Raymond Interior Systems

354 NLRB No. 85 NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the bound volumes of NLRB decisions. Readers are requested to notify the Ex- ecutive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C. 20570, of any typographical or other formal errors so that corrections can be included in the bound volumes. Raymond Interior Systems and Southern California Painters and Allied Trades District Council No. 36, International Union of Painters and Allied Trades, AFL–CIO United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Local Union 1506 and Southern Cali- fornia Painters and Allied Trades District Council No. 36, International Union of Painters and Allied Trades, AFL–CIO and Southwest Regional Council of Carpenters, United Broth- erhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Party in Interest. Cases 21–CA–37649 and 21– CB-14259 September 30, 2009 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN LIEBMAN AND MEMBER SCHAUMBER On November 10, 2008, Administrative Law Judge Burton Litvack issued the attached decision. Respondent Raymond Interior Systems (Raymond) and Respondent Carpenters Local Union 1506 (the Carpenters) each filed exceptions and a supporting brief. The General Counsel and Painters District Council No. 36 (the Painters) each filed an answering brief. Raymond and the Carpenters each filed a reply brief. The Painters filed cross- exceptions and a supporting brief. The General Counsel, Raymond, and the Carpenters each filed an answering brief, and the Painters filed a reply brief. The Board1 has considered the decision and the record in light of the exceptions, cross-exceptions, and briefs and has decided to affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,2 1 Effective midnight December 28, 2007, Members Liebman, Schaumber, Kirsanow, and Walsh delegated to Members Liebman, Schaumber, and Kirsanow, as a three-member group, all of the Board’s powers in anticipation of the expiration of the terms of Members Kir- sanow and Walsh on December 31, 2007. Pursuant to this delegation, Chairman Liebman and Member Schaumber constitute a quorum of the three-member group. As a quorum, they have the authority to issue decisions and orders in unfair labor practice and representation cases. See Sec. 3(b) of the Act. See Snell Island SNF LLC v. NLRB, 568 F.3d 410 (2d Cir. 2009), petition for cert. filed __U.S.L.W.__ (U.S. Septem- ber 11, 2009) (No. 09-328); New Process Steel v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 840 (7th Cir. 2009), petition for cert. filed 77 U.S.L.W. 3670 (U.S. May 22, 2009) (No. 08-1457); Northeastern Land Services v. NLRB, 560 F.3d 36 (1st Cir. 2009), petition for cert. filed 78 U.S.L.W. 3098 (U.S. Au- gust 18, 2009) (No. 09-213). But see Laurel Baye Healthcare of Lake Lanier, Inc. v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 469 (D.C. Cir. 2009), petitions for re- hearing denied Nos. 08-1162, 08-1214 (July 1, 2009). 2 The Respondents have excepted to certain of the judge’s credibility findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an adminis- and conclusions and to adopt the recommended Order as modified and set forth in full below.3 We agree with the judge’s unfair labor practice find- ings in this case, although with two modifications: (1) The judge found that, on October 2, 2006,4 Ray- mond violated Section 8(a)(2) and (3) of the Act by unlawfully assisting the Carpenters in obtaining authori- zation cards from Raymond’s drywall finishing employ- ees. Specifically, the judge found that Raymond warned those employees that there would be no work for them if they failed to sign with the Carpenters “that day.” The judge found that those statements coerced the drywall finishing employees into signing authorization cards, upon which Raymond immediately granted 9(a) recogni- tion to the Carpenters as the drywall finishing employ- ees’ representative. Accordingly, the judge found that Raymond further violated Section 8(a)(2) on October 2, by granting that recognition at a time when the Carpen- ters did not represent an uncoerced majority of those employees, and that the Carpenters violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) by accepting that recognition. We agree with those findings for the reasons set forth in the judge’s de- cision.5 We, therefore, find it unnecessary to pass on the judge’s additional findings that Raymond unlawfully granted 9(a) recognition to the Carpenters on October 1, and that the Carpenters unlawfully accepted 9(a) recogni- tion on that day. Those findings would be cumulative of the findings of unlawful conduct occurring on October 2, and would not materially affect the remedy in this pro- ceeding. (2) The judge also found that Raymond and the Car- penters violated Section 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2), respectively, by maintaining and applying the Carpenters Union 2006– 2010 master agreement, including its union-security pro- trative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear preponder- ance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing the findings. 3 We have modified the judge’s recommended Order to conform with the violations found and to correct certain inadvertent errors. 4 All dates are in 2006. 5 In adopting the judge’s finding that Raymond made the “that day” statements described above, we observe that the judge’s credibility resolutions on this point were based on his specific assessment and explanation of the witnesses’ demeanor. See Atlantic Veal & Lamb, Inc., 342 NLRB 418, 420 (2004), enfd. mem. 156 Fed.Appx. 330 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Member Schaumber notes he has previously expressed his view of the importance for a judge to give specific, demeanor-based reasons for crediting and discrediting witnesses to provide an adequate basis for meaningful review by the Board. Id. at 421–422 (2004) (Member Schaumber dissenting in part). See also St. Francis Medical Center, 347 NLRB 368, 369 fn. 9 (2006). He finds that the judge’s credibility resolutions here give sufficient detail to provide an adequate basis for review. DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 2 vision, to the drywall finishing employees at a time when the Carpenters did not represent an uncoerced majority of those employees. The judge tied those violations to Raymond’s October 1 recognition of the Carpenters. As stated, we are not passing on the legality of that recogni- tion. We nevertheless affirm the findings, as it is undis- puted that the parties were applying that same agreement to the drywall finishing employees on October 2, when Raymond unlawfully recognized the Carpenters as the 9(a) representative of those employees. See Duane Reade, Inc., 338 NLRB 943, 944 (2003), enfd. mem. 99 Fed.Appx. 240 (D.C. Cir. 2004). ORDER6 The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec- ommended Order of the administrative law judge as modified and set forth in full below and orders that A. Respondent, Raymond Interior Systems, Orange and San Diego, California, its officers, agents, succes- sors, and assigns, shall 1. Cease and desist from (a) Recognizing and bargaining with Southwest Re- gional Council of Carpenters on behalf of its affiliated local unions, including Respondent Carpenters Local Union 1506, as the 9(a) collective-bargaining representa- tive of its drywall finishing employees at a time when those unions do not represent an uncoerced majority of those employees. (b) Maintaining, enforcing, or giving effect to the Car- penters Union 2006–2010 master collective-bargaining agreement, including the union-security clause, so as to cover its drywall finishing employees, or any extensions, renewal, or modifications thereof, unless or until Re- spondent Carpenters Local Union 1506 has been certified by the Board as the exclusive collective-bargaining rep- resentative of those employees; provided that nothing in this Order shall authorize, allow, or require the with- drawal or elimination of any wage increase or other benefits that may have been established pursuant to said agreement. (c) Assisting Respondent Carpenters Local Union 1506 in obtaining authorization cards by warning its drywall finishing employees that, if they did not sign with Respondent Carpenters Local Union 1506 that day, there would be no more work for them. (d) In any like or related manner interfering with, re- straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. 6 Chairman Liebman observes that the judge’s remedy and recom- mended Order accord with Board precedent, and she adopts them on that basis. See, e.g., Garner/Morrison, LLC, 353 NLRB No. 78 (2009). 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act. (a) Withdraw and withhold all recognition from Re- spondent Carpenters Local Union 1506 as the collective- bargaining representative of its drywall finishing em- ployees unless and until it has been duly certified by the Board as the collective-bargaining representative of those employees. (b) Jointly and severally with Respondent Carpenters Local Union 1506, reimburse its past and present drywall finishing employees, who joined Respondent Carpenters Local Union 1506 on or after October 2, 2006, for any initiation fees, periodic dues, assessments, or any other moneys, which they may have paid or which may have been withheld from their pay pursuant to the Carpenters Union 2006–2010 master agreement, with interest as set forth in the remedy section of the judge’s decision. (c) To the extent that coverage was provided under Carpenters Union plans, provide alternate benefits cover- age equivalent to the coverage that its drywall finishing employees possessed under the Carpenters Union 2006– 2010 master agreement, including pension coverage and medical, hospitalization, prescription drug, dental, opti- cal, life, and other insurance benefits, and ensure that there be no lapse in coverage. (d) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such additional time as the Regional Director may allow for good cause shown, provide at a reasonable place desig- nated by the Board or its agents, all payroll records, so- cial security payment records, timecards, personnel re- cords and reports, and all other records, including an electronic copy of such records if stored in electronic form, necessary to analyze the amount of money to be reimbursed under the terms of this Order. (e) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its Orange facility and worksites in Southern California copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix A.”7 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 21, after being signed by Respondent Raymond’s authorized representative, shall be posted by Respondent Raymond immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent Raymond to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event that, during the pendency of these proceedings, 7 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na- tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg- ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board.” RAYMOND INTERIOR SYSTEMS 3 Respondent Raymond has gone out of business or closed the facility involved in these proceedings, Respondent Raymond shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current employees and former drywall finishing employees employed by Respondent Raymond at any time since October 2, 2006. (f) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a sworn certification of a re- sponsible official on a form provided by the Region at- testing to the steps that the Respondent has taken to comply. B. Respondent, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Local Union 1506, Los Angeles and Orange, California, its officers, agents, and representa- tives, shall 1. Cease and desist from (a) Accepting assistance from Respondent Raymond in obtaining union authorization cards from Raymond’s drywall finishing employees. (b) Accepting recognition from Respondent Raymond as the 9(a) collective-bargaining representative of its drywall finishing employees at a time when Carpenters Local Union 1506 does not represent an uncoerced ma- jority of those employees. (c) Maintaining and enforcing the Carpenters Union 2006–2010 master agreement, including the union- security clause, so as to cover Respondent Raymond’s drywall finishing employees, and any extensions, re- newal, or modifications thereof, unless and until it has been certified by the Board as the collective-bargaining representative of those employees. (d) Failing to inform Respondent Raymond’s drywall finishing employees, when it first sought to obligate them to pay dues and fees under a union-security clause, of their rights under NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963), to be and remain nonmembers of Re- spondent Carpenters; and of the rights of nonmembers under Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988), to object to paying for union activities not ger- mane to the Union’s duties as collective-bargaining rep- resentative, and to obtain a reduction-in-dues and fees for such activities. (e) In any like or related manner restraining or coerc- ing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act. (a) Jointly and severally with Respondent Raymond, reimburse all of the latter’s past and present drywall fin- ishing employees, who joined Respondent Carpenters Local Union 1506 on or after October 2, 2006, for initia- tion fees, periodic dues, assessments, or any other mon- eys, which they may have paid or which may have been withheld from their pay pursuant to the Carpenters Union 2006–2010 master agreement, with interest as set forth in the remedy section of the judge’s decision. (b) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such additional time as the Regional Director may allow for good cause shown, provide at a reasonable place desig- nated by the Board or its agents, all payroll records, so- cial security payment records, timecards, personnel re- cords and reports, and all other records, including an electronic copy of such records if stored in electronic form, necessary to analyze the amount of money to be reimbursed under the terms of this Order. (c) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its union office in Orange, California, copies of the at- tached notice to members, marked “Appendix B.”8 Cop- ies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Di- rector for Region 21, after being signed by Respondent Carpenter’s authorized representative, shall be posted by Respondent Carpenters immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to members are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent Carpenters Local Union 1506 to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event that, during the pendency of these proceedings Respondent Carpenters Local Union 1506 has ceased its representational activities or has be- come defunct, Southern California Regional Council of Carpenters shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current employees and former drywall finishing employees, employed by Respondent Raymond at any time since October 2, 2006. (d) Forward to the Regional Director of Region 21 signed copies of the attached notice, marked “Appendix B,” for posting by Respondent Raymond at its Orange facility and worksites in Southern California for 60 con- secutive days in places where notices to employees are customarily posted. (e) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a sworn certification of a re- sponsible official on a form provided by the Region at- testing to the steps that the Respondent has taken to comply. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint is dismissed insofar as it alleges violations of the Act not found. 8 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na- tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg- ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board.” DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 4 Dated, Washington, D.C. September 30, 2009 ______________________________________ Wilma B. Liebman, Chairman ______________________________________ Peter C. Schaumber, Member (SEAL) NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD APPENDIX A NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio- lated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this notice. FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO Form, join, or assist a union Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf Act together with other employees for your bene- fit and protection Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities. WE WILL NOT recognize and bargain with Southwest Regional Council of Carpenters on behalf of its affiliated local unions, including Respondent Carpenters Local Union 1506, as the 9(a) collective-bargaining representa- tive of our drywall finishing employees at a time when those unions do not represent an uncoerced majority of those employees. WE WILL NOT maintain, enforce, or give effect to our Carpenters Union 2006–2010 master collective- bargaining agreement, including the union-security clause, so as to cover our drywall finishing employees, or any extensions, renewal, or modifications thereof, unless or until Respondent Carpenters Local Union 1506 has been certified by the Board as the exclusive collective- bargaining representative of those employees; provided that nothing herein shall authorize, allow, or require us to withdraw or eliminate any wage increase or other bene- fits (pension or insurance plans) that may have been es- tablished pursuant to said agreement. WE WILL NOT assist Respondent Carpenters Local Un- ion 1506 in obtaining authorization cards by warning our drywall finishing employees that, if they did not sign with Respondent Carpenters Local Union 1506 that day, there would be no more work for them. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights set forth above. WE WILL withdraw and withhold all recognition from Respondent Carpenters Local Union 1506 as the collec- tive-bargaining representative of our drywall finishing employees unless and until it has been duly certified by the Board as the collective-bargaining representative of those employees. WE WILL jointly and severally with Respondent Car- penters Local Union 1506, reimburse our past and pre- sent drywall finishing employees, who joined Respon- dent Carpenters Local Union 1506 on or after October 2, 2006, for any initiation fees, periodic dues, assessments, or any other moneys, which they may have paid or which may have been withheld from their pay pursuant to the Carpenters Union 2006–2010 master agreement, with interest. WE WILL, to the extent that coverage was provided un- der Carpenters Union plans, provide alternate benefits coverage equivalent to the coverage that our drywall fin- ishing employees possessed under the Carpenters Union 2006–2010 master agreement, including pension cover- age and medical, hospitalization, prescription drug, den- tal, optical, life, and other insurance benefits, and ensure that there be no lapse in coverage. RAYMOND INTERIOR SYSTEMS APPENDIX B NOTICE TO MEMBERS POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio- lated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this notice. FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO Form, join, or assist a union Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf Act together with other employees for your bene- fit and protection Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities. WE WILL NOT accept assistance from Respondent Ray- mond in obtaining union authorization cards from Ray- mond’s drywall finishing employees. WE WILL NOT accept recognition from Respondent Raymond as the 9(a) collective-bargaining representative RAYMOND INTERIOR SYSTEMS 5 of our drywall finishing employees at a time when we do not represent an uncoerced majority of those employees. WE WILL NOT maintain and enforce the Carpenters Un- ion 2006–2010 master agreement, including the union- security clause, so as to cover Respondent Raymond’s drywall finishing employees, and any extensions, re- newal, or modifications thereof, unless and until we have been certified by the Board as the collective-bargaining representative of those employees. WE WILL NOT fail to inform Respondent Raymond’s drywall finishing employees, when we first seek to obli- gate them to pay dues and fees under a union-security clause, of their rights under NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963), to be and remain nonmem- bers of Respondent Carpenters; and of the rights of non- members under Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988), to object to paying for union activities not germane to the Union’s duties as collective- bargaining representative, and to obtain a reduction-in- dues and fees for such activities. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner restrain or coerce you in the exercise of the rights set forth above. WE WILL jointly and severally with Respondent Ray- mond, reimburse all of the latter’s past and present dry- wall finishing employees, who joined Respondent Car- penters Local Union 1506 on or after October 2, 2006, for initiation fees, periodic dues, assessments, or any other moneys, which they may have paid or which may have been withheld from their pay pursuant to the Car- penters Union 2006–2010 master agreement, with inter- est. UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS AND JOINERS OF AMERICA, LOCAL UNION 1506 Patrick J. Cullen, Esq., for the General Counsel. James A. Bowles, Esq. and Richard S. Zuniga, Esq. (on brief) (Hill, Farrer & Burrill LLP), of Los Angeles, California, on behalf of Respondent Raymond Interior Systems. Kathleen M. Jorgenson, Esq. (Decarlo, Connor & Shanley), of Los Angeles, California, on behalf of Respondent United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America Local Union No. 1506. Ellen Greenstone, Esq. and Richa Amar, Esq. (Rothner, Segall, & Greenstone), of Pasadena, California, on behalf of the Charging Party. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE BURTON LITVACK, Administrative Law Judge. The original and the first amended unfair labor practice charge in Case 21– CA–37649 were filed by Southern California Painters and Al- lied Trades District Council No. 36, International Union of Painters and Allied Trades, AFL–CIO (the Painters Union) on February 8 and April 30, 2007, respectively. The original un- fair labor practice charge and the first amended unfair labor practice charge in Case 21–CB–14259 were filed by the Paint- ers Union on February 8 and April 30, 2007, respectively. After investigating the above-described unfair labor practice charges, on January 30, 2008, the Regional Director for Region 21 of the National Labor Relations Board (the Board) issued an order consolidating cases and a consolidated complaint, alleg- ing that Respondent Raymond Interior Systems (Respondent Raymond) engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1), (2), and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act), and that Respondent United Brotherhood of Car- penters and Joiners of America, Local Union No. 1506 (Re- spondent Carpenters) engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act. Respon- dent Raymond and Respondent Carpenters each filed an an- swer, essentially denying the commission of any of the alleged unfair labor practices. Pursuant to a notice of hearing, on April 28 through 30 and May 1, 2008, in Los Angeles, California, a trial on the merits of the above unfair labor practice allegations was held before the above-named judge. At the hearing, each of the parties was afforded the opportunity to examine and to cross-examine witnesses, to offer into the record any relevant documentary evidence, to argue legal positions orally, and to file posthearing briefs. The latter documents were filed by counsel for the General Counsel, counsel for the Painters, coun- sel for Respondent Raymond, and counsel for Respondent Car- penters, and each brief has been carefully considered. Accord- ingly, based upon the entire record herein, including the posthearing briefs and my observation of the testimonial de- meanor of the several witnesses, I make the following FINDINGS OF FACT I. JURISDICTION At all times material, Respondent Raymond, a California corporation, with its principal place of business located in the Orange, California (the Orange facility), and another place of business in San Diego, California (San Diego facility), has been engaged in the building and construction industry as a con- tractor performing drywall, lathing, and plastering work. Dur- ing the calendar year 2006, a representative period, in conduct- ing its business affairs, Respondent Raymond purchased and received at its State of California jobsites goods, valued in ex- cess of $50,000, directly from suppliers located outside the State of California. At all times material, Respondent Ray- mond has been an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. II. LABOR ORGANIZATIONS At all material times, the Painters Union has been a labor or- ganization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. At all material times, Respondent Carpenters has been a la- bor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE ISSUES The consolidated complaint alleges that Respondent Ray- mond engaged in acts and conduct violative of Section 8(a)(1), (2), and (3) of the Act, on or about October 2, 2006, by granting DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 6 recognition to and, since then, maintaining and enforcing an existing collective-bargaining agreement with the Southwest Regional Council of Carpenters and its affiliated local unions, including Respondent Carpenters, as the exclusive representa- tive of its drywall finishing employees at a time when Respon- dent Carpenters did not represent an uncoerced majority of the above bargaining unit employees nor was the lawfully recog- nized exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the em- ployees; by maintaining and enforcing a union-security clause in the collective-bargaining agreement thereby encouraging its drywall finishing employees to join Respondent Carpenters; by warning its drywall finishing employees that they had to join or sign up with the Carpenters that day or they could no longer work for Respondent Raymond and by telling said employees they had to sign with the Carpenters that day if they wanted to work for Respondent Raymond the following day thereby ren- dering assistance and support to Respondent Carpenters and not adhering to the terms of the contractual union-security provi- sion; and by rendering assistance and support to Respondent Carpenters by entering into a recognition agreement, acknowl- edging Respondent Carpenters as the representative of all its employees under an existing collective-bargaining agreement at a time when Respondent Carpenters did not represent an unco- erced majority of Respondent Raymond’s drywall finishing employees. The consolidated complaint also alleges that Respondent Carpenters engaged in conduct violative of Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act, on or about October 2, 2006, by obtaining recognition from Respondent Raymond and maintaining and enforcing its existing collective-bargaining agreement with Respondent Raymond as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of Respondent Raymond’s drywall finishing employees at a time when it neither represented an uncoerced majority of the employees nor was recognized as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of them; by maintaining and enforcing a union-security provision in the above- collective-bargaining agreement thereby causing Respondent Raymond to encourage its drywall finishing employees to be- come members of Respondent Carpenters; by telling employees they had to sign up with the Carpenters that day or they could no longer work for Respondent Raymond; and by receiving assistance and support from Respondent Raymond when the latter entered into a recognition agreement, acknowledging Respondent Carpenters as the exclusive representative of all of its employees under an existing collective-bargaining agree- ment at a time when Respondent Carpenters did not represent an uncoerced majority of Respondent Raymond’s drywall fin- ishing employees. The consolidated complaint further alleges that Respondent Carpenters engaged in acts and conduct viola- tive of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act on or about October 2, 2006, by failing to inform Respondent Raymond’s drywall finishing employees of the following information prior to ob- taining completed membership applications from them and thereby obligating the said employees to pay dues and fees to the labor organization—that they had the right to be or remain a nonmember, that they have a right as a nonmember to object to paying for nonrepresentational activities and to obtain a reduc- tion in fees for such nonrepresentational activities, that they have the right to be given sufficient information to enable them to intelligently decide whether to object, and that they have the right as a nonmember to be apprised of any internal union pro- cedures for filing objections. In their respective answers to the consolidated complaint, Respondent Raymond and Respondent Carpenters both denied the above-described unfair labor practice allegations. Further, both deny that a unit limited to Respondent Raymond’s drywall finishing employees constitutes a unit appropriate for the pur- poses of collective bargaining and argue that, upon the expira- tion of Respondent Raymond’s collective-bargaining agreement with the Painters Union on September 30, 2006, by operation of law and the provisions of the existing collective-bargaining agreement between Respondent Raymond and the Southwest Regional Council of Carpenters on behalf of its affiliated local unions, including Respondent Carpenters, effective from July 1, 2006, through June 30, 2010, Respondent Carpenters was the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the employees covered by the agreement, including Respondent Raymond’s drywall finishing employees, within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act. Alternatively, they argue that the parties’ exist- ing collective-bargaining agreement was a lawful prehire agreement, privileged by Section 8(f) of the Act, covering Re- spondent Raymond’s drywall finishing employees and their work. In this regard, during the hearing, Respondent Raymond and Respondent Carpenters alleged that a confidential settle- ment agreement, dated September 12, 2006, between the parties also constituted a prehire collective-bargaining agreement, privileged by Section 8(f) of the Act, covering Respondent Raymond’s drywall finishing employees and their work. Next, each asserts that, on October 2, 2006, Respondent Raymond lawfully advised its drywall finishing employees that the exist- ing Carpenters collective-bargaining agreement was operative covering them and their work and that they would have to join Respondent Carpenters pursuant to the agreement. Finally, the Respondents contend that they entered into a recognition agree- ment on October 2, 2006, which agreement lawfully recognized Respondent Carpenters as the Section 9(a) of the Act majority representative of Respondent Raymond’s drywall finishing employees. IV. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The Facts Respondent Raymond is a specialty wall and ceiling contrac- tor in the building and construction industry, performing dry- wall, metal stud framing, drywall finishing, lathe, plastering, and specialty finishing work, in several States, including Cali- fornia and Nevada, whose work generally encompasses new and existing commercial projects, such as retail, educational, healthcare, and institutional structures, and some high density residential projects. Respondent Raymond performs work in each of the 11 southern California counties, and as of October 2006, employed 579 construction employees working out of its Orange and San Diego facilities, with 224 framing and drywall hanging employees and 55 drywall finishing employees em- ployed at the Orange facility and 127 framing and drywall hanging employees and 55 drywall finishing employees em- RAYMOND INTERIOR SYSTEMS 7 ployed at its San Diego facility. At least since the early 1960s, Respondent Raymond has been an employer-member of the Western Wall and Ceiling Contractors Association, Inc. (WWCCA), a multiemployer association composed of compa- nies performing work in the building and construction industry similar to that of Respondent Raymond, and the latter’s former president and current CEO, Travis Winsor,1 is currently a member of the executive board of the WWCCA and has served in each of the association’s officer positions including presi- dent. The record reveals that the WWCCA is structurally di- vided into several “conferences,” each of which negotiates, executes, and enforces collective-bargaining agreements with a particular labor organization on behalf of the WWCCA em- ployer-members, who belong to the conference. In this regard, since, at least, the1960s and through September 2006, Respon- dent Raymond had been an employer-member of the respective WWCCA conferences, which have negotiated successive col- lective-bargaining agreements with the Painters Union (the California Finishers Conference), the Southwest Regional Council of Carpenters on behalf of its affiliated local unions, including Respondent Carpenters (the Drywall/Finishers Con- ference), the Plasterers Union, and the Plaster Tenders Union. The most recent of the successive collective-bargaining agreements between the WWCA California Drywall Finishers Conference and the Painters Union, to which Respondent Ray- mond was signatory through its membership in the WWCCA conference, was the Southern California Drywall Finishers joint agreement, effective from October 1, 2003, through September 30, 2006. The agreement covered the employer-members’, including Respondent Raymond’s, drywall finishing employ- ees, who performed the work of covering up screws and joints in drywall after the drywall sheets have been hung and smooth- ing out the walls and preparing the material for painting. There is no dispute that the successive Painters Union collective- bargaining agreements were entered into by the parties pursuant to the provisions of Section 8(f) of the Act. The most recent collective-bargaining agreements between the WWCCA Drywall/Finishers Conference and the Southwest Regional Council of Carpenters on behalf of its affiliated local unions, including Respondent Carpenters, to which Respondent Raymond was signatory through its membership in the WWCCA conference, are the July 1, 2002, through June 30, 2006, and the July 1, 2006, through June 30, 2010 Southern California Drywall/Lathing master agreements. The collective- bargaining agreements contain the following identical lan- guage: VOLUNTARY RECOGNITION AGREEMENT . . . . (a) On behalf of each Contractor signatory hereto, the Asso- ciation, having received from the Union a demand or request for recognition as the majority representative of the unit em- ployees covered by this collective bargaining agreement; and having been presented or having been offered to be presented 1 Prior to employment with Respondent Raymond, Winsor practiced law. with, by the Union, proof that the Union has the support of, or has received authorization to represent, a majority of the unit employees covered by this collective bargaining agreement; hereby expressly and unconditionally acknowledges and grants, on behalf of each of its members in their individual capacities, recognition to the Union as the sole and exclusive collective bargaining representative of the unit employees covered by this collective bargaining agreement, pursuant to Section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, and agrees not to make any claim questioning or challenging the representative status of the Union. Until 1988, the successive Carpenters Union master agreements basically covered the work of the employer-members’, includ- ing Respondent Raymond’s, framing and drywall hanging em- ployees, whose work includes metal stud framing, drywall hanging, and lathing work. Then, in the above year, the parties negotiated a master agreement, which extended the bargaining unit description and work coverage of the agreement to include those employees who performed drywall finishing work.2 Sub- sequently, in 1992, as a result of the concerns of WWCCA employer-members, including Respondent Raymond, who were signatory to both the Painters Union collective-bargaining agreements and the Carpenters Union master agreements, re- garding conflicting enforcement of the overlapping work juris- dictions of their agreements by the Painters Union and by the Southwest Regional Council of Carpenters, the Dry- wall/Finishers Conference and the latter negotiated and inserted the following language in that year’s and their successive mas- ter agreements: The Union understands and recognizes that the WWCCA and its members are signatory to a collective bargaining agree- ment with the Painters . . . covering drywall work . . . . The Parties agree that [the coverage of the work of drywall finish- ing employees] shall apply only to those signatory employers who are not already signatory to a collective bargaining agreement with the Painters . . . covering the drywall finishing . . . work . . . and who choose to assign that work to the Paint- ers . . . . The Union agrees not to invoke or enforce [the cov- erage of this agreement] or to create any jurisdictional dispute concerning [the above] work against any signatory employer that is also signatory to an agreement with the Painters . . . covering the drywall finishing . . . work and who chooses to assign that work to the Painters . . . . as long as such contract remains in effect. Winsor understood the foregoing language to mean that Re- spondent Carpenters would not claim jurisdiction over the work of Respondent Raymond’s drywall finishing employees while it was signatory to a collective-bargaining agreement with the Painters Union. 2 In practice, there remained a distinction between the work per- formed by Respondent’s drywall finishing employees and those per- forming framing and drywall hanging. Thus, each of Respondent Raymond’s former drywall finishing employees, who testified at the hearing, testified without contradiction that he or she never performed framing or drywall hanging work and that the employees, who per- formed drywall hanging work, never performed drywall finishing work. DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 8 The genesis of the instant dispute was Respondent Ray- mond’s decision in May 2006 to terminate its collective- bargaining relationship with the Painters Union. In this regard, according to Travis Winsor, as he wanted to align his company with a labor organization which would provide better work acquisition and preservation strategies and higher wages and better health insurance and pension plans for the drywall finish- ing employees and would assure the “stability of our existing work force” and place Respondent Raymond in a better posi- tion to recruit skilled workers, he decided it was in the best interests of Respondent Raymond to terminate its existing col- lective-bargaining agreement with the Painters Union. Thus, on May 24, he sent the following letter to the Painters Union and a copy to the WWCCA California Finishers Conference. In pertinent part, the letter stated: Raymond Interior Systems . . . is signatory to the Southern California Finishers joint agreement. We hereby give you and your labor organization notice that it is the Company’s intention to terminate the above-mentioned agreement and any addenda or other agreement with your union on its expiration date, September 30, 2006. By copy of this letter, the Company is resigning from the [WWCCA] California Finishers Conference and with- drawing any bargaining authority from that organization. The Company is no longer a part of any multi-employer group, and will not be bound by any agreement reached between the union and such a group. . . . Thereafter, Winsor, who understood that Respondent Ray- mond was bound to the terms and conditions of employment, embodied in the existing Painters Union contract until Septem- ber 30, 2006, testified, the fact that Respondent Raymond in- tended to terminate its bargaining relationship with the Painters Union soon became “well known” throughout the industry, and “. . . we were aware that the Carpenters had expressed their intentions to enforce [the] provisions of [their existing master agreement]” so as to assert bargaining representative status for drywall finishing employees. Specifically, according to him, between May 24 and September 12, 2006, two representatives of the Southwest Regional Council of Carpenters, Mike McCar- ron, the executive secretary, and Gordon Hubel, the contract administrator, “. . . expressed their intentions to fully enforce all provisions of their contract upon the expiration of the Paint- ers Union contract . . . which could apply to our existing [dry- wall finishing employees] or another potential outcome would be to require us to receive employees to perform this work dis- patched from the Carpenters’ hall.” On this point, Gordon Hubel testified that, during bargaining over the Carpenters Un- ion 2002–2006 master agreement, he and Winsor engaged in a conversation regarding the above-quoted so-called Painters contract exception language in the collective-bargaining agree- ment and that he told Winsor, if a signatory contractor, which performed drywall finishing work, terminated its contract with the Painters Unioin, “. . . we believed [our] contract kicked in immediately, that there wasn’t any transition period . . . .” He told Winsor that the Carpenters Union would “griev” it if a signatory contractor failed or refused to give the drywall finish- ing work to the Carpenters Union. Likewise, Winsor believed that, upon expiration of the Painters Union contract, Respon- dent Raymond could not unilaterally implement its own terms and conditions of employment for its drywall finishing employ- ees rather than adopting those of the Carpenters Union 2006– 2010 master agreement without facing a lawsuit or grievance by the Carpenters Union Apparently, in order to obviate a potential contractual griev- ance, representatives of the Regional Council of Carpenters and Respondent Raymond held discussions over a period of several weeks during the summer of 2006. While Hubel placed the conversations in the context of the Southwest Regional Council of Carpenters pursuit of its demand that, upon expiration of its collective-bargaining agreement with the Painters Union, Re- spondent Raymond acknowledge that its drywall finishing em- ployees and their work were covered by the existing Carpenters Union 2006–2010 master agreement, Travis Winsor placed the negotiations in a different context. According to him, the nego- tiations, which the parties intended to keep confidential,3 con- cerned a dispute over how to provide wages and benefits to Respondent Raymond’s drywall finishers without any disrup- tions or other eligibility, vesting, and coverage issues resulting from differences between the provisions of the Painters Union and Carpenters Union collective-bargaining agreements. While such may have been Respondent Raymond’s concern, Winsor admitted that McCarron continually expressed the Carpenters Union’s intention “to fully enforce all provisions of their con- tract upon expiration of the Painters’ [collective-bargaining agreement]” and specifically threatened to file a grievance against Respondent Raymond if the latter did not comply. Fur- ther, when asked if any document exists providing for the exact vesting and eligibility terms worked out with the Southwest Regional Council of Carpenters, Winsor averred, “I believe those provisions are contained in the various trust fund docu- ments;” however, neither Respondent Raymond nor Respon- dent Carpenters offered any corroboration for his assertion. In any event, the result of the aforementioned conversations was a September 12, 2006 document, between the parties, enti- tled CONFIDENTIAL SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT. The document states in part: WHEREAS, disputes and grievances have arisen be- tween the parties about proper assignment of drywall fin- ishing and other work to the proper trade, craft, and group of employees, and the parties desire to settle said disputes through a confidential settlement agreement NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the mutual promises and agreements set forth, the parties agree as follows: 1. Raymond agrees to sign the Southern California Drywall/Lathing memorandum agreement 2006–2010. 3 Gordon Hubel stated that “[I]t’s usually the employer who wants to keep [such talks] confidential so other employees don’t know about the resolution.” In this regard, it is obvious that the instant discussions were kept confidential from Respondent Raymond’s drywall finishers in order to avert the possibility of a work stoppage. While initially denying being concerned about a strike, Winsor admitted, “I was wor- ried that the Painters Union would call a strike against Raymond pro- jects.” RAYMOND INTERIOR SYSTEMS 9 2. At the expiration of Raymond’s agreement with Painters District Council No. 36 on September 30, 2006, Raymond agrees that to the fullest extent permitted by law it will apply the Southern California Drywall/Lathing Agreement to its drywall finishing work and employees.4 In addition, pursuant to paragraph 3 of the document, the Southwest Regional Council of Carpenters agreed to indem- nify, defend, and hold harmless Respondent Raymond for any contractual grievance and/or lawsuit filed by the Painters Union or any related trust fund. While, at the hearing, Hubel main- tained that the confidential settlement agreement was a collec- tive-bargaining agreement5 as it established terms and condi- tions of employment and referred to the Carpenters Union’s memorandum agreement, which binds a signatory contractor to the existing Carpenters Union master agreement,6 he conceded that the document itself does not contain a bargaining unit de- scription7 or an expiration date, and, on this point, Winsor ad- 4 The memorandum agreement, referred to in par. 1, is a short form collective-bargaining agreement, is usually executed by a new em- ployer in the industry, and binds the signatory contractor to abide by the terms and conditions of employment of the existing Carpenters Union master agreement except as specifically excluded by the terms of the memorandum agreement. As with the master agreement, the memorandum agreement purports to be 9(a) collective-bargaining agreement. Thus, in the seventh paragraph, “the contractor and the Carpenters Union expressly acknowledge that on the contractor’s cur- rent jobsite work, the Carpenters Union has the support of a majority of the employees performing the work covered by this agreement. The Union has demanded and the contractor has recognized the Carpenters Union as the majority representative of its employees performing work covered by this Agreement.” Further, the parties to the memorandum agreement agree that “this Memorandum Agreement will be effective when signed and will remain in full force and effect for the term of the [existing master agreement]. . . .” Finally, Gordon Hubel explained that the memorandum agreement differs from the existing master agreement in that, pursuant to par. 6, the former does not contain the above-quoted Painters Union exclusion language and admitted that Respondent Ray- mond has never executed a copy of the memorandum agreement. Winsor asserted that the preamble language in the confidential set- tlement agreement recites his concerns regarding the continuity of wages and health and pension benefits for Respondent Raymond’s drywall finishing employees. 5 Hubel conceded that the parties never discussed the confidential settlement agreement in terms of creating an 8(f) bargaining relation- ship. 6 During cross-examination, Hubel insisted that the confidential set- tlement agreement somehow bound Respondent Raymond to both the memorandum agreement and to the 2006–2010 Carpenters Union mas- ter agreement. 7 Hubel, who practiced as an attorney in the field of labor relations, argued that the bargaining unit description is contained in the memo- randum agreement and the existing master agreement. While the Car- penters Union 2006–2010 master agreement seemingly does refer to drywall taping and finishing and successive master agreements since 1988 have covered such work, the parties stipulated that Respondent Raymond’s bargaining relationship with the Painters Union has existed since, at least, 1966, covering such work for 20 years prior to the Car- penters Union’s claim upon the work and the employees performing the work. Hubel, in fact, conceded that Respondent Raymond’s drywall finishers constituted a historically separate bargaining unit from those employees represented by the Carpenters Union. mitted that, during the discussions “we never used the term bargaining unit.” Respondent Raymond’s collective-bargaining agreement with the Painters Union, covering its drywall finishing employ- ees, expired by its terms on September 30, 2006, and, presuma- bly, as early as the next day, Respondent Raymond began com- plying with the terms of the above-described September 12, 2006 confidential settlement agreement and its existing Carpen- ters Union 2006–2010 master agreement8 with Southwest Re- gional Council of Carpenters on behalf of its affiliated local unions, including Respondent Carpenters, and extended recog- nition to the latter as the bargaining representative of the above employees. In a position statement to Region 21, dated De- cember 18, 2006, Respondent Raymond’s attorney stated that the 2006–2010 Carpenters Union master agreement “. . . is a full-fledged Section 9(a) agreement, unlike the former agree- ment with the Painters, which was a Section 8(f) prehire agreement” and that “. . . pursuant to its Section 9(a) collective bargaining agreement with the Carpenters, which . . . covered drywall finishing work, Raymond complied with the require- ments of that agreement and assigned the drywall finishing work to Carpenters.” In these regards, according to Gordon Hubel, if Respondent Raymond had refused to assign the dry- wall finishing work to Respondent Carpenters, “. . . we would have argued the overall unit was a 9(a) unit.” Continuing, he added, “I mean we were prepared to argue that there was one overall Section 9(a) unit.”9 Winsor and Carpenters Union rep- resentatives realized that the demise of the Painters Union’s bargaining representative status, the transferring of such status to Respondent Carpenters, and the necessity for signing forms for continued health insurance and pension coverage would have to be explained to Respondent Raymond’s drywall finish- ing employees, and, during their discussions regarding the con- fidential settlement agreement, Winsor and McCarron also developed plans for meeting with those employees to explain the foregoing subjects. Such meetings were scheduled for Monday October 2, 2006, at Respondent Raymond’s Orange facility in the morning and at its San Diego facility in the afternoon; according to Winsor, “the purpose . . . was to explain the decisions and the actions we had taken, why we had done so, and to let the employees 8 Art. IV, sec. 1 of this agreement provides in part: Every . . . person performing work covered by this Agreement shall be required, as a condition of continued employment, to apply for and become a member of and to maintain membership in good standing in the appropriate Local Union of the Union which has territorial juris- diction of the area in which such person completes his eighth (8th) day of employment. Such application shall be made within eight (8) days after the beginning of such employment for any contractor in the State of California and employment for any or all contractors shall be ac- cumulated for purposes of determining the running of the eight (8) day period. 9 According to Hubel, Respondent Carpenters recognized that it would be difficult convincing the Board that there was one appropriate unit herein, an overall carpenters unit, and “that’s why we went and got cards.” He also averred that Respondent Carpenters would have argued alternative theories—that the drywall finishers might be considered to constitute a separate bargaining unit, “and were prepared alternatively to accept the 8(f) contract.” DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 10 know of the new wage packages and benefits.”10 The instant consolidated complaint allegations concern the meeting at the Orange facility, which was scheduled for 7 a.m., and there is no dispute about the sequence of events. Thus, on the night before (Sunday evening), Hector Zorrero, Respondent Raymond’s general superintendent, and, at least, one other company official made telephone calls to all of the company’s drywall finishing employees, directing them to be at the Orange facility’s yard11 at approximately 6 o’clock in the morning for a meeting. As each employee arrived in his or her car or truck the next morn- ing, he or she was met by three company officials, who were standing by the outer gate and checking names on a sheet of paper. Upon his or her name being checked on the list, the employee was permitted to enter the parking area and to park his or her vehicle.12 At the gate entrance into the yard, a com- pany office worker also checked each employee’s name on a list of names. Then, at 7 a.m., the doors to the facility were opened and the 85 to 90 drywall finishing employees were ushered into the center warehouse section, in which tables and chairs were arranged and the employees were served breakfast. After an hour, the employees were instructed to enter the train- ing room, which is 37-feet wide and 60 feet in length and which was arranged with rows of chairs, a stage, on which were tables and a podium, in the front of the room, and two dropdown pro- jection screens on either side of the room. Spanish speaking employees were told to enter first and directed to seats on which head phones, necessary for English to Spanish transla- tion, had been placed.13 Travis Winsor and Hector Zorrero attended the meeting for Respondent Raymond, and McCarron, Hubel, Ron Schoen, the administrator of the Carpenters Union trust funds, Marty Dahlquist, and other representatives attended on behalf of the Southwest Regional Council of Carpenters and of Respondent Carpenters.14 The initial speaker at the meeting was Winsor, who spoke for several minutes utilizing Power- Point slides and a document, which was distributed to the em- ployees. The document, Respondent Raymond’s Exhibit 1, reads, in part, as follows: 10 Later, in his December 18, 2006 position letter, Respondent Ray- mond’s attorney argued that “ . . . the [October 2 meeting] was privi- leged by the fact that [the existing Carpenters Union 2006–2010 master agreement] covered the work and Raymond already recognized Carpen- ters as the Section 9(a) representative of its drywall employees (both hangers and finishers).” 11 Apparently, the Orange facility’s yard area is enclosed by an outer fence, with a sliding gate permitting entry into a parking area, and the parking area is separated from the yard by an inner fence, with an entry gate. The Orange facility building is divided into three areas—a gym and storage room, a center warehouse and a training center. 12 The obvious purpose was to keep nonemployees, especially Paint- ers Union officials out of the facility that morning. One such official, Jim Dunleavy, had been informed of the meeting by a drywall finishing employee. He arrived at the Orange facility yard entrance on Monday morning, found the entrance gate closed, and was told by Zorrero that he could not enter the facility that day. 13 A representative of the Southwest Regional Council of Carpenters, David Cordero, performed the translation. 14 The Carpenters representatives wore shirts or jackets on which the Carpenters Union logo was imprinted. Raymond has terminated its collective bargaining agreement with Painters and Allied Trades District Coun- cil No. 36, effective September 30, 2006. This was a dif- ficult decision which has come after much thought and analysis. This decision was made in the best interests of the employees and company. While Raymond has termi- nated the [above] agreement, Raymond continues to be a union company. Pursuant to Raymond’s agreement with the Southwest Regional Council of Carpenters, if the company is not bound to an agreement with the Painters covering the dry- wall finishing work, this work is covered under the Car- penters Southern California Drywall/Lathing Master Agreement. Raymond is bound by its labor agreement with the Carpenters and will apply this agreement to em- ployees performing drywall finishing work in Southern California from October 1, 2006 forward. The Carpenters agreement provides higher wages and better benefits for the employees. Higher wages, better benefits and the support of the Carpenters will improve the working conditions for everyone. Drywall finishing employees who were not previously members of the Carpenters must join the Carpenters Union under the union security provision of the Carpenters labor agreement. In addition, the Carpenters have agreed to special provisions regarding pension and health and wel- fare benefits which are only available to Raymond drywall finishing employees. . . . When Winsor finished, he introduced Marty Dahlquist of the Carpenters Union, and, utilizing another PowerPoint presenta- tion, the latter compared and contrasted the wage packages contained in the existing Painters Union and Carpenters Union collective-bargaining agreements. After Dahlquist, Ron Schoen spoke, in detail, about the Carpenters Union health and pension plans and explained the trust funds’ vesting arrange- ment with Respondent Raymond for the latter’s drywall finish- ing employees. When Schoen concluded his remarks, Hector Zorrero spoke to the employees for a few moments, and, when he finished, employees were permitted to ask questions to which Winsor, Zorrero, and the Carpenters Union representa- tives responded.15 Upon the conclusion of the question and answer portion, the employees were instructed to go back into the warehouse area.16 There, two tables were set up. Clerical employees of Respondent Carpenters were at one table, and they distributed copies of General Counsel’s Exhibit 3, a three page document consisting of identical white, yellow, and pink pages17 The document itself is in four parts, two being English 15 While unclear at exactly what point, R. Exh. 2, a form entitled Resignation from Painters Union, and an attached sample resignation letter, was distributed to the employees during the meeting. 16 The record reveals that many employees lingered in the meeting room, speaking among themselves about what they had just been told. Apparently, Winsor, Zorrero, and Carpenters Union representatives spoke to individuals and groups regarding signing with Respondent Carpenters. 17 Presumably, by writing on the top or white copy, the writer’s words appeared on the bottom yellow and pink copies. RAYMOND INTERIOR SYSTEMS 11 and Spanish versions of Respondent Carpenters’ application for membership form, the third a document entitled Supplemental Dues and CLIC Authorization, and the fourth being an English language Southwest Regional Council of Carpenters authoriza- tion for representation form. When Respondent Raymond em- ployees completed and returned the entire document to the Respondent Carpenters representatives, the employees were given copies of the Carpenters Union magazine entitled Car- penter.18 At the other table were representatives of the Carpen- ters Union trust funds, who were distributing trust fund forms to the employees. Finally, at the conclusion of the meeting, rather than going into the warehouse area, many employees either lingered in the back of the training room or left the build- ing and congregated in the yard. In both places, groups of em- ployees discussed amongst themselves what they had heard and their options and were approached by representatives of Re- spondent Carpenters, who answered questions. What is in dispute herein are alleged comments during the meeting to the assembled drywall finishing employees by Re- spondent Raymond’s Winsor and Zorrero and by representa- tives of Respondent Carpenters regarding becoming members of the latter. In this regard, Richard Myers, who had been em- ployed by Respondent Raymond for approximately 28 years and was the drywall finishing foreman in October 2006, testi- fied that he sat in the rear of the training room and that, at the outset of the meeting, Travis Winsor moved to the podium and said, “. . . that he’d been thinking about it for a while and that he’d . . . decided to sign . . . with just the Carpenters and not the Painters.” Also, “. . . he told us [that] if we did not sign with the Carpenters . . . we wouldn’t have a job.” Next, Dahlquist and Schoen of the Carpenters Union spoke. While not naming either official, Myers recalled that the first speaker told the drywall finishing employees he was “proud” that the company had “signed” with his union and the other “. . . spoke about the financial benefits, medical, what have you.” Then, according to Myers, employees were permitted to ask questions, and several, including him, did so. He asked whether his pension would be affected by switching union representation,19 and another em- 18 The copy of the magazine, which was distributed on October 2, was dated January–March 2006. On p. 47 of this magazine, after 4 pp.of obituary notices, the next to the last page, printed in English and in a print size smaller than that used throughout the rest of the maga- zine, is a document entitled Procedures for Objecting Non-members to File with the Union Objections to the Expenditure of Dues for Purposes Not Germane to Collective Bargaining. There is no dispute that, during the meeting the Carpenters Union representatives failed to verbally inform the attending employees that each had a right not to join the Carpenters Union and continue working for Respondent Raymond, that each had the right to object to paying the portion of dues that went to nonrepresentational expenditures, or that there was an internal union procedure for employees to challenge the amount they would have to pay in dues. Finally, in these regards, close scrutiny of the Carpenters Union PowerPoint discloses that, while the obligation to pay dues is discussed in detail, there was nothing shown to the employees regarding the rights of nonmembers or regard- ing objecting to paying for union activities not germane to the labor organization’s obligation as bargaining agent. 19 During direct examination, Myers averred that he actually asked two questions but could specifically recall only one; however, during ployee asked whether they would continue to perform taping work, or would they begin hanging drywall. To the latter, the response was “they would just be tapers.” Myers recalled that most of the questions pertained to the employees’ continued employment, and Winsor “repeated” several times that “. . . if you didn’t sign, you didn’t have a job . . . we were told we weren’t fired, we just couldn’t have a job.” Then, Myers testi- fied, at the conclusion of the meeting, as employees were stand- ing and speaking to each other, Carpenters Union representa- tives began handing out “the paperwork”20 and the “pam- phlets”21 for joining the Carpenters Union. When the forms were offered to him by a representative, “. . . I told him I didn’t want one.” For the next 20 to 30 minutes, Myers observed Carpenters Union agents speaking to employees and offering papers for their signatures. At one point, he recalled, Travis Winsor approached and asked if he was going to sign the mem- bership document, and Myers said, no. Winsor responded that he would like Myers to do so and stay working for Respondent Raymond. Myers replied that would not happen because it wasn’t about the money, it was about integrity. During cross-examination, Myers denied that his memory of the events of that day was hazy and testified that, as the meet- ing progressed, he became “upset” because of the way the tran- sition from the Painters Union to the Carpenters Union had been “pulled off” and that he recalled Winsor utilizing a Power- Point display but could not recall if the latter spoke from it. Further, while recalling Winsor saying that, from then on, the employees would be performing their work under the Carpen- ters Union contract and Carpenters finishers would be doing drywall finishing work, Myers could not recall whether Winsor said, “[I]f we didn’t sign with the Carpenters, we wouldn’t have a job” before or after he introduced the Carpenters Union repre- sentatives but “. . . I know that it was brought up during ques- tioning afterwards.” Then, asked to repeat what Winsor said in his opening remarks, Myers said he was unable to recall “eve- rything” but “[Winsor] just got up and said he’d been mulling it over some time, that he . . . wasn’t going to sign with the Paint- ers, he was going to sign with the Carpenters . . . and . . . then he introduced [the Carpenters representatives] and I wasn’t paying that close of attention.” While he was not sure exactly when Winsor uttered the comment regarding employees having to join the Carpenters in order to keep their jobs, Myers re- called that Winsor specifically said, “[Y]ou’re not fired” and recalled that Winsor made the statement in response to an em- ployee’s question—“. . . do we have to join the Carpenters?” Finally, while denying that he quit his job with Respondent cross-examination, he was able to recall his second question, which concerned the Carpenters Union’s “voting practices,” and he was in- formed “. . . that they didn’t vote en mass, they had delegates for their voting . . . .” 20 During cross-examination, Myers denied that this was inside the room in which the employees had been served breakfast. 21 During cross-examination, Myers said, by packet, he meant a document consisting of several sheets of paper. DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 12 Raymond,22 Myers admitted he accepted a job with another contractor the next day.23 Janet Pineda, who had been working for Respondent Ray- mond as a drywall finishing employee for 2 years, testified that she sat towards the back of the training room during the meet- ing that Travis Winsor spoke first, thanking everyone for com- ing and saying there were some speakers from the Carpenters Union after him. Pineda neither could recall anything else Winsor said nor could she recall anything the Carpenters Union representatives said except that one spoke about “. . . financial issues, wages, benefits from the Carpenters Union.”24 Accord- ing to Pineda, after the Carpenters Union representatives fin- ished, employees asked questions. “I asked a couple of ques- tions. . . . I asked if switching over . . . as a Carpenter taper was going to make us look bad because Carpenter tapers are known to do bad work. . . . Their [response] was no, it wouldn’t make us look bad.” Then, she commented that it would be nice for them to have more time to contemplate working as members of the Carpenters Union; to this, Winsor responded, saying, “. . . we had plenty of time to think about it throughout the day.” Next, another employee spoke, saying he had recently worked as a member of the Carpenters Union “. . . but there wasn’t a lot of work with [that union], so that was one of the reasons why he switched to the Painters Union. So he thought that switch- ing to the Carpenters Union wasn’t a very good idea because lack of work. Pineda could not recall a response to this remark and could recall just one other question and response. An em- ployee asked a question, “. . . if we didn’t sign up with the Car- penters were we going to be able to work the following day.” Winsor responded, saying, “. . . no, we could not work the fol- lowing day if we didn’t sign up with the Carpenters.” Pineda next testified that, after the question and answer period, for approximately 40 minutes, employees were permitted to dis- cuss what they had heard amongst themselves. At one point, according to her, “a representative from the Carpenters ap- proached me and told me that he wanted to convince me to sign . . . because it looked like I was the hardest person to convince. . . . I just laughed.”25 After speaking to other employees and attempting to dissuade them from joining the Carpenters Union, Pineda walked through the warehouse area26 and outside into 22 Myers maintained that he could not continue working for Respon- dent Raymond as Winsor said he would no longer have a job if he didn’t sign with Respondent Carpenters. 23 According to Myers, upon driving his vehicle out from Respon- dent’s facility, he encountered Painters Union representatives, who were waiting outside the gate. They told him he could begin working for another contractor KHS&S, and he accepted their offer. 24 She did remember the Carpenters Union representatives speaking from slides, which were projected upon the two screens. 25 Gordon Hubel testified that he was the Carpenters Union represen- tative who spoke to Pineda. “I specifically sought her out and said that you [look] like you’re going to be a hard person to convince because she’d asked several pointed questions. . . . she expressed he loyalty to the Painters Union and I said I understand that but . . . there’s a lot of opportunities here, you should keep an open mind . . . .” 26 In this room, there were tables set up with Carpenters Union rep- resentatives at the tables. On the tables, “there were papers, I believe. Applications. There were papers on the tables. . . . some employees were asking questions . . . to the representatives and some of them were the yard where she encountered more employees many of whom had executed the membership forms for Respondent Carpenters. During cross-examination, Pineda27 testified that she could not recall Winsor either speaking from slides, speaking about Respondent Raymond’s values, or saying he had signed a Car- penters Union collective-bargaining agreement. However, “he did mention something about the contract expiring from the Painters,” and she did recall him saying from that point for- ward, all drywall finishing work would done under the Carpen- ters Union contract and employees performing drywall finish- ing work would receive Carpenters Union benefits “if we signed with the Carpenters Union.” Immediately after so testi- fying, Pineda changed her testimony, stating that, while Winsor spoke about employees signing with the Carpenters Union, he did not say this until “towards the end” of the meeting when “. . . he encouraged us to sign over with the Carpenters Union when we were asking questions . . . . that was toward the end of the meeting, not in the introduction.” On this point, she re- membered Winsor saying, “. . . I encourage you guys to think it over and to sign . . . with the Carpenters Union.” Also, during cross-examination, Pineda recalled that most of the meeting concerned the description of the Carpenters Union’s fringe benefits, but she could not recall Winsor saying it was impor- tant for employees to sign up for benefits in order to be imme- diately covered by the Carpenters Union health plan.28 Pineda conceded that her recollection of the meeting was not good and that, while the question regarding what would happen if they didn’t sign up today with the Carpenters Union was asked just once, she could not recall whether she or another person asked the question. She did, however, reiterate Winsor responding “. . . no, we cannot work the following day if we did not sign over with the Carpenters Union.”29 Finally, with regard to her direct examination testimony that Winsor said the employees had plenty of time until the end of the day to think about their decision, after reiterating the foregoing, Pineda admitted she was not quoting the former and averred that “. . . he did men- tion that we had plenty of time to think about it.”30 Ruben Mejia Alvarez, who worked for Respondent Ray- mond as a drywall finisher from August through November 2006, testified that, after he and the other employees finished eating breakfast, they were ushered into a larger room in which the meeting was to occur. Travis Winsor and Hector Zorrero signing in and getting some information, paperwork.” Pineda was unable to identify GC Exh. 3 as the “paperwork.” 27 Pineda admitted that she is currently being paid by the Painters Union for teaching “CPR First Aid” at the Painters Union Apprentice- ship school. 28 She did remember a PowerPoint presentation about the Carpenters Union’s benefits and wages. 29 Pineda conceded that these may not have been Winsor’s exact words. Further, in her pretrial affidavit, she stated that she and other employees questioned Winsor about being terminated if they did not sign with the Carpenters Union. His quoted response in Pineda’s affi- davit is virtually identical to her testimony during the trial. 30 In her pretrial affidavit, Pineda quotes Winsor as merely saying that the employees had plenty of time to decide and that they should think about it. RAYMOND INTERIOR SYSTEMS 13 were present on behalf of Respondent Raymond, and four or five Carpenters Union officials were also present. Winsor spoke first, and he said that the Company was changing from the Painters Union to the Carpenters Union “. . . because they want better future for us” and “. . . because they going to gent paid more money with the Carpenters and so more benefits and more future for us.” Next, Zorrero spoke, and he echoed Win- sor, saying the Carpenters Union represented a “better future for us and they need us.” Then, each of the Carpenters Union representatives “spoke some,” with “. . . some of them [speak- ing] for everyone and others . . . speaking individually.” He recalled one speaker telling the employees that it was “better” working for the Carpenters and, in particular, “that it was better to sign with them because they had better benefits, better pay, and . . . their retirement was better.” Further, Alvarez testified that Zorrero and a Carpenters Union representative each said. “[T]hat in order to continue working with Raymond Company we had to sign up with them.31 According to this witness, after the speakers finished, the employees were permitted to ask questions. Alvarez asked if they would give the employees some time to think about what they had just been told about having to sign with the Carpenters Union;32 Hector Zorrero responded, in English, “No. . . . that it was either today or that there wasn’t any time to think about it, that it was at that mo- ment.”33 Another employee asked what was going to happen to their Painters Union pension plan money, and a Carpenters Union representative answered this question. When the ques- tioning ended, Alvarez testified, “[A] raffle was made” and the Carpenters Union representatives distributed paperwork in the form of “a sheet like [GC Exh. 3] that I signed in order to be able to continue working.”34 During cross-examination, Alvarez could not recall Respon- dent’s Exhibit 1 being distributed during the meeting but could recall that there was information projected onto screens in Eng- lish, “but I don’t remember what that was, but it was represent- ing the Carpenters.” With regard to what Zorrero said, he re- called that Zorrero said, “very little” speaking from the podium. On stage, “. . . he said almost the same thing [Winsor said], that they had already signed with the Carpenters . . . and they want a better future for us and they . . . will pay us more money to go with [the Carpenters Union].” As to the statement “that we needed to sign with them if we wanted to continue working,” Zorrero said this while “. . . amongst the people35 trying to con- 31 Zorrero made his comment in English, and the Carpenters Union representative spoke Spanish. 32 Alvarez recalled that a “majority” of the employees were making this same request. He and the others shouted together, and Zorrero gave just one answer—“There’s no time to think about it. Either sign for us today or you cannot work tomorrow for us.” 33 According to Alvarez, he understands spoken English but reads very little in that language. 34 Alvarez testified that, after the meeting, “nobody wanted to sign” to join the Carpenters Union; however, all the drywall finishing fore- men were called into a meeting. When they returned, all said they had signed with the Carpenters Union and, from then on, it’ll depend upon whether you sign. They added, they all signed and would continue working. 35 “[Zorrero] was walking all over the room there.” vince them . . . to sign” with the Carpenters Union. Finally, Alvarez confirmed that a large portion of the meeting was de- voted to an explanation of the Carpenters benefits plans. Spe- cifically with regard to health insurance, the employees were told “they were going to give it to us automatically just for being members of the Carpenters Union even though we didn’t have the number of hours.” He could not recall whether some- one said it was important to sign that day in order to receive health insurance coverage starting that day. Jose Ramos was hired by Respondent Raymond as a drywall finishing employee in March 2006 and ceased working for Respondent at the conclusion of the meeting on October 2. According to him, upon being instructed to enter the training room for the meeting that day, he recognized Winsor for Re- spondent Raymond and observed between six and eight Car- penters Union representatives also in the room. Winsor spoke first, and Ramos listened to the Spanish translation. The former “. . . thanked us for being present and he told us that the com- pany was big due to the workers and that the company didn’t have a contract any more with the Painters Union, that they had signed already with the Carpenters Union . . . that he wanted us to also sign with the Carpenters and that soon a representative from the Carpenters would be talking to us.” Then, according to Ramos, two or three Carpenters Union representatives spoke to the employees, and “. . . one of them explained to us what the Carpenters Union was about, the benefits we could obtain through them and on a screen they showed us all of the entitle- ments and the benefits one could obtain through the Carpenters. Also, they explained we would not be losing any benefits by joining the Carpenters.” Winsor then solicited questions, and one person, whose name Ramos did not know, “. . . asked what would happen if we didn’t sign with the [Carpenters Union],” and both Winsor and a Carpenters Union representative re- sponded. Winsor said, “. . . that they could continue working but that they needed to sign with the Carpenters,”36 and the Carpenters Union representative’s response in English was the same—“. . . that they could continue working but they had to sign up with the Carpenters Union.” At this point, Ramos’ brother David spoke, saying he had once been a member of the Carpenters Union and “. . . that what they promise, they wouldn’t fulfill . . . .” A Carpenters Union representative de- nied what David Ramos asserted and said everything was “fine” with his labor organization. Then, someone again asked if they didn’t sign, could they continue working, and Winsor this time replied “. . . that if they didn’t sign, there wouldn’t be any work.”37 At this point, according to the witness, “they started distributing these papers like applications for affiliation to the Carpenters Union” inside the meeting room.38 Ramos 36 As to what Winsor said, Ramos testified that he listened to the Spanish translation of Winsor’s words. 37 During direct examination by the attorney for the Painters Union, Ramos reiterated what Winsor said to the employees. Thus, asked whether Winsor ever said, “when” the employees had to sign with the Carpenters Union, the witness replied, “First he said that they could continue working and sign later but then someone asked again and he said that if we didn’t sign on that day, we weren’t working any more.” 38 According to Ramos, Winsor remained in the meeting room while GC Exh. 3 was being distributed. DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 14 identified the document, which he received, as General Coun- sel’s Exhibit 3,39 and said, as he had no intention of signing, he folded the bottom portion of the document and walked outside into the yard area where other drywall finishing employees were talking amongst themselves. Finally, asked whether he reported for work the next day, Tuesday, Ramos replied, “No. . . . Because of what they told us since we didn’t sign. . . . That if we didn’t sign we weren’t working any more.” During cross-examination, Ramos denied that any literature, bearing a company letterhead, was distributed to the employ- ees, and he denied being given a copy of Respondent Ray- mond’s Exhibit 1. Asked if anyone said that employees who were not previously members of the Carpenters Union would have to join that labor organization, while not recalling who spoke, Ramos replied, “Yes, they did say that. We had to be- come part of the Carpenters Union.” He added that the latter’s representatives “. . . only said that they wanted us to sign” and that one said it was important that they sign up for the Carpen- ters benefits. However, he could not recall anyone saying it was important for the employees to do so that same day. As to Winsor’s statement that employees had to sign with the Carpen- ters Union in order to continue working, a Carpenters Union representative made the same statement. Asked precisely what Winsor said through the translator, Ramos replied, “The only thing I remember precisely is . . . when he was asked what hap- pen[s] if somebody would refuse to sign, he said . . . if you don’t sign now this day, there’s no more work.” Further, Ramos, who stated he was sitting towards the rear of the room, did not recall whether, when he was given a copy of the Car- penters Union membership document, Winsor remained in the front of the room “. . . since by then many people had gotten up to leave. I don’t remember if he was still there or not.” Finally, during cross-examination by counsel for Respondent Carpen- ters, while stating that no one said they would be fired, Ramos reiterated that he did not report for work on the day after the meeting based upon what Winsor said, “. . . that if we didn’t sign that day we wouldn’t be working.” While conceding that his brother David told him that, based upon Winsor’s comment, he could no longer work for Respondent Raymond, Ramos stated that, rather than his brother telling him he could no longer work for Respondent Raymond, he made his own deci- sion in that regard. Travis Winsor specifically denied all of the alleged unlawful statements attributed to him by the above four witnesses includ- ing if the employees did not sign with the Carpenters, they would not have a job; if they didn’t sign with the Carpenters, they couldn’t work the following day; and if employees did not sign today, there won’t be any work for the Company. During his direct examination, he stated he was the first speaker, and, while he spoke, he referred to PowerPoint slides, which he projected onto the two viewing screens. First, he welcomed the drywall finishers to the meeting, acknowledged that some of them had not any occasion to be at the Orange facility prior to this meeting, and stressed the importance of what they would be told during the meeting. Then, Winsor spoke about the 39 Ramos was unable to identify the person, who gave him the docu- ment, as a Carpenters Union representative. “values” and “ideas” at the core of Respondent Raymond’s organization including the Company’s relationship with the unions, which act as the bargaining representatives of its em- ployees, and his “decisions” relative to the existing collective- bargaining agreements. Further, he spoke about the circum- stances which preceded the meeting and their impact upon the drywall finishing employees and said that, while the Company would remain a union shop and would not operate on a nonun- ion basis, as of September 30, “. . . Raymond’s contract with the [Painters Union] had expired and . . . we were no longer signatory . . . with [the] union, that, as a result, all our drywall finishing work needed to be done through the Carpenters agree- ment; and that, as a result, Raymond was able to negotiate on behalf of all of its employees . . . with the Carpenters . . . .” He added that, accordingly, every aspect of the employees’ terms and conditions of employment would be improved— specifically, higher wages and better and increased benefits. On the latter point, Winsor assured the employees that, because they were immediately covered under the existing Carpenters Union collective-bargaining agreement, their health insurance coverage would not lapse nor would there be any loss of vested benefits but that the benefits of one group of employees would be at risk—those who had less than 5 years employment with Respondent Raymond and were not vested in their pension plan benefits, and “. . . I admonished [the latter group] . . . if they were committed to the trade and remained with the Carpenters for a short period of time they would easily make back and exceed the value in their pension plan . . . .” With regard to Respondent’s Exhibit 1, Winsor denied that he discussed its contents with any specificity, “but the topic and information contained in the document were verbally relayed during my presentation.” Asked, by the attorney for Respondent Raymond, whether he referred to the union-security provisions in the existing Carpen- ters Union’s master agreement, Winsor stated that what he said was in response to an employee’s question, which came after the Carpenters Union representatives’ presentations, and “I don’t recall the exact words but questions to the effect of are we being fired? Are we going to have a job? And I reaffirmed multiple times that I wanted everybody in the room to continue to work with Raymond, that nobody was being fired, that we had put a situation in place where it was better benefits wages for all employees and encouraged them to take that option and continue to work for Raymond but no one was being fired and everyone had a job.” According to Winsor, given his audience, he did not mention the words “union security clause” as the term was “not well understood” by them, but he stressed that no worker would be fired, that they all would continue in their jobs, but that “. . . I would like you to make a decision that’s in your best interests . . . .” Asked if any employees asked if they had to make a decision that day, Winsor replied, “[P]eople did ask whether or not they had to make a decision that day” about “whether or not they needed to enroll for the benefits afforded by the Carpenters.” Moments later, after being asked by me whether the employees were specific as to about what they needed to make a decision, Winsor changed his testimony, averring “I can’t speak as to what they were specific about” and stating, “I was asked whether or not they needed to make a RAYMOND INTERIOR SYSTEMS 15 decision today.” To this, he replied, “No. They could take the time to consider it” but he wanted the employees to protect themselves from the possibility of “any fines or penalties” im- posed by the Painters Union. Asked by me what subject he and his employees were talking about, Winsor replied that the Car- penters Union representatives were standing next to him, and “they were asking for the employees to enroll in the various [health insurance and pension plan packages].” Winsor main- tained that he was referring to a “stack of paperwork,” and, while “. . . I did not review or examine any of the documents being handed out by the Carpenters,” the papers appeared, to him, to be “pension and health and welfare benefits” docu- ments. He denied he was referring to membership forms—“I did not see that.” Winsor denied that his PowerPoint presenta- tion had anything to do with membership and asserted that the “entire essence of the meeting” concerned the Carpenters Un- ion benefits plans. However, he added that “. . . there were questions about our obligations under the Carpenters agreement and after affirming that we want all of these employees to con- tinue working for Raymond, it was pointed out that it was their decision. It was voluntary, however, if they chose not to go back to work, then Raymond would be obligated under the existing contract to put employees out there from the Carpen- ters’ hall . . . .” He added that, while there were questions about union membership, such were in reference to whether or not employees could hold card in both the Painters Union and the Carpenters Union, and “. . . I said . . . they need to enroll for the Carpenters’ benefits because . . . that is the way Raymond is providing the benefits.” Then, according to Winsor, came the general questions about whether they had to decide today to which he replied, “No. You do not need to decide today.”40 Finally, during his direct examination, Winsor admitted that, at the conclusion of the meeting, he did approach Richard Myers, and . . . I acknowledged his demeanor and asked him if there’s any questions that I could answer for him. . . . I believe he made statements that I’m not signing and something about the fact he didn’t like the way the meeting was held. Winsor de- nied asking if Myers had signed with the Carpenters. During cross-examination, Winsor stated that the drywall finishing employees were paid for attending the October 2 meeting pursuant to the terms of the existing Carpenters Union master agreement. With regard to Respondent Raymond’s Exhibit 1, he maintained that “I did not discuss this specific memorandum with [the employees],” but “the information con- tained in it was provided verbally through my PowerPoint pres- entation.” Asked by counsel for the General Counsel whether there was anything in the document which he did not discuss that day with the employees, Winsor replied, “No.” Asked by counsel for the Painters Union if he told employees they did not have to become members of the Carpenters Union, Winsor replied, “I told them that they had time to make up their minds . . . ,” but he admitted not telling them they had 7 days in which 40 Winsor said he emphasized this as “I wanted to reinforce the ‘what’s-in-it-for-me’ consideration as I anticipated everyone in that room was sitting there and thinking . . . .” to do so.41 Under further questioning by counsel for the Paint- ers Union, Winsor admitted that he did reference the union- security provision of the existing Carpenters Union master agreement but denied explaining what it meant. Likewise, he acknowledged referring to the first sentence of the penultimate paragraph of Respondent Raymond’s Exhibit 1; however, “I did not discuss it during my presentation.” Specifically, he denied conveying any information regarding the contractual union- security provision during his presentation. When asked what provisions of Respondent Raymond’s Exhibit 1 he did discuss in detail, Winsor said he conveyed that the company had termi- nated its collective-bargaining agreement with the Painters Union, that such was a “difficult” decision but one made “in the best interests of the employees and the Company, that the Company continued to be a union contractor, that, pursuant to Respondent Raymond’s existing agreement with the Carpenters Union, all drywall finishing work was covered under the terms of the agreement, that the collective-bargaining agreement pro- vides for higher wages and better benefits, and that “drywall finishing employees who were not presently members of the Carpenters must join the Carpenters Union under the union- security provision of the [CBA]. I conveyed that we would be obligated to dispatch employees [from] the Carpenters hall according to our agreement.” Once again, asked if he, there- fore, conveyed all the information in Respondent Raymond’s Exhibit 1 as written except for the first sentence of the penulti- mate paragraph, Winsor responded, “I did not use the term union security provision. The employees would not know nec- essarily.” As to whether he mentioned the remainder of the sentence, “I conveyed what is stated there.” Hector Zorrero testified that he spoke “at the very end” of the meeting, initially thanking the employees for attending and for politely listening to Winsor and the Carpenters Union repre- sentatives. He said both Respondent Raymond and Respondent Carpenters are “class acts;” that he “. . . couldn’t stand up here before them without assurance from [the company] that no one would suffer any type of loss in pay or benefits . . . . that, effec- tive today all of their contributions were going to be paid into the Carpenters’ plan and [he] encouraged them to [examine all of the information which they would receive from the Carpen- ters].” Zorrero “. . . concluded by saying tomorrow Raymond is still obligated to man our jobs and if no one in this room shows up on our jobsites that they’re no longer signatory with the Painters and I would have to man . . . our drywall finishers through the Carpenters.” With regard to the question and an- swer session, Zorrero denied telling the employees that, in or- der to continue working for Respondent Raymond, they had to sign up with the Carpenters Union or that they had to sign at that moment or that day or they couldn’t work for Respondent Raymond. However, while essentially corroborating Winsor’s denials, Zorrero contradicted Winsor, denying any employee asked whether employees had to make a decision that day con- cerning anything. Further, while denying that Winsor warned 41 Winsor believed he did tell someone he had 8 days in which to decide but “I don’t recall” who and said he did so “usually in conjunc- tion with this decision in order to help them understand what their rights are.” DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 16 about employees having to sign up for anything, he did believe that, during the meeting, a Carpenters Union representative spoke about the importance of employees signing up for bene- fits—“. . . I think it was that they had to sign up . . . if they wanted the benefits they would have to sign that day . . . so they’d be paid into the Carpenters.” Finally, Zorrero denied that, at any point during the meeting, he or any other manager met in private with the foremen of the drywall finishers and stated that the meeting ended with the drywall finishers going into the warehouse area,42 which was set up with Carpenters’ fringe benefits information on tables—employees either went into that area or “. . . just went outside and hung outside for a little of the time.” Pedro Loera, a special representative for the Southwest Re- gional Council of Carpenters, testified that he attended the Oc- tober 2 meeting at Respondent Raymond’s Orange facility in order to answer questions posed by any of the Spanish-speaking drywall finishers, who were employed by Respondent Ray- mond. According to Loera, “I was on my own speaking to [the employees]” in the warehouse area and outside in the yard area after the employees left the meeting room. While also recalling the documents were on a table, he remembered that “some” of those to whom he spoke were filling out the membership appli- cation forms but was unable to remember if the documents were distributed by other Carpenters Union representatives. Loera denied telling any employee, to whom he spoke, he or she needed to make an immediate decision regarding joining the Carpenters Union or telling any employee he or she needed to join the Carpenters Union that day in order to continue work- ing for Respondent Raymond. Gordon Hubel testified that he was involved in the October 2 meeting “only to the extent that they had the Carpenters Union magazine, which contained the so-called Beck notice, at the union’s table.”43 With regard to the meeting itself, Hubel re- called that Winsor spoke first, utilizing a PowerPoint presenta- tion. Asked if Winsor warned that, if employees did not sign with the Carpenters, they wouldn’t have a job or they couldn’t work the following day, Hubel replied, “No. To the contrary, he said specifically that no one was being fired.” Asked if Winsor was asked for more time to consider switching to the Carpen- ters Union, Hubel contradicted Winsor and responded that there was a question about having to decide that day, and Winsor replied, “. . . no, you don’t have to make a decision today but you should sign up for benefits today.” According to Hubel, during his remarks to the employees, McCarron did talk about “. . . our partnership with Raymond and he hoped that all of the people would join the Carpenters Union,” but this was the only comment made about joining the union during the “whole” presentation.44 As to Hector Zorrero, Hubel denied that the former employees had to decide that day or at that moment 42 Zorrero said this was the room in which employees were supposed to execute any forms 43 One table was for Respondent Carpenters and the other table was utilized by representatives of the Carpenters Union trust funds. 44 Hubel denied hearing any representative of the Carpenters Union tell employees they needed to join that day or they could no longer work for Raymond. about joining the Carpenters Union, and “the only thing he said was that we have to man our jobs tomorrow and, if you em- ployees . . . choose to leave Raymond, we’ll have to call the Carpenters Union to man the jobs.” When the meeting ended, Hubel testified, employees congregated into small groups in- side the warehouse area and outside, and three employees ap- proached him and “. . . specifically asked me do we have to join the Carpenters today, and . . . I told them no. I said the Carpen- ters agreement does have a union-security clause within eight days you’d have to join, but you don’t have to decide today.” Hubel denied telling the employees that the Carpenters Union would not enforce the union-security clause and did not know whether the latter would, in fact, enforce the clause. Finally, Hubel testified that employees were completing all of the pa- perwork “in different areas” of the facility but that “there was nothing being distributed by the Carpenters Union anywhere except in the warehouse at this table.”45 Melinda Carlton, an office administrative assistant for Re- spondent Carpenters, testified that she attended the October 2 meeting in order “to have the employees fill out the member- ship applications to join Respondent Carpenters.” According to her, tables were set up along the wall adjacent to the gym and storage areas, and, “after the presentation, [the employees] were sent to the table where we had the membership applications for them to fill out.” She sat at the table along with another cleri- cal, Margaret Armenta, who was able to speak Spanish. Be- sides the membership application forms (GC Exh. 3), at the table were pencils, stickers, envelopes, and a stack of “the Car- penters magazine.”46 According to Carlton, “[O]nce they brought us back the membership application, we handed them the magazine,47 stickers . . . and the envelope,” which was to be used for “their dues payment.” According to Carlton, Armenta dealt with more than half of the employees, who came to Re- spondent Carpenters table, speaking Spanish. Because there were so many employees coming to her table, the Carpenters Union agents, who were at the meeting, spoke to some of them. However, Carlton denied seeing these representatives giving out membership forms during the meeting and knew this was not possible as “. . . Margaret and myself were the only ones 45 The individual, who translated from English to Spanish for the lis- tening employees, was David Cordero. For this, he did both contempo- raneous and subsequent translation. He denied anything being said about having to join the Carpenters Union that day. Testifying that there was a question and answer session after the formal presentations, Cordero was unable to recall anything “specific;” however, “I don’t recall anybody asking a question about joining the Union that time.” He added that such did not seem to be a major concern; rather, most of the employees’ questions concerned benefits and insurance. While, according to Cordero, there were questions “about being part of the Carpenters per se,” employees were told there was a “form” which they needed to fill out. However, he denied employees were told they had to sign anything that day or there would be no work. Specifically, he denied Winsor uttered such a remark. 46 Upon publication on a quarterly basis, the magazine is mailed to every Carpenters Union member. 47 The magazine is given to all new members as “. . . we are letting them know that they will be receiving this in the mail. . . .” Carlton admitted not being instructed to direct anyone’s attention to the Beck statement, contained in the magazine on p. 47. RAYMOND INTERIOR SYSTEMS 17 that had the membership applications. They had to come to us to get them. After employees signed, “I was in charge of col- lecting all of the applications along with the apprenticeship paperwork and taking them back to the office . . . . We had a list that we checked off when they brought us back the applica- tion.”48 When asked if her testimony was if returned signed and returned unsigned application forms were added together, the total equaled the exact number she and Armenta distributed that day, Carlton replied, “I did not count them at the end . . . . we had a set number of forms. I did not have an extra stack that someone could have taken from because I only had a cer- tain amount to hand out.” She conceded it was possible em- ployees, to whom she handed forms, failed to return them. During cross-examination, Carlton confirmed that she would not give out a magazine unless an employee returned signed paperwork. Finally, there is no dispute that, later on October 2 at Re- spondent Raymond’s San Diego facility, on behalf of the latter, Travis Winsor executed a document, entitled Recognition Agreement, recognizing the Southwest Regional Council of Carpenters on behalf of its affiliated local unions, including Respondent Carpenters, as the majority representative, pursuant to Section 9(a) of the Act, of all full-time and regular part-time employees performing work covered by the Southwest Re- gional Council of Carpenters Drywall/Lathing memorandum agreement.49 In this regard, Gordon Hubel testified that, during the time he was at Respondent Raymond’s Orange facility on October 2, he was aware that the Carpenters Union agents were soliciting the company’s drywall finishing employees to exe- cute the authorization cards, which are part of General Coun- sel’s Exhibit 3, and that Winsor was not informed of these ac- tivities. Also in this regard, Winsor testified that, later in the day at approximately 5 p.m. at the close of the meeting at the Company’s San Diego facility, McCarron and his attorney, Dan Shanley, approached and McCarron “. . . informed me that they had received representation from the majority of our employees of their decision to have the Carpenters be their representative and that he was prepared to present evidence of that decision at which time I was shown a stack of papers,” the authorization cards which had been attached to General Counsel’s Exhibit 3. According to Winsor, he had no idea that Carpenters Union agents had been soliciting the cards, and, after looking through the documents, he acknowledged McCarron’s representation that the signatures were authentic and executed the recognition agreement. On this point, in his December 18, 2006 position statement to Region 21, Respondent Raymond’s attorney wrote, “Carpenters later presented signed authorization cards to Ray- mond and on the basis of those cards, Raymond signed an addi- tional voluntary recognition agreement . . . recognizing that 48 Carlton maintained that there was “a set amount of applications,” and she received back the same number she handed out. All were returned, even the forms, which had not been filled out. 49 Notwithstanding the wording of the document, as stated above, there is no record evidence that Respondent Raymond ever actually entered into the Carpenters Union’s so-called memorandum agreement. union as the exclusive representative of Raymond’s drywall finishing and drywall hanging employees.”50 B. Legal Analysis The twin centerpieces of the instant consolidated complaint concern Respondent Raymond’s attempts to recognize Respon- dent Carpenters as the exclusive bargaining representative of its drywall finishing employees initially by virtue of the language of the Carpenters Union 2006–2010 master agreement and subsequently by virtue of a purported majority showing by Respondent Carpenters and Respondent Carpenters acceptance of said recognition attempts. At the outset, I shall consider whether, on or about October 1, 2006, Respondent Raymond engaged in acts and conduct, violative of Section 8(a)(1), (2), and and (3) of the Act, by extending recognition to the South- west Regional Council of Carpenters on behalf of its affiliated local unions, including Respondent Carpenters, as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative, within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act, of its drywall finishing employees and maintaining and enforcing the Carpenters Union 2006–2010 master agreement as covering the employees and whether Re- spondent Carpenters engaged in acts and conduct, violative of Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act, by obtaining such recog- nition from Respondent Raymond and maintaining and enforc- ing the Carpenters Union 2006–2010 master agreement as cov- ering Respondent Raymond’s drywall finishing employees. In these regards, there is no dispute that, by virtue of their Sep- tember 12, 2006 confidential settlement agreement, on or about October 1, immediately upon expiration of its collective- bargaining agreement, privileged by Section 8(f) of the Act, with the Painters Union,51 Respondent Raymond and the South- west Regional Council of Carpenters, on behalf of its affiliated local unions, including Respondent Carpenters, commenced covering the former’s drywall finishing employees under the existing Carpenters Union 2006–2010 master agreement, which recognizes the Carpenters Union as the 9(a) majority represen- tative of the bargaining unit employees and to which Respon- dent Raymond is a party. Thus, counsel for Respondent Ray- mond in his December 18, 2006 position statement to the Board, admitted that, as the parties’ existing master agreement covered drywall finishing work, “on October 2 . . . pursuant to its Section 9(a) collective-bargaining agreement with the Car- penters . . . Raymond complied with the requirements of that agreement and assigned the drywall finishing work to Carpen- ters,” with the latter acting “. . . as the Section 9(a) representa- 50 Hubel testified that the only authorization cards, which were solic- ited that day, were signed by Respondent Raymond’s drywall finishing employees. 51 Sec. 8(f) of the Act permits labor organizations and employers in the building and construction industry to enter into collective- bargaining agreements without the former being established as the majority representative of the employees in the covered bargaining unit. Unlike a bargaining relationship within the meaning of Sec. 9(a) of the Act, an 8(f) relationship may be terminated by either the labor organi- zation or the employer at the expiration of a collective-bargaining agreement. John Deklewa & Sons, 282 NLRB 1375, 1386–1387 (1987), enfd. 843 F.2d 770 (3d Cir. 1988), cert denied 488 U.S. 889 (1988). DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 18 tive of its drywall employees (both hangers and finishers).” Likewise, at the hearing, Gordon Hubel conceded that, as of October 1, the “overall unit” of Respondent Raymond’s drywall employees included both drywall hangers and drywall finishers. Counsel for the General Counsel, joined by counsel for the Painters Union, argues that, in these circumstances, Respondent Raymond and Respondent Carpenters clearly considered the former’s drywall finishing employees as having been accreted into the contractual wall-to-wall Carpenters’ 9(a) bargaining unit and that as Respondent Raymond’s drywall finishing em- ployees had been historically excluded from the bargaining unit, represented by the Carpenters Union, and as, demonstrated by the drywall finishing employees’ long bargaining history as an independent bargaining unit, the only appropriate unit herein is, therefore, not a wall-to-wall bargaining unit, accretion herein was unlawful; for, by their actions, Respondent Raymond and Respondent Carpenters deprived the former’s drywall finishing employees of their statutory right to select the bargaining repre- sentative of their choice. I agree that the concessions by Respondent Raymond’s at- torney and by Hubel, who practiced as an attorney in the field of labor law, seemingly describe an accretion. Pursuant to applicable Board law, accretion is the “. . . incorporation of employees into an already existing larger unit when such a community of interests exists among the entire group that the additional employees have no separate unit identity. Thus, they are properly governed by the larger group’s choice of bargain- ing representative.” Reliable Trailer & Body, 295 NLRB 1013 (1989), quoting NLRB v. Security Columbian Banknote Co., 541 F.2d 135, 140 (3d Cir. 1976). Essentially, the act of accre- tion is designed to preserve industrial stability by allowing adjustments to bargaining units without requiring representa- tion elections whenever new jobs are created or incorporated into the workforce. Brooklyn Hospital Center, 309 NLRB 1163, 1182 (1992). However, the Board has traditionally fol- lowed a “restrictive policy” in determining accretions to exist- ing units as “. . . employees accreted to such units are not ac- corded a self-determination election, and the Board seeks to insure the employees’ right to determine their own bargaining representative.” Passavant Retirement & Health Center, 313 NLRB 1216, 1218 (1994). Therefore, “. . . previously unrepre- sented employees may not be lawfully accreted to an existing bargaining unit where “. . . the group sought to be accreted . . . . has been in existence and historically excluded” from the larger unit and “. . . where the employee group sought to be [accreted] . . . is so composed that it may separately constitute an appro- priate bargaining unit.” Teamsters Local 89 (United Parcel Service), 346 NLRB 484, 484 (2006); Passavant Retirement & Health Center, supra. In such circumstances, whenever the parties to an existing collective-bargaining agreement attempt to include previously unrepresented employees within the exist- ing contractual bargaining unit without an “expression of the desire of the majority of said employees to be so represented,” a violation of the Act must be found. Teamsters Local 89, su- pra. Further, “it is the fact of historical exclusion that is deter- minative and not whether the union has acquiesced in that ex- clusion or whether the excluded group has some common job- related characteristic distinct from unit employees. United Parcel Service, 303 NLRB 326, 327 (1991). In the cited cases involving unlawful accretion, by granting recognition to a labor organization as the representative of the previously unrepre- sented employees, the offending employer violates Section 8(a)(1), (2), and (3) of the Act, and, by accepting exclusive recognition as the representative of the previously unrepre- sented employees, the offending labor organization violates Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act. Finally, unlawful accre- tion only exists in the context of a 9(a) bargaining relationship, and, as a finding of majority status is immaterial, such does not apply in the context of an 8(f) contract. IBEC Housing Corp., 245 NLRB 1282, 128 (1979). In agreement with counsel for the General Counsel and counsel for the Painters Union, I find that the General Counsel has established that Respondent Raymond and Respondent Carpenters acted unlawfully. At the outset, the language of the Carpenters Union 2006–2010 master agreement clearly meets the requirements prerequisite for a 9(a) bargaining relationship between the contracting parties as set forth by the Board in Staunton Fuel & Material, 335 NLRB 717 (2001).52 Thus, the voluntary recognition agreement provision of the Carpenters Union 2006–2010 master agreement recites the Carpenters Union’s demand for recognition, upon each contracting em- ployer, including Respondent Raymond, as the majority repre- sentative of the bargaining unit employees; the Carpenters Un- ion’s show of, or offer to show, proof of its majority support amongst the employees covered by the collective-bargaining agreement; and each contracting employer’s, including Re- spondent Raymond, grant of recognition to the Carpenters Un- ion as “the sole and exclusive” bargaining representative of its bargaining unit employee within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act. Id. at 720. Moreover, the provision of the Septem- ber 12 confidential settlement agreement, wherein Respondent Raymond agreed that, at the expiration of the Painters Union collective-bargaining agreement, it would apply the existing Carpenters Union master agreement to its drywall finishing employees “to the fullest extent permitted by law”53 and the admissions of Respondent Raymond’s attorney and of Gordon Hubel are demonstrative of the parties’ intent to establish a 9(a) bargaining relationship, encompassing a unit of Respondent Raymond’s drywall framing and drywall finishing employees, 52 Therein, the Board decided how a labor organization, whose status as a bargaining representative is privileged by Sec. 8(f) of the Act, may acquire, through agreement with the employer, the status of a majority bargaining representative within the meaning of Sec. 9(a) of the Act. It stated that “a recognition agreement or contract provision will be inde- pendently sufficient to establish a Section 9(a) representation status where the language unequivocally indicates that (1) the union requested recognition as the majority or 9(a) representative of the unit employees; (2) the employer recognized the union as the majority or 9(a) represen- tative; and (3) the employer’s recognition was based upon the union’s having shown, or having offered to show, evidence of its majority support.” Id. at 719–720. 53 In my view, in the context of the earlier warning from Hubel to Winsor with regard to coverage of the drywall finishing employees at the expiration of the Painters Union collective-bargaining agreement, the quoted language can only refer to a 9(a) relationship, and any ambi- guity, in this regard, must be resolved against each Respondent. RAYMOND INTERIOR SYSTEMS 19 immediately upon expiration of Respondent Raymond’s collec- tive-bargaining agreement with the Painters Union. Indeed, such must be the case as, given the legal training of the princi- pals of each contracting party, they most certainly would have been aware of the possibility of a representation petition, filed by the Painters Union, and the resultant legal consequences and that only a collective-bargaining agreement with a 9(a) repre- sentative would bar such a petition. Deklewa, supra at 1387. In these circumstances, absent the filing of a representation peti- tion and subsequent certification, I believe that the only method by which Respondent Raymond and Southwest Regional Coun- cil of Carpenters, on behalf of its affiliated local Unions, in- cluding Respondent Carpenters, could have assured the latter’s majority representative status for Respondent Raymond’s dry- wall finishing employees, a historically separate appropriate unit,54 was through the process of accretion, and that, therefore, it is manifestly certain that the parties meant to accrete Respon- dent Raymond’s existing drywall finishing employees bargain- ing unit to the existing Carpenters Union master agreement’s bargaining unit, which ostensibly covers employees, who per- form drywall finishing work. However, since, at least the 1960s, given the drywall finishing employees’ status as an his- torical separate appropriate bargaining unit, clearly, a wall-to- wall unit, comprised of drywall framers and drywall finishers, is not the only appropriate unit herein, and the record evidence establishes that Respondent Raymond and Respondent Carpen- ters had historically excluded the former’s drywall finishing employees from their master agreement bargaining unit.55 Ac- cordingly, I think that the parties attempted accretion of Re- spondent Raymond’s drywall finishing employees to the exist- ing Carpenters Union master agreement bargaining unit was unlawful, and it follows that Respondent Raymond’s recogni- tion of Respondent Carpenters as the majority representative of the former’s drywall finishing employees and Respondent Car- penters’ acceptance of such recognition must have been viola- tive of the Act. Teamsters Local 89, supra; Brooklyn Hospital Center, supra. Contrary to the General Counsel, Respondent Raymond and Respondent Carpenters contend that the former’s extension of recognition to the latter on or about October 1, 2006, was law- ful. Initially, counsel for Respondent Raymond argue that, even if the parties meant to accrete the drywall finishing em- 54 While in their answers, Respondent Raymond and Respondent Carpenters deny that a bargaining unit limited to the former’s drywall finishing employees constitutes an appropriate unit within the meaning of Sec. 9(a) of the Act, neither offered any evidence to establish that said historical unit was no longer appropriate. Each, of course, had the burden of proof in this regard. Paramus Ford, 351 NLRB 1019 (2007). In these circumstances, I reject the Respondents’ contention and find that a unit of Respondent Raymond’s drywall finishing employees constituted a historically separate and appropriate unit within the mean- ing of Sec. 9(a) of the Act. 55 In this regard, I note that drywall finishing employees have only recently been included in the Carpenters Union master agreement’s bargaining unit and, even after the employees were included, they had been specifically excluded whenever a contracting employer, such as Respondent Raymond, had an existing bargaining relationship with the Painters Union. ployees to the overall Carpenters Union bargaining unit, the act was not unlawful. Citing Central Soya Co., 281 NLRB 1308 (1986), counsel assert that “. . . the Board will find an accretion where the employees in the represented group outnumber the employees in the unrepresented group.” However, unlike the situation herein, Central Soya involved an employer, whose employees were represented by a union, purchasing another company, whose bargaining unit employees were unrepre- sented, and then consolidating the two business operations at the location of the latter enterprise with no substantial change in operations. The crucial factor herein, one not present in the cited decision, is the parties’ “historical exclusion” of drywall finishing employees from Respondent Raymond’s carpenters bargaining unit, and, as pointed out above, the factor is, of course, paramount in alleged unlawful accretion situations. United Parcel Service, supra at 327. The crux of Respondent Raymond’s and Respondent Car- penters’ defense is that, as of October 1, 2006, Respondent Raymond’s drywall finishing employees were covered by a preexisting 8(f) collective-bargaining agreement, between the parties—either the existing Carpenters Union 2006–2010 mas- ter agreement and/or the parties’ September 12 confidential settlement agreement.56 With regard to coverage under the former agreement, relying upon Western Pipeline, Inc., 328 NLRB 925, 927 (1999), and Deklewa, supra at 1385 fn. 41, counsel for Respondent Raymond and counsel for the Carpen- ters argue that “the drywall finishing employees were a separate bargaining unit and, in the construction industry, the Board presumes that a bargaining relationship is a nonmajority Sec- tion 8(f) relationship.”57 Recognizing that this presumption is only valid absent evidence to the contrary and noting the exis- tence of language in the master agreement, which satisfies the Staunton Fuel test for the existence of a 9(a) bargaining rela- tionship, counsel for Respondent Raymond nevertheless argue such does not mean that the contracting parties intended such a bargaining relationship with respect to the “separate unit” of drywall finishing employees and assert “an analysis of the par- ties’ intent limited solely to the [Staunton Fuel language] would be inappropriate and in error.” In this regard, citing Madison Industries, 349 NLRB 1306 (2007), counsel argue that “whether the parties intended a Section 9(a) relationship vis-à- 56 Counsel for Respondent Carpenters argues that the General Coun- sel’s consolidated complaint allegations with regard to the Carpenters Union 2006–2010 master agreement are time-barred by Sec. 10(b) of the Act inasmuch as they were filed more than 6 months after the exe- cution of the document. Counsel’s contentions seem to be based upon her perception of the consolidated complaint as attacking the validity of the 9(a) character of the agreement. Contrary to counsel, the General Counsel neither argues nor seeks a finding that the master agreement is not what it appears to be—a collective-bargaining agreement within the meaning of Sec. 9(a) of the Act. Rather, it appears that, notwithstand- ing the recognition language of the master agreement, the General Counsel is only attacking the validity of Respondent Raymond’s and Respondent Carpenters’ attempt to bring the former’s drywall finishing employees within the coverage of the master agreement. Accordingly, I reject counsel’s contention that the above consolidated complaint allegations are time-barred by Sec. 10(b) of the Act. 57 The presumption is a rebuttable one with the Board challenging “. . . the party asserting a 9(a) relationship to prove it.” Deklewa, supra. DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 20 vis the drywall finishing employees requires an examination of the parties’ entire agreement.” However, counsels’ assertion that the parties were concerned with a separate unit consisting of Respondent Raymond’s drywall finishing employees is be- lied by the record evidence, and their reliance upon the cited decision is misplaced. Thus, the Carpenters Union Representa- tive Hubel told Travis Winsor during bargaining for the 2002– 2006 master agreement that the language, excluding drywall finishers from the contract bargaining unit, became void imme- diately upon a signatory contractor terminating his bargaining relationship with the Painters Union. Also, Respondent Ray- mond’s attorney admitted that, as of October 2, 2006, “. . . Raymond already recognized Carpenters as the 9(a) representa- tive of its drywall employees (both hangers and finishers),” and Hubel confirmed that his labor organization likewise intended to assert such status in one overall Carpenters unit. Further, unlike the Carpenters Union 2006–2010 master agreement, which specifies recognition of the labor organization as the exclusive bargaining representative pursuant to Section 9(a) of the Act,58 the contractual recognition clause, at issue in Madi- son Industries, failed to specify that the employer recognized the union pursuant to Section 9(a) of the Act, and it was this lack of such specificity that caused the Board to examine the entire agreement in order to ascertain the intent of the parties— a task unnecessary herein. Moreover, to the extent such may be necessary, as noted above, extrinsic evidence reveals that the parties herein meant to establish a 9(a) bargaining relationship covering one overall carpenters bargaining unit. Nevertheless, continuing to expound upon their illusory separate bargaining unit contention and coverage for the unit pursuant to Section 8(f) of the Act, counsel for Respondent Raymond and counsel for Respondent Carpenters argue that, inasmuch as the Board, in Deklewa, supra, rejected the so- called merger doctrine, under which an employer’s separate bargaining unit was deemed to have become merged into a multiemployer bargaining association’s 9(a) bargaining unit, such “. . . can only mean that coverage of the separate unit of Raymond’s drywall finishing employees did not merge those employees into the larger Carpenters’ represented framing and hanging bargaining unit . . . .” Therefore, they argue that Re- spondent Carpenter’s representation of the drywall finishing employees bargaining unit must have been on an 8(f) basis and that the Board’s decision in Comtel Systems Technology, Inc., 305 NLRB 287 (1991), is dispositive on this point. In the cited decision, a representation matter, the question presented by the Board was “. . . whether, in the construction industry, [a Sec- tion 9(a) collective-bargaining agreement] will bar an election in a unit consisting of the employees of an individual employer- member of a multiemployer association if it is not established that a majority of the employees in the classifications covered by the agreement had expressed a desire for union representa- tion at the time recognition was extended by the multi- employer association.” Id. at 288. Therein, a construction industry electrical contractor was a member of the multiem- ployer association but failed to signify its assent to be bound by 58 Such wording is “independently sufficient” to establish 9(a) status. Staunton Fuel, supra at 720. the association’s collective-bargaining agreement with the in- volved labor organization until after the former had extended recognition to the latter as the majority 9(a) bargaining repre- sentative of the employees in the multiemployer bargaining unit and after the ratification of a collective-bargaining agreement between the parties. Further, at no point prior to receiving rec- ognition as the 9(a) bargaining representative did the labor organization establish that it represented a majority of the em- ployer’s employees, who were working in the bargaining unit job classifications. In these circumstances, the Board held, the employer’s relationship with the labor organization was an 8(f) relationship and if a labor organization desires to achieve status as a 9(a) bargaining representative of employees in a multiem- ployer association, “. . . it must have the manifest support of a majority of the employees of any individual employer whose employees it seeks to merge into the unit under a Section 9(a) agreement.” Id. at 291. From the foregoing, counsel for Re- spondent Raymond and counsel for Respondent Carpenters extrapolate that, when Respondent Raymond’s collective- bargaining agreement with the Painters Union expired, until Respondent Carpenters established its majority status as the representative of Respondent Raymond’s drywall finishing employees, the parties’ existing 2006–2010 master agreement covered the employees on an 8(f) basis. Pursuant to Comtel, supra, when a building and construction industry employer joins a multiemployer bargaining association after a labor organization has been recognized as the 9(a) bar- gaining representative of the employees in the multiemployer bargaining unit but prior to having achieved majority status amongst the new employer’s bargaining unit employees, a 8(f) bargaining relationship exists between the employer and the labor organization until such time as the latter establishes its majority status amongst the employer’s bargaining unit em- ployees. Contrary to counsel for each Respondent, I do not believe that Comtel has any broader meaning, and neither coun- sel has cited any contrary Board case authority. Indeed, the instant matter is factually distinguishable from Comtel. Thus, unlike in the cited decision, Respondent Raymond is not seek- ing to join a multiemployer association, Respondent Raymond and Respondent Carpenters have an extant 9(a) bargaining relationship memorialized in successive collective-bargaining agreements, including the existing Carpenters Union 2006– 2010 master agreement, and Respondent Raymond’s drywall finishing employees represent an historically separate bargain- ing unit. In my view, the contentions of counsel for Respon- dent Raymond and counsel for Respondent Carpenters appear to distort Comtel to mean that, in the building and construction industry, the same collective-bargaining agreement may estab- lish an 8(f) bargaining relationship for one bargaining unit and a 9(a) bargaining relationship for another bargaining unit. While, apparently under Comtel, in a multiemployer context, a collective-bargaining agreement may be considered to be an 8(f) privileged agreement until the labor organization estab- lishes its 9(a) representative status in the bargaining unit job classifications, it appears axiomatic that the single-employer’s bargaining unit job classifications must be the same as those of the multiemployer bargaining unit. Further, there exists no language in Comtel, suggesting that the agreement may also RAYMOND INTERIOR SYSTEMS 21 constitute an 8(f) agreement, covering a completely separate bargaining unit, and neither counsel for Respondent Raymond nor counsel for Respondent Carpenters has cited any case au- thority for a contrary view of the law. Perhaps recognizing this, counsel for Respondent Carpenters argues that requiring the parties to have drafted a separate collective-bargaining agree- ment, setting forth the identical terms and conditions of em- ployment but describing the bargaining unit and governing provision of the Act differently, would have elevated form over substance and would not have effectuated the intent of the par- ties. While in a different context, one not involving a histori- cally separate bargaining unit, I might view counsel’s argument in a more favorable light, given the admission of Respondent Raymond’s attorney that the parties intended to establish a 9(a) relationship covering the drywall finishing employees, I agree with counsel for the General Counsel that giving credence to Respondents’ belated defense would allow them to escape the consequences of a 9(a) bargaining relationship after they have been permitted to enjoy the benefits of the status. Moreover, contrary to counsel for Respondent Carpenters, I do not believe ensuring industrial stability trumps the drywall finishing em- ployees’ Section 7 right to choose their own bargaining repre- sentative. Finally, counsel for Respondent Carpenters argues the fact that her client solicited authorization cards from Re- spondent Raymond’s drywall finishing employees and then entered into a separate recognition agreement with the latter demonstrates that the parties had intended a 8(f) bargaining relationship immediately following Respondent Raymond’s termination of its contract with the Painters Union. However, said contention is rendered utterly nugatory by Gordon Hubel’s admission that Respondent Carpenters solicited authorization cards herein solely to buttress its legal argument that, upon expiration of Respondent Raymond’s contract with the Painters Union, a valid 9(a) bargaining unit existed, encompassing all of the former’s drywall employees, including the finishers. Turning to the second aspect of Respondent Raymond’s and Respondent Carpenters’ defense, counsel for each asserts that, assuming the Carpenters Union 2006–2010 master agreement was not a valid 8(f) prehire agreement, to the extent that a sepa- rate collective-bargaining agreement, between the parties, was necessary to create an 8(f) bargaining relationship, the parties considered their September 12, 2006 confidential settlement agreement to have been such a collective-bargaining agree- ment, covering Respondent Raymond’s drywall finishing em- ployees, since it incorporated the terms and conditions of em- ployment set forth in the above master agreement. At the out- set, contrary to counsel, I have previously concluded that, by the phrase “to the fullest extent permitted by law,” the parties clearly signified their intent to establish a 9(a) bargaining rela- tionship covering the drywall finishing employees, and the collective-bargaining agreements, to which Respondent Ray- mond agreed to bind itself, are 9(a) agreements. Next, I do not accept that the September 12 document may be viewed as con- stituting a collective-bargaining agreement. Initially, I note that, while not dispositive, rather than bearing any title com- mensurate with collective-bargaining agreement, the document is entitled “Confidential Settlement Agreement.” Further, noth- ing in the document’s preamble suggests the parties intended to create a collective-bargaining agreement or even meant to es- tablish terms and conditions of employment; rather, the lan- guage therein describes their intent to settle disputes and griev- ances, which had arisen between them. Next, while in Made- laine Chocolate Novelties, 333 NLRB 1312, 1312 (2001), the Board concluded, in a “contract-bar” context, that to be con- sidered a collective-bargaining agreement, a document “. . . must contain substantial terms and conditions of employment deemed sufficient to stabilize the bargaining relationship,” there is no record evidence herein that the parties intended their settlement agreement to constitute a collective-bargaining agreement,59 the term bargaining unit is not mentioned, and the document bears no expiration date. Moreover, the document apparently binds Respondent to two separate and different col- lective-bargaining agreements—the Carpenters Union memo- randum agreement, which Respondent Raymond agreed to execute, and the existing Carpenters Union master agreement, which Respondent Raymond agreed to abide by upon expira- tion of its existing Painters Agreement. Also, in the second numbered paragraph, the reference to Respondent Raymond’s drywall finishing employees is tenebrous—did the parties refer to said employees as a separate bargaining unit or as, I believe, included in the overall carpenters represented unit of the exist- ing master agreement? Finally, as counsel for the Painters Un- ion persuasively argues, if, as argued, the parties did enter into a collective-bargaining agreement via the confidential settle- ment agreement, such would have been an unlawful act. Thus, pursuant to Deklewa, supra, a collective-bargaining agreement, privileged by Section 8(f) of the Act, is enforceable under Sec- tion 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act during its term, and a labor or- ganization, which enters into such a contract with an employer, enjoys a limited 9(a) status during the duration of the the agreement. Gem Management Co., 339 NLRB 489, 501 (2003). Further, an employer engages in acts and conduct, violative of Section 8(a)(1) and (2) of the Act, if, during the term of such an agreement, it unlawfully offers assistance to another labor organization in contravention of its existing bar- gaining relationship. Id. Specifically, in Oil Field Mainte- nance Co., 142 NLRB 1384, 1386 (1963), the Board held that contracting with a labor organization while bound to maintain recognition of another during the term of a collective-bargain- ing agreement “falls outside the purpose and protection of Sec- tion 8(f).” Herein, there is no dispute that Respondent Ray- mond’s collective-bargaining agreement with the Painters Un- ion was not due to expire until September 30, 2006. Accord- ingly, if as argued, by entering into their September 12, 2006 confidential settlement agreement Respondent Raymond and Respondent Carpenters actually entered into an 8(f) prehire collective-bargaining agreement, such would have constituted an unfair labor practice, and the putative collective-bargaining agreement would have been unlawful as would have been Re- 59 Counsel for Respondent Raymond cite to the Board’s decision in Carthage Sheet Metal Co., 286 NLRB 1249 (1987), for the proposition that an employer may be held bound to an 8(f) agreement pursuant to the terms of a settlement agreement. However, from the record therein, although unclear, it does not appear that the settlement agreement and purported 8(f) agreement were the same document. DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 22 spondent Raymond’s recognition of Respondent Carpenters as the bargaining representative of its drywall finishing employees and the latter’s acceptance of such recognition. In the above circumstances, I reject Respondent Raymond’s and Respondent Carpenters’ defenses that either their existing 2006–2010 master agreement or their September 12, 2006 con- fidential settlement agreement was a valid Section 8(f) of the Act privileged collective-bargaining agreement covering Re- spondent Raymond’s drywall finishing employees. Therefore, I find that, on or about October 1, 2006, in the context of a 9(a) bargaining relationship, Respondent Raymond unlawfully rec- ognized Respondent Carpenters as the majority representative of its drywall finishing employees and Respondent Carpenters unlawfully accepted such recognition, and Respondent Ray- mond and Respondent Carpenters unlawfully enforced and applied their existing 2006–2010 master agreement as to the former’s drywall finishing employees, who constituted a his- torically separate appropriate unit, by accreting the employees to the existing carpenters bargaining unit. By their actions, each Respondent deprived Respondent Raymond’s drywall finishing employees of their statutory right to select their own bargaining representative. Accordingly, Respondent Raymond engaged in acts and conduct violative of Section 8(a)(1), (2), and (3) of the Act and Respondent Carpenters engaged in acts and conduct violative of Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act. Teamsters Local 89, supra; Brooklyn Hospital Center, supra. The consolidated complaint next alleges that Respondent Raymond engaged in acts and conduct violative of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act and that Respondent Carpenters en- gaged in acts and conduct violative of Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act by subjecting the former’s drywall finishing em- ployees to the union-security provision of the Carpenters Union 2006–2010 master agreement. I have found that, upon expira- tion of its collective-bargaining agreement with the Painters Union, pursuant to the terms of their September 12 confidential settlement agreement, Respondent Raymond and Respondent Carpenters unlawfully extended the coverage of their existing master agreement to include representation of the former’s drywall finishing employees. The collective-bargaining agree- ment contains a common building and construction industry union-security provision, requiring membership in the labor organization after an employee’s eighth day of employment. The Board has long held that, in such circumstances, by enter- ing into, maintaining, and enforcing a collective-bargaining agreement, which includes a union-security clause, an employer and a labor organization engage in conduct violative of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) and Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act, re- spectively, and, therefore, I find such violations in the instant matter. Duane Reade, Inc., 338 NLRB 943, 944 (2003); Poly- clinic Medical Group, 315 NLRB 1257 (1995). Next, I consider Respondent Raymond’s recognition of Re- spondent Carpenters as the exclusive representative of its dry- wall finishing employees, by virtue of the latter’s purported majority showing, late in the afternoon on October 2, 2006. In this regard, the consolidated complaint alleges that, at the time, Respondent Carpenters did not represent an uncoerced majority of said employees and that, therefore, Respondent Raymond engaged in acts and conduct violative of Section 8(a)(1), (2), and (3) of the Act by extending such recognition and Respon- dent Carpenters engaged in acts and conduct violative of Sec- tion 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act by accepting such recogni- tion. Concerning these allegations, there is no dispute, and I find, that, on the above date, subsequent to the formal presenta- tions to the drywall finishing employees by representatives of Respondent Raymond and the Carpenters Union during the meeting at the Orange facility, Respondent Carpenters distrib- uted a form (GC Exh. 3), which included a membership appli- cation and a representation authorization, to the the employees for completion and execution; that Respondent Carpenters col- lected signed copies of these forms; that, later at approximately 5 p.m. at Respondent Raymond’s San Diego facility, agents of the Carpenters Union, demanded recognition by Respondent Raymond as the majority representative of the employees in the bargaining unit set forth in the Carpenters Union memorandum agreement and, as evidence of its majority status, permitted Travis Winsor to examine the authorization forms, which Re- spondent Carpenters had obtained earlier during the day, and that, after examining the authorization forms, Winsor entered into a recognition agreement, by which Respondent Raymond recognized Respondent Carpenters as the majority representa- tive, within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act, of the lat- ter’s drywall framing and finishing employees. Urging that Respondent Raymond’s recognition of Respondent Carpenters as the above employees’ majority bargaining representative and that Respondent Carpenters acceptance of such recognition be found unlawful, counsel for the General Counsel argues that such was tainted by statements made during the employee meeting earlier that day by agents of Respondent Raymond. Thus, he asserts that, by warning its employees that they must immediately join Respondent Carpenters if they wished to con- tinue working for the Company, Respondent Raymond unlaw- fully assisted Respondent Carpenters by conditioning continued employment on immediate membership in a union, thereby denying employees their statutory grace period. Acme Tile & Terrazzo Co., 318 NLRB 425, 427–428 (1995).60 In his posthearing brief, in arguing that Respondent Ray- mond unlawfully coerced its drywall finishing employees and unlawfully assisted Respondent Carpenters,61 counsel for the 60 In Acme Tile, what the Board found unlawful were employer statements to employees, conditioning continued employment upon “immediate membership” in the assisted labor organization. Id. Thus, in my view, to be considered unlawful herein, statements, attributed to agents of Respondent Raymond, must clearly condition continued employment with it upon employees becoming members of Respondent Carpenters prior to the conclusion of the statutory 80-day grace period, as set forth in the master agreement’s union-security clause. Appar- ently recognizing this, the General Counsel has alleged as unlawful only statements made at the October 2 by agents of Respondent Ray- mond that employees had to sign with the Carpenters that day in order to continue working for it. 61 The consolidated complaint also alleges that similar statements were made by unnamed Southwest Regional Council of Carpenters representatives. However, the record evidence attributes no such statements to any Carpenters Union representative. Rather, according to witnesses Alvarez and Ramos, Carpenters Union officials, at most, told the listening employees that, in order to continue working, they would have to sign with the Carpenters Union, a statement not inconsis- RAYMOND INTERIOR SYSTEMS 23 General Counsel relies solely upon statements attributed to Travis Winsor and Hector Zorrero.62 As such is directly at issue, I must, at the outset, assess the credibility of the several witnesses, and, in this regard, the most trustworthy was Jose Ramos. In my view, his demeanor, while testifying, was that of a veracious witness, one who, unlike others, clearly exhibited his comprehension of the meaning, gravity, and consequences of the oath, to which he swore prior to testifying. That Ramos forthrightly recounted Travis Winsor’s alleged threat to the listening drywall finishers and that he understood Winsor as being utterly serious seem unmistakably clear given his indeli- ble decision, based upon what Winsor said and reached without the immediate prospect of another job, not to report for work the next day.63 Although enigmatical, given the candid testi- monial demeanor of each and their corroboration by the candid Ramos, I likewise believe that Janet Pineda64 and Ruben Mejia Alvarez65 were honest witnesses, testifying to the best of their respective recollections.66 Moreover, with regard to each of the above witnesses, I note that neither had any pecuniary, em- ployment, or other interest in the outcome of this matter. In contrast, while portions of his testimony, regarding what he told the listening employees on October 2, were uncontro- verted and probably truthful, Travis Winsor, whose demeanor, on the whole while testifying, was hardly that of a guileless witness, appeared to be testifying particularly disingenuously concerning his colloquy with the employees as to the subject about which they had to reach a decision that day. On this, he was contradictory, stating, at one point, he was referring to benefit enrollment forms and, later, stating he was referring to Painters Union membership withdrawal forms so that the em- ployees could protect themselves against the possibility of fines or penalties imposed by that labor organization. Further, I found both his testimony, as to the underlying purpose for the September 12, 2006 confidential settlement agreement, and his tent with the union-security clause and not requiring immediate action. Accordingly, I recommend dismissal of par. 19(a) of the consolidated complaint. 62 Counsel for the Painters Union argues that I should also find that the totality of Raymond’s statements and conduct during the meeting constitutes unlawful assistance. Such is not an allegation of the con- solidated complaint, and I shall make no finding in this regard. 63 Acme Tile, supra at 428. 64 I recognize that Pineda admitted that her memory of the October 2 meeting was “not good;” however, Respondent Raymond’s attorney’s attempted impeachment of her only served to corroborate her testimony with regard to Winsor’s threat that employees could not work the fol- lowing day if they did not sign with the Carpenters. 65 I recognize that Alvarez testified regarding an asserted meeting to which all of Respondent Raymond’s drywall finishing foremen were called and that there was no corroboration for such a meeting. How- ever, whether said meeting did or did not occur does not detract from my belief that Alvarez was basically an honest witness. 66 While Richard Myers also impressed me as testifying truthfully, I note that he recalled Winsor as repeatedly warning the listening em- ployees that, if they did not sign with the Carpenters, they would not have a job. As I stated above, said comment was not inconsistent with the language of the master agreement’s union-security clause and did not demand that the employees act prior to the end of the statutory grace period. Accordingly, I shall not rely upon his testimony herein. testimony, pertaining to what he said regarding the master agreement’s union-security clause during the October 2 em- ployee meeting at the Orange facility, adroitly labored and vague. Accordingly, I do not credit his specific denials of the unlawful threats attributed to him by the above witnesses. Next, Hector Zorrero failed to impress me as exhibiting any candor, and, particularly as compared to Alvarez, I found the latter to have been a more compelling and frank witness. Moreover, I note that Zorrero and Winsor were contradictory as to whether, during the question and answer session, employees questioned Winsor regarding having to reach a decision that day about any subject. In these circumstances, I do not credit his specific denials of unlawful statements, which were attrib- uted to him or to Winsor. Finally, with regard to the respective testimony of Gordon Hubel, David Cordero, and Pedro Loera and their denials of statements attributed to Winsor and Zor- rero, I note such testimony tracked the specific denials of Win- sor and Zorrero. However, inasmuch as neither Winsor nor Zorrero convinced me as to the candor of said denials,67 I shall place no reliance upon the putative corroborating testimony of Hubel, Cordero, or Loera. In the foregoing circumstances, I find that, at the October 2 morning employee meeting at Respondent Raymond’s Orange facility, during the question and answer session, which fol- lowed the formal presentations of Travis Winsor on behalf of Respondent Raymond and Marty Dahlquist and Ron Schoen on behalf of the Carpenters Union, an employee asked, if employ- ees did not sign with the Carpenters, could they continue work- ing, Travis Winsor replied that, if they did not sign, there would be no more work, and that, if you don’t sign, you will not have a job but that no one would be fired. Then, one or more em- ployees asked if they had to reach a decision that day about signing with the Carpenters Union, and Winsor responded, “. . . that if we didn’t sign on that day, we weren’t working any more.” I further find that, at the conclusion of the question and answer session, while Hector Zorrero stayed with the employ- ees in the training room and answered their questions, several employees shouted to Zorrero, asking if the Company would give them some time to decide about signing with the Carpen- ters Union. He replied, “There’s no time to think about it. Either sign . . . today or you cannot work tomorrow for us.” Given the circumstances, Winsor’s and Zorrero’s warnings obviously were heard by numerous employees and are virtually identical to those which the Board found unlawful in Acme Tile, supra. In defense, counsel for Respondent Raymond point out that neither Winsor nor Zorrero solicited nor directed the drywall finishing employees to execute authorization for representation forms and that the warnings, which are attributed to each, con- cern the signing of Respondent Carpenters’ application for membership forms. Therefore, they argue, the alleged viola- tions of the Act may taint the latter forms but not the former, which formed the basis for the request for recognition later that day. On this point, counsel for Respondent Carpenters argues 67 I note that Hubel contradicted Winsor as to whether any employee asked if the employees had to decide that day about becoming a mem- ber of Respondent Carpenters. DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 24 that the desire to be represented and the desire to be a member of a labor organization constitute separate and distinct issues and that “. . . any alleged comments urging the employees to become members of the Carpenters Union that day should not negate the employees stated desire to have Carpenters Union represent them for the purposes of negotiating terms and condi- tions of employment . . . .” In support, counsel cites the Board’s decision, Highlands Regional Medical Center, 347 NLRB 1404 (2006), in which the Board considered an em- ployer’s reliance upon a petition, assertedly signed by half of its bargaining unit employees, for withdrawing recognition from a labor organization. Noting that shortly after signing and dating the petition, an employee joined the union and began paying dues, the Board stated, “. . . where an employee who has signed a decertification petition then voluntarily joins the union and begins paying dues, the employer may no longer count the em- ployee as opposing union representation.” Id. at 1407 at fn. 16. Contrary to both attorneys, I understand the Board as equating membership in a labor organization with supporting representa- tion by the labor organization, and, therefore, I believe that becoming a member of a labor organization signifies one’s desire to be represented by it for the purpose of collective bar- gaining. Accordingly, the inevitable result of Winsor’s and Zorrero’s coercive warnings upon the listening drywall finish- ing employees, most of whom, I believe, desired to retain their jobs with Respondent Raymond, was a tropism to execute Re- spondent Carpenters’ membership forms immediately after the October 2 morning meeting, and it follows that the threats un- doubtedly had the equally coercive effect upon the employees, who also executed authorization cards on behalf of Respondent Carpenters. In this regard, I note that General Counsel’s Ex- hibit 3 contains both Respondent Carpenters’ application for membership and authorization for representation forms and believe that employees, who were instructed to complete the membership application, undoubtedly completed and executed every form on the large document without regard to the differ- ences between them. In the foregoing circumstances, Respon- dent Raymond’s and Respondent Carpenters’ defense is with- out merit, and I find that, in violation of Section 8 (a)(1), (2), and (3) of the Act, by the above warnings of Travis Winsor and Hector Zorrero, Respondent Raymond unlawfully coerced its employees into executing authorization cards on behalf of Re- spondent Carpenters and, thereby, rendered unlawful assistance to the latter. Acme Tile, supra. An employer violates Section 8(a)(1) and (2) of the Act when it extends recognition to a labor organization that does not represent an uncoerced majority of its bargaining unit em- ployees, and the labor organization violates Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by accepting such unlawful assistance from the em- ployer. Ladies Garment Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731 (1961). In this regard, the General Counsel need not show, “with mathematical precision,” that the labor organization lacks the support of an uncoerced majority of the bargaining unit employees. Dairyland USA Corp., 347 NLRB 310, 311 (2006); SMI of Worcester, 271 NLRB 1508, 1520 (1984). Rather, the General Counsel must show only that a “pattern” of employer assistance exists. Dairyland USA, supra; Famous Castings Corp., 301 NLRB 404, 408 (1991). Such misconduct includes an employer’s direction to its employees to sign cards. Famous Castings, supra at 407. Herein, I have concluded that the signed authorization cards, which Respondent Carpenters col- lected subsequent to the October 2 morning meeting at Respon- dent Raymond’s Orange facility and relied upon in demanding recognition as the uncoerced majority representative of Re- spondent Raymond’s drywall finishing employees later that day, were tainted by the warnings uttered by Respondent Ray- mond’s Winsor and Zorrero. Also, in my view, the acts and conduct demonstrate a pattern of unlawful assistance to Re- spondent Carpenters sufficient to taint the latter’s asserted showing, by authorization cards, of majority support. Accord- ingly, as there exists insufficient record evidence to establish that Respondent Carpenters represented an uncoerced majority of Respondent Raymond’s drywall finishing employees at the time Respondent Raymond granted such recognition, the latter engaged in acts and conduct violative of Section 8(a)(1) and (2) of the Act. Ladies Garment Workers, supra.68 Similarly, by accepting recognition from Respondent Raymond as the major- ity representative of the latter’s drywall finishing employees at a time when it did not represent an uncoerced majority of the employees, Respondent Carpenters engaged in acts and conduct violative of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. Dairyland USA, supra at 312.69 Finally, I consider the consolidated complaint allegations that, during the October 2 meeting at Respondent Raymond’s Orange facility, Respondent Carpenters failed to properly in- form Respondent Raymond’s drywall finishing employees of their General Motors70 and Beck71 rights in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. Briefly stated, in General Motors, supra, the Supreme Court held that, whenever a labor organization’s collective-bargaining agreement with an employer contains a union-security clause, whereby continued employment is condi- tioned upon membership in the former, the labor organization must inform bargaining unit employees they have a right to be or remain nonmembers and that the term “union membership” may be “whittled down to its financial core” so that nonmem- bers are only required to pay an amount equivalent to union initiation fees and dues. Id. at 742. In Beck, supra, the Court held that Section 8(a)(3) of the Act does not permit a collec- tive-bargaining representative, over the objections of dues- paying nonmember employees, to expend funds, which are collected pursuant to a collective-bargaining agreement, on activities which are not germane to collective bargaining, con- tract administration, or grievance adjustment. While the Court believed that nonmember employees, who enjoyed the benefits 68 While the October 2 recognition agreement seemingly bound Re- spondent Raymond to the Carpenters Union memorandum agreement, the latter only becomes effective upon an employer’s signature, and the record evidence is that Respondent Raymond never entered into the agreement. Accordingly, the union-security clause of the agreement never became binding upon Respondent Raymond’s drywall finishing employees, and, therefore, I can not find that the latter engaged in acts and conduct violative of Sec. 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. 69 For the reasons set forth in fn. 68, supra, I can not find that Re- spondent engaged in conduct violative of Sec. 8(b)(2) of the Act. 70 NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 742 (1963). 71 Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988). RAYMOND INTERIOR SYSTEMS 25 of representation by a labor organization, should bear their fair share of the costs incurred by the bargaining representative for such representation, it also concluded that “. . . the expenditure of dues and fees on activities outside the [labor organization’s] role as collective-bargaining representative violate[s its] duty of fair representation to nonmember employees who objected to such expenditures.” Id. at 752–754; California Saw & Knife Works, 320 NLRB 224 (1995). Therefore, in California Saw, the Board interpreted Beck and formulated the following rules [B]efore a union seeks to obligate an employee to pay fees and dues under a union-security clause, the union should in- form the employee that he has the right to be or remain a nonmember and that nonmembers have the right (1) to object to paying for union activities not germane to the union’s du- ties as bargaining agent and to obtain a reduction in fees for such activities; (2) to be given sufficient information to enable the employee to intelligently decide whether to object; and (3) to be appraised of any internal union procedures for filing ob- jections. In the view of the Board, a “close connection” exists between these rights of nonmember employees and the right, under General Motors, to be and remain a nonmember subject only to the duty to pay union initiation fees and periodic dues, and, “simply stated, an employee cannot exercise Beck rights with- out exercising the General Motors right.” Paperworkers Local 1033 (Weyerhaeuser Paper Co.), 320 NLRB 349, 349 (1995). Therefore, in order to fully inform nonmember bargaining unit employees of their Beck rights, a labor organization must also inform said employees of their right, pursuant to General Mo- tors, to be or remain nonmembers, and, “basic obligations of fairness” require the labor organization to notify all bargaining unit employees of their rights under Beck and General Motors at the time it initially seeks to subject them to the obligations of a contractual union-security clause. Id. at 349–350; California Saw, supra at 233 and 235 at fn. 57. Finally, the Board views a labor organization’s failure to properly give employees the General Motors and Beck notices as a breach of its fair duty of representation in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. Weyerhaeuser Paper Co., supra. Herein, the record evidence is that, during the October 2 meeting at Respondent Raymond’s Orange facility, Travis Winsor, speaking on behalf of Respondent Raymond placed the its drywall finishing employees, none of whom was a member of Respondent Carpenters at the time, on notice that the Car- penters Union 2006–2010 master agreement’s union-security clause would be applicable to them, and the Carpenters Union officials, who followed him, spoke about the employees’ obli- gation to pay monthly union dues. The uncontroverted record evidence is, and I find, that no Carpenters Union official ever informed the employees that they did not have to become members of Respondent Carpenters; that they had the right to object to that portion of their dues going to nonrepresentational expenses; or that there was an internal union procedure for challenging the amount of their monthly dues payment. In this context, the Carpenters Union then distributed General Coun- sel’s Exhibit 3, which contained the membership application forms and a supplemental dues-checkoff form for Respondent Carpenters, to the drywall finishing employees. Further, the record also establishes that, while Respondent Carpenters em- ployee, Melinda Carlton, distributed copies of the quarterly Carpenters Union magazine, which contained a Beck notice, to bargaining unit employees, she did so only after employees returned completed and executed copies of the membership applications and supplemental dues-checkoff forms. In these circumstances, I find that, prior to enforcing its contractual union-security clause and obligating them to pay monthly dues, Respondent Carpenters failed to inform Respondent Ray- mond’s drywall finishing employees, none of whom were members of the labor organization, that they were not obligated to join Respondent Carpenters subject only to the duty to pay union initiation fees and periodic dues and that, as nonmem- bers, they had the rights to object to paying for union activities not germane to the union’s duty as bargaining representative and to obtain a reduction in fees for such activities, to be given sufficient information to enable them to object; and to be ap- praised of any internal union procedure for filing objections. Based upon the foregoing, there can be no doubt that Respon- dent Carpenters failed to meet the requirements of California Saw, supra, and Weyerhaeuser Paper Co., supra. In defense, counsel for Respondent Carpenters asserts that her client never actually sought to obligate nonmembers work- ing for Respondent to pay dues or fees and that, in such circum- stances, the instant matter is distinguishable from California Saw. However, contrary to counsel, as in the cited decision,72 Carpenters Union employees distributed membership applica- tions and supplemental dues-checkoff forms for Respondent Carpenters to Respondent Raymond’s drywall finishing em- ployees, none of whom were members of Respondent Carpen- ters, moments after they were informed the existing Carpenters Union master agreement and its union-security provision would be applicable to them and they would be required to pay union dues. I find that, in these circumstances, presentation of the two forms to these nonmembers effectively caused them to believe that membership in Respondent Carpenters, including the obligation to pay full dues, was required at that time.73 California Saw, supra at 235. That this is, indeed, true, is seen from the fact that, along with a copy of the Carpenters maga- zine, Melinda Carlton handed each employee an envelope for the payment of dues. Accordingly, in the foregoing circum- stances, as Respondent Carpenters failed to give the required General Motors and Beck notices to Respondent Raymond’s drywall finishing employees prior to giving them membership applications and supplemental dues-checkoff forms, Respon- dent Carpenters breached its duty of fair representation, owed 72 In California Saw, the Board was concerned with newly hired em- ployees. Here, while obviously not new hires, Respondent Raymond and Respondent Carpenters were treating the former’s drywall finishing employees in the same manner for purposes of covering them under a new and different collective-bargaining agreement. Thus, the distinc- tion is without a difference. 73 Herein, of course, the record evidence is that Respondent Ray- mond’s officials, Winsor and Zorrero, warned the employees that such was, indeed, required that day. Whether Respondent Carpenters thereafter sought to enforce its un- ion-security provision is irrelevant. DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 26 to Respondent Raymond’s drywall finishing employees, in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.74 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent Raymond is an employer engaged in com- merce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. 2. The Painters Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. Respondent Carpenters is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 4. By, on or about October 1, 2006, recognizing Southwest Regional Council of Carpenters on behalf of its affiliated local unions, including Respondent Carpenters, as the 9(a) majority bargaining representative of its drywall finishing employees and maintaining and enforcing the Carpenters Union 2006– 2010 master agreement, to which it and Respondent Carpenters are parties and which contains a union-security provision, as covering its drywall finishing employees, Respondent Ray- mond engaged in acts and conduct violative of Section 8(a)(1), (2), and (3) of the Act.. 5. By, on or about October 1, 2006, accepting recognition from Respondent Raymond as the 9(a) majority bargaining representative of the latter’s drywall finishing employees and maintaining and enforcing the Carpenters Union 2006–2010 master agreement, to which Respondent Raymond and it are parties and which contains a union-security provision, as cover- ing Respondent Raymond’s drywall finishing employees, Re- spondent Carpenters engaged in acts and conduct violative of Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act. 6. By, on or about October 2, 2006, warning its drywall fin- ishing employees that, if they fail to sign with Respondent Car- penters that day, there will be no more work for them, Respon- dent Raymond conditioned employment upon immediate mem- bership in Respondent Carpenters and rendered assistance to said labor organization in violation of Section 8(a)(1), (2), and (3) of the Act. 7. By, on or about October 2, 2006, extending recognition to Southwest Regional Council of Carpenters on behalf of its af- filiated local unions, including Respondent Carpenters, as the 9(a) majority bargaining representative of its drywall finishing employees at a time when Respondent Carpenters did not rep- resent an uncoerced majority of its drywall finishing employ- ees, Respondent Raymond engaged in acts and conduct viola- tive of Section 8(a)(1) and (2) of the Act. 8. By, on or about October 2, 2006, accepting recognition from Respondent Raymond as the 9(a) majority bargaining representative of the latter’s drywall finishing employees at a time when it did not represent an uncoerced majority of the employees, Respondent Carpenters engaged in acts and conduct violative of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. 9. By, on or about October 2, 2006, failing to inform Re- spondent Raymond’s drywall finishing employees, whom it 74 In these circumstances, as Respondent Carpenters failed to give the required notices prior to obtaining signed membership applications, I need not and do not reach the issue of the sufficiency of the Beck notice, which is printed in Respondent Carpenters quarterly magazine. sought to obligate to pay dues and fees under a union-security provision, of their rights under General Motors, supra, to be and remain nonmembers and of the rights of nonmembers un- der Beck, supra, to object to paying for union activities not germane to its duties as bargaining agent and to obtain a reduc- tion in dues and fees for such activities, Respondent Carpenters engaged in acts and conduct violative of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. 10. By their activities, in violation of the Act, Respondent Raymond and Respondent Carpenters engaged in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 11. Unless specified above, Respondent Raymond and Re- spondent Carpenters engaged in no other unfair labor practices. REMEDY I have found that, by its acts and conduct, Respondent Ray- mond engaged in serious unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1), (2), and (3) of the Act and that, by its and conduct, Respondent Carpenters engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act. Therefore, I shall recommend that each be ordered to cease and desist from the acts and conduct and to take certain affirmative actions designed to effectuate the purposes and policies of the Act. Initially, with regard to Respondent Ray- mond, I shall recommend that it be required to withdraw recog- nition from Respondent Carpenters as the collective-bargaining representative of its drywall finishing employees until the labor organization has been has been certified by the Board as their exclusive collective-bargaining representative. In accord with standard Board practice in similar circumstances,75 I shall fur- ther recommend that, jointly and severally with Respondent Carpenters, Respondent Raymond be required to reimburse all its past and present drywall finishing employees, who joined Respondent Carpenters on or after October 2, 2006,76 for any initiation fees, periodic dues, assessments, or any other moneys, which they may have paid or which may have been withheld from their pay pursuant to the Carpenters Union 2006–2010 master agreement, together with interest as prescribed in New Horizons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987). In addi- tion, while nothing in the Order herein should be construed as permitting Respondent Raymond to withdraw or eliminate any benefit, including, but not limited to, pension plans and medi- cal, dental, prescription drug, optical, hospitalization, and/or life insurance, which it may have implemented pursuant to the above collective-bargaining agreement for its drywall finishing employees, to the extent that such insurance and pension cover- age was by or through a Carpenters Union plan, I shall recom- mend that it be required to provide an equivalent substitute.77 As to Respondent Carpenters, in accord with standard prac- 75 Duane Reade, Inc., supra at 945. 76 While there is record evidence that some employees signed mem- bership applications for Respondent Carpenters subsequent to October 2, there is no evidence that any received the necessary General Motors and Beck notices before doing so. 77 Brooklyn Hospital Center, supra at 1163; Mego Corp., 254 NLRB 300 (1981). RAYMOND INTERIOR SYSTEMS 27 tice,78 I shall recommend that it be required, jointly and sever- ally with Respondent Raymond, to reimburse all of the latter’s past and present drywall finishing employees, who joined it on or after October 2, 2006, for any initiation fees, periodic dues, assessments, or other moneys, which they may have paid or which may have been withheld from their pay pursuant to the Carpenters Union 2006–2010 master agreement, with interest as set forth above. Finally, I shall recommend that each Re- spondent post an appropriate notice, setting forth its obliga- tions. On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the following recommended79 ORDER A. The Respondent, Raymond Interior Systems, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall 1. Cease and desist from (a) Recognizing and bargaining with Southwest Regional Council of Carpenters on behalf of its affiliated local unions, including Respondent Carpenters, as the exclusive bargaining representative of its drywall finishing employees until Respon- dent Carpenters has been certified as their exclusive collective- bargaining representative by the Board. (b) Maintaining, enforcing, or giving effect to the Carpenters Union 2006–2010 master agreement, including the union- security clause, so as to cover its drywall finishing employees, or any extensions, renewal, or modifications thereof unless or until Respondent Carpenters has been certified by the Board as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the em- ployees; provided that nothing in this Order shall authorize, allow, or require the withdrawal or elimination of any wage increase or other benefits (pension or insurance plans) that it may have been established pursuant to the agreement. (c) Assisting Respondent Carpenters by warning its drywall finishing employees that, if they did not sign with Respondent Carpenters that day, there would be no more work for them. (d) Recognizing Respondent Carpenters as Section 9(a) of Act exclusive bargaining representative of its drywall finishing employees when it does not represent an uncoerced majority of said employees. (e) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec- tuate the policies of the Act. (a) Withdraw recognition from Respondent Carpenters as the exclusive bargaining representative of its drywall finishing employees unless and until it has been certified by the Board as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the em- ployees. (b) Jointly and severally with Respondent Carpenters, reim- burse its past and present drywall finishing employees, who 78 Duane Reade, Inc., supra at 946. 79 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recom- mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all purposes. joined Respondent Carpenters on or after October 2, 2006, for any initiation fees, periodic dues, assessments, or any other moneys, which they may have paid or which may have been withheld from their pay pursuant to the Carpenters Union 2006–2010 master agreement, together with interest as set forth above. (c) To the extent that coverage was provided under Carpen- ters Union plans, provide alternate benefits coverage equivalent to the coverage that its drywall finishing employees possessed under the Carpenters Union 2006–2010 master agreement in- cluding pension coverage and medical, hospitalization, pre- scription drug, dental, optical, life, and other insurance benefits and ensure that there be no lapse in coverage. (d) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such addi- tional time as the Regional Director may allow for good cause shown, provide at a reasonable place designated by the Board or its agents, all payroll records, social security payment re- cords, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records, including an electronic copy of such records if stored in electronic form, necessary to analyze the amount of money to be reimbursed under the terms of this Order. (e) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its Or- ange facility and worksites in Southern California copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix A.”80 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 21, after being signed by Respondent Raymond’s authorized repre- sentative, shall be posted by Respondent Raymond immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in con- spicuous places including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent Raymond to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event that, during the pendency of these proceedings, Respondent Ray- mond has gone out of business or closed the facility involved in these proceedings, Respondent Raymond shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current em- ployees and former drywall finishing employees employed by Respondent Raymond at any time since October 2, 2006. (f) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the Respondent has taken to comply. B. The Respondent, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Local Union 1506, its officers, agents, and representatives, shall 1. Cease and desist from (a) Receiving assistance and accepting recognition from Re- spondent Raymond as the exclusive bargaining representative of the latter’s drywall finishing employees unless and until it has been certified by the Board as the exclusive collective- bargaining representative of the employees. 80 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na- tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg- ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board.” DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 28 (b) Maintaining and enforcing the Carpenters Union 2006– 2010 master agreement, including the union-security clause so as to cover Respondent Raymond’s drywall finishing employ- ees, and any extensions, renewal, or modifications thereof unless and until it has been certified by the Board as the exclu- sive collective-bargaining representative of the employees. (c) Failing to inform Respondent Raymond’s drywall finish- ing employees, whom it sought to obligate to pay dues and fees under a union-security provision, of their rights, under NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963), to be and remain nonmembers of Respondent Carpenters and of the rights of nonmembers, under Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988), to object to paying for union activities not germane to the labor organization’s duties as collective- bargaining representative and to obtain a reduction in dues and fees for such activities. (d) Seeking and obtaining 9(a) recognition from Respondent Raymond as the majority representative of its drywall finishing employees when it does not represent an uncoerced majority of said employees. (e) In any like or related manner restraining or coercing em- ployees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec- tuate the policies of the Act. (a) Jointly and severally with Respondent Raymond, reim- burse all of the latter’s past and present drywall finishing em- ployees, who joined Respondent Carpenters on or after October 2, 2006, for initiation fees, periodic dues, assessments, or any other moneys, which they may have paid or which may have been withheld from their pay pursuant to the Carpenters Union 2006–2010 master agreement. (b) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such addi- tional time as the Regional Director may allow for good cause shown, provide at a reasonable place designated by the Board or its agents, all records, including an electronic copy of such records if stored in electronic form, necessary to analyze the amount of money to be reimbursed under the terms of this Or- der. (c) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its un- ion office in Los Angeles, California, copies of the attached notice to members, marked “Appendix B.”81 Copies of the no- tice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 21, after being signed by Respondent Carpenter’s authorized repre- sentative, shall be posted by Respondent Carpenters immedi- ately upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to mem- bers are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent Carpenters to ensure that the notices are not al- tered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event that, during the pendency of these proceedings, Respondent Carpenters has ceased its representational activities or has be- come defunct, Southern California Regional Council of Car- penters shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current employees and former drywall finishing 81 See fn. 80, supra. employees, employed by Respondent Raymond at any time since October 2, 2006. (d) Forward to the Regional Director of Region 21 signed copies of the attached notice, marked “Appendix B,” for post- ing by Respondent Raymond at its Orange facility and work- sites in Southern California for 60 consecutive days in places where notices to employees are customarily posted. (e) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the Respondent has taken to comply. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint is dismissed inso- far as it alleges violations of the Act not specifically found. Dated, Washington, D.C. November 10, 2008 APPENDIX A NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this no- tice. FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO Form, join, or assist a union Choose representatives to bargain with us on your be- half Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection Choose not to engage in any of these protected activi- ties. WE WILL NOT recognize and bargain with Southwest Re- gional Council of Carpenters (SWRCC) on behalf of its affili- ated local unions, including United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America. Local Union 1506 (Carpenters 1506), as the exclusive bargaining representative of our drywall finish- ing employees until Carpenters 1506 has been certified as their exclusive representative by the Board. WE WILL NOT maintain, enforce, or give effect to our Carpen- ters Union 2006–2010 master agreement, including the union- security clause, as covering our drywall finishing employees, or any extensions, renewal, or modifications thereof unless or until Carpenters 1506 has been certified by the Board as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the employ- ees, provided that nothing herein shall authorize, allow, or re- quire us to withdraw or eliminate any wage increases or other benefits that we established pursuant to the agreement. WE WILL NOT assist Carpenters 1506 by warning our drywall finishing employees that, if they did not sign with Carpenters 1506 today, there would be no work for them. WE WILL NOT recognize Carpenters 1506 as 9(a) exclusive bargaining representative of our drywall finishing employees when it does not represent an uncoerced majority of the em- ployees. WE WILL NOT, in any like or related manner, interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed to them by Section 7 of the Act. RAYMOND INTERIOR SYSTEMS 29 WE WILL withdraw recognition from Carpenters 1506 as the exclusive bargaining representative of our drywall finishing employees unless and until it has been certified by the Board as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the the employees. WE WILL, jointly and severally with Carpenters 1506, reim- burse our past and present drywall finishing employees, who joined Carpenters 1506 on or after October 2, 2006, for any initiation fees, periodic dues, assessments, or any other moneys, which they may have paid or which may have been withheld from their pay pursuant to our Carpenters Union 2006–2010 master agreement, together with interest. WE WILL, to the extent that coverage was provided under Carpenters Union plans, provide alternate benefits coverage equivalent to the coverage that our drywall finishing employees possessed under our Carpenters Union 2006–2010 master agreement including pension coverage and medical, hospitali- zation, prescription drug, dental, optical, life, and other insur- ance benefits and ensure that there will be no lapse in coverage. RAYMOND INTERIOR SYSTEMS APPENDIX B NOTICE TO MEMBERS POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this notice. FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO Form, join, or assist a union Choose representatives to bargain on your behalf with your employer Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection Choose not to engage in any of these protected activi- ties. WE WILL NOT accept assistance or recognition from Ray- mond Interior Systems as the exclusive bargaining representa- tive of its drywall finishing employees unless and until we has been certified by the Board as the exclusive collective- bargaining representative of said employees. WE WILL NOT maintain and enforce the Carpenters Union 2006–2010 master agreement, including the union-security clause, as covering Raymond Interior Systems’ drywall finish- ing employees, and any extensions, renewal, or modifications thereof unless and until we have been certified by the Board as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the em- ployees. WE WILL NOT fail to inform Raymond Interior Systems’ dry- wall finishing employees, whom we sought to obligate to pay dues and fees under a union-security provision, of their rights under the Supreme Court’s decision in NLRB v. General Mo- tors Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963), to be and remain nonmembers of this labor organization and of the rights of nonmembers un- der the Supreme Court’s decision in Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988), to object to paying for union activities not germane to our duties as collective-bargaining representative and to obtain a reduction in dues and fees for such activities. WE WILL NOT seek and obtain 9(a) recognition from Ray- mond Interior Systems as the majority representative of its drywall finishing employees when we do not represent an un- coerced majority of the employees. WE WILL NOT, in any like or related manner, restrain, or co- erce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. WE WILL, jointly and severally with Raymond Interior Sys- tems, reimburse all of the latter’s drywall finishing employees, who joined this labor organization on or after October 2, 2006, for initiation fees, periodic dues, assessments, or other moneys, which they may have paid or which may have been withheld from their pay pursuant to the Carpenters Union 2006–2010 master agreement. UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS AND JOINERS OF AMERICA, LOCAL UNION 1506