interrelat- ed. While employees in the computer group are separate- ly supervised, the manager of the computer center re- ports to Respondent Vice President Conner, who active- ly participates in decisions regarding the hire and termi- nation of employees, significant disciplinary situations, and determines the labor policies to be followed in both groups of employees . Although the two groups are sta- tioned 10 miles apart, such separation of elements of the bargaining unit has existed during the 40 years the Union has represented Respondent's clerical employees in the tri-city area described above. Finally, while employees in the two groups presently received slightly different wages and benefits, and are paid on a different basis, their terms and conditions of employment are not sub- stantially different. In sum, the similarities between the computer group and the bargaining unit group are such that I find the clerical employees in the computer group enjoy suffi- cient community of interest with employees in the East St. Louis bargaining unit to be includible in the unit. See Austin Cablevision, 279 NLRB 535 (1986). I am satisfied the bargaining unit which existed prior to the changes is still a viable unit, and that Respondent has failed to show that the computer group is sufficiently dissimilar from the bargaining unit group so as to warrant Respondent's removal of the computer group from the East St. Louis bargaining unit. For the reasons stated , I find that Respondent , through Conner's March conduct, violated Section 8 (a)(1) of the Act by threatening to terminate unit employees if the Union insisted on applying the collective -bargaining agreement to computer center employees. I further find that by refusing to recognize the Union as the exclusive bargaining agent of all employees in the unit , including computer center employees , and by failing and refusing since September 26, 1987, to apply the terms of the East St. Louis bargaining agreement to computer center em- ployees, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act as alleged. Finally, I find the following to be an appropriate unit within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act: 721 All office employees employed by the Respondent at its Belleville computer center, and Granite City and East St. Louis District Offices, EXCLUDING employees performing group insurance and/or pen- sion duties, other confidential employees, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act. D. The Customer Remittance Change Prior to October 1, 1987, Respondent 's customers paid their bills for water service by mailing the remittance to a district office in a self-addressed envelope, visiting a district office in person , by placing remittance in a night depository, or by presenting the bill together with the payment at a facility authorized to accept payments on Respondent's behalf, i.e., certain stores. On the above-indicated date, Respondent, in accord- ance with a new policy effectuated throughout American Water Works Mid-America region , changed the address on the self-addressed envelopes sent to customers with their bills. As a consequence, customer remittance went directly to a bank in Indiana where the bank 's employees accomplished necessary work to reflect the payment, and the checks were immediately processed for collection. Respondent did not at any time inform the Union it was implementing the described change. The Union's business representative, Goodrick, learned from an Alton steward on October 2 that Respondent had effectuated the above-described change. He later learned it affected the East St. Louis unit also. It is un- contradicted that he did not request that Conner or any Respondent official bargain with the Union regarding the decision to change the address on remittance envelopes or the effect of the change on unit employees. Instead, Goodrick filed a charge in Case 14-CA-19234 on No- vember 2, 1987, which alleged, in essence, that Respond- ent had violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act "by failing and refusing to bargain regarding its decision to transfer certain work performed by unit employees locat- ed in Alton, Illinois, to nonunit workers in Indiana, and by failing to bargain regarding the effects of this deci- sion." Subsequently, on December 2, 1987, the Union filed an amended charge in Case 14-CA-19234 to allege a refusal-to-bargain over the effects of the October 1, 1987 decision to transfer certain work performed by unit employees in Alton, Illinois, to nonunit workers in Indi- ana, and, on the same date, it filed the charge in Case 14-CA-19237, alleging the same violation in the East St. Louis bargaining unit. The record reveals that prior to October 1, 1987, one or two employees in the respective district offices would process the mail each day. Union Steward Mary Allen, who worked in the East St. Louis district office at the time, testified that prior to October 1, one employee, oc- casionally assisted by another employee, spent the entire day processing mail. She indicated one employee spent from 2-1/2 to 3 hours a day processing mail after Octo- ber 1. Similarly, employee Jackie Langford, a clerk in the Alton district office when the change was made, tes- tified she and another employee spent 4-6 hours process- ing the mail before October 1, but 1-1/2 to 2 hours per day after the change. 722 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Conner testified the sole reason for causing customer remittance to be sent to a bank rather than to the district offices was to speed up the transfer of funds and avail- ability of money. He testified no labor costs savings re- sulted from the change, and he indicated the change has not resulted in any reduction in the hours employees work, and it has not caused any layoffs. Finally, Conner testified that Goodrick has never requested that Re- spondent bargain with the Union over the decision or its effect on bargaining unit employees. Analysis The complaint alleges Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by refusing to bargain with the Union over the effects of subcontracting out the work of mail sorting and customer payment processing previously performed by employees in the Alton and East St. Louis bargaining units. In American Buslines, Inc., 164 NLRB 1055 (1967), the Board observed (at 1055 and 1056): In N.L. R.B. v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 297, the Supreme Court, in dis- cussing the duty of labor organizations to initiate collective bargaining, held "that the statute does not compel him the Employer to seek out his employees or request their participation in negotiations for pur- poses of collective bargaining... ." To put the em- ployer in default here the employees must at least have signified to respondent their desire to negoti- ate. In the instant case, it is clear the Union did not, at any time subsequent to the time it learned Respondent had implemented a decision to subcontract the above-de- scribed customer remittance work to an Indiana bank, re- quest or demand that Respondent bargain with it con- cerning the effects of the implementation of that decision upon the Alton and East St . Louis bargaining unit em- ployees. Instead, it merely protested Respondent's action by filing charges. It is clear that the filing of a charge does not constitute a request or demand for bargaining. American Buslines, supra; Whirlpool Corp., 281 NLRB 17 (1986). While it would appear the refusal to bargain concern- ing effects portions of the complaint should be dismissed because the Union admittedly failed to request that Re- spondent bargain concerning the subcontracting at issue, General Counsel contends the Board 's decision in Gar- wood-Detroit Truck Equipment, 274 NLRB 113 (1985), re- quires a finding that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by failing and refusing to bargain over the effects of the subcontracting on unit employees . I cannot agree; the cited case is factually distinguishable . There, the record revealed the Union requested meetings with the employer, but those meetings were not held until more than 2 months after the employees affected by the sub- contracting had been laid off. Here, the record fails to reveal that a request for bargaining was made at any time. In sum, I find, the General Counsel failed to prove that the instant Union requested bargaining concerning the effects of Respondent's implementation of its decision to subcontract the work of mail sorting and customer payment processing to an Indiana bank upon unit em- ployees. In the absence of a demand for bargaining, no 8(a)(5) violation can be found . I recommend the applica- ble portions of the complaint be dismissed. E. The Alleged Information Violation Through an initial letter dated March 30, 1987, and a followup letter dated May 8, 1987, the Union requested that Respondent furnish it the following information for each bargaining unit employee:16 Name Current Address, City, State and Zip Birth Date Social Security No. Dates(s) Employed Type of Employee (Full time, Part time, Tempo- rary) By letter dated May 14, Respondent acknowledged re- ceipt of the Union's correspondence stating:17 Your May 8, 1987 letter is acknowledged. You do not state your purpose in seeking the in- formation which your letter requests; and I am sur- prised that you do not have such information or that it is not readily available to you through the stewards of your Union or the members of your Union who are employees of Illinois-American Water Company. The collective bargaining Agreement between your Union and "Illinois-American Water Compa- ny-Belleville, East St. Louis and Granite City Dis- trict Offices" effective for the period March 1, 1986 through February 28, 1989, contains both Union Shop and Deduction of Dues provisions so that I am puzzled by the request made in your May 8 letter. Please let me know the purpose for which the requested information is asked and why it is not already readily available to you. The protection of the right of privacy of Illinois- American employees, as you will understand, makes me very reluctant to provide the home phone num- bers and the other personal information about the Company's employees which your letter asks unless there are justifiable and compelling reasons to do so. By letter dated May 20, 1987, the Union responded to Respondent's May 14 letter stating:18 This is to acknowledge your letter dated May 14, 1987. In this letter you request the purpose of the infor- mation we requested in our letters dated March 30, 1987 and May 8, 1987. 16 G C. Exhs 4 and 5 17 0 C Exh. 6. 19 G.C Exh 7 .ILLINOIS-AMERICAN WATER CO. If you review our letter dated March 30, 1987 you will find that the purpose we requested this in- formation was to allow us to adequately represent your employees in collective bargaining matters. As you point out the collective bargaining agree- ment has a union shop agreement and enforcement of this provision requires verifiable information as to the name of each employee in the bargaining unit. For the same reason and other reasons we need to know the date of employment of each em- ployee. Since our dues structure is different for full time, part time, and temporary employees we must be able to determine what category an employee falls into. We need the birth date to formulate pensions proposals. We need the address and phone number of each employee so that we may communicate with such employees. We expect you to comply with our request im- mediately. By letter dated June 2, 1987, Respondent furnished the Union with limited material. The body of the letter states:19 Your May 20 letter in response to my May 14 letter to you is acknowledged. In my May 14 letter I asked you to let me know why the information which you requested in your May 8 letter to me is not already readily available to you as well as for what purpose you requested such information. Your May 20 letter makes no answer to my first inquiry and only a limited re- sponse to the second. In 1986-1989 collective bargaining Agreement between Illinois-American Water Company-Belle- ville, East St. Louis and Granite City Offices (Dis- trict) and your Union provides that the District shall withhold union dues "from each employee who is a member of the bargaining unit" and shall remit such dues to the Treasurer of the Local Union. The District, of course, has complied with the District's monthly report of dues withheld for April, 1987 and which lists the names of all of the District's regular employees represented by your Union for whom dues were withheld. You know, of course, that for temporary employees, the District withholds and transmits union dues on a weekly basis. I enclose a copy of the District's report of dues withheld for the week of May 17, 1987 and which lists the names of the District's temporary employees who are represented by your Union and from whose wages union dues were withheld and transmitted. I have shown on each of the enclosed lists the Districts' offices at which those persons listed are employed. The telephone numbers at these offices are: East St. Louis, (618) 397-9550 and Granite City, (618) 876-0010. I feel sure you can contact these employees at such numbers and obtain "GC Exh 8 .723 the personal information from them which your letter requests. As I advised you in my May 14 letter the protec- tion of the privacy of Illinois-American employees makes me hesitate to provide home phone numbers and the other personal information for which you ask. If Illinois-American employees represented by your Union authorize the Company to provide such information, I shall, of course, be glad to do so. The collective bargaining Agreement between the District and your Union provides that the Pen- sion Plan described in Article 27 of that Agreement shall continue in full force and effect through Feb- ruary 28, 1989 and this Plan, as I am sure you are aware, is negotiated on a national rather than a local level and covers the employees of all of the Companies of American Water Works Company, Inc. During the hearing Goodrick indicated that in March 1987 his Union sent information requests, such as the one sent to Respondent, to all the employers with which it maintained contractual relations. He testified that all companies except Respondent furnished the information requested. Expanding upon the reason the information requests were made, he explained the Union was in the process of storing member information in a newly in- stalled computer, and desired accurate information. He claimed past efforts to correspond with members had been hampered because considerable mail had been re- turned because the addresses used were incorrect. Through cross-examination of the General Counsel's witnesses Goodrick and Union Steward Allen, and through the introduction of documentary evidence, Re- spondent sought to show the Union possessed the infor- mation it requested before the March letter was sent. Thus, it caused Goodrick to admit that Respondent sub- mits dues-checkoff information to the Union each month and that such documents indicate the amount of dues de- ducted for each employee as well as the place the member is employed. When he was asked if he could de- termine the status of an employee by inspecting the dues remittance documents, Goodrick indicated he could not, but others in the Union's office might be able to make that determination. Similarly, Respondent established through Goodrick that unit members complete applica- tions for membership, and that such documents contain spaces for the applicant's name, social security number, address, occupation, telephone number, department, name of company where employed, date, and signature. Goodrick testified many membership applications were completed years ago, and he indicated they are filed al- phabetically rather than by employer. Finally, through testimony given by Allen, Respondent established that it supplies unit employees with a seniority list each year, and that such lists indicate the names of employees, their place of employment, and the date they were hired by Respondent. With respect to the 1987 seniority list, the record reveals Allen had obtained and placed on her per- sonal copy of the list the birthdates of all unit employees hired prior to August 1987. She testified she used the in- 724 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD formation for birthday celebrations and had not, prior to the hearing, supplied the information to the Union. Conner indicated during his testimony that he failed to respond fully to the Union's March 30 request for infor- mation because: ( 1) He believed the Union possessed the information it requested; and (2) The Company did not divulge private information concerning its employees. It is uncontested that the Union did not attempt to obtain releases from employees to cause Respondent to provide information. Analysis and Conclusions The General Counsel's initial burden with respect to the refusal to furnish information portions of the com- plaint was to establish that the information requested by the Union's March 30 letter was information the Union needed for the proper performance of its duties as a col- lective-bargaining representative. NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 152 (1956); NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432, 435-436 (1967); Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301 (1979). In determining whether an employer is obligated to supply particular information, the question is only whether there is a "probability that the desired information [is] relevant, and that it would be of use to the union in carrying out its statutory duties and responsibilities." NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., supra at 437. The Supreme Court has characterized the stand- ard to be applied in determining the union 's right to in- formation as "a broad discovery type standard," permit- ting the union access to a broad scope of information po- tentially useful for the purpose of effectuating the bar- gaining process. NLRB v. Acme Industrial, supra at 437 fn. 6. Most of the information requested by the Union in its March 30 letter is information which the Board has held to be information which is presumptively relevant to a union's representative functions .20 Indeed, Respondent indirectly concedes that, with exception of the request for the ages of unit employees, the Union requested in- formation which is relevant to its performance of its rep- resentative functions.21 As noted, supra, Respondent's vice president, Conner, informed the Union he would not comply fully with its March 30 request for information because : ( 1) Respond- ent intended to respect the privacy rights of its employ- ees; (2) Respondent felt the information requested was in the possession of the Union or available to it through stewards and/or employees ; and (3) the request for the ages of employees was not proper because Respondent was not a party to the International Union's pension plan, and no negotiations were in progress. In brief, Re- spondent adds two additional arguments . It contends it 20 Thus, names and addresses of unit employees have been held to be presumptively relevant . See Joke Belts Co., 265 NLRB 1130 (1982), and Autoprod, Inc, 223 NLRB 773 (1973) Similarly, information which goes to the core of the employee-employer relationship is presumptively rele- vant. Washington Center Hospital, 270 NLRB 396 ( 1984), and San Diego Newspaper Guild v. NLRB, 548 F 2d 683 (9th Cir 1977) Si Birth dates of unit employees were found to constitute information relevant to a union's performance of its representative functions in Reed & Prince Mfg Co, 96 NLRB 850 ( 1951), enfd . 205 F.2d 131 (1st Cir. 1953), cert. denied 346 U S. 887 ( 1953). was not required to produce the information because the record reveals the Union's reason for requesting it was to harass Respondent, and it contends the Union's entire course of conduct during the period covered by the complaint reveals it failed to bargain in good faith with respect to the information matter. The contentions are discussed individually below. Respondent's contention that the privacy rights of its employees justified its refusal to provide the Union with requested information is clearly without merit. Other than indicating its policy was to refuse to divulge such information, no evidence was presented which would show employees had informed the Respondent they did not want private information to be disclosed to the Union, and the record fails to reveal that any harm could be expected to befall employees if the information was supplied . In the circumstances described, Respondent could not lawfully invoke the privacy rights of its em- ployees to justify its refusal to furnish the requested in- formation. Burkart Foam, Inc., 283 NLRB 351 (1987); Armstrong World Industries, 254 NLRB 1239 ( 1981); and United Aircraft Corp. v. NLRB, 434 F.2d 1198 (2d Cir. 1970). With respect to Respondent's claim that the informa- tion requested by the Union was available to it through other sources including its own records, its stewards, and through employees, the record does, in fact, reveal that portions of the information requested could have possi- bly been obtained through other sources . Respondent did not, however, claim that acquiescence with the request would place any significant burden on it. In BelAir Bowl, Inc., 247 NLRB 6 (1980), the administrative judge, with subsequent Board approval found that absent special cir- cumstances, a union's right to information is not defeated merely because the Union may acquire the needed infor- mation through an independent course of investigation. Similarly, in American Beef Packers, 193 NLRB 1117, 1120 (1971), it was held that the availability of other sources of information does not relieve the employer of its bargaining obligation of disclosure , particularly where it was not shown that the production of the data was unduly burdensome . I find Respondent's claim that some of the information requested by the Union was available through other sources did not warrant its refusal to supply the requested information to the Union in conven- ient form. The only reason advanced by Conner for refusing to furnish requested information which gives me cause for concern is his claim that the birth dates of employees were not needed by the Union because Respondent did not participate in the pension plan promulgated by the International Union with which the Union is affiliated and his indication that the pensions were negotiated on a national basis . While it is clear that the age information requested is presumably relevant as the subsisting con- tract contained pension plan provisions, the issue posed is whether Respondent has rebutted the presumption that age information was needed by the Union to permit it to perform its representative functions. With respect to this issue, I note that the record fails to reveal which union or unions are involved in the systemwide negotiations re- ILLINOIS-AMERICAN WATER CO. 725 ferred to by Conner. Thus, Respondent failed to show that the instant Union does not participate in negotiations which determine the pension benefits which are to be en- joyed by unit employees. While the issue is close, I am persuaded to conclude that it is just as feasible to specu- late that the Union wanted age information to permit for- mulation of pension proposals which would be furnished to its International Union as it is to speculate that the Union takes no active part in negotiations involving pen- sions. I thus find Respondent was obligated to furnish the Union with the age information requested.22 The "harassment" and "bad faith bargaining" conten- tions advanced by Respondent in its brief are so clearly without merit that little discussion of them is warranted. The harassment argument is based on Respondent's con- tention that the Union's insistence on applying the sub- sisting contract to employees transferred from the East St. Louis district office to corporate headquarters and to the computer center warrants an inference that the Union made its information request to harass Respond- ent. As noted, supra, the Union sent letters, such as the March 30 letter which requested that Respondent supply it with information, to all employers with whom it main- tained contractual relations in the spring of 1987. That fact, coupled with the complete absence of any record evidence which would reveal the Union had an ulterior motive for sending its March 30 information request to Respondent, causes me to conclude Respondent has failed to establish that the Union intended to harass Re- spondent by requesting information it did not need. The contention that the Union failed to bargain in good faith throughout the period during which it sought the information described in its March 30 letter is based largely on Respondent's contention that the Union did not need the information it requested; that it failed to make any counterproposals when Conner invited it to obtain the requested information through other sources; and a contention that the record reveals Goodrick wanted only the names and addresses of employees, but insisted that Respondent provide all the information set forth in its March 30 letter. As indicated above, I con- clude the information requested by the Union in its May 30 letter was relevant to its function as the representative of Respondent's employees, and Respondent was obligat- ed to furnish the information requested. Contrary to Re- spondent's assertions, the record does not establish that the Union did not need the information, and it fails to es- tablish that Goodrick sought only the names and ad- dresses of employees. Finally, as Respondent was obli- gated to furnish the information requested by the Union, the Union did not engage in unlawful conduct by refrain- ing from making counterproposals when Conner invited it to obtain the information it desired through alternative means and sources. In sum, for the reasons stated, I find that by refusing to furnish the Union with the information requested in its 22 Respondent 's contention that the birth dates of employees were available to the Union because Union Steward Allen had recorded them on her copy of a seniority list which was not made available to the Union is without merit See Interstate Food Processing Corp, 283 NLRB (1983) (fact that stewards had access to information did not satisfy the employ. er's obligation to furnish the requested information). March 30, 1987 letter, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act as alleged. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and the entire record, I make the following CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. 2. The Union is a labor organization within the mean- ing of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. The following employees of Respondent constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of the Act: All office employees employed by the Respondent at its Belleville computer center, and Granite City and East St. Louis District Offices, EXCLUDING employees performing group insurance and/or pen- sion duties, other confidential employees, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act. 4. By refusing to recognize and bargain with the Union as the exclusive bargaining representative of all employees in the aforesaid bargaining unit, by refusing to apply the terms and conditions of the East St. Louis col- lective-bargaining agreement to the computer center em- ployees since September 26, 1987, and by refusing to fur- nish the Union with information which is relevant to the performance of its function as the exclusive bargaining agent of certain of its employees, Respondent has en- gaged in, and is engaging in, unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. 5. By threatening employees with loss of employment if the Union insisted upon applying its collective-bargain- ing agreement to computer center clerical employees, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 6. Respondent has not violated the Act in any other respect. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent has engaged in, and is engaging in, certain unfair labor practices affecting com- merce, I shall recommend that it cease and desist there- from and take certain affirmative action in order to effec- tuate the policies of the Act. Respondent will be required to furnish the Union, in convenient form, with the information requested in its letter dated March 30, 1987, and it shall be ordered to recognize the Union as the representative of office em- ployees employed in its computer center as part of the overall bargaining unit and make whole those employees for any losses, if any, they have suffered as a result of Respondent's failure to apply its subsisting East St. Louis contract to them by payment to them of any wage differ- entials from the contract rate, and by making all pension, health and welfare payments, and any other payments or contributions required by the bargaining agreement; pro- vided, however, nothing herein shall be construed as re- quiring recission of any wage increase or benefits which previously have been granted to computer center em- 726 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD ployees. Any backpay is to be computed as provided in F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950), with interest computed in the manner provided in New Horizons for the Retarded.23 On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record in this case, I issue the following recommended24 ORDER The Respondent, Illinois-American Water Company, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall 1. Cease and desist from (a) Refusing to recognize Office and Professional Em- ployees International Union, Local 13, AFL-CIO as the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees in the appropriate unit, including those employed at the Belleville, Illinois computer center. (b) Refusing to apply the terms and conditions of the collective-bargaining agreement with the Union to its computer center employees. (c) Refusing to supply the Union with requested infor- mation which is relevant to its performance of its duties as a collective-bargaining representative. (d) Threatening to terminate unit employees if the Union insists on applying the collective-bargaining agree- ment to computer center employees. 22 In accordance with the decision in New Horizons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987), interest on and after January I, 1987, shall be computed at the "short-term Federal rate" for the underpayment of taxes as set out in the 1986 amendment to 26 U S C § 6621 . Interest on amounts accrued prior to January 1, 1987 (the effective date of the 1986 amendment to 26 U S C. § 6621), shall be computed in accordance with Florida Steel Corp, 231 NLRB 651 (1977) 24 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102 46 of the Board's Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102 48 of the Rules , be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur- poses (e) In any like or related manner interfering with, co- ercing, or restraining employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act. (a) Upon request, honor the subsisting collective-bar- gaining agreement, and any extensions thereof, applying the terms thereof to computer center employees who are within the appropriate bargaining unit herein. (b) Make the computer center employees whole for any losses suffered by reason of Respondent's failure to apply the subsisting collective-bargaining agreement, and make all fringe benefit payments and contributions re- quired thereby or any extensions thereof, in the manner described in the remedy section of this decision. (c) Post at its Alton district office, its East St. Louis district office, and its Belleville computer center, all lo- cated in Illinois, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 25 Copies of the notice on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 14 shall be signed by Respondent's authorized representative and posted immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecu- tive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Rea- sonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to ensure that said notices are not altered , defaced, or covered by any other material. (d) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days from the date of this Order what steps Respondent has taken to comply. 25 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Nation- al Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board "