Trump Marina Casino Resort

354 NLRB No. 123 NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the bound volumes of NLRB decisions. Readers are requested to notify the Ex- ecutive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C. 20570, of any typographical or other formal errors so that corrections can be included in the bound volumes. Trump Marina Associates, LLC d/b/a Trump Marina Casino Resort and International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Im- plement Workers of America, UAW. Case 4– CA–36528 December 31, 2009 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN LIEBMAN AND MEMBER SCHAUMBER On August 27, 2009, Administrative Law Judge Robert A. Giannasi issued the attached decision. The Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and the General Counsel filed an answering brief. The National Labor Relations Board1 has considered the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the judge’s rulings, find- ings,2 and conclusions and to adopt the recommended Order. 1 Effective midnight December 28, 2007, Members Liebman, Schaumber, Kirsanow, and Walsh delegated to Members Liebman, Schaumber, and Kirsanow, as a three-member group, all of the Board’s powers in anticipation of the expiration of the terms of Members Kir- sanow and Walsh on December 31, 2007. Pursuant to this delegation, Chairman Liebman and Member Schaumber constitute a quorum of the three-member group. As a quorum, they have the authority to issue decisions and orders in unfair labor practice and representation cases. See Sec. 3(b) of the Act. See Narricot Industries, L.P. v. NLRB, ___ F.3d ___, 2009 WL 4016113 (4th Cir. Nov. 20, 2009); Snell Island SNF LLC v. NLRB, 568 F.3d 410 (2d Cir. 2009), petition for cert. filed 78 U.S.L.W. 3130 (U.S. Sept. 11, 2009) (No. 09-328); New Process Steel v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 840 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. granted ___ S.Ct. ___, 2009 WL 1468482 (U.S. Nov. 2, 2009); Northeastern Land Ser- vices v. NLRB, 560 F.3d 36 (1st Cir. 2009), petition for cert. filed 78 U.S.L.W. 3098 (U.S. Aug. 18, 2009) (No. 09-213); Teamsters Local 523 v. NLRB, ___ F.3d ___, 2009 WL 4912300 (10th Cir. Dec. 22, 2009). But see Laurel Baye Healthcare of Lake Lanier, Inc. v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 469 (D.C. Cir. 2009), petition for cert. filed 78 U.S.L.W. 3185 (U.S. Sept. 29, 2009) (No. 09-377). 2 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an adminis- trative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear preponder- ance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing the findings. We agree with the judge that the Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)(1) by maintaining and enforcing unlawfully broad rules prohibiting employ- ees from releasing statements to the news media without prior approval, and authorizing only certain representatives to speak with the media. The Respondent argues that the judge erroneously conflated the rules, but the Respondent acknowledged in its posthearing brief that the rules are part of a bifurcated approach to limit employee statements to the media. Further, the judge found that after Shift Manager Karen Lew asked employee Mario Spina if he had spoken to the media, Lew refer- ORDER The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec- ommended Order of the administrative law judge and orders that the Respondent, Trump Marina Associates, LLC d/b/a Trump Marina Casino Resort, Atlantic City, New Jersey, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Order. Dated, Washington, D.C. December 31, 2009 ______________________________________ Wilma B. Liebman, Chairman ______________________________________ Peter C. Schaumber, Member (SEAL) NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Emily DeSa, Esq., for the General Counsel. Brian A. Caufield, Esq., of Roseland, New Jersey, for the Re- spondent. Cassie R. Ehrenberg, Esq., of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for the Charging Party. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE ROBERT A. GIANNASI, Administrative Law Judge. This case was tried in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on June 3, 2009. The complaint alleges that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by maintaining and enforcing rules restricting employ- ees from speaking to the media about protected concerted and union activities within the meaning of Section 7 of the Act. The complaint also alleges that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) by interrogating an employee concerning his communi- cations with the media about the decision of an NLRB adminis- trative law judge in a case involving Respondent, and advising the employee that the communication violated Respondent’s rules against speaking to the media. Respondent filed an an- swer denying the essential allegations of the complaint. The enced both rules. The credited testimony was that Lew asked Spina if Spina represented the Respondent, and reminded him that in the future he would need prior approval before speaking to the media, thus invok- ing both rules to “restrict Section 7 activity.” See Crowne Plaza Hotel, 352 NLRB 382, 383 (2008), citing Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia, 343 NLRB 646, 646–647 (2004). Member Schaumber agrees that the Respondent’s questioning of Spina constituted an unlawful interrogation, not necessarily because the Respondent attempted to enforce rules the Board is now finding overly broad, but because the Respondent was clearly inquiring into his Sec. 7 activity. In support of his finding that the rules are unlawfully overbroad, the judge cited Saginaw Control & Engineering, Inc., 339 NLRB 541 (2003). However, in that case there were no exceptions to the Board on that finding. Accordingly, Saginaw Control has no precedential value and we do not rely on it. However, Brunswick Corp., 282 NLRB 794, 795 (1987), also cited by the judge, has precedential value and supports his finding. DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 2 General Counsel and Respondent filed posthearing briefs, which I have read and considered. Based on the entire record in this case, including the testi- mony of the witnesses, and my observation of their demeanor, I make the following Findings of Fact Jurisdiction Respondent, a New Jersey corporation, is engaged in the op- eration of a hotel and casino in Atlantic City, New Jersey. During a representative 1-year period, Respondent received gross revenues in excess of $500,000, and purchased and re- ceived, at its casino, goods valued in excess of $5000 directly from points outside the State of New Jersey. Accordingly, I find, as Respondent admits, that it is an em- ployer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. The Charging Party Union (the Union) is a labor organiza- tion within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. The Alleged Unfair Labor Practices Background On July 18, 2008, Administrative Law Judge Earl Shamwell issued his decision in Cases 4–CA–35334, et al., involving the same Respondent and Union that are involved in the instant case. Judge Shamwell found that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act in several respects; recommended dismissing other complaint allegations; and sustained certain objections to a Board representation election held on May 11, 2007, among Respondent’s casino dealers. Among the unfair labor practices he found were that Respondent’s Shift Manager Karen Lew discriminatorily issued employee Mario Spina, a leading and open union supporter, a suspension and final warn- ing, after summoning Spina into her office on April 27, 2007. Judge Shamwell also found that Respondent’s unlawful con- duct warranted setting aside the election. On February 17, 2009, the Board affirmed most of Judge Shamwell’s findings, including those involving the suspension and warning of employee Mario Spina. The Board also found, contrary to the judge, that Respondent had additionally violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act when a supervisor made two coercive statements to Spina. In addition, the Board affirmed Judge Shamwell’s order that the election be set aside and a new elec- tion take place. As of the time of the hearing in this case, the new election had not been held, because the Respondent filed a petition to review the Board’s Order. That petition was still pending at the time of the hearing. Respondent’s Handbook Rules on Talking to the Media It is stipulated that Respondent’s handbook contains the fol- lowing rules: EMPLOYEE CONDUCT Violation of, disregard for, or any departure from a posted or known Company policy or departmental rule, or commission of any prohibited conduct as outlined below will subject employees to disciplinary action up to and in- cluding discharge: . . . . 36. Releasing statement to the news media without prior authorization. . . . . PUBLIC SPEAKING/MEDIA REQUESTS It is the policy of Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts that only the following employees, Chief Executive Officer, the respective property’s Chief Operating Officer, General Manager or Public Relations Director/Manager is author- ized to speak with the media. Employee Spina Comments on Judge Shamwell’s Decision After the issuance of Judge Shamwell’s decision, a union representative called employee Mario Spina and asked for his comment on the decision. Spina, who understood that the comment would be used in a union publication, said that the judge had gotten “it exactly right,” referring to the determina- tion that the Respondent had discriminated against him. Sub- sequently, on July 29, 2008, the Union issued a press release describing Judge Shamwell’s decision in favorable terms. In that release, Spina was quoted as saying, “The judge got this one exactly right.” He was also quoted as saying, “[T]he com- pany broke all kinds of rules and interfered with our right to vote—and we’re not going to allow them to get away with it.” As a result of the Union’s press release, an Associated Press article appeared in the Atlantic City Courier Post about Judge Shamwell’s decision. The article used the quotations of Spina that appeared in the Union’s press release. Several of Respon- dent’s management officials saw the story and expressed con- cern that Spina might have violated Respondent’s policy, set forth in its rules above, against talking to the media without permission. Spina had not been authorized by Respondent to talk to the media about Judge Shamwell’s decision. Shift Man- ager Karen Lew, who had issued Spina the earlier discrimina- tory warning and suspension, took the lead in investigating Spina’s possible violation of Respondent’s media policy. She first consulted Respondent’s vice president and the director of employee relations and obtained approval to talk to Spina about the possible infraction. Respondent Confronts Spina About His Comments On August 12, 2008, Respondent summoned Spina from his work station to Shift Manager Karen Lew’s office. The office is one of several in an area off the casino floor. It is used by different shift managers and is also the site of some training meetings, although it is a relatively small office, about 12 feet by 12 feet. Between the time Spina was summoned to the of- fice and the time he reported, Casino Administrator Mark Wal- ter arrived in the office to talk to Lew about some scheduling matters. He remained in the office after Spina arrived and throughout the short meeting between Lew and Spina, although he did not say anything. Lew sat at one of the two desks in the Shift Manager’s office and Spina sat across from her about 5 feet away. Lew mentioned the Courier Post article to Spina and referred to his quoted statement in the article. She also mentioned Re- spondent’s policy against talking to the media. She asked Spina if he had talked to the media and Spina responded that he had talked only to a union representative. Lew also asked if TRUMP MARINA ASSOCIATES 3 Spina was a representative of the Trump dealers or of Trump and he said that he had made no such statement. Lew then reminded Spina that in the future he would have to receive prior approval before speaking to the media. The above is based on the composite testimony of Spina, Lew and Walter, all of whom testified about the meeting. Ex- cept in one respect, to the extent that their testimony conflicts, I rely primarily on the testimony of Spina, whom I viewed as a candid and reliable witness.1 There are two significant con- flicts in the testimony of the three witnesses to the meeting. Walter and Lew testified that Lew asked whether Spina was aware of Respondent’s policy against talking to the media without authorization and Spina responded that he was not aware of it. Spina did not testify that the specific question was asked or that he responded he was not aware of the policy. His testimony is that Lew asked whether he talked to the media and affirmatively stated that he had violated the policy. In addition, Spina testified that Lew asked him if he was a representative of the Trump dealers or Trump and he said that he had made no such statement. Lew denied asking Spina whether he was a representative of the Trump dealers. Walter did not testify about that matter; thus, he did not corroborate Lew. As indicated above, I found Spina the most credible witness of the three who testified about the meeting. Neither Walter nor Lew impressed me as reliable witnesses. Walter’s testi- mony was very conclusory and he could not even recall whether Lew mentioned the newspaper article to Spina. Lew’s testimony was likewise conclusory, not corroborated by Walter in one respect, and implausible in other respects. For example, on cross-examination, she testified that Spina volunteered, without prompting or responding to a question by her, that he did not make the statement to the press, but made it to a union representative. It seems obvious to me that Spina’s statement was in response to a question from Lew. In addition, Lew testi- fied that she did not ascertain from Spina whether he permitted himself to be quoted. Again, that seems to me implausible, in view of her stated purpose in calling Spina into her office. Moreover, I perceived in Lew’s demeanor a reluctance to tes- tify in detail about her remarks to Spina. She seemed more interested in summarily testifying that she simply wanted to make Spina aware of the Respondent’s policy and nothing more, thus exculpating herself from the allegations in this case. Discussion and Analysis Respondent does not dispute that Spina’s comments to his union representative, which were then repeated in a press re- lease by the Union and carried in at least one newspaper, amounted to protected concerted activity within the meaning of Section 7 of the Act. See generally, Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556 (1978). The question then is whether the maintenance and enforcement of Respondent’s rules were unlawful and 1 I do not accept Spina’s testimony that Lew did not reference Re- spondent’s written policy in their meeting. He testified that Lew sim- ply stated that he had violated Respondent’s policy. I find it more plausible that she did at least reference Respondent’s written rules, contained in the handbook, in accordance with her testimony and that of Walter. whether Respondent’s interrogation of Spina about his possible violation of the rules was coercive.2 The Unlawful Maintenance and Enforcement of Respondent’s Rules In Crowne Plaza Hotel, 352 NLRB 382 (2008), the Board faced an issue similar to that presented in this case: whether a rule prohibiting employees from talking to the press was unlaw- fully broad and thus violative of the Act. Citing Valley Hospi- tal Medical Center, 351 NLRB 1250, 1252 (2007), the Board affirmed that Section 7 of the Act protects “employee commu- nications to the public that are part of and related to an ongoing labor dispute.” Id. at 386 fn. 21. In Crowne Plaza, the Board found that the rule in that case could reasonably be construed as “prohibiting all employee communications with the media re- garding a labor dispute;” at the very least, the rule could be viewed as “ambiguous.” The Board concluded that the rule was facially overbroad and thus the maintenance of the rule was violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Id. at 386. See also, with respect to interfering with the protected right to talk to the media about labor disputes, St. Luke’s Episcopal-Presbyterian Hospitals, 331 NLRB 761, 762 (2000); and Hacienda de Salud- Espanola, 317 NLRB 962, 966 (1995). Applying Crowne Plaza to the facts of this case, I find that Respondent’s rules likewise interfere with the Section 7 right of employees to communicate with the public concerning an on- going labor dispute. Indeed, this is a stronger case than Crowne Plaza because the communication involved an earlier Board case between Respondent and the Union and the communica- tion was made by an employee who was found by an adminis- trative law judge to have been discriminated against in that case. The employee’s comment that the judge’s decision was “exactly right” is surely the type of comment that the Act pro- tects. Moreover, the meeting at which Shift Supervisor Lew made clear that Respondent’s rules applied to his comments shows in dramatic fashion that Respondent not only maintained its unlawfully broad rules against talking to the media, but that it was enforcing them—indeed enforcing them specifically to encumber communication related to an ongoing labor dispute. Accordingly, I find that Respondent violated the Act by main- taining and enforcing unlawfully broad rules prohibiting em- ployee communication with the media.3 2 Although it appears that only one of Respondent’s rules specifi- cally prohibits employees from talking to the media without permis- sion, it is clear that another ancillary rule limits the individuals who are authorized to speak with the media. Thus, although sometimes only one rule is referenced in the testimony, it is clear that both rules operate to limit protected concerted or union activity and both were mentioned in the complaint. As discussed more fully below, Respondent ac- knowledges that the two rules are to be read together as a single policy, which Respondent characterizes as bifurcated. 3 The fact that the prohibition was conditioned on not first obtaining Respondent’s permission does not save the rules. To the extent that an employee is required to obtain permission before engaging in protected activity, that requirement is an impediment to the full exercise of an employee’s Sec. 7 rights. See Saginaw Control & Engineering, Inc., 339 NLRB 541, 553 (2003); and Brunswick Corp., 282 NLRB 794, 795 (1987). DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 4 As noted, Respondent describes its media policy as bifur- cated (Br. 15–16). According to Respondent, the rule set forth in its handbook under the heading, public speaking/media re- quests, contains no prohibition, but merely defines who is au- thorized to speak to the media on behalf of Respondent. Simi- larly, Respondent contends that rule 36, set forth in the hand- book under the heading, employee conduct, contains no sub- stantive prohibition, but merely establishes an authorization procedure for media statements by employees not speaking on behalf of Respondent. Respondent’s characterization is at odds with the facts. As set forth above, Respondent’s public speak- ing/media requests rule states that only certain specified offi- cers and managers are “authorized to speak with the media.” The employee conduct section of Respondent’s rules makes violations or disregard of any posted or known policy or rule ground for “disciplinary action up to and including discharge” and rule 36 of that section specifically prohibits “[r]eleasing statement[s] to the news media without prior authorization.” Contrary to Respondent’s contentions (Br. 13, 15), the very nature of the Lew-Spina meeting shows that the rules did not simply amount to an authorization policy; the rules were ap- plied to and enforced against Spina. Although he was not dis- ciplined, Spina was reminded of the rules against unauthorized talking to the media and the clear implication was that he should not violate those rules again or he would be disciplined. Indeed, as noted, the handbook clearly states that violation of any known or posted rule or policy “will subject employees to disciplinary action up to and including discharge.” Nothing in Lew’s remarks to Spina contradicted the handbook’s discipli- nary statement, or limited application of the rules to conduct other than protected concerted or union activity. In these cir- cumstances, Respondent’s attempt to distinguish Crowne Plaza (Br. 15) is unavailing. Respondent’s contention that its rules are justified by busi- ness considerations is also without merit. The breadth of the rules far exceeds the reasons offered to justify them. Barbara Hulsizer, Respondent’s director of employee relations and di- versity, testified that the reason for the rules is “[t]o prevent any statements that have anything to do with proprietary informa- tion or confidential information.” Tr. 91. Examples, she ex- plained, were “[a]ny sort of financial data that has not come to the point of being released, customer lists, marketing plans, new table game products, new slot products. . . .” Tr. 91–92. Those reasons have nothing to do with the Section 7 activities Spina was engaged in. Nor do those reasons provide a legiti- mate business reason to infringe on Section 7 activities gener- ally. Thus, here, as in Crowne Plaza, the “scope of the rule” is “not commensurate with” the limited intent suggested by Re- spondent’s reasons for the rule. 352 NLRB at 386. The Unlawful Interrogation Lew’s remarks at the meeting with Spina also constituted unlawful interrogation. As indicated above, the meeting amounted to an interview that probed into Spina’s protected union and concerted activity. Lew admittedly asked if Spina was aware of the no-talking-to-the-media policy, and, as found in my credibility determination above, she went further and asked another question—whether he represented Respondent or the dealers. In the circumstances, the questions were coercive. Those circumstances included an effort to enforce an unlaw- fully broad rule in an office setting that brought into play a previous disciplinary action against Spina by the very supervi- sor who was previously found to have issued an unlawful warn- ing and suspension against him in that very office. The ten- dency to coerce in those circumstances far outweighs the fact that Spina was a known supporter of the Union. This is not a situation where an employer asks a known union supporter whether or why he supports a union. It was because Spina was a known and active union supporter that Respondent raised its media rules with him. Lew was concerned that Spina’s pro- tected statements, reported in the media, were a violation of Respondent’s rules; she sought to confirm the possible viola- tion; and to warn against such conduct in the future. Intent, of course, is not a necessary element in an unlawful interrogation; rather, the test is the reasonable tendency of the questioning to restrain protected concerted activity. But, where, as here, an employer seeks to confirm particular protected activity and to restrain it in the future, the obvious tendency of the questioning is to have the restraining effect sought. Accordingly, I find that Respondent also violated the Act by interrogating Spina about his possible violation of its rules in an effort to inhibit continua- tion of his protected concerted activity. See Brighton Retail, Inc., 354 NLRB No. 62, slip op. 1 fn. 4 (2009); and M.V.M., Inc., 352 NLRB 1165, 1175 (2008). Conclusions of Law 1. Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by maintaining and enforcing rules that prohibit an employee from releasing statements to the media without prior permission or limit employees authorized to speak with the media and by interrogating an employee about the application of those rules. 2. The above violations are unfair labor practices within the meaning of the Act. REMEDY Having found that Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, I shall order that it cease and desist from the conduct found to be unlawful and to rescind its unlawful rules, remove them from its handbook, and advise employees in writing that its unlawful rules are no longer being maintained and enforced. Nothing shall prevent Respondent from reissuing similar rules to achieve legitimate business purposes that do not infringe on the Section 7 rights of employees. See Crowne Plaza Hotel, 352 NLRB 382, 388 fn. 33 (2008). On these findings of fact and conclusions of law, and on the entire record herein, I issue the following recommended4 ORDER The Respondent, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall 1. Cease and desist from 4 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur- poses. TRUMP MARINA ASSOCIATES 5 (a) Maintaining or enforcing rules in its employee handbook that prohibit employees from releasing statements to the news media without prior authorization and limiting the employees who are authorized to speak with the media. (b) Interrogating employees about violating rules that in- fringe on their protected Section 7 activities under the Act. (c) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them under Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec- tuate the policies of the Act. (a) Rescind the employee handbook’s rules with respect to employees releasing statements to the news media without prior authorization and limiting those who are authorized to speak with the media. (b) Furnish all current employees with inserts for the current employee handbook that (1) advise employees that the unlawful rules have been rescinded, or (2) provide the language of lawful rules; or publish and distribute revised employee handbooks that (1) do not contain the unlawful rules, or (2) provide the language of lawful rules. (c) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its fa- cility in Atlantic City, New Jersey, copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix.”5 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 4, after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in con- spicuous places, including all places where notices to employ- ees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, de- faced or covered by any other material. In the event that, dur- ing the pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current employees and former employees employed by the Respondent at any time since August 12, 2008. 5 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na- tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg- ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board.” (d) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the Respondent has taken to comply. Dated, Washington, D.C. August 27, 2009 APPENDIX NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this notice. FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO Form, join, or assist a union Choose representatives to bargain with us on your be- half Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection Choose not to engage in any of these protected activi- ties. WE WILL NOT maintain or enforce rules in our employee handbook that prohibit employees from releasing statements to the media without prior authorization and limit their authority to speak with the media. WE WILL NOT interrogate employees about their Section 7 rights. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, re- strain, coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed you in Section 7 of the Act. WE WILL rescind the rules set forth above from the employee handbook. WE WILL furnish all of you with inserts for the current em- ployee handbook that (1) advise you that the unlawful rules have been rescinded, or (2) provide the language of lawful rules; or publish and distribute revised employee handbooks that (1) do not contain the unlawful rules, or (2) provide the language of lawful rules. TRUMP MARINA ASSOCIATES, LLC TRUMP MARINA CASINO RESORT