363 NLRB 11
Hoot Winc, LLC and Ontario Wings, LLC dba Hooters of Ontario Mills, Joint Employers
HOOTERS OF ONTARIO MILLS
11
363 NLRB No. 2
Hoot Winc, LLC and Ontario Wings, LLC d/b/a
Hooters of Ontario Mills and Alexis Hanson
Hoot Winc, LLC and Ontario Wings, LLC d/b/a
Hooters of Ontario Mills and Jamie West
Hoot Winc, LLC and Ontario Wings, LLC d/b/a
Hooters of Ontario Mills and Chanelle Panitch.
Cases 31–CA–104872, 31–CA–104874, 31–CA–
104877, 31–CA–104892, 31–CA–107256, and 31–
CA–107259
September 1, 2015
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN PEARCE AND MEMBERS MISCIMARRA
AND HIROZAWA
On May 19, 2014, Administrative Law Judge William
Nelson Cates issued the attached decision. The Re-
spondents filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and
the General Counsel filed an answering brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
adopt the judge’s rulings, findings, and conclusions re-
garding the Respondents’ arbitration agreement and to
adopt his recommended Order as modified and set forth
in full below.1
1. The judge found, and we agree, that the Respond-
ents violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by maintaining a
mandatory arbitration agreement that would reasonably
be read by employees to prohibit the filing of unfair labor
practice charges with the Board. It is well settled that a
work rule violates Section 8(a)(1) if employees would
reasonably believe that the rule interferes with their abil-
ity to file Board charges, even if the policy does not ex-
pressly prohibit access to the Board. See Murphy Oil
USA, Inc., 361 NLRB 774, 792 fn. 98 (2014); D. R. Hor-
ton, Inc., 357 NLRB 2277, 2278 fn. 2 (2012), enf. denied
on other grounds 737 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2013), petition
1 Following the judge’s decision in this case, the parties executed an
informal Board settlement agreement and a non-Board settlement
agreement resolving all alleged violations other than those pertaining to
the maintenance of the arbitration agreement. On October 22, 2014, the
Board granted the parties joint motion to sever and remand the settled
allegations. Accordingly, the only issue before us is whether the Re-
spondents’ arbitration agreement violates Sec. 8(a)(1) of the Act. There
are no exceptions to the judge’s finding that the Respondents are joint
employers.
We shall modify the recommended Order to reflect the settlement
and remand of the other allegations and to conform to the Board’s
standard remedial language. We shall substitute a new notice to con-
form to the Order as modified.
for rehearing en banc denied (2014); U-Haul Co. of Cali-
fornia, 347 NLRB 375, 377–378 (2006), enfd. mem. 255
Fed. Appx. 527 (D.C. Cir. 2007). Furthermore, it is set-
tled that production of extrinsic evidence, such as testi-
mony showing that employees interpreted the rule to
preclude access to the Board, is not a precondition to
finding that a rule is unlawful by its terms. See, e.g.,
Murphy Oil, supra at 786 fn. 79; Hills & Dales General
Hospital, 360 NLRB 611, 611–612 (2014) (citing Lu-
theran Heritage Village-Livonia, 343 NLRB 646, 646–
647 (2004); Claremont Resort & Spa, 344 NLRB 832,
832 (2005)).
Here, the parties stipulated, and the judge found, that
the Respondents required employees to sign an arbitra-
tion agreement as a condition of employment. The arbi-
tration agreement requires that all “claims” between the
employee and the Respondents shall exclusively be de-
cided by arbitration. The term “claims” encompasses
all disputes arising out of or related to your application
for employment, the application and recruitment pro-
cess, the interview process, the formation of the em-
ployment relationship, your employment by the Com-
pany, or your separation from employment with the
Company. The term “Claims” includes, but is not lim-
ited to, any claim whether arising under federal, state,
or local law, under a statute such as Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, under a rule, under a regula-
tion or under the common law, including, but not lim-
ited [to] ANY CLAIM OF DISCRIMINATION,
SEXUAL OR OTHER TYPE OF HARASSMENT,
RETALIATION, WRONGFUL DISCHARGE, ANY
CLAIM
FOR
WAGES,
COSTS,
INTEREST,
ATTORNEYS’ FEES OR PENALTIES. “Claim” does
not include any dispute that cannot be arbitrated as a
matter of law.
(Emphasis in original.)
Although the arbitration agreement does not explicitly
prohibit employees from filing charges with the Board,
we agree with the judge’s finding that employees would
reasonably read it to do so—particularly in light of the
breadth of the provision quoted above, its reference to
“any claim” under “federal law” or “under a statute,” and
its specific inclusion of claims of discrimination, retalia-
tion, or discharge or for wages. See U-Haul Co. of Cali-
fornia, supra, 347 NLRB at 377.
The Respondents point out that the arbitration agree-
ment includes an express exemption for “any dispute that
cannot be arbitrated as a matter of law.” That provision,
however, does not save the arbitration agreement from
violating Section 8(a)(1). Although unfair labor practice
charges must be filed with the Board, they may be re-
12
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
solved through arbitration. See Murphy Oil, supra at
786, 791–792 fn. 98. Accordingly, we affirm the judge’s
conclusion that the arbitration agreement violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) because employees would reasonably believe
it prohibited the filing of charges with the Board. See
id.; U-Haul Co. of California, supra, 347 NLRB at 377–
378.
2. Applying the Board’s decision in D. R. Horton,
Inc., supra, the judge also found that the arbitration
agreement violated Section 8(a)(1) because it required
employees to waive their right to engage in class or col-
lective action in all forums, whether arbitral or judicial.
We agree.
In Murphy Oil, supra, the Board thoroughly examined
and reaffirmed the rationale of D. R. Horton. Specifical-
ly, the Board found that class or collective litigation by
employees of claims relating to the terms and conditions
of their employment is protected concerted activity, and
that a policy prohibiting such activity in both arbitral and
judicial forums violates Section 8(a)(1). As in Murphy
Oil and D. R. Horton, the Respondents here required
employees to sign, as a condition of employment, an
arbitration agreement that barred each employee from
litigating claims against the Respondents on a class, rep-
resentative, or collective basis in any forum, arbitral or
judicial.2 Thus, we agree with the judge that the Re-
spondents’ maintenance of that arbitration agreement
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.3
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board orders that the
Respondents, Hoot Winc, LLC and Ontario Wings, LLC
2 In their statement of facts, the Respondents quote a section of the
agreement, entitled “Arbitrators’ Authority,” which states in part that
the arbitration agreement “shall not be construed to deprive a party of
any substantive right preserved by law.” The Respondents do not oth-
erwise address or rely on that provision. In any event, we find that the
provision does not change the result here. At most, it creates ambiguity
as to an employee’s right to file charges with the Board, and it is insuf-
ficient to counteract the broadly worded language requiring individual
arbitration of all claims arising under Federal law. It is well established
that any ambiguity in a work rule that may restrict protected concerted
conduct “must be construed against the [employer] as the promulgator
of the rule[ ].” Ark Las Vegas Restaurant Corp., 343 NLRB 1281,
1282 (2004).
3 For the reasons stated in his partial dissent in Murphy Oil USA,
Inc., 361 NLRB 774, 795–808 (2014), Member Miscimarra does not
believe that Sec. 8(a)(1) of the Act prohibits employees and employers
from entering into agreements that waive class procedures in litigation
or arbitration. Accordingly, he would find that the Respondents did not
violate Sec. 8(a)(1) by maintaining a class waiver agreement. Member
Miscimarra agrees with his colleagues, however, that employees would
reasonably read the agreement to require arbitration of disputes arising
under the NLRA and thus to prohibit the filing of charges with the
Board. To that extent, he agrees that the language of the agreement
violates Sec. 8(a)(1). See id., slip op. at 23 fn. 4.
d/b/a/ Hooters of Ontario Mills, Joint Employers, Ontar-
io, California, their officers, agents, successors, and as-
signs, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a)
Maintaining a mandatory arbitration agreement
that employees reasonably would believe bars or restricts
the right to file charges with the National Labor Rela-
tions Board.
(b) Maintaining a mandatory arbitration agreement
that requires employees, as a condition of employment,
to waive the right to maintain joint, class, or collective
actions in all forums, whether arbitral or judicial.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed to them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Rescind the unlawful arbitration agreement in all
of its forms, or revise it in all of its forms to make clear
to employees that the agreement does not constitute a
waiver of their right to maintain employment-related
joint, class, or collective actions in all forums, and that it
does not restrict employees’ right to file charges with the
National Labor Relations Board.
(b) Notify all current and former employees who were
required to sign the unlawful arbitration agreement that it
has been rescinded or revised and, if revised, provide
them a copy of the revised agreement.
(c) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
their Ontario, California facility, and at all other facilities
where the unlawful arbitration agreement is or has been
in effect, copies of the notice marked “Appendix A.”4
Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional
Director for Region 31, after being signed by the Re-
spondents’ authorized representative, shall be posted by
the Respondents and maintained for 60 consecutive days
in conspicuous places, including all places where notices
to employees are customarily posted. In addition to
physical posting of paper notices, notices shall be dis-
tributed electronically, such as by email, posting on an
intranet or an internet site, and/or other electronic means,
if the Respondents customarily communicate with their
employees by such means. Reasonable steps shall be
taken by the Respondents to ensure that the notices are
not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. If
the Respondents have gone out of business or closed the
facility involved in these proceedings, the Respondents
4 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
HOOTERS OF ONTARIO MILLS
13
shall duplicate and mail, at their own expense, a copy of
the notice to all current employees and former employees
employed by the Respondents at any time since April 15,
2013.
(d) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director for Region 31 a sworn certifi-
cation of a responsible official on a form provided by the
Region attesting to the steps that the Respondents have
taken to comply.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and
obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on
your behalf
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.
WE WILL NOT maintain a mandatory arbitration agree-
ment that employees reasonably would believe bars or
restricts the right to file charges with the National Labor
Relations Board.
WE WILL NOT maintain a mandatory arbitration agree-
ment that requires employees, as a condition of employ-
ment, to waive the right to maintain joint, class, or col-
lective actions in all forums, whether arbitral or judicial.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
listed above.
WE WILL rescind the unlawful arbitration agreement in
all of its forms, or revise it in all of its forms to make
clear that the agreement does not constitute a waiver of
your right to maintain employment-related joint, class, or
collective actions in all forums, and that it does not re-
strict your right to file charges with the National Labor
Relations Board.
WE WILL notify all current and former employees who
were required to sign the unlawful arbitration agreement
that it has been rescinded or revised and, if revised, pro-
vide them a copy of the revised agreement.
HOOT WINC, LLC AND ONTARIO WINGS, LLC
D/B/A HOOTERS OF ONTARIO MILLS, JOINT
EMPLOYERS
The
Board’s
decision
can
be
found
at
http://www.nlrb.gov/case/31-CA-104872 or by using the
QR code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of
the decision from the Executive Secretary, National La-
bor Relations Board, 1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington,
D.C. 20570, or by calling (202) 273–1940.
Juan Carlos Gonzalez, Esq. and Amanda Dixon, Esq., for the
General Counsel.
Justin J. Johl, Esq., for the Respondent Hoot Winc, LLC.
Michael Barnett, Esq., for the Respondent Hooters of Ontario,
LLC.
Burton F. Boltuch, Esq., for the Charging Party Alexis Hanson.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
WILLIAM NELSON CATES, Administrative Law Judge. This
case was tried before me in Los Angeles, California, on January
29 and 30, 2014.1 Charging Party Alexis Hanson, an individu-
al, filed the charges in Cases 31–CA–104872 and 31–CA–
104874 initiating this matter on May 9,2 and the General Coun-
sel (Government) issued an order consolidating cases, consoli-
dated complaint, and notice of hearing (complaint) on Septem-
ber 27 and amended on December 12 against Hoot Winc, LLC
(Hoot Winc) and Hooters of Ontario, LLC d/b/a Hooters of
Ontario Mills (Hooters of Ontario). The Government alleges
Hoot Winc, an Oceanside, California company providing res-
taurant management services, and Hooters of Ontario, an On-
tario, California company operating a public restaurant selling
food and beverages are joint employers of the employees of
Hooters of Ontario. I shall refer to Hoot Winc and Hooters of
Ontario collectively as the Company. The complaint also al-
leges the Company has maintained certain rules in an employee
handbook, and a confidential information agreement, that in-
fringe upon employees Section 7 rights in violation of Section
1 All dates are 2013, unless otherwise indicated.
2 I do not allude to the other charges as Hanson’s discharge is the
only discharge before me. Other allegations are, however, alleged,
considered, and decided here.
14
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
8(a)(1) of the Act. It is also alleged the Company maintains an
arbitration policy, an agreement to arbitrate and an acknowl-
edgement of receipt of arbitration agreement that infringes
upon employees Section 7 rights in violation of Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act. It is also alleged the Company on April 23 sus-
pended and on April 26 discharged Charging Party Hanson
because she concertedly complained to the Company regarding
wages, hours, and working conditions of the Company’s em-
ployees, and conditions surrounding an upcoming competition
involving the employees and such actions of the Company are
alleged to interfere with, restrain, and coerce employees in the
exercise of rights protected by Section 7 and in violation of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
The parties were given full opportunity to participate, to in-
troduce relevant evidence, to examine and cross-examine wit-
nesses, and to file briefs. I carefully observed the demeanor of
the witnesses as they testified and I rely on those observations
here. I have studied the whole record, and based on the de-
tailed findings and analysis below, I conclude and find the
Company violated the Act as outlined below.
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION AND RELATED ISSUES
A. Jurisdictional Status of Hoot Winc and Hooters of Ontario
Hoot Winc has been, and continues to be, a limited liability
company with an office and place of business in Oceanside,
California, providing restaurant management services. During
the calendar year ending December 31, 2012, Hoot Winc in
conducting its business operations, performed services valued
in excess of $50,000 in states other than the State of California.
The parties admit, and I find, Hoot Winc is an employer en-
gaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6),
and (7) of the Act.
Hooters of Ontario has been, and continues to be, a limited
liability company with an office and place of business in Ontar-
io, California, operating a public restaurant selling food and
beverages. During the calendar year ending December 31,
2012, Hooters of Ontario derived gross revenues in excess of
$500,000 and bought and received at its Ontario, California
facility products, goods, and materials in excess of $5000 di-
rectly from points outside the State of California. The parties
admit, and I find, Hooters of Ontario is an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of
the Act.
B. Joint Employer Status
It is alleged that Hoot Winc and Hooters of Ontario have, at
all times here, been joint employers of Hooters of Ontario’s
employees at the Hooters Restaurant of Ontario, California. It
is also alleged Hoot Winc has exercised control over the labor
relations policies of Hooters of Ontario and administered a
common labor policy for employees of Hooters of Ontario. It
is admitted that Hoot Winc has provided human resources ser-
vices to Hooters of Ontario, but Hoot Winc denies they are
joint employers.
The Government contends Hoot Winc had a joint employer
relationship with Hooters of Ontario and the relationship exist-
ed at the time Hoot Winc suspended and terminated Hooters of
Ontario employee Charging Party Hanson.
Hoot Winc and Hooters of Ontario contend they are not joint
employers but separate distinct entities with Hoot Winc simply
providing human resources, management, accounting, and simi-
lar expertise to not only the Ontario restaurant but 18 other
Hooters’ restaurant locations in California. Hoot Winc and
Hooters of Ontario argue the following shows they were and
are not joint employers, namely: (1) they are separate entities;
(2) Hooters of Ontario is owned by a holding company, not
Hoot Winc and Hoot Winc is not a member of the holding
company that owns Hooters of Ontario; (3) neither is a subsidi-
ary of the other; (4) Hooters of Ontario engages Hoot Winc to
provide restaurant management services through a written fee-
for-services agreement; and (5) Hanson was an employee of
and paid by Hooters of Ontario, not Hoot Winc.
A joint employer relationship may be found to exist where
there is sufficient evidence that one company has immediate
control over the other company’s employees. The Board in
Aim Royal Insulation, Inc., 358 NLRB 787, 793–794 (2012),
stated:
The test for joint-employer status is whether two entities
“share or co-determine those matters governing the essential
terms and conditions of employment.” Laerco Transporta-
tion, 269 NLRB 324, 325 (1984). To establish a joint-
employer relationship, there must be evidence that one em-
ployer “meaningfully affects matters relating to the employ-
ment relationship such as, hiring, firing, discipline, supervi-
sion, and direction of the other employer’s employees.” Id.
In Capital EMI Music, 311 NLRB 997, 999 (1993), enfd. 23
F.3d 399 (4th Cir. 1994), a case which I cannot deny familiarity
with, the Board noted:
Joint employers are businesses that are entirely separate enti-
ties except they both “take part in determining essential terms
and conditions” of a group of employees. Manpower, Inc.,
164 NLRB 287, 288 (1967). Accord: NLRB v. Browning-
Ferris Industries, 691 F.2d 1117, 1122–1123 (3d Cir. 1982),
and cases there cited.
In NLRB v. Browning-Ferris Industries, supra, the court spe-
cifically found that where two separate entities share or code-
termine those matters governing the essential terms and condi-
tions of employment they are considered joint employers for
the purpose of the Act.
Did Hoot Winc participate meaningfully in exercising con-
trol over matters governing the terms and conditions of em-
ployment of Hooters of Ontario employees, and, more specifi-
cally with respect to Charging Party Hanson’s employment?
The evidence establishes Hoot Winc did. Hoot Winc Vice
President of Human Resources Herrmann, when notified of the
situation at the Hooters of Ontario bikini contest, directed
Hooters of Ontario General Manager Vidauri to suspend em-
ployees Hanson and Panitch and to conduct an investigation to
see what action would be taken. Herrmann personally investi-
gated the situation at the Ontario restaurant. Thereafter,
Herrmann notified both Panitch and Hanson she was terminat-
ing their employment. Herrmann testified she determined to
HOOTERS OF ONTARIO MILLS
15
fire Panitch before she spoke with her and determined to fire
Hanson while speaking with her. Herrmann signed the dis-
charge notices provided to Hanson and Panitch and only men-
tioned her termination decisions to Regional Director Peterson
and General Manager Vidauri.
During material times here, Hoot Winc Regional Director
Peterson disciplined (oral and written) Ontario General Manag-
er Vidauri and Bar Manager Ramirez. Both Vidauri and
Ramirez are management personnel but it further demonstrates
the direct control Hoot Winc exercised over Hooters of Ontario.
The discipline given Vidauri and Ramirez was based on com-
ments they made about Hooter Girl employees at Hooters of
Ontario.
Hoot Winc developed and provides the “Employee Hand-
book” given to each Hooters of Ontario employee. The Hoot
Winc name appears on each page of the handbook. The Em-
ployee Handbook (GC Exh. 18) addresses conduct, dress, al-
lowable grooming practices, open door policy, nonharassment
policy, restaurant work rules, company philosophy, employee
relations, employee meals, alcohol consumption, safety, disci-
pline, pay, benefits, vacation, absences, substance abuse, and
other policies. A number of the policies inform Hooters of
Ontario employees to contact Hoot Winc directly. The open
door policy, for example, directs employees to first address
work-related concerns with their immediate supervisor or gen-
eral manager but if the matter is not resolved to then report
their concerns to a regional supervisor and if appropriate report
their complaint directly to Hoot Winc human resources via
telephone or email. Hoot Winc issues to each Hooters of On-
tario employee its standard operating procedure booklet (GC
Exh. 20) which addresses various policies and procedures for
Hooters of Ontario employees. For example, with respect to
the anti-harassment and discrimination procedures it is specifi-
cally noted that Hoot Winc Vice President of Human Resources
(in this case Herrmann) was ultimately responsible for hearing
complaints, conducting investigations, documenting infor-
mation, and determining what action would be taken regarding
those procedures. Other procedures are addressed such as what
employees at Hooters of Ontario must wear, meal and rest
break guidelines and requirements, when and how employees
will be paid, tip allocations, communications with employees,
medical reimbursement, and work schedules.
It is clear Hoot Winc has immediate and effective control in
determining the terms and conditions of employment of Hoot-
ers of Ontario employees.
Hoot Winc and Hooters of Ontario’s contention that there is
no joint employer relationship here is invalid because, among
other reasons, the contentions are grounded on corporate struc-
ture and separate entities and not on control, or lack thereof, by
one entity over employees of the other concerning essential
terms of employment. The fact, for example, that Hanson’s and
Panitch’s paychecks were drawn from Hooters of Ontario ac-
counts does not require a different result than I conclude here,
namely, that a joint employer relationship exists.
As noted elsewhere here, I shall refer to Hoot Winc and
Hooters of Ontario jointly as the Company.
C. Supervisory and Agency Status
It is admitted that Vice President of Human Resources Am-
ber Herrmann (Herrmann or Vice President of Human Re-
sources Herrmann) and Regional Director Scott Peterson (Pe-
terson or Regional Director Peterson) were supervisors within
the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act and/or agents of Hoot
Winc or Hooters of Ontario within the meaning of Section
2(13) of the Act. It is, however, denied that Marketing coordi-
nator/key employee Pamela Noble and Key employee Alicia
Wade (Strohman) are supervisors and/or agents within the
meaning of the Act.
1. Facts
Marketing Coordinator Noble and employee Wade both
were, at applicable times, “key employees” for the Company.
As the name implies, key employees are provided keys to the
restaurant and cash registers. No other nonmanagement em-
ployees have keys either to the restaurant or cash registers.
Charging Party Hanson explained that if a “Hooters Girl” had a
problem with a customer’s check (bill), that is, something was
rang up incorrectly, or the customer had, for example, a dis-
count coupon, the key employee on duty could delete items
from a customer’s bill or give the customer credit for a promo-
tional coupon. Key employees may go to the bank or take in-
ventory for the Company.
Key employees sometimes conduct “jumpstart” sessions at
the beginning of the workday or shift. Hanson described
“jumpstart” sessions as “just a little meeting we have before our
shift every day.” Upcoming events and specials at the restau-
rant, sales for the day, merchandise sales, and section assign-
ments are discussed and/or made.
Key employees sometimes “cut the floor.” Cutting the floor
happens when there are more workers present than the custom-
er base justifies. Key employee Noble explained “we have to
check labor every hour. And if it’s over ten percent, we’re
supposed to cut accordingly. That way we can save money on
labor, so normally we ask who wants to stay and go.” If volun-
teers do not resolve who goes, “Hooter Girls” name tags are
collected and it is decided who will leave work that shift by
drawing name tags. Noble testified employees were never just
selected because that would not be fair.
There were times at the restaurant when key employees were
present while managers were not. If anything occurred on a
shift, with no manager present, the key employee would leave a
note for the general manager. Key employee Wade stated if an
issue arose she could coach or counsel the employee, and had,
on a couple of occasions, filled out a computer generated doc-
ument on which she recorded what had occurred. Wade viewed
the computer form as basically a type of written warning letter.
She explained the computer generated document “is not con-
sidered at issue, nor valid, unless it is given by upper manage-
ment.” Wade could not recall whether upper management ac-
tually issued the warnings she had drafted. General Manager
Vidauri testified key employees could not hire, fire, or suspend
other employees.
Marketing coordinator and key employee, Noble, when also
functioning as marketing coordinator, had the additional duty of
16
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
setting up promotional events such as the April 22 bikini con-
test at the Ontario location.
2. Analysis and applicable principles
Section 2(11) of the Act defines a “supervisor” as:
Any individual having authority, in the interest of the em-
ployer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, dis-
charge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or re-
sponsibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or ef-
fectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the
foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely
routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent
judgment.
To establish that Noble and Wade were supervisors, the
Government must prove by a preponderance of the evidence:
(1) that they held authority to engage in any one of the 12 enu-
merated supervisory functions listed above; (2) that their “exer-
cise of such authority [was] not of a merely routine or clerical
nature, but require[d] the use of independent judgment”; and
(3) that their authority was held “in the interest of the employ-
er.” See, e.g., NLRB v. Kentucky River Community Care, 532
U.S. 706, 710–713 (2001); Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 348
NLRB 686, 687 (2006). The Government can prove they had
the requisite supervisory authority either by demonstrating they
actually performed a supervisory action or by showing they
effectively recommended it be done. Oakwood, above. Fur-
ther, “to exercise ‘independent judgment’ an individual must at
minimum act, or effectively recommend action, free of the
control of others and form an opinion or evaluation by discern-
ing and comparing data.” Id. at 692–693. A “judgment is not
independent if it is dictated or controlled by detailed instruc-
tions, whether set forth in company policies or rules, the verbal
instructions of a higher authority, or in the provisions of a col-
lective-bargaining agreement.” Id. at 693. Because the Gov-
ernment bears the burden of proving supervisory status, any
lack of evidence on an element necessary to establish supervi-
sory status must be held against the Government. G4S Regu-
lated Security Solutions, 358 NLRB 1701, 1701 (2012).
Applying these principles here, I find the Government’s evi-
dence fails to establish Noble and/or Wade possessed any indi-
cia of supervisory authority.
The fact an employee is given a literal key to the employer’s
facility and cash registers does not, in any way, establish the
employee has authority to exercise any indicia of supervisory
status as outlined above. At best, assigning an employee keys
to the facility and cash registers may indicate a degree of trust
by the employer in the employee but little else. The fact a key
employee is authorized to correct a customer’s bill where incor-
rect data has been entered into the company cash register or
giving customers credit for valid promotion coupons does not
establish key employees have or exercise any indicia of super-
visory status. That key employees may take inventory or do
banking transactions for a manager does not establish an indicia
of supervisory authority.
Key employees may, when managers are not present, con-
duct jumpstart meetings at the beginning of shifts. The evi-
dence in this regard only establishes that key employees notify
employees concerning upcoming events at the restaurant, sales
for the day including particular merchandise sales, and advising
“Hooter Girls” which tables and sections of the restaurant they
will be assigned for that day. There is absolutely no showing,
on this record, that key employees utilize independent judgment
when making such announcements or assignments. It appears
key employees simply followed a set routine in selecting em-
ployees to cover customer tables.
In cutting the floor or reducing the number of “Hooter Girls”
in relation to customers, key employees simply perform a rou-
tine check of labor every hour, and, on a specific percentage
ratio of labor to customers, they cut or reduce the work force.
Key employees do not independently select employees to be cut
but rather ask for volunteers; or, collect “Hooter Girl” name
tags and conduct a drawing to determine which employee(s) are
sent home for the remainder of the workshift. This activity
does not establish key employees responsibly direct worktimes
for employees of the restaurant.
The Government contends key employees prepare written
disciplinary warnings for employees which are approved by the
General Manager and issued. The Government further con-
tends this procedure establishes key employees effectively issue
discipline to other employees, because upper management fol-
lows the key employees’ recommendations. I find the evidence
here is insufficient to carry the Government’s burden. A key
employee may, if no managers are present on a shift, document
an event that occurred on the shift which management might
need to know about. Key employee Wade indicated she could
coach and/or counsel an employee and that on a couple of occa-
sions she documented what had occurred for the general man-
ager. Key employee Wade considered the forms she prepared
basically a type of written warning but added the document was
not considered an issue or valid unless it was given to the em-
ployee involved by upper management. This evidence does not
shed light on a key employees’ disciplinary authority. It does
not establish that Wade, or the other key employee, utilized
independent judgment regarding a warning recorded about an
incident. The fact the general manager may have issued some
form of discipline, based, at least in part, on the event docu-
mented by a key employee does not establish an effective rec-
ommendation of discipline by the key employee such as to
establish Wade, or the other key employee, to be supervisors
within the meaning of the Act. The evidence does not demon-
strate specific examples of independent judgment regarding
discipline. I find the Government failed to establish Noble and
Wade were supervisors within the meaning of the Act.
The Government additionally, or alternatively, contends No-
ble and Wade are agents of the Company pursuant to Section
2(13) of the Act. Section 2(13) of the Act reads as follows:
In determining whether any person is acting as an “agent” of
another person so as to make such other person responsible
for his act, the question of whether the specific acts performed
were actually authorized or subsequently ratified shall not be
controlling.
The Board looks to the common law principles of agency in
determining who is an agent under the Act and those principles
must be broadly construed when applied to labor relations.
HOOTERS OF ONTARIO MILLS
17
Longshoremen ILA (Coastal Stevedoring Co.), 313 NLRB 412,
415 (1993). The doctrine of apparent authority results from a
manifestation by the principal to a third party that creates a
reasonable basis for the latter to believe that the principal had
authorized the alleged agent to perform the acts in question.
The test is whether, under all the circumstances, employees
would reasonably believe that the employee in question was
reflecting company policy and/or acting and speaking for man-
agement. Hausner Hard-Chrome of Kentucky, 326 NLRB 426,
428 (1998).
The evidence establishes Noble and Wade both were agents
of the Company within the meaning of Section 2(13) of the
Act. Wade for example prepared incident disciplinary type
reports for management by which employees would reasonably
believe she was reflecting company policy and spoke for man-
agement. Noble’s April 3 message to the bikini contest partici-
pants, in which she explained if they signed up for the contest
and did not show up they would be terminated, would cause
employees to reasonably believe her memorandum reflected
Company policy, especially in light of the fact upper manage-
ment knew of the message. Additionally, the fact Noble and
Wade both conducted jumpstart meetings with employees,
opened the restaurant, and had keys to the cash registers, made
banking transactions for the Company, corrected and adjusted
customers’ bills and checked labor rates and cut the work force
would reasonably cause employees to conclude they were per-
forming their duties on behalf of management. I find the evi-
dence establishes Noble and Wade were, at applicable times,
agents of the Company.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Suspension and Discharge of Alexis Hanson
1. The Government’s evidence
The thrust of this case centers around the discharge of
Charging Party Hanson. Hanson’s discharge centers around the
Company’s annual bikini contest held at the Ontario Hooters
location on April 22. Hanson was a participant in the contest.
Hanson worked as one of approximately 40 “Hooter Girls” at
the Ontario, California Hooters location. Her entire employ-
ment from April 2011, until her suspension on April 23, and
discharge on April 26, was at that location. Hanson worked 5
days per week totaling 30 hours at $8.25 per hour plus tips. As
a Hooter Girl, Hanson greeted customers, waited tables, and
handled cash and credit payments by customers. In addition to
her Hooter Girl duties she also served as a certified trainer,
training new hires, and assisted in opening new Hooters loca-
tions.
Ontario General Manager Gerardo Vidauri, among others,
conducted mandatory bartender meetings and held such a meet-
ing in April.
Bartender Panitch attended the April meeting and thereafter
spoke with “Hooter Girls” and coworkers Hanson and Rochelle
about what she considered inappropriate or disparaging re-
marks, about the two coworkers among others. Hanson told
Panitch she should immediately telephone Regional Director
Peterson and tell him everything that had happened; that it was
unprofessional. Panitch spoke with Hooter Girl Rochelle on
the telephone. Rochelle “was very upset” and was going to
speak with Regional Manager Peterson also and reported back
to Panitch as soon as she had spoken to Peterson.
Hanson who did not attend the meeting, but received a text
message, with complaints, about the meeting, from bartender
Chanelle Panitch, whom she met for lunch later that day. Pa-
nitch told Hanson everything that occurred at the bartenders
meeting that day. Marketing coordinator and key employee,
Noble, and key employee Wade were at the meeting at which
General Manager Vidauri and Bar Manager Chris Ramirez
talked about the Ontario Hooter Girls. Panitch testified the
managers specifically spoke about five Hooter Girls; namely,
Alexis Hanson, Jaime West, Jean Delroja, Kelli Rochelle, and
Candyce Miller. Panitch told Hanson the first full hour of the
meeting was spent talking about the Hooter Girls being fat
along with other derogatory comments. Hanson testified Pa-
nitch explained that Vidauri, Ramirez, and Noble called one of
the Hooter Girls, Lena Delroja, “stupid” and a “dumb blond,”
and, that bartender and Hooter Girl Kelli Rochelle’s singing
career was not going anywhere. Rochelle was not present at
the meeting. Hanson testified Panitch told her General Manag-
er Vidauri said Hooter Girl Angela was fat and looked that way
in her uniform. Panitch told Hanson that Bar Manager Ramirez
said Hooter Girl Candyce Miller, “scrunched her hair like a
Mexican and had tattoos that they didn’t like.” Panitch ex-
plained to Hanson, she thought it was not a professional work
environment and felt if they were saying these things about
other employees, what were they saying about her when she
was not present. Panitch told Hanson this upset and made her
uncomfortable and unhappy. Panitch told Hanson her name
was brought up at the bartenders meeting. Panitch said they
were talking about promoting someone to bartender and Han-
son’s name was mentioned as a good candidate. Panitch told
Hanson. General Manager Vidauri responded that Hanson just
demanded and expected to be promoted and “if [she] didn’t
have an attitude problem then he would.” Hanson told Panitch
it wasn’t right that her name was brought up without her being
present and she wanted a direct meeting with Vidauri so if she
had an attitude problem he could address it with her and not in
front of all the other bartenders. Hanson testified it made her
unhappy and she wanted to confront General Manager Vidauri
in person, but Panitch thought it would make it uncomfortable
for her (Panitch) because she was the one that had told Hanson
what had taken place at the April bartenders meeting. Panitch
asked Hanson not to do it.
Hanson testified she thereafter spoke with Hooter Girls Kelli
Rochelle, Lena Delroja, and Panitch about what was said con-
cerning specific Hooter Girls at the early April bartenders meet-
ing. Hanson and Delroja complained about their names being
brought up and Delroja said she would call Vice President of
Human Relations Herrmann.
Hanson testified that about a couple of days after the April
bartenders meeting, but still in early April, she and Rochelle
met with General Manager Vidauri at the end of the bar in the
restaurant. At the meeting Vidauri talked about Hooter Girl
Angie saying; “Angie eats too many key lime pies after her
shift and she needs to go to the gym, rather than laying around
with her boyfriend. And that she’s starting to look really bad in
18
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
her uniform.” Hanson testified; “me and Kelli did not respond
to Gerardo [Vidauri]. We kind-of just gave him a look that
indicated that we were tired of hearing them talk about our co-
workers and turned our back towards him and walked away
from the conversation.”
Panitch testified she sent a text message to Regional Manag-
er Peterson about the bartenders meeting and he immediately
telephoned her. Panitch told Peterson all about the bartender
meeting. She said he responded kind-of-like he had heard the
story and said he would speak with General Manager Vidauri
and Bar Manager Ramirez about it. Hanson testified Regional
Director Peterson, some time later, telephoned the restaurant
and she happened to answer the phone and she discussed the
bartenders meeting with him. Hanson told Peterson it was un-
professional and she had no one in management she could look
up to or take her complaints to. Peterson told Hanson she could
call him anytime and said he had received several complaints
about the bartenders meeting.
At about this same time in early April, flyers were placed in
the employee breakroom announcing that the Hooters of Ontar-
io bikini contest would be held on April 22. The annual bikini
contest is one of three or four events drawing large numbers of
customers to, and providing publicity for, various Hooter res-
taurants and the participants.
Panitch testified she had participated in approximately 10 bi-
kini competitions before the April 22 Ontario contest. Panitch
participated in early April in the West Covina and Costa Mesa,
California contests as did Marketing Coordinator Noble. Pa-
nitch testified Noble’s best friend, Krystle Lina, served as a
judge at both contests. Noble finished in the top three at both
contests. Panitch knew Lina was Noble’s best friend from No-
ble’s social media pages. Panitch testified that when in the
second contest, the Costa Mesa one, Noble received second
place, she (Panitch) telephoned Charging Party Hanson and
said, “I told her that Pamela Nobles had got second place and
that her best friend was a judge again.” Panitch also spoke the
next day with Hanson about Noble winning and Lina being one
of the judges. Hanson suggested Panitch tell Regional Director
Peterson. Panitch thought that was a good idea but told Hanson
she felt uncomfortable doing so because she had already spoken
to Peterson about the bartenders meeting and she “didn’t want
it to seem like [she] was complaining all the time.”
The bikini contest is divided into two events. First there is a
costume portion then a bikini portion. Cash prizes are awarded
with $300 given for first place, $200 for second place, and $100
for third place. First and second place winners advance to re-
gional and possibly the national contest where larger prizes are
awarded and selections are made for the annual Hooter Girls
calendar. Those pictured in the calendars are given a percent-
age of the profit from the calendar sales aside from the cash
awards and other prizes and contestants gain exposure for pos-
sible careers in modeling and movies.
The flyer announcing the bikini contest at the Ontario loca-
tion was provided by Marketing Coordinator Noble. Hanson
testified Noble not only set the date for the contest but an-
nounced the theme for the costume portion and provided a sign-
up sheet for those wishing to enter the contest. Hanson testified
there was no mention, in the flyer, that after signing up to par-
ticipate it was mandatory for those signing to do so. On prior
occasions, employees were allowed to withdraw after signing
up and could do so without penalty. Hanson had, in the past,
withdrawn from the contest without penalty.
Hanson signed up for the contest at the time Noble first post-
ed the contest details. Hanson testified Marketing Coordinator
Noble told her in early April, “that she [Noble] would not be
participating in the contest, because she was putting on the
contest. And if she did so, she was worried that other employ-
ees and contestants would think that she was cheating.”
After Hanson signed up for the contest she and other Hooter
Girls received a “hot message” via their cell phones from Noble
on Wednesday, April 3 which reads as follows:
Hey Ladies, If you are not signed up for the contest you
WILL be working that night. But to clarify if you have your
name on the list and you plan on backing out cross your name
off the list by Friday. If you are signed up for the contest and
do not show up it will be a no call no show by our regional
and GM and you WILL BE TERMINATED. Also you
MUST be here by 8:30 p.m. if you are late you will not be al-
lowed to enter the contest and you will work the floor that
night like it was a scheduled shift. Any questions or if I’m not
clear let me know.
Marketing Coordinator Noble did in fact participate in the
bikini contest. Hanson testified that by the time she learned
Noble would be participating in the contest it was too late to
withdraw without being terminated. Hanson was upset and
concerned the contest might be rigged. Hanson explained; “We
had known that she was already participating in other contests,
so it just made us not want to do it. Because we had known
that [s]he put the whole event together.”
Hanson’s concerns that the contest might be rigged grewhen
she saw certain pictures posted around April 15, by Noble on
the social media site Instagram—an account where those who
join can post and view pictures and related comments. Hanson
and Noble followed each other on Instagram. Hanson saw
pictures of Noble, one of which included Krystle Lina, identi-
fied by Noble in the comment section, as her best friend for
life. The picture of Noble and Lina showed Noble winning
second place at the Costa Mesa Hooters restaurant. Noble had
also introduced Hanson to Linda as her best friend. According
to Hanson, Lina served as a judge at other contest locations.
Hanson knew at the time she saw the Instagram picture, Lina
would be one of the judges at the Ontario contest.
Hanson testified that before the April 22 bikini contest she
and several employees discussed, Marketing Coordinator Noble
having her friend serve as one of the judges at other contests at
which Noble had won. Hanson spoke about this with Lena
Delroja, Kelli Rochelle, Chanelle Panitch, and Jessy Wiles.
Hanson testified Wiles started the conversation by saying she
did not want to participate, “that it was going to be rigged, that
we had to participate in something that we were not being paid
for. We had to go purchase things for basically a rigged com-
petition.” Hanson agreed with Wiles. Hanson explained; “We
all agree[d] that we were unhappy about participating in this
unpaid competition.” Hanson testified that although she, Pa-
nitch, and Delroja were unhappy having to compete, they were
HOOTERS OF ONTARIO MILLS
19
afraid they would be terminated if they did not and they did not
like having to spend money to get ready for something they
were not being paid for.
Hanson testified that at a jumpstart meeting before the bikini
contest at Ontario, General Manager Vidauri reminded them
“about our mandatory appearance in the competition.” Hanson
expressed her unhappiness about participating in the contest
and asked Vidauri; “how can they force me to participate in
something that I wasn’t paid for, when [she] had to go and
spend [her] own money on stuff for the competition and gas to
drive down to the competition.” General Manager Vidauri
explained he did not make the mandatory decision, that it came
from corporate. Hanson also told Vidauri she was concerned
the contest was rigged, “just like all the other one’s were with
Pamela [Noble] and her friend judging the contest.” Vidauri
“brushed” it off as corporate’s decision.
Hanson testified that in the morning hours 1 or 2 days before
the April 22 bikini contest she answered the telephone at the
restaurant and it was Regional Director Peterson calling. Ac-
cording to Hanson this was the same telephone call from Peter-
son in which she had told Peterson about the several complaints
she had received concerning the April bartenders meeting,
which she thought was unprofessional. Peterson asked Hanson
if she was going to participate in the bikini contest. Hanson
said she was but she was not looking forward to doing so. Pe-
terson asked why. Hanson answered, “because we were forced
to do it, we are not being paid and that it was rigged.” Regional
Director Peterson told Hanson he was looking into the competi-
tion being rigged, and added, “I will handle this for you, Alex-
is.”
Panitch testified she spoke to Regional Director Peterson
about the relationship between Nobles and Krystle Lina. Pa-
nitch explained she had Peterson’s telephone number from
when she previously called him about the bartenders meeting.
Panitch told Peterson she did not think it was fair that Market-
ing Coordinator Noble had her best friend judge these competi-
tions. Peterson told Panitch if she could prove they were
friends or best friends he would not allow Lina to be a judge in
the Ontario bikini competition. Panitch told Peterson she could
prove it by providing him with a screenshot from her cell phone
of an Instagram photograph depicting Lina and Noble together
with the caption best friends for life.
Hanson testified Marketing Coordinator Noble sent a “hot
schedules message” notifying all contestants they were to be at
the restaurant April 22 at 8:30 p.m. although the contest did not
start until 10 p.m. Hanson arrived at around 8 p.m., signed in
and proceeded through the restaurant to a tent set up behind the
restaurant for the contestants to change clothing.
Hanson and the other participants dressed in costume for the
first portion of the contest. Hanson noticed Marketing Coordi-
nator Noble’s best friend, Krystle Lina, as well as Noble’s boy-
friend, were contest judges. Hanson did not recognize any of
the other judges. Panitch observed Lina as a judge and that she
“was whispering to the other judges.” Hanson and the others
later participated in the second, or bikini, portion of the contest.
Panitch testified that between the costume and bikini portions
of the contest she spoke with Regional Director Peterson about
Lina being one of the judges. Panitch explained, “I asked him
if he knew that Krystle Lina was still going to be a judge at our
contest, and he said no.” Panitch said Hanson was also present
and asked Peterson if he knew who was going to win. Peterson
shook his head and laughed. Hanson testified that when she
and Panitch saw the two were still judges at the bikini portion
of the contest Panitch told Regional Direction Peterson she was
unhappy, “that he had said it would be dealt with and that it
wasn’t and then we were still forced to participate in a rigged
competition.” Hanson testified Peterson replied, “I know Cha-
nelle. Know. It’s okay,” and put his arms around her to com-
fort her.
The contest ended around midnight. The winners were an-
nounced with Marketing Coordinator Noble winning first place
and awarded $300 prize money. The three top finishers had
their pictures taken near the changing tent. Hanson testified
she, Panitch, and Kelli Rochelle congratulated the second and
third place winners. Noble was present also. Hanson testified
she told Noble “Congratulations, Pam, on cheating.” Noble
asked “What?” Hanson did not respond. Hanson testified she
did not use any curse words at Noble nor did she threaten No-
ble in any manner. Panitch testified Hanson did not raise her
voice nor use any curse words that night.
Panitch testified she was upset at the end of the contest, “not
at the fact that I didn’t win but at the fact that we were force[d]
to do this contest that was obviously rigged.” When Panitch
saw Marketing Coordinator Noble in the photograph area wear-
ing the first place sash she told Noble; “Thanks for Cheating.”
Panitch could not exactly remember what else she said but it
was something to the effect, “you’re a fucking bitch.” Noble
told Panitch she could leave. Hanson testified Marketing Co-
ordinator Noble and Panitch started “yelling at each other” in
back of the restaurant but not around customers. Hanson testi-
fied Noble and Panitch cursed at each other, explaining, “it was
a heated exchange between both girls and there were curse
words exchanged.” Hanson said she and Kelli Rochelle told
Panitch, “this is not the time or the place for this” and took
Panitch inside the restaurant. Panitch acknowledged they may
have told her to stop acting like she was, and acknowledged she
went into the restaurant with Hanson. Hanson proceeded to
speak with her (Hanson’s) boyfriend.
Hanson testified key employee Wade approached and told
Hanson she needed to leave and “if [she] didn’t leave right now
that she would terminate me.” Hanson told Wade she had not
done anything, that the conversation with Market Coordinator
Noble that took place outside, was over and that she and Ro-
chelle were on their way out. Hanson also told Wade she had
no right to threaten to take away her job; that she had not done
anything.
Hanson observed key employee Wade then approach Panitch
and that a caddy—a container on each table holding paper tow-
els, ketchup, salt and pepper—flew off the table onto the floor.
Hanson thought Panitch pushed it off the table. Panitch testi-
fied Wade approached saying; “Sweetie, I know you’re upset
that you lost, but it’s not worth your job.” Hanson said she
moved away from that confrontation because she did not wish
anyone to think she had anything to do with it. Hanson next
noticed that key employee Wade had her arms around Panitch
who was telling Wade to let go of her. Panitch testified that as
20
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
she was trying to leave the restaurant key employee Wade
“bear hugged” her and she told Wade to, “Get the fuck off me.”
Panitch may also have said “I know she is your fucking friend
but this isn’t right.” Panitch testified Hanson was speaking
with her (Hanson’s) boyfriend at the time, then left the restau-
rant. Panitch denied pushing a chair against Wade.
Hanson and Rochelle left along the side of the restaurant and
observed Regional Director Peterson, General Manager
Vidauri, Marketing Coordinator Noble, and Noble’s boyfriend.
Peterson approached Hanson and asked that she not say any-
thing to Noble. Hanson told Peterson, “Scott, I wouldn’t say
anything to Pamela. I haven’t said anything to Pamela. Every-
thing that has gone on tonight was Chanelle, and I apologize for
that.” Peterson thanked Hanson, and she and Rochelle left.
Hanson testified that as she and Rochelle were in her car to
leave Peterson approached and they discussed what had hap-
pened. Peterson told Hanson, “Thank you for not reacting the
way that Chanelle did.” Hanson told Peterson she would never
do that. Peterson again thanked Hanson. Hanson told Peterson
the whole thing could have been avoided. Peterson acknowl-
edged; “I know. It’s probably my fault.” Hanson and Rochelle
drove away.
Hanson specifically stated she was not escorted off Hooters’
property by security after the bikini contest and never saw secu-
rity interact with Panitch. Hanson said that as she left Hooters’
parking lot she saw Noble 10 to 15 feet away but they never
spoke.
Panitch testified she walked, unescorted, from the restaurant,
and, as she walked toward her car she observed Marketing Co-
ordinator Noble near Noble’s car, which she had to pass getting
to her car. Panitch yelled to Noble that she did not deserve to
win; she was a cheater; and, “I called her a cunt” and “was
basically yelling out profanities to her.” Panitch was about 10
feet from Noble and Regional Director Peterson, Bar Manager
Ramirez, and Former Manager Jackie. Panitch told Bar Man-
ager Ramirez; “I know that’s your friend, but what she did
wasn’t right.” Panitch testified; “Jackie and Kelli Rochelle
were just basically telling me to calm down and not to say any-
thing.” Panitch testified Hanson was not in the area at that time
nor when Panitch drove away. Panitch testified she was not
escorted to her car nor did she see or know if police came to the
restaurant that evening. Panitch said she did, about 5 minutes
after she left, receive a telephone call from Hanson checking on
her. Panitch guessed Peterson was near Hanson when Hanson
placed the call because she could hear Peterson in the back-
ground asking if Panitch wanted to be followed home.
Hanson was scheduled to work the next day, April 23 how-
ever, General Manager Vidauri telephoned telling her not to
bother coming to work. She was suspended for what had hap-
pened the night before. Hanson asked Vidauri; “okay, well,
what happened? I didn’t do anything. I had nothing to do with
that.” Hanson testified Vidauri again stated they were investi-
gating it and would get back with her in 2 or 3 days. Hanson
asked if her job was at risk. Vidauri said it was.
Hanson received a telephone call, on or about April 26, from
Vice President of Human Resources Herrmann who told Han-
son, “I just want to let you know you are being discharged.”
Hanson asked for what. Herrmann replied, “For cursing at
Pamela Noble the night of the bikini contest.” Hanson told
Herrmann she never cursed at Noble that night. Herrmann
acted surprised and stated, “Oh, you didn’t?” Hanson testified
Herrmann then replied, “Okay. Well, then you are being termi-
nated for your negative social media posts.” Herrmann asked if
Hanson had anything to say. Hanson said she had been a good
employee for Hooters and didn’t understand why she was being
discharged for something like this without even hearing her
side of the story. Hanson reminded Herrmann she had worked
for Hooters for 2 years and didn’t deserve to be fired.
Herrmann told Hanson, “I know, Alexis. You were always a
good employee” and you are “eligible for rehire” later on.
On April 26, Vice President of Human Resources Herrmann
notified Hanson in writing of her termination. The notification
reads, in part, as follows:
On April 22, 2013 after the Ontario Swim Suit Competition
you got into a verbal altercation with other employees, as well
as posting disparaging comments about coworkers and man-
agers on Social Media. This behavior violated the following
provisions of the “Discipline” section of the Hooters employ-
ee handbook (page 36):
•
Acts of violence, threats of violence, dishonesty to-
ward guest or fellow employees of Hooters.
•
Insubordination to a manager or lack of respect and
cooperation with fellow employees or guest.
•
Any off-duty conduct which negatively affects, or
would tend to negatively affect, the employee’s abil-
ity to perform his or her job, the Company’s reputa-
tion, or the smooth operation, goodwill or profitabil-
ity of the Company’s business.
•
Any other action or activity which Hooters reasona-
bly believes represents a threat to the smooth opera-
tion, goodwill, or profitability of the business.
At this time we are releasing you from employment. Your
final check is enclosed and includes all monies due you at this
time for termination.
________________________
____________________
Alexis Hansen
Date
/s/Amber Herrmann
4/26/13
________________________
____________________
Amber Herrmann
Date
Panitch was notified on April 23, she was suspended and ap-
proximately 5 or so days later received a telephone call from
Vice President of Human Resources Herrmann. Herrmann told
Panitch she was going to fire her, but she would hear her side
of the story. Panitch “
+told her everything from the bar meeting to the bikini con-
test.” Panitch filed a charge with the Board regarding her dis-
charge. The Board dismissed her charge. Panitch did not ap-
peal the Board’s dismissal.
HOOTERS OF ONTARIO MILLS
21
2. The Company’s evidence
General Manager Vidauri conducted a meeting in April with
bartenders at the Ontario restaurant where he made comments
about certain Hooter Girls not at the meeting. Thereafter Re-
gional Director Peterson informed Vidauri there had been com-
plaints about Vidauri’s comments and he and Vice President of
Human Resources Herrmann were conducting an investigation.
Vidauri testified Peterson told him the complaints came from
Hooter Girls and concerned bad things Vidauri had said about
them. After the investigation, Vidauri was given a written dis-
ciplinary action, and Vice President of Human Resources
Herrmann told him his conduct could not be tolerated and if it
reoccurred he could be further disciplined or terminated. On
direct-examination Vidauri testified, neither Panitch or Hanson
ever spoke with him about the comments he made at the bar-
tenders meeting; however, on cross-examination he said he
could not recall if he, on the day of the bartender’s meeting,
talked with Hanson about the meeting.
Regional Director Peterson received a telephone complaint
from Hooters Girl Kelli Rochelle telling him she had been
called a “diva” at the bartenders meeting at which General
Manager Vidauri and Bar Manager Ramirez were present.
Peterson told Rochelle he would take care of it and informed
Vice President of Human Resources Herrmann. Peterson ob-
tained documents regarding proper behavior for managers and
how they would communicate with employees. Peterson visit-
ed the Ontario restaurant and gave both General Manager
Vidauri and Bar Manager Ramirez verbal and written disci-
pline. According to Peterson no other employees raised con-
cerns with him about the bartenders meeting.
Although Peterson learned of comments made at the bar-
tenders meeting from others, he did not recall a telephone con-
versation with Hanson taking place anytime in which Hanson
said the conduct at the bartender meeting was unprofessional.
Marketing Coordinator Noble performed “every last detail”
setting up the bikini contest of April 22, at the Ontario store.
Noble explained it included decorating the restaurant, finding a
DJ, a photographer and obtaining celebrity and table judges.
Noble worked as marketing coordinator the night of the contest,
but not as a key employee. Noble observed Hanson and Pa-
nitch that night but not much until after the first round of the
contest because she was inside the restaurant ensuring every-
thing for the contest was getting done. Noble testified that
between the costume and bikini portions of the contest she
heard Hanson and Panitch say it was unfair that Noble was
cheating.
Marketing Coordinator Noble placed first overall in the con-
test and proceeded to the back lot for pictures with the second
and third place winners. Noble testified Panitch and Hanson
approached saying “Did it feel good to place first when you
cheated?” Noble told them, “I don’t know why either of you
guys are acting like this when I’ve been there for both of you.”
Noble said, “And that’s when the ruckus kind of started.” No-
ble testified Panitch and Hanson, “started coming after me say-
ing I haven’t been there for either of them and I’m a bitch . . .
among other obscenities.” Noble was upset and intimidated.
She said other contestants were in the area as well as the pho-
tographer. Noble denied using any obscenities toward Panitch
or Hanson. Noble testified Regional Director Peterson and
Corporate Representative Rachel Maas said to Hanson and
Panitch, “they needed to stop, and it was stopping.” Peterson
and Maas directed Hanson and Panitch away from the photo-
graph area, and Hanson and Panitch went into the restaurant.
Noble never heard Hanson try to clamp Panitch down. Noble
said she had no further interaction with Hanson and Panitch
until later in the restaurant parking lot near her car when “Cha-
nelle [Panitch] and Alexis [Hanson] both came out of the build-
ing yelling more obscenities at me when security got in their
way and basically pulled them away.” Noble said when Pa-
nitch and Hanson started their obscenities they were “at least a
hundred feet away.” Noble testified she did not respond but
stated Hanson called her a “bitch” and “cunt” and that she
“cheated.” Noble said she was intimidated and frightened and
that employee Karen took her back to the restaurant and she
never saw Panitch and Hanson again that evening. Noble said a
police officer later came in the restaurant and asked if she was
okay and she told him, “Fine, I guess.”
Alicia Strohman (Alicia Wade)3 worked as a “key employ-
ee” the night of the bikini contest. Wade’s first interaction that
evening with Charging Party Hanson concerned an issue, which
was resolved, that related to where Hanson’s boyfriend would
be seated. Wade thereafter observed Panitch and Hanson, near
the wait station, during the intermission between the first and
second round of the contest. Wade testified Panitch said, “This
shit is rigged and it’s fucking bullshit” and that Panitch and
Hanson went into the restroom. As they left the restroom Pa-
nitch pushed a dish rack onto the floor.
Wade distributed “goodie [gift] bags” after the bikini contest
in the photo area where she observed Panitch, Rochelle, and
Hanson, off to the side, talking. Wade heard Hanson ask Mar-
keting Coordinator Noble, “Pam, do you feel good that you
cheated? Do you feel good that you won first place because
you cheated?” Wade testified Panitch started yelling at Noble,
calling her a “bitch” and invading her personal space. Wade
left to find General Manager Vidauri. When Wade returned she
said Regional Director Peterson was putting his arms out to
create space between Panitch, Hanson, and Noble saying this
had to stop. Wade testified Panitch told her “Fuck this shit.
No, I don’t want a goodie bag” but Hanson took one. Panitch
and Hanson then went into the restaurant. Wade continued to
hand out “goodie bags” but Regional Director Peterson asked
her to go inside the restaurant “and speak to the girls and ask
them to remain calm.”
Wade first spoke with Hanson saying Regional Director Pe-
terson had asked her to tell them to calm down. According to
Wade, Hanson asked why she was not talking to Panitch.
Wade said she would speak with Panitch and told Hanson it
wasn’t worth losing her job over. Wade testified Hanson told
her, “they can’t touch her, they can’t fire her, that she didn’t do
anything wrong.” Wade said restaurant guests, including Han-
son’s boyfriend, were in the area.
Wade testified that Panitch “came over and started yelling in
my ear, saying . . . I know that she’s your fucking friend, but
3 During the events here Ms. Strohman was known as Ms. Wade. I
have, for ease of understanding, referred to her here as Ms. Wade.
22
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
fuck that bitch. It was rigged. This is fucking bullshit.” Wade
asked Panitch to calm down. Panitch slid a chair toward Wade.
Wade testified she then went toward Panitch to usher her out of
the building. Wade said Panitch pushed her back and she
(Wade) “grabbed her, like wrapped my arms around her and
started pushing her toward the exit of the building.” Wade said
Panitch left the restaurant with Hanson behind her. Wade re-
ported the events to Regional Director Peterson and General
Manager Vidauri. Wade told them she would not be comforta-
ble working with Panitch and Hanson. General Manager
Vidauri escorted Wade to her car and she left. Wade never
heard Hanson use curse words that evening nor curse at Noble,
and she never reported such to management. Wade did tell
management Panitch yelled expletives at Noble.
The April 22 bikini contest at the Ontario location was the
first such contest General Manager Vidauri ever worked. He
testified that prior to the bikini contest neither Panitch nor Han-
son spoke with him about the contest being rigged or fixed, but
that about 60 percent of the staff did complain or mention their
concerns to him. Vidauri determined the complaints lacked
validity. Vidauri testified neither Panitch nor Hanson talked to
him, on the day of the contest, about it being rigged.
Vidauri testified he told the Hooter Girls at a jumpstart meet-
ing there would not be any cheating at his store and he did not
want to hear anymore about it. Vidauri, however, said he re-
peated this at jumpstarts every day for 2 weeks and he was sure
Hanson was present for at least one such meeting. Vidauri said
complaints persisted. Vidauri said he selected the celebrity
judges.
General Manger Vidauri testified neither Hanson nor Panitch
talked with him on the day of the contest about not participating
in the contest.
After the bikini contest ended, General Manager Vidauri re-
trieved “goodie bags” from Marketing Coordinator Noble’s car
for distribution. When he approached the area of the changing
tent he noticed Panitch and Hanson waving their hands and
talking to Noble. Vidauri testified he heard Panitch call Noble
“a fucking bitch” but did not hear what Hanson may have said
because, “he was too far away to hear that.” Vidauri, however,
never at any time the entire evening of the bikini contest, heard
Hanson use any curse words. Vidauri heard Regional Director
Peterson tell Panitch and Hanson to calm down. According to
Vidauri, Panitch was saying, “this fucking bullshit . . . she
cheated” and words of that nature. Vidauri said Peterson, Pa-
nitch, and Hanson walked rapidly to the back entrance to the
restaurant. Peterson told key employee Wade to go inside the
restaurant and talk to Panitch and Hanson about cooling off.
Vidauri thereafter was called into the restaurant and from
about 20 feet away he heard Panitch screaming and yelling as
she was being escorted by security out of the front door. He
testified Panitch was “saying the same thing,” “she cheated,”
“she’s a fucking, I don’t know . . . that kind of stuff.” Vidauri
testified Hanson was about 3 feet behind Panitch not saying or
doing anything. General Manager Vidauri said he, at one point,
got next to Panitch and Hanson and told them they needed to
stop. Panitch told Vidauri, “she’s a fucking bitch, she cheated.”
Vidauri told Panitch if she did not stop he was going to call the
police. Vidauri testified when he went to Hanson she asked
him how he felt about letting someone win that cheated.
Vidauri told her she needed to leave. Vidauri testified Hanson
said, “I didn’t do nothing wrong, and there’s nothing you can
do about it.” Vidauri again stated if they did not leave he
would call the police.
Vidauri thereafter did call the police. Vidauri also checked
on Noble who he described as upset and crying. Vidauri told
Noble to calm down that everything would be okay. Vidauri
then escorted key employee Wade to her car. Wade asked why
this all happened and stated she wanted to go home, and, did
not wish to return to work the next day if “these girls” are going
to be there.
General Manager Vidauri and Regional Director Peterson
decided to inform Vice President of Human Resource
Herrmann about the contest and did so at around 12:30 a.m.
that evening. Vidauri said he contacted Herrmann because, “It
was bigger than in my genre with what was going to happen
with the whole situation” and “the police” had arrived. Vidauri
briefly explained to Herrmann what had happened. Herrmann
instructed Vidauri to ensure everyone got home safely and they
would talk about the situation the next day. Vidauri then spoke
with a responding police officer telling him, “everything was
good, everybody left, he said okay.”
The next day, April 23, Vice President of Human Resources
Herrmann asked General Manager Vidauri to prepare a state-
ment of what happened and make sure statements were taken
from all managers and employees regarding the situation.
Vidauri asked Herrmann, “What we were going to do with the
situation?” Herrmann wanted to determine what happened.
Vidauri told her he did not feel safe having Panitch and Hanson
working at the restaurant. Statements were taken and forward-
ed to Herrmann. Herrmann thereafter notified General Manag-
er Vidauri she had decided to fire both Panitch and Hanson.
Regional Director Peterson testified he was present at the
Ontario restaurant for the bikini contest to make sure things ran
smoothly. Peterson could not recall any employee talking with
him about the swimsuit competition or judging prior to the
actual day of the contest. Peterson explained right before the
contest started Charging Party Hanson had a brief and “very
polite” conversation with him concerning the judges for the
contest. Peterson testified that Hanson told him Marketing
Coordinator Noble had a friend as a judge which she thought
was unfair. Peterson said Panitch also expressed her concerns
in a cordial and calm manner as well. Peterson told Panitch and
Hanson he would review the judging to see if he felt it was
somehow inappropriate. Peterson testified the contest went
well and nothing occurred that raised concerns for him as re-
gional director. Immediately after the competition and the
winners had been announced, Peterson followed the winners to
the photo shoot area to keep customers from getting into the
area. At that time Peterson heard behind him “some scream-
ing” and “you fucking cunt, you fucking bitch, you fucking
cheat.” Peterson saw Panitch within inches of Marketing Co-
ordinator Noble’s face verbally bashing her. Peterson attempt-
ed to come between the two. Peterson did not know where
Hanson was nor did he hear her say anything. Peterson specifi-
cally testified he did not hear Hanson curse at Noble nor did he
witness any misconduct by Hanson at anytime the entire night
HOOTERS OF ONTARIO MILLS
23
of the bikini contest. Peterson asked Panitch to leave the area
and she went into the restaurant. Peterson asked key employee
Wade to go inside and see if everything was okay.
Peterson testified that a couple of minutes later he heard
“yelling and screaming” and observed Panitch heading toward
the changing tent behind the restaurant. Peterson approached
Panitch and told her she had to get her car and leave. Peterson
said Hanson “came over” to where he and Panitch were. Peter-
son could not recall Hanson saying anything, but Panitch was
still calling Noble a “fucking cheat,” “fucking cunt,” and asking
how it felt to win “by fucking cheating.” Peterson said Hanson
“was calm in talking to me.” Peterson said he walked Panitch
and Hanson to a car and they left the area. Peterson then went
inside the restaurant to find out what happened. General Man-
ager Vidauri told Peterson that Panitch threw a chair at key
employee Wade. Wade said she wasn’t going to put up with
this and was going to quit. Peterson testified General Manager
Vidauri told him Hanson was “instigating the situation getting
everything worked up” and Panitch was just acting out what
Hanson was saying.
Michael Gill, currently assistant manager at Hooters Restau-
rant in Costa Mesa, California, was on April 22, the owner of a
two-person security company providing security for the Ontario
bikini contest. Gill said he and his security helper, Robert
Hatcher, kept the peace ensuring no customers approached the
stage or messed with the Hooter Girls competing in the contest.
More specifically Gill guided the contestants to and from the
changing tent that was behind the restaurant. Gill also assisted
each contestant on to, and off from, the stage or from “where
they walk the catwalk.” No security concerns were reported to
Gill during the competition. Gill thereafter stationed himself
outback where the photographer was and near the changing
tent. Gill saw two females come into that area and heard the
two say; “fuck you, bitch, you fucked the judges, I thought we
were friends. . . .” Gill said both were talking but he did not
know who said exactly what. Gill stated Regional Director
Peterson started talking to the two and escorted them to the
middle of the parking lot. Gill later asked Peterson who the
two were for his report. Gill also talked with General Manager
Vidauri about what had happened. Gill could not say which of
the two, that he later learned were Panitch and Hanson, used the
curse words he heard. Specifically, Gill could not say Hanson
spoke any of the curse words.
Vice President of Human Resources Herrmann learned of the
April 22 bikini contest incident in a text message from General
Manager Vidauri on April 23. Herrmann telephoned Vidauri
who instructed her Marketing Coordinator Noble had won the
bikini contest and that Hooter Girls Panitch and Hanson had
gotten into a verbal altercation with Noble and local police had
been called and the two Hooter Girls had been escorted out of
the building. Herrmann instructed General Manager Vidauri to
suspend Panitch and Hanson and conduct an investigation.
Herrmann telephoned Regional Director Peterson who told
her “the contest had been a mess.” Herrmann told Peterson she
had already instructed General Manager Vidauri to suspend the
two Hooter Girls pending an investigation of the incident.
Herrmann went to the Ontario location on April 24, and
spoke with Marketing Coordinator Noble whom she observed
to still be upset. Noble told Herrmann both Panitch and Han-
son accused her of cheating in winning the swimsuit contest
and she did not want to work again with either of them.
Herrmann testified General Manager Vidauri also told her he
did not feel he could continue to work with Panitch and Han-
son. Herrmann reviewed all statements gathered in the investi-
gation and determined to discharge Panitch. Herrmann tele-
phoned Panitch informing her she was terminated. Herrmann
asked Panitch why she acted the way she did. Panitch told her
they all felt Noble had rigged the contest with her best friend as
a judge. Herrmann said Panitch identified “all” as she and
Hanson. Herrmann told Panitch “you and Alexis [Hanson]
went and verbally attacked Pamela [Noble].” According to
Herrmann, Panitch replied, “Well, of course we did. We were
pissed off and somebody needed to do it.”
Herrmann then telephoned Hanson whom, she was 80 per-
cent sure, she would terminate. Hanson told Herrmann the
contest was rigged, unfair, and she hadn’t wanted to participate.
Herrmann told Hanson there was a right way and a wrong way
for them to have responded and told Hanson they had cursed at
Noble. Hanson denied cursing. Herrmann told Hanson she had
“multiple witness statements that said [she] did curse.”
Herrmann testified Hanson replied; ‘Well, I may have, but I’m
not the one that got physical. Chanelle was the one that got
physical.” Herrmann told Hanson she was discharged.
Herrmann testified, on direct examination, she based Han-
son’s termination on Hanson’s cursing, that two of her cowork-
ers and her manager did not feel comfortable continuing to
work with her, and on social tweets she had posted. On cross-
examination, Herrmann acknowledged she had said elsewhere,
under oath, she did not rely on Hanson’s social tweets in firing
her. Herrmann was uncertain exactly what curse words Hanson
had used but she believed Hanson had used the words “fuck”
and “bitch.” On cross-examination Herrmann said neither
Marketing Coordinator Noble nor key employee Wade specifi-
cally told her Hanson used the word “fuck” but did say she
used the word “bitch.” Herrmann concluded the curse words
Hanson used, whatever those words were, was enough, stand-
ing alone, to discharge Hanson and she did so. Herrmann spe-
cifically acknowledged on cross-examination, the only reason
she decided to terminate Hanson was “her cursing at a co-
worker . . . in front of guest.”
B. Legal Principles, Credibility Determinations, Analysis,
Discussion and Conclusions
1. Legal principles
It is helpful to review certain guidance of the Board and
courts regarding concerted activity to include, under what cir-
cumstances, it will or will not be protected under the Act. Sec-
tion 7 of the Act guarantees employees the right to engage in
concerted activity for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection. Section 8(a)(1) of the Act
makes it an unfair labor practice “for an employer to interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in Section 7.” For an employee’s activity to be
“concerted” the employee must be engaged with or on the au-
thority of other employees and not solely on behalf of the em-
ployee him/herself. Meyers Industries (Meyers I), 268 NLRB
24
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
493 (1984), and Meyers Industries (Meyers II), 281 NLRB 882
(1986). The statute requires the activities under consideration
be “concerted” before they can be “protected.” Bethany Medi-
cal Center, 328 NLRB 1094, 1101 (1999). As the Board ob-
served in Meyers I “Indeed, Section 7 does not use the term
‘protected concerted activities’ but only concerted activity.” It
goes, without saying, the Act does not protect all concerted
activity. In Meyers Industries (Meyers II), 281 NLRB 882
(1986), enfd. sub. nom. Prill v. NLRB, 835 F.2d 1481 (D.C. Cir.
1987), the Board made it clear that under the proper circum-
stances, a single employee could engage in concerted activity
within the meaning of Section 7 of the Act. The question of
whether an employee has engaged in concerted activity is a
factual one based on the totality of the record evidence. See,
e.g., EWinc v. NLRB, 861 F.2d 353 (2d Cir.1988). The Board
has found an individual employee’s activities to be concerted
when they grew out of prior group activity. Every Woman’s
Place, 282 NLRB 413 (1986). An employee’s activity will be
concerted when he or she acts formally or informally on behalf
of the group. Oakes Machine Corp., 288 NLRB 456 (1988).
Concerted activity has been found where an individual solicits
other employees to engage in concerted or group action even
where such solicitations are rejected. El Gran Combo, 284
NLRB 1115 (1987), enfd. 853 F.2d 996 (1st Cir. 1988). It is
clear the Act protects discussions between two or more em-
ployees concerning terms and conditions of employment. In a
group meeting context, a concerted objective may be inferred
from the circumstances. Whittaker Corp., 289 NLRB 933, 934
(1988), citing Jeannette Corp. v. NLRB, 532 F.2d 916, 919 (3d
Cir. 1976). The Board has long held, however, that for conver-
sations between employees to be found protected concerted
activity, they must look toward group activity and mere griping
is not protected. See Mushroom Transportation Co. v. NLRB,
330 F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1964). Once the activity is found to be
protected concerted activity an 8(a)(1) violation will be found
if, in addition, the employer knew of the concerted nature of the
employee’s activity, the concerted activity was protected by the
Act and the adverse employment action at issue (e.g., dis-
charge) was motivated by the employee’s protected concerted
activity.
If an employee is discharged for alleged misconduct in the
course of engaging in protected activity, the applicable standard
for determining whether the discharge was unlawful is that set
forth in NLRB v. Burnup & Sims, 379 U.S. 21 (1964). The
Court explained:
[Section] 8(a)(1) [of the Act] is violated if it [is]shown that the
discharged employee was at the time engaged in protected ac-
tivity, that the employer knew it was such, that the basis of the
discharge was an alleged act of misconduct in the course of
that activity, and that the employee was not, in fact guilty of
that misconduct.
The employer then has the burden of showing it held an hon-
est belief that the discharged employee engaged in the miscon-
duct. If the employer meets its burden, the burden shifts to the
government to show the employee did not, in fact, engage in
this asserted misconduct. If the Government meets its burden
that the employee did not engage in the asserted misconduct the
discharge violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. See Roadway
Express, Inc., 355 NLRB 197, 204, 215 (2010), enfd. 427 Fed.
Appx. 838 (11th Cir. 2011).
2. Credibility resolutions
It is necessary to review the testimony and make certain
credibility resolutions. In deciding whether employees, Hanson
in particular, engaged in concerted activity prior to the bikini
contest as well as on the day of the contest (April 22); and, if
so, was it protected conduct, requires credibility determina-
tions.
In making my credibility resolutions I was impacted by im-
pressions I formed while watching the witnesses as they testi-
fied. The impressions I gather were based on a combination of
the witnesses’ mannerisms, how they spoke, and their overall
bearing on the witness stand. I applied my observations as one,
among other factors, in deciding whether witnesses’ testimo-
nies impressed me as candid, fair, and believable. I note credit-
ing certain testimony will automatically discredit testimony of
other witnesses without having to so state. Although I have not
commented on every bit of testimony, nor resolved every pos-
sible credibility conflict, I have considered all the testimony
and made necessary credibility resolutions.
It is essential to address the credibility of Charging Party
Hanson. Some observations: Hanson sat on the forward edge
of the witness chair, spoke directly to the person questioning
her and responded in a clear, articulate, and calm manner. She
appeared moved by a strong and eager desire to testify and to
do so truthfully. She never shied away or recoiled from an-
swering any questions on direct or cross-examinations. Her
testimony demonstrated she had observed, and was directly
familiar with, and remembered in detail, the events of her tes-
timony. Simply stated she knew what she was testifying about
and expressed herself in a fair and candid manner. Hanson’s
demeanor was superior.4 I credit her testimony rather than
certain opposing witnesses.5
I find it helpful, if not essential, to expound upon my as-
sessment of Panitch’s testimony. I note, Panitch had filed
charges with the Board regarding her own termination, but, the
Board’s Regional office dismissed her case—which dismissal
she did not appeal. The outcome of the case here will not im-
pact her dismissed charge with the Board. Panitch had nothing
personally, regarding her discharge, to gain or lose by her tes-
timony. Panitch readily acknowledged her command of a range
of profanities and exercised the opportunity to express such
related to events surrounding her and Hanson’s discharge.
Panitch’s demeanor, while testifying, convinced me she was
there to tell the truth whether it cast her in a favorable light or
not. I credit her testimony.
4 Although I have set forth a combination of mannerisms, manner of
speaking, and overall bearing that triggered my inclination to accept
Hanson’s testimony as truthful; I however note, courts do not require
fact finders to itemize a witness’ characteristic or mannerisms when
making a demeanor-based credibly resolution. See Bloomington-
Normal Seating Co .v. NLRB, 357 F.3d 692, 695 (7th Cir. 2004).
5 I note it is the weight of the credible evidence, not the numerical
superiority of witnesses, which is controlling. See Riley-Beaird, Inc.,
259 NLRB 1339, 1367 fn. 115 (1982).
HOOTERS OF ONTARIO MILLS
25
3. Discussion, analysis, and conclusions
It is alleged that about April 20, Charging Party Hanson con-
certedly complained to the Company regarding wages, hours,
and working conditions of the Company’s employees by com-
plaining to Regional Director Peterson about the disparagement
of certain of the Company’s employees, and conditions sur-
rounding an upcoming competition involving the employees.
It is undisputed that in April, General Manager Vidauri,
along with Bar Manager Ramirez, and key employees Noble
and Wade conducted a bartenders meeting at which Panitch,
among others, was present. Panitch immediately text messaged
Hanson her concerns about the meeting and they met for lunch
later that day to discuss those concerns. Panitch and Hanson
discussed the fact five “Hooter Girls” had derogatory com-
ments made about them by management. Comments were
made that one Hooter Girl was getting fat; another was “stupid”
and “a dumb blond”; another’s singing career was going no-
where; another “scrunched her hair like a Mexican”; and yet
another had an attitude problem and still another was a diva.
Hanson spoke with three coworkers, namely, Rochelle, Delroja,
and Panitch, about the comments made at the bartender’s meet-
ing. Hanson and Delroja complained their names were brought
up and they were not present. Delroja said she would telephone
Vice President of Human Relations Herrmann about their com-
plaints. Panitch telephoned Regional Director Peterson and
told him all about the bartender meeting, which Peterson
seemed to already know about. Regional Director Peterson
testified he had heard from Hooter Girl Rochelle concerning the
meeting and was told what she had been called at the bartenders
meeting. Peterson promised to take care of the matter. Hanson
also spoke with Regional Director Peterson about concerns of
unprofessional conduct on the part of managers at the April
bartenders meeting.
It is clear from above, Hanson, Panitch, and other Hooter
Girls concertedly discussed what they considered unprofession-
al comments by managers at the bartenders meeting. Their
concerns directly involved working conditions; namely, a re-
spectful and professional working environment. It is clear
management knew of Hanson’s, Panitch’s, and other Hooter
Girls concerns related to the bartenders meeting. Hanson and
Panitch both spoke with Regional Director Peterson about their
concerns. General Manager Vidauri acknowledged Regional
Manager Peterson told him there had been complaints from
Hooter Girls regarding comments made at the meeting and
specifically comments Vidauri had made about some of the
Hooter Girls. Vidauri and Bar Manager Ramirez were disci-
plined for their comments.
After Panitch observed Marketing Coordinator Noble win, in
April, at two other Hooter restaurant locations with her (No-
ble’s) best friend Lina as a judge, Panitch raised concerns about
that with Hanson. Panitch and Hanson concluded it was unfair
to the contestants at Hooters of Ontario for Noble to have her
best friend as a judge at contests and then win the contests.
Hanson spoke not only with Panitch but with coworkers Delro-
ja, Rochelle, and Jessy Wiles about unfairness and possible
rigging of the contests. The coworkers were unhappy about the
situation with Wiles complaining “it was going to be rigged”
that they “had to participate in something that we were not
being paid for” and had to “purchase things for basically a
rigged competition.” These Hooter Girls concluded they did
not want to participate in the contest but were concerned they
would be fired if they did not. Hanson raised their concerns
with Regional Director Peterson before the day of the contest at
the Hooters of Ontario. Peterson, in their telephone conversa-
tion, asked Hanson if she was participating in the bikini contest.
She told him she was but was not looking forward to it because,
“we were forced to do it, we are not being paid and that it was
rigged.” Peterson told Hanson he was looking into the compe-
tition being rigged and would handle it.
Panitch also spoke with Regional Director Peterson, before
the day of the bikini contest, that it was unfair for Marketing
Coordinator Noble to be in the competitions with her best
friend Lina as a judge. Peterson wanted to know if Panitch
could prove Lina was Noble’s friend or best friend, and if so,
he would not have her as a judge. Panitch told Peterson she
could send him a screenshot from her cell phone of an Insta-
gram photograph showing Lina with Noble with a caption that
stated they were best friends for life.
Hanson raised the concerns about fairness in judging the bi-
kini contest at a jumpstart meeting in April with General Man-
ager Vidauri. Hanson, in the presence of other coworkers and
managers, expressed concern they were being forced to partici-
pate in the contest without being paid and that the contest was
rigged just like the other contests Noble had won with her
friend as a judge. General Manager Vidauri explained it was
all coming from corporate not him. While Vidauri testified
neither Panitch nor Hanson spoke with him about the contest
being rigged or fixed he acknowledged 60 percent of the staff
mentioned or raised concerns the contest was rigged. I specifi-
cally do not credit Vidauri’s testimony that Hanson never raised
the concerns with him. The concerns persisted. General Man-
ager Vidauri addressed those concerns every day for 2 weeks at
the jumpstart meetings prior to the work shifts starting. Vidauri
was certain Hanson was present at least at one of the jumpstart
meetings at which the concerns about the contest being rigged
were discussed. I am fully persuaded Hanson raised her con-
cerns with Vidauri at a jumpstart meeting.
It is clear from the above that many Hooter girls discussed
their concerns with each other concerning the bikini contest
being rigged. Specifically Hanson and Panitch discussed these
concerns with various coworkers and the concerns were raised
with groups of employees at jumpstart meetings. Hanson spe-
cifically raised such concerns at a jumpstart meeting. General
Manager Vidauri had concerns raised with him from 60 percent
of the work force. Regional Manager Peterson was fully aware
many employees had concerns about the contest. This is clear-
ly concerted activity and was activity protected by the Act as
well. The concerns raised by the employees related to wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment. The
employees were concerned they were being forced to partici-
pate in the bikini contest without pay and were incurring out-
of-pocket expenses for a contest they were concerned was
rigged. Additionally, employees had the potential to win cash
as well as other benefits if they could compete fairly at Ontario
and the potential to advance to the regional and national con-
tests. I need not, and do not, address whether the contest was
26
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
actually rigged, nor do I address the fairness or wisdom of al-
lowing Marketing Coordinator Noble to participate in the con-
tests. I need only conclude employees, including Hanson,
thought the contest was rigged and discussed such among
themselves and with management. I need only find it was a
concern of the employees involving a working condition and it
was discussed among the employees and raised with manage-
ment.
I turn next to whether employees, Hanson in particular, en-
gaged in concerted activity protected by the Act on the evening
of the bikini contest at the Ontario location. Hanson and the
other bikini contestants were directed by Marketing Coordina-
tor Noble to be at the restaurant on April 22 at 8:30 p.m., and
advised the contest would commence at 10:30 p.m. Hanson
arrived around 8 p.m. and she, Panitch, and the other contest-
ants participated in the costume portion of the contest first.
Hanson and Panitch observed that Marketing Coordinator No-
ble’s best friend Lina as well as Noble’s boyfriend were contest
judges. Panitch observed Lina “whispering” to the other judg-
es. Hanson and Panitch spoke with Regional Director Peterson
between the costume and bikini portions of the contest. Panitch
asked Peterson if he knew Lina was still going to be a judge.
Peterson did not. Hanson asked Regional Director Peterson if
he knew who was going to win. Peterson shook his head and
laughed. Panitch told Peterson she was unhappy because Peter-
son had said he would deal with that matter and had not, and,
they were still forced to participate in a rigged competition.
Peterson told Panitch he knew, and, it would be okay and com-
forted her.
After the three winners had been selected and announced,
Marketing Coordinator Noble had won first place. Hanson and
Panitch, along with Rochelle, congratulated the second and
third place winners. Hanson stated to Noble; “Congratulations,
Pam on cheating.” Although Noble asked what, Hanson did
not respond, nor did she curse at Noble or raise her voice. Re-
gional Director Peterson testified he did not hear Hanson use
curse words toward Noble nor did Hanson engage in any mis-
conduct at any time that evening. General Manager Vidauri
never heard Hanson use any curse words that evening. Key
employee Wade never heard Hanson use any curse words at all
that evening and never told anyone that she heard curse words
by Hanson. Security company owner and current Assistant
Manager, Gill, of Hooters Restaurant of Costa Mesa, Califor-
nia, heard cursing but could not say if Hanson spoke any curse
words that evening.
Hanson and Panitch were continuing their concerted activity,
protected by the Act, concerning wages and working condi-
tions, when they addressed with Regional Director Peterson, at
the contest, their continued concerns about Noble, having her
best friend and boyfriend as judges at the contest.
I next outline and discuss the credited comments, events, and
actions involving Charging Party Hanson that took place after
the contest ended and until she left the Hooters of Ontario facil-
ity perhaps in the early morning hours of April 23.
Hanson, as set forth elsewhere here, commented to Market-
ing Coordinator Noble after the bikini portion of the contest,
“congratulations, Pam, on cheating” but said nothing else.
Hanson described Panitch and Noble as “yelling at each other”
in a “heated exchange between both girls” and “curse words
exchanged.” Hanson and coworker Rochelle told Panitch, “this
was not the time or the place for this” and took Panitch inside
the restaurant. Hanson spoke with her (Hanson’s) boyfriend
who was also inside the restaurant. Key employee Wade ap-
proached Hanson telling Hanson to leave then or be terminated.
Hanson explained to Wade she had not done anything and the
conversation with Noble, outside the restaurant, had ended.
Hanson also told Wade she had no right to threaten to take
away her job; that she had done nothing.
Hanson observed actions, and overheard an exchange, be-
tween key employee Wade and Panitch where Wade “bear
hugged” Panitch attempting to remove Panitch from the restau-
rant. Panitch responded cursing at Wade. Hanson moved away
from the Panitch–Wade exchange and actions because she did
not wish anyone to think she was involved in those actions and
that exchange.
Hanson then left the restaurant along with coworker Ro-
chelle. She observed Regional Director Peterson, General
Manager Vidauri, and Market Coordinator Noble as well as
Noble’s boyfriend in the parking lot. Peterson approached
Hanson asking that she not say anything to Noble. Hanson told
Peterson she had not and would not say anything to Noble ex-
plaining everything that had gone on involved Panitch. Hanson
apologized for Panitch’s actions and comments that evening.
Peterson thanked Hanson and acknowledged the whole thing
could have been avoided and it was probably his fault. Peter-
son also acknowledged Hanson was calm talking with him that
entire evening. Hanson thereafter left the premises, unescorted
by security, and never saw security interact with Panitch that
evening. Although Hanson observed Noble as Hanson left the
restaurant parking lot, they never spoke. I specifically do not
credit Marketing Coordinator Noble’s testimony that when she
was in the restaurant parking lot after the contest, Hanson and
Panitch came out of the restaurant “yelling more obscenities at
me when security got in the way and basically pulled them
away.” I note Regional Director Peterson saw no misconduct
by Hanson that night. General Manger Vidauri heard no curse
words from Hanson that evening. Key employee Wade did not
hear Hanson use any curse words that evening nor did she ever
tell anyone she heard Hanson use curse words that evening.
Security Guard Gill could not say Hanson spoke any of the
curse words he heard that evening.
I note Panitch acknowledged that when she left the restau-
rant, unescorted, she observed Noble in the parking lot as Pa-
nitch passed Noble’s car and yelled profanities at Noble telling
her she did not deserve to win, and calling her a “cheater” and a
“cunt.” Panitch placed Regional Director Peterson along with
Bar Manager Ramirez in the area but stated Hanson was not
there nor when Panitch drove away.
Hanson was scheduled to work on April 23, but was notified
by General Manager Vidauri not to bother coming to work.
She was suspended for what had happened the night before.
Hanson stated she had not done anything wrong the night be-
fore and asked if her job was at risk. Vidauri told Hanson it
was.
On April 26, Vice President of Human Resources Herrmann
telephoned Hanson informing her she was being discharged.
HOOTERS OF ONTARIO MILLS
27
Hanson asked why and was told “for cursing at Pamela Noble
the night of the bikini contest.”6 When Hanson told Herrmann
she never cursed at Noble, Herrmann then told Hanson she was
“being terminated for your negative social media posts.” I
specifically do not credit Herrmann’s testimony that Hanson
told her she may have cursed. I am persuaded Hanson would
not have consistently denied cursing or that many Company
officials would have acknowledged and stated they never heard
her curse and then admit to Herrmann she may have cursed.
Hanson told Herrmann she had been a good employee for the
Company and did not understand why she was being terminated
without the Company ever hearing her side of the story.
Herrmann told Hanson she knew she had always been a good
employee and would be eligible for rehire later on.
Vice President of Human Resources Herrmann also notified
Hanson in writing on April 26 that she was terminated for a
verbal altercation with employees on April 22 after the Ontario
swim suit competition, as well as posting disparaging com-
ments about coworkers and managers on Social Media all of
which violated certain Employee Handbook rules.7 In her let-
ter, Herrmann listed the rules violated as: acts of violence,
threats of violence, dishonesty toward guest[s] or fellow em-
ployees of Hooters; insubordination to a manager or lack of
respect and cooperation with fellow employees or guest[s]; off-
duty conduct which negatively affects, or would tend to nega-
tively affect, the employees ability to perform his or her job, the
Company’s reputation, or smooth operation, goodwill or profit-
ability of the Company’s business; and any other action or ac-
tivity which Hooters reasonably believes represents a threat to
the smooth operation, goodwill, or profitability of the business.
Did the Company violate the Act when it suspended and dis-
charged Hanson? The evidence establishes the Company did.
First, as set forth above, it is clear Hanson engaged in concerted
activity protected by the Act. Second, it is just as clear the
Company knew of Hanson’s and others concerted protected
activity. Hanson individually spoke with Regional Director
Peterson and General Manager Vidauri about the concerns and
Hanson also raised the concerns at a jumpstart meeting with
coworkers and General Manager Vidauri. Vidauri acknowl-
edged 60 percent of the staff raised concerns about the contest
being rigged and he spoke about it every day for 2 weeks but
the concerns persisted. Company management knew its em-
ployees concerns were about working conditions and possible
additional wages if the employees could participate in a fair
contest. Third, it is clear Hanson complained in a telephone
conversation with Regional Director Peterson about managers’
comments at the bartender meeting, and about the selection of
judges for the bikini contest as well as the fact the outcome of
6 Vice President of Human Resources Herrmann acknowledged, on
cross-examination, she was uncertain what curse words Hanson used
but stated that whatever words Hanson used were enough, standing
alone, to discharge Hanson and that she did so for that reason. More
specifically Herrmann acknowledged, on cross-examination, the only
reason she decided to terminate Hanson was “Hanson’s cursing at a co-
worker . . . in front of guest[s].”
7 On cross-examination Herrmann, however, acknowledged she had
stated under oath she did not rely on Hanson’s social tweets in firing
Hanson.
the contest might be rigged. Hanson complained openly at a
jumpstart meeting with other employees that the contest was
unfair and might be rigged. The evidence indicates the Com-
pany knew it could rid itself of Panitch8 and simply sought to
lump Hanson’s discharge in the mix and rid itself of both com-
plaining employees. I find it clear Hanson’s discharge was
motivated by her protected concerted activity. Herrmann, in
writing, gave several reasons for discharging Hanson; however,
at trial she shifted and testified the sole reason for Hanson’s
discharge was that she cursed at Marketing Coordinator Noble.
Herrmann was simply looking for any reason to terminate Han-
son. The credited evidence establishes Hanson’s only state-
ment to Noble was “congratulations, Pam on cheating.” Han-
son did not curse at Noble.
As noted elsewhere, when the credited evidence establishes,
an employer has discharged an employee for conduct during the
course of protected activity, as here, the burden shifts to the
employer to prove it acted with an honest belief the employee
engaged in misconduct. When the employer has established
such a good-faith belief, the burden shifts back to the Govern-
ment and if the Government proves the asserted misconduct did
not, in fact, occur, the discharge will be found to violate Sec-
tion 8(a)(1). I am persuaded the Company did not establish a
good-faith belief because many of its witnesses testified Han-
son did not curse at Noble or anyone. A thorough investigation
by the Company would have demonstrated such to the Compa-
ny. Assuming arguendo the Company did establish a good-
faith honest belief Hanson engaged in misconduct the Govern-
ment, by credible evidence established the misconduct did not,
in fact, occur. In summary, I find the Company violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the Act when it suspended and thereafter dis-
charged its employee Hanson.
C. The Arbitration Agreement and Related Documents
1. Arbitration agreement
It is admitted Hooters’ Employee Handbook contains the fol-
lowing “Hooters’ arbitration policy (GC Exh. 18 p. 54) which
reads as follows:
Resolution matters, including charges of employment dis-
crimination or harassment, may only be obtained by request-
ing arbitration under Hooters Agreement to Arbitrate. You
will be required to sign an Agreement to Arbitrate as a condi-
tion of your employment with Hooters.
It is admitted that at all times material here the Company
maintained agreement to arbitrate documents containing the
following provisions:
This Agreement requires you to arbitrate any legal dispute re-
lated to your application for employment, the application or
interview process, your employment, or the termination of
your employment with Hooters of Ontario, LLC[.]
By signing this Agreement you and the Company each agree
8 Panitch, by her admitted actions (cursing and related conduct) af-
forded the Company an opportunity to rid itself of an employee that
discussed with other employees actions of managers that resulted in
two managers being disciplined.
28
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
that all Claims between you and the Company shall be exclu-
sively decided by arbitration[.]
. . . .
As used above, “claims” mean all disputes arising out of or
related to your application for employment, the application
and recruitment process, the interview process, the formation
of the employment relationship, your employment by the
Company, or your separation from employment with the
Company. The term “Claims” includes, but is not limited to,
any claim whether arising under federal, state, or local law,
under a statute such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, under a rule, under a regulation or under the common
law, including, but not limited ANY (sic) CLAIM OF
DISCRIMINATION, SEXUAL OR OTHER TYPE OF
HARASSMENT,
RETALIATION,
WRONGFUL
DISCHARGE, ANY CLAIM FOR WAGES, COSTS,
INTEREST, ATTORNEYS’ FEES OR PENALTIES.
“Claim” does not include any dispute that cannot be arbitrated
as a matter of law.
YOU AND THE COMPANY AGREE THAT EACH MAY
BRING AND PURSUE CLAIMS AGAINST THE OTHER
ONLY IN YOUR/ITS INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY, AND
NOT AS A PLAINTIFF, CLASS MEMBER OR
REPRESENTATIVE IN ANY PURPORTED CLASS,
REPRESENTATIVE OR COLLECTIVE PROCEEDING.
YOU AND THE COMPANY ACKNOWLEDGE AND
AGREE THAT AT ALL TIMES YOU HAVE HAD AN
AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE WITH THE COMPANY
AND HAVE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE AGREEMENT
WAS AN AGREEMENT TO BRING AND PURSUE
CLAIMS AGAINST THE OTHER ONLY IN YOUR/ITS
INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY, AND NOT AS A PLAINTIFF,
CLASS MEMBER OR REPRESENTATIVE IN ANY
PURPORTED
CLASS,
REPRESENTATIVE
OR
COLLECTIVE PROCEEDING.
(Emphasis in original.)
It is admitted that at all times material here the Company
maintained an acknowledgement of arbitration agreement.
It is admitted that at all times material here the Company
maintained an acknowledgement of execution of arbitration
document, among others, containing the following provisions:
I have freely and voluntarily agreed to bring and pursue
claims only in my individual capacity and not as a plaintiff,
class member or representative in any purported class, repre-
sentative or collective proceeding.
At all times I have had an agreement to arbitrate with the
Company, I have always understood that the Company and I
had agreed to only bring claims against each other in our indi-
vidual capacities and that we had freely and voluntarily
agreed not to bring or pursue claims in any purported class,
representative or collective proceeding.
It is admitted Charging Party Hanson signed the Company’s
arbitration agreement; agreement to arbitrate, acknowledge-
ment of receipt of arbitration agreement, and, acknowledge-
ment of arbitration agreement on February 7, 2011.
2. Brief statement of the parties’ position
The Government asserts the Company’s mandatory agree-
ment to arbitrate, precludes employees from filing joint, class,
or collective action claims addressing wages, hours, or other
working conditions in all forums arbitral and judicial and that
D. R. Horton, 357 NLRB 2277 (2012), is controlling here, and
pursuant to D. R. Horton Inc., the Company’s arbitration
agreement violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
The Company contends its arbitration agreement and related
policies are not unlawful because recent Supreme Court prece-
dent, binding here, compels the conclusion that arbitration
agreements containing class action waivers are enforceable and
do not violate the Act.
3. Discussion, analysis, and conclusions
Simply stated the issue here is whether the Company’s arbi-
tration agreement and related documents contain restrictive
provisions violating Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
In evaluating whether a rule applied to all employees, as a
condition of continued employment, including the mandatory
arbitration agreement and related documents at issue here, vio-
lates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, the Board, as noted in D. R.
Horton Inc., at 2280–2282, applies its test set forth in Lutheran
Heritage Village-Livonia, 343 NLRB 646 (2004), citing U-
Haul Co. of California, 347 NLRB 375, 377 (2006), enfd. 255
Fed. Appx. 527 (D.C. Cir. 2007). Pursuant to Lutheran Herit-
age the inquiry, or test to be applied, is whether the rule explic-
itly restricts activities protected by Section 7 of the Act. If so,
the rule is unlawful. If it does not explicitly restrict protected
activity, the finding of a violation is dependent on a showing of
one of the following: (1) employees would reasonably construe
the rule to prohibit Section 7 activity; (2) the rule was promul-
gated in response to union activity; or (3) the rule has been
applied to restrict the exercise of Section 7 rights.
The Board concluded in D. R. Horton that as a condition of
employment “employers may not compel employees to waive
their NLRA right to collectively pursue litigation of employ-
ment claims in all forums arbitral and judicial.” 357 NLRB
2277, 2288 (2012). The arbitration agreement here, by its
terms, restricts employees, as a condition of their employment,
from acting concertedly by pursuing class arbitral and judicial
litigation of employment claims, I find the arbitration agree-
ment here is facially unlawful. The Board explained in D. R.
Horton, Inc., supra at 2286 “The right to engage in collective
action . . . is the core substantive right protected by the NLRA
and is the foundation on which the Act and Federal labor policy
rest.”
Turning now to the Company contention it may not be found
to have violated the Act by maintaining its arbitration agree-
ment and related documents based on recent Supreme Court
precedent, binding here, that compels the conclusion that arbi-
tration agreements’ containing class action waivers are enforce-
able and do not violate the Act. The Company notes all Federal
Circuit Courts of Appeals, asked to address this issue, have
declined to enforce the D. R. Horton Inc. decision invalidating
arbitration agreements containing class waivers and asks I also
HOOTERS OF ONTARIO MILLS
29
reject the Board’s substantive analysis in D. R. Horton, supra.
First, the Company expands its request that I reject the
Board’s substantive analysis in D. R. Horton, Inc., supra. Not-
ing that three Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal in, namely,
Owen v. Bristol Care Inc., 702 F.3d 1050, 1052–1055 (8th Cir.
2013); Richards v. Ernest & Young, 734 F.3d 871, 873–874
(9th Cir. 2013); and, the direct appeal of D. R. Horton; D. R.
Horton v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2013), have reviewed
the Board’s D. R. Horton Inc. decision, and all three have re-
jected the Board’s substantive analysis. I, however, am bound
by Board precedent unless and until the Supreme Court or the
Board directs otherwise. Iowa Beef Packers, Inc., 144 NLRB
615, 616 (1963). Neither has done so thus D. R. Horton, Inc. is
the applicable law here that I follow.
Second, the Company urges I reject D. R. Horton, Inc., su-
pra, and rely on certain specific Supreme Court decisions ap-
plying the mandate that Federal law, namely the Federal Arbi-
tration Act (FAA), favors arbitration and that class waivers in
agreements to arbitrate executed by employees do not violate
the Act. In support of this argument or contention the Compa-
ny points, in part, to the Supreme Court’s decisions in AT&T
Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011); American
Express v. Italian Colors Restaurants, 133 S.Ct. 2304 (2013);
and, CompuCredit v. Greenwood, 132 S.Ct. 665 (2012). I ad-
dress below the three above-cited cases and find those cases do
not compel that I reject the Board’s D. R. Horton, Inc. decision
based on the cited Supreme Court decisions.
The Board in D. R. Horton considered the Supreme Court’s
holding in AT&T Mobility LLC and concluded that decision
does not require a conclusion different from its holding in D. R.
Horton Inc. Accordingly, I reject the Company’s contention
AT&T Mobility LLC controls and must be applied here. I apply
here the Board’s rational as set forth in D. R. Horton Inc. as
explained below:
A policy associated with the FAA and arguable in tension
with the policies of the NLRA was explained by the Supreme
Court in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, supra at 1748: The
“overarching purpose of the FAA . . . is to ensure the en-
forcement of arbitration agreements according to their terms
so as to facilitate streamlined proceedings.” The “switch from
bilateral to class arbitration,” the Court stated, “sacrifices the
principal advantage of arbitration—its informality.” Id. at
1750. But the weight of this countervailing consideration was
considerably greater in the context of AT&T Mobility than it is
here for several reasons. AT&T Mobility involved the claim
that a class-action waiver in an arbitration clause of any con-
tract of adhesion in the State of California was unconsciona-
ble. Here, in contrast, only agreements between employers
and their own employees are at stake. As the Court pointed
out in AT&T Mobility, such contracts of adhesion in the retail
and services industries might cover “tens of thousands of po-
tential claimants.” Id. at 1752. The average number of em-
ployees employed by a single employer, in contrast, is 20
[footnote omitted] and most classwide employment litigation,
like the case at issue here, involves only a specific subset of
an employer’s employees. A classwide arbitration is thus far
less cumbersome and more akin to an individual arbitration
proceeding along each of the dimensions considered by the
Court in AT&T Mobility—speed, cost, informality, and risk—
when the class is so limited in size. 131 S.Ct. at 1751–1752.
Moreover, the holding in this case covers only one type of
contract, that between an employer and its covered employ-
ees, in contrast to the broad rule adopted by the California Su-
preme Court at issue in AT&T Mobility. Accordingly, any in-
trusion on the policies underlying the FAA is similarly lim-
ited.
Thus, whether we consider the policies underlying the two
statutes as part of the balancing test required to determine if a
term of a contract is against public policy and thus properly
considered invalid under Section 2 of the FAA, or a part of the
accommodation analysis required by Southern Steamship, Mor-
ton, and other Supreme Court precedent, our conclusion is the
same: holding that an employer violates the NLRA by requiring
employees, as a condition of employment, to waive their right
to pursue collective legal redress in both judicial and arbitral
forums accommodates the policies underlying both the NLRA
and the FAA to the greatest extent possible.
Next, I turn to the American Express Co. v. Italian Colors
Restaurant, supra, a case, which was decided after D. R. Hor-
ton, to determine if, as the Company contends, the decision
compels a finding that the class waiver in the agreement to
arbitrate here does not violate the Act.
American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant involved
merchants who contracted with American Express to accept
American Express cards at their businesses and in their agree-
ment with American Express agreed to arbitrate disputes aris-
ing between the merchant and American Express and further
precluded any claims from being arbitrated as a class action.
The merchants, nevertheless, filed a class action lawsuit against
American Express contending their agreement with American
Express violated Federal antitrust statutes. The merchants con-
tended waiving class arbitration made the agreement with
American Express invalid and unenforceable because the cost
of individually arbitrating a Federal statutory claim would ex-
ceed any potential recovery. In response to the merchants law-
suit, American Express moved to enforce the arbitration agree-
ment terms calling for individually arbitrating claims pursuant
to the provisions of the FAA. The Supreme Court rejected the
merchants’ position holding arbitration is a matter of contractu-
al agreement between the parties and that the FAA precludes
the courts from invalidating a contractual waiver of class arbi-
tration simply because the cost of individually arbitrating a
Federal statutory claim exceeds any potential recovery.
Next I turn to CompuCredit Corp v. Greenwood, supra,
which involved actions brought by consumers against the mar-
keter of credit cards and the Federal Credit Repair Organization
Act (CROA), to determine if, as the Company contends, the
decision compels a finding that the waiver here does not violate
the Act. The Court held CROA provisions requiring credit
repair organizations disclose to consumers the right to sue over
violations of CROA and prohibiting waiver of that right none-
theless did not preclude enforcement of an arbitration agree-
ment the parties had also executed. The Supreme Court held
the FAA requires that the parties’ arbitration agreement be
30
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
enforced according to its terms. The court specifically con-
cluded that even when the claims at issue are Federal statutory
claims, the FAA’s mandate cannot be overridden unless “over-
ridden by a contrary congressional command.”
The two above Supreme Court cases address consumer rights
and contract language, and, in my opinion, have absolutely
nothing to do with unilaterally imposed arbitration agreements
in the context of employee–employer relationships. The cases
do not discuss how, if at all, the FAA may be applied to alter,
by private arbitration agreement, the core substantive rights
protected by the NLRA which are the foundation on which the
NLRA and all Federal labor law rests. It goes without saying
the core issue before me, on this portion of the case, is whether
the Company may, by private arbitration agreement imposed on
its employees, restrict the right of its employees to engage in
concerted or class activities recognized and protected by Sec-
tion 7 of the Act. I have elsewhere here concluded the Compa-
ny cannot lawfully do so and nothing in the two subsequent
Supreme Court decisions compels a different conclusion than I
make.
The Company further notes that most recently, Board Ad-
ministrative Law Judge Keltner W. Locke issued his decision in
Haynes Building Services, LLP, JD(ATL)03-014 (February 7,
2014) in which Judge Locke recommended the Board dismiss
allegations Haynes Building Services’ arbitration agreement
violated the Act. Judge Locke’s decision is without authority
here as it is an intermediate decision not yet ruled upon by the
Board and may not be considered as precedent.
In summary, the agreement to arbitrate and related docu-
ments clearly inhibits and interferes with employees’ Section 7
rights in that it requires employees to waive their right to en-
gage in concerted activity for mutual aid and protection by
prohibiting class or collective action in any forum and as such
violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Additionally, I find the language of the Company’s arbitra-
tion agreement would reasonably be read by employees to pro-
hibit the filing of unfair labor practice charges with the Board.
Accordingly, I find the policy, for that reason alone, also vio-
lates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. See U-Haul Co. of California,
347 NLRB 375, 377–378 (2006).
D. Employee Handbook Rules
It is admitted that at all times material here the Company has
maintained the following rules in its Employee Handbook and
it is alleged it has thereby been interfering with, restraining, and
coercing employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Sec-
tion 7 of the Act in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. The
rules in issue are:
(a) Remember: NEVER discuss tips with other employees or
guests. Employees who do so are subject to discipline up to
and including termination.
(b) Insubordination to a manager or lack of respect and coop-
eration with fellow employees or guests [might result in disci-
pline up to, and including immediate termination.]
(c) Disrespect to our guests including discussing tips, profani-
ty or negative comments or actions [might result in discipline
up to, and including immediate termination.]
(d) The unauthorized dispersal of sensitive Company operat-
ing materials or information to any unauthorized person or
party [might result in discipline up to, and including immedi-
ate termination.] This includes, but is not limited to, recipes,
policies, procedures, financial information, manuals or any
other information in part or in whole as contained in any
Company records.
(e) Any other action or activity which Hooters reasonably be-
lieves represents a threat to the smooth operation, goodwill or
profitability of its business [might result in discipline up to,
and including immediate termination.]
(f) Any off-duty conduct which negatively affects, or would
tend to negatively affect, the employee’s ability to perform his
or her job, the Company’s reputation, or the smooth opera-
tion, goodwill or profitability of the Company’s business
[might result in discipline up to, and including immediate
termination.]
(g) Employees shall not discuss the Company’s business or
legal affairs with anyone outside of the Company. Infor-
mation concerning claims or lawsuits brought by the Compa-
ny or against the Company shall be treated as confidential.
Employees shall not discuss matters related in any way to liti-
gation or claims. Any employee who violates this rule shall
be subject to discipline up to and including termination of
employment.
(h) Information published on your social networking sites
should comply with the company’s confidentiality and disclo-
sure of proprietary information policies. This also applies to
comments posted on other blogs, forums, and social network-
ing sites.
(i) Be respectful to the Company, other employees, custom-
ers, partners, and competitors. Refrain from posting offensive
language or pictures that can be viewed by co-workers and
clients. Refrain from posting negative comments about Hoot-
ers or co-workers. In all cases, NEVER publish any infor-
mation regarding a co-worker or customer.
I address each of the above rules in the same order as set
forth above.
First, in determining whether the maintenance of a work rule
violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act the Board analyzes the rule
according to the following framework set forth in Crowne Pla-
za Hotel, 352 NLRB 382, 383 (2008), quoting from Lutheran
Heritage Village-Livonia, 343 NLRB 646 (2004).
[A]n employer violates Section 8(a)(1) when it maintains a
work rule that reasonably tends to chill employees in the ex-
ercise of their Section 7 rights. Lafayette Park Hotel, 326
NLRB 824, 825 (1998). In determining whether a challenged
rule is unlawful, the Board must, however, give the rule a rea-
sonable reading. It must refrain from reading particular
phrases in isolation, and it must not presume improper inter-
ference with employee rights. Id at 825, 827. Consistent with
the foregoing, our inquiry into whether the maintenance of a
challenged rule is unlawful begins with the issue of whether
the rule explicitly restricts activities protected by Section 7. If
it does, we will find the rule unlawful.
If the rule does not explicitly restrict activity protected by Sec-
tion 7, the violation is dependent upon a showing of one of the
HOOTERS OF ONTARIO MILLS
31
following: (1) employees would reasonably construe the lan-
guage to prohibit Section 7 activity; (2) the rule was promul-
gated in response to union activity; or (3) the rule has been
applied to restrict the exercise of Section 7 rights. Lutheran
Heritage Village-Livonia, 343 NLRB 646 (2004). Where a
rule is ambiguous regarding its application to Section 7 activi-
ty and no examples or violative conduct or limitation lan-
guage is set forth that would clarify to employees the rule
does not restrict Section 7 rights such a rule is unlawful under
the Act.
The Board noted in Flex Frac Logestics, LLC, 358 NLRB
1131, 1132 (2012):
Board law is settled that ambiguous employer rules—rules
that reasonably could be read to have a coercive meaning—
are construed against the employer. This principle follows
from the Act’s goal of preventing employees from being
chilled in the exercise of their Section 7 rights—whether or
not that is the intent of the employer—instead of waiting until
that chill is manifest, when the Board must undertake the dif-
ficult task of dispelling it.
1. Discussing tips
The Company’s policy forbidding employees from discuss-
ing tips with each other explicitly restricts activities protected
by Section 7 of the Act and thereby violates Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act. Discussing tips between employees is essentially dis-
cussing wages. See, e.g., Wynn Las Vegas, LLC, 358 NLRB
674, 676 (2012). Nothing is more basic “terms and conditions”
of employment than wages. Parexel International, LLC, 356
NLRB 516, 518 (2011). The portion of this rule that forbids
employees from discussing tips with guests is unlawfully over
broad. The rule precludes employees from exercising their
right to discuss their terms and conditions of employment, such
as wages, with nonemployees. See generally MasTec Ad-
vanced Technologies, 357 NLRB 103 (2011).
2. Insubordination by employees
The Company’s insubordination rule is impermissible. In
University Medical Center, 335 NLRB 1318, 1322 (2001), the
Board prohibited a rule, applying the Lafayette standard, in an
employee handbook prohibiting “insubordination, refusing to
follow directions, obey legitimate requests or orders, or other
disrespectful condition towards a service integrator, service
coordinator, or other individual.” Id. The Board held the rule
was overly broad because it prohibited all disrespectful conduct
towards others and “[d]efining due respect, in the context of a
union activity, seems inherently subjective.” Id. Further, po-
tential employee advocates could reasonably surmise that
members of their target audience would screen them from ex-
pressing views not welcomed or agreed with. Id. at 1323.
Thus, the rule would have a chilling effect on employees in the
exercise of their Section 7 rights. Similarly, here, the Compa-
ny’s rule prohibiting ‘insubordination to a manager or lack of
respect and cooperation with fellow employees or guest [might
result in discipline up to, and including immediate termina-
tion]” is as broad as the “disrespectful conduct” clause in
Community Hospitals of Central California in that it does not
go on to define what “insubordination,” “lack of respect,” or
“cooperation” means and thus are subjective. These broad
terms could have the same chilling effect the Board was con-
cerned with in Community Hospitals. There is also no limiting
language here like in Lafayette, which held permissible the rule
“[b]eing uncooperative with supervisors, employees, guest[s]
and/or regulatory agencies or otherwise engaging in conduct
that does not support the Lafayette Park Hotel’s goals and ob-
jectives.” The rule limited the conduct as to the company’s
“goals and objectives.” And thus was permissible. There are
no such limiting terms here, thus the rule is unlawful.
3. Disrespect to guests
This rule on disrespect is unlawfully over broad and unquali-
fied.9 The prohibitions against “profanity or negative com-
ments or actions” are also over broad in that no examples or
clarifications are provided. The rule reasonably tends to chill
employee exercise of Section 7 rights and violates Section
8(a)(1) of the Act. See Claremont Resort & Spa, 344 NLRB
832, 836 (2005), citing Lafayette Park Hotel, supra.
4. Unauthorized dispersal of sensitive company materials
This nondisclosure or nondispersal rule is unlawfully over-
broad because employees would reasonably believe they are
prohibited from discussing wages or other terms and conditions
of employment with nonemployees, such as, for example, union
representatives—an activity clearly protected by Section 7 of
the Act. See Flex Frac Logistics, LLC, 358 NLRB 1131
(2012), citing Hyundai American Shipping Agency Inc., 357
NLRB 860, 871 (2011) (finding rule unlawful that prohibited
“[a]ny unauthorized disclosure from an employee’s personnel
file”); IRIS U.S.A. Inc., 336 NLRB 1013, 1013 fn. 1, 1015,
1018 (2001) (finding rule unlawful that stated all information
about employees is strictly “confidential” and defined “person-
nel records” as confidential). Additionally, as noted by counsel
for the Government, nothing about the rule limits or qualifies
the prohibition on disclosing “policies, procedures, and manu-
als” to exclude wages thus reinforcing the likely inference the
rule prescribes wage discussions with outsiders.
5. Conduct affecting the Company’s smooth operation, good-
will, or profitability of its business
As discussed below this rule is overbroad and restricts rights
protected by the Act. In Costco Wholesale Corp., the Board
found the following paragraph unlawful because employees
would reasonably construe the rule as regulating and inhibiting
Section 7 conduct.
Any communication transmitted, stored or displayed electron-
ically must comply with the policies outlined in the Costco
Employee Agreement. Employees should be aware that
statements posted electronically (such as [to] online message
boards or discussion groups) that damage the Company, de-
fame any individual or damage any person’s reputation, or vi-
olate the policies outlined in the Costco Employee Agreement
may be subject to discipline, up to and including termination
of employment. 358 NLRB No. 106 [1100] (2012).
9 The portion of the rule concerning not discussing tips with cus-
tomers has been addressed above in “Discussing Tips” and will not be
restated here.
32
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The Board found statements that: “damage the company, de-
fame any individual or damage any person’s reputation” clearly
encompasses protests that respond to respondent’s treatment of
its employees. Id. There is also nothing in the company’s rule
that suggests that protected communications are excluded. Id.
The Board held that employees could reasonably conclude that
the rule required them not to partake in protected communica-
tions. Id.
Here, the Company has an arguably broader rule than the
rule in Costco Wholesale Corp. The rule here states: “[a]ny
other action or activity which Hooters reasonably believes rep-
resents a threat to the smooth operation, goodwill, or profitabil-
ity of its business [might result in discipline up to, and includ-
ing immediate termination.]” As in Costco Wholesale Corp.,
supra, there is nothing to suggest that protected communica-
tions or activities are excluded as the rule says “any other ac-
tion or activity.” Though the Company limits the text to what it
reasonably believes; employees could reasonably conclude the
rule prohibits protected activities and communications. See
Southern Maryland Hospital, 293 NLRB 1209, 1221 (1989),
enfd. in relevant part 916 F.2d 932, 940 (4th Cir. 1990) (rule
prohibiting “derogatory attacks on . . . hospital representative[s]
found unlawful); Claremount Resort Spa, 344 NLRB 832
(2005) (rule prohibiting “negative conversations about associ-
ates and/or managers” found unlawful); Beverly Health & Re-
habilitation Services, 332 NLRB 347, 348 (2000), enfd. 297
F.3d 468 (6th Cir. 2002). Thus this rule in the Company’s
handbook is unlawful.
6. Off-duty conduct
This rule is overly broad and invalid essentially for the rea-
sons stated immediately above in number five. More specifi-
cally off-duty conduct such as discussing working conditions
with fellow employees, third party persons such as employees
of other employers, and union representatives could be con-
strued as violating this rule. Thus employees could reasonably
conclude the overbroad language in this rule encompassed Sec-
tion 7 activity. The rule is invalid.
7. Discussing the Company’s business or legal affairs
outside the company
This rule is overbroad and invalid. Prohibiting employees
from discussing legal affairs including claims or lawsuits
brought by the Company or against the Company or in any way
discussing matters related in any way to such litigation inter-
feres with employee rights under the Act in that employees
would reasonably construe the rule language to prohibit or limit
their exercise of rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. For
example, it would preclude discussing terms and conditions of
employment related to lawsuits addressing wage and hour is-
sues, protected age issues, race discrimination issues, fair labor
standard issues, California Labor Code issues, and even Board
litigation issues with third parties such as union representatives.
8. Information on employee social networking sites
I find this rule invalid for the reasons explained hereinafter
where I conclude the Company’s confidential information
agreement and its nondisclosure agreement are unlawful be-
cause employees would construe that these two policies inter-
fere with the employees’ ability to engage in activities protect-
ed by Section 7 of the Act.
9. Being respectful to the Company, employees, customers,
partners and competitors; post no offensive language or pic-
tures that can be viewed by coworkers and clients; post no neg-
ative comments about the Company or coworkers; and, never
post any information regarding a coworker or customer
I find the “Being respectful to the Company,” other employ-
ees, customers, partners, and competitors rule, in conjunction
with the prohibition regarding posting negative comments
about the Company or coworkers, as encompassing protected
Section 7 activity, such as employees’ statements made to
coworkers, supervisors, and third parties, who deal with the
Company, about terms and conditions of employment they
object to and seek support from in improving their working
conditions. Additionally there is nothing in the rule that would
reasonably suggest to employees that employee communica-
tions protected by Section 7 of the Act are excluded from the
rules reach. See Knauz BMW, 358 NLRB 1754, 1754–1755
(2012); Hills & Deals General Hospital, 360 NLRB 611
(2014); and, First Transit, Inc., 360 NLRB 619, 621 (2014).
E. Confidential Information and Nondisclosure Agreement
It is admitted the Company maintains an agreement contain-
ing the following provisions:
1. Nature of the agreement and acknowledgement
Employee acknowledges that:
. . . .
(b) In the course of Employee’s employment, Em-
ployee has or may become personally acquainted with in-
formation about The Company’s employees and their job
duties, payroll or accounting records and practices, or the
Company’s personnel policies and practices, including all
matters related to employees training, selection, discipline
and/or discharge, which is not generally known to the pub-
lic;
(c) In the course of Employee’s employment, Em-
ployee has or may become personally acquainted with
compensation data, . . . (or) employee relations or EEO
strategies . . . which are not generally known to the public.
2. Nondisclosure
(a) Employee agrees to act as a trustee of the infor-
mation described in Paragraph 1 of this Agreement which
is not generally known to the public.
(b) Employee further represents to The Company that,
as an inducement to The Company to employ or continue
to employ Employee, Employee would hold such infor-
mation in trust and confidence for the use and benefit sole-
ly of The Company.
(c) During Employee’s employment by The Compa-
ny, and for a period of two (2) years thereafter, Employee
agrees that, without prior written permission from The
HOOTERS OF ONTARIO MILLS
33
Company’s General Counsel, Employee shall not publish,
communicate, divulge, or otherwise disclose such infor-
mation to any person, firm, company, corporation, associa-
tion, partnership, or other entity for any reason or purpose
whatsoever, unless (1) such information has already be-
come known to the public, or (2) Employee is required to
disclose such information by legal process.
(d) Notwithstanding Paragraph 2(c), Employee agrees
that, without prior written permission from The Compa-
ny’s General Counsel, Employee shall at no time publish,
communicate, divulge or otherwise disclose any infor-
mation (a) concerning a matter which Employee knows or
has reason to know is privileged . . . , or (b) concerning
the reasons for or circumstances surrounding, or Employ-
ee’s understanding of those reasons for or circumstances
surrounding, personnel actions taken by The Company
with regard to other Hooters employers, including the hir-
ing, firing, promotion, transfer, demotion, or discipline of
any other Hooters employee.
Here employees are prohibited from disclosure of any infor-
mation pertaining to terms and conditions of employment of
employees such as their job duties, payroll or accounting rec-
ords and practices, personnel policies and practices including
all matters related to employee training, selection, discipline
and/or discharge, which is not generally known to the public.
This nondisclosure rule is so broadly written employees would
reasonably believe, if they did not clearly understand, they are
prohibited from discussing wages and salary information, dis-
ciplinary and discharge policies and practices and other infor-
mation they are entitled to discuss and share with coworkers
and even with third parties that might be able to assist them
with the terms and conditions of their employment. This is the
type of information that may be shared with employees, unions,
and even governmental agencies. The rule here has a clear
chilling effect on employees in the exercise of their Section 7
rights. See MCPc, Inc., 860, 871 (2014); Hundai American
Shipping Agency, 357 NLRB 216, 216 (2011); and Flex Frac
Logistics, LLC, 358 NLRB 1131, 1131.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Hoot Winc, LLC is, and has been, an employer engaged
in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of
the Act.
2. Ontario Wings, LLC d/b/a Hooters of Ontario Mills is,
and has been, an employer engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
3. Hoot Winc, LLC and Ontario Wings, LLC d/b/a Hooters
of Ontario Mills are, and at all material times have been, joint
employers of the employees of Ontario Wings, LLC d/b/a
Hooters of Ontario Mills (hereafter I shall refer to the joint
employers as the Company).
4. Key employee and marketing coordinator Pamela Noble,
and Key employee Alicia Wade, at all material times, have
been agents of the Company within the meaning of Section
2(13) of the Act.
5. By suspending and then discharging Alexis Hanson be-
cause of her concerted activity of complaining to Company
management regarding wages, hours, and working conditions
of Company employees specifically about the disparagement of
Company employees and conditions surrounding a competition
involving employees, the Company has violated Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act.
6 The Company, by restricting its employees’ Section 7
rights, has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by maintaining
the following overly broad work rules:
(a) That prohibits employees from discussing tips with other
employees or guests.
(b) That prohibits all insubordination to a manager or lack of
respect and cooperation with fellow employees or guests.
(c) That prohibits employees from disrespecting guests by
discussing tips with guests or making negative comments or
actions to guests.
(d) That prohibits dispersal of sensitive Company operating
materials including policies, procedures, financial information,
and Company manuals.
(e) That prohibits any action or activity affecting the Com-
pany’s smooth operation, good will, or profitability of its busi-
ness.
(f) That prohibits off-duty conduct which would tend to
negatively affect employees’ ability to perform their jobs or the
smooth operation, good will, or profitability of the Company’s
business.
(g) That prohibits employees from discussing the Compa-
ny’s business or legal affairs with anyone outside the Company.
(h) That prohibits employees from publishing on their social
networking sites any confidential or proprietary information of
the Company.
(i) That prohibits employees from being disrespectful to the
Company, other employees, customers, partners, and competi-
tors, posting no offensive language or pictures and no negative
comments about the Company or coworkers or posting any
information regarding a coworker or the Company.
7. The Company, by restricting its employees’ Section 7
rights, has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by maintaining an
overly broad, confidential information and nondisclosure
agreement rule, that prohibits employees from disclosure of any
information pertaining to terms and conditions of employment
of employees such as their job duties, payroll or accounting
records and practices, personnel policies and practices includ-
ing all matters related to employee training, selection, disci-
pline and/or discharge which is not generally known to the
public.
8. By maintaining its mandatory agreement to arbitrate and
related documents, that requires employees to waive their right
to maintain class or collective actions in all forums, judicial or
arbitral, the Company has engaged in unfair labor practices
affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7)
of the Act and has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
9. By maintaining its mandatory agreement to arbitrate and
related documents that would reasonably be read by employees
to prohibit the filing of unfair labor practice charges with the
National Labor Relations Board, the Company has engaged in
unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning
of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act and has violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
34
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
REMEDY
Having found the Company has engaged in certain unfair la-
bor practices, I shall recommend that it cease and desist there-
from and take certain affirmative actions designed to effectuate
the policies of the Act.
Having found that the Company has violated Section 8(a)(1)
by suspending and discharging Alexis Hanson, I recommend
the Company be ordered to reinstate her to her former job, or if
that job no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent job with-
out prejudice to her seniority or other rights and privileges pre-
viously enjoyed, and make her whole for any lost wages and
benefits as a result of her April 23 suspension and her April 26,
2013 discharge, with interest.
The backpay shall be computed as prescribed in F. W.
Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950), with interest at the rate
prescribed in New Horizons, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987), com-
pounded daily as prescribed in Kentucky River Medical Center,
356 NLRB 6 (2010). Additionally, the Company is ordered to
compensate Alexis Hanson for the adverse tax consequences, if
any, of receiving a lump sum backpay award, and to file a re-
port with the Social Security Administration allocating the
backpay awards to the appropriate calendar quarters for Alexis
Hanson. See Latino Express, Inc., 359 NLRB 518 (2012). I
also recommend the Company, within 14 days of the Board’s
Order, be ordered to remove from its files any reference to
Hanson’s suspension on April 23 and her discharge on April
26, 2013, and within 3 days thereafter notify Hanson in writing
it has done so and that her suspension and discharge will not be
used against her in any manner.
I also recommend the Company be ordered to rescind, modi-
fy, or revise its agreement to arbitrate, and related documents,
to clearly inform its employees the agreement does not consti-
tute a waiver in all forums of their right to maintain employ-
ment-related class or collective actions and to clearly inform its
employees that the agreement does not prohibit the filing of
unfair labor practices with the National Labor Relations Board,
and notify its employees the agreement to arbitrate and related
documents have been rescinded, modified, or revised and pro-
vide a copy of the modified or revised agreements to all em-
ployees.
Having also found certain rules in the Company’s Employee
Handbook infringes on its employees’ Section 7 rights, I rec-
ommend the Company be ordered to rescind the following rules
fully described elsewhere in this decision addressing; (1) dis-
cussing tips; (2) insubordination by employees; (3) disrespect
to guests; (4) unauthorized dispersal of sensitive Company
materials; (5) conduct affecting the Company’s smooth opera-
tion, goodwill, or profitability of its business; (6) off-duty con-
duct; (7) discussing the Company’s business or legal affairs
outside the Company; (8) information on employee social net-
working sites; and (9) being respectful to the Company, em-
ployees, customers, partners, and competitions, post no offen-
sive language or picture that can be viewed by coworkers and
clients; and post no negative comments about the Company or
coworkers and never post any information regarding a cowork-
er or customer; and notify its employees in writing that it has
rescinded these rules.
I also recommend the Company be ordered to rescind its
confidential information and nondisclosure agreement.
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]