299 NLRB 505
Ambac International Ltd.
AMBAC INTERNATIONAL
505
AMBAC International Limited and Local 112,
International Federation of Professional and
Technical Engineers, AFL-CIO, CLC. Cases 1-
CA-25801, 1-CA-25943, and 1-CA-26168
August 20, 1990
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN STEPHENS AND MEMBERS
CRACRAFT AND DEVANEY
On September 18, 1989, Administrative Law
Judge David L Evans issued the attached decision
The Respondent filed exceptions and a supportmg
bnef, and the General Counsel filed a brief in sup-
port of the judge's decision
The National Labor Relations Board has delegat-
ed its authority in this proceeding to a three-
member panel
The Board has considered the decision and the
record in light of the exceptions and bnefs and has
decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings, and
conclusions only to the extent consistent with this
Decision and Order
The judge concluded that the Respondent un-
lawfully withdrew recognition of the Union, find-
ing msufficient support for the Respondent's de-
fense that it entertained a reasonable doubt of the
Union's continuing majonty status as representative
of the bargaining unit employees In consequence
of this 8(a)(5) violation, the judge concluded that
the Respondent also violated Section 8(a)(5) by im-
plementing several unilateral changes in the em-
ployees' terms and conditions of employment fol-
lowing its withdrawal of recognition As explained
below, we disagree with the judge's analysis of the
Respondent's defense, and we conclude that the
withdrawal of recognition was valid and that the
subsequent changes in employment conditions were
not unlawful Thus, we will dismiss the complaint
The significant facts are as follows In late
summer 1988, 1 the Respondent, a successor em-
ployer, and the Union had been engaged in collec-
tive bargaining for a new agreement for about a
year, there had been 15 negotiating sessions up to
this time The predecessor employer's contract
with the Union, whose obligations the Respondent
had assumed when it purchased the predecessor's
facility in 1987, had expired by this time By letter
dated August 29, a time between scheduled bar-
gaining sessions, the Respondent informed the
Union that it was withdrawing recognition based
on objective evidence it had received showmg that
the Union no longer represented a majority of unit
employees The Respondent invited the Union to
1 All dates are in 1988 unless otherwise noted
review its evidence, and soon thereafter the
Union's representative was shown five letters
which had been delivered to the Respondent, each
dated August 22, each signed by one member of
the 10-employee bargaining unit, and each stating
the following
I believe my interests might best be served
through individual, direct negotiation with
AMBAC International, not through a third
party, presently Local 112, IFPTE
By letter dated September 7, and subsequently
by letter dated September 14, the Union notified
the Respondent that it possessed objective evidence
that a majonty of the unit employees had affirmed
their support of the Union, and that the Respond-
ent was free to verify its evidence Included in the
September 14 letter were copies of individual state-
ments signed by 7 of the 10 umt employees, each
dated either September 6 or 7, and each declaring
continued support for the Union as collective-bar-
gaining representative 2 In essence, the Respond-
ent's reply to both of the Union's letters was to
recommend that the Union file a representation pe-
tition with the Board On September 8, the Re-
spondent terminated the deduction of union dues
from the unit employees' paychecks, a practice it
had continued after the expiration of the collective-
bargaining agreement, which had union-secunty
and checkoff provisions Beginning in November,
the Respondent made several unilateral changes in
the unit employees' terms and conditions of em-
ployment
Unit employee George Gifford testified at the
hearing that pnor to the events above, -apparently
in June, he had a discussion with Gary Mistalski,
the Respondent's operations manager, about the
poor progress of negotiations Thereafter, he
showed Mistalski a draft of what apparently was a
statement of resignation from union membership 3
Mistalslu expressed the opinion that it was not "suf-
ficient," and he drafted a version and showed it to
Gifford Gifford rejected MistsIsla's draft of the
resignation statement At a subsequent time, after
consultation with other bargaining unit members,
Gifford drafted the language of the August 22 let-
ters, and he delivered at least a few of the five
signed letters to Mistalslu There is no evidence
that Mistalski participated in the drafting of the
language of these letters, or that he consulted with
Gifford or other employees concerning them
2 Two unit employees signing these statements also signed the August
22 letters delivered to the Respondent
3 Gifford testified that "I did present Mr MistaIsla with something to
the extent that I preferred to not be in the Union" No documents were
placed in evidence concerning this matter
299 NLRB No 66
506
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The judge found that the message contained in
the August 22 letters was ambiguous, rather than a
clear statement of the five employees' desire to re-
pudiate the Union as their collective-bargaining
representative In his view, the message, at most,
could be interpreted either as a statement of dissat-
isfaction with the Union's effectiveness in negotia-
tions for a new contract, or as a merely hypotheti-
cal suggestion concerning the possible results avail-
able through individual bargaining with the Re-
spondent Combimng the absence of a clear repudi-
ation of the Union with the Respondent's refusal to
consider the Union's unambiguous evidence of its
continued majority support, i e, the September 6
and 7 statements of the seven unit employees, the
judge concluded that the Respondent's withdrawal
of recognition on August 29 was made in bad faith
and violated Section 8(a)(5) He further concluded
that the Respondent's subsequent changes in terms
and conditions of employment, including the dis-
continuance of checkoff, also violated Section
8(a)(5) because the Respondent did not bargain
with the Union concerning them
We do not agree with the judge's evaluation of
the August 22 letters or with his overall analysis of
the Respondent's defense that it had a reasonable
doubt of the Union's majority support on August
29
The essential principles are well established re-
garding the presumption of a union's majority sup-
port as collective-bargaining representative and the
circumstances in which an employer lawfully may
withdraw recognition See, e g, Hajoca Corp, 291
NLRB 104 (1988), enfd 872 F 2d 1169 (3d Cir
1989), Station KKHI, 284 NLRB 1339 (1987), enfd
891 F 2d 230 (9th Cir 1989) Thus, in the absence
of unusual circumstances, there is an irrebuttable
presumption that a union has majority status during
the year followmg its certification by the Board
There is a similarly irrebuttable presumption of the
Union's majority support during the term of a col-
lective-bargaining agreement At the expiration of
the certification year, or at the expiration of the
contract, whichever the case may be, the presump-
tion continues, but it is rebuttable An employer
who wishes to withdraw recognition at the expira-
tion of the certification year or of the contract may
do so m either of two ways (1) by showing that on
the date the employer refused to bargain the union
did not in fact enjoy majority status, or (2) by pre-
senting evidence of a sufficient objective basis to
support a reasonable doubt of the Union's majority
support among the employees at the time the em-
ployer withdrew recognition Hajoca Corp, supra
at 105 and cases cited there These principles are
fully applicable to a successor employer, such as
the Respondent in this case See, e g, Harley-Da-
vidson Co, 273 NLRB 1531 (1985)
We address as a threshold matter the judge's er-
roneous reliance on evidence of union support
postdating the withdrawal of recognition in reach-
ing his conclusion that the Respondent violated the
Act The critical date for the evaluation of a rea-
sonable-doubt defense, the Respondent's position in
this case, is the date that the employer withdraws
recognition
facts regarding union support ascertained
after the refusal to bargain are not controlling,
or even guiding, in determining whether the
Employer had a reasonable basis for doubt at
the time it refused to bargain Rather, what is
controllmg is whether the Respondent had a
reasonable basis for doubt at the time it re-
fused to bargain
Orion Corp, 210 NLRB 633, 634 (1974), enfd 515
F 2d 81 (7th Cir 1975) Further, if the employer
successfully proves that it had a reasonable doubt
of the union's majority on the day it withdrew rec-
ognition, this showing constitutes a complete de-
fense In such circumstances, proof that the union
in fact represented a majority of the employees on
the date in question (or, a fortiori, thereafter) is ir-
relevant See, e g, Arkay Packaging Corp, 227
NLRB 397, 398 (1976), affd sub nom Graphic
Communications Local 51 v NLRB, 575 F 2d 1045
(2d Or 1978) Accordmgly, we place no signifi-
cance on the employee statements showing majori-
ty support of the Union, dated September 6 and 7,
which the Union offered to the Respondent on
September 7 and 14, and which the Respondent de-
clined to consider 4
We turn now to the question of the sufficiency
of the August 22 employee letters m support of the
Respondent's defense Employee statements offered
to establish a reasonable doubt of the Union's ma-
jority status "must demonstrate a clear intention by
the employees not to be represented by the
Union" Royal Midtown Chrysler Plymouth, 296
NLRB 1039 (1989) See also, e g, Parkview Furni-
ture Mfg Co, 284 NLRB 947, 969 (1987), Greg-
ory's, Inc. 242 NLRB 644, 648 (1979) Contrary to
4 Terrell Machine Co v NLRB, 427 F 2d 1088 (4th Cir 1970), cert
denied 398 U S 929 (1970), relied on by the judge, is not to the contrary
In Terrell, the employer was found to have had an insufficient objective
basis to support a reasonable doubt on the date It refused to bargain Its
subsequent refusal to consider proffered evidence of majority support
after stating It would entertain a proffer of such evidence, was found to
be an additional sign of bad faith Thus, Terrell is factually distinct from
the Instant case, and does not stand for the general proposition that an
employer is required to review evidence of the union's majority support
subsequent to the date It withdraws recognition on the basis of a reasona-
ble doubt of majority status
AMBAC INTERNATIONAL
507
the judge, we find nothing ambiguous in the formal
statement of these employees to their employer
that each believes his "interests might best be
served through individual, direct negotiation with
AMBAC International, not through a third party,
presently Local 112, IFPTE " Although there is an
implicit suggestion of frustration with the Union's
effectiveness in the negotiations up to that time, as
the judge pointed out, the statement conveys more
than this On its face, and taking into account that
5 of 10 unit employees signed letters with the iden-
tical message, this statement is a clear invitation to
the Respondent from one-half of the bargaining
unit to engage in direct negotiations with the em-
ployees, thus repudiating the Union's role as the
exclusive bargaining representative 5 Consequently,
the only reasonable, objective interpretation of this
message in the circumstances presented to us is that
50 percent of the unit employees indicated that
they did not want the Umon to represent them On
the strength of this message, untainted by any em-
ployer misconduct, 6 the Respondent's doubt that
the Union retained the support of a majority of em-
ployees was reasonable 7 Accordingly, we find that
the Respondent's withdrawal of recognition on
August 29 did not violate Section 8(a)(5) Pursuant
to this finding, the Respondent's subsequent unilat-
eral changes in various of the employees' condi-
tions of employment did not violate the Act be-
cause the Respondent no longer had an obligation
to bargain over these matters with the Union 8
5 Although we acknowledge the tentative and hypothetical character
of the language used, we do not agree with the judge that this tone
makes the message sufficiently ambiguous that the Respondent could not
reasonably assume that these employees did not want representation by
the Union It is highly unlikely that the employees would memoralize
mere idle conjectures about the advantages of direct bargaining in identi-
cal letters delivered to their employer
6 As noted above, there is no evidence that Operations Manager Mis-
talslu solicited the August 22 letters or contributed in any way to the
draftmg of their content His assistance to employee Gifford in drafting
an individual letter of resignation from union membership is a matter
quite distinct from, and on this record unrelated to, the August 22 letters
repudiating the Union as collective-bargaining representative We also
note that there is no dispute in this case concerning the authenticity of
the August 22 letters
7 Compare, e g, Bel-Mar Foods, 286 NLRB 786, 795-796 (1987) (em-
ployee petition requesting an election because "we believe a majonty of
employees in our unit no longer want to be represented by the
union" conveyed the clear impression that the signers no longer wanted
to be represented by the union, and contributed substantially to the law-
fulness of the employer's withdrawal of recognition), Industrial Waste
Service, 268 NLRB 1180, 1186 (1984) (employee petition stating that
"[w]e don't want the Union What we want is what belongs to us Our
raises long waited" found sufficient to establish the employer's reasonable
doubt)
8 Concerning the Respondent's September 8 termination of dues-check-
off, we note that this was neither alleged nor litigated as an 8(a)(5) viola-
tion Further, It is generally not an unfair labor practice for an employer
to discontinue dues-checkoff after the collective-bargaining agreement ex-
pires See, e g, Tampa Sheet Metal Co, 288 NLRB 322 fn 15 (1988),
Bethlehem Steel Co, 136 NLRB 15CO, 1501-1502 (1962), affd in relevant
part sub nom Shipbuilders v NLRB, 320 F 2d 615 (3d Cu- 1963) Thus,
quite apart from the lawfulness of the Respondent's withdrawal of recog-
ORDER
The complaint is dismissed
ninon, its discontinuance of dues-checkoff after the contract had expired
did not violate the Act
Kathleen McCarthy, Esq , for the General Counsel
William R McKibbon, Esq , of Greenville, South Caroli-
na, for the Respondent
DECISION
DAVID L EVANS, Administrative Law Judge This
matter under the National Labor Relations Act (the Act)
was tried before me on June 28, 1989, in Northampton,
Massachusetts The charges against AMBAC Internation-
al Limited (Respondent) were filed by Local 112, Inter-
national Federation of Professional and Technical Engi-
neers, AFL-CIO, CLC (the Union) Upon the basis of
the charges, the General Counsel issued a complaint' al-
leging that Respondent, in violation of Section 8(a)(5)
and (1) of the Act, withdrew recognition from the Union
and thereafter committed several unilateral actions Re-
spondent filed answers to the complaint which admit ju-
risdiction but deny the commission of any unfair labor
practices
On the entire record, and my observation of the de-
meanor of the witnesses, and after considering the briefs
filed by the parties, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I JURISDICTION
Respondent is a corporation which has a facility at
West Springfield, Massachusetts, where it is engaged in
the manufacture of fuel injection components During
the calendar year 1988, 2 Respondent, in the course and
conduct of its business operations, sold and shipped from
its West Springfield facility products, goods, and materi-
als valued in excess of $50,000 directly to purchasers lo-
cated at points outside Massachusetts, and during that
period Respondent also purchased and received at its fa-
cility products, goods, and materials valued in excess of
$50,000 directly from suppliers located at points outside
Massachusetts
Respondent admits, and I find and conclude, that Re-
spondent is an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act Re-
spondent further admits, and I further find and conclude,
that the Union is a labor organization within the meamng
of Section 2(2) of the Act
The charge in Case 1-CA-25801 was filed on September 22, 1988,
and the complaint and notice of hearing Issued on November 4, 1988
The charge in Case 1-CA-25943 was filed on November 15, 1988, and
the order consolidating cases, amended consolidated complaint and notice
of heanng issued on December 14, 1988 The charge in Case 1-CA-
26168 was filed on February 27, 1989, and the further order consolidating
cases, second amended consolidated complaint and notice of heanng (the
complaint) issued on April 11, 1989
2 All dates are in 1988 unless otherwise indicated
508
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
II ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A Facts
The relevant facts are not in dispute Respondent pur-
chased the facility involved in 1987 At that time, and at
all times material herein, there were 10 technical depart-
ment employees employed, all of whom were represent-
ed by the Union under a collective-bargaining agree-
ment 3 Respondent assumed the predecessor's contract
and bargained with the Union after that contract expired
in the summer of 1987 4 There were 15 bargaining ses-
sions, a 16th session was scheduled for September 28
when the events of this case arose
By letter dated August 29, Eric S Bnsbon and Gary
M Mistalslu, Respondent's vice president of engineering
and its operations manager, respectively, notified John F
Dommgos, employee and vice president of the Union
that
We have been presented with objective evidence
that Local 112 no longer represents a majority of
the employees of AMBAC at 3601 Main Street,
Spnngfield, MA 01107 5 Because of this fact, we
hereby withdraw recognition of the Union, Local
112 IF P TE If you wish to verify the objective
evidence used to support our legal position, we will
be glad to oblige you
Upon receipt of the August 29 letter, Dommgos went to
Bnsbon's office Bnsbon presented Dommgos with five
statements, each one of which was signed by a member
of the (10-member) bargaining unit Each letter is dated
August 22, each has no address or salutation, each states
I believe my interests might best be served through
individual, direct negotiation with AMBAC Inter-
national, not through a third party, presently Local
112, IFPTE
The five employees who, it is undisputed, signed the
statements were George G Gifford, Donald S Johnson,
John S Bnttam, Jean-Paul Aubm, and E H Suger-
meyer Dommgos, who was called by the General Coun-
sel, testified that he protested that the five employees
had signed the statements on the basis of nusrepresenta-
tions by some unnamed person or entity Bnsbon replied
that Respondent believed the letters and that, because of
them, Respondent would no longer recognize the Union
By letter dated September 7, Dommgos notified Bns-
bon
I have been presented with objective evidence
that a majority (greater than 50%) of the employees
of Ambac have affirmed their desire to continue to
be represented by Local 112 of the International
Federation of Professional and Technical Engineers
If you wish to verify the objective evidence, I will
be glad to oblige you
3 The (admitted) complete unit description is stated below
4 The exact date of the expiration of that contract is not in evidence
5 This was the wrong address, but no one made an issue of it
The next negotiation meeting has been scheduled
for September 28, 1988 at the Holiday Inn in
Springfield We look forward to meeting Ambac
representatives at that time
By letter (also) dated September 7, Bnsbon responded to
Dommgos
We are in receipt of your letter dated 9/7/88 We
recommend that if you persist in your claim to rep-
resent the employees of AMBAC at 103 Myron
Street, West Springfield, MA, that you file a peti-
tion for election with the National Labor Relations
Board
On September 8, Respondent discontinued deducting
union dues from the unit employees' paychecks as it had
continued to do even after the last contract, with its
union-shop 6 and checkoff clauses, had expired in 1987
By certified letter dated September 14, Dommgos re-
sponded to Bnsbon
Your decision to stop dues deductions effective
September 8, 1988 was unjustified because the infor-
mation that you provided me does not represent a
majority of our membership As I stated in my
letter of September 7, 1988, the Union has evidence
of an overwhelming majority of our membership
expressing their desire to have the Umon continue
to represent them It is most unfortunate that you
took action before investigating the facts on [sic]
this matter
I tried to give this evidence to Mr Gary Mis-
talslu and he would not take it from me 7 I also be-
lieve that action is equally unfortunate on such an
important issue regarding labor relations
I have enclosed the Union's evidence of the
seven (7) members who have signed statements in
support of Local 112 to continue to represent them
in negotiations for wages, hours of work, and other
conditions of employment As a result of this evi-
dence, your acknowledgement to continue Local
112 recognition and to reinstate the dues deductions
of our members is requested
The next negotiation meeting has been scheduled
for September 28, 1988, at the Holiday Inn in
Springfield We look forward to meeting with
Ambac representatives at that time
Enclosed with Dommgos' September 14 letter were
statements signed by Dommgos, Aubm, Sugermeyer,
Plasse, Czamik, Ladd, and Danos Each is dated Septem-
ber 6 or 7, and each states
I, the undersigned employee of Ambac Internation-
al, want Local 112 of the International Federation
of Professional and Technical Engineers to continue
to represent me in the negotiations for wages, hours
of work, and other conditions of employment
5 The transcript, p 28, L 9, is corrected to change "white work
stated" to "right to work state"
Dommgos testified that he made this attempt at some point after Re-
spondent discontinued deducting union dues on September 8
AMBAC INTERNATIONAL
509
By letter dated September 16, Bnsbon responded to Do-
mmgos
We are in receipt of your letter dated 9/14/88
Again, I would suggest that if you persist in your
claim to represent the employees of AMBAC at 103
Myron Street, West Springfield, MA, that you file a
petition for election with the National Labor Rela-
tions Board
Respondent admits that, in addition to checkoff, after
receipt of the August 22 statements it unilaterally elimi-
nated Veterans Day and Presidents' Day as paid holi-
days, and it admits that it made unilateral changes in em-
ployee benefits regarding retirement, insurance plans,
paid absence policy, personal holidays, overtime pay, and
payroll period
Employee George Gifford was called as a witness by
the General Counsel Gifford testified that in mid-June
he had a conversation with Mistalski about the progress
of negotiations According to Gifford, he told Mistalski
that he (Gifford) was disappointed because it appeared
that no one was willing "to work to find solutions to
what appeared to be deadlocks in negotiations" Mistalski
replied that it would be inappropriate for him (Mistals1u)
to comment At some point thereafter, further according
to Gifford, "I did present Mistalslu with something to
the extent that I preferred not to be in the Union" When
shown what Gifford had drafted, Mistalski responded,
"Well, that isn't sufficient "8
Gifford further testified that at a still later point Mis-
talski "came back with something that he thought might
be sufficient "9 When shown what Mistalslu had drafted,
Gifford replied that "it was maybe too argumentative or
fault finding, too accusatory, maybe" Gifford was not
asked what he meant by this specific remark, however,
Gifford was asked if, during his conversations with Mis-
talski, he had indicated what he intended to accomplish
by the drafts 10 According to Gifford, he told Mistalslu,
"I thought things could be worked out or that there
were solutions to problems if people were willing to try
to find them" At this point Gifford was asked and testi-
fied
Q Did you ever tell Mr Mistalski that you
wanted to decertify Local 112?
A No I discussed missions more
Thereafter, upon consultations with some other members
of the bargaining unit, and apparently without further
consultations or conversations with Mistalslu, Gifford
drafted the language of the August 22 statements On
direct examination Gifford testified that he either handed
his signed statement to Mistalslu or he left it on Mistal-
ski's desk On cross-examination, Gifford testified that he
submitted more than just his signed copy to Mistalski, he
testified that "just which ones [I turned in to Mistalslu] I
Gifford was not asked if Mistalskt mdtcated to him what Mistalslu
meant by "sufficient"
9 Again, Gifford was not asked if Mistalski indicated to him what Mi-
stalski meant by "sufficient"
10 None of the drafts between Gifford and Mistalski were offered Into
evidence, Gifford testified at least one of the drafts may have appeared
only on a computer screen
don't remember, but I am pretty sure I did not turn them
all in"
Mistalski did not testify
There is no evidence of record of what, if anything,
Gifford said to Mistalslu when he submitted his August
22 statement and the unknown number of other employ-
ee statements, nor is there any evidence of how manage-
ment received those copies which were not submitted to
Mistalslu by Gifford, nor is there any evidence of what,
if anything, was said when those statements were pre-
sented to management
Bnsbon was called to testify by Respondent He testi-
fied that Mistalski presented him with all five of the
August 22 statements 11 Bnsbon and Mistalski compared
the signatures to the payroll and Bnsbon called his
lawyer for advice
B Conclusions
Respondent acknowledges that upon expiration of a
collective-bargaining agreement, there continues a pre-
sumption of union majority status, however, Respondent
cites several cases which hold that the presumption can
be rebutted by petitions that indicate that a union no
longer possesses such status In one case cited by Re-
spondent, KDS-AM Radio, 262 NLRB 687 (1982), the ad-
muustrative law judge, at 691, concisely states the find-
ings necessary before such employee petitions may serve
as a predicate for a lawful refusal to bargain
Given the absence of any evidence tending to show
Respondent's proclivity to violate the Act, I am un-
persuaded, without more, that Respondent's reliance
on a petition signed by a majority of the employees
stating unambiguously that they no longer wanted
[the union] to represent them was grounded on bad
faith or seized upon as a basis to avoid its bargain-
ing obligations under the Act
Here, of course, while there is no demonstrated proclivi-
ty to violate the Act, there also is no such unambiguous
expression by employees, and Respondent virtually
pounced upon the employee statements to unilaterally
reduce some benefits and make changes in others Fur-
thermore, it did this notwithstanding the fact that it had
in its possession unambiguous expressions from the ma-
jonty of unit employees that they wished to continue to
be represented by the Union
As most plainly stated in Sahara-Tahoe Corp v NLRB,
648 F 2d 553, 554 (9th Cir 1980)
But, as we stated before, "[I]n refusing to bargain
because of an alleged decline in union adherents,
the employer is acting as vicarious champion of its
employees, a role no one has asked it to assume"
NLRB v Tahoe Nugget, 584 F 2d [293] at 301 Thus,
before refusing to bargain with a union, an employ-
er should have before it evidence which unequivo-
cally indicates that the union no longer has the ma-
jority support of the employees
11 As noted, there is no evidence of how Mistalski received those state-
ments which were not presented by Gifford
510
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
At most, the employees' August 22 statements express
some degree of dissatisfaction with the effectiveness of
the Union during the on-going bargaining Literally, they
posit only the hypothetical that more desirable results
could be obtained by individual bargaining 12 Neither al-
ternative is the unambiguous expression of a desire not to
be represented by the incumbent collective-bargammg
agent, as was required by KSD-AM Radio and all other
cases cited by Respondent, and all other cases decided
by the Board and the courts on the issue 13
Nor was Respondent free to disregard the Union's
proffer of evidence of majority status contained in the
September 14 letter from Dommgos As stated in Terrell
Machine Co v NLRB, 427 F 2d 1088, 1090-1091 (4th
Cir 1970), cert denied 398 U S 929 (1970), in circum-
stances indistinguishable from these
Coupled with the lack of a reasonable basis to give
rise to doubt [of continued majority status] was af-
firmative evidence of lack of good faith on the part
of Terrell Although Terrell publicly stated that it
was refusing to bargain only until the union's major-
ity status was proved [in a Board election], it re-
fused to consider the union's proffer to exhibit its
record of members and authorizations as evidence
of its legitimacy
In summary, an employer may not unilaterally destroy
an established collective-bargaining relationship on the
basis of ambiguous expressions of employee dissatisfac-
tion with the collective-bargaining agent and then refuse
thereafter to consider unambiguous evidence of contin-
ued majority support 14
It therefore follows that by Respondent's withdrawal
of recognition of the Union, and by its unilateral actions
thereafter, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of
the Act, as I find and conclude
THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in cer-
tain unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that it
cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative
actions designed to effectuate the policies of the Act
Having found that Respondent unlawfully withdrew
recognition from the Union on or about August 29, 1988,
I shall recommend that it be ordered to recognize the
Union as the exclusive bargaining representative of its
employees in the appropriate unit and that Respondent,
upon request, bargain collectively with the Union with
respect to the rates of pay, wages, hours of employment,
iS Nor is there any evidence that the statements were presented as any-
thing else
is As well as there being no evidence of what, if anything, was said
when the employees' statements were presented to management, Gifford
categoncally denied telling Mistalski (the only management official di-
rectly Involved) that he wished to have the Union decertified
14 Respondent cites Linden Lumber EMUS= v NLRB, 419 U S 301
(1974), for the proposition that an employer faced with an initial bargain-
ing demand may insist on a Board election, as long as its own unfair
labor practices do not prevent the holding of such election While this is
an accurate statement of the law regarding initial bargaining requests, the
case sub Judice is one of an established bargaining relationship, not one
yet to be established
and other conditions of employment of its unit employ-
ees and, if an understanding is reached, embody such un-
derstanding in a signed agreement
Having found that Respondent unlawfully discontin-
ued or changed certain unit employee benefits, I shall
recommend that Respondent be ordered to reinstate any
terms of employment that existed at the time that it un-
lawfully withdrew recognition, if requested to do so by
the Union, and that it be ordered to make the employees
whole by paying all benefits that would have been paid
absent Respondent's unlawful changing or discontinuing
said benefits
Having found that Respondent unlawfully failed to
check off union dues and remit those payments to the
Union, I will recommend that Respondent be ordered to
make whole the Union for any loss of dues suffered as a
result of its failure to comply with the dues provisions of
the collective-bargaining agreement after its expiration
Interest is to be paid upon any amounts found to be
owing by Respondent pursuant to this section in the
manner prescribed in New Horizons for the Retarded, 283
NLRB 1173 (1987)
Finally, I shall recommend that Respondent be re-
quired to post an appropriate notice to its unit employ-
ees
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1 AMBAC International Limited is an employer en-
gaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the
Act
2 Local 112, International Federation of Professional
and Technical Engineers, AFL-CIO, CLC is a labor or-
ganization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act
3 The following employees of AMBAC International
Limited constitute an appropriate unit for bargaining
All technical engineering, architectural, experimen-
tal, chemical, research employees, time study ana-
lysts and other technical employees at Respondent's
West Springfield, Massachusetts, location, but ex-
cluding executives, production and maintenance em-
ployees, clerical employees, blueprint and office em-
ployees, and guards and supervisors as defined in
the Act
4 At all times material herein and continuing to date,
the Union has been the exclusive representative of all
employees within the appropriate unit for purposes of
collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(a)
of the Act
5 By the following acts and conduct, Respondent has
engaged in, and is engaging in, unfair labor practices
within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act
(a) Withdrawing recognition from, and thereafter re-
fusing to recognize and bargain in good faith with, the
Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining representa-
tive of the employees in the above appropriate unit
(b) Unilaterally eliminating or making changes in the
terms and conditions of employment of the employees in
the above appropnate unit including checkoff, holidays,
group insurance carrier and benefits, rates, and condi-
AMBAC INTERNATIONAL
511
tions of the group insurance plan, paid absence policy,
employee personal holiday, overtime payments, payroll
periods, and pension plan
6 The above unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act
[Recommended Order omitted from publication ]