Sunrise Operations, LLC a Wholly-Owned Subsidiary of the Pasha Group

373 NLRB No. 30 NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the bound volumes of NLRB decisions. Readers are requested to notify the Ex- ecutive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C. 20570, of any typographical or other formal errors so that corrections can be included in the bound volumes. Sunrise Operations, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of The Pasha Group and International Organiza- tion of Masters, Mates & Pilots, ILA/AFL–CIO. Cases 20–CA–219534, 20–CA–227593, and 20– CA–230861 February 27, 2024 SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MCFERRAN AND MEMBERS KAPLAN AND PROUTY This case is on remand from the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. In the un- derlying decision, a panel majority of the National Labor Relations Board found that the Board lacked jurisdiction over the proceeding and, accordingly, dismissed the com- plaint in its entirety.1 As explained more fully below, on review, the court found that the Board’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence and reflected arbitrary and capricious decisionmaking. The court thus vacated the Board’s decision and remanded it to the Board for re- consideration in light of the court’s decision. On remand, after carefully considering the court’s decision along with the record, position statements filed by the parties, and our established case law, we find, in agreement with the ad- ministrative law judge, that the Board has jurisdiction over this proceeding and that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act as al- leged in the complaint.2 I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND The facts relevant to this proceeding are more fully set forth in the judge’s decision. Briefly, Respondent Sunrise Operations operates four large maritime vessels that transport goods between ports in California and Hawaii. Since 1981, the Charging Party, International Organiza- tion of Masters, Mates & Pilots, ILA/AFL–CIO (Union), has been the exclusive bargaining representative of the li- censed deck officers (LDOs) on these ships. The LDOs comprise four job classifications: master, chief mate, sec- ond mate, and third mate. The Union has negotiated with a series of successor companies that have owned the ves- sels to reach collective-bargaining agreements covering the LDOs. In 2015, The Pasha Group purchased the ves- sels involved in these proceedings. The Respondent, Pa- sha’s wholly owned subsidiary, now operates the vessels and is the most recent successor employer of the LDOs. Upon its purchase of the vessels in 2015, the Respondent informed the Union that it would assume and abide by the collective-bargaining agreement. 1 371 NLRB No. 4 (2021). In 2017 and 2018, the Union sought information from the Respondent regarding the LDOs on the four vessels. The Respondent refused to provide the information sought by the Union and then refused to participate in arbitration at the Union’s headquarters in Maryland, as required by a 1984 memorandum of understanding (MOU) to the par- ties’ collective-bargaining agreement. The Union filed unfair labor practice charges with the Board. Thereafter, the General Counsel issued a complaint al- leging that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act by failing to furnish and/or unreasonably delaying the production of necessary and relevant information re- quested by the Union, and by failing and/or refusing to abide by the 1984 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that required the parties to meet for arbitration proceedings at the Union’s headquarters in Linthicum Heights, Maryland. II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY In her decision, Administrative Law Judge Lisa D. Ross determined that the Respondent is an employer within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act and that the Union is a labor organization within Section 2(5) of the Act. The judge thus determined that the Board had jurisdiction over this proceeding. Having done so, the judge analyzed the facts surrounding the information re- quests and bargaining obligations. She concluded that the information requested by the Union was relevant to Un- ion’s bargaining obligations. She also concluded that the record demonstrated that the 1984 MOU to the collective- bargaining agreement governed where arbitration pro- ceedings would be held and that the Respondent knew of this obligation when it adopted the collective-bargaining agreement. On this basis, the judge concluded that the Re- spondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act as al- leged in the complaint. On July 12, 2021, the Board issued a Decision and Or- der in this proceeding. A divided Board reversed the judge’s findings that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by failing to provide and/or timely provide requested information, and by failing to abide by an MOU provision specifying the location of arbitration proceed- ings. The Board majority accepted the judge’s findings that the Respondent had voluntarily recognized the Union and had agreed to abide by the collective-bargaining agreement. The Board majority also did not dispute the judge’s findings that the Respondent refused to provide the requested information or arbitrate pursuant to the terms of the MOU. However, the majority dismissed the complaint in its entirety, finding that the Respondent had voluntarily recognized the Union as the bargaining repre- sentative of a unit of LDOs that it believed to consist en- tirely of supervisors excluded from coverage under the Act and, accordingly, the Board lacked jurisdiction over 2 The Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three- member panel. DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 2 the allegations in the case. Chairman McFerran, dissent- ing, would have affirmed the judge’s findings that the Re- spondent voluntarily recognized the Union as the repre- sentative of employees in a “mixed” unit that included both statutory employees and statutory supervisors, that the Board therefore maintained jurisdiction over the pro- ceeding, and that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) as alleged.3 Subsequently, the Union petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for review of the Board’s Order. On March 3, 2023, the court granted the Union’s petition for review and vacated the Board’s decision.4 The court explained that the Board had “departed from the case that had been presented to the [ad- ministrative law judge] and focused instead on a signifi- cant issue that had never been raised,” i.e., whether the Respondent “believed it had consented to a unit ‘consist- ing entirely of supervisors’ excluded from coverage under the [Act].”5 The court stated that this “alone” provided grounds to reverse because this approach arbitrarily and inexcusably denied the parties a full and fair opportunity to be heard on the merits of the [ULP] charges.”6 The court also determined that the Board’s decision “fails sub- stantial evidence review,” and “is arbitrary and capricious for want of reasoned decision making,” because it “lacks support in the record, defies established law, and creates a new rule without reasoned justification.”7 The court thus vacated the Board’s decision and remanded the case to the Board for reconsideration consistent with the court’s opin- ion.8 On May 11, 2023, the Board notified the parties that it had decided to accept the court’s remand and invited them to file statements of position with respect to the issues raised by the court’s opinion. The General Counsel, the Union, and the Respondent did so. As discussed below, on remand, we find that the Board has jurisdiction in this proceeding and that the Respondent, having voluntarily recognized the “mixed” unit of LDOs, could not invoke the “mixed” nature of the unit as a defense to the unfair labor practice allegations at issue here. We thus find that 3 The Union filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Board de- nied via unpublished Order on November 17, 2021. 4 International Organization of Masters, Mates & Pilots, ILA, AFL– CIO v. NLRB, 61 F.4th 169 (D.C. Cir. 2023). 5 Id. at 179 (emphasis in original). 6 Id. 7 Id. at 174, 182. 8 Id. at 174, 183. 9 Id. at 174. Member Kaplan finds it unnecessary to pass on the merits of the Board’s original decision in this case. The merits have already been re- solved by the court, and the court’s decision is the law of the case. 10 See id. at 177; see also Union Plaza Hotel & Casino, 296 NLRB 918, 918 fn. 4 (1989), enfd. sub nom. E.G. & H., Inc. v. NLRB, 949 F.2d 276, 278–280 (9th Cir. 1991). In E.G. & H., supra, the Ninth Circuit enforced a Board order finding that the employer had violated Sec. 8(a)(5) by refusing to execute and give effect to a collective-bargaining agreement. The court rejected the employer’s argument that the Board was precluded from taking any action in the case because some of the the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) as alleged in the complaint. III. ANALYSIS To begin, we find, in agreement with the judge, that the Board has jurisdiction over this proceeding. The judge found the Respondent to be an employer within the mean- ing of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act and the Union to be a labor organization within Section 2(5) of the Act. These findings by the judge were properly supported, and the Respondent did not argue otherwise in its exceptions to the Board or in its position statement after the court's remand. In confirming the Board’s jurisdiction in this pro- ceeding, we agree with the court that the prior Board panel erred in dismissing the complaint on the ground that the Board lacked jurisdiction in this case because the Re- spondent believed it had consented to recognizing a unit consisting entirely of supervisors excluded from coverage under the Act. As the court stated in its decision, neither the Board nor any reviewing court has ever found that an employer’s unannounced belief about the supervisory sta- tus of employees determines the Board’s jurisdiction over a proceeding.9 Rather, as relevant to this proceeding, the Board, with court approval, has held that after voluntarily recognizing a union as the representative of employees in a “mixed” bargaining unit that includes both statutory employees and statutory supervisors—i.e., a unit that the Board would not compel under Section 9(a) of the Act—the employer may not invoke the “mixed” nature of the unit as a defense to unfair labor practice allegations.10 Here, it is undisputed that the Respondent voluntarily recognized the Union as the exclusive bargaining representative of the LDOs on the four vessels. The remaining question then is whether the LDO unit the Respondent voluntarily recognized con- stituted a “mixed” unit of statutory employees and statu- tory supervisors. In its statement of position on remand, the Respondent contends that all four classifications of LDOs constitute statutory supervisors.11 In their position statements, the employees in the unit were supervisors. The court observed that, under Sec. 14(a) of the Act, although an employer could not be compelled to recognize a union containing supervisors, “the employer certainly could do so voluntarily.” Id. at 279–280, citing NLRB v. News Syndicate Co., 365 U.S. 695 (1961). The court further observed that “where an employer has consented to a bargaining unit that includes supervisors, the NLRB properly may find the employer guilty of an unfair labor prac- tice with respect to that bargaining unit.” Id. at 279. The court concluded that “[t]he authority of the Board to recognize a union containing super- visors would have little meaning if the NLRB were powerless to enforce any agreements reached with such a union.” Id. at 280; see Red Coats, 238 NLRB 205, 206–207 (1999) (holding that estoppel barred an em- ployer, after voluntary recognition of the union, from challenging the ap- propriateness of a unit in three locations where it had bargained for five months); see also Alpha Associates, 344 NLRB 782, 783–284 (2005) (applying Red Coats). 11 The Respondent does not develop this argument in its position state- ment, instead directing the Board to the supervisory-status arguments SUNRISE OPERATIONS, LLC, A WHOLLY OWNED SUBSIDIARY OF THE PASHA GROUP 3 General Counsel and the Union argue that at least some of the LDOs—specifically, the second and third mates—are statutory employees. For the reasons stated below, we find, in agreement with the General Counsel, the Union, and the administrative law judge, that at least some of the Respondent’s LDOs are statutory employees covered by the Act.12 Thus, having voluntarily recognized a “mixed” unit, the Respondent could not invoke the “mixed” nature of the unit as a defense to the unfair labor practice allega- tions against it. A. Individuals are statutory supervisors under Section 2(11) of the Act if they possess the authority, in the inter- est of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, re- call, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such ac- tion, and their exercise of such authority is not merely rou- tine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment. The Respondent makes several arguments as to why second and third mates are supervisors.13 As explained below, there is no merit in these arguments, as the evi- dence does not establish that second and third mates pos- sess any of the 2(11) indicia of supervisory authority or, even assuming they do, that the second and third mates exercise such authority using independent judgment as the Board requires.14 See Oakwood Healthcare, 348 NLRB 686, 687–688 (2006). made in its brief in support of exceptions to the administrative law judge’s decision. In light of our finding that the unit of LDOs constituted a “mixed” unit, we need not address the hypothetical situation of the Respondent voluntarily recognizing a unit consisting exclusively of statutory super- visors. On this point, Chairman McFerran adheres to the position set forth in her dissenting opinion in the underlying decision. 371 NLRB No. 4, slip op. at 6 fn. 6. 12 We note that, in its decision, the court stated that “the Board itself left untouched the ALJ’s finding that second and third mates are employ- ees within the meaning of NLRA Section 2(3). Thus, on the record be- fore us, the LDO unit is in fact a voluntarily recognized “mixed” bar- gaining unit protected by the NLRA.” International Organization of Masters, Mates & Pilots, ILA, AFL–CIO v. NLRB, supra, 61 F.4th at 180. This finding would seem to be the law of the case. Nevertheless, as the court vacated the underlying Board decision and remanded the proceed- ing to the Board for reconsideration, we find it prudent to address below the supervisory status of the second and third mates in light of the judge’s findings and the parties’ statements of position on remand. Our ultimate conclusion is consistent with the ALJ’s finding. 13 In its position statement, the Respondent contends that the judge deprived it of due process by finding that the unit was “mixed” and/or that it had voluntarily recognized a “mixed” unit because the General Counsel did not raise that argument until her posthearing brief. How- ever, because the Respondent did not raise this due process argument in its exceptions to the judge’s decision, it is deemed waived. See Parsip- pany Hotel Management Co. v. NLRB, 99 F.3d 413, 418, 426 (D.C. Cir. 1996), enfg. 319 NLRB 114 (1995). 14 In addition to the arguments addressed below, the Respondent also contends that second and third mates responsibly direct the unlicensed crew using independent judgment. Although the Respondent briefly mentions this argument in its exceptions brief, its only attempt to develop The Respondent contends that “increased regulatory re- quirements”15 and the original 1981 collective-bargaining agreement16 establish that second and third mates are su- pervisors. However, the fact that LDOs may be deemed supervisors by maritime law or a collective-bargaining agreement does not prove that the LDOs at issue here— i.e., the second and third mates on the Respondent’s four vessels—are supervisors under the Act. See Brusco Tug & Barge, 359 NLRB 486, 493 (2012) (incorporated by reference at 362 NLRB 257 (2015)) (observing that mari- time law and the Act “serve separate purposes,” and the existence of authority that derives from the “privileges and obligations of maritime law . . . doesn’t answer the ques- tions posed by the 2(11) indicia of supervisory status”), enfd. 696 Fed.Appx. 519 (D.C. Cir. 2017); see also DH Long Point Management LLC, 369 NLRB No. 18 (2020) (finding that “‘paper’ authority,” without more, is insuffi- cient to establish actual supervisory authority under Sec. 2(11)), citing Beverly Enterprises-Massachusetts, Inc. v. NLRB, 165 F.3d 960, 962–964 (D.C. Cir. 1999); G4S Reg- ulated Security Solutions, 362 NLRB 1072, 1072–1073 (2015) (finding that job titles and descriptions prepared by employers are not controlling; and merely labelling a po- sition as supervisory does not make an employee a super- visor under the Act); Oakwood Healthcare, 348 NLRB at 687, 690 fn. 24 (2006) (same). The Respondent additionally argues that second and third mates exercise supervisory authority to command the vessel while serving as Officer of the Watch (OOW).17 the argument is its citation to District No. 1, 2003 WL 249694 (NLRB Div. of Judges Jan. 27, 2003), where an administrative law judge found that second and third assistant engineers used independent judgment in assessing unlicensed crew. But the judge’s decision in that case, which was never reviewed by the Board, does not establish that the second and third mates in this case responsibly direct the unlicensed crew using in- dependent judgment. 15 For example, the Respondent claims that an LDO’s failure to adhere to the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 could result in the U.S. Coast Guard’s revocation of the LDO’s license as well as a variety of civil penalties. 16 The Respondent contends that the 1981 collective-bargaining agree- ment, which is still in effect, stipulates that LDOs have supervisory sta- tus. For example, the agreement states that “[t]he duties of the licensed deck officers, including masters, shall be maintained as supervisory and professional,” and enumerates duties to be performed by the LDOs, in- cluding “supervision of all hull maintenance, cargo gear maintenance, lifesaving equipment, firefighting and safety equipment, and all cargo activity.” 17 In rejecting the Respondent’s argument, the judge relied on Chev- ron Shipping Co., 317 NLRB 379, 380 (1995), where the Board deter- mined that LDOs were not statutory supervisors when serving as OOWs. As the Respondent correctly notes, supervisory determinations require a “fact intensive and careful examination of the relevant facts and circum- stances in each case.” USF Reddaway, Inc., 349 NLRB 329, 339 (2007). Contrary to the Respondent’s contention, however, the judge’s rejection of its argument with respect to the OOW was based on a careful exami- nation of the relevant facts and circumstances of the case. Further, alt- hough NLRB v. Kentucky River Community Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706 (2001), questioned certain aspects of the Board’s analysis in Chevron Shipping, the Court specifically cited Chevron Shipping as an example of when the Board engaged in the necessary fact-intensive analysis to determine that the putative supervisors’ judgment was “reduced below DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 4 The Respondent contends that when a second or third mate is on duty as OOW, he or she assumes the position of mas- ter, and the crew must adhere to his or her orders. More specifically, the Respondent asserts that: the International Safety Management Code establishes that the OOW is re- sponsible for the safety of the vessel, crew, and cargo; the OOW may remove a crew member from his or her posi- tion for incompetence or failure to follow a lawful order; the OOW supervises the helmsman and lookout to ensure safe passage of the vessel; and when the OOW identifies another vessel in his or her path and is at risk of collision, the OOW charts a new course for the vessel without first contacting the master for approval. However, as the judge correctly found, the credited evidence shows that none of these tasks require independent judgment because the LDOs must either: (1) follow the master’s detailed written standing orders or, if there were any questions, seek clari- fication from the master, or (2) adhere to the established protocols found in the Respondent’s Safety Management Administration policies. Notably, the Respondent does not point to a single example of a second or third mate who, while serving as OOW, took any of the above actions without first contacting the master. Moreover, the hearing testimony that the Respondent points to in support of its contention that the OOW can adjust the vessel’s course without first calling the master for approval is both hypo- thetical and contradicted by other testimony. Indeed, Ed Washburn, the Respondent’s senior vice president of ves- sel operations, testified that when one of the Respondent’s vessels encounters another vessel at sea, the OOF “has to take action,” but that “[i]f he can't take action to meet the parameters that the captain set, then he has to call the cap- tain.” We therefore agree with the judge that the OOW duties do not require the exercise of independent judg- ment. See, e.g., Chevron Shipping, 317 NLRB at 380–382 (finding that licensed officers’ use of independent judg- ment and discretion was circumscribed both by the mas- ter’s standing orders, which required the watch officer to contact a superior when something unusual happens or if problems arise, and by applicable regulations). Finally, the Respondent contends that second and third mates exercise the supervisory authority to recommend discipline. Although the Respondent acknowledges that only masters and chief mates possess the authority to dis- cipline, it argues that second and third mates frequently make recommendations to the master and chief mate about which crew members should be disciplined.18 According the statutory threshold by detailed orders and regulations issued by the employer.” Id. at 713–714. 18 For example, according to the Respondent, if the third mate is stand- ing watch from 12 a.m. to 4 a.m. and realizes that the helmsman is not properly attentive to his duties, the third mate will not wake the master to tell him or her about the helmsman’s poor performance; instead, he will inform the master at breakfast and recommend that the helmsman be removed from his position or given remedial training. 19 The Respondent admits that Union Plaza prohibits a “mixed” unit defense; it only contended that this was an all-supervisory unit. to the Respondent, the master and chief mate must act on the disciplinary recommendations made by second and third mates. However, the only evidence the Respondent cites in support of this contention is hypothetical and not based on first-hand knowledge. Specifically, when asked the basis for his belief that a second or third mate could recommend discipline of another employee, Washburn re- plied: “Tradition.” As noted above, maritime “tradition” is insufficient evidence for supervisory determinations un- der the Act. Brusco Tug & Barge, 359 NLRB at 493. And when asked if he had ever understood a second or third mate to have recommended discipline of another em- ployee, Washburn answered: “Personally, no.” The Re- spondent did not otherwise support its contention regard- ing disciplinary recommendations. Based on the foregoing, we find, in agreement with the judge, that the Respondent has failed to establish that the second and third mates are supervisors under Section 2(11) of the Act. Thus, the LDO unit constituted at least a “mixed” unit of statutory employees and statutory super- visors. B. Having found the LDO unit to be a “mixed” unit and as it is undisputed that the Respondent voluntarily recog- nized the Union as the exclusive representative of this unit under Union Plaza, supra, the Respondent could not in- voke the “mixed” nature of the unit as a defense to the unfair labor practice allegations at issue in this proceed- ing.19 Here, despite having voluntarily recognized the Un- ion and agreed to the collective-bargaining agreement, the Respondent nevertheless refused to provide the infor- mation requested by the Union or to arbitrate pursuant to the terms of the MOU.20 For the reasons stated by the judge and applying our well-established case law, we af- firm these findings. Accordingly, we find that the Re- spondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) as alleged in the complaint. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent Sunrise Operations, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of The Pasha Group, is an employer within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. 2. By refusing to provide to furnish necessary and rel- evant information to the Union, the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. 20 The Respondent does not contest these findings in its position state- ment to the Board. The Union’s September 19, 2017 and March 2, 2018 information re- quests also sought “any collective bargaining agreement covering Li- censed Deck Officers crewing the Jean Anne or the Marjorie C.” The General Counsel’s complaint did not allege the Respondent’s refusal to provide this information was unlawful. Accordingly, the Respondent does not need to provide this information to the Union. SUNRISE OPERATIONS, LLC, A WHOLLY OWNED SUBSIDIARY OF THE PASHA GROUP 5 3. By unreasonably delaying in furnishing necessary and relevant information to the Union, the Respondent vi- olated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. 4. By failing to meet with the Union for arbitration pro- ceedings at the Union’s headquarters in Linthicum Heights, Maryland, as stated in the parties’ Memorandum of Understanding dated June 16, 1984, the Respondent vi- olated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. 5. The unfair labor practices committed by Respondent affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. REMEDY Having found that the Respondent has engaged in cer- tain unfair labor practices, we shall order it to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative action de- signed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Having found that the Respondent failed and refused to provide and also unreasonably delayed in furnishing the Union with requested information that is relevant and nec- essary to the Union’s performance of its functions as the collective-bargaining representative of the Respondent’s unit employees, we shall order the Respondent to timely provide this information, as specified in the Order below. We shall further order the Respondent to meet and con- fer with the Union, as the exclusive representative of the employees in the appropriate unit concerning all terms and conditions of employment, at arbitration proceedings at the Union’s headquarters in Linthicum Heights, Mary- land, in accordance with section 36 of the parties’ 1984 MOU to the master collective-bargaining agreement. As found by the administrative law judge, the Respond- ent has not clearly delineated and, by its corporate owner- ship structure, has confused the Union as to whether the Respondent, The Pasha Group, and/or Pasha Hawaii oper- ates as the employer to the Union’s LDO members. Ac- cordingly, as recommended by the judge, we shall order the Respondent to post the remedial notice at its offices and places of business in Charlotte, North Carolina, and San Rafael, California.21 ORDER Respondent Sunrise Operations, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of The Pasha Group, Charlotte, North Carolina, and San Rafael, California, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall 1. Cease and desist from 21 The Respondent did not contest this aspect of the judge’s r remedy in either its exceptions to the administrative law judge’s decision or its position statement on remand. 22 If the facilities involved in these proceedings are open and staffed by a substantial complement of employees, the notice must be posted within 14 days after service by the Region. If the facilities involved in these proceedings are closed or not staffed by a substantial complement of employees due to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pan- demic, the notice must be posted within 14 days after the facilities reopen and a substantial complement of employees have returned to work. If, while closed or not staffed by a substantial complement of employees (a) Refusing to bargain collectively with the Union by failing and refusing to furnish it with requested infor- mation that is relevant and necessary to the Union’s per- formance of its functions as the collective-bargaining rep- resentative of the Respondent’s unit employees. (b) Refusing to bargain collectively with the Union by unreasonably delaying in furnishing it with requested in- formation that is relevant and necessary to the Union’s performance of its functions as the collective-bargaining representative of the Respondent’s unit employees. (c) Failing and refusing to recognize and bargain with the Union by failing to meet and confer with the Union for arbitration proceedings at the Union’s headquarters in Linthicum Heights, Maryland, in accordance with section 36 of the parties’ 1984 MOU to the master collective-bar- gaining agreement. (d) In any like or related manner interfering with, re- straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act. (a) To the extent that it has not already done so, furnish to the Union in a timely manner the information requested by the Union on September 19, 2017, March 2, and No- vember 7, 2018, that was unlawfully withheld. (b) Continue to meet and confer with the Union for ar- bitration proceedings at the Union’s headquarters in Lin- thicum Heights, Maryland, as set forth in Section 36 of the parties’ 1984 MOU to their master collective-bargaining agreement unless otherwise agreed to by the parties. (c) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its Charlotte, North Carolina, and San Rafael, California, places of business copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix”22 in both English and Spanish. Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Re- gion 20, after being signed by the Respondent’s author- ized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are cus- tomarily posted. In addition to physical posting of paper notices, the notices shall be distributed electronically, such as by email, posting on an intranet or an internet site, and/or other electronic means, if the Respondent custom- arily communicates with its employees by such means. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to en- sure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered due to the pandemic, the Respondent is communicating with its employ- ees by electronic means, the notice must also be posted by such electronic means within 14 days after service by the Region. If the notice to be physically posted was posted electronically more than 60 days before physical posting of the notice, the notice shall state at the bottom that “This notice is the same notice previously [sent or posted] electronically on [date].” If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg- ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board.” DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 6 by any other material. If the Respondent has gone out of business or closed the businesses involved in these pro- ceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current and former employees employed by the Respondent at any time since May 2, 2018. Dated, Washington, D.C. February 27, 2024 ______________________________________ Lauren McFerran, Chairman _____________________________________ Marvin E. Kaplan, Member _____________________________________ David M. Prouty, Member (SEAL) NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD APPENDIX NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio- lated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this notice. FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO Form, join, or assist a union Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf Act together with other employees for your bene- fit and protection Choose not to engage in any of these protected ac- tivities. WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with the In- ternational Organization of Masters, Mates & Pilots, ILA/AFL–CIO (Union) by failing and refusing to furnish it with requested information that is relevant and necessary to the Union’s performance of its functions as the collective-bargaining representative of our unit em- ployees. WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with the Un- ion by unreasonably delaying in furnishing it with re- quested information that is relevant and necessary to the Union’s performance of its functions as the collective-bar- gaining representative of our unit employees. WE WILL NOT fail and refuse to recognize and bargain with the Union by failing to meet with the Union for arbi- tration proceedings at the Union’s headquarters in Linthi- cum Heights, Maryland, in accordance with section 36 of the parties’ 1984 MOU to the master collective-bargaining agreement. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights listed above. WE WILL, to the extent that we have not already done so, furnish to the Union in a timely manner the information requested by the Union on September 19, 2017, March 2 and November 7, 2018, that we unlawfully withheld. WE WILL continue to meet and confer with the Union for all arbitration proceedings at the Union’s headquarters in Linthicum Heights, Maryland, as set forth in section 36 of the parties’ 1984 MOU to their master collective-bar- gaining agreement. SUNRISE OPERATIONS, LLC, A WHOLLY OWNED SUBSIDIARY OF THE PASHA GROUP The Board’s decision can be found at www.nlrb.gov/case/20-CA-219534 or by using the QR code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, 1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling (202) 273-1940.