Stevens Chrysler Plymouth

STEVENS FORD 907 Stevens Ford, Inc , and Stevens Lincoln Mercury, Inc , also d/b/a Stevens Chrysler Plymouth and International Union, United Automobile, Aero space and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW), Local 376 Cases 39-CA-1384 and 39-CA-1621 23 October 1984 DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS ZIMMERMAN, HUNTER AND DENNIS On 8 March 1984 Administrative Law Judge Harold B Lawrence issued the attached decision The Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief and the General Counsel filed an answering brief \ The National Labor Relations Board has delegat ed its authority in this proceeding to a three member panel The Board has considered the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the judge s rulings, findings, and conclusions and to adopt the recommended Order 1 Our dissenting colleague would dismiss the corn plaint because he found a procedural defect in the unit clarification proceeding on which the judge relied to determine the scope of the Respondent's bargaining obligation We find no fault with that proceeding and affirm the judge's reliance on it The Regional Director s decision in the unit clar ification case shows that the Respondent received due process Thus, as the Regional Director noted, despite the denial of the Respondent's request for a continuance of the hearing because of the unavail ability of its owner its counsel as well as other of ficials supervisors and representatives attended the hearing The Respondent s counsel had the oppor tunity to present evidence and examine and cross examine witnesses, he chose not to do so Nor did he claim that the owner s presence was necessary for the presentation of the Respondent s evidence When the Respondent requested Board review of the Regional Director s denial for a continuance, the Board with Member Hunter dissenting denied review We see no reason now to reach a different conclusion or to permit relitigation of that issue here 2 ' We deny the General Counsel s motion to strike the Respondent s ex ceptions and brief 2 We also note that the Respondent had an opportunity to raise this Issue in another unfair labor practice proceeding (Case 39-CA-362) and chose not to do so In that case which was predicated on the same unit clarification determination the Respondent withdrew its answer to the General Counsel s complaint the Board adopted the judge s decision which found the violations as alleged and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals enforced the Board s Order ORDER The National Labor Relations Board adopts the recommended Order of the administrative law judge and orders that the Respondent, Stevens Ford, Inc , and Stevens Lincoln Mercury Inc also d/b/a Stevens Chrysler Plymouth, Milford, Con necticut, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns shall take the action set forth in the Order MEMBER HUNTER, dissenting In the unit clarification proceeding on which the judge and my colleagues rely to find that the Re spondent was obligated to bargain with the Union for a unit of employees which included employees working under the Respondent s Chrysler Plym outh franchise, I dissented from the Board's deci mon to deny the Respondent s request for review The hearing in that proceeding took place as ongi nally scheduled, notwithstanding the Respondent s requests for a continuance based on the unavailabil ity of the Respondent s owner William Stevens, to appear and testify In dissenting from the Board s denial of the Respondent s request for review, I in dicated that I would have granted that request and remanded the case for a reopened hearing In view of this procedural defect in the underlying unit clarification proceeding, I place no reliance on the decision reached therein and would dismiss the complaint allegation of a general refusal to bargain with the Unioa regarding the Chrysler Plymouth employees DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE HAROLD B LAWRENCE Administrative Law Judge These consolidated cases were tried before me on June 22, 23 and 24 1983 at Hartford Connecticut The charges were filed on October 21 1982 and April 20 1983 by International Union United Automobile Aero space and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW) Local 376 (the Union) The complaint in Case 39-CA-1384 was served on December 1 1982 and an amended complaint was issued on March 2 1983 The complaint in Case 39-CA-1621 was issued on April 21 1983 and an order consolidating it with Case 39-CA- 1384 was made on May 27 1983 The amended and consolidated complaint alleges that the Respondent Stevens Ford Inc and Stevens Lincoln Mercury Inc also d/b/a Stevens Chrysler Plymouth which constitute a single integrated business enterprise and employer engaged in the sale and servicing of new and used automobiles notwithstanding the fact that they are legally distinct corporate entities violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act by refusal to recognize and bargain with the Union and re fusal to furnish information to which the Union was ent tied Stevens Ford Inc is located on the property 272 NLRB No 141 908 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD known as 717 Bridgeport Avenue Milford Connecticut Stevens Lincoln Mercury Inc is located on the adjoin ing property known as 737 Bridgeport Avenue Milford The crux of the case is the contention that the Union represents a bargaining unit which as clarified in a Board clarification proceeding embraces employees of both corporations working at the service facilities at both locations who do the unit work including employees who perform work which is in the shops under the Chrysler Plymouth franchise The Respondent had re fused to recognize the Union as the representative of these employees and it is alleged that the Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act by such refus al and by refusal to negotiate with the Union while one of them served on the Union s negotiating committee and by refusal to supply data which the Union requested concerning them 1 The Respondent denies having committed any wrong doing or having in any manner violated the Act The parties were afforded full opportunity to be heard to call examine and cross examine witnesses and to in troduce relevant evidence Postheanng briefs have been filed on behalf of the General Counsel and the Respond ent On the entire record and based on my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses and the manner in which they gave their testimony and after consideration of the briefs submitted I make the following FINDINGS OF FACT I JURISDICTION The Respondent s answer to the amended consolidated complaint admitted that during the 12 month period ending November 30 1982 the two corporations had been engaged in the sale and servicing of new and used automobiles and that each had derived gross revenues in excess of $500 000 and that each had purchased and re ceived at its respective facility products goods and ma tenals valued in excess of $50 000 directly from points outside the State of Connecticut It was admitted that the Union has been at all material times and is now a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act The answer denied the allegation that at material times alleged the corporations had been employers en gaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2) (6) and (7) of the Act This denial in the face of other concessions in the answer appears to have reflected the reference in the complaint to the two employers jointly as the Respondent in the singular 2 On the basis of the admitted allegations of the complaint and evidence ad duced during the hearing as to the nature of the business operations carried on at 717 Bridgeport Avenue and 739 Bridgeport Avenue which I shall refer to as the 717 fa 1 An allegation that a stnke began on February 15 1983 was pro longed by Respondent s unfair labor practices was withdrawn at the hearing 2 Par 4 of the complaint denied by the Respondent refers to the cor porations as Stevens Ford Inc and Stevens Lincoln Mercury Inc also d/b/a Stevens Chrysler Plymouth hereinafter collectively called Re spondent [which] constitute a single integrated business enterpnse and a single employer within the meaning of the Act cility and the 739 facility respectively I find that Ste yens Ford Inc and Stevens Lincoln Mercury Inc have each been employers engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2) (6) and (7) of the Act at all ma tenal times The issue of their status as an integrated en terpnse and as a single employer is dealt with below The Union s status as a labor organization was admitted II THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A Background3 The basic issues of the case are whether the two cor porations constitute an affiliated and integrated business enterprise and whether the appropriate collective bar gaining unit of service and maintenance employees in cluded those employees working at the 739 facility (Ste yens Lincoln Mercury) who service vehicles under the Chrysler Plymouth franchise I The business operations The two corporations are owned by William Stevens and do business in Milford Connecticut at premises owned by Stevens Realty which is solely owned by Wil ham Stevens Stevens Ford Inc occupies the portion of the property known as 717 Bridgeport Avenue and Ste yens Lincoln Mercury occupies the portion known as 739 Bridgeport Avenue under separate leases from Ste yens Realty An individual named Malcolm Chapman who reports directly to William Stevens acts as the gen eral manager of both enterprises and fixes policy relating to wages working hours and working conditions deal ing directly with the employees without regard to which company they happen to work for He governs the sales policies of the two franchises He appears to divide his time between the two premises as the needs of the busi nesses dictate In addition to having the same general manager the two corporations also have the same person as controller A deliberate effort is made to give the public the im pression that the Stevens operations are a single integrat ed enterprise and the Respondent cannot evade the con sequences of holding itself out to the public in this fash ion This is the typical situation in which the question of single employer arises whose two entities each have their own work force but are nonetheless interrelated 4 A large sign bearing the legend Stevens Auto Super Market is mounted in front of the used car lot which occupies the space between the 717 facility and the 739 facility The sales policy established by Chapman author izes salesmen on the payroll of either corporation to sell any automobile displayed at either 717 Bridgeport Avenue or 739 Bridgeport Avenue or on the used car lot Their business cards identify them as sales represent atives for all of the makes of vehicles sold under any of the franchises (Lincoln Mercury Ford Dodge Chrys ler and Plymouth) Joint advertising is run in the news 3 The facts of the case as set forth in this section are a narrative corn posite of the undisputed and credited testimony admissions in the an swers and data contained in the exhibits 4 Blumenfeld Theatres Circuit 240 NLRB 206 215 (1979) enfd mem 626 F 2d 865 (9th Cm 1980) STEVENS FORD 909 papers in the name of Stevens Auto Super Market 717- 739 Bridgeport Avenue and carries pictures of person nel who are on both corporate payrolls Advertisements which have been placed in the newpapers for sales help have referred to the selling of all of the lines carried by both corporations The appearance of unified consolidated operation which is presented to the public merely reflects the reali ty of a considerable measure of internal integration of the business operations both administratively and with re spect to the work of the bargaining unit Automobiles sold by Stevens Lincoln Mercury Inc at the 717 facility are serviced at the 739 facility The Chrysler Plymouth line is sold and serviced at the Stevens Lincoln Mercury Inc premises at 739 Bridgeport Avenue notwithstanding the fact that Chrysler Corporation had stipulated that an independent service facility must be maintained for war ranty service on its franchised products The employees servicing the vehicles under the Lin coln Mercury franchise are all on the payroll of Stevens Ford Inc All employees selling and servicing the Chrysler Plymouth franchise are on the payroll of Ste yens Lincoln Mercury Inc The evidence establishes very clearly that as in the case of advertising and sales in getting the servicing work done full advantage is taken of the opportunities afforded by close proximity and combined operation of the respective facilities The 717 facility includes a serv ice department a body shop and a parts department which stocks Ford and Lincoln Mercury parts The 739 facility contains a service and parts department which stocks all Chrysler Plymouth and Dodge parts The serv ice departments at both facilities work on all makes of vehicles The 739 facility includes a carwash which serv ices vehicles from both facilities The body shop at the 717 facility handles all types of vehicles including Chrysler Plymouth and Dodge vehicles from the 739 facility Though Respondent insists that warranty work is restricted to the appropriate location at the manufac turers insistence it is conceded that there is interchange of assistance between the mechanics at the two facilities and that they occasionally cross over to the other facility to work on a vehicle New cars whether delivered to Stevens Ford Inc or Stevens Lincoln Mercury Inc are checked in by the same employee who happens to be one of the group of employees working under the Chrysler Plymouth fran chise New car check in procedure is performed by one person in order to save money for both companies An employee working under the Ford franchise does the rust proofing work for all vehicles regardless of make The same maintenance and utility employees routinely perform the same work at both the Stevens Lincoln Mer cury Inc and the Stevens Ford Inc premises at 739 Bridgeport Avenue and 717 Bridgeport Avenue respec tively without regard to which company is technically their employer During the period from 1980 through early 1982 there was substantial interchange of employ ees between the franchises located at the respective fa cilities and the corporations made purchases from each other in amounts which greatly exceeded purchases from other sources These circumstances conclusively established by the evidence in the record demonstrate common ownership common management and centralized control of labor relations to a degree which requires a finding of joint or single employer status under the Act 5 This was the conclusion of the Regional Director Right on the first page of his Decision and Clarification of Bargaining Unit he stated The Petitioner claims that Stevens Ford Inc and Stevens Lincoln Mercury Inc are joint employers of the employees involved herein Although it does not deny joint employer status Stevens Ford Inc claims that the two entities are separate corpora tons Furthermore it is clear that both dealerships have functioned in a joint and integrated matter [manner] Accordingly notwithstanding the fact that both entities are separate corporations and that they have always maintained separate payrolls and separate sales staffs and sales functions I find that Stevens Ford Inc and Stevens Lincoln Mercu ry Inc are operating as a single integrated enter pnse and constitute a single employer of the em ployees involved herein 2 The bargaining unit On a petition filed by the Union an election was held among the employees of Stevens Ford Inc at the 717 fa edit)/ on March 27 1979 On the basis of the results of that election the Union was certified on August 18 1980 as the exclusive bargaining representative for the employees in a unit described as follows All service and maintenance employees including mechanics service workers partsmen bodymen and drivers employed by the Employer at its 717 Bridgeport Avenue location but excluding office clerical employees professional employees sales persons dispatcher confidential employees guards and supervisors as defined in the Act However between the date of the election and the date of certification a process of intermingling of busi ness operations between Stevens Fords Inc and Stevens Lincoln Mercury Inc was alleged by the Union to have commenced or accelerated Accordingly the Union filed a petition for clarification of the certified bargaining unit contending that an expanded overall unit had been cre ated by the merger of the two companies or their oper ations While the clarification proceeding was pending Chrysler Corporation granted a Chrysler Plymouth fran chise to Stevens Lincoln Mercury Inc and that corpora tion began selling and servicing Chrysler and Plymouth vehicles By letter dated July 1 1980 William P Stevens accepted the agreement in his capacity as president of Stevens Lincoln Mercury Inc which then began using the name Stevens Lincoln Mercury Inc d/b/a Stevens Chrysler Plymouth In all documents executed by it 5 Electrical Workers Local 1264 v Broadcast Service of Mobile 380 U S 255 (1965) 910 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD under that name its address continued to be set forth at 739 Bridgeport Avenue Milford Connecticut According to the Respondent several employees who had formerly worked in the Ford and Lincoln Mercury franchises were transferred to the Chrysler Plymouth franchise i e they were put to work in a Chrysler Plymouth service department which was established at the 739 facility where sale of Chrysler and Plymouth automobiles had commenced I think it is important to understand precisely what did and did not occur at this juncture The Respondent s characterization of the event as a transfer of employees to the Chrysler Plymouth franchise can be misleading It is more accurate to state that some of the mechanics and maintenance employees who had formerly serviced the Ford Lincoln and Mer cury vehicles were shifted to work on the Chrysler and Plymouth vehicles Stevens Lincoln Mercury Inc d/b/a Stevens Chrysler Plymouth is a trade name No new corporate entity was established No existing corpo rate entity was modified There is no evidence that even the corporate name of Stevens Lincoln Mercury Inc was changed Employees working under the Chrysler franchise continued to be employees of one or the other of the two existing corporations on the same corporate payroll they had been on before or on whichever payroll suited Chapman There had been two corporate entities operating an integrated enterprise before the Chrysler franchise was awarded to William P Stevens There were still only two corporations and one integrated en terpnse afterwards The same employees were involved as had been involved formerly they had merely been shifted around to accommodate the new business from Chrysler Corporation This was the state of affairs when a hearing was held on the certification petition on October 23 1981 Though the concern of the Union respecting the merger of oper atonal functions between employees of Stevens Ford Inc and Stevens Lincoln Mercury Inc in handling vehi cies under the various franchises had been inevitably lim ited to the franchises existing at the time the petition was filed the enlargement of its concern to include the Chrysler Plymouth work is reflected in the transcript of the clarification proceedings Russell See the union representative testified that when the certification petition was filed the entities in volved had been Stevens Ford and Stevens Lincoln Mer cury at 717 Bridgeport Avenue and 739 Bridgeport Avenue respectively that changes had occurred with the passage of time while Respondent was appealing the decision certifying the Union that William Stevens had acquired an additional dealership which was being called the Stevens Chrysler Plymouth dealership The operations pursuant to the Chrysler franchise were gone into at some length The Milford Connecticut Telephone Directory was put in evidence and showed listings for both Stevens Lincoln Mercury and Stevens Chrysler Plymouth sales and service at 739 Bridgeport Avenue Milford Testimony was taken with respect to whether Chrysler repair work was done at Stevens Ford Inc 717 Bridgeport Avenue Testimony was adduced to the effect that employees in various categories worked on all types of vehicles including the Chrysler and Plymouth automobiles Thus the cleanup man from Ste yens Lincoln Mercury Inc did the cleanup for Chrysler and Plymouth vehicles and no one else was assigned to that chore The make ready man who was on the Ste yens Lincoln Mercury Inc payroll did that work for the Lincoln Mercury Chrysler and Plymouth vehicles The Chrysler Plymouth warranty work was done at the 739 facility The clerical work for both the Lincoln Mercury dealership and the Chrysler Plymouth dealership was done by one person in the office of Stevens Lincoln Mercury Inc The man who had acted as the Ford parts counterman was promoted to parts manager of Ste yens Chrysler Plymouth The Ford service worker was transferred to the Chrysler Plymouth dealership where he became assistant service manager The hearing officer noted that the petition for clanfi cation referred to all service and maintenance employees including mechanics service workers partsmen body men and drivers employed by employer at 717 Bridge port Avenue and 739 Bridgeport Avenue Milford Con necticut and put the following question to See Now that s the address of the Plymouth Chrysler dealer so are you looking for those in your amendments 9 His re sponse was clear Yes I am I m looking for all employ ees that fall within the realm of the bargaining unit in both buildings On November 23 1981 the Regional Director made the following findings Based upon the above and the record as a whole I find that the Lincoln Mercury service and mamte nance employees have accreted to the certified unit and I shall clarify the certified unit to include these disputed employees See e g Massey Ferguson Inc 202 NLRB 193 (1973) and Pacific Intermountain Express Co 145 NLRB 805 (1964) 3 Accordingly the unit certified in Case No 1- RC-16 152 is hereby clarified to specifically in dude therein all service and maintenance employees employed by the Employer at its 717 Bridgeport Avenue and 739 Bridgeport Avenue locations The meaning of this clarification which the Re spondent professes to find unclear is obvious semantical ly as well as from the foregoing survey of the operations of the Respondent and the history of the clarification proceeding the transcript of which is studded with refer ences to the employees servicing vehicles pursuant to the Chrysler franchise The correctness of this conclusion is apparent if one merely keeps in mind the precise nature of the legal relationship involved The Regional Director quite properly refused to buy the language of either the Respondent or the hearing officer in their various refer ences to the Chrysler Plymouth dealership or to Ste yens Lincoln Mercury Inc d/b/a Stevens Chrysler Plymouth as though these constituted discrete legal en tities The former is nothing more than the designation of a contractual relationship the latter is nothing more than a trade name employed by a corporate entity The use of these terms should not be permitted to distort the true nature of the employment relationships between the cor porations and the men who were servicing the automo STEVENS FORD 911 biles At times involved in this case there were two cor porate employers which between them employed all of the service and maintenance men servicing all vehicles in either shop regardless of which franchise was involved There was no such category as a Chrysler Plymouth employee separate and apart from the other employees Since all of the men worked for either Stevens Ford Inc or Stevens Lincoln Mercury Inc and worked either at the 717 facility or the 739 facility they were all covered by the Regional Director s order I therefore hold that the unit was clarified so as to embrace all serv ice and maintenance employees employed by Respond ent which consists of both corporations at its 739 Bridgeport Avenue location and its 717 Bridgeport Avenue location and that that group includes the em ployees servicing vehicles pursuant to the Chrysler fran chise B Refusal to Meet with the Union Negotiating Committee The Union and the Respondent commenced collective bargaining negotiations in May 1982 and it quickly became apparent that an insurmountable difficulty was being created by the' Respondent s insistence that em ployees working under the Chrysler Plymouth franchise were not included in the bargaining unit The General Counsel contends that in the first sessions the Respond ent s counsel conceded that they were included in the bargaining unit but I do not believe that Respondent s counsel was conceding anything more than that a ques ton existed which it fully intended to litigate The Re spondent s counsel took the trouble to try to obtain clan fication from the National Labor Relations Board office at Hartford Connecticut an action which hardly corn ports with a concession of the gsue However this is of slight import for the determination of whether the em ployees working under the Chrysler franchise were members of the unit rests on the facts and circumstances of the case as found herein and the terms of the unit clarification order as construed herein and cannot be af fected by the opinions of Respondent s counsel or of any employee of the Board In April and May 1983 the Union included in its ne gotiating committee an employee who was working on the Chrysler line at the 739 facility The Respondent re fused to negotiate while he was at the bargaining table and so notified the Union The Union was adamant about including that employee on its negotiating team As a result no negotiations could be conducted in April and May 1983 I cannot accept the Respondent s contention that it properly refused to negotiate while an employee who was not a member of the bargaining unit sat with the Union s negotiating committee In the first place he was a member of the bargaining unit In the second place his inclusion as a member of the union negotiating commit tee was warranted because at some point assuming that the employees on the Chrysler line were not in the unit the terms of their employment would be a relevant con sideration in the Union s negotiating position relative to the employees in the bargaining unit Third assuming that they were not recognized as integral members of the bargaining unit they would still be entitled to have a representative on the negotiating committee to assist in negotiation of matters of common interest among the em ployees working on Chrysler franchise vehicles and the employees working on the vehicles franchised by Mercu ry and Ford 6 Finally it is well settled that each party in the collec tive bargaining process may choose its own representa live in formal labor negotiations and that the other party has a correlative duty to negotiate The extremely rare exceptions to this rule have involved situations infected with such extreme ill will as to preclude good faith bar gaining In those rare instances when a bona fide doubt of the right of a designated appointee to sit in negotia tons exists the burden is on the party objecting to estab lish that his or her presence will subvert the collective bargaining process 7 The Respondent certainly has made no such showing in this case Accordingly I find that the Respondent s refusal to negotiate while the employee who was a member of the group working on vehicles under the Chrysler Plymouth franchise sat with the union negotiating delegation con stituted a refusal to tiargain in violation of the Act C Refusal to Negotiate with Respect to Employees Assigned to Work Under the Chrysler Plymouth Franchise It is the Respondent s argument that the issue of the inclusion of the employees assigned to work under the Chrysler franchise in the bargaining unit was the subject of a court appeal pending which the Respondent stood ready able and willing to negotiate with the Union with respect to the employees whose inclusion in the unit was not questioned The General Counsel concedes that the refusal to bargain was limited as stated by the Respond ent and further that the Respondent was willing to ne gotiate with the Union for the inclusion of the disputed employees in the unit In my view that does not alter the basic proposition that all of the employees were al ready in the bargaining unit and that the Regional Three tor had said so in language whose meaning was not at all obscure The Respondent was not entitled to ignore the Re Donal Director s order during the pendency of the court appeal No stay of enforcement was in effect An existing appropriate unit is not a mandatory subject of bargain ing The Board has already rejected contentions raised by the Respondent herein Thus a refusal to bargain is not excused by the fact that a party is seeking clarifica tion of a unit or is demanding that a change from the Board certified unit be negotiated 8 Neither can the Re 6 Indianapolis Newspapers 224 NLRB 1490 (1976) 7 Harley Davidson Motor Co 214 NLRB 433 437 (1974) 8 Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co 236 NLRB 1637 (1978) enfd 602 F 2d 73 (4th Or 1979) Preterm Inc 240 NLRB 654 (1979) By holding itself out as ready to bargain with respect to the balance of the employees Respondent apparently hoped to avoid a result such as obtained in Preterm Inc in which a conceded ambiguity existed with re spect to inclusion in the unit of certain trainees and part time employees but in which a refusal to bargain with respect to the remaining employees was nevertheless found to constitute a lack of good faith However as in Continued 912 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD spondent relitigate the outcome of that proceeding in this complaint proceeding 9 Moreover the fact that in the present instance there is no real ambiguity in the clarification order and the fact that its intent and construction are in any case apparent from the course of the proceedings on which it is based which were attended by Respondent s counsel lead me to the conclusion that the refusal of the Respondent to bargain collectively was not the result of a bona fide mis apprehension but was intended to impede the bargaining process i I find that the refusal to negotiate with respect to the Chrysler employees violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act t D Refusal to Furnish Information The conclusions which I have ,reached with respect to the constitution of the collective bargaining unit and the obligation of the Respondent to negotiate with the Union with respect to all of its maintenance and service em ployees also require a finding that the Respondent violat ed the Act when it refused to make available to the Union the name wage rates and labor grades for all bar gaining unit employees at the 717 and 739 amities The evident lack of sincerity in the Respondent s position is apparent from the fact that initially the Respondent did comply with the Union s request for the information However when the Union requested an updated list of all service employees at the facilities on February 4 1983 including job descriptions titles and wage rates the Respondent furnished it only for the employees working on the Ford Lincoln and Mercury lines and re fused to supply it with respect to the employees working on the Chrysler line Since the latter were members of the bargaining unit the refusal to furnish the information was a violation of the Act The result would not be different if the employees working on the Chrysler line were not members of the bargaining unit since they were doing work similar in nature to the work being done by the members of the bargaining unit and because of the intermingling of the operations in some situations they could have been doing work that belonged to the bargaining unit The re quest for information thus related to data respecting wages and wage related information relevant to the needs of the Union in negotiating a contract with the Re spondent and needed by the Union to police wfiatever collective bargaining agreement was finally achieved and the present case a unit clarification order was made dunng the pendency of negotiations so that thereafter the subject was a nonmadatory subject of bargaining (240 NLRB at 672) 9 See Lamar Hotel 140 NLRB 226 229 (1962) enfd 328 F 2d 600 (5th Cu 1964) perform its duties as a collective bargaining representa tive 1 ° The probable need for the data is apparent IV THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES ) ON COMMERCE The unfair labor practices committed by the Respond ent have a close intimate and substantial relationship to trade traffic and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor 'disputes burdening and oh structing commerce and the free flow of commerce CONCLUSIONS OF LAW i 1 Respondent Stevens Ford Inc and Respondent Ste yens Lincoln Mercury Inc also d/b/a Stevens Chrysler Plymouth constitute a single employer engaged in corn merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act 2 The Union is a labor organization within the mean mg of Section 2(5) of the Act 3 Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1 1 and (5) of the Act by (a) Refusing in and after April 1983 to engage in nego nations with the Union for a collective bargaining con tract because the bargaining committee designated and selected by the Union to represent it in such negotiations included an employee performing work pursuant to the Chrysler Plymouth franchise operated by the Respond ent at 739 Bridgeport Avenue Milford Connecticut, and refusing to resume negotiations with the Union unless it confined its negotiating committee to union officials and employees performing work pursuant to the Ford Mer cury or Dodge franchises operated by the Respondent (b) Refusing to recognize and bargain with the Union as the exclusive collective bargaining representative of its employees employed in performance of work pursuant to all of its franchise as required in the appropriate bargain ing unit e All service and maintenance employees including mechanics service workers partsmen bodymen and drivers employed by the Employer at its 739 Bridgeport Avenue location and its 717 Bridgeport Avenue location but excluding office clerical em ployees professional employees sales persons dis patcher confidential employees guards and supervi sors as defined in the Act (c) Failing and refusing to furnA the Union with in formation requested by it on February 4 1983 which pertained to the names grades and job classifications of employees in the above described bargaining unit and 1 ° Temple Eastex Inc 228 NLRB 203 (1977) enf denied 579 F 2d 932 (5th Or 1978) (on due process grounds unrelated to the point for which the case is cited) General Electric Co 199 NLRB 286 (1972) Curtiss Wright 145 NLRB 152 (1963) enfd 347 F 2d 61 (3d Cu 1965) Holly wood Brands 142 NLRB 304 (1963) enfd 324 F 2d 956 (4th Cu 1963) cert denied 377 U S 923 (1964) (information sought respecting nonunit employees at another plant) Associated General Contractors of California 242 NLRB 891 (1979) enfd as modified 633 F 2d 766 (9th Cu . 1980) r " See Westinghouse Electric Corp 239 NLRB 106 107 (1978) enfd as modified 648 F 2d 18 (DC Cir 1980) STEVENS FORD 913 specifically employees working on vehicles pursuant to Respondent s Chrysler Plymouth franchise 4 The unfair labor practices herein found to have been committed affect commerce within the meaning of Sec tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act 5 The Respondent did not engage in any unfair labor practices other than those hereinabove enumerated THE REMEDY Having found the Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices I recommend that the Respondent be directed to cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action to effectuate the policies of the Act These are specified in the recommended Order hereinafter set forth Because of the extended interruptions of collective bargaining negotiations by reason of the Respondent s violations of the Act it will be recommended that the certification year be extended for a period of 1 year from the date of commencement of new collective bargaining negotiations On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record I issue the following recommend edi2 ORDER The Respondent Stevens Ford Inc and Stevens Lin coln Mercury Inc also d/b/a Stevens Chrysler Plym outh Milford Connecticut its officers agents succes sors and assigns shall 1 Cease and desist from (a) Refusing to bargain with International Union United Automobile Aerospace and Agricultural Imple ment Workers of America (UAW) Local 376 by declin ing to meet with the selected negotiating committee of that Union for the purpose of negotiating a collective bargaining agreement because the bargaining committee includes an employee working pursuant to the Chrysler Plymouth franchise operated by the Respondent and conditioning its meeting with the negotiating committee on a requirement that the Union confine its negotiating committee to union officials and employees working pur suant to the other franchises operated by the Respond ent (b) Refusing to bargain collectively with International Union United Automobile Aerospace and Agricultural Workers of America (UAW) Local 376 as the exclusive collective bargaining representative of the employees in the following appropriate unit which includes employees working under the Chrysler Plymouth franchise operated by the Respondent All service and maintenance employees including mechanics service workers partsmen bodymen and drivers employed by the Employer at its 739 Bridgeport Avenue location and its 717 Bridgeport 12 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the Board s Rules and Regulations the findings conclusions and recommended Order shall as provided in Sec 102 48 of the Rules be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur poses Avenue location but excluding office clerical em ployees professional employees sales persons dis patcher confidential employees guards and supervi sors as defined in the Act (c) Failing or refusing to furnish the Union with rea sonable promptness information duly requested by it concerning wages ,hours or terms or conditions of em ployment of all employees in said unit employed at either of the locations mentioned in the above description of the unit including employees working under the Chrys ler Plymouth franchise (d) In any like or related manner interfering with re straining or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act 2 Take the following affirmative action which is deemed necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act (a) On request bargain collectively concerning rates of pay hours of employment and other terms and condi tions of employment with International Union United Automobile Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW) Local 376 as the exclusive collective bargaining representative of all the employees in the appropnate unit described above at both locations and regardless of which automobile dealership franchise they are working under and if an agreement is reached embody it in a signed contract The certification year shall extend 1 year from the date such new bargaining negotiations begin (b) Furnish the Union with reasonable promptness in formation duly requested by it concerning wages hours or terms and conditions of employment of all employees employed at either location identified in the description of the bargaining unit regardless of which automobile dealership they are working under (c) Post at its facilities at 717 Bridgeport Avenue and 739 Bridgeport Avenue Milford Connecticut copies of the attached notice marked Appendix 13 Copies of the notice on forms provided by the Officer in Charge for Subregion 39 after being signed by the Respondent s au thonzed representative shall be posted by the Respond ent immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60 con secutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted Rea sonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered defaced or covered by any other material (d) Notify the Officer in Charge for Subregion 39 in writing within 20 days from the date of this Order what steps the Respondent has taken to comply 13 If this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals the words in the notice reading Posted by Order of the Na tional Labor Relations Board shall read Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the Nation al Labor Relations Board 914 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the National Labor Relations Act and has or dered us to post and abide by this notice WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain with International Union United Automobile Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW) Local 376 by declining to meet with the selected negotiating commit tee of that Union for the purpose of negotiating a collec tive bargaining agreement because the bargaining corn mittee includes an employee working pursuant to the Chrysler Plymouth franchise operated by the Respond ent and/or condition our meetings with the negotiating committee on a requirement that the Union confine its negotiating committee to union officials and employees working pursuant to the other franchises operated by the Respondent WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with International Union United Automobile Aerospace and Agricultural Workers of America (UAW) Local 376 as the exclusive collective bargaining representative of the employees in the following appropriate unit which in eludes employees working under the Chrysler Plymouth franchise operated by the Respondent All service and maintenance employees including mechanics service workers partsmen bodymen and drivers employed by the Employer at its 739 Bridgeport Avenue location and its 717 Bridgeport Avenue location but excluding office clerical em ployees professional employees sales persons dis patcher confidential employees guards and supervi sors as defined in the Act WE WILL NOT fail or refuse to furnish the Union with reasonable promptness information duly requested by it concerning wages hours or terms or conditions of em ployment of all employees in said unit employed at either of the locations mentioned in the above description of the unit including employees working under the Chrys ler Plymouth franchise WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them in Section 7 of the Act WE WILL on request meet with the said Union and bargain collectively concerning rates of pay hours of employment and other terms and conditions of employ ment with International Union United Automobile Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW) Local 376 as the exclusive collective bargaining representative of all the employees in the ap propnate unit described above at both locations and re gardless of which automobile dealership franchise they are working under the Chrysler Plymouth franchise and if an agreement is reached embody it in a signed con tract The certification year shall extend 1 year from the date such new bargaining negotiations begin WE WILL furnish the Union with reasonable prompt ness information duly requested by it concerning wages hours or terms and conditions of employment of all em ployees employed at either location identified in the de scription of the bargaining unit regardless of which automobile dealership they are working under and in cluding those working under the Chrysler Plymouth franchise STEVENS FORD INC AND STEVENS LIN COLN MERCURY INC ALSO D/B/A STE VENS CHRYSLER PLYMOUTH