Local 471, Rochester Regional Joint Board, Workers United (Sodexo, Inc.)

1538 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 359 NLRB No. 166 Local 471, Rochester Regional Joint Board, Workers United (Sodexo, Inc.) and Sharron Rodrigue and Tina Mayotte. Cases 03–CB–009172 and 03–CB– 009176 July 16, 2013 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN PEARCE AND MEMBERS GRIFFIN AND BLOCK On August 9, 2011, Administrative Law Judge Robert A. Ringler issued the attached decision. The Respondent filed exceptions with supporting arguments, the Acting General Counsel filed an answering brief, and the Re- spondent filed a reply brief. The National Labor Relations Board has considered the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and briefs, and has decided to affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,1 and conclusions only to the extent consistent with this Decision and Order.2 This case concerns the Respondent Union’s alleged unlawful retaliation against two bargaining unit employ- ees, Sharron Rodrigue and Tina Mayotte, because they actively assisted a rival union’s effort to replace the Un- ion as the collective-bargaining representative. As dis- cussed below, we find that the Union did unlawfully re- taliate against Rodrigue, but that the Union’s actions 1 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an adminis- trative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear preponder- ance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing the findings. Elizabeth Weiner began work as the Union’s business agent/organizer in June 2009, instead of December 2009, as the judge inadvertently stated. We correct the error. 2 We have amended the judge’s remedy to provide that the make- whole remedy shall be computed in accordance with Ogle Protection Service, 183 NLRB 682 (1970), enfd. 444 F.2d 502 (6th Cir. 1971), rather than with F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950). The Ogle Protection formula applies where, as here, the Board is remedying “a violation of the Act which does not involve cessation of employment status or interim earnings that would in the course of time reduce back- pay.” Ogle Protection Service, supra at 683; see also Pepsi-America, Inc., 339 NLRB 986, 986 fn. 2 (2003). We have modified the judge’s recommended Order in accordance with Latino Express, Inc., 359 NLRB No. 44, slip op. at 2 fn. 10 (2012) (holding that a respondent that has never been an employer of the dis- criminatee is subject to the tax-compensation remedy, but not the So- cial Security reporting requirement). See also Operating Engineers Local 627, 359 NLRB 753, 753 fn. 3 (2013). We have amended the judge’s conclusions of law and recommended remedy and modified the recommended Order to conform to our find- ings and to the Board’s standard remedial language. We shall substitute a new notice to conform to the Order as modified. affecting Mayotte were not unlawful. I. BACKGROUND The Employer, Sodexo, Inc., provides a variety of ca- tering and other food services at the Empire State Plaza (ESP) in Albany, New York. The Union represents a unit of Sodexo’s food service workers at the ESP. In January 2009, the parties commenced bargaining for a successor collective-bargaining agreement. Sporadic bargaining sessions took place over the next year, and a successor agreement was executed in July 2010, retroac- tive to January 2009 (the 2009–2012 agreement). Meanwhile, early in 2010, UNITE HERE, a rival un- ion, attempted to organize the unit and to replace the Union as the bargaining representative. Unit employees Rodrigue and Mayotte actively assisted UNITE HERE in that effort. Several months later, the Union negotiated two provi- sions in the parties’ 2009–2012 collective-bargaining agreement, one that adversely affected Rodrigue with respect to her vacation pay and one that adversely affect- ed Mayotte with respect to the distribution of work as- signments. II. THE JUDGE’S FINDINGS The complaint alleges, and the judge found, that the Union negotiated the contract provisions to retaliate against Rodrigue and Mayotte for exercising their Sec- tion 7 right to support a rival union, in violation of Sec- tion 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act. The complaint also alleges, and the judge further found, that the Union breached its duty of fair representation by negotiating the provision affecting Mayotte. III. DISCUSSION We agree with the judge’s finding as to Rodrigue. By contrast, we find merit to the Union’s exceptions regard- ing Mayotte, and we shall dismiss the complaint to that extent. A. The Rodrigue Allegation Rodrigue worked primarily as a hostess in the Albany room, a buffet-style restaurant in the ESP. She occasion- ally worked in other positions, such as house wait staff, cashier, and carver. In her capacity as hostess, Rodrigue received vacation pay of approximately $650 per week of vacation. Beginning in January 2010, Rodrigue assisted UNITE HERE in its effort to organize the unit, and the Union was well aware of her dissident activities. Four months later, the Union and the Employer agreed to a provision in the successor collective-bargaining agreement that capped vacation pay for house wait staff at $250 per week. That provision memorialized a past ROCHESTER REGIONAL JOINT BOARD LOCAL 471, WORKERS UNITED (SODEXO, INC.) 1539 practice that applied in other areas of the ESP, but that had never been applied to Albany Room employees, such as Rodrigue. After the close of negotiations, however, the Union contacted the Employer to propose additional language extending the vacation pay cap to “wait staff who normally work in the Albany Room.” This proposal had never been a subject of negotiation. The Employer agreed, and that provision was inserted into the 2009– 2012 agreement. The Union believed that this additional language referred solely to Rodrigue—who was actually a hostess—and thus would reduce her vacation pay. In analyzing the Union’s conduct, the judge applied the well-established burden shifting framework of Wright Line.3 For the reasons given by the judge, and as further discussed below, we agree with his finding that the Act- ing General Counsel proved that the Union’s belated vacation pay proposal was motivated by its animus to- ward Rodrigue for her protected concerted activity of campaigning for a rival union.4 We also adopt the judge’s finding that the Union failed to prove that it would have negotiated the same provision even in the absence of Rodrigue’s protected activity. The Union argues that it did not single out Rodrigue for reprisal, but rather that it merely sought to achieve consistency of vacation pay among all wait staff and that it reasonably relied on a September 25, 2009 list from the Employer that erroneously listed Rodrigue as wait staff in the Albany Room.5 The Union asserts that it did not 3 251 NLRB 1083, 1088 fn. 11, 1089 (1980), enfd. on other grounds 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 989 (1982), ap- proved in NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 399–403 (1983). Member Block concurs in finding the violation involving Rodrigue, but would do so on the theory that the Union breached its duty of fair representation. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967). Although the complaint does not specifically allege this theory, Member Block observes that the theory was fully litigated and that it represents a more appropriate framework than Wright Line for analyzing 8(b)(1)(A) alle- gations relating to contract negotiations. In her view, the record (as discussed below) establishes that the Union discriminated against a dissident member without any rational justification. Accordingly, she would find it unnecessary to pass on the judge’s Wright Line analysis. 4 In adopting the judge’s findings of unlawful motivation, we reject the Union’s exception to the judge’s reliance on statements made by Jay Manning, then a member of the Union’s executive board, who did not testify, on the basis that they were hearsay. Manning’s statements are not hearsay because (1) they were not relied upon “to prove the truth of the matter asserted,” and (2) they are an opposing party’s statements made by the party in an individual or representative capaci- ty. See Fed.R.Evid. 801(c)(2), 801(d)(2)(A), and advisory committee’s note (d)(2). Even if Manning’s statements are hearsay, they would fall within the exception for a then-existing state of mind, because the judge relied on the statements for evidence of the Union’s animus toward Rodrigue’s dissident activity. Fed.R.Evid. 803(3). 5 Contrary to the judge, we do not rely on a “conflicting report,” which showed Rodrigue’s hours and earnings from January through October 2010 and classified her as both hostess and wait staff. That learn until October 2010 that Rodrigue was actually a hostess. These contentions actually highlight the Un- ion’s intent to penalize Rodrigue. The Union knew that the practice of capping vacation pay for house wait staff at $250 per week had never been applied to employees in the Albany Room. It knew that this distinction had never previously caused concern. Finally, it knew not only that Rodrigue worked in the Albany Room, but also that the Employer’s September 25, 2009 list showed her as the only employee (and thus, by definition, the only wait staff employee) working there.6 With this knowledge, the Union—on its own initiative, after the close of negotiations—proposed new language specifically extending the vacation pay cap to Albany Room employees: that is, to Rodrigue. The inev- itable result was to reduce Rodrigue’s vacation pay by more than half. And that result was clearly the Union’s goal. The Union neither sought, nor achieved, any other benefit for unit members by conceding Rodrigue’s vaca- tion pay, unbidden. In these circumstances, and in light of the judge’s find- ings of significant union animus toward Rodrigue’s dis- sident activities, we are hard pressed to accept the Un- ion’s asserted pursuit of “consistency” to explain its ac- tions. Rather, we agree with the judge that the Union’s proposal was a stratagem to retaliate against Rodrigue. Accordingly, we adopt the judge’s conclusion that the Union violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) by negotiating the vacation pay provision that adversely affected Ro- drigue. The Union argues that instead of reaching the merits, the judge should have deferred the Rodrigue allegation to a 2011 grievance settlement. We reject this argument, as well. The Board will defer to a settlement agreement if its standards for deferral to an arbitration award have been met. Alpha Beta Co., 273 NLRB 1546, 1547 (1985) (ap- plying the principles set forth in Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 NLRB 1080 (1955), and Olin Corp., 268 NLRB 573 (1984)), review denied sub nom. Mahon v. NLRB, 808 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir. 1987). One factor the Board consid- ers is whether the unfair labor practice issue was consid- ered by the parties to the settlement. That test is satisfied document was created months after the Union negotiated the vacation pay provision affecting Rodrigue and therefore could not have indicat- ed to the Union at the time of negotiations that Rodrigue was actually a hostess. 6 The list may have been wrong on that score as well: Rodrigue testi- fied that another employee worked with her in the Albany Room from the summer of 2008 until September 2010. Based on the Employer’s list, however, the Union evidently thought when it negotiated the vaca- tion pay provision that Rodrigue was the only employee in the Albany Room. 1540 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD if the contractual issue is factually parallel to the unfair labor practice issue, and the parties were generally aware of the facts relevant to resolving the unfair labor practice. Postal Service, 300 NLRB 196, 198 (1990). Deferral would not have been proper here, however. The essential facts follow: In October 2010 and Janu- ary 2011, the Employer mistakenly applied the new wait- staff vacation pay provision of the 2009–2012 agreement to Rodrigue’s earnings as a hostess. As a result, Ro- drigue received $250 per vacation week on those occa- sions, rather than the approximately $650 per vacation week she was entitled to as a hostess. After Rodrigue protested to the Union, the Union filed a grievance on her behalf, the grievance was settled, and Rodrigue was reimbursed for the deficiency in her vacation pay. How- ever, the unlawfully negotiated extension of the wait- staff vacation cap to Albany Room employees remained in the 2009–2012 agreement. Here, then, the issue presented in the grievance pro- ceeding was not factually parallel (or even related) to the complaint allegation that the Union negotiated the Alba- ny Room vacation cap provision to discourage Rodrigue and other employees from supporting a rival union. The grievance stated merely that the new provision had been erroneously applied to Rodrigue.7 The grievance does not refer to the facts underlying the unfair labor practice allegation; not surprisingly, it is silent as to how and why the extension of the wait staff vacation cap was negotiat- ed.8 Moreover, even though Rodrigue was compensated for the erroneous application of the new provision to her hostess pay, the one-time monetary remedy to her did not address the unfair labor practice or the continued pres- ence in the collective-bargaining agreement of an unlaw- fully negotiated provision that applies uniquely to her. For all of those reasons, deferral is not appropriate in this case.9 B. The Mayotte Allegations Contrary to the judge, we find that the Union did not unlawfully negotiate a contractual provision that adverse- ly affected employee Mayotte’s work assignments. 7 The grievance recited that “[s]ince on or around December 27, the Employer has improperly paid the grievant’s vacation time without just cause. The cap on wait staff vacation should not apply to hourly host- ess pay. This violates Article 12, Section 4 of the Collective Bargain- ing Agreement and all other relevant Articles and Sections.” 8 We need not decide whether the grievance procedure would have been a proper forum for addressing whether the negotiation of a con- tract provision was lawful. 9 The Union asserts that the judge’s decision could hypothetically prevent it from addressing the Employer’s reward to an employee for opposing the Union. We reject that notion, as the Union may always file a charge under Sec. 8(a)(3). 1. Factual background Mayotte, like Rodrigue, was a UNITE HERE support- er in January 2010. Mayotte had been hired in 2007 and was the most junior of the house wait staff, which also included Lane Williams and Josephine Franco.10 House wait staff earned hourly wages, tips, and health insurance benefits, but qualified for health insurance benefits only if they worked at least 1040 hours in the preceding year. Under the parties’ 2005–2008 collective-bargaining agreement, the Employer used a rotation system to dis- tribute house wait staff assignments, starting with the most senior employee and rotating through the list until all assignments were taken. The rotation system was “blind” to the timing or type of event (factors affecting the potential for gratuities) and enabled the Employer to retain the loyalty of a core staff. Both the Employer’s labor relations director, Harold Taegel, and Union Busi- ness Agent Elizabeth Weiner’s predecessor, Jason Crane, agreed that rotation was the fairest scheduling system. It was also the industry standard and a longstanding custom at ESP. The Employer’s addition of Mayotte to the small staff in January 2007 generated tension from the outset, be- cause it reduced the chances that any employee on the house wait staff would be able to work enough hours to qualify for health insurance benefits. As a result, Franco filed three grievances relating to Mayotte between 2007 and 2010. The first, filed in August 2007, protested the Employer’s asserted favoritism toward Mayotte. The second, filed in January 2008, contended that there was no need for a fourth wait staff employee (Mayotte’s sta- tus at the time). Beginning in 2008, bidding and scheduling procedures gained importance as available wait staff work steadily declined. After Union Business Agent Weiner’s arrival, Franco, who had become shop steward, filed a third grievance in July 2009, requesting that the “4th person be taken off rotation until senior members work the 1040 hours required to maintain benefits.” On January 22, 2009, the Employer proposed incorpo- rating the longstanding rotation system into the 2009– 2012 agreement. On February 6, 2009, the Union reject- ed that proposal. Labor Relations Director Taegel testi- fied that Franco, who was on the union negotiating committee, stated that the “union wants [the] option of having house wait staff scheduled according to seniori- ty.” On May 12, 2010, Franco again proposed a new system in which assignments would be bid by seniority, 10 Mayotte was hired as the fourth member of the house wait staff. Employee Anne-Marie Hayes resigned in September 2009 before the incidents giving rise to this case. ROCHESTER REGIONAL JOINT BOARD LOCAL 471, WORKERS UNITED (SODEXO, INC.) 1541 specifically explaining that the more junior Mayotte was working more hours than Franco was. Franco vigorously advocated the change throughout the bargaining, and Taegel reluctantly conceded. The new procedures were included in the parties’ tentative agreement and imple- mented. 2. Analysis The judge found, under two separate theories, that the Union violated the Act by negotiating and implementing the seniority-based bidding system. The judge found that the Union breached its duty of fair representation by ne- gotiating the seniority-based bidding provision to ad- vance Franco’s interests. He rejected the Union’s de- fense that it had rational, nondiscriminatory reasons for changing the bidding procedures. The judge also found, under a Wright Line analysis, that the Union negotiated the new seniority bidding system to retaliate against Ma- yotte for her dissident activities. In so doing, he con- cluded, without explanation, that the Union did not sus- tain its Wright Line rebuttal burden because it failed to prove that it would have taken the same action against Mayotte absent her protected activity. Contrary to the judge, we find that the Acting General Counsel has failed to establish a violation under either theory. a. The fair representation theory The Board has held that a union’s breach of its duty of fair representation violates Section 8(b)(1)(A). Miranda Fuel Co., 140 NLRB 181, 184–185 (1962), enf. denied 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963). A breach occurs when a union’s conduct toward a bargaining unit member is “ar- bitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith.” Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967). In collective bargaining, a union’s actions are arbitrary “only if, in light of the fac- tual and legal landscape at the time of the union’s ac- tions, the union’s behavior is so far outside a ‘wide range of reasonableness’ as to be irrational.” Air Line Pilots Assn. v. O’Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 67 (1991) (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953)). The broad deference granted to a union’s actions in negotiations comes from an understanding that, as the exclusive representative of bargaining unit employees under Section 9(a) of the Act, a union is frequently re- quired to balance competing interests of the employees it represents. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, supra, 345 U.S. at 337–339. The negotiation of seniority provisions of- ten gives rise to claims that the union failed in its respon- sibility toward some segment of its constituents. Indeed, Huffman itself arose in that context. Observing that the terms of a negotiated agreement could affect employees differently, the Supreme Court stated: The mere existence of such differences does not make them invalid. The complete satisfaction of all who are represented is hardly to be expected. A wide range of reasonableness must be allowed a statutory bargaining representative in serving the unit it represents, subject always to complete good faith and honesty of purpose in the exercise of its discretion. Id. at 338. Similarly, the Board has held that a union did not breach its duty of fair representation when it negotiated a change in the seniority system in response to certain em- ployees’ requests, even though other employees would be adversely affected by the change. Firemen & Oilers Local 320 (Philip Morris, U.S.A.), 323 NLRB 89, 91 fn. 4 (1997) (citing Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 349 (1964)). Here, we find that the negotiated change in the bidding system for house wait staff was not arbitrary, discrimina- tory, or made in bad faith. Rather, it was based on the Union’s legitimate concern over employees’ ability to qualify for health benefits and was well within the “wide range of reasonableness” afforded unions in negotiating collective-bargaining agreements. The employment situation at the time the Union made its proposal was grim. Following the economic decline that began in 2008, there was barely enough catering work for the house wait staff to achieve their minimum hours to earn health benefits. Even after the staff was reduced from four to three employees, the redistribution of available work did not improve matters, in the face of further economic decline. The three employees actually worked an average of only 1042 hours in 2010, just over the 1040-hour minimum required to qualify for health benefits. The grievances Franco filed beginning in August 2007 reflect a longstanding dissatisfaction with the Employer’s staffing practices (the addition of Mayotte) and with the increasing inability of the house wait staff to work the minimum hours required for health benefits. These complaints culminated in the Union’s May 12, 2010 pro- posal to change bidding procedures from the industry standard of a “blind” rotation system to one based on seniority, as it had proposed in February 2009. The judge found that Franco was granted the bidding system as a consolation prize after the Employer denied her repeated requests to lay off Mayotte. We view the matter differently. While the change in bidding proce- dures would directly benefit Franco, with her greater seniority, we do not find that the Union’s proposal was made in bad faith, out of hostility toward Mayotte, or for Franco’s exclusive and personal gain. Given the im- portance of health benefits to employees, the Union was understandably concerned that the existing rotation sys- tem exposed employees to the possibility that none would receive those benefits. To address this issue, the 1542 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Union began its efforts to gain control over house wait staff work assignments by lobbying for a smaller staff. When that failed, the Union decided to press for an alter- native method of distributing work, one that could im- prove the wait staff employees’ chances of qualifying for health benefits in challenging economic times. The sen- iority system appeared to offer such an alternative. Seniority, moreover, is a well-recognized principle for assigning work, particularly in unionized workplaces. Indeed, it was a feature of other provisions in both the 2005–2008 and 2009–2012 collective-bargaining agree- ments. The Union credibly claimed that the majority of the house wait staff preferred the seniority method for these reasons, and also because the seniority method added flexibility in scheduling and the ability to select the best jobs. (Unlike the “blind” rotation method, the seniority system would give bidders access to infor- mation enabling them to identify the biggest and most lucrative jobs.) The Union thus faced a choice. It could maintain a “fair” rotation system that distributed work evenly, but put some or all of the house wait staff at risk of losing their health benefits. Or, it could adopt another system that ensured that at least some of the house wait staff would qualify for benefits and that appealed to employ- ees for other reasons as well. In those circumstances, as the Huffman decision and its progeny suggest, the Union did not breach its duty of fair representation by choosing seniority-based bidding, even though the more junior Mayotte might have been disad- vantaged as a result. See, e.g., Griffin v. Air Line Pilots Assn., 32 F.3d 1079 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding no breach of the duty of fair representation by union proposing per- manent demotion of least senior members to remedy em- ployer’s overstaffing). As the Board has explained, “the wide range of reasonableness accorded a union in its negotiating capacity does not require a union to achieve a ‘Solomonic’ solution or to precisely split the difference between legitimate competing demands.” Firemen & Oilers Local 320 (Philip Morris, U.S.A.), 323 NLRB at 91. For these reasons, we reverse the judge’s finding that the Union breached its duty of fair representation by ne- gotiating bidding procedures based on seniority for the house wait staff. b. The Wright Line theory We also find that the Acting General Counsel has failed to show that the Union negotiated the seniority system for assigning wait staff work in order to retaliate against Mayotte for her protected concerted activities. Even assuming that the Acting General Counsel met his initial Wright Line burden,11 we find, largely for the rea- sons stated above, that the Union met its rebuttal bur- den.12 As we have found, the Union negotiated the new system out of a legitimate desire to ensure, to the extent possible, that at least some house wait staff would quali- fy for health benefits. We also find it significant that the issue of wait staff assignments had been the subject of grievances since at least 2007, and the Union’s first re- quest to switch to seniority bidding was raised in nego- tiations almost a year before Mayotte’s protected con- certed activity. We therefore find that the Union proved, based on its grievance and negotiating history predating Mayotte’s dissident activity, that it would have insisted on seniority-based job bidding even absent Mayotte’s protected conduct. AMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Delete the judge’s Conclusion of Law 6 and renumber the subsequent paragraph. ORDER The National Labor Relations Board orders that the Respondent, Local 471, Rochester Regional Joint Board, Workers United, its officers, agents, and representatives, shall 1. Cease and desist from (a) Retaliating against any employee because she sup- ports another union. (b) Restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights by negotiating and effectuating contractual terms with the Employer that are detrimental to such employees because of their protected concerted and dissident union activities. (c) In any like or related manner restraining or coerc- ing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act. (a) Request the Employer, in writing, to delete the por- 11 The Union contends that it was unaware of Mayotte’s dissident ac- tivities, and thus the Acting General Counsel failed to prove that those activities motivated its successful attempt to replace the existing rota- tion system with a seniority-based bidding system. Because we find that the Union met its Wright Line rebuttal burden in any case, we need not reach that issue. We note, however, that the judge erred in finding that “Mayotte stated that she admitted to Franco that she signed the petition, after being demanded to confess her allegiance to UNITE HERE.” Mayotte in fact testified that she responded “No” when Fran- co asked her if she had signed the petition, and that she was not asked to confess her allegiance to the rival union. 12 As stated, see fn. 3, supra, Member Block believes that the duty of fair representation is a more appropriate framework than Wright Line for analyzing 8(b)(1)(A) allegations relating to contract negotiations. Nevertheless, she agrees that the Union proved that it would have nego- tiated the same provision even absent Mayotte’s protected activity. ROCHESTER REGIONAL JOINT BOARD LOCAL 471, WORKERS UNITED (SODEXO, INC.) 1543 tion of article 12, section 4 of the 2009–2012 collective- bargaining agreement, which caps vacation pay for “wait staff who normally work in the Albany Room” at $250 per week, and provide a copy of this request to Sharron Rodrigue. (b) Request the Employer in writing to engage in fur- ther bargaining, which would be limited in scope to ad- dressing the vacation pay cap issue described herein, and provide a copy of this request to Rodrigue. (c) Make Rodrigue whole, with interest, for any loss of wages, overtime, gratuities, vacation pay, and other bene- fits associated with negotiating and effectuating with the Employer the $250 vacation pay cap for “wait staff who normally work in the Albany Room” under article 12, section 4 of the 2009–2012 collective-bargaining agree- ment. (d) Compensate Rodrigue for any adverse income tax consequences of receiving make-whole relief in one lump sum. (e) Within 14 days after service by the Region, physi- cally post at its union office and hiring hall in Saratoga Springs, New York, as well as any other places where notices to members and employees are normally posted, including its union business bulletin board at the facility, if any exists, copies of the attached notice marked “Ap- pendix.”13 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 3, after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be physically posted by the Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees and members are cus- tomarily posted. In addition to physical posting of paper notices, notices shall be distributed electronically, such as by email, posting on an intranet or an internet site, and/or other electronic means, if the Respondent custom- arily communicates with its members by such means. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or cov- ered by any other material. (f) Within 14 days after service by the Region, sign and return to the Regional Director for Region 3 signed copies of the notice in sufficient number for posting by Sodexo, Inc., if willing, at all places at its Empire State Plaza facility in Albany, New York, where notices to employees are customarily posted. (g) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director for Region 3 a sworn certifi- 13 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na- tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg- ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board.” cation of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the Respondent has taken to comply. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the remaining complaint allegations concerning the Union’s actions affecting Tina Mayotte are dismissed. APPENDIX NOTICE TO MEMBERS AND EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this notice. FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO Form, join, or assist a union Choose representatives to bargain on your behalf with your employer Act together with other employees for your bene- fit and protection Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities. WE WILL NOT retaliate against any employee because he or she supports another union. WE WILL NOT restrain or coerce employees in the exer- cise of their Section 7 rights by negotiating and effectuat- ing contractual terms with the Employer, Sodexo, Inc., which are detrimental to such employees because of their protected concerted and dissident union activities. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner restrain or coerce you in the exercise of the rights listed above. WE WILL promptly request the Employer, in writing, to delete the portion of article 12, section 4 of the 2009– 2012 collective-bargaining agreement which caps vaca- tion pay for “wait staff who normally work in the Albany Room” at $250 per week, which harmed Sharron Ro- drigue, and provide her a copy of this request. WE WILL request the Employer in writing to engage in further bargaining on the vacation pay cap issue de- scribed above, and provide Sharron Rodrigue with a copy of this request. WE WILL make Sharron Rodrigue whole, with interest, for any loss of wages, overtime, gratuities, vacation pay, and other benefits she may have suffered as a result of our unlawfully negotiated changes to the vacation pay cap in article 12, section 4 of the 2009–2012 collective- bargaining agreement. 1544 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD WE WILL compensate Sharron Rodrigue for any ad- verse income tax consequences of receiving her make- whole relief in one lump sum. LOCAL 471, ROCHESTER REGIONAL JOINT BOARD, WORKERS UNITED Alfred M. Norek and Brie Kluytenaar, Esqs., for the Acting General Counsel. Lucinda Lapoff, Esq. (Chamberlain, D’Amanda, Oppenheimer & Greenfield, LLP), for the Respondent. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE ROBERT A. RINGLER, Administrative Law Judge. This case was tried in Albany, New York, on February 23 and 24, 2011. The underlying charges were filed by Tina Mayotte and Shar- ron Rodrigue against Local 471, Rochester Regional Joint Board, Workers United (Local 471 or the Union). On October 27, 2010,1 a complaint issued alleging that Local 471 violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act) by negotiating vacation pay and scheduling provi- sions, which harmed the charging parties. Based upon the entire record, including my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and after considering the par- ties’ briefs, I make the following FINDINGS OF FACT I. JURISDICTION At all material times, Sodexo, Inc. (the Company), a corpora- tion, with an office and place of business in Albany, New York, has provided food services at the Empire State Plaza (the facili- ty). Annually, it derives gross revenues exceeding $500,000, and purchases and receives at the facility goods and services exceeding $50,000 directly from points located outside of New York. Thus, Local 471 admits, and I find, that the Company is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Sec- tion 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. Local 471 also admits, and I find, that it is a labor organiza- tion within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. It further admits, and I find that the Union of Needletrades, Industrial, and Textile Employees and Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees International Union (UNITE HERE) is a labor or- ganization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Background The Company employs 45 food service workers at the facili- ty, where it operates a catering enterprise, restaurants, and food kiosks. The facility is located at the Empire State Plaza, which is a complex that services New York’s executive and legislative branches. The facility is run by General Manager Laurie Jen- kins, Director of Catering Stephanie Forgue-Dolan, and Senior Director of Labor Relations Harold Taegel. 1 All dates herein are in 2010, unless otherwise indicated. Local 471 represents the following unit (the unit) at the facil- ity: All cafeteria and food service employees, which includes all cooks, bakers, food service workers/cashiers, food service workers, utility workers, hosts and hostesses, house wait staff, bus persons, wait staff and bartenders, but excludes managers, office clerical employees . . . and all supervisory employees. (GC Exh. 5, art. 1). Michael Roberts is Local 471’s district director, and Elizabeth Weiner has been a business agent since December 2009. She succeeded Jason Crane, who served as a business agent from June 2008, through December 2009. Prior to Crane, Theresa Hammer held a business agent position for decades.2 Josephine Franco is a Local 471 executive board and bargaining team member, as well as a shop steward at the fa- cility. Local 471 and the Company have been parties to successive collective-bargaining agreements. Taegel and Weiner negotiat- ed the January 1, 2009, through December 31, 2012 collective- bargaining agreement (the 2009–2012 CBA). The 2009–2012 CBA succeeded the May 1, 2005, through December 31, 2008 collective-bargaining agreement (the 2005–2008 CBA). Over the years, Local 471 has undergone several significant evolutions. These changes are described by the following ta- ble: Period Status Pre-July 2004 Local 471 was affiliated with the Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees International Union (HERE), and identified as Local 471, HERE. July 2004 Union of Needletrades, Industrial, and Textile Employees (UNITE) merged with HERE, which resulted in the formation of Local 471, UNITE-HERE. January 2005 Local 471, UNITE-HERE became Local 471, Rochester Regional Joint Board, UNITE-HERE. 2007 Local 471, Rochester Regional Joint Board, UNITE-HERE was placed under a trustee- ship. Early 2009 Following the trusteeship, Local 471, Rochester Regional Joint Board, UNITE- HERE disaffiliated from UNITE-HERE, and became Local 471, Rochester Regional Joint Board, Workers United. 2009 to present Local 471, Rochester Regional Joint Board, Workers United affiliates with the Service Employees International Union (SEIU), and becomes Local 471, Rochester Re- gional Joint Board, Workers United, SEIU, which is its present iteration. (GC Exhs. 14, 27, 28, 30, 32.) 2 Hammer separated under dubious circumstances, after the Union was placed under a trusteeship in 2007. ROCHESTER REGIONAL JOINT BOARD LOCAL 471, WORKERS UNITED (SODEXO, INC.) 1545 B. UNITE HERE’s Organizing Attempt During the roughly 18-month gap between the expiration of the 2005–2008 CBA and the consummation of the 2009–2012 CBA, UNITE HERE attempted to organize the unit and appro- priate it from Local 471. In furtherance of this effort, it enlisted Hammer, the former business agent, to solicit support from unit employees. 1. Hammer’s visit to the facility a. Record evidence On January 27, Hammer visited the facility and beseeched unit employees to sign the following petition on behalf of UNITE HERE (the petition): We the undersigned employees . . . don’t want to be repre- sented by [Local 471] . . . . We still want UNITE HERE to represent us and . . . authorize . . . [it] to serve as our . . . repre- sentative. We demand that Sodexo immediately enter into collective bargaining with . . . UNITE HERE. (GC Exh. 15.) Hammer testified that, during her visit, Ro- drigue escorted her around the facility, introduced her to em- ployees, and lobbied them on her behalf. She recalled several workers promptly signing the petition, and stated that Rodrigue persuaded Mayotte, another unit employee, to meet them at the facility and assist with the petition. Hammer recollected that, at some point, Weiner, the current business agent, arrived at the facility, began tracking her whereabouts, and engaged in the following conduct: She was making dirty faces at me, and taking pictures of me, and on the phone, and stalking around and that type of behav- ior. Hammer testified that she eventually eluded Weiner. She stated that, after losing Weiner, she observed Shop Steward Franco shout these comments at an unidentified unit employ- ee:3 Why did you sign this petition? [Hammer’s] . . . a phony, . . . counterfeiter . . . [and] embezzler. She recalled Franco also calling her a “thief,” questioning the intellect of whoever signed the petition, and ordering employ- ees to retract their signatures. Hammer reported that Rodrigue, Mayotte, and others signed the petition. (GC Exh. 15.) She added that, although Franco demanded her to surrender the petition, she declined and eventually departed the facility. Rodrigue and Mayotte confirmed that they aided Hammer with the petition. Mayotte witnessed Franco calling Hammer an embezzler and making other derogatory comments. Mayotte stated that she admitted to Franco that she signed the petition, after being demanded to confess her allegiance to UNITE HERE. Weiner stated that she visited the facility on January 27, after being told about Hammer’s visit. She stated that she stayed at the facility throughout the day, spoke to employees, and coinci- dentally encountered Hammer. She denied, however, stalking 3 Franco, without any explanation, failed to testify at the hearing. Hammer. She admitted knowing about Rodrigue’s activities, but, denied knowing about Mayotte’s activities. b. Credibility analysis I fully credit Rodrigue’s and Mayotte’s testimony regarding the January 27 events. Their demeanors were credible, reliable, and truthful. They were consistent, and equally helpful on direct and cross-examination. I will draw an adverse inference against Local 471’s unex- plained failure to call Franco to rebut the many animus-bearing statements attributed to her by Hammer, Rodrigue, and Ma- yotte. See Douglas Aircraft Co., 308 NLRB 1217 (1992) (fail- ure to call a witness “who may reasonably be assumed to be favorably disposed to the party, [supports] an adverse inference . . . regarding any factual question on which the witness is like- ly to have knowledge”). I do not credit Weiner’s claim that she was unaware of Ma- yotte’s organizing activities. First, I found her demeanor to be less than credible. She was a cagey witness, who while cooper- ative on direct, was intermittently hostile on cross. She period- ically parsed the wording of questions, in order to avoid re- sponding to tougher queries. I also find that, in a small, 45- person unit, it is implausible that employees would have failed to tell Weiner about Mayotte’s organizing activities. I similarly find it inconceivable that Franco, who was openly hostile to Mayotte and a staunch Local 471 supporter, would have ne- glected to tell Weiner about Mayotte’s confessed support for UNITE HERE. Lastly, because Hammer testified that Weiner stalked her and openly demonstrated animus against her organizing activi- ties, and Weiner denied such conduct, I must make a credibility resolution. For several reasons, Hammer wins this credibility battle. Weiner’s demeanor, as noted, was less than credible. It is also unlikely that Weiner made a special trip to the facility after being forewarned about Hammer’s activities, and then completely resisted the opportunity to directly observe her re- ception by the unit. 2. UNITE HERE’s RC petition On January 28, Hammer filed with the National Labor Rela- tions Board (the Board) an RC-Certification of Representative Petition on behalf of UNITE HERE (the RC petition), which sought to represent the unit. (GC Exh. 16.) Rodrigue and Ma- yotte, thereafter, visited employees at their homes, and asked them to support UNITE HERE. Within weeks, however, the drive floundered, and the RC petition was withdrawn. (GC Exh. 17.) C. The February 18 Overflow Meeting 1. Record evidence On February 18, Local 471 held a meeting concerning over- flow issues. Local 471 uses an overflow list, which is a list of members available to work for signatory employers on a tem- porary, as needed, basis. A huge catering event at the facility, for instance, typically generates multiple referrals from the overflow list. 1546 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Rodrigue testified that she attended the meeting.4 She recol- lected that, before the meeting began, District Director Roberts approached her, and made the following comments: You probably won’t want to attend this meeting . . . because I’m going to make the nomination that you are not going to be allowed to be a Union member anymore. You’re going to be thrown out of the Union. We’re going to take you down and you’re not going to be affiliated with the Union. . . .5 She indicated that, in spite of this admonition, she attended and sat beside Mayotte. She stated that Roberts opened the meeting by publicly indicting her conduct, and stating that, “she was going to be under charges and thrown out of the Union.” She added that Roberts repeatedly asked her whether she under- stood the seriousness of her actions. She indicated that, when she responded that “people should have choices,” he flatly countered that, “he would take her down.” Rodrigue reported that Jay Manning, another Local 471 member, also stated:6 I want her out of here. She doesn’t belong here. She’s not a Union member. She should be taken out. She’s trying to or- ganize UNITE-HERE and bring them in. She stated that people were upset by this exchange, and recalled Mayotte imploring Roberts and Manning to suspend their as- sault. She added that she, consequently, filed unfair labor prac- tice charges against Local 471, which were withdrawn in ex- change for an apology. (GC Exhs. 19–21.) Mayotte also testified about the overflow meeting. She es- sentially corroborated Rodrigue’s testimony. Weiner testified that, before the meeting began, Local 471 received charges from Lane Williams, a unit employee, which alleged that Hammer and Rodrigue had engaged in conduct detrimental to Local 471 by distributing the petition. (GC Exh. 34.) She indicated that District Director Roberts told Rodrigue about these charges before the meeting began, and opened the meeting by announcing the charges. She indicated that Wil- liams later withdrew the charges, before any further action was taken against Rodrigue. 2. Credibility analysis I fully credit Rodrigue’s account of the meeting. As noted, I found her to be a credible witness. Her testimony was corrobo- rated by Mayotte, and essentially uncontradicted by Weiner. I will also draw an adverse inference against Local 471 for failing, without explanation, to call Roberts to rebut Rodrigue’s and Mayotte’s accounts of the several animus-laden statements attributed to him. See Douglas Aircraft Co., supra. 4 Although not determinative of the underlying issues, Rodrigue stated that the meeting occurred on February 25. 5 Roberts failed, without explanation, to testify at the hearing. 6 Manning failed, without explanation, to testify at the hearing. Alt- hough he is not currently a union member, he was previously a Local 471 executive board member. D. Rodrigue’s Vacation Pay Issue 1. Record evidence Rodrigue, who has been employed at the facility for 3 years, works in the Albany Room, a buffet-style restaurant. She is paid at the hostess classification, and monitors the buffet, cleans and arranges tables, seats patrons, and processes pay- ments. She has been the sole unit employee assigned to the Albany Room since September, which means that any changes regarding the Albany Room uniquely affect her, and no other unit employee. Under the 2005–2008 CBA, Rodrigue’s vacation pay was calculated in the following way: Pay for a week of vacation will be . . . 1/52nd of . . . W-2 earnings for the previous calendar year. . . . (GC Exhs. 4–5.) In 2009, under the latter calculus, she re- ceived roughly $650 per vacation week. The May 13 tentative agreement amended the vacation pay provision. The amendment solely capped vacation pay for the house wait staff, but, left the overall vacation pay equation unchanged for Rodrigue and the remainder of the unit. Specifi- cally, it newly provided: Pay for a week of vacation will be . . . 1/52nd of . . . W-2 earnings for the previous calendar year. . . . Notwithstanding the foregoing, pay for a week of vacation for House Wait Staff will be Two Hundred and Fifty Dollars ($250.00). (GC Exh. 11 at art. 12, sec. 4) (emphasis added under new lan- guage). On May 26, Weiner sent the following, unsolicited, email to the Company: It was recently . . . brought to my attention that Albany Room staff [i.e. Rodrigue] is paid vacation time 1/52nd of their W2s. As you know, this does not hold the same for the rest of the catering department. There needs to be consistency. (GC Exh. 12). There is no evidence that Weiner contacted Rodrigue, before instigating this controversial issue. Her email also conspicuously failed to mention that Rodrigue was the only affected employee. On the same date, Taegel responded: We are looking into how the Albany Room catering staff are paid vacation. I am assuming that the union’s position is that the Albany Room catering employees [i.e. Rodrigue] should receive the same $250.00 for a week for paid vacation as we agreed to for the House Wait Staff. Please confirm. . . . Id. In July, the 2009–2012 CBA was executed. The 2009–2012 CBA modified the tentative agreement, and added a special vacation pay cap provision for Rodrigue, the solitary Albany Room employee. This amendment provided as follows: Pay for a week of vacation will be . . . 1/52nd of . . . W-2 earnings for the previous calendar year. . . . ROCHESTER REGIONAL JOINT BOARD LOCAL 471, WORKERS UNITED (SODEXO, INC.) 1547 Notwithstanding the foregoing, pay for a week of vacation for House Wait Staff and wait staff who normally work in the Al- bany Room will be Two Hundred and Fifty Dollars ($250.00). (GC Exh. 13 at art. 12, sec. 4) (emphasis added under new lan- guage). There is no evidence that the unit ratified, or was oth- erwise advised of, this change. Rodrigue testified that, in January 2011, she was astonished, when she received a $250 vacation payment, instead of her customary $650. She related that she was never forewarned of this change by Local 471. (See GC Exh. 22.) She complained that, as the sole Albany Room employee, she was uniquely affected by this amendment. She reported that, once she pro- tested, Local 471 filed the following grievance on her behalf: Since on or around December 27, the Company has improper- ly paid [Rodrigue’s] . . . vacation time. . . . The cap on wait- staff vacation should not apply to hourly hostess pay. . . . (GC Exh. 23.) The Company later sustained the grievance, and made her whole. (U. Exh. 13A.) Weiner testified that she was unaware that Rodrigue was a hostess, and errantly considered her house wait staff. She add- ed that her email solely attempted to maintain consistency amongst house wait staff. (GC Exh. 12.) She stated that, once her error was discovered, she filed a grievance. (GC Exh. 23.) She said that her error was supported by a seniority list, which incorrectly identified Rodrigue as wait staff.7 (U. Exh. 10.) She denied that Rodrigue’s organizing activities had any con- nection to her actions. She failed to explain, however, why she approached Taegel, without first contacting Rodrigue about the matter. 2. Credibility analysis I do not credit Weiner’s testimony that Rodrigue’s dissident organizing activity had no bearing on her handling of this issue. As stated, I found her demeanor to be less than credible. I also find it unlikely that Weiner, whose chief role is to represent workers, would normally agree to slash someone’s vacation benefit without first discussing the matter with them, unless she had a retaliatory motivation. I find it similarly unlikely that Weiner would raise a controversial issue of this nature in a sua sponte manner, unless she had an invidious intent. Finally, I find it plausible that Roberts, Weiner’s superior, vicariously accomplished his threat to “take down” Rodrigue via Weiner’s action. I do not, as a result, credit Weiner’s denial. E. House Wait Staff Scheduling Issues 1. Record evidence The Company employs the following house wait staff em- ployees at the facility: 7 A conflicting report, however, identified Rodrigue as a hostess, and Williams, Franco and Mayotte as “Bnqt Supp Wkr II” employees. (U Exh. 13B.) House Wait Staff Seniority/Hire Date Williams May 5, 1997 Franco September 30, 2000 Mayotte August 1, 2006 (GC Exhs. 4, 13; U. Exhs. 10, 13B.) They serve as waiters and waitresses at catered events, and, as a result, receive an hourly wage, a pro rata share of the gratuity,8 and health insurance benefits, as long as they worked at least 1040 hours in the prior year. (GC Exh 13.) Given the direct relationship between their hours of work and health insurance eligibility, scheduling has historically been an important issue for this constituency. Under the 2005–2008 CBA, house wait staff received as- signments on a rotating basis, which meant that the Company chronologically sorted through the weekly catering schedule and distributed assignments to them in order of their seniority, with the cycle repeating until all work was evenly allocated (the rotation system). Taegel stated that the rotation system permit- ted the Company to equitably distribute assignments, without regard to an event’s timing or gratuity. (GC Exh. 24.) He re- lated that the rotation system was a longstanding facility prac- tice and industry custom. He added that this system permitted the Company to maintain a core staff, where employees each received a proportional share of the work.9 He testified that, on this basis, he proposed memorializing the rotation system into 2009–2012 CBA. (GC Exh. 7 at 18.) Taegel stated that he was surprised, when his proposal to memorialize the rotation system into the 2009–2012 CBA was rejected by Local 471. He stated that Local 471, instead, pro- posed replacing the rotation system with another system, which would permit house wait staff to bid on weekly assignments by seniority (the bidding system). He explained that the proposed bidding system permitted senior house wait staff to hoard the best assignments that involved the largest gratuities, in lieu of such assignments being evenly distributed under the rotation system. He recalled a May 12 bargaining session, where Fran- co, a member of Local 471’s bargaining team and executive board, proclaimed that the rotation system had to be eliminated because Mayotte, a less senior employee, was working more hours than she was. He added that, throughout bargaining, Franco fiercely supported transitioning to the bidding system. He indicated that the Company eventually, but very reluctantly, conceded this issue during bargaining, in order to achieve labor peace. (GC Exh. 11.) The parties’ tentative agreement, consequently, memorial- ized the new bidding system: Section 9. Rotation. “House Wait Staff” as defined in Section 8 of this Article, will be scheduled in accordance with the fol- lowing rotation system: . . .  Catering shifts will be bid and catering jobs will be assigned with the most senior employee receiving the first assignment as long as such assignment does not put the employee into overtime. . . . Subsequent as- 8 The gratuity for an event equals 15 percent of the bill. 9 He recalled Crane, the former business agent, also describing this system as “an industry practice.” 1548 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD signments will then follow in accordance with senior- ity ranking. . . . Id. at 10; see also (GC Exhs. 25, 42–43). Mayotte testified that she was economically injured by the bidding system in multiple ways. First, as the least senior house wait staff employee, she receives the last chance to bid on assignments. Second, she related that, under the bidding system, house wait staff workers review BEO10 forms prior to accepting assignments, which permits senior employees to “cherry pick” the best assignments involving the greatest gratu- ities. She noted that, under the prior rotation system, assign- ments were blindly distributed, without consideration of the BEO or potential gratuity, and that she previously obtained a greater share of premium assignments. Third, she reported that, under the bidding system, she has also been assigned fewer “pop-ups.”11 She stated that, prior to July, pop-ups were of- fered to staff on a rotational basis; whereas, under the bidding system, pop-ups are bid on the basis of seniority, and normally appropriated by Franco and Williams. She stated that, as a result, she now works for the Company at General Electric Research, in order to regain her lost income. Mayotte testified that Franco routinely complained that the catering department was overstaffed. She recalled a September 2007 meeting, where Franco and Williams asked the Company to lay her off. She also recollected an April or May conversa- tion, where Franco threatened that she would lose hours of work once negotiations concluded, and taunted that she “should just wait and see.” Hammer testified that, in September 2007, she attended a meeting, where Franco and Williams vociferously complained that the catering department was overstaffed, and insisted that Mayotte be laid off. She stated that, while she served as busi- ness agent, she and the Company consistently opposed Franco’s grievances and requests seeking Mayotte’s layoff. Taegel testified that the Company’s catering business at the facility has steadily decreased since 2008. He stated that, at some point, Weiner told him that there might not be enough work remaining for three house wait staff employees, and sug- gested that he lay off the least senior employee, Mayotte, until business volume increased. He indicated that he rejected Local 471’s invitation to lay off Mayotte. Weiner testified that Local 471 proposed the bidding system for many reasons. First, she indicated that Franco and Wil- liams, the two most senior house wait staff, were being as- signed fewer work hours, which compromised their ability to meet the 1040-hour threshold for health insurance benefits. She added that grievances were filed about this issue from 2007 to 2009. (U. Exhs 7–9.) She explained that the concerns un- derlying these grievances came to fruition, when Williams, the most senior house wait staff employee, failed to work 1040 hours in 2010, and then lost his health insurance coverage in 10 “BEO” is an acronym for banquet event order form, which de- scribes, inter alia: the meal to be served; the number of patrons; the duration of the gathering; and other logistics. 11 Pop-ups are catered events, which arise after the schedule has been posted. 2011. She stated that the bidding system addressed this dilem- ma. Second, she explained that the proposal gathering work- sheets, which Local 471 solicited from the unit during negotia- tions, supported changing to a seniority-based, bidding system. (See U. Exh. 16.) Third, she related that the new system gave employees greater control over their schedules. Lastly, she offered that Local 471, which had been seeking enhanced vaca- tion benefits for the catering department during negotiations, withdrew their vacation proposal as a quid pro quo for gaining the bidding system. Weiner acknowledged that Crane, her predecessor, believed that the rotational system represented the fairest scheduling system. (See also GC Exh. 31.) Although she related that the three house wait staff workers assigned to the catering depart- ment were having difficulty meeting the 1040-hour threshold for health insurance, she denied ever advocating a layoff. 2. Credibility analysis I fully credit Taegel’s testimony that Franco advocated re- placing the rotation system with the bidding system during the negotiation of the 2009–2012 CBA, and expressly cited Ma- yotte being assigned greater hours as a rationale for her posi- tion. I fully credit Hammer’s and Mayotte’s testimonies that Franco repeatedly requested Mayotte’s layoff, and historically complained about the quantity of hours that she worked. I credit Mayotte’s testimony that Franco threatened that she would lose hours of work under the 2009–2012 CBA, as well as her description of how the bidding system has economically harmed her. Taegel, Mayotte, and Hammer were credible, and their testimonies were essentially unrebutted, as well as con- sistent with the overall record. Because Taegel testified that Weiner requested Mayotte’s layoff, and Weiner denied such commentary, I must make a credibility determination. For several reasons, I credit Taegel’s account. First, as noted, I found his demeanor to be truthful. He was candid, and appeared to be a witness with a limited stake in the outcome. Weiner’s demeanor, as stated, appeared to be less than truthful. Second, I find it probable that Weiner, who was willing to abandon Mayotte’s interests by agreeing to the bidding system, would have similarly advocated her layoff. Third, Taegel’s testimony is consistent with Mayotte’s and Hammer’s unrebutted testimonies that Franco, a union agent, has repeatedly sought Mayotte’s layoff in the past. See U. Exhs. 7–9.) III. ANALYSIS A. The Legal Framework A labor union owes a duty of fair representation to the work- ers that it represents. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967). A union breaches this duty, when its conduct toward a unit em- ployee is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith. Id. Along these lines, Section 8(b) of the Act provides: It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents (1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exer- cise of the rights guaranteed in section 7 . . . [or]; (2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee in violation of [section 8(a)(3)]. . . . ROCHESTER REGIONAL JOINT BOARD LOCAL 471, WORKERS UNITED (SODEXO, INC.) 1549 An essential element of any violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) is restraint or coercion in the exercise of a Section 7 right, i.e., the right to form, join, or assist a labor organization, or to refrain from such activity. Opposition to union officers or policies are protected Section 7 activities. Sheet Metal Workers Local 16 (Parker Sheet Metal), 275 NLRB 867 (1985). The Board employs Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), in allocating the burdens of proof in 8(b)(2) cases. Paperworkers Local 1048 (Jefferson Smurfit Corp.), 323 NLRB 1042, 1044 (1997). Moreover, in Ironworkers Local 340 (Consumers En- ergy Co.), 347 NLRB 578, 579 (2006), the Board held: To establish a prima facie case under Wright Line, the Gen- eral Counsel must establish that [the employee’s] . . . protect- ed concerted activity was a substantial or motivating factor in the Respondent’s adverse employment actions. . . . If the General Counsel makes the required initial showing, the bur- den then shifts to the Respondent to prove, as an affirmative defense, that it would have taken the same action even in the absence of [the employee’s] protected activity. Id. A union does not, however, breach its duty of fair represen- tation simply because it negotiates contract provisions, which are beneficial to one constituency over another, as long as it has a rational, nondiscriminatory rationale. See Firemen & Oilers Local 320 (Philip Morris, U.S.A.), 323 NLRB 89 (1997). If, however, a union favors one group of represented employees for reasons that restrain or coerce others in the exercise of their Section 7 rights, or for reasons that are arbitrary or demonstrate bad faith, a negotiated contractual provision violates the Act. See, e.g., Teamsters Local 435 (Super Valu, Inc.), 317 NLRB 617 fn. 3 (1995) (union violated Sec. 8(b)(1)(A) when it fa- vored one group, who were members for a longer duration); Reading Anthracite Co., 326 NLRB 1370 (1998) (union violat- ed Sec. 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) when it favored one group, who were members of one local union rather than another); Red Ball Motor Freight, 157 NLRB 1237 (1966), enfd. 379 F.2d 137 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (union violated Sec. 8(b)(1)(A) when, for political reasons, it agreed to place at the bottom of the seniori- ty list employees from one of two merged facilities), Barton Brands, Ltd., 213 NLRB 640 (1974), enf. denied 529 F.2d 793 (7th Cir.1976) (union violated Sec. 8(b)(1)(A) and (2), when it negotiated a new seniority clause for internal political reasons). Additionally, “the Board has found the duty of fair represen- tation breached where the union’s conduct was motivated by an employee’s lack of union membership, strifes resulting from intraunion politics, and racial or gender considerations.” Postal Service, 272 NLRB 93, 104 (1984). A union, therefore, breaches its duty of fair representation, when its actions are taken to advance its agents’ interests, at the expense of its rank and file members. See, e.g., Local 600 (UAW), 225 NLRB 1299 (1976) (union violated Sec. 8(b)(1)(A), when its chairman refused to appeal a grievance, which would have reduced his overtime opportunities); Explo, Inc., 235 NLRB 918 (1978) (union violated Sec. 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) when its business agent, for personal reasons, appointed his son-in-law to a steward position, which afforded super seniority and a superior sched- ule); Local 417 (UAW), 245 NLRB 527 (1979) (union violated Sec. 8(b)(1)(A), when its agent refused to process a grievance due to personal animus). B. Local 471’s Handling of Rodrigue’s Vacation Pay Issue Violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) I find that Local 471’s handling of Rodrigue’s vacation pay issue was unlawful. This issue was created by Weiner’s May 26 email to Taegel, which asked the Company to agree to add language to the 2009–2012 CBA that effectively capped Ro- drigue’s weekly vacation pay at $250. Weiner’s request, which was made sua sponte, was adopted by the Company, and incor- porated into the 2009–2012 CBA. Counsel for the Acting Gen- eral Counsel contends that these actions were intended to retali- ate against Rodrigue because she assisted Hammer with the petition, and, as a result, violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2). 1. Prima facie case I find that counsel for the Acting General Counsel has demonstrated that Rodrigue’s protected activity was a substan- tial or motivating factor in Local 471’s handling of her vacation pay issue. Specifically, counsel has shown that: she exercised a Section 7 right when she attempted to organize the unit on be- half of UNITE HERE; Local 471 knew of her activities; Local 471 harbored animus against such activities; and this animus motivated its handling of her vacation pay issue. Rodrigue exercised her Section 7 rights, when she distributed the petition and aided Hammer’s organizing effort. See Sheet Metal Workers Local 16 (Parker Sheet Metal), supra. She so- licited employees to sign the petition at the facility, introduced them to Hammer, signed the petition herself, recruited Mayotte to aid the campaign, and visited workers at their homes on be- half of UNITE HERE following the filing of the RC petition. Local 471 knew about her activities. Weiner admitted such knowledge, and Roberts demonstrated knowledge when he publically ostracized her activities at the overflow meeting. Local 471 harbored significant animus against her activities. On February 18, for example, Roberts publicly proclaimed that charges had been filed against her, and threatened that she would be, “thrown out of the Union . . . [and] take[n] . . . down,” because of her dissident activities. Significant animus can also be gleaned from Weiner stalking Hammer, while Ro- drigue escorted her around the facility on January 27, as well as Franco’s disparaging comments against Hammer and any other UNITE HERE supporters on the same date. The relatively close timing between Rodrigue’s organizing activity and Weiner’s sua sponte suggestion to the Company to slash her vacation benefits further demonstrates animus. Or put another way, Weiner’s May 26 email occurred within only a few months of Rodrigue’s activities. Lastly, the fundamentally unreasonable and clandestine way that Weiner handled Ro- drigue’s vacation pay issue smacks of animus. Weiner, whose main function is to represent employees, covertly raised an issue with Taegel, which solely harmed Rodrigue and exclu- sively benefited the Company. This action was taken without Weiner talking to Rodrigue either beforehand or after the fact, and without the unit’s approval or ratification. This matter was, instead, essentially concealed in the 2009–2012 CBA, and left to ambush Rodrigue. Lastly, I find it likely that an attempt to oust an incumbent union, and replace it with a predecessor 1550 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD union that had been trusteed and ousted, was deemed a hostile action by Local 471’s leadership, which would have prompted Weiner’s ill will. I find, accordingly, that Local 471’s agents harbored extensive animus against Rodrigue’s Section 7 activi- ties. Based upon the extensive level of animus found herein, I find that counsel for the Acting General Counsel has demon- strated that Local 471 retaliated against Rodrigue’s dissident organizing activities by engineering the reduction of her vaca- tion benefits. As a result, a prima facie case has been adduced. 2. Affirmative defense Local 471 failed to establish that it would have handled Ro- drigue’s vacation pay issue in the same manner, absent her dissident organizing activities. In its defense, Weiner explained that she solely sought to treat all house wait staff consistently regarding the $250 vacation cap, and errantly believed that Rodrigue was house wait staff. She added that, once her error was discovered, Local 471 filed a grievance and Rodrigue was subsequently made whole. For several reasons, I reject this assertion. First, as stated, Weiner was a less than credible wit- ness. Second, her contention that her mistake was innocent in nature is greatly outweighed by the extensive record of animus present herein. As stated, if her intentions were truly innocu- ous, she would have minimally discussed the matter with Ro- drigue before agreeing to slash her vacation benefit, and simi- larly afforded her the courtesy of advising her about the change after it was enacted. Third, I do not find that Local 471’s sub- sequent attempt to remedy Rodrigue’s issue by filing a griev- ance, eradicates the invidious motivation that initially prompted this issue. Thus, I find Local 471 failed to satisfactorily prove its affirmative defense, and, as a result, conclude that its actions regarding Rodrigue’s vacation issue were unlawful. 3. Conclusion Accordingly, Local 471 violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act, when Weiner engineered the capping of Rodrigue’s weekly vacation pay. See Ironworkers Local 340 (Consumers Energy Co.), supra. Local 471 failed to prove that it would have taken the same action against Rodrigue, absent her pro- tected activity. C. Local 471’s Negotiation of the New Bidding System With the Company Violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) Local 471’s negotiation and implementation of the house wait staff bidding system, which economically harmed Ma- yotte, violated the Act. Counsel for the Acting General has advanced two related theories of a violation. First, counsel contends that Local 471 unlawfully negotiated the bidding sys- tem, in order to retaliate against Mayotte for engaging in dissi- dent organizing activities. Second, counsel avers that Local 471 unlawfully negotiated the bidding system, in order to ad- vance Franco’s economic interests (i.e., the interests of a stew- ard, and bargaining team and executive board member), over Mayotte’s economic interests (i.e., the lesser interests of an ordinary rank and file member). I find that each theory has merit, and Local 471 possessed a dual invidious motivation, when it negotiated the bidding system. 1. Prima facie case Counsel for the Acting General Counsel demonstrated that Mayotte’s protected activity motivated Local 471’s negotiation of the bidding system. Counsel has also shown that Franco’s superior status as a steward, and bargaining team and executive board member, played a controlling role in the enactment of the bidding system. Mayotte exercised a Section 7 right, when she distributed the petition and aided UNITE HERE’s organizing effort. She so- licited employees to sign the petition at the facility, introduced them to Hammer, signed the petition herself, and visited work- ers at their homes on behalf of UNITE HERE following the filing of the RC petition. Local 471 knew that Mayotte aided UNITE HERE’s organ- izing drive. As discussed under my earlier credibility analysis, I do not credit Weiner’s denial of such knowledge. Local 471 demonstrated significant animus against any activ- ities connected to UNITE HERE’s organizing campaign. Such animus was previously described under my analysis of the Ro- drigue vacation pay allegation. Local 471 also negotiated the bidding system, in order to pacify Franco, its steward, and negotiating team and executive board member. Franco was granted the bidding system as a consolation prize, after her repeated requests to lay off Mayotte were denied by the Company.12 The Company’s refusal to lay off Mayotte resulted in Franco staunchly advocating the bid- ding system throughout bargaining, and expressing that Ma- yotte’s ability to work greater hours under the rotation system supported this changeover. Local 471’s stance on the bidding system became so intense that Taegel believed that he would be unable to reach an agreement with Local 471 on the 2009–2012 CBA, until he conceded this point. The fact that Local 471 would elevate this isolated issue, which only benefited two house wait staff employees, over the interests of the rest of the unit in concluding 18 months of bargaining, demonstrates that its actions were politically taken to advance Franco’s pecuniary interests. Finally, I find it likely that Weiner, a new business agent, with very limited prior labor relations experience, want- ed to gain Franco’s confidence by obtaining the bidding sys- tem, in order to earn her allegiance. In sum, I find that counsel for the Acting General Counsel has demonstrated that Local 471 negotiated the bidding system, in order to both retaliate against Mayotte’s dissident organizing activities, and promote the interests of Franco, a shop steward and politically active member. Local 471 understood that, un- der the bidding system, which rewarded seniority, the more senior Franco would gain a substantial scheduling advantage over Mayotte. 12 It is undisputed that Franco repeatedly sought Mayotte’s layoff, in order to increase her own work opportunities. Moreover, at some point, Weiner even requested Taegel to lay off Mayotte. ROCHESTER REGIONAL JOINT BOARD LOCAL 471, WORKERS UNITED (SODEXO, INC.) 1551 2. Affirmative defense In its defense, Local 471 avers that it had a rational, nondis- criminatory motivation behind its pursuit of the bidding system. It contends that the bidding system sought to advance the unit’s seniority interests, which is a legitimate policy. It added that the proposal gathering worksheets completed by the unit priori- tized pursuing seniority-based issues in negotiations. I find that this defense lacks merits, and is deeply undercut by the signifi- cant level of animus against Mayotte’s dissident activities, and the transparent manner that the bidding system aided Franco. I also note that the bidding system was not even remotely man- dated by the unit, given that it solely had an isolated impact on the three-person house wait staff, and no obvious impact on anyone else. 3. Conclusion Accordingly, I find that Local 471 violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act, when Weiner negotiated the bid- ding system, which directly harmed Mayotte, a dissident mem- ber, while advancing the interests of Franco, a politically active member and ally. See Auto Workers Local 600 (Ford Motor), supra; Explo, Inc., supra. Local 471 failed to prove that it would have taken the same action against Mayotte, absent her protected activity and Franco’s obvious stake in the bidding system. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Sodexo, Inc. is an employer within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. 2. Local 471 is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. UNITE HERE is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 4. Local 471 is, and, at all material times, has been the exclu- sive bargaining representative for the following appropriate unit at the facility: All cafeteria and food service employees, which includes all cooks, bakers, food service workers/cashiers, food service workers, utility workers, hosts and hostesses, house wait staff, bus persons, wait staff and bartenders, but excludes managers, office clerical employees, chef managers, pastry chefs, and all supervisory employees. 5. Local 471 violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act by amending article 12, section 4, vacation pay, of the 2009– 2012 CBA, in a manner that was detrimental to Rodrigue be- cause of her Section 7 activities on behalf of UNITE HERE. 6. Local 471 violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act by negotiating, and effectuating, a new scheduling and bidding system for house wait staff employees under article 25 of the 2009–2012 CBA in a manner that was detrimental to Mayotte because of her Section 7 activities on behalf of UNITE HERE, and in order to advance the economic interests of Franco, a steward and politically active member. 7. The unfair labor practices committed by Local 471 are un- fair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. REMEDY Having found that Local 471 has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I find that it must be ordered to cease and desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Local 471 is ordered to distribute appropriate remedial notic- es electronically via email, intranet, internet, or other appropri- ate electronic means to its members and employees, in addition to the traditional physical posting of paper notices on a bulletin board. See J. Picini Flooring, 356 NLRB No. 9 (2010). Local 471 must provide written notice to the Company, with- in 14 days of the date of this Order, with a copy furnished to Rodrigue and Mayotte, which requests: the deletion of the un- lawful vacation pay provision referring to “wait staff who nor- mally work in the Albany Room” under article 12, section 4 of the 2009–2012 CBA; and the rescission of the unlawful sched- uling and bidding system for house wait staff employees under article 25 of the 2009–2012 CBA. Such written notice shall also request further bargaining with the Company, which would be limited in scope to addressing the issues delineated above. Local 471, having taken unlawful action against Rodrigue and Mayotte shall be ordered to make them whole, to the extent that it has not already done so, for any loss of wages, overtime, gratuities, vacation pay and other benefits that they may have suffered as a result of Local 471’s unlawful actions, in accord- ance with F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950), plus interest as computed in New Horizons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987), compounded daily as prescribed in Ken- tucky River Medical Center, 356 NLRB 6 (2010). [Recommended order omitted from publication.]