PRICE-SIMMS, INC. D/B/A TOYOTA SUNNYVALE

484 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 363 NLRB No. 52 Price-Simms, Inc. d/b/a Toyota Sunnyvale and Rich- ard Vogel. Case 32–CA–138015 November 30, 2015 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN PEARCE AND MEMBERS MISCIMARRA AND MCFERRAN The General Counsel seeks summary judgment in this case on the grounds that there are no genuine issues of ma- terial fact as to the allegations of the complaint, and that the Board should find, as a matter of law, that the Re- spondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by promul- gating, maintaining, and enforcing an agreement that pro- hibits its employees from participating in collective or class litigation in all forums. Pursuant to a charge filed by Richard Vogel on October 2, 2014, the General Counsel issued the complaint on Jan- uary 30, 2015. The complaint alleges that, since at least April 2, 2014, the Respondent has promulgated and main- tained the Binding Arbitration Agreement and Toyota Sunnyvale Handbook Employee Acknowledgement Agreement (the Agreement), and required its Sunnyvale employees to execute the Agreement as a condition of em- ployment. The complaint further alleges that the Agree- ment requires that Sunnyvale employees bring all disputes arising out of or related to their employment to individual binding arbitration. The relevant portion of the Agreement reads as follows: I . . . acknowledge that the Company utilizes a system of alternative dispute resolution which involves binding ar- bitration to resolve all disputes which may arise out of the employment context. . . . In order to provide for the efficient and timely adjudication of claims, the arbitrator is prohibited from consolidating the claims of others into one proceeding. This means that an arbitrator will hear only my individual claims and does not have the author- ity to fashion a proceeding as a class or collective action or to award relief to a group of employees in one pro- ceeding, to the maximum extent permitted by law. Thus, the Company has the right to defeat any attempt by me to file or join other employees in a class, collective or joint action or arbitration (collectively “class claims”).1 The complaint alleges that, by promulgating and maintaining the Agreement, the Respondent interfered with employees’ Section 7 rights to engage in collective legal activity by bind- ing employees, including the Charging Party, to an 1 The Binding Arbitration Agreement and the handbook each contain this language. Employees are required to sign both documents, and the Charging Party did so. irrevocable waiver of their rights to participate in collective and class litigation. The complaint additionally alleges that the Respondent violated the Act when it sought to enforce this Agreement on October 1, 2014, by filing a motion to compel individ- ual arbitration in a wage and hour class action filed by Charging Party Vogel in California Superior Court.2 On February 10, 2015, the Respondent filed an answer admitting all of the factual allegations in the complaint but denying the legal conclusions and asserting certain affirm- ative defenses. On March 10, 2015, the General Counsel filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. On March 18, 2015, the Re- spondent filed an opposition to the General Counsel’s mo- tion. On March 24, 2015, the Board issued an order trans- ferring the proceeding to the Board and a Notice to Show Cause why the motion should not be granted. On April 7, 2015, the General Counsel and the Respondent filed re- sponses. The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment In Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 361 NLRB 774 (2014), enf. denied in relevant part No. 14–60800, 2015 WL 6457613, ___ F.3d. ___ (5th Cir. Oct. 26, 2015), the Board reaf- firmed the relevant holdings in D. R. Horton, Inc., 357 NLRB No. 184 (2012), enf. denied in relevant part 737 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2013), and found unlawful the mainte- nance and enforcement of a mandatory arbitration agree- ment requiring employees to waive the right to commence or participate in class or collective actions in all forums, whether arbitral or judicial. As stated above, the Respond- ent’s answer admits all of the factual allegations in the complaint. Specifically, the Respondent’s answer admits that it required its current and former employees at its Sunnyvale, California facility to execute the Agreement as a condition of employment and that the Agreement ex- pressly requires that all employment-based claims be re- solved through individual, binding arbitration. The Re- spondent’s answer further admits that it sought to enforce the Agreement by filing a motion to compel individual ar- bitration and stay judicial proceedings in Richard Vogel v. Price-Simms, Inc., in order to require individual arbitra- tions of the class action wage and hour claims. We there- fore find that there are no material issues of fact; nor has the Respondent raised any other issues warranting a hear- ing. 2 Richard Vogel v. Price-Simms, Inc., Case No. 1–14–CV–261268 (Superior Court of California, Santa Clara County). The court granted the Respondent’s motion on October 24, 2014. TOYOTA SUNNYVALE 485 The Respondent contends in its answer that the unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint are barred by the 6-month statute of limitations set forth in Section 10(b) of the Act. As to the allegations that the Respondent unlaw- fully maintained and enforced the Agreement, we find no merit to this contention. It is well settled that regardless of when an unlawful rule was first promulgated, the Board will find a violation where the rule was maintained or en- forced during the 6-month period prior to the filing of a charge. See, e.g., PJ Cheese, Inc., 362 NLRB 1452, 1452 (2015); Neiman Marcus Group, 362 NLRB 1286, 1287 fn. 6 (2015); Cellular Sales of Missouri, 362 NLRB 241, 241 (2015). Here, the Agreement was in effect at all relevant times, and the Respondent filed its motion to enforce the Agreement 1 day before the unfair labor practice charge was filed. Accordingly, we reject the Respondent’s 10(b) affirmative defense as to the maintenance and enforce- ment allegations. We reach a contrary finding, however, as to the ‘prom- ulgation’ allegation. Notwithstanding that the Respondent admitted that it has promulgated the Agreement since at least April 2, 2014 (within the 10(b) period), the General Counsel’s Motion for Summary Judgment makes clear that the Agreement was promulgated well outside the 10(b) period. As shown by Exhibit 2 to the General Coun- sel’s motion, Vogel himself signed the Agreement on June 7, 2012. Accordingly, we find merit to the Respondent’s 10(b) defense in this respect and shall dismiss the unlaw- ful promulgation allegation. Next, the Respondent argues that D.R. Horton, Inc., Murphy Oil USA, Inc., and Cellular Sales of Missouri, LLC, supra, were wrongly decided when finding that sim- ilar mandatory arbitration provisions violated Section 8(a)(1). We disagree. Accordingly, we apply D.R. Horton and Murphy Oil USA here, and find that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) by maintaining and enforcing the Agreement. The Agreement expressly requires employ- ees to bring all employment-related claims to individual arbitration and to waive—in any forum—their right to pursue claims on a class or collective basis. We therefore find that the Respondent’s maintenance of the Agreement violates the Act.3 Additionally, we find that the Respondent unlawfully sought to enforce the Agreement. In Murphy Oil, the Board found that the employer’s motion to dismiss a col- lective FLSA action in Federal district court, and compel individual arbitration pursuant to its mandatory arbitration agreement, violated Section 8(a)(1) because that enforce- ment action unlawfully restricted employees’ exercise of 3 We disagree with our dissenting colleague’s argument that manda- tory arbitration agreements do not violate the Act for the reasons stated Section 7 rights. 361 NLRB 123. As in Murphy Oil, the Respondent unlawfully enforced its arbitration agreement when it petitioned the California Superior Court to stay the class action wage and hour claim in order to compel em- ployees to arbitrate their claims individually. Accordingly, we grant the General Counsel’s Motion for Summary Judgment. On the entire record, the Board makes the following FINDINGS OF FACT I. JURISDICTION At all material times, Respondent, a California corpora- tion with an office and place of business in Sunnyvale, California, has been engaged in the sale and servicing of automobiles. During the 12-month period ending December 31, 2014, the Respondent, in conducting its operations de- scribed above, derived gross revenues in excess of $500,000 and purchased and received at its Sunnyvale, California facility goods or services valued in excess of $5000 which originated outside the State of California. We find that the Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES Since at least April 2, 2014, the Respondent has re- quired its current and former employees to sign the Agree- ment as a condition of employment. The Agreement con- tains the following language: In order to provide for the efficient and timely adjudica- tion of claims, the arbitrator is prohibited from consoli- dating the claims of others into one proceeding. This means that an arbitrator will hear only my individual claims and does not have the authority to fashion a pro- ceeding as a class or collective action or to award relief to a group of employees in one proceeding, to the maxi- mum extent permitted by law. Thus, the Company has the right to defeat any attempt by me to file or join other employees in a class, collective or joint action lawsuit or arbitration (collectively “class claims”). On October 1, 2014, the Respondent sought to enforce the Agreement described above by filing a motion to com- pel individual arbitration and stay judicial proceedings to compel individual arbitration rather than class-wide litiga- tion of claims in a class action wage and hour complaint filed against the Respondent by the Charging Party in Richard Vogel v. Price-Simms, Inc., Case No. 1–14–CV– 261268 (Superior Court of California, Santa Clara in Murphy Oil, 361 NLRB 774, 774–794 (2014), and reiterated in Bristol Farms, 363 NLRB 442 (2015). DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 486 County). On October 24, 2014, the court granted the Re- spondent’s motion. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The Respondent, Price-Simms Inc., doing business as Toyota Sunnyvale, is an employer within the meaning of Section 2(6) of the Act. 2. By maintaining and enforcing a mandatory and bind- ing arbitration agreement that requires employees, as a condition of employment, to waive the right to maintain class or collective actions in all forums, whether arbitral or judicial, the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sec- tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act, and has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 3. The Respondent has not violated the Act in any other respect. REMEDY Having found that the Respondent has engaged in cer- tain unfair labor practices, we shall order it to cease and desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Consistent with our de- cision in Murphy Oil, supra, at 794, and the Board’s usual practice in cases involving unlawful litigation, we shall or- der the Respondent to reimburse Richard Vogelfor all rea- sonable expenses and legal fees, with interest, that Vogel may have incurred in opposing the Respondent’s unlawful motion to stay his wage and hour class action and compel individual arbitration. See Bill Johnson’s Restaurants v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 747 (1983) (“If a violation is found, the Board may order the employer to reimburse the em- ployees whom he had wrongfully sued for their attorneys’ fees and other expenses” and “any other proper relief that would effectuate the policies of the Act.”). Interest shall be computed in the manner prescribed in New Horizons, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987), compounded daily as prescribed in Kentucky River Medical Center, 356 NLRB 6 (2010). See Teamsters Local 776 (Rite Aid), 305 NLRB 832, 835 fn. 10 (1991) (“[I]n make-whole orders for suits main- tained in violation of the Act, it is appropriate and neces- sary to award interest on litigation expenses”), enfd. 973 F.2d 230 (3d Cir. 1992). We shall also order the Respond- ent to rescind or revise the Agreement, notify employees and the Superior Court of California, Santa Clara County that it has done so, and inform the court that it no longer opposes the lawsuit on the basis of the Agreement.4 4 We need not address the Respondent’s argument that the General Counsel’s proposed remedy for this violation—ordering that the Re- spondent move the Superior Court of California, Santa Clara County, to vacate its order for individual arbitration—violates the Respondent’s due process rights and separation of powers, because, consistent with Mur- phy Oil, supra, at 794, we shall order only the remedies described above. ORDER The Respondent, Price-Simms, Inc., d/b/a Toyota, Sunnyvale, Sunnyvale, California, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall 1. Cease and desist from (a) Maintaining and/or enforcing a mandatory arbitra- tion agreement that requires employees, as a condition of employment, to waive the right to maintain class or col- lective actions in all forums, whether arbitral or judicial. (b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re- straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed to them by Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act. (a) Rescind the Binding Arbitration Agreement and Toyota Sunnyvale Employee Handbook Employment Ac- knowledgment Agreement (Agreement) in all of its forms, or revise it in all of its forms to make clear to employees that the Agreement does not constitute a waiver of their right to maintain employment-related joint, class, or col- lective actions in all forums. (b) Notify all current and former employees who were required to sign the Agreement in any form that it has been rescinded or revised and, if revised, provide them a copy of the revised agreement. (c) Notify the Superior Court of California, Santa Clara County, that it has rescinded or revised the arbitration agreement upon which it based its motion to compel indi- vidual arbitration and stay judicial proceedings in the wage and hour class action brought by Richard Vogel, and inform the court that it no longer opposes the lawsuit on the basis of the Agreement. (d) In the manner set forth in the remedy section of this decision, reimburse Richard Vogel for any reasonable at- torneys’ fees and litigation expenses that he may have in- curred in opposing the Respondent’s motion to stay the collective lawsuit and compel individual arbitration. (e) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its Sunnyvale, California facility copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix.”5 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 32, after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized repre- sentative, shall be posted by the Respondent and main- tained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places, in- cluding all places where notices to employees are custom- arily posted. In addition to physical posting of paper 5 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notices reading “Posted by Order of the Na- tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board.” TOYOTA SUNNYVALE 487 notices, notices shall be distributed electronically, such as by email, posting on an intranet or an internet site, and/or other electronic means, if the Respondent customarily communicates with its employees by such means. Rea- sonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. If the Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice marked “Appendix” to all current em- ployees and former employees employed by the Respond- ent at any time since April 2, 2014, and any employees against whom the Respondent has enforced its mandatory arbitration agreement since April 2, 2014. (f) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director for Region 32 a sworn certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the Respondent has taken to com- ply. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint is dismissed insofar as it alleges violations of the Act not specifically found. MEMBER MISCIMARRA, dissenting. In this case, my colleagues find that the Respondent’s Binding Arbitration Agreement and Toyota Sunnyvale Handbook Employee Acknowledgement Agreement (the Agreement) violates Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act or NLRA) because the Agreement waives the right to participate in class or collective actions regarding non-NLRA employment claims. Richard Vogel 1 Richard Vogel v. Price-Simms, Inc., Case No. 1–14–CV–261268 (Superior Court of California, Santa Clara County Oct. 24, 2014). 2 361 NLRB 774, 795–808 (2014) (Member Miscimarra, dissenting in part). The Board majority’s holding in Murphy Oil invalidating class action waiver agreements was recently denied enforcement by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB, No. 14– 60800, 2015 WL 6457613 (5th Cir. Oct. 26, 2015). 3 I agree that non-NLRA claims can give rise to “concerted” activities engaged in by two or more employees for the “purpose” of “mutual aid or protection,” which would come within the protection of NLRA Sec. 7. See Murphy Oil, 361 NLRB 774, 796–798 (Member Miscimarra, dis- senting in part). However, the existence or absence of Sec. 7 protection does not depend on whether non-NLRA claims are pursued as a class or collective action, but on whether Sec. 7’s statutory requirements are met—an issue separate and distinct from whether an individual em- ployee chooses to pursue a claim as a class or collective action. Id.; see also Beyoglu, 362 NLRB 1238, 1241–1242 (2015) (Member Miscimarra, dissenting). 4 Murphy Oil, above, at 803–806(Member Miscimarra, dissenting in part). Sec. 9(a) states: “Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other condi- tions of employment: Provided, That any individual employee or a group signed the Agreement, and later he filed a class action law- suit against the Respondent in the Superior Court of Cali- fornia alleging wage-hour violations. In reliance on the Agreement, the Respondent filed a motion to compel in- dividual arbitration, which was granted.1 My colleagues find that the Respondent thereby unlawfully enforced its Agreement. I respectfully dissent from these findings for the reasons explained in my partial dissenting opinion in Murphy Oil USA, Inc.2 I agree that an employee may engage in “concerted” ac- tivities for “mutual aid or protection” in relation to a claim asserted under a statute other than NLRA.3 However, Sec- tion 8(a)(1) of the Act does not vest authority in the Board to dictate any particular procedures pertaining to the liti- gation of non-NLRA claims, nor does the Act render un- lawful agreements in which employees waive class type treatment of non-NLRA claims. To the contrary, as dis- cussed in my partial dissenting opinion in Murphy Oil, NLRA Section 9(a) protects the right of every employee as an “individual” to “present” and “adjust” grievances “at any time.”4 This aspect of Section 9(a) is reinforced by Section 7 of the Act, which protects each employee’s right to “refrain from” exercising the collective rights enumer- ated in Section 7. Thus, I believe it is clear that (i) the NLRA creates no substantive right for employees to insist on class type treatment of non-NLRA claims;5 (ii) a class- waiver agreement pertaining to non-NLRA claims does not infringe on any NLRA rights or obligations, which has prompted the overwhelming majority of courts to reject the Board’s position regarding class waiver agreements;6 and (iii) enforcement of a class action waiver as part of an of employees shall have the right at any time to present grievances to their employer and to have such grievances adjusted, without the inter- vention of the bargaining representative, as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of a collective-bargaining contract or agree- ment then in effect: Provided further, That the bargaining representative has been given opportunity to be present at such adjustment” (emphasis added). The Act’s legislative history shows that Congress intended to preserve every individual employee’s right to “adjust” any employment- related dispute with his or her employer. See Murphy Oil, above, at 804– 805 (Member Miscimarra, dissenting in part). 5 When courts have jurisdiction over non-NLRA claims that are po- tentially subject to class treatment, the availability of class type proce- dures does not rise to the level of a substantive right. See D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344, 362 (5th Cir. 2013) (“The use of class action procedures . . . is not a substantive right.”) (citations omitted), petition for rehearing en banc denied No. 12–60031 (5th Cir. 2014); Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 332 (1980) (“[T]he right of a litigant to employ Rule 23 is a procedural right only, ancillary to the litigation of substantive claims.”). 6 The Fifth Circuit has twice denied enforcement of Board orders in- validating a mandatory arbitration agreement that waived class type treatment of non-NLRA claims. See Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB, above; D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, above. The overwhelming majority of courts considering the Board’s position have likewise rejected it. See Murphy Oil, 361 NLRB 774, 807 fn. 5 (Member Miscimarra, dissenting DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 488 arbitration agreement is also warranted by the Federal Ar- bitration Act (FAA).7 Although questions may arise re- garding the enforceability of particular agreements that waive class or collective litigation of non-NLRA claims, I believe these questions are exclusively within the prov- ince of the court or other tribunal that, unlike the NLRB, has jurisdiction over such claims. Because I believe the Respondent’s Agreement was lawful under the NLRA, I would find it was similarly law- ful for the Respondent to file a motion in state court seek- ing to enforce the Agreement. It is relevant that the state court that had jurisdiction over the non-NLRA claims granted the Respondent’s motion to compel arbitration. That the Respondent’s motion was reasonably based is also supported by the multitude of court decisions that have enforced similar agreements.8 As the Fifth Circuit recently observed after rejecting (for the second time) the Board’s position regarding the legality of class waiver agreements: “[I]t is a bit bold for [the Board] to hold that an employer who followed the reasoning of our D.R. Hor- ton decision had no basis in fact or law or an ‘illegal ob- jective’ in doing so. The Board might want to strike a more respectful balance between its views and those of circuit courts reviewing its orders.”9 I also believe that any Board finding of a violation based on the Respondent’s meritori- ous state court motion to compel arbitration would im- properly risk infringing on the Respondent’s rights under the First Amendment’s Petition Clause. See Bill John- son’s Restaurants v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731 (1983); BE & K Construction Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516 (2002); see also my partial dissent in Murphy Oil, above, 361 NLRB 774, 806–808. Finally, for similar reasons, I believe the Board cannot properly require the Respondent to reimburse the Charging Party for its attorneys’ fees in the circumstances presented here. Murphy Oil, above, at 774, 808. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. APPENDIX NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government in part); (Member Johnson, dissenting) (collecting cases); see also Pat- terson v. Raymours Furniture Co., No. 14–CV-5882 (VEC), 2015 WL 1433219 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2015); Nanavati v. Adecco USA, Inc., No. 14-cv-04145-BLF, 2015 WL 1738152 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2015), motion to certify for interlocutory appeal denied 2015 WL 4035072 (N.D. Cal. June 30, 2015); Brown v. Citicorp Credit Services,, No. 1:12–CV– 00062-BLW, 2015 WL 1401604 (D. Idaho Mar. 25, 2015) (granting re- consideration of prior determination that class waiver in arbitration agreement violated NLRA). The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio- lated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this notice. FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO Form, join, or assist a union Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf Act together with other employees for your bene- fit and protection Choose not to engage in any of these protected ac- tivities. WE WILL NOT maintain and/or enforce a mandatory ar- bitration agreement that requires our employees, as a con- dition of employment, to waive the right to maintain class or collective actions in all forums, whether arbitral or ju- dicial. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights listed above. WE WILL rescind the Binding Arbitration Agreement and Toyota Sunnyvale Employee Handbook Employment Acknowledgment Agreement (Agreement) in all of its forms, or revise it in all of its forms to make clear that the Agreement does not constitute a waiver of your right to maintain employment-related joint, class, or collective ac- tions in all forums. WE WILL notify all current and former employees who were required to sign the Agreement in any of its forms that the Agreement has been rescinded or revised and, if revised, WE WILL provide them a copy of the revised agreement. WE WILL notify the Superior Court of California, Santa Clara County that we have rescinded or revised the man- datory arbitration agreement upon which we based our motion to compel individual arbitration and stay judicial proceedings in the wage and hour class action brought by Richard Vogel, and WE WILL inform the court that we no longer oppose the lawsuit on the basis of the arbitration agreement. WE WILL reimburse Richard Vogel for any reasonable attorneys’ fees and litigation expenses that he may have 7 Even if a conflict existed between the NLRA and an arbitration agreement’s class waiver provisions, the FAA requires that the arbitra- tion agreement be enforced according to its terms. Murphy Oil, above, slip op. at 34 (Member Miscimarra, dissenting in part); id., slip op. at 49– 58 (Member Johnson, dissenting). 8 See, e.g., Murphy Oil, Inc., USA v. NLRB, above; Johnmohammadi v. Bloomingdale’s, 755 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2014); D. R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, above; Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc., 702 F.3d 1050 (8th Cir. 2013); Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP, 726 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2013). 9 Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB, above, at 779. TOYOTA SUNNYVALE 489 incurred in opposing the sour motion to stay the collective lawsuit and compel individual arbitration. PRICE-SIMMS, INC. D/B/A TOYOTA SUNNYVALE The Board’s decision can be found at www.nlrb.gov/case/32–CA–138015 or by using the QR code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, 1015 Half Street, S.E., Room 5011, Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling (202) 273–1940.