357 NLRB 736
Somerset Valley Rehab and Nursing Center
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
357 NLRB No. 71
736
1621 Route 22 West Operating Company, LLC d/b/a
Somerset Valley Rehabilitation & Nursing
Center and 1199 SEIU United Healthcare
Workers East, New Jersey Region, Petitioner.
Case 22–RC–013139
August 26, 2011
DECISION AND CERTIFICATION
OF REPRESENTATIVE
BY CHAIRMAN LIEBMAN AND MEMBERS BECKER
AND HAYES
The National Labor Relations Board, by a three-
member panel,1 has considered objections to an election
held on September 2, 2010, and the hearing officer’s
report recommending disposition of them. The election
was conducted pursuant to a Stipulated Election
Agreement. The tally of ballots shows 38 ballots for and
28 against the Petitioner, with 5 challenged ballots, an
insufficient number to affect the results.
The Board has reviewed the record in light of the
exceptions and briefs,2 has adopted the hearing officer’s
findings3 and recommendations, and finds that a
certification of representative should be issued.
In support of its Objection 1, the Employer contended
that the Union distributed a flyer during the critical
period containing statements purportedly made by
employees that they did not, in fact, either make or
authorize. The hearing officer recommended overruling
the objection. For the reasons stated by the hearing
officer, and those that follow, we agree with and adopt
the hearing officer’s recommendation.
Explaining to employees that the Union was making a
campaign flyer, the Union obtained signed release forms
from employees willing to be photographed and/or
videotaped and to provide statements of support for the
Union. Employees who signed the release forms
authorized the Union “to use pictures made of me and
comments made by me on this date in video tapes,
printed
material,
digital
and
online
media,
advertisements, and any other materials.” Two questions
on the release form asked employees how having a union
1 Member Pearce is recused and did not participate in this case.
2 The Employer filed 14 objections, but withdrew Objs. 8 and 14 at
the close of the hearing. The Employer excepted to the hearing
officer’s recommendations to overrule Objs. 1–7 and 11–13. In the
absence of exceptions, we adopt pro forma the hearing officer’s
recommendations to overrule Objs. 9 and 10.
3 The Employer has excepted to some of the hearing officer's
credibility findings. The Board's established policy is not to overrule a
hearing officer's credibility resolutions unless the clear preponderance
of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect.
Stretch-Tex Co., 118 NLRB 1359, 1361 (1957). We have carefully
examined the record and find no basis for reversing the findings.
would (1) “improve your life and/or the life of your
family” and (2) “help you provide better care [for your
patients].”
After collecting signed releases from approximately 49
employees in a proposed bargaining unit of 73, the Union
then published a campaign flyer containing statements
based on the answers in the release forms and on the
prior statements employees made in campaign videos
expressing their desire for a union. The cover of the
flyer displayed the words “We’re Voting Yes for
1199SEIU!” between two group photographs of
employees. These words were repeated on the back of
the flyer, surrounded by individual photographs and
employee statements. The flyer included statements
from approximately 48 individual employees, and
approximately 25 of the statements included the words
“I’m voting yes,” although none of the employees
expressly authorized the Union to use those specific
words.
The Employer objected to the Union’s use of the
words “I’m/We’re voting yes” in quotes on the flyer. It
claims that the “voting yes” quotes were unauthorized
misrepresentations that deceived voters and that should
require a second election.
Under the well-established standard for evaluating
misrepresentation in campaign propaganda, an election
can be set aside on the basis of misleading campaign
statements only if a party has used “forged documents
which render the voters unable to recognize propaganda
for what it is.” Midland National Life Insurance Co.,
263 NLRB 127, 133 (1982). Under the Sixth Circuit’s
broader rule, an election may also be set aside “where no
forgery can be proved, but where the misrepresentation is
so pervasive and the deception so artful that employees
will be unable to separate truth from untruth and where
their right to a free and fair choice will be affected.” Van
Dorn Plastic Machinery Co. v. NLRB, 736 F.2d 343, 348
(6th Cir. 1984). There was no forgery here and voters
could easily identify the flyer at issue as campaign
propaganda. Nor, for the reasons we explain below, was
there any pervasive misrepresentation or deception so
artful that employees were unable to separate truth from
untruth. In fact, we agree with the hearing officer that
the Union had received sufficient evidence of the
employees' support that its insertion of the words “I’m
voting yes” into employees’ statements expressing their
desire for a union did not amount to misrepresentation,
regardless of whether employees expressly authorized
attribution of those specific words to them. See Gormac
Custom Mfg., 335 NLRB 1192, 1200–1201 (2001).
Our dissenting colleague would set aside the election.
He cites the Board’s statement in BFI Waste Services,
SOMERSET VALLEY REHAB & NURSING CENTER
737
343 NLRB 254 (2004), that it did not “condone the
creation and attribution of quotes to employees, at least
where the union makes no prepublication effort to verify
that the quotes fairly represent[ed] the views of the
quoted employees.” Id. at 254 fn. 2. But the Union’s
actions here render the concerns expressed by the BFI
majority inapposite. Indeed, the Union made precisely
the sort of prepublication effort to verify mentioned
there. The Union asked all the quoted employees to state
their reasons for supporting union representation and for
permission to use their names, images, and statements in
campaign literature. The campaign flyer included
statements received in the answers supplied in the signed
release forms. And many of the employees quoted in the
flyer also appeared in a campaign video sincerely stating
their desire for a union. Based on these interactions, the
Union reasonably believed that each of the named
employees was planning to vote “yes” for representation.
To suggest that by including the phrase “we’re voting
yes” or “I’m voting yes” in quotes the Union engaged in
“pervasive misrepresentation,” “artful deception,” or
even misrepresentation at all is not supported by these
facts. The Union did exactly what each of the employees
who signed the release form would have understood the
Union was going to do—it used the employees’ names,
images, and words in an effort to create a persuasive
piece of campaign literature.
In turn, no reasonable employee reading the Union’s
flyer would think that all the listed employees actually
got together and literally said, “We’re voting yes.” That
language appears on the cover and back of the flyer and
is not attributed to any specific employee. A reasonable
reader would have understood those words, as well as the
repeated phrase, “I’m voting yes,” as characterizing the
pro-union sentiments of the named employees as a
whole.4 There was no “artful deception” of the reader:
that characterization was accurate and was verified by
the Union. Surely, readers could “recognize the
propaganda ‘for what it is.’” Midland, supra at 131.
And, as there was no misrepresentation, necessarily there
was no “pervasive misrepresentation” under Van Dorn.5
The dissent’s approach reflects a view of the ability of
voters to assess campaign propaganda that was
4 There was simply no “deception of all other unit employees about
the extent of support for the Petitioner” as suggested in the dissent.
5 Nor can we understand the dissent’s concerns that the employees
whose names and pictures appeared in the flyer might somehow “feel
compelled to support the union,” when they had expressly authorized
such use and expressed their support for representation, and that their
right “to cast a private election ballot had been violated,” when they
indisputably cast their ballot in private and remained free at any time to
announce to their fellow employees that they had changed their minds
and no longer supported representation.
decisively rejected in Midland, and it would impose an
unrealistic burden on unions’ production of campaign
literature and certainly a burden more rigorous than BFI
envisioned. It is in tension, moreover, with the objective
of the Midland rule to “insure the certainty and finality of
election results, and minimize unwarranted and dilatory
claims attacking those results.” Midland, supra at 131.
For all those reasons, we decline to find that the Union’s
distribution of the flyer requires us to set aside the
election.
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE
IT IS CERTIFIED that a majority of the valid ballots have
been cast for 1199 SEIU United Healthcare Workers
East, New Jersey Region, and that it is the exclusive
collective-bargaining representative of the employees in
the following appropriate unit:
All full-time and regular part-time and per diem non-
professional employees including licensed practical
nurses, certified nursing assistants, housekeepers,
rehabilitation technicians, dietary cooks, dietary aides,
laundry aides, recreation assistants, unit secretaries,
medical records coordinators, maintenance workers,
porters and receptionists employed by the Employer at
its Bound Brook, New Jersey location, but excluding
all office clerical employees, registered nurses,
dieticians,
physical
therapists,
physical
therapy
assistants, occupational therapists, occupational therapy
assistants, speech therapists, social workers, staffing
coordinators, payroll/benefits coordinators, all other
professional employees, guards and supervisors as
defined in the Act.
MEMBER HAYES, dissenting.
Contrary to my colleagues and the hearing officer, I
would sustain the Employer’s Objection 1. In my view,
the Petitioner’s unauthorized addition of the words “I’m
voting yes” or “We’re voting yes” to images and
quotations of 25 employees in its campaign flyer
interfered with employee free choice in the election.1
The Board has stated that it does not “condone the
creation and attribution of quotes to employees, at least
where the union makes no prepublication effort to verify
that the quotes fairly represent the views of the quoted
employees.” BFI Waste Services, 343 NLRB 254, 254
fn. 2 (2004). This sort of conduct impedes the laboratory
conditions sought in Board elections. “An employee
who has merely signed a petition may feel compelled to
support the union after seeing his signature or
photograph reproduced on a poster. A slickly produced
1 I find no need to pass on the Employer’s other objections.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
738
mass-mailing that includes ghost-written employee
quotations may deceptively induce other employees to
support the union.” Id. at 254 (Member Meisburg,
concurring).
The Board did not set aside the election in BFI because
it concluded that the union’s misrepresentations were not
“pervasive” or “artful deceptions.” In this instance, they
were both. The leaflets with the fabricated quotes were
mailed to all eligible voters. In a unit of 73 voters, 25
employees who signed releases approving the use of their
images in the Petitioner’s campaign literature were
quoted as stating the equivalent to “I’m/We’re Voting
Yes,” but none of them made those statements in their
releases or elsewhere. In contrast to BFI, in which two
employees were told that a quote would be prepared for
them, the numerous employees here were not told that
such statements would be made on their behalf in the
Petitioner’s flyer. As a consequence, their statutory right
to refrain from making that public declaration and to cast
a private election ballot has been violated. Further,
unless the employees took the difficult step of publicly
recanting the flyer’s message—another intrusion on their
right to refrain from disclosure of their vote on
representation—the inaccuracy of that message remained
as an artful deception of all other unit employees about
the extent of support for the Petitioner.
My colleagues rely on Midland National Life
Insurance Co., 263 NLRB 127, 131 (1982), to conclude
that readers of the flyers “could recognize the
propaganda for what it is.” They reach that conclusion
by layering speculation upon speculation: the Petitioner
“reasonably believed” that the named employees were
planning to vote “yes” for representation; the named
employees “would have understood” that the Petitioner
was going to use their information as it did; and no
reasonable reader of the flyer “would think” that the
named employees actually said, “We’re voting yes,” and
instead “would have understood” that the quoted words
accurately characterized the pro-union sentiments of the
named employees.
I am not persuaded by such speculation. More
importantly, I do not agree that it is unrealistically
burdensome for a union, in preparing campaign
literature, to verify the authorization of quoted material
that publicly purports to reveal the voting preference of
employees on a matter as to which they have a statutory
right to privacy. In my view, consistent with BFI, this
intrusive and misleading form of campaign propaganda
is beyond the scope of what Midland permits. That is,
not only does the attribution of unauthorized voting
pledges to certain employees mislead others in the voting
unit, a Midland misrepresentation issue, but it also
directly impinges on the identified voters’ Section 7 right
to
refrain
from
declaring
their
position
on
a
representation issue prior to voting in a private Board
election, which is not a matter addressed by Midland.
When pervasive, as it was in this case, such conduct is
objectionable. I would therefore sustain the Employer’s
Objection 1 and set aside the election results.