A-1 Door and Building Solutions

A-1 DOOR & BUILDING SOLUTIONS 499 A-1 Door and Building Solutions and Millmen and Industrial Carpenters Union, Local 1618, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America. Case 20–CA–33485 January 11, 2011 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN LIEBMAN AND MEMBERS BECKER AND HAYES The issue presented in this case is whether the Re- spondent, A-1 Door and Building Solutions, violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by refusing to furnish relevant information requested by the Union.1 For the reasons discussed below, we agree with the judge that it did.2 The relevant facts are fully set forth in the judge’s de- cision. The Respondent manufactures and supplies doors to contractors in the construction industry. The Re- spondent and the Union have had a collective-bargaining relationship for approximately 40 years. The last con- tract between the Respondent and the Union was effec- 1 On January 15, 2008, Administrative Law Judge Gregory Z. Mey- erson issued the attached decision. The Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, the General Counsel filed an answering brief, and the Charging Party filed cross-exceptions and a supporting brief. The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the judge’s rulings, findings, and conclusions and to adopt the recommended Order as modified and set forth in full below. The Union excepts to the judge’s failure to order the Respondent to post the Board’s remedial notice on its intranet site. Consistent with our recently issued decision in J. Picini Flooring, 356 NLRB 11 (2010), we have ordered the Respondent to distribute the notice elec- tronically if it is customarily communicating with employees by such means.For the reasons stated in his dissenting opinion in J. Picini Flooring, supra, Member Hayes would not require electronic distribu- tion of the notice. The Union also excepts to some of the language that appears in the judge’s recommended notice. We find no merit in these exceptions, as the notice properly tracks the Board’s standard remedial language. Finally, we reject the Union’s request that the notice be read aloud in the Respondent’s facility. The Board grants notice-reading remedies only in cases where, unlike here, the respondent’s conduct has been egregious. Ishikawa Gasket America, Inc., 337 NLRB 175, 176 (2001). 2 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an adminis- trative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear preponder- ance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing the findings. No party has excepted to the judge’s finding that the Respondent vi- olated the Act by failing to furnish certain information regarding new employees requested by the Union in its July 6, 2007 letter, or to his finding that the Respondent’s 1-month delay in furnishing copies of documents given to new employees was not unlawful. tive from May 1, 2004, to May 1, 2007; negotiations for a new agreement began in April 2007.3 The parties held 10 bargaining sessions between April and September. From the outset, the parties were far apart on economic and other issues. The Respondent proposed, among other things, a substantial reduction in profit sharing for unit employees and a reduction in wag- es. The contested allegations involve the Union’s re- quests for information regarding the contractual profit- sharing plan and the Respondent’s job-bidding history. I. APRIL 26 AND AUGUST 8 REQUESTS FOR PROFIT-SHARING INFORMATION The expiring collective-bargaining agreement created a companywide profit-sharing plan for all salaried and hourly employees, including nonunit employees. Early in negotiations, the Respondent proposed cutting the em- ployees’ share of the net profits under the plan from 10 to 5 percent. By letter dated April 26, the Union request- ed that the Respondent disclose its net profit for each of the previous 3 years and the total amount of profit that was distributed to all employees during each of the past 3 years, along with the number of employees who received part of the distribution.4 The only information the Re- spondent provided in response to that request was the amount of profit distributed to bargaining unit employees over the 3-year period. The Respondent asserted that it was not required to provide the rest of the requested fi- nancial information. Sometime after the Union’s initial information request, Union Representative David Imus was given a paystub for nonunit employee John Wilkerson, which led him to believe that Wilkerson was receiving unusually large profit-sharing bonuses. If that was accurate, Imus sur- mised, it could have an adverse impact on the funds available for bargaining unit employees’ bonuses. By letter dated August 8, Imus requested the following in- formation from the Respondent: (1) [For] all salaried employees, including non- bargaining unit employees, name, job title, wage rate, gross yearly wages, [and] the date and the amount of profit sharing distribution for each year for the last three years; (2) [for] all hourly employees, including non-bargaining unit employees, [the same information as requested above]; (3) [the] name of all salaried or hourly employees, including non-bargaining unit em- ployees, [and] the amount of any other bonus or bonus- es paid to them during each of the last three years; 3 All dates hereafter are 2007, unless otherwise indicated. 4 The judge found that the Union was not entitled to information re- garding the Respondent’s gross revenues, which the Union had also requested in the letter, and no party has excepted to that finding. 356 NLRB No. 76 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 500 [and] (4) the employee name and the amount of any other non-wage compensation received by all salaried and hourly employees, including non-bargaining unit employees. The Respondent did not produce any of the requested in- formation. At a negotiation session on August 31, the Respondent presented the Union with a written proposal that the Un- ion select an accountant to examine the Respondent’s books and records and determine: (1) whether the Re- spondent’s profit and loss was calculated according to generally accepted accounting procedures, and if not, how it deviated from those procedures; and (2) whether the allocation of profit-sharing funds to union and nonun- ion employees was equal and made according to the same criteria and if not, the manner in which the alloca- tions were unequal. The parties briefly discussed the proposal and agreed to return to it later. There were no further discussions on this issue. The judge found that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by refusing to provide the requested prof- it-sharing information. The Respondent excepts that the judge failed to protect the privacy rights of nonunit em- ployees in ordering the production of the information, and that, in any event, its proposed accommodation was adequate. We agree with the judge. An employer’s duty to bargain includes a general duty to provide information needed by the bargaining repre- sentative in contract negotiations and administration. See NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 152–153 (1956); Caldwell Mfg. Co., 346 NLRB 1159, 1159 (2006). Generally, information concerning wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment for unit employees is presumptively relevant to the union’s role as exclusive collective-bargaining representative. See Southern California Gas Co., 344 NLRB 231, 235 (2005). By contrast, information concerning extra unit employees is not presumptively relevant; rather, rele- vance must be shown. Shoppers Food Warehouse Corp., 315 NLRB 258, 259 (1994). The burden to show rele- vance, however, is “not exceptionally heavy,” Leland Stanford Junior University, 262 NLRB 136, 139 (1982), enfd. 715 F.2d 473 (9th Cir. 1983); “[t]he Board uses a broad, discovery-type standard in determining relevance in information requests.” Shoppers Food Warehouse, supra at 259. The Respondent has not excepted to the judge’s find- ing that the General Counsel demonstrated the relevance of the requested profit-sharing information. In its brief in support of exceptions, however, the Respondent appar- ently contends that the General Counsel failed to show the relevance of that information as it pertained to non- unit employees. We shall disregard this argument, as it fails to comply with Section 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations. Section 102.46(b)(1) requires that each exception “set forth specifically the questions of proce- dure, fact, law, or policy to which exception is taken,” and that if a supporting brief is filed, it should present “argument . . . in support of the exceptions.” Section 102.46(c) provides that “[a]ny brief in support of excep- tions shall contain no matter not included within the scope of the exceptions[.]” The Respondent has failed to comply with the Board’s Rules by arguing in its brief matters that are “not included within the scope of the exceptions.” Accordingly, the Respondent’s relevancy argument is not properly before us for review. See Engi- neered Comfort Systems, 346 NLRB 661, 661 (2006). But even if it were,5 under the foregoing principles, we would agree with the judge for the reasons stated in his decision that the profit-sharing information requested by the Union was presumptively relevant insofar as it con- cerned unit employees, and that the General Counsel demonstrated the relevance of the requested information concerning nonunit employees.6 Moreover, this infor- mation remained relevant even after the Respondent dropped its demand for cuts to the program, because the Union still needed the information to administer and en- force the contractual provision, which remained a term and condition of employment following the contract’s expiration.7 See Shoppers Food Warehouse Corp., su- pra, 315 NLRB at 259–260 (information that was neces- sary to administer contract still relevant following em- ployer’s withdrawal of related proposal).8 We also agree with the judge’s rejection of the Re- spondent’s confidentiality argument. In considering un- ion requests for relevant but assertedly confidential in- formation, the Board balances the union’s need for the 5 Inasmuch as the Respondent did not properly raise the issue of rel- evance by its exceptions, Member Hayes would not address that issue and he does not join his colleagues in this part of the decision. 6 In light of the General Counsel’s showing that the profit-sharing in- formation for nonunit employees was relevant, we find it unnecessary to pass on the judge’s additional finding that this information was pre- sumptively relevant. In addition, the Respondent does not except to the judge’s conclusions that the other information the Union sought con- cerning nonunit employees was relevant. 7 Because we find that the requested information was relevant to the Union’s administration of the contract, we need not rely on the judge’s additional finding that the Union needed the information in order to respond to the Respondent’s proposal after it was withdrawn. 8 We find no merit in the Respondent’s contention that Imus’ August 8 request was triggered by “mere suspicion” because it was based sole- ly on John Wilkerson’s pay stub. The relevance of a union’s request for nonunit information must be based on more than “mere suspicion” but it need not be based on information that is either accurate or ulti- mately reliable. Shoppers Food Warehouse, supra, 315 NLRB at 258. A-1 DOOR & BUILDING SOLUTIONS 501 information against any “legitimate and substantial” con- fidentiality interests established by the employer. See Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301 (1979). The party asserting confidentiality has the burden of proving that such interests exist and that they outweigh its bar- gaining partner’s need for the information. See Jackson- ville Area Assn. for Retarded Citizens, 316 NLRB 338, 340 (1995). Further, a party refusing to supply infor- mation on confidentiality grounds has a duty to seek an accommodation. Pennsylvania Power Co., 301 NLRB 1104, 1105 (1991) (footnotes omitted). Here, no party has excepted to the judge’s finding that the Respondent’s employees had a legitimate and sub- stantial expectation of privacy in the information sought by the Union. Nonetheless, “[a]lthough the disclosure of individual employees’ wage and benefit information to the Union implicates privacy concerns to some extent, the Board has generally found that, without more, such concerns do not justify withholding information that is relevant to the Union’s role as bargaining representa- tive.” Comar, Inc., 349 NLRB 342, 355 (2007). There is no additional factor weighing against disclosure in this case. The Respondent did not present any evidence suggest- ing that wages and benefits were not set based on known, generally-applicable criteria, i.e., that employees did not already know what other employees were earning. Nor did the Respondent show that nonunit employees object- ed to the Respondent’s sharing with the Union infor- mation regarding their individual terms and conditions of employment. Nor was there testimony showing that the Respondent generally made special efforts to keep such information secret. Id. In fact, the Respondent asserted no such concerns about confidentiality at any point dur- ing negotiations; it first raised that argument in its amended answer to the complaint, months after it initial- ly refused to provide the information. See Earthgrains Co., 349 NLRB 389, 397 (2007), enf. denied on other grounds 514 F.3d 422 (5th Cir. 2008) (failure to raise confidentiality defense in a timely fashion undermines its legitimacy). For those reasons, we find that the Re- spondent did not establish that its confidentiality con- cerns outweighed the Union’s need for the information. Similarly, we reject the Respondent’s argument that the judge erred by finding that its alternative proposal did not satisfy the Union’s request. That proposal—to per- mit an accountant to audit the Respondent’s books—was not an attempt to accommodate any identified interest on the part of the Respondent. As stated, the Respondent did not assert confidentiality until much later. Thus, by the proposal, the Respondent was offering the Union less than it requested,9 for no articulated reason. That offer did not fulfill the Respondent’s duty to bargain in good faith. When the Union asked for relevant information, the Respondent was required either to provide that in- formation or to state a legitimate reason for not doing so and to timely offer an accommodation. It did neither.10 II. JUNE 18 REQUEST FOR JOB BID INFORMATION Union Representative Imus testified that the Respond- ent’s representatives repeatedly justified their bargaining proposals by contending that the Respondent was not competitive with other companies because of the overly generous wages and benefits it was paying unit employ- ees under the current agreement. At one point, the Re- spondent orally presented the Union with the names of companies with which the Respondent believed it was not competitive. According to Imus, the Respondent discussed competitiveness in terms of its ability to “get and receive [job] bids” instead of these companies. In a letter dated June 18, the Union requested specific information regarding the Respondent’s job-bidding his- tory. The letter stated: “During negotiations the compa- ny has repeatedly stated that they were not competitive with other companies. The workers are willing to nego- tiate in order to make the company more competitive . . . . In order to negotiate responsib[ly] we need the fol- lowing information to evaluate the company’s pro- posals.” The letter then listed 11 separate items: (1) Copies of bids received; (2) Copies of new projects bidding; (3) Copies of bids that were not awarded to A-1 Door; (4) The reason why A-1 Door did not receive the bid; (5) What company was awarded the bid, not re- ceived, and why; (6) How much lower was the competition on each bid not received; (7) Were there any dates A-1 Door was too busy, and turned away bids, if so when; (8) Copies of jobs that you were doing, but now are awarded to another company; (9) Copies of bids or jobs A-1 Door was removed from and the reason for removal; 9 For example, the proposal would not have provided the Union with information concerning net profit or the total amount paid under the profit-sharing plan to either unit or nonunit employees. 10 Further, the Respondent cannot assert as a defense that the Union did not respond to its proposal. The Respondent had not even asserted any confidentiality concern at the time. See Jacksonville Area Assn. for Retarded Citizens, supra, 316 NLRB at 340 fn. 12. Moreover, the offer was untimely, coming 4 months after the Union’s April 26 request, which did not seek even arguably confidential information. DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 502 (10) Copies of bids not submitted due to contrac- tors insurance requirements; (11) Copies of bids not submitted due to a lack of production ability.11 The Respondent answered, in a letter dated June 20, that it would not provide any of the requested infor- mation. It contended that the requested information was not relevant and that it either did not exist or was confi- dential. The judge found that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by refusing to provide all information requested in the June 18 letter. The Respondent excepts, contending, among other things, that the General Coun- sel failed to establish the relevance of the information. For the reasons discussed below, we reject the Respond- ent’s argument and adopt the findings of the judge.12 As the judge observed, the Board has held that the type of job-bidding information requested by the Union is not presumptively relevant. When there has been a showing of relevance, however, the Board has consistently re- quired the production of similar information, including information concerning competitors, labor costs, produc- tion costs, restructuring studies, and income statements. See E. I. du Pont & Co., 276 NLRB 335 (1985); E. I. du Pont & Co., 264 NLRB 48, 51 (1982), enfd. 744 F.2d 536 (6th Cir. 1984); see also CalMat Co., 331 NLRB 1084, 1096–1097 (2000); Litton Systems, 283 NLRB 973, 974–975 (1987), enf. denied on other grounds 868 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1989). We find that the General Counsel established that the job bid information was relevant. That information would have assisted the Union in evaluating, and re- sponding to, the Respondent’s repeated claim that it could not compete for contracts against other specifical- ly-named companies because it was paying overly gen- erous wages and benefits to unit employees. Given those assertions, the Union was entitled to proof that Respond- ent was, in fact, losing contracts, and, if so, that the cause was unit employees’ wage and benefit levels rather than other factors that could not be addressed through union 11 At various points during negotiations, the Union used the term “bids” to mean “jobs” and/or “contracts.” The Respondent does not contend that it failed to understand the Union’s requests. 12 The Respondent, in its exceptions brief, also contends that the Un- ion’s request for job bid information was invalid because the Union’s purported interest in improving the Respondent’s competitive position might lead to “impermissible collusion.” We find no merit in this ar- gument. The Respondent cites no authority to support its suggestion that the Union violates antitrust laws by requesting or obtaining infor- mation needed to evaluate the impact of its bargaining proposals on the Respondent’s competitive position or even by negotiating with the Respondent concerning wages, hours, and working conditions in an effort to preserve or improve the Respondent’s competitiveness. concessions. To this end, the Union appropriately asked for copies of the Respondent’s failed bids along with the stated reasons for their rejection, and for information that would show the differences between the Respondent’s bids and those of the winning bidders. The Union also appropriately requested information regarding instances where the Respondent did not submit bids, including facts about the Respondent’s production capacity and ability to meet the insurance requirements for different projects, so that it could determine whether the Respond- ent was failing to win bids for reasons that would not be affected by the wage and benefit concessions that were being demanded. For example, as the Respondent con- cedes in its brief, concessions by the Union would not have alleviated noncontractual competitive hurdles such as high insurance costs. In these circumstances, we find that the Union “re- quested specific information to evaluate the accuracy of the Respondent’s specific claims and to respond appro- priately with counterproposals, and that the information requested was relevant to those purposes.” Caldwell Mfg. Co., 346 NLRB 1159, 1160 (2006) (finding the union’s request for detailed information involving costs, productivity, and competitor performance to be relevant where the employer asserted that concessions were nec- essary in order to make a less competitive facility viable and to become more competitive in the industry); see also E. I. du Pont & Co., supra, 276 NLRB at 336 (find- ing production cost and competitor data to be relevant where the employer proposed a major restructuring of production jobs). Further, the Union’s request was tai- lored to the Respondent’s claims and did not encompass general financial data. See Caldwell Mfg., supra, 346 NLRB at 1160.13 The Respondent relies on F. A. Bartlett Tree Expert Co., 316 NLRB 1312 (1995), in contending that its rep- resentations during bargaining were insufficient to render the requested information relevant.14 As we will explain, that decision is distinguishable. 13 The Respondent contends that, under Nielsen Lithographing Co., 305 NLRB 697 (1991), review denied 977 F.2d 1168 (7th Cir. 1992), it is not required to provide financial information because it did not assert during negotiations an inability to pay. The judge, however, did not find that the Respondent asserted an inability to pay, nor does the Gen- eral Counsel so claim. Our holding is based on the Respondent’s as- serted inability to compete, not an inability to pay. 14 No party has excepted to the judge’s finding that, although the Re- spondent had a legitimate confidentiality interest in the requested job bid information, the Union’s interest in disclosure outweighed the Respondent’s concerns. In addition, despite raising the confidentiality argument in its posthearing brief, the Respondent never specified which of the requested items were confidential nor why any of the information was confidential. Nor did it offer to accommodate the Union’s request during negotiations. A-1 DOOR & BUILDING SOLUTIONS 503 In F. A. Bartlett, supra, the employer provided the un- ion during negotiations with wage and benefit data re- vealing wide disparities in wages among unit employees working in the same classifications under different cus- tomer contracts. Id. The union proposed that wages be increased and standardized across contracts. Id. The employer responded that standardizing wages for all con- tracts would likely require decreasing the wage rates of the highest paid employees. Id. The union later request- ed copies of the employer’s customer contracts, stating that review of the contracts was necessary to evaluate the employer’s proposals and to formulate counterproposals. Id. The Board found that the employer was not required to provide those contracts, rejecting the General Counsel’s argument that the employer had rendered them relevant through its negotiating position. The Board emphasized that the employer referred to the contracts merely to make the point that it did not believe standardized wages were appropriate in a system where it obtained revenues through individually bid contracts. The employer claimed neither an inability to standardize wages at the higher levels nor that doing so would render it uncompet- itive. Given the nature of contract bidding procedures, the Board found that the General Counsel could not plau- sibly claim that the union needed the actual contracts to confirm that the customers were not paying the employer the same amount under each contract. Id. at 1313. In effect, the Board concluded that the union had already been provided with all the information it needed to eval- uate the employer’s position. By contrast, the Union here was seeking information that had not been provided by the Respondent and that was not otherwise apparent. That information, moreover, was central to the Union’s ability to respond to the Re- spondent’s specific claims of noncompetitiveness. For those reasons, we find that F. A. Bartlett is distinguisha- ble, and that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by refusing to produce the information in the Union’s June 18 request. ORDER15 The National Labor Relations Board orders that the Respondent, A-1 Door and Building Solutions, North Highlands, California, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall 1. Cease and desist from (a) Refusing to provide the Union with requested in- formation that is relevant and necessary to the Union’s 15 We have modified the judge’s recommended Order and notice to conform more closely to our standard format. performance of its duties as collective-bargaining repre- sentative of the Respondent’s employees. (b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re- straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act. (a) Promptly provide the Union with: all relevant in- formation regarding profit sharing requested in its letters dated April 26 and August 8, 2007; all information re- garding job bids requested in its letter dated June 18; and all information regarding new employees requested in its letter dated July 6.16 (b) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its North Highlands, California facility copies of the at- tached notice marked “Appendix.”17 Copies of the no- tice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Re- gion 20, after being signed by the Respondent’s author- ized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. In addition to physical posting of paper notices, notices shall be distributed electronically, such as by email, posting on an intranet or an internet site, and/or other electronic means, if the Respondent customarily communicates with its employees by such means. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respond- ent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all cur- rent employees and former employees employed by the Respondent at any time since April 26, 2007. (c) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a sworn certification of a re- sponsible official on a form provided by the Region at- testing to the steps that the Respondent has taken to comply. 16 We leave to compliance a determination of the appropriate time period for which the Respondent must produce the requested infor- mation. 17 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na- tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg- ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board.” DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 504 APPENDIX NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio- lated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this notice. FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO Form, join, or assist a union Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf Act together with other employees for your bene- fit and protection Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities. WE WILL NOT refuse to provide the Union with re- quested information that is relevant and necessary to the Union’s performance of its duties as collective- bargaining representative. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights listed above. WE WILL promptly provide the Union with all relevant information regarding profit sharing requested in its let- ters dated April 26 and August 8, 2007; all information regarding job bids requested in its letter dated June 18, 2007; and all information regarding new employees re- quested in its letter dated July 6, 2007. A-1 DOOR AND BUILDING SOLUTIONS Lucile Lannan Rosen, Esq., for the General Counsel. E. A. Hubbert Jr., Esq., of Sacramento, California, for the Re- spondent. Matthew J. Gauger, Esq., of Sacramento, California, for the Charging Party. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE GREGORY Z. MEYERSON, Administrative Law Judge. Pursu- ant to notice, I heard this case in Sacramento, California, on November 6, 2007. Millmen and Industrial Carpenters Union, Local 1618, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America (the Union or the Charging Party) filed an unfair labor practice charge in this case on July 5, 2007. Based on that charge, the Acting Regional Director for Region 20 of the Na- tional Labor Relations Board (the Board) issued a complaint on September 12, 2007. The complaint alleges that A-1 Door and Building Solutions (the Respondent or the Employer) violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act). The Respondent filed a timely answer to the complaint denying the commission of the alleged unfair labor practices and raising a number of affirmative defenses.1 All parties appeared at the hearing, and I provided them with the full opportunity to participate, to introduce relevant evi- dence, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, to argue orally and file briefs. Based upon the record, my consideration of the briefs filed by counsel for the General Counsel, counsel for the Union, and counsel for the Respondent, and my observations of the demeanor of the witnesses, I now make the following2 FINDINGS OF FACT I. JURISDICTION The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find that the Respondent is a corporation with and office and place of busi- ness in North Highlands, California, where it has been engaged in the business of manufacturing and/or supplying doors, win- dows, hardware, and millwork to construction contractors. Further, I find that during the calendar year ending December 31, 2006, the Respondent, in the course and conduct of its busi- ness operations, sold and shipped from its North Highlands, California facility goods valued in excess of $50,000 directly to points located outside the State of California. Accordingly, I conclude that the Respondent is now, and at all times material herein has been, an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. II. LABOR ORGANIZATION The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find that at all times material herein, the Union has been a labor organiza- tion within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The Dispute The Respondent manufactures and supplies interior and exte- rior doors to contractors in the construction industry. Addition- ally, the Respondent has a retail division that sells doors and hardware to the general public. The finished product manufac- tured at the Respondent’s facility is loaded into trucks by the Respondent’s employees and delivered by its drivers to cus- tomers. The Union and the Respondent have had a collective- bargaining relationship for approximately 40 years. During that time they have successfully negotiated numerous contracts. The parties agree that at all material times the Union has been the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of a unit (the 1 All pleadings reflect the complaint and answer as those documents were finally amended. 2 The credibility resolutions made in this decision are based on a re- view of the testimonial record and exhibits, with consideration given for reasonably probability and the demeanor of the witnesses. See NLRB v. Walton Mfg. Co., 369 U.S. 404, 408 (1962). Where witnesses have testified in contradiction to the findings herein, I have discredited their testimony, as either being in conflict with credited documentary or testimonial evidence, or because it was inherently incredible and un- worthy of belief. A-1 DOOR & BUILDING SOLUTIONS 505 unit) of the Respondent’s employees described as: All employ- ees performing work covered by the collective-bargaining agreement between the Respondent and the Union effective for the period from May 1, 2004, to May 1, 2007. There is further agreement among the parties, and I find, that at all times mate- rial, the unit constitutes a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act, and that based on Section 9(a) of the Act, the Union has been the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the employees in the unit. There are currently approximately 60 employees in the bargaining unit. The last contract between the Respondent and the Union was effective by its terms from May 1, 2004, to May 1, 2007. (GC Exh. 2.) Negotiations for a new agreement began in April 2007. Approximately 10 negotiation meetings between the Union and the Respondent took place between April and Sep- tember 2007.3 The principal negotiators on behalf of the Re- spondent were the Respondent’s president, Dale Winchester, and its legal counsel, E. A. Hubbert Jr. On behalf or the Union, its principal negotiator was David Imus, business representa- tive. Preliminarily, it is important to note that the General Counsel is not contending that the Respondent engaged in bad-faith bargaining during the course of these negotiations. Counsel for the General Counsel made this very clear in both her oral statements at the hearing and in her posthearing brief. Further, I will note that in rendering this decision I specifically make no finding regarding bad-faith or surface bargaining by either par- ty to these negotiations. No such finding is required in order to decide the limited issues alleged in the complaint and litigated before me. It is the General Counsel’s contention that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act by refusing to pro- vide information necessary to the Union’s administration of the collective-bargaining agreement and to its effective negotiation for a successor agreement. While there are no bad faith bar- gaining issues to be addressed by me, it is necessary to consider the course and progress of the parties’ negotiations for a suc- cessor agreement. It is in this context that the Union’s request for information and the Respondent’s response to that request must be viewed. The negotiations took place during, and were certainly made more difficult by, a significant reduction in the residential con- struction industry. Most of the Respondent’s business is with contractors in this industry. From the testimony of Imus and Winchester, it appears that the parties were initially very far apart on economic and other issues. The Respondent initially proposed a 50-percent reduction in the profit sharing for unit employees, a reduction in wages for those same employees, the elimination of union-security provisions, and the elimination of the successorship, sales, and assigns clauses, and offered a contract of only 1-year duration. There appears to be no disa- greement that during the course of these negotiations the Re- spondent’s negotiators repeatedly supported their bargaining proposals by contending that the Respondent was losing bids 3 All dates are in 2007, unless otherwise indicated. for door fabrication in part because it was paying overly gener- ous benefits to its bargaining unit employees. The information requested by the Union can best be consid- ered and analyzed when placed in three separate categories. The first category of requests related to the profit-sharing plan as provided for in the parties’ collective-bargaining agreement. The Union’s requests for information regarding this category, as alleged in paragraphs 7(a) and (aa) of the complaint, were in the form of two letters sent to the Respondent and dated April 26 and August 8, respectively. The second category of requests related to job bid information. This request for information, as alleged in paragraph 7(b) of the complaint, was in the form of a letter dated June 18. The third, and last category of requests, related to information about newly hired employees. This re- quest for information, as alleged in paragraph 7(c) of the com- plaint, was in the form of a letter dated July 6. These requests for information will be discussed at length throughout the remainder of this decision. The General Coun- sel and the Union contend that the Respondent’s bargaining proposals made during the course of negotiations, as well as its conduct, serve as justification for the Union’s information re- quests. It is alleged that these requests were necessary to rebut those proposals and effectively negotiate for a successor agreement, and also to be able to administer the collective- bargaining agreement.4 The Respondent takes the position that it fully complied with its duty to furnish the Union with the requested information to the extent that the information was relevant, not privileged, confidential, or private, and did in fact exist. This is the gavamen of the case. B. Applicable Law In a recent case, Disneyland Park & Disney’s California Ad- venture, 350 NLRB 1256 (2007), the Board recited certain well-established legal principles regarding an employer’s obli- gation to provide requested information to a union representing the employer’s employees. As the Board said, “An employer has the statutory obligation to provide, on request, relevant information that the union needs for the proper performance of its duties as collective bargaining representative.” The Board cited to a number of Supreme Court decisions including, NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 152 (1956); NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432, 435–436 (1967); and Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301 (1979). Further, the Board added that, “[t]his includes [information need for] the decision to file or process grievances,” citing to Beth Abraham Health Services, 332 NLRB 1234 (2000). Specifically, where the union’s request for information per- tains to employees in the bargaining unit, the Board reiterated that the “information is presumptively relevant and the [r]espondent must provide the information. However, where the information requested by the union is not presumptively relevant to the union’s performance as bargaining representa- tive, the burden is on the union to demonstrate the relevance.” Disneyland Park; and cases cited therein including Richmond Health Care, 332 NLRB 1304 (2000); Associated Ready Mixed 4 While the collective-bargaining agreement between the parties had expired, there is no dispute that certain provisions remained in effect. DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 506 Concrete, Inc., 318 NLRB 318 (1995), enfd. 108 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1997); Pfizer, Inc., 268 NLRB 916 (1984), enfd. 736 F.2d 887 (7th Cir. 1985). The Board went on to say that “[a] union has satisfied its burden when it demonstrates a reasonable belief, supported by objective evidence, that the requested in- formation is relevant,” citing to Knappton Maritime Corp., 292 NLRB 236, 238–239 (1988). Finally, in the Disneyland case the Board repeated its well- established principle that it “uses a broad, discovery-type standard in determining the relevance of requested information. Potential or probable relevance is sufficient to give rise to an employer’s obligation to provide information.”5 Still, where the information requested is not presumptively relevant, as not pertaining to employees in the bargaining unit, “the General Counsel must present evidence either (1) that the union demon- strated relevance of the nonunit information, or (2) that the relevance of the information should have been apparent to the Respondent under the circumstances. [Internal citations omit- ted.] Absent such a showing, the employer is not obligated to provide the requested information.” C. Documents Related to Profit Sharing; Letters of April 26 and August 8. While the General Counsel does not allege bad-faith bargain- ing on the part of the Respondent, counsel still attempts to por- tray the Respondent’s negotiators as less than cooperative. In an effort to “color the case” and set the stage for the later al- leged failure to furnish information, counsel for the General Counsel questioned David Imus regarding a statement allegedly made to him by Dale Winchester just prior to the first negotia- tion session. According to Imus, he and Winchester had a pri- vate conversation in Winchester’s office during which they discussed the fact that “work was down,” and the economic conditions were not good. Imus testified that he informed Win- chester that it was the Union’s goal to reach an agreement with the Employer with “the least amount of trouble as possible.” Imus contends that Winchester responded by saying that he did not want “to continue the relationship with the Union, that it was too much hassle.” Winchester placed the date of a private conversation in his office with Imus as the day before negotiations began. Win- chester specifically denied saying anything to Imus to the effect that the relationship between the Employer and the Union was too much of a hassle. However, he does recall Imus asking him if there were any “surprises” coming from the Employer during the negotiations. Winchester testified that he told Imus that the only surprises came from Imus, who allegedly had a habit of arriving at the plant unannounced. According to Winchester, he informed Imus that he would appreciate it if Imus would check in with Winchester and let him know what was going on before Imus walked into the plant to speak with employees. In comparing the demeanor and testimony of Imus with that of Winchester, I did not find either man to be anymore credible than the other. To some extent, both men seemed to have se- 5 Other cases have described a union’s burden under these circum- stances as “not an exceptionally heavy one.” Wisconsin Bell, Inc., 346 NLRB 62, 64 (2005). lective memory, specifically recalling those events that put them in the best light. Each man was clearly a partisan on be- half of his respective side in this dispute. I do not believe that either man was fabricating testimony, but rather tended to ex- aggerate or embellish events to favor their respective positions. In considering the alleged statement by Winchester that he did not want to continue the relationship with the Union be- cause it was too much of a hassle, I am of the belief that it is more probable than not that Winchester did in fact make the statement attributed to him by Imus. I doubt that Imus would make up such a statement “out of whole cloth.” Imus’ version of the conversation is inherently more plausible than that told by Winchester. Accordingly, I believe that the words were spoken by Winchester. However, I do not believe that those words establish that the Respondent held any particular animus towards the Union as would make the Respondent inclined to refuse to furnish the Union with relevant documents pursuant to a request for information. The parties have had a successful 40-year history of collec- tive bargaining. Certainly, hard economic conditions in the home building industry had made these current negotiations particularly difficult. Never the less, I seriously doubt that an “off the cuff” remark by Winchester that the Union was a has- sle establishes animus such that the Respondent had any sort of a design or plan to frustrate the Union’s request for infor- mation. While I believe that the statement attribute to him was made by Winchester, I do not believe that it is entitled to any weight in deciding the issues in this case, and I shall give it none. In any event, it is not necessary to establish animus or malice in this case in order to find a violation of the Act. The expired collective-bargaining agreement provided that the Respondent establish a companywide profit-sharing plan for “all salaried and hourly employees.” The “profit-sharing pool” was based on a formula depending on the “net” profit of the Employer. (See GC Exh. 2, p. 25.) It is undisputed that early in negotiations, the Respondent proposed reducing this profit- sharing formula from 10 percent of net profit to 5 percent. By letter dated April 26 from Imus to counsel for the Re- spondent, the Union requested that the Respondent furnish it with certain financial information. According to the letter, and Imus’ testimony, he had previously orally asked for this infor- mation on two separate occasions, but the Respondent had failed to comply with his request. The letter seeks the produc- tion of three categories of information, specifically: “1. Gross revenue each year for the last three years; 2. Net profit each year for the last three years; [and] 3. Total amount of profit distributed to the employees with the number of employees receiving the distribution each year for the last three years.” (GC Exh. 3.) According to Imus, he requested item 1, the gross revenue, because the Respondent had been claiming it was having diffi- culty competing with other door manufactures, and so the Un- ion needed to see the gross revenue in order to determine whether the claim was reasonable or not. Regarding item 2, the net profits, Imus testified that in order to evaluate the Re- spondent’s profit-sharing proposal and to formulate a counter- proposal, it was necessary to determine just how much money was available to pay profit sharing to bargaining unit employ- A-1 DOOR & BUILDING SOLUTIONS 507 ees, which was a product of the Respondent’s net profits. As to item 3, profit distributed to employees, Imus testified that he needed this information in order to administer the contract and determine whether the bargaining unit employees had been receiving the proper profit-sharing amounts pursuant to the contractual provisions, and also to help in formulating a re- sponse to the Respondent’s proposal to reduce profit sharing. Imus testified that the only information that he ever received in response to the Union’s request of April 26 was the amount of profit distributed to bargaining unit employees for the last 3 years. He did not receive the amount of profit distributed to nonbargaining unit employees, which he testified was neces- sary since the amount of money available for bargaining unit employees was dependent to some extent on how much profit was distributed to nonbargaining unit employees. The contract provided that the profit-sharing plan was companywide, mean- ing that a pool was created from which all employees, unit and nonunit, were paid. Additionally, he never received the re- quested information on gross revenue and net profits. The Respondent’s immediate response to the Union’s request was a letter from counsel for the Respondent dated April 27. (GC Exh. 4.) In that letter counsel recited what would be the Respondent’s recurring theme throughout negotiations. Ac- cording to the letter, the Respondent “has never maintained it’s not a profitable company or that it lacks the financial ability to comply with your economic demands during these negotiations. We have consistently maintained, however, that the wages, hours and working conditions of the employees you represent . . . should be consistent with other employees in the Sacramen- to area working in the same job classifications.” Counsel for the General Counsel acknowledged at the hear- ing and in her posthearing brief that the Respondent had made it very clear during negotiations that it was not pleading “an inability to pay.” What all parties agree that the Respondent was arguing during negotiations was that in order to be compet- itive with similar door manufactures in the Sacramento, Cali- fornia area, the wages and benefits paid to its employees had to be comparable to those wages and benefits paid to the employ- ees’ of competing employers. It is the Respondent’s contention that as it has never asserted a financial inability to meet the Union’s wage demands, nor has it made a “plea of poverty,” that it is not required to furnish the Union with its financial information concerning gross and net profits. NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956). The Respondent further argues that an assertion of “competitive disadvantage” does not by itself constitute a claim of inability to pay. Nielsen Lithographing Co., 305 NLRB 697, 701 (1991). In his posthearing brief, counsel for the Respondent claims that the Respondent did not make a claim of either ina- bility to pay or to compete. He contends that the Respondent “merely reminded the Union that it was paying higher wages and benefits than any other comparable employer.” In my view, this is nothing more than semantics. Throughout negotia- tions, on many different occasions, the Respondent’s negotia- tors made it very clear to the union negotiators that it was hav- ing trouble competing with its nonunion competitors. While it is clear that the Respondent did not make a general “plea of poverty,” it is equally clear that it did make a claim of inability to compete, and I so find. Further, counsel for the Respondent argues that it was only obligated to furnish the Union with information as to profit distributed to bargaining unit employees, since similar infor- mation for nonunit employees was irrelevant. As another de- fense, counsel contends that the Respondent proposed an alter- nate means of satisfying the Union’s request. At the negotia- tion session held on August 31, the Respondent presented the Union with a written proposal to have the Union select an ac- countant to examine the Respondent’s books and records and provide the Union with the following information: (1) Whether the Respondent’s profit and loss is calculated according to gen- erally accepted accounting procedures and standards, and, if not, how does it deviate from those procedures and standards; and (2) Whether the allocation of profit-sharing funds between Union and nonunion employees is conducted on an equal basis, and, if not, in what manner are the allocations unequal. (R. Exh. 5.) While not entirely clear from the record, it appears from Imus’ testimony that the proposal was briefly discussed, after which the parties agreed to further discuss the proposal later. However, apparently no further discussions were held on this issue. In any event, it is important to note that the Re- spondent’s written proposal of August 31 was received by the Union over 4 months after the Union’s initial written request of April 26. The Union contends that as time passed it had reason to re- quest additional information regarding the administration of the Respondent’s profit-sharing program. According to Imus, he was given a pay stub for John Wilkerson, a nonunit employee, whom Imus thought was a company salesman.6 Imus testified that his review of the pay stub led him to believe that Wilker- son was receiving profit sharing or production bonuses far in excess of what a salesman, as a nonunit employee, should have received. (GC Exh. 5.) If accurate, this could adversely impact on the profit sharing received by bargaining unit employees, as the amounts received by all employees were interdependent. Accordingly, by letter dated August 8, Imus requested the following information from the Respondent: “1. [For] all sala- ried employees, including non-bargaining unit employees, name, job title, wage rate, gross yearly wages, [and] the date and the amount of profit sharing distribution for each year for the last three years; 2. [For] all hourly employees, including non-bargaining unit employees, [the same information as re- quest above]; 3. [The] name of all salaried or hourly employ- ees, including non-bargaining unit employees, [and] the amount of any other bonus or bonuses paid to them during each of the last three years; [and] 4. The employee name and the amount of any other non-wage compensation received by all salaried and hourly employees, including non-bargaining unit employees.” (GC Exh. 6.) While not entirely clear from the record, it appears that Imus never indicated to the Respondent’s negotiators that he was in 6 In fact, Wilkerson was not a salesman, but, rather, the general manager of the Respondent’s commercial department, which is a sepa- rate profit center not covered by the collective-bargaining agreement with the Union. DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 508 possession of Wilkerson’s pay stub. In any event, Imus testi- fied that he never received any of this requested information. In his posthearing brief, counsel for the Respondent argues that the information requested by the Union in its August 8 letter need not have been furnished because the Union’s reli- ance on Wilkerson’s pay stub was irrational and unsubstantiat- ed. Further, counsel contents that the information requested was not produced because it was irrelevant and protected by the right to individual privacy in the United States and California Constitutions. Regarding Wilkerson’s pay stub, counsel seems to be sug- gesting that this was merely a ruse used by Imus to justify a broad irrelevant request for information that the Union was not legally entitled to. Imus’ testimony suggests that his “suspi- cions” regarding the pay stub were based only on what other employees told him about Wikerson’s job duties and responsi- bilities. As counsel for the Respondent points out, it is well established that mere suspicions are not enough to create a presumption of relevance.7 Anchor Motor Freight, 296 NLRB 944, 949 (1989) (union failed to show anything beyond “mere suspicion” that the information may be relevant). Counsel for the Respondent contends that the Union’s re- quest for the names and financial information regarding the nonunit employees in the August 8 letter was irrelevant and a violation of the individual right to privacy as protected by the United States and California Constitutions. Counsel acknowl- edges that the Board traditionally will balance employees’ ex- pectations of privacy with the Union’s need for the information, but contends as the Union had no legitimate right to the infor- mation concerning nonunit employees, the balance tips strongly in favor of not disclosing the information. See Aerospace Corp., 314 NLRB 100 (1994); Exxon Co. USA, 321 NLRB 896 (1996); Good Life Beverage Co., 312 NLRB 1060 (1993); Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 301 NLRB 1104 (1991); Howard University, 290 NLRB 1006 (1988). In analyzing the request for information contained in the Un- ion’s letter of April 26 (GC Exh. 3), it is necessary to determine the use to which the Union would or could put the information. As expressed by David Imus, the Union needed the information in order to fully understand the Respondent’s proposal to re- duce profit sharing, to prepare a counterproposal, and to admin- ister the profit-sharing clause in the expired contract. The amount of profit sharing distributed to unit employees is direct- ly dependent on the Respondent’s total net profit, the number of company employees receiving the money, and the amount each is receiving. Accordingly, both items 2 and 3 in the letter of April 26, the request for the “net profit each year for the last three years,” and for the “total amount of profit distributed to the employees with the number of employees receiving the distribution each year for the last three years,” pertain to, among others, employees in the bargaining unit. Therefore, the information is presumptively relevant and the Respondent must 7 Frankly, I am of the belief that had Imus genuinely wanted to de- termine who Wilkerson was, or what role he played with the Employer, it would not have been difficult for him to have done so. He might have started out with simply asking Wilkerson or Winchester. Howev- er, apparently he did neither. provide it to the Union. See George Koch & Sons, 295 NLRB 695 (1989); Kendell College of Art, 292 NLRB 1065 (1989). Further, to the extent that the request calls for the profit dis- tributed not only to unit employees, but also to nonunit em- ployees the information is also presumptively relevant. The contractual profit-sharing formula for employees covers both nonunit employees and unit employees. It is an interdependent calculating system. There is no way to accurately determine or project the profit sharing for unit employees, without also knowing the profit sharing for nonunit employees. In other words, there is only “one pot,” the Respondent’s net profits, out of which all employees receive their profit sharing. Even assuming the information requested for nonunit em- ployees is not presumptively relevant, it is still extremely rele- vant for use in the collective-bargaining process and contract administration because, as noted, the profit-sharing system for all employees is interdependent. The Union’s burden to estab- lish relevance is not a heavy one, and is easily met under the circumstances of this case. The Board allows for the use of a broad discovery-like standard to measure relevance, and even potentially or probably relevant material would be sufficient to require production by an employer. Postal Service, 332 NLRB 635, 636 (2000); Shoppers Food Warehouse, 315 NLRB 258, 259 (1994); Reiss Viking, 312 NLRB 622, 625 (1993). Clear- ly, the Union has met that standard for both unit and nonunit employees as it concerns the Employer’s profit-sharing pro- gram. Accordingly, items 2 and 3 in the Union’s request for information letter of April 26 must be produced. The Respond- ent’s failure to furnish this information constitutes a violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act, as alleged in paragraph 7(a)(ii) and (iii) of the complaint. However, I do not believe that the Union is entitled to the in- formation requested in item 1 of its April 26 letter, the “gross revenue each year for the last three years.” As mentioned above, the Respondent was not claiming a financial inability to meet the Union’s contract demands. All parties agree that the Respondent was not making a plea of poverty. As such, the Respondent was not required to open its financial books to the Union. See Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956); North Star Steel Co., 347 NLRB 1364 (2006). Yet, that is essentially what the Employer would be required to do in producing gross reve- nue information. Imus’ testimony regarding the Union’s alleged need for the Respondent’s gross revenue information made no sense to me. The profit-sharing plan is predicated on the Respondent’s “net” profits. These are, of course, the profits remaining after all the expenses of doing business are deducted. I have already indi- cated the relevance of net profit figures and the requirement that the Respondent produce this information. Gross revenue is neither potentially nor probably relevant to the profit-sharing issue, and the General Counsel and the Union have failed to establish a reasonable justification for its production. The Re- spondent’s refusal to produce the gross revenue figures does not constitute a violation of the Act. Accordingly, I shall rec- ommend that paragraph 7(a)(i) of the complaint be dismissed. Regarding the Union’s request for information as set forth in its letter of August 8 (GC Exh. 6), Imus testified that this in- formation was necessary in order to properly administer the A-1 DOOR & BUILDING SOLUTIONS 509 contract and determine whether a salesman was receiving ex- cessive benefits to the detriment of the profit-sharing payments made to unit members, and also to fully evaluate the Respond- ent’s profit-sharing proposal and to prepare counterproposals. As noted above, Imus testified that after having viewed the pay stub for John Wilkerson, he became suspicious as to whether salesmen and perhaps other nonunit employees were receiving excessive benefits. While I am not entirely confident that Imus was genuinely confused about Wilkerson’s status with the Em- ployer, the amount of benefits paid to nonunit employees was a legitimate concern for the Union, since whatever profit sharing or other benefits they received correspondingly diminished the net profits available to provide profit sharing to bargaining unit employees. As I have indicated repeatedly, the profit-sharing formula for both nonunit and unit employees was an interde- pendent calculating system. The letter of August 8, in its four paragraphs, essentially re- quested for all employees, including unit and nonunit employ- ees, their names, job classifications, the wages paid to them, and all benefits received by them, including profit sharing, bonuses, and nonwage compensation, for a 3-year period. For the same reasons as listed above regarding the April 26 letter, I find that this information is presumptively relevant as it con- cerns the Union’s duty to administer a contact provision, the profit-sharing clause, and was the subject of bargaining pro- posals. George Koch, supra; Kendell College, supra. Again, even if not presumptively relevant because it included infor- mation on nonunit employees, the interdependency of the prof- it-sharing formula caused the information on nonunit employ- ees to be relevant to a determination as to whether the unit em- ployees were being properly compensated under the expired contract and as it related to contract negotiations. Thus, the Union has met the relatively light burden of establishing poten- tial or probable relevance. Postal Service, supra; Shoppers Food Warehouse, supra; Reiss Viking, supra. As noted earlier, counsel for the Respondent argued in his posthearing brief that even assuming the requested information for nonunit employees was relevant, the Respondent had of- fered a legitimate alternative means of satisfying the Union’s request. By this he is referring to the Respondent’s written offer of August 31 (R. Exh. 5), handed to Imus during contract negotiations. This document proposes allowing an accountant selected by the Union to examine the Respondent’s books and records to determine whether its profit-and-loss figures are calculated according to generally accepted accounting proce- dures, and, if not, how does it deviate from those procedures; and whether the allocation of profit-sharing funds between unit and nonunit employees is conducted on an equal basis, and, if not, in what manner is the allocation unequal. This “alternative” was offered by the Respondent over 4 months after the original request for information was made by the Union in its April 26 letter. While counsel for the General Counsel did not specifically address whether this offer was “reasonably prompt,” I am of the view that it was not. The Board has indicated that what constitutes reasonable prompt- ness must be determined under the totality of the circumstances in each case. There is no “per se” rule, rather what is required is a reasonable good-faith effort to respond to the request as promptly as circumstances allow. Allegheny Power, 339 NLRB 585, 587 (2003). Under the circumstances of this case, I believe that a 4-month delay was not reasonable. None of the information sought by the Union was particularly complex, and was likely readily available from the Respondent’s payroll and personnel records, which should have been easily accessed through its computer system. Samaritan Medical Center, 319 NLRB 392, 398 (1995). Such access to the information by the Respondent should not have required a 4-month delay before an alternative proposal was even made. See Regency Service Carts, Inc., 345 NLRB 671 (2005) (3-month delay in circum- stances unlawful); Peyton Packing Co., 129 NLRB 1358 (1961) (3-month delay too long, even when data are incomplete and necessary persons absent from work). However, even if a 4-month delay in this case from the ini- tial request for the information was not excessive, I am of the view that the proposal of August 31 (R. Exh. 5) was not an adequate alternative. As an alternative, it provided only that an accountant view the records and report back to the Union as to whether the Respondent has made its calculations and alloca- tions regarding profit sharing according to accepted accounting procedures and on an equal basis, and, if not, how it deviated from those procedures and equity. That information, while certainly useful, would not serve as a basis for the Union to fulfill its legal duty as the exclusive collective-bargaining rep- resentative to administer the terms of the contract on behalf of the unit employees. The Union needed to know the specific information requested as it related to individual employees and how each employee classification was effected by the profit sharing of the other classifications. Such information was even more necessary in order for the Union to be in a position to intelligently address the Respondent’s bargaining proposal on profit sharing and, if necessary, to respond with a counterpro- posal. Therefore, I conclude that the Respondent’s proposal of August 31 did not relieve the Respondent of the duty to comply with the Union’s request for information contained in its letters of April 26 and August 8, as more fully set forth above. Finally, counsel for the Respondent argues in his posthearing brief that the information requested by the Union, as it related to individual nonunit employees, was irrelevant, and, thus, protected against disclosure by the United States and California Constitutions as the guarantors of the individual employees’ privacy rights. However, as noted at length above, I have al- ready concluded that most of the information requested by the Union was relevant. While counsel for the Respondent correct- ly notes that where employees have a legitimate and substantial expectation of privacy, the Board will balance those interests against a union’s need for the information,8 I am of the opinion that in this case the balance tips strongly in favor of the Union’s need for the information. The Union seeks the names, job titles, wage rates, gross yearly wages, profit-sharing distribution received, other bonus- es received, including nonwage compensation, for all employ- ees, unit and nonunit. Certainly this is sensitive information, 8 Aerospace Corp., supra; Exxon Co. USA, supra; Good Life Bever- age Co., supra; Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., supra; Howard Uni- versity, supra. DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 510 for which employees have a legitimate and substantial expecta- tion of privacy. Never the less, the Union has at least as great an interest in ensuring that the Respondent is abiding by the contract provisions that establish a profit-sharing formula for unit employees. As noted, this formula is interdependent and involves not only the unit employees represented by the Union, but all other employees of the Respondent. As the Respondent has yet to offer an adequate alternative to the production of these documents, the balance tips in favor of releasing this in- formation to the Union. Only in this way can the Union fulfill its legal duty to administer the contract on behalf of the unit employees, and to properly carry out its collective-bargaining responsibility. For the reasons expressed, items 1 through 4 in the Union’s request for information letter of August 8 must be produced. The Respondent’s failure to furnish this information constitutes a violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act, as alleged in complaint paragraphs 7(aa)(i), (ii), (iii), and (iv). D. Documents Related to Job Bids; Letter of June 18 There appears to be no dispute that throughout the course of negotiations the Respondent took the position that because of superior wages and benefits paid to its employees, the Re- spondent was at a competitive disadvantage when bidding for jobs against other companies performing similar work. Imus testified that at one point during negotiations the Respondent presented the Union with a list of companies with whom the Respondent believed it was not competitive. According to Imus, in an effort to determine the basis upon which the Re- spondent was not competitive, the Union requested certain information from the Respondent. It was Imus’ contention that if the Union could determine the reasons why the Respondent was not competitive, assuming that to be accurate, the Union might be able to alter its bargaining proposals in an effort to provided the Respondent with a competitive advantage. It was allegedly for this reason that the Union sent a letter to counsel for the Respondent dated June 18. (GC Exh. 7.) The first paragraph of the letter notes that, “[d]uring negotiations the company has repeatedly stated that they were not competi- tive with other companies. The workers are willing to negotiate in order to make the company more competitive. . . . In order to negotiate responsibility [sic] we need the following infor- mation to evaluate the company’s proposals. All information should be for the last three years.” The letter then specified 11 separate items the Union was re- questing, as follows: 1. Copies of bids received; 2. Copies of new projects bidding; 3. Copies of bids that were not awarded to A-1 Door; 4. The reason why A-1 Door did not receive the bid; 5. What company was awarded the bid, not received, and why; 6. How much lower was the competition on each bid not received; 7. Were there any dates A-1 Door was too busy, and turned away bids, if so when; 8. Copies of jobs that you were doing, but now are awarded to another company; 9. Copies of bids or jobs A-1 Door was removed from and the reason for removal; 10. Copies of bids not submitted due to contractors in- surance requirements; 11. Copies of bids not submitted due to a lack of pro- duction ability. In response to its request for information, the Union received a letter from counsel for the Respondent dated June 20. (GC Exh. 8.) In part, that letter stated, “I must inform you that your various requests for information include information that does not exist and information that will not [be] produced due to the fact that it contains confidential proprietary information.” Fur- ther the letter stated, “. . . we dispute the necessity for the Em- ployer to produce any of the information you requested because the Employer has not maintained an inability to comply with the demands of the Union during the negotiations.” For all intense and purposes, none of the requested docu- ments were received by the Union, and apparently no further formal explanation was proffered by the Respondent. In his posthearing brief, counsel for the Respondent defends the Re- spondent’s failure to furnish the bid related documents on the basis that they were not relevant to negotiations, did not exist, and/or were confidential, proprietary, and/or constituted trade secrets. I am of the opinion that all 11 categories of documents re- quested in the Union’s letter of June 18 were relevant to the parties’ negotiations. If not relevant on their face, they certain- ly became relevant when the Respondent argued during negoti- ations that it was not competitive with other door manufactures in the Sacramento area because its wages and benefits paid to employees were greater than the wages and benefits competi- tors paid to their employees. Items 1–9 and 11 appear to be directly related to the Respondent’s bidding process, specifical- ly why bids submitted by the Respondent were either accepted or rejected by contractors. The Union was also seeking infor- mation as to whether the Respondent was in a position to per- form the work needed to submit a bid, or whether a lack of production capacity resulted in a failure to submit a bid on a particular project. Further, the Union wanted to find out what reasons the Respondent may have been given by contractors or otherwise learned regarding why it was unsuccessful in bidding for any particular projects. As to item 10, Imus testified that he had been told my Jeff Wilson, one of the Respondent’s manag- ers, that some contractors were creating such stringent insur- ance requirements that the Respondent was declining to bid certain work. This item was requested in order to produce doc- uments as could establish which jobs the Respondent had de- clined to bid on because of concerns that insurance and liability issues were so significant that a profit could not be made on the projects. Regarding counsel for the Respondent’s contention in his let- ter of June 20 that much of the requested information on bids did not exist, Winchester was cross-examined at length by counsel for the Union. His testimony in this area was a mass of contradictions and equivocation. He claimed not to understand what the Union was requesting for several of the items listed, but he admitted not approaching the Union to clarify specifical- A-1 DOOR & BUILDING SOLUTIONS 511 ly what was being requested.9 For many of the listed items he claimed to have had no specific information as it was allegedly outside his area of responsibility and expertise, but repeatedly acknowledged that managers Jeff Wilson and Rick Hall likely had such information. Of course, the information request was made of the Respondent as the employing entity, not of Win- chester personally. The Respondent had the duty to produce relevant documents and information through its collective knowledge, and that included from Winchester, Wilson, Hall, and any other managers who could appropriately respond. It was clear from his testimony that Winchester had no intention of putting forth a good-faith effort to respond to the Union’s request. It is obvious to the undersigned that the letter of June 20 refusing to furnish any information was the only response that the Respondent intended to proffer. In his posthearing brief, counsel for the Respondent argues that the bid information concerned matters outside the bargain- ing unit, for which the Union had failed to establish relevance. The Board has repeatedly taken the position that information requests for similar documents, such as subcontracting agree- ments, even those relating to bargaining unit employees’ terms and conditions of employment, are not presumptively relevant. Therefore, a union seeking such information must demonstrate its relevance. Disneyland Park, supra, citing Richmond Health Care, 332 NLRB 1304, 1305 fn. 1 (2000); See Detroit Edison Co., 314 NLRB 1273, 1273–1274 (1994). However, in the case before me, the Union is certainly able to establish relevance as it was the Respondent itself that raised the underlying issue during negotiations by alleging difficulty in the bidding process with its nonunion competition. Under these circumstances, the relevance of the information requested should have been appar- ent to the Respondent, but, in any event, that relevance was pointed out to the Respondent in the first paragraph of the Un- ion’s letter of June 18. (GC Exh. 7.) Disneyland Park, supra, citing Allison Co., 330 NLRB 1363, 1367 fn. 23 (2000); Brazos Electric Power Cooperative, Inc., 241 NLRB 1016, 1018–1019 (1979), enfd. in relevant part 615 F.2d 1100 (8th Cir. 1980). Counsel for the Respondent further argues that it has a legit- imate confidentiality and proprietary interest in protecting the specifics of its contractual and business relationship with con- tractors’ soliciting bids. There is no genuine dispute that the Respondent does in fact have such legitimate interests. How- ever, the Board has repeatedly held that “in dealing with union requests for relevant but assertedly confidential information, [it is] required to balance a union’s need for such information against any ‘legitimate and substantial’ confidentiality interests established by the employer, accommodating the parties’ re- spective interests insofar as feasible in determining the employ- er’s duty to supply the information.” Allen Storage & Moving Co., 342 NLRB 501, 502 (2004). In the case at hand, the Un- ion needs the requested bidding information in order to deter- 9 Imus testified that regarding item 1, he should have more accurate- ly used the words: “Copies of bids awarded”; and regarding item 2, should have more accurately used the words: “Copy of a list of new projects that A-1 Door is bidding on.” He further indicated that the Respondent’s negotiators never asked him to explain what was meant by the items in the request. mine both whether the Respondent’s argument is genuine that it has a problem competing due to the alleged superiority of the wages and benefits it pays, and also so as to be able to formu- late appropriate contract proposals. As Imus testified, the Un- ion might be willing to adjust its proposals to aid the Respond- ent in successfully bidding on jobs, if any proffered information from the Respondent can demonstrate such a need. In my view, a balancing of these competing interests tips strongly in the Union’s favor. After all, the Respondent can not “have it both ways.” The Respondent should not be able to advance the contention during negotiations that it is not com- petitive in the bidding process and then be privileged on the basis of confidentiality and propriety interests not to have to produce any proof of its claim. The information is relevant to the Union’s proposals at the bargaining table, and, in fact, the Union may be in a position to adjust its proposals to improve the Respondent’s bidding position. These factors weigh heavi- ly in favor of requiring the Respondent to produce the request- ed information. Counsel for the Respondent argues in his posthearing brief that the Respondent offered an alternative method of satisfying the Union’s need for the requested information, that being the proposal of August 31 (R. Exh. 5) to allow an accountant to examine the Respondent’s books and records regarding its prof- it and loss calculations and profit-sharing allocations. Frankly, I am at a loss to understand how this proposal has any connec- tion with the Union’s request for bidding information made in its letter of June 18 (GC Exh. 7). I am unaware of any alternate proposal that the Respondent made in response to the Union’s request for the bidding information. Certainly, the letter from counsel dated June 20 (GC Exh. 8), which was the Respond- ent’s only official response, makes no mention of any alternate method of satisfying the Union’s request. Finally, in counsel’s posthearing brief, he alleges that the bidding information sought by the Union is protected from disclosure by the California Uniform Trade Secrets Act. How- ever, counsel offers no Board or court case holding this to be so. I am unaware of any such case. In any event, to the extent that the California Uniform Trade Secrets Act would protect the Respondent’s bidding process from disclosure as a confidential or proprietary interest, I have already addressed the Board’s position on the balancing of such conflicting legitimate inter- ests. As I have found, the interests of the Union in addressing this matter through the collective-bargaining process outweigh the Respondent’s interests in keeping it confidential. Also, it would seem that the Respondent waived any such defense when it raised the issue of competitive disadvantage during negotia- tions. Accordingly, items 1–11 in the Union’s request for infor- mation letter of June 18 must be produced. The Respondent’s failure to furnish this information constitutes a violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act, as alleged in paragraphs 7(b)(i) through (xi) of the complaint. E. Documents Related to New Employees; Letter of July 6 The expired collective-bargaining agreement between the Union and the Employer contains a “Union-Security” provision DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 512 requiring a newly hired employee to either be a member of, or join, the Union within a certain period to time. Further, the contract requires that a newly hired employee will be processed through the union hiring hall and receive a “work referral.” Whenever a referral is requested, the Employer is required to provide the Union with “a written request stating the name, address, classification, rate of pay, Social Security number and proposed date of hire” of the person to be employed.10 (GC Exh. 5, the Collective-Bargaining Agreement, article 2, Union Security; and “Exhibit D,” Employer’s Notification of Hire.) Winchester testified that sometime in May the Respondent hired a company called Huffmaster to provide security services. Huffmaster’s employees remained on the Respondent’s proper- ty for approximately 3 weeks. According to Winchester, these individuals were never hired by the Respondent or placed on its payroll. They remained employees of Huffmaster. Apparently, these individuals were engaged principally for security purpos- es to ride along as passengers when the Respondent’s truck- drivers made deliveries of product to construction sites. From Winchester’s testimony, it seems that the use of Huffmaster personnel coincided with a period of high labor unrest among the bargaining unit members employed at the Respondent’s facility. In any event, Imus testified that he became suspicious that Huffmaster personnel might be performing bargaining unit work, even though they had never been referred through the union hiring hall. In an effort to determine whether the contract was being violated, and in order to further respond to the Em- ployer’s negotiation proposals, Imus requested certain infor- mation from the Respondent. He sent Winchester a letter dated July 6 (GC Exh. 9) requesting the following information for the period from “May 1, 2007, to [the] present”: 1. The name, address, phone number, date of hire, rate of pay of anyone hired. 2. The resume and application for anyone you accepted an application from. 3. Application and/or resume of anyone offered a job but did not take the job. 4. Copies of any and all documents given to new or pro- spective employees. 5. Copy of any document notifying applicants of the la- bor dispute in progress. Counsel for the Employer responded by letter dated July 9, indicating that the information would be forthcoming, but only to the extent that it concerned bargaining unit employees. (R. Exh. 7.) A second letter was sent by counsel dated July 12, enclosing “copies [of] the Employer’s records concerning em- ployees hired in the bargaining unit during the period you re- quested.” Attached to the letter was the personnel information requested by the Union in item 1, for 11 of the Respondent’s newly hired employees. (GC Exh. 10.) Imus testified that sometime after he received the Respond- ent’s letter of July 12, he went to the Respondent’s facility. While there he was introduced to two bargaining unit employ- 10 No party has claimed that these provisions of the collective- bargaining agreement did not survive the expiration of the contract. ees, Mario Navarro and Juan Villegas, who informed him that they had recently been hired by the Respondent. These two employees had not been included in the personnel information received from the Respondent. Further, Imus testified that while at the facility he was told by employees that there were three other individuals recently hired by the Respondent for bargaining unit positions, but he was not able to meet with them or lean their names or dates of hire. Counsel for the Respondent argues in his posthearing brief that I should find Imus’ testimony regarding Mario Navarro and Juan Villegas incredible and disregard it, because counsel for the General Counsel had to refresh Imus’ memory by showing him his affidavit given to an agent of the Board during the in- vestigation of this case. In my view, that is a totally specious argument. After all, the Respondent offered no evidence to rebut Imus’ contention. Winchester did not deny the assertion and no personnel or payroll records were offered to show that no such persons were on the Respondent’s payroll. The fact that a witness can not recall the names he learned of approxi- mately 4 months before the hearing and needs to have his memory refreshed by use of his earlier affidavit does not by any means establish that he is incredible. As Imus’ testimony was unrebutted by the Respondent, I credit that testimony and conclude that Navarro and Villegas were hired as bargaining unit employees, but not included as such on the Respondent’s July 12 letter responding to the Un- ion’s information request of July 6.11 Whether the absence of their payroll and personnel information was intentional or inad- vertent is really not an issue. All that matters is that the infor- mation furnished by the Respondent was incomplete. Regarding item 4 in the Union’s July 6 information request, copies of any documents given to new or prospective employ- ees, Imus testified that the Respondent did supply him with an “employee handbook” given to new hires, but that he did not receive that until early August. Later, during cross- examination, he described what he received from the Respond- ent as a “new hire packet” that “included an employee hand- book.” It is significant and important to note that the complaint does not allege that the Respondent should have furnished the Union with all the information requested in the Union’s July 6 letter. Counsel for the General Counsel represented at the hearing that the General Counsel was only alleging that the Respondent violated the Act by failing to furnish the information requested by the Union in items 2 and 4 of the July 6 letter. In fact, to be very specific, the complaint (see paragraphs 7(c)(i) and (ii)) is even somewhat more restrictive than that, alleging as a viola- tion of the Act only the failure to furnish: (i) The resume and application for anyone Respondent ac- cepted an application from [limited to individuals actually hired]. (ii) Copies of any and all documents given to new employ- ees. 11 As Imus’ testimony regarding the possible existence of three other bargaining unit employees was vague and unsubstantiated, I will not rely on this information. A-1 DOOR & BUILDING SOLUTIONS 513 Regarding item (i) above, the resume and application for an- yone hired by the Respondent in a bargaining unit position, this would certainly be presumptively relevant information. It per- tains to the persons hired for bargaining unit positions. The Union has an interest in administering the collective-bargaining agreement and determining that individuals hired to perform unit work are processed pursuant to the terms of the contract including union-security and hiring hall referral procedures. Apparently, the Respondent did not dispute that relevance, as counsel’s letters of July 9 and 12 (R. Exh. 7; GC Exh. 10) make it clear that such documents are being furnished for bargaining unit personnel. Unfortunately, Imus’ testimony establishes that the infor- mation furnished by the Respondent was incomplete, since it failed to include the requested information for at least two new- ly hired members of the bargaining unit, namely Mario Navarro and Juan Villegas. I reject counsel for the Respondent’s argu- ment in his posthearing brief that such records are protected against disclosure by the involved employees’ privacy rights. Any employee applying and being hired for a job where the unit employees are covered by a collective-bargaining agree- ment containing a union-security provision has to assume that basic payroll and personnel information will be turned over to the Union representing those employees. Without that infor- mation, the Union can not properly administer the contract, nor knowledgeably respond to the Respondent’s contract proposals. Any balancing of rights tips strongly in favor of the Union’s right to this information. Accordingly, the Respondent must furnish the Union with the resume and application for anyone hired by the Respondent in a bargaining unit position for the period from May 1 to the present, the time period specified in the Union’s letter of July 6. The Respondent’s failure to furnish this information constitutes a violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act, as alleged in complaint paragraph 7(c)(i). Regarding item (ii) above, copies of any and all documents given to new employees, this would also constitute presump- tively relevant information. It involves the documentation giv- en to newly hired bargaining unit employees, and, depending upon what such documents consists of, may directly impact the relationship between the Union and the bargaining unit mem- bers it represents. Such information may well have a direct bearing on the Union’s ability to administer the contract as well as present bargaining proposals to the Respondent. It appears that the Respondent did not initially disagree, as Imus testified that in early August the Respondent did provide him with a “new employee packet” that “included an employee handbook.” Presumably this was the entire set of documents new bargaining unit employees received from the Respondent at the time of their hire. No evidence was offered to establish that this was not so. Still, the Respondent did not furnish cop- ies of these documents until early August, approximately 1 month after the July 6 request was made. The only remaining issue, therefore, is whether such a delay constitutes an unfair labor practice. I am of the view that it does not. As I noted above, the Board has indicated that what consti- tutes reasonable promptness in the production of requested information must be determined under the totality of the cir- cumstances in each case. There is no “per se” rule, rather what is required is a reasonable good faith effort to respond to the request as promptly as circumstances allow. Allegheny Power, supra. In my opinion, 1 month’s time is not an inordinate de- lay. Clearly, the Respondent’s managers had other matters to attend to, not the least of which was operating the business during a period of difficult economic and labor conditions, as well as while preparing for and engaging in bargaining sessions with the Union. Under these circumstances, I do not believe that the Re- spondent’s 1-month delay in furnishing the Union with copies of any documents given to newly hired employees constitutes a violation of the Act. Accordingly, I shall recommend that par- agraph 7(c)(ii) of the complaint be dismissed. F. Summary As is reflected above, I recommend dismissal of the follow- ing paragraphs of the complaint: 7(a)(i) and (c)(ii). Further, I find that the Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act, as alleged in the following para- graphs of the complaint: 7(a)(ii) and (iii), (aa)(i) through (iv), (b)(i) through (xi), and (c)(i). CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The Respondent, A-1 Door and Building Solutions, is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. 2. The Union, Millmen and Industrial Carpenters Union, Lo- cal 1618, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. All employees performing work covered by the collective- bargaining agreement between the Respondent and the Union effective for the period from May 1, 2004, to May 1, 2007, constitutes an appropriate unit for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. 4. At all times material, the Union has been, and is now, the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of Respondent’s employees in the above unit within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act. 5. By failing and refusing to provide the following infor- mation to the Union since on or after April 26, 2007, the Re- spondent has engaged in unfair labor practice conduct within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act: Net profit each year for the last 3 years; and the total amount of profit distributed to the employees with the number of employees receiving the distribution each year for the last 3 years. 6. By failing and refusing to provide the following infor- mation to the Union since on or after June 18, 2007, the Re- spondent has engaged in unfair labor practice conduct within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act: Copies of bids awarded; a copy of a list of new projects that A-1 Door is bidding on; copies of bids that were not awarded to A-1 Door; the reason why A-1 Door did not receive the bid; what compa- ny was awarded the bid not received, and why; how much low- er was the competition of each bid not received; were there any dates A-1 Door was too busy, and turned away bids, and if so when; copies of jobs that A-1 Door was doing, but now are DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 514 awarded to another company; copies of bids or jobs A-1 Door was removed from and the reason for removal; copies of bids not submitted due to contractors’ insurance requirements; and copies of bids not submitted due to a lack of production ability. All information submitted should be for the preceding 3 years. 7. By failing and refusing to provide the following infor- mation to the Union since on or after July 6, 2007, the Re- spondent has engaged in unfair labor practice conduct within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act: The resume and application for anyone hired by the Respondent in a bar- gaining unit position. The information provided should be for the time period from May 1, 2007, to the present. 8. By failing and refusing to provide the following infor- mation to the Union since on or after August 8, 2007, the Re- spondent has engaged in unfair labor practice conduct within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act: All salaried employees, including nonbargaining unit employees, name, job title, wage rate, gross yearly wages, the date and the amount of profit sharing distribution for each year for the last 3 years; all hourly employees, including nonbargaining unit employees, name, job title, wage rate, gross yearly wages, the date and the amount of profit-sharing distribution for each year for the last 3 years; names of all salaried or hourly employees, including nonbargaining unit employees, the amount of any other bonus or bonuses paid to them during each of the last 3 years; and the employee name and the amount of any other nonwage compen- sation received by all salaried and hourly employees, including nonbargaining unit employees. 9. The above unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 10. The Respondent has not violated the Act except as set forth above. REMEDY Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain un- fair labor practices, I find that it must be ordered to cease and desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectu- ate the polices of the Act.12 [Recommended Order omitted from publication.] 12 In order to provide a meaningful remedy, the Respondent is di- rected to furnish the documents to the Union, as specified in this Order, from the time periods listed in the respective information request letters to the date by which the Respondent complies with this Order.