368 NLRB No. 83
Cedars-Sinai Medical Center
368 NLRB No. 83
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
bound volumes of NLRB decisions. Readers are requested to notify the Ex-
ecutive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C.
20570, of any typographical or other formal errors so that corrections can
be included in the bound volumes.
Cedars-Sinai Medical Center and Chandra Lips. Case
31–CA–143038
September 30, 2019
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN RING AND MEMBERS MCFERRAN
AND KAPLAN
On March 15, 2016, Administrative Law Judge Ariel L.
Sotolongo issued the attached decision. The Respondent
filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and the General
Counsel filed an answering brief. The Charging Party also
filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and the Respond-
ent filed an answering brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record in
light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm
the judge’s rulings, findings, and conclusions only to the
extent consistent with this Decision and Order.1
I. BACKGROUND
Since at least July 2011, the Respondent has maintained
a Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate Claims (Agreement),
which employees are required to sign as a condition of em-
ployment. The relevant portion of the Agreement reads as
follows:
It is not uncommon for disputes to arise between an em-
ployer and an employee. Arbitration is a speedy, impar-
tial and cost-effective way to resolve these disputes. For
this reason, except as otherwise provided in this Agree-
ment, you and Cedars-Sinai agree that all claims or con-
troversies in any way relating to or associated with your
employment or the termination of your employment
(“Claims”) will be resolved exclusively by binding arbi-
tration. For purposes of this Agreement, Claims in-
cludes, but is not limited to, all statutory, contractual
and/or common law claims including, but not limited to,
claims arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964; the Age Discrimination in Employment Act; the
Equal Pay Act of 1963; the California Fair Employment
and Housing Act; California Labor Code sections 200,
et seq., 970, and 1050, et seq; the Fair Labor Standards
Act; and the Americans with Disabilities Act.
Claims not covered by this Agreement
1 We shall modify the judge’s recommended Order to conform to our
findings and in accordance with our decision in Excel Container, Inc.,
This Agreement to Arbitrate does not apply to:
Workers’ Compensation or Unemployment Insur-
ance claims;
Claims which parties are legally prohibited from
submitting to arbitration;
Claims under an employee pension or benefit plan,
the terms of which contain its own arbitration or
claims review procedure;
Claims covered by an applicable collective bargain-
ing agreement or that are preempted by federal la-
bor laws;
Claims of employees with written “Employment
Agreements” that contain arbitration provisions.
. . .
By signing this agreement, you agree that Cedars-Sinai
and you will have claims decided by an arbitrator rather
than by a judge or jury.
In 2011, Charging Party Chandra Lips signed a copy of
the Agreement as a condition of her employment with the
Respondent. On April 18, 2014, Lips filed a complaint for
damages with the designated arbitration association re-
garding a dispute that arose out of her employment and
sought class status for those employees similarly situated.
In response, the Respondent argued that the Agreement
did not permit class arbitration. Ultimately, the arbitrator
determined that the Agreement did not preclude class ar-
bitration and allowed Lips to proceed. The Respondent
filed a motion for reconsideration with the arbitrator and
also filed a “Complaint for Declaratory Relief” in state
court. Its filing in state court sought to prevent Lips from
pursuing class status in arbitration pursuant to the terms of
the Agreement.
II. DISCUSSION
The judge found that the Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act by maintain-
ing the Agreement because employees would reasonably
read it to prohibit the filing of unfair labor practice charges
with the Board. In addition, the judge found that the Re-
spondent violated Section 8(a)(1) by filing the request for
declaratory relief in state court seeking to force Lips into
individual arbitration because it restricted her right to pur-
sue collective action. Finally, the judge dismissed the al-
legation that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) by
opposing Lips’ request for class action status before the
arbitrator.
325 NLRB 17 (1997). We shall also substitute a new notice to conform
to the Order as modified.
2
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
For the reasons stated by the judge, we agree with his
dismissal of the allegation that the Respondent unlawfully
opposed the request for class action status before the arbi-
trator.2 For the reasons set forth below, we also adopt his
finding that maintenance of the Agreement is unlawful to
the extent that it applied to claims arising under the Act.
However, we reverse the judge’s finding that the Re-
spondent unlawfully filed a request for declaratory relief
in state court.
A. Maintenance of the Mutual Agreement to
Arbitrate Claims
In concluding that the Respondent unlawfully main-
tained the Agreement, the judge applied the Board’s deci-
sion in U-Haul Co. of California, 347 NLRB 375, 377–
378 (2006), enfd. 255 Fed.Appx. 527 (D.C. Cir. 2007),
which relied on the “reasonably construe” prong of Lu-
theran Heritage Village-Livonia, 343 NLRB 646 (2004).
In The Boeing Company, 365 NLRB No. 154 (2017), the
Board overruled the “reasonably construe” prong of Lu-
theran Heritage and announced a new standard, which ap-
plies retroactively, for evaluating the lawfulness of a fa-
cially neutral policy. Id., slip op. at 3, 16–17.3
In Prime Healthcare Paradise Valley, LLC, the Board
held that “an arbitration agreement that explicitly prohib-
its the filing of claims with the Board or, more generally,
with administrative agencies must be found unlawful” be-
cause “[s]uch an agreement constitutes an explicit prohi-
bition on the exercise of employee rights under the Act.”
368 NLRB No. 10, slip op. at 5 (2019). The Board further
stated that where an agreement does not explicitly prohibit
the filing of claims with the Board, the Board must apply
the standard set forth in Boeing and initially “determine
whether that agreement, ‘when reasonably interpreted,
would potentially interfere with the exercise of NLRA
rights.’” Id. (quoting Boeing, above, slip op. at 3). “The
‘when reasonably interpreted’ standard is objective and
looks solely to the wording of the rule, policy, or other
provision at issue[,] . . . interpreted from the employees’
perspective.” Id., slip op. at 6 fn. 14.
Applying this standard, the Board found that the arbi-
tration agreement in Prime Healthcare violated the Act
because its provisions, “taken as a whole, make arbitration
the exclusive forum for the resolution of all claims, includ-
ing federal statutory claims under the National Labor
2 See also Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp., 559
U.S. 662, 684 (2010) (holding that a “party may not be compelled under
the [Federal Arbitration Act] to submit to class arbitration unless there is
a contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to do so”) (em-
phasis in original).
3 Under Boeing, the Board first determines whether a challenged rule
or policy, reasonably interpreted, would interfere with the exercise of
rights under Sec. 7 of the Act. If not, the rule or policy is lawful. If so,
Relations Act.” Id., slip op. at 6 (emphasis in original).
Further, the Board found that, “as a matter of law, there is
not and cannot be any legitimate justification for provi-
sions, in an arbitration agreement or otherwise, that re-
strict employees’ access to the Board or its processes.” Id.
The Agreement here requires that “all claims or contro-
versies in any way relating to or associated with . . . em-
ployment or the termination of . . . employment . . . will
be resolved exclusively by binding arbitration,” including
“all statutory . . . claims.” As in Prime Healthcare, this
language, when reasonably interpreted under Boeing’s ob-
jective reasonable employee standard, plainly makes arbi-
tration the exclusive forum for the resolution of statutory
claims arising under the Act. Further, claims arising under
the Act are not specifically listed among those claims not
covered by the Agreement’s otherwise exclusive arbitra-
tion mandate. The Respondent contends, however, that
the exclusion of claims that are “preempted by federal la-
bor laws” is a sufficient savings clause to render the
Agreement lawful. We disagree. As recounted in Prime
Healthcare, above, slip op. at 3–4, the General Counsel
has suggested six principles for analyzing arbitration
agreements in light of Boeing, with the fourth such princi-
ple stating as follows:
Vague savings clauses that would require employees to
“meticulously determine the state of the law” them-
selves are likely to interfere with the exercise of NLRA
rights. Such clauses include, for example, those stating
that “nothing in this agreement shall be construed to re-
quire any claim to be arbitrated if an agreement to arbi-
trate such claim is prohibited by law,” or that exclusively
require arbitration but limit that requirement to circum-
stances where a claim “may lawfully be resolved by ar-
bitration.”
We find that this principle applies here.4 The vague ref-
erence to the exclusion of claims that are “preempted by
federal labor laws” is the only language relied on by the
Respondent as a savings clause allegedly sufficient to ex-
clude claims arising under the Act from the Agreement’s
otherwise explicit inclusion of all statutory claims. An ob-
jectively reasonable employee, as defined in Boeing and
Prime Healthcare, reading this vague language would not
divine an implicit intent to exclude claims arising under
the Board evaluates two things: “(i) the nature and extent of the potential
impact on NLRA rights, and (ii) legitimate justifications associated with
the rule.” Id., slip op. at 3. The Boeing standard replaced the “reasonably
construe” prong of Lutheran Heritage. Other aspects of Lutheran Her-
itage remain intact, including whether a challenged rule or policy explic-
itly restricts activities protected by Sec. 7. 343 NLRB at 646.
4 We do not otherwise pass on the merits of the General Counsel’s
six principles. Accord Prime Healthcare, above, slip op. at 3 fn. 4.
CEDARS-SINAI MEDICAL CENTER
3
the Act. It is unlikely that such an employee would be
familiar with the legal doctrine of preemption, let alone
what actions and claims are preempted by federal labor
laws. See Prime Healthcare, above, slip op. at 3; Ingram
Book Co., 315 NLRB 515, 516 fn. 2 (1994) (“Rank-and-
file employees do not generally carry lawbooks to work or
apply legal analysis to company rules as do lawyers, and
cannot be expected to have the expertise to examine com-
pany rules from a legal standpoint.”).5 For that matter, the
concept of labor law preemption has frequently eluded
definition even among those in the legal profession, has
involved extensive litigation, and has required interpreta-
tion by the Supreme Court on several occasions. See, e.g.,
Chamber of Commerce v. Brown, 554 U.S. 60 (2008);
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180 (1978);
Machinists Lodge 76 v. Wisconsin Employment Rela-
tions Commission, 427 U.S. 132 (1976); San Diego Build-
ing Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
In sum, the language of the Agreement, when reasona-
bly interpreted, makes arbitration the exclusive forum for
resolution of claims arising under the Act, and the Agree-
ment’s carve-out of claims “preempted by federal labor
laws” is legally insufficient. The Agreement restricts em-
ployee access to the Board, and such a restriction of Sec-
tion 7 rights cannot be supported by any legitimate busi-
ness justification.6 Accordingly, we find that the Re-
spondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by maintain-
ing the Agreement.7
B. Respondent’s Opposition to Class Arbitration
The judge found, relying on the Board’s decision in
Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 361 NLRB 774 (2014), enf. denied
in relevant part 808 F.3d 1013 (5th Cir. 2015), that the Re-
spondent violated Section 8(a)(1) by filing a state court
action to force Lips into individual arbitration rather than
class arbitration. After the judge issued his decision, the
Supreme Court issued a decision in Epic Systems Corp. v.
Lewis, 584 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018), a consolidated
proceeding including review of the court decision below
in Murphy Oil, in which the Supreme Court expressly re-
jected the rationale from Murphy Oil, which the judge re-
lied on to find the violation at issue. Accordingly, in light
of the Supreme Court’s decision in Epic Systems, we
5 This is in contrast to the savings clause language in the arbitration
agreement found lawful in Briad Wenco, 368 NLRB No. 72 (2019). That
language expressly stated: “Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed
to prohibit any current or former employee from filing any charge or
complaint or participating in any investigation or proceeding conducted
by an administrative agency, including but not limited to . . . the National
Labor Relations Board . . . .” Id., slip op. at 1.
6 Therefore, the Agreement would be considered a “Category 3” pol-
icy under Boeing. 365 NLRB No. 154, slip op. at 4, 15.
7 Member McFerran acknowledges that Boeing, above, is currently
governing law, and joins the majority in applying that standard for
reverse the judge’s finding and conclude that the com-
plaint allegation that the Respondent unlawfully sought to
compel Lips into individual arbitration must be dismissed.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board orders that the Re-
spondent, Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, Los Angeles,
California, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Maintaining a Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate
Claims that employees reasonably would believe bars or
restricts the right of employees to file charges with the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Rescind the Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate Claims
in all its forms or revise it in all its forms to make clear to
employees that the Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate Claims
does not bar or restrict employees’ right to file charges
with the National Labor Relations Board.
(b) Notify all current and former employees who were
required to sign or otherwise became bound to the Mutual
Agreement to Arbitrate Claims in any form that the Mu-
tual Agreement to Arbitrate Claims has been rescinded or
revised and, if revised, provide them a copy of the revised
agreement.
(c) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
all its facilities in California where the Mutual Agreement
to Arbitrate Claims is or has been in effect, copies of the
attached notice marked “Appendix.”8 Copies of the no-
tice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Re-
gion 31, after being signed by the Respondent’s author-
ized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent and
maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places,
including all places where notices to employees are cus-
tomarily posted. In addition to physical posting of paper
notices, notices shall be distributed electronically, such as
by email, posting on an intranet or an internet site, and/or
other electronic means, if the Respondent customarily
institutional reasons but adheres to and reiterates her dissent in that case.
Here, Member McFerran agrees with her colleagues that employees
would reasonably construe the Agreement as prohibiting employees
from filing charges with the Board, under either the standard set forth in
Boeing or the previous standard.
8 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the National
Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the
United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor
Relations Board.”
4
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
communicates with its employees by such means. Rea-
sonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure
that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any
other material. If the Respondent has gone out of business
or closed the facility involved in these proceedings, the
Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a
copy of the notice marked “Appendix” to all current em-
ployees and former employees employed by the Respond-
ent at any time since June 16, 2014.
(d) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with
the Regional Director for Region 31 a sworn certification
of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region
attesting to the steps that the Respondent has taken to com-
ply.
Dated, Washington, D.C. September 30, 2019
______________________________________
John F. Ring,
Chairman
______________________________________
Lauren McFerran,
Member
_____________________________________
Marvin E. Kaplan,
Member
(SEAL) NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vi-
olated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and
obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your
behalf
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected ac-
tivities.
WE WILL NOT maintain a Mutual Agreement to Arbi-
trate Claims that you reasonably would believe bars or
restricts your right to file charges with the National Labor
Relations Board.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
listed above.
WE WILL rescind the Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate
Claims in all its forms or revise it in all its forms to make
clear that the Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate Claims does
not restrict your right to file charges with the National La-
bor Relations Board.
WE WILL notify all current and former employees who
were required to sign or otherwise became bound to the
Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate Claims in any form that
the Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate Claims has been re-
scinded or revised and, if revised, WE WILL provide them
a copy of the revised agreement.
CEDARS-SINAI MEDICAL CENTER
The
Board’s
decision
can
be
found
at
https://www.nlrb.gov/case/31-CA-143038 or by using the
QR code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the
decision from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Rela-
tions Board, 1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20570,
or by calling (202) 273–1940.
Nikki N. Cheaney, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Henry E. Farber, Esq., and Taylor S. Ball, Esq. (Davis Wright
Tremaine LLP), for the Respondent.
I. Benjamin Blady, Esq. (Blady Weinreb Law Group, LLP), for
the Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
ARIEL L. SOTOLONGO, Administrative Law Judge. On May
29, 2015, the Regional Director for Region 31 of the Board,
based on a charged filed by Chandra Lips, an individual (the
Charging Party), issued a complaint alleging that Respondent
Cedars-Sinai Medical Center violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act
by: (1) maintaining a mandatory arbitration agreement that could
reasonably be interpreted by employees to preclude them from,
or restrict them in, filing charges with the Board; and (2) seeking
to enforce said mandatory arbitration agreement by filing mo-
tions and briefs with an arbitrator to preclude class actions and
seeking a declaratory judgment to that effect in the Superior
CEDARS-SINAI MEDICAL CENTER
5
Court of the State of California. I presided over this case in Los
Angeles, California on August 31, 2015. Most of the facts in this
case are not in dispute, and indeed almost all the evidence was
admitted by way of joint stipulations. There was limited testi-
mony during the trial, as well as offers of proof regarding certain
testimony that I ruled was not relevant, as discussed below.1
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent admits, and I find, that it is a corporation with an
office and place of business in Los Angeles, California, where it
is engaged in the operation of an acute care hospital. In conduct-
ing its business operations during the 12-month period ending on
April 30, 2015, Respondent received gross revenues in excess of
$250,000. During the same time period, Respondent purchased
and received at its Los Angeles, California facility goods valued
in excess of $5000 directly from points outside the State of Cal-
ifornia. Respondent admits, and I find, that it is an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6),
and (7) of the Act, and that it is a health care institution within
the meaning of Section 2(14) of the Act.
II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
As briefly discussed above, the central issue in this case con-
cerns the “Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate Claims” (MAA) that
Respondent admittedly required its employees to execute as a
condition of employment, including Charging Party Sandra Lips.
The MAA provides, in relevant part:
It is not uncommon for disputes to arise between an employer
and an employee. Arbitration is a speedy, impartial and cost-
effective way to resolve these disputes. For this reason, except
as otherwise provided in this Agreement, you and Cedars- Si-
nai agree that all claims or controversies in any way relating to
or associated with your employment or the termination of your
employment (Claims) will be resolved exclusively by binding
arbitration. For the purposes of this Agreement, Claims in-
cludes, but is not limited to, all statutory, contractual and/or
common law claims including, but not limited to, claims aris-
ing under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act; the Equal Pay Act of
1963; the California Fair Employment and Housing Act; Cali-
fornia Labor Code sections 200, et seq., 970 and 1050, et seq;
the Fair Labor Standards Act; and the Americans with Disabil-
ities Act.
Claims not covered by this Agreement
This Agreement to Arbitrate does not apply to:
Workers’ Compensation or Unemployment Insurance
claims;
Claims which parties are legally prohibited from submit-
ting to arbitration;
Claims under an employee pension or benefit plan, the
1 As discussed further below in more detail, I granted Respondent’s
request for permission to submit a special appeal to the Board regarding
my ruling that certain testimony proffered by Respondent was not
terms of which contain its own arbitration or claims re-
view procedure;
Claims covered by an applicable collective bargaining
agreement or that are preempted by federal labor laws;
Claims of employees with written “Employment Agree-
ments” that contain arbitration provisions.
. . .
By signing this agreement, you agree that Cedars-Sinai and you
will have claims decided by an arbitrator rather than by a judge
or jury. (GC Exh. 3, 1.)
In a “Joint Stipulation of Facts and Index of Exhibits” (JSF),
which is part of the record as Joint Exhibit 1 (Jt. Exh. 1), the
parties (General Counsel, Respondent, and Charging Party Lips)
agreed to the following facts:
Charging Party was employed by Respondent as a Medi-
cal Staff Assistant II from about July 13, 2011, to about
May 10, 2013. By letter dated July 6, 2011, Respondent
provided an offer of employment to Charging Party. The
letter stated that the offer was “contingent upon . . . [y]our
signature on an agreement to arbitrate any claims that may
arise from or relate to your employment, with the excep-
tion of those claims excluded in the agreement.” A copy
of Respondent’s July 6, 2011 letter is in evidence as Gen-
eral Counsel Exhibit 2.
The Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate Claims proffered by
Respondent to the Charging Party with the offer of em-
ployment, and signed by the Charging Party, is in evi-
dence as General Counsel Exhibit 3. Since at least July
12, 2011, Respondent has maintained a Mutual Agree-
ment to Arbitrate Claims and has required employees, in-
cluding the Charging Party, to sign a Mutual Agreement
to Arbitrate Claims as a condition of employment.
On April 18, 2014, Charging Party filed a Complaint for
Damages with the American Arbitration Association
against the Respondent in Chandra Lips an individual, vs.
Cedars Sinai Medical Center, a California corporation;
Saima Abbas, an individual; and Does 1 through 50, in-
clusive (the Arbitration). A copy of Charging Party’s
Complaint for Damages is in evidence as General Coun-
sel Exhibit 4.
On July 8, 2014, Respondent filed an Answering State-
ment in the Arbitration, a copy of which is in evidence as
General Counsel Exhibit 5.
On October 3, 2014, Respondent filed its Opening Brief
Re: Threshold Clause Construction Award Compelling
Individual Arbitration in the Arbitration, a copy of which
is in evidence as General Counsel Exhibit 6.
On October 24, 2014, Charging Party filed its Brief in
Support of Construction of Arbitration Agreement Per-
mitting Arbitration of Putative Class Claims in the
relevant, and therefore not admissible. The Board thereafter sustained
my ruling on this issue.
6
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Arbitration, a copy of which is in evidence as General
Counsel Exhibit 7.
On November 7, 2014, Respondent filed its Reply Brief
Re: Threshold Clause Construction Award Compelling
Individual Arbitration in the Arbitration, a copy of which
is in evidence as General Counsel Exhibit 8.
On December 17, 2014, the Arbitrator issued a Clause
Construction Award, a copy of which is attached as Gen-
eral Counsel Exhibit 9.
On December 27, 2014, Respondent sought reconsidera-
tion of the Clause Construction Award and filed a Recon-
sideration Brief in the Arbitration, a copy of which is in
evidence as General Counsel Exhibit 10.
On April 9, 2015, the Arbitrator declined to reconsider the
Clause Construction Award, holding that she did not have
jurisdiction to do so. A copy of the Arbitrator’s Ruling is
in evidence as General Counsel Exhibit [11].2
On February 2, 2015, Respondent filed a Complaint for
Declaratory Relief in the Superior Court of the State of
California, County of Los Angeles in Cedars-Sinai Med-
ical Center, a California Corporation, and Saima Abbas,
an individual v. Chandra Lips, an individual, Case No.
BC 571046, a copy of which is in evidence as General
Counsel Exhibit [12]. 3 This action for Declaratory Relief
is still pending in the Superior Court.
Charging Party filed the charge in Case 31–CA–143038
on December 16, 2014, and a copy of the charge was
served on Respondent by U.S. mail on December 17,
2014.
Charging Party filed the first amended charge in Case 31–
CA–143038 on April 1, 2015, and a copy of the first
amended charge was served on Respondent by U.S. mail
on April 3, 2015.
On January 16, 2015, Jonathan Clemons, an employee of
Respondent, filed a charge against Respondent in Case
31–CA–144678 in which he alleged that Respondent vi-
olated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by terminating
him. A copy of the charge in Case 31–CA–144678 is in
evidence as Respondent Exhibit 1. Mr. Clemons signed
the same Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate Claims as the
Charging Party. A copy of the Mutual Agreement to Ar-
bitrate Claims signed by Mr. Clemons is in evidence as
Respondent Exhibit 2. The charge in Case 31–CA–
144678 was withdrawn by Mr. Clemons on or about
March 30, 2015. At no time did Respondent contend that
the Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate Claims signed by Mr.
Clemons precluded him from filing the charge or operated
as a defense to the charge.
2 The JSF is actually incorrect in that this document was actually
marked and admitted in the record as GC Exh. 12
3 This document was actually marked and received as GCExh. 11 (see
fn. above).
On March 16, 2015, Daniel Zaldana, an employee of Re-
spondent, filed a charge against Respondent in Case 31–
CA–148392 in which he alleged that Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by terminating him. A
copy of the charge in Case 31–CA–148392 is in evidence
as Respondent Exhibit 3. Mr. Zaldana signed the same
Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate Claims as the Charging
Party. A copy of the Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate
Claims signed by Mr. Zaldana is in evidence as Respond-
ent Exhibit 4. The charge in Case 31–CA–148392 was
dismissed by Region 31 on May 29, 2015. A copy of the
dismissal letter from the Regional Director of Region 31
of Mr. Zaldana’s charge is in evidence as Respondent Ex-
hibit 5. At no time did Respondent contend that the Mu-
tual Agreement to Arbitrate Claims signed by Mr. Zal-
dana precluded him from filing the charge or operated as
a defense to the charge.
Other than the above facts, neither the General Counsel nor
the Charging Party offered any additional evidence, including
testimony from any witness. Respondent, on the other hand,
called as a witness Catherine Jeter, its labor relations manager.
Jeter testified that as part of her duties, she routinely conducted
training and orientation classes for employees, during which they
were instructed about the provisions of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act (NLRA). As part of this training, Jeter told these em-
ployees that they were free to access the Board without fear of
retribution. She also testified that over the years, employees
have filed charges with the Board against Respondent, and that
Respondent has not taken any action to preclude the filing of
charges with the Board. Jeter admitted during cross examina-
tion, however, that she has only provided these training sessions
to registered nurses, not any other type of employees. She ad-
mitted that the Charging Party was a “Management Assistant,”
and that management assistants were not given the above-de-
scribed training. (Tr. 36–37; 40–42; 47–53; 54–57.)
In addition to the testimony of Jeter, Respondent sought to in-
troduce the testimony of two additional witnesses, Nancy Ish-
ioka, a recruitment manager, and Edward Finegan, a professor at
the University of Southern California (USC). Respondent
sought to show, through the testimony of Ishioka, that Respond-
ent’s employees are required to have at least a high school edu-
cation and to be proficient in English. Through the testimony of
Finegan, as an expert witness on linguistics, Respondent sought
to show that given the above employee requirements and char-
acteristics, no employee could reasonably interpret the MAA to
preclude the filing of charges with the Board. Both the General
Counsel and the Charging Party objected to the testimony of Ish-
ioga and Finegan, on the basis that their testimony was not rele-
vant.4 I sustained the objection(s), concluding that such testi-
mony was irrelevant in light of the fact that the applicable stand-
ard is an objective one, that is, whether an employee could rea-
sonably interpret the MAA to preclude the filing of Board
4 The General Counsel and Charging Party also objected to the testi-
mony of Finegan on the basis that Respondent had not notified them of
its intent to introduce testimony by an expert witness, pursuant to the
Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) §403. In light of my ruling as de-
scribed below, I find this additional objection need not be addressed.
CEDARS-SINAI MEDICAL CENTER
7
charges. The Board denied Respondent’s special appeal of my
ruling, finding that I had not abused my discretion in precluding
such testimony. See, Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, 31–CA–
143038, unpub. Board order issued Dec. 1, 2015 (2015 WL
7769416.
The above-described facts thus constitute the entire record
upon which I base my decision.
Discussion and Analysis
The central issue in this case is whether the MAA, admittedly
a mandatory condition of employment, violates Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act because employees could reasonably interpret it to
preclude, or inhibit, employees from filing charges with the
Board. Also, at issue is whether Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act by opposing the Charging Party’s attempt
seeking class action status before an arbitrator, and by later seek-
ing declaratory relief from a State court precluding the Charging
Party from pursuing class action status before the arbitrator pur-
suant to the provisions of the MAA. For the reasons discussed
below, I conclude that Respondent violated the Act because em-
ployees could reasonably interpret the MAA to preclude them
from filing charges with the Board. I also conclude that Re-
spondent violated the Act by attempting to have a State court
preclude employees from seeking class action status pursuant to
the MAA but find that Respondent did not violate the Act by
opposing the Charging Party’s class action status before an arbi-
trator.
1. Respondent Violated the Act by Maintaining a Mandatory
Arbitration Agreement that Employees could Reasonably
Interpret as Precluding the filing of Charges with the Board
At first glance, this case might appear to squarely fit under the
category of cases, by now numerous, stemming from the Board’s
decisions in D. R. Horton, 357 NLRB 2277 (2012), enf. denied
in relevant part 737 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2013) and Murphy Oil
USA, Inc., 361 NLRB 774 (2014), enf. denied in part 808 F.3d
1013 (5th Cir. 2015). A closer look reveals, however, that it does
not—at least not initially. Although this case, like D. R. Horton
and Murphy Oil involve the existence of a mandatory arbitration
agreement that requires the use of arbitration to resolve employ-
ment-related disputes, in the present case, unlike in those cases,
the MAA does not explicitly preclude employees from initiating
or seeking class action status in arbitration or in other forums.
Rather, the MAA is silent on this issue.
Under Board precedent, a work rule that may directly or indi-
rectly inhibit or preclude employees from engaging in activity
protected by Section 7 must be carefully scrutinized. To deter-
mine the validity of any such work rule, including an arbitration
agreement, I must first determine, pursuant to the Board’s ruling
in Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia, 343 NLRB 646 (2004), if
the rule explicitly restricts activities protected by Section 7. If
so, the rule is unlawful. If the rule does not explicitly restrict
Section 7 rights, I must examine the following criteria: (1)
whether employees would reasonably construe the rule to pro-
hibit (or restrict) Section 7 activity; (2) whether the rule was
promulgated in response to union activity; and (3) whether the
rule has been applied to restrict the exercise of Section 7 rights.
Lutheran Heritage, at 647; U-Haul Co. of California, 347 NLRB
375, 377 (2006), enfd. 255 Fed.Appx. 527 (D.C. Cir. 2007). See,
also, D. R. Horton, supra.
As discussed above, the MAA does not explicitly prohibit
class actions, nor explicitly precludes or restricts other Section 7
activity. Additionally, there is no evidence that the MAA was
promulgated in response to protected activity. Accordingly, the
MAA must be evaluated by applying the first and third criteria
under Lutheran Heritage. Applying the first criteria, whether
employees could reasonably construe the language of the MAA
to prohibit or inhibit Section 7 activity, I conclude that it does. I
find that employees could reasonably conclude that the MAA
precludes them from filing charges with the Board, because they
would first be required to recur to arbitration. I note in this re-
gard that the language of the MAA is sweeping in that it requires
employees to submit to arbitration “all statutory, contractual
and/or common law claims . . . “(emphasis added). While the
MAA later provides for exceptions, including claims “. . .
preempted by federal labor laws,” such language is too vague for
an employee not legally trained—if indeed not versed in labor
law—to understand its implications. See, e.g., Ralph’s Grocery
Co., 363 NLRB No. 128, slip op. at 4 (2016) (“rank and file em-
ployees. . . cannot be expected to have the expertise to examine
company rules from a legal standpoint.” Id., slip op. at 5, quoting
Ingram Book Co., 315 NLRB 515, 516 fn. 2 (1994)). Indeed, the
Board has repeatedly found language similar to the one in the
MAA to be unlawful because employees would reasonably as-
sume it bars them from bringing claims to the Board. See, e.g.,
2 Sisters Food Group, Inc., 357 NLRB 1816, 1817 (2011); U-
Haul Co. of California, supra, at 377–378; Century Fast Foods,
Inc., 363 NLRB No. 97, slip op. at 10–11 (2016). Even more
ominously for Respondent, the Board has also found that even in
cases where the language of the arbitration agreement appears to
make a specific exception for Board proceedings, the inherent
ambiguity in the overall language of such agreement still results
in an unlawful impact on the employees’ exercise of Section 7
rights. See, e.g., Amex Card Services Co., 363 NLRB No. 40,
slip op. at 2–3 (2015), citing Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 NLRB
824, 828 (1998) (“[A]ny ambiguity in the rule must be construed
against the Respondent as the promulgator of the rule”); Solar-
City Corp., 363 NLRB No. 83, slip op. at 4–6 (2015). Needless
to say, if the language of arbitration agreements containing lan-
guage specifically exempting Board proceedings could not save
them from running afoul of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, the MAA,
which does not contain any such language, cannot withstand
scrutiny.
Respondent argues that evidence contained in the JSF that
shows that employees Jonathan Clemons and Daniel Zaldana,
and perhaps others, have filed charges with the Board shows that
employees would not reasonably understand the language of the
MAA to preclude or inhibit the filing of Board charges. I reject
this argument because the Board has long made it clear that in
determining whether language or conduct can reasonably be in-
terpreted to interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the
exercise of their Sec 7 rights, the test is an objective one. See,
e.g., Multi-Aid Services, 331 NLRB 1226, 1227–1228 (2000);
American Freightways Co., Inc., 124 NLRB 146, 147 (1959).
Thus, the mere fact that one or more employees may have had
the sophistication or ingenuity to realize that the MAA’s
8
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
language was not a barrier to filing charges with the Board does
not signify that the language could not have been reasonably in-
terpreted by many, if not most, to do just that.5 For the same
reasons, I stand by my ruling that the proffered testimony by Re-
spondent’s witnesses Ishioka and Finegan was not relevant, a
ruling earlier affirmed by the Board, as noted above. Finally, I
find it equally irrelevant that some employees—registered
nurses—may have been told during training that they were free
to access the Board without fear of retaliation, as testified by
Jeter. It is notable that many other categories of employees, in-
cluding the Charging Party, apparently did not receive similar
training.6 Accordingly, even if it could be assumed that such
training somehow neutralized the coercive impact of the MAA’s
language—a doubtful proposition in light of the cases cited
above—many employees, including the Charging Party, did not
receive such training, and were thus coerced by the language of
the MAA.7
In light of the above, I conclude that Respondent violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the Act by maintaining a mandatory arbitration
agreement that employees could reasonably interpret as preclud-
ing them from filing charges with the Board.
2. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by Filing a
Complaint for Declaratory Relief in State Court
As noted in the JSF, On February 2, 2015, Respondent filed a
“Complaint for Declaratory Relief” in the Superior Court of the
State of California, County of Los Angeles in Cedars-Sinai Med-
ical Center, a California Corporation, and Saima Abbas, an in-
dividual v. Chandra Lips, an individual, Case No. BC 571046.
By filing this action, Respondent seeks to compel the Charging
Party to submit her employment-related claims to individual ar-
bitration. In essence, Respondent asks the court to reverse the
arbitrator’s decision to allow the Charging Party’s arbitration to
proceed as a class action, and force her to submit to individual
arbitration pursuant to the terms of the MAA and “relevant au-
thority,” citing, inter alia, a ruling by the California Court of Ap-
peal, Nelsen v. Legacy Partners Residential, Inc., 207 Cal. App.
4th 1115, 1129 (2012), and a Supreme Court case, Stolt-Nielsen
5 There is no telling, for example, if Clemmons or Saldana needed to
get legal advice, from an attorney or the Board itself, on whether they
were restricted by the MAA from filing Board charges. If that were the
case, it would be further evidence of the inhibiting nature of the MAA’s
language.
6 Moreover, fear of retaliation is not the point. Employees might not
fear retaliation—which would be an independent violation of Sec.
8(a)(4) of the Act—but might still be inhibited from filing charges be-
cause they could reasonably believe it would be an exercise in futility,
given the MAA’s preemptive language.
7 Respondent raises two additional affirmative defenses, both of
which lack merit. First, Respondent avers that Charging Party Lips’
charge is barred by Section 10(b) of the Act because the charge in this
case was filed more than 6 months after she signed the MAA. The Board
has repeatedly held, however, that the maintenance of such unlawful ar-
bitration agreement constitutes a “continuing violation” that in essence
extends the 10(b) period into infinity. See, e.g., AWG Ambassador, LLC,
363 NLRB No. 137, slip op. at 7–8 (2016); Cellular Sales of Missouri,
LLC, 362 NLRB 241, 242 and fn. 7 (2015); The Neiman Marcus Group,
362 NLRB 1286, 1287 fn. 6 (2015) and cases cited therein. Additionally,
Respondent argues that Lips was not an “employee” within the meaning
of Section 2(3) of the Act because she was no longer employed by
S.A. v. Animal Feeds Int’l Corp., 130 S.Ct. 1758, 1775–1776
(2010).
The Board’s rulings in D. R. Horton and Murphy Oil, supra,
are clearly dispositive of this issue. In Murphy Oil, the Board,
expanding on its ruling in D. R. Horton, found that an employer
violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by seeking to force employ-
ees, through court actions, into individual arbitration pursuant to
mandatory arbitration agreements, therefore restricting em-
ployee rights under Section 7 to pursue collective action. The
fact that in Murphy Oil the action was filed in Federal court,
whereas the action in this case was filed in State court, makes no
difference. Century Fast Foods, supra, slip op. at 9. Although
Respondent, like most if not all employers in these types of
cases, argues that D. R. Horton and Murphy Oil were wrongly
decided, pointing to the 5th Circuit’s rejection of the Board’s
views on these matters, I am compelled to follow the Board’s
decisions unless the Supreme Court overrules the Board. See,
e.g., Pathmark Stores, 342 NLRB 378, fn. 1 (2004); Waco, Inc.,
273 NLRB 746, 749 fn. 14 (1984), and cases cited therein.
Accordingly, and in light of the above, I conclude that Re-
spondent violated Sec. 8(a)(1) of the Act by filing and pursuing
a State court action to force the Charging Party into individual
arbitration of her employment-related claims.
3. Respondent Did Not Violate the Act by Opposing the
Charging Party’s Actions to Obtain Class Action Status
Before an Arbitrator
As described in the JSF, on April 18, 2014, the Charging Party
filed a complaint for damages with the American Arbitration As-
sociation (AAA) regarding a dispute that occurred as part of her
employment by Respondent. The Charging party filed this ac-
tion on behalf of herself and other employees (“Does 1 through
50, inclusive”), in essence seeking or alleging class action status.
Thereafter, in its initial answer (on July 8, 2014), its opening
brief (on October 3, 2014), its reply brief (on November 7, 2014),
and motion for reconsideration (on December 27, 2014), Re-
spondent opposed the Charging Party’s request for class action
status. In its complaint, the General Counsel alleges that this
Respondent, and because she had not lost her job due to a “labor dispute”
or because of an unfair labor practice, citing Chemical Workers v. Pitts-
burgh Glass, 404 U.S. 157, 166 (1971); and Operating Engineers, Local
39, 346 NLRB 336, 347 fn. 9 (2006). Respondent misreads both cases.
In Chemical Workers the Supreme Court stressed that the individuals at
issue had long since retired and were no longer members of an active
work force or available for hire. The Court therefore concluded that the
employer had no obligation to bargain with the union regarding a change
in their retiree pension or benefits, since these individuals were no longer
employees within the meaning of Sec. 2(3). Such is far from the case
with Charging Party Lips, a relatively young woman who has not retired
and who appears to be contesting the underlying cause of her termination
by Respondent in the arbitration proceedings. The passage cited by Re-
spondent in Operating Engineers—to the effect that an individual had
been discharged for “cause” and was thus no longer a Sec. 2(3) em-
ployee- appears to be dicta by the Administrative Law Judge, who did
not rely on that conclusion as the main factor in his decision. Far more
on point are the Board decisions in Haynes Building Services, LLC, 363
NLRB No. 125, slip op. at 12 (2016), and cases cited therein, including
Waco, Inc., 273 NLRB 746, 747 (1984), and Cellular Sales, supra.,
where the Board re-affirmed the principle that former employees are in-
deed “employees” within the meaning of Sec. 2(3).
CEDARS-SINAI MEDICAL CENTER
9
conduct by Respondent, as detailed on paragraphs on paragraph
4(a), (b), (c), and (e) of the complaint (and admitted as part of
the JSF), violated Sec. 8(a)(1) of the Act, as alleged on paragraph
6, which encompasses all the conduct alleged in paragraphs 3
through 5 of the complaint.8 Curiously, in its brief, the General
Counsel does not even discuss Respondent’s conduct in regard
to the filing of the legal briefs and motions submitted to the ar-
bitrator, only discussing Respondent’s conduct with regard to fil-
ing its motion for declaratory relief in State court, discussed
above. Whether this was by oversight or because the General
Counsel decided not to pursue the allegations in paragraph(s)
4(a), (b), (c), (d) and (e) is not clear, since the General Counsel
never withdrew such allegations. It might as well have, because
the Board’s decisions in Citigroup Technology, Inc., 363 NLRB
No. 55 (2015), and more recently, Concord Honda, 363 NLRB
No. 136, slip op. at 1–2 (2016), indicate that where an employee
initially files an initial action with an arbitrator, an employer’s
filings with the arbitrator opposing class action status are not un-
lawful, even if such opposition is based on a mandatory arbitra-
tion agreement that arguably precludes class action status. While
the Board does not go into much detail explaining its rationale in
these decisions, I believe it is based on its discussion in D. R.
Horton and Murphy Oil, in which the Board correctly explained
that class action status is not guaranteed by Section 7—only the
right to seek such status is. Therefore, an employer is free to
oppose the granting class action status before an arbitrator. It is
only when an employer seeks enforcement of an unlawful arbi-
tration agreement in court to automatically preclude class actions
that it runs afoul of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Accordingly, and for these reasons, I conclude that the allega-
tions of paragraph 6 of the complaint, as they relate to the con-
duct alleged in paragraphs 4(a), (b), (c), (d) and (e) of the com-
plaint should be, and are, dismissed.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent at all times material herein has been an em-
ployer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2),
(6), and (7) of the Act.
2. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by main-
taining a mandatory arbitration agreement that employees could
reasonably construe to preclude filing of charges with the Board,
and by enforcing said arbitration agreement so as to preclude
class or collective actions actions.
3. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by filing a
Complaint for Declaratory Relief in the Superior Court of the
State of California, County of Los Angeles in Cedars-Sinai Med-
ical Center, a California Corporation, and Saima Abbas, an in-
dividual v. Chandra Lips, an individual, Case No. BC 571046,
on February 2, 2015.
4. Respondent did not otherwise violate the Act, specifically
8 Indeed, the all-inclusive language of paragraph 6 of the complaint
even subsumes the allegation contained in paragraph 4(d), which de-
scribes the arbitrator’s decision to grant class action status as sought by
the Charging Party. How such action by the arbitrator could be unlaw-
ful—and attributable to Respondent—is a mystery to me.
9 Pursuant to the Board’s D. R. Horton and Murphy Oil rulings, Re-
spondent is free to oppose class certification on any basis other that an
unlawful arbitration agreement compelling employees to arbitrate
as alleged in paragraph 6 of the complaint as it relates to para-
graphs 4(a), (b), (c), and (d) of the complaint.
REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain unfair
labor practices, I shall order it to cease and desist and to take
certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of
the Act.
As I have concluded that the “Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate
Claims” (MAA) is unlawful, Respondent must revise or rescind
the MAA and advise their employees in writing that the MAA
has been revised or rescinded. Further, Respondent shall post
notices in all locations where the MAA was in effect informing
employees of the revision or rescission of the MAA and shall
provide said employees with a copy of any revised versions.
Any revision should clarify that such agreement does not bar or
restrict employees from seeking class wage and hour actions or
any other type of class employment-related actions in any forum,
and specifically does not bar or restrict employees from filing
charges with the NLRB.
Respondent shall further be ordered to notify the State Court
in Case No. BC 571046 that it no longer opposes the plaintiff’s
claims on the basis of the MAA, which has been rescinded or
revised because it was found unlawful, and, if the court grants
Respondent’s motion, move the court to vacate its order compel-
ling individual arbitration on the basis of the MAA.9 Respondent
shall also be ordered to reimburse Charging Party Lips for all
reasonable expenses and legal fees, with interest, incurred in op-
posing Respondent’s unlawful complaint for declaratory relief to
compel individual arbitration in a collective action. Interest shall
be computed as prescribed in New Horizons, 283 NLRB 1173
(1987), compounded daily as prescribed in Kentucky River Med-
ical Center, 356 NLRB 6 (2010).
Upon the forgoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and
upon the entire record, I issue the following recommended10
ORDER
Respondent Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, a corporation with
an office and principal place of business in Los Angeles, Cali-
fornia, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Maintaining a mandatory and binding arbitration agree-
ment that employees would reasonably believe bars or restricts
employees’ rights to file unfair labor practice charges with the
National Labor Relations Board or to access the Board’s pro-
cesses; or enforcing said agreement to preclude class or collec-
tive action by its employees.
(b) Filing or maintaining a complaint for declaratory relief to
enforce its MAA to thereby compel individual arbitration and
preclude employees from pursuing employment-related disputes
employment disputes on an individual basis. As the Board observed,
employees have Sec. 7 rights to seek class actions, not to have such class
actions approved.
10 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s
Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions and recommended Or-
der shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
10
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
with the Respondent on a class or collective basis in any forum.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectu-
ate the policies of the Act.
(a) Rescind the mandatory and binding arbitration agreements
in all of its forms, or revise them in all of its forms to make clear
to employees that the arbitration agreement does not restrict em-
ployees’ right to file charges with the National Labor Relations
Board or to access the Board’s processes, or preclude employees
from pursuing employment-related disputes with the Respondent
on a class or collective basis in any forum.
(b) Notify all current and former employees who were re-
quired to sign the arbitration agreement in any form that they
have been rescinded or revised and, if revised, provide them a
copy of the revised agreement.
(c) Within 14 days after service by the Region, notify the Su-
perior Court of the State of California in Case No. BC 571046
that it has rescinded or revised the mandatory arbitration agree-
ment upon which it based its complaint for declaratory relief to
compel individual arbitration of Chandra Lips’ claim, and inform
the court that it no longer opposes the action on the basis of the
arbitration agreement.
(d) In the manner set forth in this decision, reimburse Sandra
Lips for any reasonable attorneys’ fees and litigation expenses
that she may have incurred in opposing Respondent’s complaint
for declaratory relief.
(e) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at all its
locations in California where notices to employees are custom-
arily posted, copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix.”11
Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director
for Region 31, after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized
representative, shall be posted by the Respondent and maintained
for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all
places where notices to employees are customarily posted. In ad-
dition to physical posting of paper notices, the notices shall be
distributed electronically, such as by email, posting on an intra-
net or an internet site, and/or other electronic means, if the Re-
spondent customarily communicates with its employees by such
means. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to
ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any
other material. In the event that, during the pendency of these
proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of business or closed
the facilities involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall
duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all
current employees and former employees employed by the Re-
spondent at any time since December 16, 2014.
(f) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director for Region 31 a sworn certification of a re-
sponsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to
the steps that the Respondent has taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C. March 15, 2016
11 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of the United States court
of appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judgment
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated
Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your be-
half
Act together with other employees for your benefit and
protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activi-
ties.
WE WILL NOT maintain a mandatory and binding arbitration
agreement that our employees reasonably would believe bars or
restricts their right to file charges with the National Labor Rela-
tions Board or to access the Board’s processes.
WE WILL NOT maintain and/or enforce a mandatory and bind-
ing arbitration agreement that requires our employees, as a con-
dition of employment, to waive the right to maintain class or col-
lective actions in all forums, whether arbitral or judicial.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights listed above.
WE WILL rescind the mandatory and binding Mutual Agree-
ment to Arbitrate Claims in all of its forms, or revise it in all of
its forms to make clear that the arbitration agreement does not
constitute a waiver of your right to maintain employment-related
joint, class, or collective actions in all forums; that it does not
restrict your right to file charges with the National Labor Rela-
tions Board or to access the Board’s processes; and does not pro-
hibit you from discussing arbitrations with each other.
WE WILL notify all current and former employees who were
required to sign the mandatory Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate
Claims in all of its forms that the arbitration agreement has been
rescinded or revised and, if revised, provide them a copy of the
revised agreement.
WE WILL notify the court in which we filed our complaint for
declaratory relief that we have rescinded or revised the manda-
tory Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate Claims upon which we
based our complaint.
WE WILL inform the court that we no longer oppose Chandra
Lip’s collective claim on the basis of that agreement.
WE WILL reimburse Chandra Lips for any reasonable attor-
neys’ fees and litigation expenses that she may have incurred in
opposing our complaint for declaratory relief to compel individ-
ual arbitration.
Cedars-Sinai Medical Center
of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National
Labor Relations Board.”
CEDARS-SINAI MEDICAL CENTER
11
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/31-CA-143038 or by using the QR code be-
low. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision from
the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, 1015
Half Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling (202)
273–1940.