Regency Grande Nursing & Rehabilitation Center

354 NLRB No. 93 NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the bound volumes of NLRB decisions. Readers are requested to notify the Ex- ecutive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C. 20570, of any typographical or other formal errors so that corrections can be included in the bound volumes. Regency Grande Nursing & Rehabilitation Center and SEIU 1199 New Jersey Healthcare Union. Case 22–CA–26231–S October 23, 2009 SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN LIEBMAN AND MEMBER SCHAUMBER On May 28, 2009, Administrative Law Judge Mindy E. Landow issued the attached supplemental decision. The Respondent filed an exceptions brief and the General Counsel filed an answering brief and cross-exceptions. The National Labor Relations Board1 has considered the supplemental decision and the record in light of the exceptions and briefs, and has decided to affirm the judge’s rulings, findings, and conclusions and to adopt the recommended Order as modified.2 SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec- ommended Order of the administrative law judge and orders that the Respondent, Regency Grande Nursing & Rehabilitation Center, Dover, New Jersey, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall make whole the employees named below by paying them the amounts set 1 Effective midnight December 28, 2007, Members Liebman, Schaumber, Kirsanow, and Walsh delegated to Members Liebman, Schaumber, and Kirsanow, as a three-member group, all of the Board’s powers in anticipation of the expiration of the terms of Members Kir- sanow and Walsh on December 31, 2007. Pursuant to this delegation, Chairman Liebman and Member Schaumber constitute a quorum of the three-member group. As a quorum, they have the authority to issue decisions and orders in unfair labor practice and representation cases. See Sec. 3(b) of the Act. See Snell Island SNF LLC v. NLRB, 568 F.3d 410 (2d Cir. 2009), petition for cert. filed 78 U.S.L.W. 3130 (U.S. September 11, 2009) (No. 09-328); New Process Steel v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 840 (7th Cir. 2009), petition for cert. filed 77 U.S.L.W. 3670 (U.S. May 22, 2009) (No. 08-1457); Northeastern Land Services v. NLRB, 560 F.3d 36 (1st Cir. 2009), petition for cert. filed 78 U.S.L.W. 3098 (U.S. August 18, 2009) (No. 09-213). But see Laurel Baye Healthcare of Lake Lanier, Inc. v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 469 (D.C. Cir. 2009), petition for cert. filed sub nom. NLRB v. Laurel Baye Healthcare of Lake Lanier, Inc., __U.S.L.W.__ (U.S. September 29, 2009) (No. 09-377). 2 The Order corrects factual errors in the judge’s backpay computa- tion that the General Counsel identified on cross-exception. Specifi- cally, the Order reflects that Maria E. Carreon is owed $940, not $780; and that Michelle Modafferi, is owed $00.00, not -$60. As to the for- mer, the judge correctly found Maria E. Carreon and Maria Oulds are the same person; therefore, the amounts found owing to each ($780 and $160) should be combined (and listed under Maria E. Carreon). As for Modafferi, the Respondent did not dispute the General Counsel’s cross-exception. Therefore, the figure for Modafferi is corrected and the backpay total is amended accordingly. forth opposite their names, plus interest as prescribed in New Horizons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987), accrued to the date of payment, minus tax withholding required by Federal and State laws: Abril, Jamie $190.00 Acevedo, Maria 290.00 Antunez, Isabel 30.00 Agrinsoni, Claudia 20.00 Aguado, Nora 140.00 Angel, Jaime 100.00 Appel, Ricardo 590.00 Agron, Lilibeth A 20.00 Arias, Angie 120.00 Arias, Darley 50.00 Arias, Javier 170.00 Arellano, Elizabeth 100.00 Armstrong, Kelly 940.00 Artigas, Lucrecia 280.00 Artigas, Pablo 750.00 Atehortua, Diego 10.00 Augustine, Elma 280.00 Ayala, Nilsa 940.00 Baker, Dorothy 130.00 Balbuena, Carlos 940.00 Basulato, Aida 0.00 Bell, Kelly 170.00 Best, Jr., Douglas 170.00 Best, Kathy 0.00 Betancourth, Sylvia 200.00 Bojkovic, Hajrije 940.00 Bojkovic, Ilira 401.00 Bonnell, Janet 560.00 Buitrago, Diana 180.00 Caamano, Aida 60.00 Camacho, Ana 940.00 Canepa, Andrea 120.00 Cano, Victoria 140.00 Carmona, Maria 940.00 Carreon, Maria E 940.00 Castro, Francisco 940.00 Castro-Richards, Rosa 950.00 Catania, Noemi 140.00 Celentano, Ashley 100.00 Chavis, Fabiola 50.00 Chavis, Cornell 670.00 Cochran, Krystle L 270.00 Conklin, Minnie 100.00 Cornier, Inocencio 940.00 Correa, Gricelda 100.00 Cortes, Debora 100.00 Crosby, Gwendolyn 940.00 Cuellar, Jeison 160.00 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 2 Culleny, Marion 60.00 Delgado, Roman J. 50.00 Duque, Alberto 270.00 Duque, Andrea 70.00 Dale, Patti 100.00 Easton, Warren 940.00 Enriquez, Brenda 950.00 Escobedo Pro, Rames 50.00 Estrada, Rosana E 240.00 Estudillo, Cristal 920.00 Estudillo, Estrella 380.00 Fauste, Jose Omar 800.00 Ferreira, Ana Maria 940.00 Ferreira, Mariela 0.00 Figueroa, Elizabeth 20.00 Figueroa, Manuela Erika 920.00 Finlayson, Alnora 100.00 Fitzpatrick, Rosita 940.00 Florez, Diana M. 170.00 Forrest, Doreth 510.00 Foster, Katrina 30.00 Francis, Dorie 60.00 Franco, Alba 940.00 Fudriai, Claudia 340.00 Garcia, Elvira 940.00 Garcia, Raul 120.00 Garderes, Virginia 170.00 Garnder, Carole 940.00 Gatling, Leatha 900.00 Gibbons, Michael 940.00 Giraldo, Leidy 50.00 Gomez, Natalia P 20.00 Gonzalez, Jose A 120.00 Gonzalez, Mauricio 200.00 Grames, Charles 10.00 Groman, Nancy 60.00 Guida, Silvia 630.00 Gutierrez, Jennifer 310.00 Hall, Jahmad 291.31 Harvey, Norma 920.00 Hernandez, Leidi 90.00 Hickenbottom, Kerry Ann 600.00 Hickenbottom, Tyreese 170.00 Hidalgo, Miguel 940.00 Hunter, Barbara 510.00 Hunter, Desmond 150.00 Jackson, Melouise 340.00 Jasso, Cristina 160.00 Jiminez, Dulce 170.00 Kaur, Amarjeet 210.00 Kaur, Kulwinder 180.00 Kennedy, Shannon 670.00 Laboy, Alex Leoner 90.00 Lasaga, Matias 340.00 Lascano, Filomena 80.00 Lewis, Sylvia 310.00 Lopez, Carolina 230.00 Lopez, Eduardo 510.00 Lopez, Navih 50.00 Maidana, Valeria 80.00 Mantilla, Arlyn 50.00 Martinez, Nubia 110.00 Masini, Ana 40.00 Massari, Anthony 40.00 Masson, Jorge 510.00 McClanahan, Grethel 260.00 McLean, Velma 20.00 McCord, Robin 340.00 Meikle, Michele 940.00 Meirelles, Marcelo 70.00 Mella, Paola 940.00 Mendez, Ruth 120.00 Mendez, Sol M. 470.00 Miraflores, Gelia 10.00 Modafferi, Michelle 0.00 Mohamed, Swalaha 940.00 Molena Oyola, Isela 90.00 Moncaleano, Adela 850.00 Montanez, Carmen 260.00 Montenegro, Victoria 940.00 Moraga, Juan 510.00 Muneton, Eliana 30.00 Montoya, Ana 130.00 Montoya, Claudia 40.00 Moreira, Julio Cesar 90.00 Munoz, Claudia 460.00 Munoz, Flor de Maria 30.00 Munoz, Jennifer 130.00 Myers, Amy 0.40 Navarro, Lino 510.00 Navarro, Maria E. 310.00 Newell, Joan 600.00 Noel, Rita 940.00 Orbes, Diana 270.00 Orihuela, Ana M. 80.00 Orozco, Diana 190.00 Ortiz, Jasmin 80.00 Ospina, Ofelia 950.00 Oulds, Dominique N. 230.00 Palomba, Frieda 40.00 Palomino, Greyssi 230.00 Parks, Laureen Anne 600.00 Pasion, Juanito 180.00 Pafez, Nestor E. 780.00 REGENCY GRANDE NURSING & REHABILITATION CENTER 3 Pedraza-Rodrigu, Samaris 100.00 Phelan, Helen 860.00 Pizano, Monserrat 50.00 Portilla, Gloria 40.00 Posse, Cindy 120.00 Richards, Joyce 940.00 Ritzie, Omar Antony 150.00 Riveria, Elvira 40.00 Roberts, Christine M. 80.00 Roberts, Marion 160.00 Rodriquez, Miquel Hernand 310.00 Rohde, Kathy Patricia 920.00 Rojas, Ivonne 360.00 Rojas, Marianela 490.00 Rosario, Kimberly 90.00 Ruiz Morocho, Yessica 160.00 Ruiz, William 80.00 Saavedra, Veronica 550.00 Sadick, Zahira 940.00 Salazar, Melida 290.00 Saldarriaga, Nathalia 40.00 Sanchez, Betty 330.00 Sanchez, Jose 940.00 Sanchez, Tecza 480.00 Secola, Patricia 140.00 Shann, Steven 360.00 Siepierski, Karina 240.00 Silva, Nancy B. 550.00 Silveira, Nestor 180.00 Smith, Harry 940.00 Soto, Justin 310.00 Soto, Maria Lenor 310.00 Stuber, Miriam 70.00 Studivant, Alnora 40.00 Suarez, Gabiela 0.00 Tavera, Elvira 900.00 Taylor, Donna 70.00 Terry, Mary 940.00 Thomas, Mattie 300.00 Torres, Stephanie 190.00 Toussaint, Edythe M. 170.00 Toxqui, Jose 40.00 Trujillo, Wilfer 490.00 Tuballes, Amado Bart B 600.00 Uddin, Katijha 50.00 Valentin, Francisco 440.00 Vergara, Brenda 80.00 Villegas, Viviana 120.00 Walker, Mary Delores 940.00 Walling, Belinda 130.00 Wayside, Jessica 230.00 Waysome, Vivienne 940.00 Witto, Paola 760.00 Zabala, Liberato 50.00 Zapata, Fanny Marie 750.00 Zaretskie, Angela 40.00 Zelada, Flores R 370.00 Zorilla, Nancy 80.00 TOTAL: $74,852.71 Dated, Washington, D.C. October 23, 2009 Wilma B. Liebman, Chairman Peter C. Schaumber, Member (SEAL) NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Lisa D. Pollack, Esq., for the General Counsel. Morris Tuchman, Esq., of New York, New York, for the Re- spondent. William S. Massey, Esq. (Gladstein Reif &Meginniss, LLP), of New York, New York, for the Charging Party. SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE MINDY E. LANDOW, Administrative Law Judge. This is a supplemental proceeding to determine the amounts of money due to employees of Regency Grande Nursing & Rehabilitation Center (Respondent) based on the Board’s decision and order issued on August 30, 2006 (347 NLRB 1143), subsequently enforced by the Court of Appeals on February 20, 2008.1 A hearing was held before me on December 17, 2008.2 Briefs have been filed by the General Counsel and Respondent and have been carefully considered. Based on the entire record I make the following I. FINDINGS OF FACT A. The Board’s Decision The Board found that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1)(2) and (3) of the Act by recognizing Local 300S, Production Ser- vice & Sales District Council a/w United Food and Commercial Workers International Union (Local 300S) as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of its employees and by entering into, maintaining and enforcing a collective-bargaining agreement containing union-security and dues-checkoff provi- sions with Local 300S at a time when Local 300S did not repre- sent a majority of employees in the following unit: All full time and regular part time service employees, mainte- nance employees and LPN’s employed by Respondent at its Dover, New Jersey facility, but excluding all officers, mana- 1 265 Fed. Appx. 74 (3d Cir. 2008). 2 Unless otherwise stated, all dates refer to 2008. DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 4 gerial and professional employees, confidential employees, temporary employees, all other employees, guards and super- visors as defined in the National Labor Relations Act. The Board ordered that Respondent reimburse former and present unit employees, with interest, for fees and moneys de- ducted pursuant to the union-security and dues-checkoff clauses of the contract, providing, however, that those employees who voluntarily joined and became members of Local 300S prior to January 8, 2004, are not entitled to reimbursement of such dues and fees. 347 NLRB 1143 fn. 4; 1144 (citing Dairyland USA Corp., 347 NLRB 310 (2006); Elmhurst Care Center, 345 NLRB 1167 (2005)). B. The Compliance Specification and Respondent’s Answers Thereto On September 25, the Regional Director for Region 22 is- sued a compliance specification and notice of hearing alleging amounts of reimbursement due to approximately 218 claimants in the amount of $74,392.71, plus interest.3 The reimburse- ment period began on January 8, 2004,4 the date Respondent entered into the collective-bargaining agreement with Local 300S and terminated on March 31, 2008, the date Respondent ceased deducting union dues and initiation fees from the pay- checks of bargaining unit members. After an extension of time to file its answer due to service on an incorrect address, Respondent filed its answer on October 13. The answer admitted certain paragraphs of the compliance specification and contained general denials concerning others, in particular paragraphs 5 and 6.5 The answer further raised the following affirmative defense: The Board’s Order provides that reimbursement is not due for employees who joined Local 300S before January 4, 2004, Respondent will show that 68 employees signed membership cards for Local 300S before January 4, 2008.6 On October 24, counsel for the General Counsel notified Re- spondent that inasmuch as the answer filed neither stated with specificity those 68 employees referred to in its affirmative defense nor provided alternate computations, its answer was insufficient. Respondent was granted additional time to file an amended answer. Respondent then submitted a letter, dated October 28, providing, in pertinent part, as follows: In amplification of our previously filed answer to the compli- ance specification, please be advised that we agree that $20,070 (or 19,980) of the specification is “due.” Since the 3 As will be discussed below, certain individual claimants are listed more than once, under different names. The recommended order herein will consolidate the claims as is appropriate. 4 The compliance specification sets the date as January 4, 2004. Un- der all the circumstances, I have concluded that this is an inadvertent typographical error. 5 Par. 5 avers that each discriminatee’s gross backpay calculations are reflected alphabetically on a summary worksheet attached to the specification and par. 6 contains a summary list of employees due reimbursements and the total amounts owed. 6 Again, I find that Respondent’s answer contains inadvertent typo- graphical errors regarding the relevant date. Board provided no dues reimbursement for employees who had signed up with Local 300S before January 2004 and since a number of employees (see below) had dues deducted in 2005 and thereafter, we would agree that they likely did not sign cards for Local 300S before January 2004. However, we intend to show that as many as 68 employees signed cards for Local 300S before January 2004 and there- fore do not agree that employees who had dues deducted in 2004 and thereafter should receive reimbursement. We intend to subpoena Local 300S to produce the cards signed by em- ployees before January 2004. . . . . The employees who we acknowledge are due reimbursement are: Abril, Acevedo, Antunez, Appel, Agron, Arias (Darley and Javier), Arellano, Artigas, Baker, Bell, Best (Douglas and Kathy), Bonnell, Buitrago, Caamano, Cano, Carreon, Catania, Chavis, Chavis, Cochran, Cortes, Delgado, Duque (Alberto and Andria), Dale, Escobedo, Estrada, Estudillo (Estrella), Fitzpatrick, Florez, Forrest, Garderes, Giraldo, Gomez, Grames, Guida, Gutierrez, Hernandez, Hickenbottom (Tyreese), Hunter, Jimenez, Kennedy, Laboy, Lascano, Lewis, Lopez (Carolina, Eduardo and Navih), Maidana, Man- tilla, Masson, McLean, Meirelles, Molena (if she did not seek reimbursement under another name for 2004), Montoya (Ana), Moreira, Munoz (Flor de Maria and Jennifer), Navarro (Lino, Maria E. and Nino), Orbes, Orihuela, Orozco, Ouldes (Dominique), Palomino, Posse, Ritzie, Riviera, Roberts (Christine), Rodriguez, Rojas (Marianela), Ruendes, Ruiz (Morocho), Saavedra, Salazar, Sanchez (Betty), Silva, Soto (Justin and Maria), Stuber, Suarez, Taylor, Torres, Toussaint, Trujillo, Uddin, Vergera, Villegas, Wayside, Zabala, Zapata, Zorilla. The General Counsel accepted the October 28 letter as an amended answer. C. Relevant Testimony at the Underlying Proceeding As is more fully set forth in Judge Davis’ opinion in the under- lying case, James Robinson, who in 2003 was the president of Local 300S, testified that the Union had obtained a total of 68 signed authorization cards from Respondent’s employees during the period from February to April 2003. During that period, only three or four signed cards were obtained in person at the facility; the remainder had been mailed to Local 300S. Robinson testified that he had been informed that there were approximately 120 employees in the unit, and on May 5, 2003, he wrote to Respon- dent, advising that Local 300S represented a majority of employ- ees. On May 21, 2003, the cards were presented to an arbitrator who compared the signatures on the cards with W-4 forms sup- plied by Respondent. The arbitrator found that Local 300S had demonstrated its majority status, and Respondent recognized Local 300S on the following day. Robinson further testified that, in about late-November 2003, he threw the authorization cards signed by Respondent’s employees away inasmuch as a 6-month period of time had elapsed and he was advised they were no longer needed. Robinson could recall the name of only one em- REGENCY GRANDE NURSING & REHABILITATION CENTER 5 ployee who had signed a card.7 In contrast to Robinson’s testimony, evidence was received from 81 unit employees who were employed on May 22, 2003, when Respondent recognized Local 300S. In the underlying proceeding, Judge Davis credited the testimony of these em- ployees and, in particular relied on the testimony of 74 (out of a unit of approximately 117 employees) who affirmatively stated that they did not sign a card authorizing Local 300S to repre- sent them before it was recognized, “or indeed at any time be- fore January 2004.”8 347 NLRB at 1147. In addition, 38 em- ployees testified that they were unaware of the presence of Local 300S prior to January 2004. Further, 27 employees, some of whom were the same as those who testified that they were unaware of Local 300S, stated that they did not see any union organizers outside the building soliciting membership in a union and 28 employees stated that they did not recall seeing any such people. Twenty workers heard no conversations in Respondent’s facility about a union trying to organize employ- ees at the time, and 15 could not recall any such conversations. Judge Davis concluded that the General Counsel had made a prima facie showing that Local 300S did not represent a major- ity of employees at the time it was recognized by Respondent on May 22, 2003. The judge further found that the Respondent had not met its burden of proving the majority status of Local 300S. 347 NLRB at 1154. In so finding, Judge Davis noted that Robinson never inquired of the Respondent the size of the unit so that he could test whether the cards he testified to re- ceiving constituted a majority of the unit. The judge further noted that the arbitrator who certified Local 300S as represent- ing a majority did not identify in his award the number of cards he received, the number of employees in the unit, or which categories of employees were encompassed in the unit. Id. at 1153. D. The Instant Hearing At the inception of the instant hearing, the parties entered into a stipulation that that the employees listed and referred to in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the compliance specification were employed by Respondent during the relevant period between January 8, 2004, and March 31, 2008. In addition, Respondent stipulated that the “gross pay figures as stated in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the [compliance specification] are accurate and cor- rectly calculated.” Respondent reserved its right; however, to contest that employees named in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the 7 Robinson further testified that, after he learned of the charge in the underlying case, he did not attempt to have any employees verify that they had signed cards on or before May 21, 2003. In addition he had not retained copies of the cards, a list of the card signers or their ad- dresses, notes showing which employees were contacted who supported the Union, or those who may have been helpful in organizing and rep- resenting the workers. 8 Two other employees stated that they could not recall signing a card for Local 300S prior to its recognition. Five employees who testi- fied were not asked directly whether they had signed a card for Local 300S. One employee, Aida Basualto, stated that she had in fact signed a card, but the judge found it was unclear whether the card had been signed prior to the date of recognition. The General Counsel is not seeking remuneration for this employee. compliance specification were due to receive reimbursement. Neither the General Counsel nor the Charging Party pre- sented witnesses at the hearing. The General Counsel took the position that, based on the stipulations which had been entered into by the parties, as described above, no witnesses were nec- essary. Respondent called one witness, now former Local 300S President Robinson.9 Robinson had received a subpoena duces tecum from Respondent seeking production of authorization cards in his possession signed by employees of Respondent. Robinson asserted at the compliance hearing, as he did in the underlying case, that he did not have possession of such cards. Robinson further testified that Respondent had never had ac- cess to the cards in question. Robinson offered no testimony regarding whether any other employee, other than those whose cards had been disposed of, had joined the Union after May 22, 2003, and prior to January 8, 2004. Counsel for Respondent then proffered certain testimony go- ing to an issue, first raised at the hearing, of whether the reim- bursement remedy sought by the General Counsel was unduly burdensome. I accepted Robinson’s testimony, over the objec- tions of the General Counsel and the Charging Party, in the form of an offer of proof. In this regard, Robinson further testi- fied that during the time he was president he was familiar with the finances of Local 300S, but that now his understanding of the Union’s finances was “minimal.” He then testified that if a judgment were to be rendered against the Union for approxi- mately $100,000 it would bankrupt the Union. Respondent presented no further witnesses or evidence in support of its case. At the close of Respondent’s case, counsel for the General Counsel submitted a Motion for Summary Judgment, which I denied by order dated December 23.10 E. The Contentions of the Parties Respondent contends that, inasmuch as the Board’s order re- quires reimbursement for dues only to those employees who had not signed cards for Local 300S prior to January 2004, it is incumbent on the General Counsel to establish eligibility for reimbursement. Thus, Respondent asserts that the General Counsel bears the burden of showing that those employees that it seeks reimbursement for did not sign membership cards for Local 300S prior to January 8, 2004. Respondent asserts that the General Counsel presented no evidence that reflected on the eligibility of such employees in this proceeding and, moreover, that the evidence adduced in the underlying case is insufficient for me to conclude that such employees are eligible for reim- bursement. Respondent now seems to have retreated from its apparent concession, as set forth in its amended answer, that certain 9 At the time of his testimony in this hearing, Robinson was no longer president of Local 300S. The record does not establish when he ceased serving in this capacity. 10 In that ruling I stated that “[t]he judge considered no evidence and made no specific finding regarding whether any other employee may have voluntarily signed a card for or joined Local 300S prior to January 4, 2004.” In addition to the obvious typographical error, I was incor- rect insofar as such a statement implies that Judge Davis made no find- ing regarding whether the employee witnesses had signed cards prior to January 2004. I hereby correct that error. DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 6 employees, in particular, those who “had dues deducted in 2005 and thereafter” are owed reimbursement of dues and fees. Re- spondent argues in its brief as follows: The letter sent to amplify the answer in this case, dated Octo- ber 28, 2008, conceded that the [General Counsel] did not have to offer evidence that employees who first came to work at [Respondent] after the ‘04 date did not sign with [Local 300S] before they came to work. It did not concede liability to pay. (It noted the amount “due” with word “due” in quotes.) As Respondent currently asserts, there are three categories of employees at issue here: (1) employees who came to work after January 8, 2004; (2) employees who testified in the underlying proceeding that they had not signed an authorization card for Local 300S prior to the date of recognition; and (3) “employees that a claim is being made for but which there is no evidence about their underlying eligibility for reimbursement at all.” Respondent further contends that due to “changed circum- stances” liability as to the first two groups of employees should be extinguished on the basis that such liability would be “un- duly burdensome.” With regard to the third category of em- ployees, Respondent contends that there is no liability because the General Counsel has not met its burden of establishing that such employees are, in fact, eligible for reimbursement. The General Counsel, to the contrary, argues that Respon- dent has the burden of establishing its affirmative defense that 68 employees were not entitled to backpay because they had voluntarily signed cards for Local 300S prior to January 8, 2004, and that Respondent has the burden to establish with specificity any amounts it claims would mitigate backpay li- ability.11 The General Counsel further argues that Respondent is merely attempting to relitigate issues raised in the underlying unfair labor practice proceeding. The General Counsel addi- tionally contends that Respondent’s argument that changed circumstances have rendered the remedy sought herein unduly burdensome is irrelevant. II. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS A. The Burden of Proof Here, it is not disputed that the employees named in the compliance specification were, in fact, employed by Respon- dent during the relevant period: that is, between the dates of January 8, 2004, and March 31, 2008. Moreover, it is not dis- puted that the method by which the reimbursement amounts were calculated is an accurate one. The General Counsel and the Respondent each contend that the other party has the burden of proof on the issue of whether any of the employees listed in the compliance specification voluntarily joined Local 300S prior to January 8, 2004, rendering them ineligible for reim- 11 In support of these contentions, the General Counsel relies on At- lantic Limousine, 328 NLRB 257, 258 (1999); Hacienda Hotel & Ca- sino, 279 NLRB 601, 603 (1986), and Ryder System, Inc., 302 NLRB 6087 (1991). These cases involve situations where employees are owed backpay and stand generally for the proposition that once the General Counsel has shown the gross amounts of backpay due, the respondent bears the burden of establishing those facts which would mitigate its liability. bursement. Respondent argues that the testimony of those employees who testified in the underlying proceeding cannot be relied on inasmuch as it is not evidence presented in the instant proceed- ing and, further, that there is no evidence in the record that other employees named in the compliance specification had not voluntarily joined the Union prior to January 2004. The Gen- eral Counsel asserts, to the contrary, that it is well-settled that the burden of proof is on a respondent to establish affirmative defenses that mitigate its liability. The General Counsel further argues that a respondent carries the burden of establishing with specificity any amounts it claims would mitigate liability. As an initial matter, for the purposes of this proceeding, I take administrative notice of and rely on Judge Davis’ findings as regards the testimony of those employees who testified in the underlying case about whether they had signed cards for Local 300S either prior to recognition or January 2004.12 See, e.g., Stark Electric, Inc., 327 NLRB 518, 518 fn. 1 (1999). Thus, I find that of a unit of approximately 117 employees, at least 74 employees did not voluntarily join Local 300S prior to January 8, 2004. In agreement with the General Counsel, I find that this was an issue, litigated in the underlying case, which may not be relitigated here. See, e.g., Convergence Communications, Inc. 342 NLRB 918, 919 (2004); Paolicelli, 335 NLRB 881, 883 (2001) (citing Arostook County Regional Ophthalmology Cen- ter, 332 NLRB 1616, 1617 (2001). I further find, contrary to the assertions contained in Respondent’s brief, that the amended answer filed on October 28 constitutes an admission, unamended by any subsequent stipulation, that approximately 94 employees named in the compliance specification, who had dues deducted beginning in 2005 and thereafter, are due reim- bursement. Nevertheless, even if I were to find this not to be the case, and were to accept Respondent’s contention that its amended answer somehow reserved its right to contest reim- bursement for all named employees, for the reasons discussed below, I find that reimbursement is due to those employees named in the compliance specification, as amended at the hear- ing. As a general matter, the General Counsel ultimately bears the burden of proof in a compliance case. See, e.g., Triple A Fire Protection, 353 NLRB No. 88 (2009). Here, I find that the stipu- lations entered into by the parties as described above, are suffi- cient for the General Counsel to meet its initial burden of estab- lishing that the amounts sought for employees are accurate. Thus, the record establishes that the employees named in the compliance specification were employed by the Respondent during the relevant period for purposes of computing their reim- bursement, and that the figures set forth are accurate calculations of moneys which would be due to employees pursuant to the Board’s Order which provides that Respondent be directed to: Reimburse, with interest, all of its former and present unit 12 Although, in making such a finding, Judge Davis did not specify the precise date the contract was entered into, i.e. January 8, I conclude that is what he intended. If there had been some variance in the proof on this issue, I find that Judge Davis, who the Third Circuit noted “as- siduously laid out the evidence,” would have discussed such a discrep- ancy. REGENCY GRANDE NURSING & REHABILITATION CENTER 7 employees for fees and moneys deducted from their back pay pursuant to the union-security and dues-checkoff clauses of the contract dated January 8, 2004. However, reimbursement does not extend to those employees who voluntarily joined and became members of Local 300S prior to January 8, 2004. This language echoes that which is contained in numerous cases where the Board has held that reimbursement is not avail- able to those employees who “voluntarily” joined a union prior to the effective date of an unlawful contract. See, e.g., Control Services, 319 NLRB 1195, 1196 (1995); Katz’s Deli, 316 NLRB 318, 334 (1995), enfd. in pert. part 80 F.3d 755 (2d Cir. 1996); Polyclinic Medical Center, 315 NLRB 1257 (1995), enfd. 79 F.3d 139 (D.C. Cir 1996); Cascade General, 303 NLRB 656, 657 fn. 14 (1991), enfd. 9 F.3d 731 (4th Cir. 1993).13 In my view, such language contemplates that the proof to be adduced at any subsequent compliance proceeding would be in the form of mitigation of Respondent’s liability. There is no clear suggestion in such cases that the General Counsel would be obliged to prove the negative, i.e., that indi- vidual employees had not voluntarily joined the unlawfully recognized union, to render them eligible for a reimbursement remedy. The issue of which party bears the burden of proof on such matters at the compliance stage was more fully explicated in Freeman Decorating Co., 336 NLRB 1 (2001), enf. denied on other grounds 334 F.3d 27 (D.C. Cir. 2003). In that case, it was held that the respondent employers had unlawfully withdrawn recognition from a union following the expiration of their col- lective-bargaining agreement because the union had previously obtained 9(a) status prior to the expiration of the contract. The Board majority found that the employers and another union had violated Sections 8(a)(2) and 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by entering into a collective-bargaining agreement. Part of the remedy sought by the General Counsel involved the disgorgement of monies paid by employees and the Board agreed, as follows: We find merit in the General Counsel’s exceptions seeking disgorgement of dues, fees and contributions made by or on behalf of employees [performing work for respondent employers falling within the respondent un- ion’s jurisdiction] to the extent that such payments are not shown by the Respondent Employers to have been nonco- ercive. We defer this issue to the compliance stage.[14] 13 In Carpenters Local 60 v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 651 (1961), the Court reversed the Board’s award of reimbursement of dues and fees where the union and the company enforced and maintained an illegal closed- shop clause. The Court noted that there was no evidence that any em- ployee was coerced to join or to remain a member of the union and that; in fact, all affected employees were already union members. In such circumstances, the Court concluded that the Boards’ order was puni- tive. Based on this decision, and its reasoning, the Board began to except from its reimbursement remedy those employees who were not coerced into joining a union, e.g., those who “voluntarily” joined or supported an unlawfully assisted union, prior to the effective date of an unlawful contract. 14 The Board’s Order reiterated this burden allocation and required the respondents to: “[j]ointly and severally disgorge all dues, fees and benefit contributions made by or on behalf of employees . . . to the Id. at 14 (citing Polyclinic Medical Center, supra at 1257). Thus, in that instance the Board stated that, at the compli- ance stage, it would be the Respondent’s burden to adduce evidence of noncoercion. Similarly, here, I find it appropriate to assign the burden of proof on the issue of voluntariness to the Respondent. Respondent claims a particular disability in this regard inas- much as the cards which were allegedly obtained by Local 300S were disposed of and unavailable at the hearing. It is also the case that the record here establishes that Respondent did not have access to the authorization cards in question. Neverthe- less, it is a basic tenet of Board law that an employer extends voluntary recognition to a union at its own peril. Ladies Gar- ment Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731 (1961). In particular, an employer who relies on authorization cards to support a claim of majority status bears the risk that such cards may have a disability which would preclude a finding that a valid majority existed. In such situations an employer is not exonerated from its conduct in recognizing a minority union.15 In a similar vein, it stands to follow that such a party would not be relieved from its subsequent liability in a compliance proceeding based upon an inability to come forward with valid cards or other evidence to support a claim of mitigation. Moreover, it is well- established that when ambiguities or uncertainties exist in com- pliance proceedings, doubts should be resolved in favor of the wronged party rather than the wrongdoer, see, e.g., Paper Moon Milano, 318 NLRB 962, 963 (1995), United Aircraft Corp., 204 NLRB 1068 (1973). I additionally note that while Respondent has argued that the General Counsel failed to call witnesses to confirm that they had not signed cards, the converse is also true: Respondent could have availed itself of an opportunity at the hearing to establish mitigation through testimonial evidence. In this re- gard, Respondent was in a position to readily identify those employees who were employed during the relevant period, and has presented no evidence that it unsuccessfully attempted to do so or that Respondent would have been unable to contact them to testify in this proceeding. Nor did Respondent seek to adduce testimony from Robinson about whether any employee, other than those whose cards had been disposed of, had voluntarily joined the Union prior to January 8, 2004. Thus, Respondent failed to avail itself of the opportunity to present relevant evi- dence going to the issue of whether employees had voluntarily joined the Union prior to the effective date of the contract. Based on the foregoing, I find that Respondent has failed to meet its burden of establishing that any employee named in the compliance specification voluntarily joined and became a member of Local 300S prior to January 8, 2004. B. The Claim that an Order Requiring Reimbursement of Employees is “Unduly Burdensome” At the hearing, and in its posthearing brief, Respondent claimed that it would be unduly burdensome to assess responsi- extent that such payments are not shown by the Respondent to have been noncoercive.” 336 NLRB at 16. 15 See generally Le Marquis Hotel, LLC, 340 NLRB 485, 492 (2003), and cases cited therein. DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 8 bility for the dues reimbursement to Respondent alone. In sup- port of this contention, Respondent argues that there was never any finding in the underlying case that Respondent coerced em- ployees to sign cards for Local 300S, nor was there any dispute that the arbitrator had concluded that that union represented a majority of employees. Respondent further argues that it was Local 300S who received the benefit of the dues, and that Re- spondent derived no benefit from them. Such arguments raise matters which have been previously considered by the Board and the Third Circuit and will be discussed in further detail below. With regard to the evidence developed in the instant case, Re- spondent relies on Robinson’s testimony that any attempt to seek subrogation from Local 300S by Respondent would bankrupt that union. As an initial matter, Respondent failed to raise the claim that the Board’s remedy is unduly burdensome, tantamount to an affirmative defense, in its answer to the compliance specifica- tion.16 At the hearing, however, Respondent entered into stipula- tions with the General Counsel and the Charging Party which, in essence, amended its answer with regard to paragraphs 5 and 6 of the compliance specification and in the course of doing so spe- cifically stated that it was reserving its right to contest that the amounts set forth in the compliance specification were due to employees named therein. Although a fair argument can be made that Respondent’s amended answer, as again amended at hearing, does not meet the Board’s requirements for specificity,17 affording the Respondent the benefit of the doubt on this issue, I will consider the evidence proffered by the Respondent in sup- port of its argument that “changed circumstances” have rendered the Board’s remedy “unduly burdensome.” The only evidence adduced in support of this defense is Re- spondent’s claimed inability to seek contribution from Local 300S. As an initial matter, there is no finding as against Local 300S, so the issue of that union’s liability is not properly before me. Further, any purported right of subrogation held by Respon- dent is irrelevant to any issue in this case, where a Board Order, enforced by the Third Circuit, has found that Respondent is liable for the reimbursement of the employees involved herein.18 Moreover, there is no evidence to support the general claim of “changed circumstances” advanced by the Respondent. No evi- dence has been adduced to support the assertion that an order requiring reimbursement of employees for unlawfully withheld 16 Sec. 102.56(c) of the Board’s Rules and Regulations sets forth the effect of a respondent’s failure to answer or plead specifically and in detail to allegations in a compliance specification. 17 In this regard, I note that Respondent did not seek to amend that paragraph of its amended answer where it was acknowledged that cer- tain employees were due reimbursement. 18 Moreover, as to the asserted financial circumstances of Local 300S, as noted above, I note that Respondent has not supported its factual assertions with competent evidence. Robinson is no longer president of that union and there is no evidence to suggest that he is currently familiar with the state of its finances. In fact, he admitted that his current knowledge was “minimal.” Parenthetically, I note that even if the Respondent and Local 300S had been held jointly and severally liable for the reimbursement remedy ordered herein, any purported inability of one respondent to pay its share does not relieve the obliga- tion of any other party. See, e.g., Regional Import & Export Trucking, 323 NLRB 1206, 1207 (1997). dues and fees would be “unduly burdensome” as that standard has been applied by the Board. In particular, Respondent has presented no evidence in this compliance proceeding regarding any limitation on its financial resources, threat to its continued viability, negative impact on employees or consumers or any other purported hardship which would be caused by compliance with the Board’s order. In this regard, as a matter of law, the authority relied on by Re- spondent in support of its contentions is unpersuasive. In Plumb- ers Local 425 (Lummus Corp.), 125 NLRB 1161 (1959), the respondent union contended by way of defense in an unfair labor practice proceeding that the application of the Brown-Olds rem- edy19 sought by the General Counsel would be punitive. In sup- port of this contention, the respondent, among other things, sought to make an offer of proof that because of the respondent union’s limited financial resources, enforcement of a reimburse- ment order against it would jeopardize its existence and deprive its members of vested rights to certain benefits. The Board held that proof respecting the respondent’s financial inability to com- ply with a reimbursement order should be reserved for considera- tion in the compliance stage of the proceeding. Lummus Corp. appears to have been last cited in a published decision by Justice Harlan in his concurrence in Carpenters Lo- cal 60 v. NLRB, supra, and not for the point of law urged by the Respondent here.20 Nevertheless, Respondent has drawn my attention to a January 31, 2007 unpublished Board order in Elm- hurst Care Center, Cases 20–CA–22674 and 2–CB–10843. In the underlying case, the Board had ordered the respondent em- ployer and union to reimburse employees for union dues and initiation fees. In response to the respondents motions for re- consideration and rehearing, the Board, relying in part on Lummus Corp., stated that, consistent with the Board’s policy on remedial matters, it would permit the parties to introduce, at the compliance stage of the proceeding, evidence relevant to whether the remedy ordered was unduly burdensome. Al- though I do not find that the Board’s unpublished order has precedential value with respect to the instant case, I note that the issues involved there are similar to ones under consideration here. Thus, it appears from the order in Elmhurst Care Center that the Board remains amenable to allowing respondents to as- sert and litigate through relevant evidence claims that a reim- bursement remedy would be unduly burdensome. In any event, 19 Prior to the Court’s decision in Carpenters Local 60, discussed above, the Board required unions to reimburse employees for all dues and assessments received under unlawful union-security agreements. Plumbers Local 231 (Brown-Olds Plumbing & Heating Corp.), 115 NLRB 594 (1956). In Carpenters Local 60, the Court invalidated such a remedy as “punitive” and found that the Board erred in compelling the respondent union, under the so-called Brown-Olds rule to refund dues, assessments and work permit fees collected from employees who had been members of that union at the time they had been employed on the job in question. 20 Lummus Corp. was cited by Justice Harlan as standing for the proposition that, at that time, Board law found an illegal closed shop or discriminatory hiring practices to create an irrebutable presumption of coercion. In the context of this case, I note that Justice Harlan charac- terized evidence that employees had voluntarily made dues or assess- ment payments as “defensive.” 365 U.S. at 657. REGENCY GRANDE NURSING & REHABILITATION CENTER 9 however, I find Lummus Corp. does not compel the result sought by the Respondent inasmuch as I have concluded, as discussed above, that the evidence adduced by Respondent on this issue is irrelevant to any matter properly before me and that Respondent has otherwise failed to support its claims herein. Lear Siegler, Inc., 295 NLRB 857, 861 (1989), also relied on by Respondent, dealt with an order to restore a manufacturing operation that had been moved to another location because the employer did not want to deal with the Union. The administra- tive law judge ordered the respondent to reestablish and resume production of its operations as they had been prior to the unfair labor practices and to reinstate all discriminatorily laid-off unit employees. As a result of the respondent’s exceptions to the judge’s order, the Board directed that the employer be permitted to introduce evidence at the compliance hearing that the restora- tion remedy was unduly burdensome. In that case, the Board additionally announced that it would henceforth apply the “un- duly burdensome” standard to any respondent challenging the appropriateness of such a restoration remedy. Notwithstanding the foregoing, I am mindful that this case was also cited by the Board in its unpublished January 31, 2007 order as has been described above. However, in my view this case is inapposite to the present circumstances where the sole remedy sought by the General Counsel is monetary, and, as noted above, there is no evidence to prove that such a remedy would be unduly burden- some, in any event.21 21 As noted above, in its posthearing brief Respondent has also ar- gued that the remedy sought herein is unduly burdensome because there was never any finding in the underlying case that Respondent coerced employees to sign cards for Local 300S, that the arbitrator had con- cluded that that union represented a majority of employees, that Local 300S received the benefit of the dues, and that Respondent derived no benefit from them. Respondent has cited no case which stands for the proposition that such circumstances constitute an undue burden which would obviate the imposition of the Board’s remedy, and I find that they do not. I additionally note that Respondent’s contentions as set forth above echo arguments raised before the Board and the Third Circuit which have been duly considered and rejected. For example, Judge Davis, affirmed by the Board, found Respondent’s defense that it honored the arbitrator’s award in good faith to be unwarranted based upon the facts of the case as well as applicable Board law. Respondent then argued before the court that the Board erred in not deferring to the arbitrator’s award. The court rejected that argument, finding that based on the evidence adduced in the record, the Board did not abuse its discretion in declining to follow the arbitrator’s decision. Respondent additionally argued to the Third Circuit that requiring it, but not Local 300S, to refund dues was tantamount to a penalty and not a proper make-whole relief. Although the Board had previously rejected this argument on the ground that it had not been timely raised in exceptions, the Third Circuit found that the Respondent’s statement of exceptions was “minimally sufficient” to warrant its consideration of the remedy. The court found that the remedy ordered by the Board was proper in- asmuch as it restored the status quo ante and did not exceed the Board’s discretion. Thus, even if I were to find Respondent’s arguments to be compelling, which I do not, such matters have been previously litigated in the underlying unfair labor practice proceeding. Scepter Ingot Cast- ings, Inc., 341 NLRB 997 (2004) (citing Grinnel Fire Protection Sys- tems Co., 337 NLRB 141, 142 (2001)); Triple A Fire Protection, 353 NLRB No. 88, slip op. at 3 (2009) (citing Convergence Communica- tions, Inc., 342 NLRB 918, 191 (2004)). III. CONCLUSION On these finding of fact and conclusions of law and on the en- tire record, I issue the following recommended22 ORDER It is hereby ordered that Respondent Regency Grande Nursing & Rehabilitation Center, its officers, agents, successors, and as- signs, shall make whole those individuals named in the compli- ance specification, as amended herein and set forth below23 plus interest as prescribed in New Horizons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987). Employee Name Grand Total Abril, Jamie $190.00 Acevedo, Maria 290.00 Antunez, Isabel 30.00 Agrinsoni, Claudia 20.00 Aguado, Nora 140.00 Angel, Jaime 100.00 Appel, Ricardo 590.00 Agron, Lilibeth A. 20.00 Arias, Angie 120.00 Arias, Darley 50.00 Arias, Javier 170.00 Arellano, Elizabeth 100.00 Armstrong, Kelly 940.00 Artigas, Lucrecia 280.00 Artigas, Pablo 750.00 Atehortua, Diego 10.00 Augustine, Elma 280.00 Ayala, Nilsa 940.00 Baker, Dorothy 130.00 Balbuena, Carlos 940.00 Basulato, Aida 0.00 Bell, Kelly 170.00 Best, Jr., Douglas 170.00 Best, Kathy 0.00 Betancourth, Sylvia 200.00 22 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings conclusions and recom- mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all purposes. 23 As noted above, pursuant to stipulation of the parties the compli- ance specification was amended as follows: claimant Maria Carrion (also listed as Maria Oulds) is owed a total sum of $780; claimant Lino Navarro (also listed as Nino Navarro) is owed a total sum of $510; claimant Rosita Fitzpatrick (also listed as Rosita Romero) is owed $940. In addition, the General Counsel has made the uncontested claim that Fanny Maria Zapata (also listed as Fanny Marie Ruendes) is owed $750. DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 10 Bojkovic, Hajrije 940.00 Bojkovic, Ilira 401.00 Bonnell, Janet 560.00 Buitrago, Diana 180.00 Caamano, Aida 60.00 Camacho, Ana 940.00 Canepa, Andrea 120.00 Cano, Victoria 140.00 Carmona, Maria 940.00 Carreon, Maria E 780.00 Castro, Francisco 940.00 Castro-Richards, Rosa 950.00 Catania, Noemi 140.00 Celentano, Ashley 100.00 Chavis, Fabiola 50.00 Chavis, Cornell 670.00 Cochran, Krystle L. 270.00 Conklin, Minnie 100.00 Cornier, Inocencio 940.00 Correa, Gricelda 100.00 Cortes, Debora 100.00 Crosby, Gwendolyn 940.00 Cuellar, Jeison 160.00 Culleny, Marion 60.00 Delgado, Roman J. 50.00 Duque, Alberto 270.00 Duque, Andrea 70.00 Dale, Patti 100.00 Easton, Warren 940.00 Enriquez, Brenda 950.00 Escobedo Pro, Rames 50.00 Estrada, Rosana E 240.00 Estudillo, Cristal 920.00 Estudillo, Estrella 380.00 Fauste, Jose Omar 800.00 Ferreira, Ana Maria 940.00 Ferreira, Mariela 0.00 Figueroa, Elizabeth 20.00 Figueroa, Manuela Erika 920.00 Finlayson, Alnora 100.00 Fitzpatrick, Rosita 940.00 Florez, Diana M. 170.00 Forrest, Doreth 510.00 Foster, Katrina 30.00 Francis, Dorie 60.00 Franco, Alba 940.00 Fudriai, Claudia 340.00 Garcia, Elvira 940.00 Garcia, Raul 120.00 Garderes, Virginia 170.00 Garnder, Carole 940.00 Gatling, Leatha 900.00 Gibbons, Michael 940.00 Giraldo, Leidy 50.00 Gomez, Natalia P 20.00 Gonzalez, Jose A 120.00 Gonzalez, Mauricio 200.00 Grames, Charles 10.00 Groman, Nancy 60.00 Guida, Silvia 630.00 Gutierrez, Jennifer 310.00 Hall, Jahmad 291.31 Harvey, Norma 920.00 Hernandez, Leidi 90.00 Hickenbottom, Kerry Ann 600.00 Hickenbottom, Tyreese 170.00 Hidalgo, Miguel 940.00 Hunter, Barbara 510.00 Hunter, Desmond 150.00 Jackson, Melouise 340.00 Jasso, Cristina 160.00 Jiminez, Dulce 170.00 Kaur, Amarjeet 210.00 Kaur, Kulwinder 180.00 Kennedy, Shannon 670.00 Laboy, Alex Leoner 90.00 Lasaga, Matias 340.00 Lascano, Filomena 80.00 Lewis, Sylvia 310.00 Lopez, Carolina 230.00 Lopez, Eduardo 510.00 Lopez, Navih 50.00 Maidana, Valeria 80.00 Mantilla, Arlyn 50.00 Martinez, Nubia 110.00 Masini, Ana 40.00 Massari, Anthony 40.00 Masson, Jorge 510.00 McClanahan, Grethel 260.00 McLean, Velma 20.00 McCord, Robin 340.00 Meikle, Michele 940.00 Meirelles, Marcelo 70.00 Mella, Paola 940.00 REGENCY GRANDE NURSING & REHABILITATION CENTER 11 Mendez, Ruth 120.00 Mendez, Sol M. 470.00 Miraflores, Gelia 10.00 Modafferi, Michelle -60.00 Mohamed, Swalaha 940.00 Molena Oyola, Isela* (Same) 90.00 Moncaleano, Adela 850.00 Montanez, Carmen 260.00 Montenegro, Victoria 940.00 Moraga, Juan 510.00 Muneton, Eliana 30.00 Montoya, Ana 130.00 Montoya, Claudia 40.00 Moreira, Julio Cesar 90.00 Munoz, Claudia 460.00 Munoz, Flor de Maria 30.00 Munoz, Jennifer 130.00 Myers, Amy 0.40 Navarro, Lino 510.00 Navarro, Maria E. 310.00 Newell, Joan 600.00 Noel, Rita 940.00 Orbes, Diana 270.00 Orihuela, Ana M. 80.00 Orozco, Diana 190.00 Ortiz, Jasmin 80.00 Ospina, Ofelia 950.00 Oulds, Dominique N. 230.00 Palomba, Frieda 40.00 Palomino, Greyssi 230.00 Parks, Laureen Anne 600.00 Pasion, Juanito 180.00 Pafez, Nestor E. 780.00 Pedraza-Rodrigu, Samaris 100.00 Phelan, Helen 860.00 Pizano, Monserrat 50.00 Portilla, Gloria 40.00 Posse, Cindy 120.00 Richards, Joyce 940.00 Ritzie, Omar Antony 150.00 Riveria, Elvira 40.00 Roberts, Christine M. 80.00 Roberts, Marion 160.00 Rodriquez, Miquel Hernand 310.00 Rohde, Kathy Patricia 920.00 Rojas, Ivonne 360.00 Rojas, Marianela 490.00 Rosario, Kimberly 90.00 Ruiz Morocho, Yessica 160.00 Ruiz, William 80.00 Saavedra, Veronica 550.00 Sadick, Zahira 940.00 Salazar, Melida 290.00 Saldarriaga, Nathalia 40.00 Sanchez, Betty 330.00 Sanchez, Jose 940.00 Sanchez, Tecza 480.00 Secola, Patricia 140.00 Shann, Steven 360.00 Siepierski, Karina 240.00 Silva, Nancy B. 550.00 Silveira, Nestor 180.00 Smith, Harry 940.00 Soto, Justin 310.00 Soto, Maria Lenor 310.00 Stuber, Miriam 70.00 Studivant, Alnora 40.00 Suarez, Gabiela 0.00 Tavera, Elvira 900.00 Taylor, Donna 70.00 Terry, Mary 940.00 Thomas, Mattie 300.00 Torres, Stephanie 190.00 Toussaint, Edythe M. 170.00 Toxqui, Jose 40.00 Trujillo, Wilfer 490.00 Tuballes, Amado Bart B 600.00 Uddin, Katijha 50.00 Valentin, Francisco 440.00 Vergara, Brenda 80.00 Villegas, Viviana 120.00 Walker, Mary Delores 940.00 Walling, Belinda 130.00 Wayside, Jessica 230.00 Waysome, Vivienne 940.00 Witto, Paola 760.00 Zabala, Liberato 50.00 Zapata, Fanny Marie 750.00 Zaretskie, Angela 40.00 Zelada, Flores R 370.00 Zorilla, Nancy 80.00 TOTAL $74,792.71 Dated May 28, 2009