Starbucks Corporation

373 NLRB No. 33 NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the bound volumes of NLRB decisions. Readers are requested to notify the Ex- ecutive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C. 20570, of any typographical or other formal errors so that corrections can be included in the bound volumes. Starbucks Corporation and Workers United. Case 31– CA–299257 March 6, 2024 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MCFERRAN AND MEMBERS PROUTY AND WILCOX On May 12, 2023, Administrative Law Judge Eleanor Laws issued the attached decision. The Respondent filed 1 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an adminis- trative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear preponderance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect. Stand- ard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing the findings. 2 The Union filed a petition on May 19, 2022, seeking to represent the baristas and shift supervisors at the Respondent’s Figueroa Street store in Los Angeles, California. Shortly thereafter, the Respondent di- rected Store Manager Letitia Nolda to conduct one-on-one meetings with employees to “brin[g] awareness about unions to her team by telling them what could happen if a union came into the store.” The complaint alleges that the Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)(1) of the Act when Store Manager Nolda interrogated, threatened, and held a one-on-one manda- tory captive-audience meeting with employee Yesenia Alarcon on May 25, 2022. We adopt the judge’s finding that the Respondent, by Nolda, violated Sec. 8(a)(1) by making unlawful threats of economic reprisals, including the loss of a pay raise and benefits if the store became unionized, during this 20-minute meeting with Alarcon. In addition, we adopt the judge’s finding that the Respondent coercively interrogated Alarcon in violation of Sec. 8(a)(1) by Nolda’s remarks at the beginning and end of the meet- ing with Alarcon stating that she wished to know who started the union- ization effort. In affirming the judge’s related finding that the Respond- ent has a history of hostility toward employee unionization, we rely only on the judge’s reference to a Board decision finding that the Respondent violated the Act at another store and on the contemporaneous unlawful threat. See Bourne v. NLRB, 332 F.2d 47, 48 (2d Cir. 1964). See also ADT, LLC, 371 NLRB No. 67, slip op. at 1 fn. 2 (2022) (citing Healthy Minds, Inc., 371 NLRB No. 6, slip op. at 4–5 (2021) (relying in part on contemporaneous unfair labor practice to find interrogation was coer- cive)). We find it unnecessary to rely on the judge’s additional reference to several nonfinal administrative law judges’ decisions in this regard. Finally, we adopt the judge’s dismissal of the Sec. 8(a)(1) complaint al- legation that Nolda’s one-on-one meeting with Alarcon to discuss the Respondent’s position regarding unionization constituted an unlawful mandatory captive audience meeting under Babcock & Wilcox, 77 NLRB 577, 578 (1948). On exception, the General Counsel and the Charging Party request that the Board overrule Babcock & Wilcox. We decline to reconsider Babcock & Wilcox at this time and do not pass on the legal theory advanced by the General Counsel with respect to this allegation. We are, however, open to reconsidering the matter in a future appropriate case. 3 In recommending a broad order requiring the Respondent to cease and desist from violating the Act “in any other manner,” the judge again relies on the Board decision and administrative law judges’ decisions referenced in her 8(a)(1) interrogation analysis as evidence of the Re- spondent’s “widespread misconduct and [] proclivity to violate the Act.” Hickmott Foods, Inc., 242 NLRB 1357 (1979) (broad order warranted where respondent is shown to have “a proclivity to violate the Act or has engaged in such egregious or widespread misconduct that demonstrates a general disregard for the employees’ fundamental statutory rights.”). exceptions and a supporting brief, the General Counsel filed an answering brief, and the Respondent filed a reply brief. In addition, the General Counsel and the Charging Party each filed cross-exceptions and supporting briefs, and the Respondent filed an answering brief. The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,1 and conclusions,2 and to adopt the recommended Order as modified and set forth in full below.3 We find that the instant matter involving two 8(a)(1) violations that oc- curred during a manager’s one-on-one meeting with an employee does not present circumstances warranting a broad cease-and-desist order un- der Hickmott Foods. See generally Blankenship & Associates, 306 NLRB 994, 995 (1992) (finding a narrow order appropriate where there were only several 8(a)(1) violations), enfd. 999 F.2d 248 (7th Cir. 1993). Accordingly, we shall substitute a narrow cease-and-desist order requir- ing the Respondent to cease and desist from violating the Act “in any like or related manner.” The judge’s recommended Order also provides for a posting of the “Explanation of Rights” and a notice-reading remedy. Contrary to the judge, we find that the Board’s traditional remedies are sufficient to ef- fectuate the purposes of the Act in this matter. Cf. HTH Corp., 361 NLRB 709, 713 (2014) (“Explanation of Rights” warranted where “the rights of so many employees have been broadly suppressed for an ex- tended period of time and in numerous ways”); Amerinox Processing, Inc., 371 NLRB No. 105, slip op. at 2 (2022) (citing cases) ( “[A] notice- reading remedy [is] appropriate where the employer’s violations are so numerous and serious that a reading of the notice is warranted to dissi- pate the chilling effect of the violations on employees’ willingness to exercise their Section 7 rights.”). Additionally, the General Counsel and the Charging Party except to the judge’s refusal to recommend an extended posting period for 90 days and to order the Respondent’s managers and supervisors to undergo training regarding employees’ rights under the Act. We decline to do so in this case. The General Counsel and the Charging Party also request the Board order a nationwide posting, and likewise we find this remedy is not appropriate at this time. Member Prouty would order the notice-reading and notice-distribu- tion remedies requested by the General Counsel. See CP Anchorage Ho- tel 2 d/b/a Hilton Anchorage, 371 NLRB No. 151, slip op. at 9–15 (2022) (Member Prouty, concurring) (urging the Board to adopt a reading of the notice aloud and distribution to employees at a group meeting as a stand- ard remedy for unfair labor practices because “[h]aving the notice to em- ployees read aloud to them in a group meeting, with a copy in hand to follow along if they choose, is a superior means of disseminating and amplifying the Board’s message to maximize the extent to which em- ployees hear and comprehend it”). He further notes that notice reading is a particularly effective remedy in small facilities, such as the one at issue here. He would likewise order the Respondent to post an explana- tion of rights. Member Prouty joins his colleagues in denying the re- quested supervisory-training remedy, but notes that he would be open to considering, in a future appropriate case, whether it would effectuate the policies of the Act to order that employees receive training from a Board agent, during working time, regarding their rights under the Act. Lastly, on exception the General Counsel and the Charging Party re- quest the Board reconsider the J. Picini Flooring, 356 NLRB 11 (2010), standard for electronic distribution of notices and to instead require re- spondents to distribute notices by text message, social media, and inter- nal smartphone applications even if they do not customarily communi- cate with employees via these means. We decline their request at this time. In denying this request, Member Prouty notes that J. Picini DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 2 ORDER The National Labor Relations Board orders that the Re- spondent, Starbucks Corporation, Los Angles, California, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall 1. Cease and desist from (a) Threatening employees with loss of raises or bene- fits if they engage in union activity. (b) Coercively interrogating employees about their un- ion activity. (c) In any like or related manner interfering with, re- straining, or coercing employees in exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act. (a) Post at its Cypress and Figueroa facility in Los An- gles, California, copies of the attached notice marked “Ap- pendix.”4 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 31, after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. In addition to phys- ical posting of paper notices, notices shall be distributed electronically, such as by email, posting on an intranet or an internet site, and/or other electronic means, if the Re- spondent customarily communicates with its employees by such means. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, de- faced, or covered by any other material. If the Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current employees and former employees employed by the Re- spondent at any time since May 25, 2022. (b) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director for Region 31 a sworn certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the Respondent has taken to com- ply. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint is dismissed insofar as it alleges violations of the Act not specifically found. Dated, Washington, D.C. March 6, 2024 Flooring already requires distribution by these methods to the extent that employers use them to communicate with employees. Accordingly, we shall modify the judge’s recommended Order to con- form to the Board’s standard remedial language, and in accordance with our decision in Paragon Systems, Inc., 371 NLRB No. 104 (2022). We shall substitute a new notice to conform to the Order as modified. 4 If the facility involved in these proceedings is open and staffed by a substantial complement of employees, the notice must be posted within 14 days after service by the Region. If the facility involved in these pro- ceedings is closed or not staffed by a substantial complement of employ- ees due to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, the no- tice must be posted within 14 days after the facilities reopen and a sub- stantial complement of employees have returned to work. If, while ______________________________________ Lauren McFerran, Chairman ______________________________________ David M. Prouty, Member ______________________________________ Gwynne A. Wilcox, Member (SEAL) NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD APPENDIX NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio- lated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this notice. FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO Form, join, or assist a union Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf Act together with other employees for your bene- fit and protection Choose not to engage in any of these protected ac- tivities. WE WILL NOT threaten you with loss of raises or benefits if you engage in union activity. WE WILL NOT coercively question you about your union activity. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights listed above. STARBUCKS CORPORATION The Board’s decision can be found at https://www.nlrb.gov/case/31-CA-299257 or by using the closed or not staffed by a substantial complement of employees due to the pandemic, the Respondent is communicating with its employees by electronic means, the notice must also be posted by such electronic means within 14 days after service by the Region. If the notice to be physically posted was posted electronically more than 60 days before physical posting of the notice, the notice shall state at the bottom that “This notice is the same notice previously [sent or posted] electronically on [date].” If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board.” STARBUCKS CORP. 3 QR code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, 1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington D.C. 20570 or by calling (202) 273-1940. Marissa Dagdagan, Esq., for the General Counsel. David R. Comfort, Esq., Rana Haimout, Esq.,Sheila Hanley, Esq., and Michael L. Kibbe, Esq. (Littler Mendelson PC), for the Respondent. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE ELEANOR LAWS, Administrative Law Judge. This case was tried in Los Angeles, California, on March 14, 2023. Workers United (the Charging Party or Union) filed the original charge on July 11, 2022, and an amended charge on October 6, 2022.1 The General Counsel issued the complaint on November 4, 2022, and Starbucks Corporation (the Respondent or Starbucks) filed a timely answer denying all material allegations. The complaint alleges the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act) when, in late May, a store manager: (1) held a captive-audience meeting, (2) threat- ened employees with economic reprisal by telling employees, during the course of an organizing campaign, that their benefits were on hold and they may not receive a raise that nonunion stores were receiving, and (3) interrogated employees about their union activities and/or sympathies. On the entire record, including my observation of the de- meanor of the witnesses, and after considering the briefs filed by the General Counsel and the Respondent, I make the following. FINDINGS OF FACT I. JURISDICTION The Respondent is a Washington State corporation with a fa- cility located at 3241 Figueroa Street, Los Angeles, California 90065 (the Cypress and Figueroa store). At all relevant times, the Respondent annually derived gross revenues in excess of $500,000 and purchased and received goods outside the State of 1 All dates are in 2022 unless otherwise indicated. 2 Nolda is referred to frequently by her nickname Letty. She became store manager at Cypress and Figueroa in June 2020, having previously worked at several other locations. She resigned from Starbucks on Feb- ruary 27, 2023. 3 This number was less during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic. 4 Nolda’s lack of authority in these areas is not material. In the meet- ings discussed below, she was admittedly speaking on behalf of higher- level management, vested with the authority to discuss wages and bene- fits, and apparently vested with knowledge about employee wages, in- cluding the wages of workers in Canada. 5 The meetings took place on the clock either outside or in the back of the house. California. The Respondent admits, and I find, that it is an em- ployer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act and that the Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Background Starbucks is a household name at this point, operating over 9000 retail stores selling beverages (most notably coffee) and food items. This case involves Starbucks’ store at Cypress and Figueroa in Los Angeles. Workers United filed petition 31–RC– 296098 on May 19, 2022, to represent workers at this location. The Union prevailed and was certified on August 10, 2022, to represent the store’s baristas and shift supervisors. During the relevant time period, Letitia Nolda2 was the store manager at Cypress and Figueroa. She was the highest-ranking manager who regularly worked at the store, overseeing around 30–40 employees.3 As store manager, Nolda had the ability to hire and fire employees, issue discipline, and meet with employ- ees to correct problems. Nolda did not have authority over em- ployee wages and benefits.4 Nolda had no experience with un- ions prior to the Union’s petition, organizing campaign, and cer- tification at Cypress and Figueroa. During the organizing campaign, as store manager, Nolda was tasked with bringing awareness about unions to her team by tell- ing them what could happen if a union came into the store. To accomplish this, she was directed to conduct one-on-one meet- ings with all the employees (referred to as partners) at the store. (Tr. 87.)5 The meetings lasted anywhere from 5–20 minutes. (Tr. 84–86.) 6 The meetings were required by Starbucks management, but Nolda testified partners could leave if they wanted. (Tr. 99– 100.) Nolda did not specifically tell partners the meetings were optional nor did she specifically tell them they were mandated to stay. In general, when Nolda pulled a partner aside for a meet- ing, she expected them to stay for its duration. (Tr. 97–98.) Yesenia Alarcon has worked for Starbucks for about 8 years. At the time of the hearing, she was a shift supervisor at the Cy- press and Figueroa store, having previously worked as a barista. Alarcon and Nolda worked together for about 2-1/2 years. They were not personal friends outside of work, but they knew some personal things about each other such as marital and familial sta- tus. B. The May 25 Meeting: Alarcon’s Recollection As part of the meetings referenced above, Alarcon and some other partners met one-on-one with Nolda on May 25.7 Alarcon’s meeting with Nolda took place at the store in the back of the house toward the end of Alarcon’s shift.8 They sat face-to-face in chairs with no desk in between. (Tr. 58–59.) At the beginning of the meeting, another partner came into the area to stock some 6 Abbreviations used in this decision are as follows: “Tr.” for tran- script; “GC Br.” for the General Counsel’s brief; and “R Br.” for the Re- spondent’s brief. Although I have included several citations to the record to highlight particular testimony, I emphasize that my findings and con- clusions are based not solely on the evidence specifically cited but rather are based my review and consideration of the entire record. 7 Alarcon knew other employees had meetings because these meet- ings were reflected on the line chart, which is a paper depicting the part- ners’ respective schedules for the day. (Tr. 36–37, 43–44.) 8 A computer and desk, products for the store, and the dishwasher, among other things, are located in the back of the house. Partners per- form some of their tasks there. DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 4 items, and Nolda asked if they could “give us a few seconds.” (Tr. 68.) Nolda expressed that she was tired of having so many meetings with Starbucks’ lawyers and mentioned that the law- yers told her what she could and could not share about the Union. Nolda stated that she was not in favor of the Union, and she wished she knew who had started it, then paused. Alarcon per- ceived that Nolda was staring at her, and she stared back at Nolda following this comment. (Tr. 38–39.)9 When Alarcon did not verbally respond, Nolda asked if she knew anything about the Union, and Alarcon responded that she did not. (Tr. 39–40.)10 Nolda told Alarcon that the Union was a third party, and asked if Alarcon knew she would need to pay union dues. (Tr. 40, 62.) Alarcon stated she did not know that, and asked what the dues were. Nolda said the dues could be about $500. Alarcon was shocked and responded that $500 was more than half of her check, and Nolda nodded. Alarcon asked if the $500 was a monthly fee or a one-time fee, and Nolda responded that it could be monthly, but she did not know.11 (Tr. 40–41, 62.) Nolda said that was why it was important to stay nonunion because the part- ners have their benefits, which would be paused, and they “were up for a raise that was coming up” which could be affected if the store unionized. (Tr. 41, 62–63.) More specifically, she stated that she knew nonunion stores were going to get the raise, but she did not know if their store would get it or would get it at the same time as nonunion stores, because of the petition. (Tr. 41, 63–64.) Alarcon followed up, asking Nolda to clarify what she meant about benefits being paused, and Nolda responded that she did not know. (Tr. 41, 62–63.) Nolda mentioned a Canadian store had unionized and told Alarcon that the employees were now paid less than nonunion stores in Canada. (Tr. 41–42.) Nolda ended the meeting by expressing that she was drained and tired from the meeting with lawyers, reiterated that she wished she knew who had started this, and stared at Alarcon. When Alarcon did not respond, Nolda told her about a government website that provided information about unions with a video. Alarcon asked Nolda to send her the information about the web- site. (Tr. 42.) Toward the end of the meeting, Nolda told Alarcon to come to her or the district manager if she had any questions. (Tr. 43, 68.) 12 They did not raise their voices during the meeting. It lasted roughly 20 minutes, and Alarcon clocked out when it ended. Nolda did not provide Alarcon her the information about the website and did not tell her the name of it even after Alarcon followed up. (Tr. 42, 66–67.)13 In Alarcon’s experience, the meeting was rare because of COVID. Nolda did not promise Alarcon that her job would not be affected if she decided not to attend the meeting. Alarcon did not feel free to leave the meet- ing. (Tr. 44.) 9 The transcript mistakenly says “started” instead of “stared” when referencing this testimony. (Tr. 39.) 10 According to Alarcon, this was true at the time, as she was not in- volved in organizing the Union and did not know much about it. (Tr. 40.) 11 Alarcon’s testimony establishes that Nolda’s stated lack of knowledge was offered only in response to Alarcon’s follow-up question regarding the frequency of the dues. 12 The Respondent appears to argue that Alarcon should have known the meeting was voluntary, stating that she “confirmed in her testimony that Nolda told her that if she did not feel comfortable, she did not have to talk to Nolda.” (R Br. 5 and 6, citing Tr. 68.) This is somewhat mis- leading, as this “confirmation” was not in refence to the meeting itself. Instead, it referred to any questions that Alarcon may have following the meeting: C. The May 25 Meeting: Nolda’s Recollection Nolda testified that she did not remember much about the meeting because it was a long time ago, and she did not remem- ber where it occurred. (Tr. 86–88.) She asked Alarcon if she knew what a union was and shared that she did not think the store needed a union. She also expressed that she wished she knew who had started the Union so that she could change her leader- ship style and fix “whatever led to all of this starting.” (Tr. 89– 90.) Nolda stated that she wasn’t sure about dues, but that they could range from $40 to $500 per month and that would need to be negotiated with the Union. Nolda stated that, because the store had petitioned, she was not sure if the partners would get a raise that had been implemented recently. (Tr. 91–92.) With regard to the Canada example, she stated that, as a result of negotiations, the employees there were being paid less than they had been originally paid, and the employees at the Cypress and Figueroa store would need to negotiate. She reiterated that she did not think the store should unionize. (Tr. 91–93.) Nolda described her tone as emotional. (Tr. 90.) III. DECISION AND ANALYSIS A. Credibility A credibility determination may rest on various factors, in- cluding “the context of the witness’ testimony, the witness’ de- meanor, the weight of the respective evidence, established or ad- mitted facts, inherent probabilities and reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the record as a whole.” Hills & Dales Gen- eral Hospital, 360 NLRB 611, 615 (2014), citing Double D Con- struction Group, 339 NLRB 303, 305 (2003); Daikichi Sushi, 335 NLRB 622, 623 (2001). In making credibility resolutions, it is well established that the trier of fact may believe some, but not all, of a witness’s testimony. NLRB v. Universal Camera Corp., 179 F.2d 749 (2d Cir. 1950). When Nolda was asked if she recalled the meeting, she stated, “It was a long time ago, so I don't remember much.”14 (Tr. 86.) This detracts from her testimony regarding what was specifically said at the meeting. Alarcon had better recollection of the meet- ing, and therefore her testimony is credited where it conflicts with Nolda’s. I found Alarcon to be credible based on her de- meanor, which was forthcoming. She did not appear to embellish her testimony or exaggerate what occurred. Moreover, Alarcon’s testimony is particularly reliable given that she was testifying against her pecuniary interests. Gold Standard Enterprises, 234 NLRB 618, 619 (1978); Flexsteel Industries, 316 NLRB 745 (1995). A . . . At the—towards the end of the meeting, as I stated, she made it very clear if I do feel comfortable, to reach out to her; if not, to reach out to our district manager. Q Okay. So she tells you if you don’t feel comfortable, you don't have to talk me? A Yes. Q You can talk to somebody else? A Yes. (Tr. 68.) 13 Alarcon’s testimony is unrefuted on this point. 14 Nolda did not recall the meeting’s location, so Alarcon’s testimony on this point is unrefuted and therefore credited. Nolda further testified regarding the meeting with Alarcon, “I know I did have like a one-on- one conversation with her at the beginning when they did petition. Just because I have to have a conversation with all of the partners.” (Tr. 87.) STARBUCKS CORP. 5 B. General Legal Standards: Section 8(a)(1) and 8(c) Under Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, it is an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. The rights guaranteed in Section 7 include the right “to form, join or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through rep- resentatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other con- certed activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection . . .” The basic test for a violation of Section 8(a)(1) is whether un- der all the circumstances the employer’s conduct reasonably would tend to restrain, coerce, or interfere with employees’ rights guaranteed by Section 7. Mediplex of Danbury, 314 NLRB 470, 472, (1994); Sunnyside Home Care Project, 308 NLRB 346, fn. 1 (1992), citing American Freightways Co., 124 NLRB 146, 147 (1959). The General Counsel bears the burden to prove 8(a)(1) violations. Under Section 8(c) of the Act: The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dis- semination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or vis- ual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this Act [subchapter], if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or prom- ise of benefit. During an ongoing organizing campaign, employers may per- missibly engage in legitimate campaign propaganda about the merits of union membership, as long as the campaign propa- ganda is not linked to comments that cross the line set by Section 8(a)(1) and become coercive from the objective standpoint of employees, over whom the employer has a measure of economic power. See Mesker Door, Inc., 357 NLRB 20 591, 595 (2011). C. The Captive Audience Meeting The General Counsel alleges, in complaint paragraph 5(a), that the meeting discussed above was a captive-audience meet- ing, and argues for a change in the law to hold that captive-audi- ence meetings, which require employees, while on paid time, to listen to the Respondent’s position regarding unionization, vio- late Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Under longstanding extant Board law, captive-audience meetings do not, under the circumstances present here by themselves, violate the Act. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 77 NLRB 577, 578 (1948). As I am bound to apply Board law, I recommend dismissal of this complaint allegation. D. Alleged Threats The complaint alleges, at paragraph 5(b), that the Respondent, by Nolda, threatened employees with economic reprisal by tell- ing them, during the organizing campaign, that their benefits would be put on hold and that she did not know if employees would receive a raise the other stores were going to receive. In assessing whether a remark constitutes a threat, the appro- priate test is “whether the remark can reasonably be interpreted by the employee as a threat.” Smithers Tire, 308 NLRB 72 (1992). The actual intent of the speaker or the effect on the lis- tener is immaterial. Id. see also Wyman-Gordon Co. v. NLRB, 654 F.2d 134, 145 (1st Cir. 1981) (inquiry under Sec. 8(a)(1) is an objective one which examines whether the employer’s actions would tend to coerce a reasonable employee). The “threats in 15 Nolda testified that she said they would need to negotiate with the Union about dues and that she did not know if what happened in Canada would happen here but they would need to negotiate. As noted above, I question need not be explicit if the language used by the em- ployer or his representative can reasonably be construed as threatening.” NLRB v. Ayer Lar Sanitarium, 436 F.2d 45, 49 (9th Cir. 1970). The Board considers the totality of the circumstances in assessing the reasonable tendency of an ambiguous statement or a veiled threat to coerce. KSM Industries, 336 NLRB 133 (2001). Tentative language about adverse consequences can be coer- cive, particularly where the employer’s prediction is not based on objective facts or the nature of the collective-bargaining pro- cess. Daikichi Sushi, 335 NLRB at 623–624 (holding that it was not a defense that the employer phrased its prediction that the plant could close if employees unionized “as a possibility rather than a certainty”), enfd. 56 Fed.Appx. 516 (D.C. Cir. 2003); see also Holy Cross Hospital, 370 NLRB No. 16, slip op. at 1 fn. 3 (2020) (employer unlawfully threatened that if employees union- ized, the employer’s leave policies might become less generous and its shift scheduling less flexible); Metro One Loss Preven- tion Services Group, 356 NLRB 89 (2010) (employer unlawfully threatened that an employee’s pay rate could get worse if the un- ion came in); compare Jefferson Smurfit Corp., 325 NLRB 280, fn. 3 (1998) (employer’s statement that benefits “could go either way as a result of collective bargaining” was lawful). An em- ployer may lawfully communicate to its employees carefully phrased predictions about “demonstrably probable consequences beyond [the employer’s] control” that unionization will have on the company, provided that the predictions are based on objec- tive facts. However, if the employer predicts, without any sup- porting objective facts, that it may or may not take action solely on its own initiative for reasons unrelated to economic necessi- ties and known only by the employer, then the employer’s pre- diction is a threat of retaliation that violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Daikichi Sushi, supra. Under the present circumstances, I find Nolda’s comments would reasonably coerce employees. Nolda conveyed to Alar- con, in a one-on-one meeting, that the benefits the partners re- ceive made it important to stay nonunion, benefits would be paused, and they were up for a raise that nonunion stores were certainly getting, but unionized stores may not get. In other words, the raise was happening if the employees did not union- ize, but it may be stopped in its tracks if they did unionize. See BP Amoco Chemical-Chocolate Bayou, 351 NLRB 614, 617 (2007), quoting NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618 (1969) (“employers may make statements to their employees that predict economic consequences of unionization, so long as the prediction is ‘carefully phrased on the basis of objective fact to convey [its] belief as to demonstrably probable consequences be- yond its control.’”) Nolda’s prediction was not based on objec- tive facts or the give-and-take of the collective-bargaining pro- cess.15 Nolda’s next comments to Alarcon, that the bargaining pro- cess had backfired on unionized employees in a Canadian store because they were paid less than nonunionized stores, exacerbate the coercive nature of the May 25 meeting. It reinforced a mes- sage that employees who unionized risked their pay, juxtaposed with a comment that employees who didn’t unionize had a guar- anteed raise. The Respondent contends that the comments about Canada were statements of fact, and “[a]s this store is the only have found Alarcon’s recollection of the meeting was more credible, and I credit her testimony which does not include Nolda mentioning negoti- ations much less explaining the bargaining process. DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 6 store to date with a Collective Bargaining Agreement in place, it is relevant to illustrate what happened in a store that unionized.” (R Br. 14.) I note, however, that this “fact” was not established.16 See Schaumberg Hyundai, Inc., 318 NLRB 449, 450 (1995) (Finding burden on respondent to support its claim). The Respondent contends that Nolda’s comments were pro- tected by Section 8(c). However, as the Board explained in NY Paving, 371 NLRB No. 139, slip op. at 4 (2022): Section 8(c) provides that expressing views, arguments or opinions “shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice . . . if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.” 29 U.S.C. §158(c); see also Cham- ber of Commerce v. Brown, 554 U.S. 60, 67, 128 S.Ct. 2408, 171 L. Ed. 2d 264 (2008). Thus, while Section 8(c) protects an employer’s noncoercive statements of opposition to unions or unionization, it does not protect an employer’s explicit or im- plicit threats of reprisal or predictions of future consequences resulting from protected union conduct. Thisis particularly true where the employer’s implicit threat concerns a matter within the employer’s control. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 589, 618, 89 S.Ct. 1918, 23 L. Ed. 2d 547 (1969). As the decision regarding whether to offer the stores involving unions the same as stores not involving unions was not beyond the Respondent’s control, and I have found the statements at is- sue coercive, this argument fails.16 The Respondent’s citation to the administrative law judge’s partial analysis in Heckethorn Mfg. Co., 208 NLRB 302, 306 (1974), misses the mark.17 First, the section of the case cited involved a delay in an actual wage increase that was retroactively restored, not an alleged unlawful threat. Second, even assuming the judge’s analysis finds analogy here, it is unclear whether ex- ceptions were filed regarding this finding, and it is therefore un- clear whether the Board passed on it. The Respondent cites to Wild Oats Mkts., Inc., 344 NLRB 717 (2005), arguing that a statement that “in collective bargaining you could lose what you have now” was not unlawful.18 In Wild Oats, this statement, con- sidered by itself, “appeared in a flyer not otherwise alleged to be unlawful, which depicted a union authorization card and ex- plained possible negative outcomes of engaging in the collec- tive-bargaining process.” Id. The Board noted that the flyer made clear that “the loss of benefits was a possible consequence of collective bargaining, not a possible consequence of simply signing a union card.” Id. at fn. 5. This is meaningfully distin- guishable from the instant case, which involved personal meet- ings with the highest manager at the store, and no explanation of the distinction between simply unionizing and what could hap- pen during the bargaining process.19 And, “[w]hen the question 16 Though it does not alter my finding that “fact” has not been estab- lished, I note that, at the Respondent’s store in Buffalo, New York, the administrative law judge found that partner resource manager stated that the employees in the unionized Canadian store ended up bargaining for a higher hourly wage rate that was only slightly above the cost of the union dues. See Starbucks Corp., 2023 NLRB LEXIS 99, p. 41 (March 1, 2023). 16 Even in the absence of an obligation, nothing prevented the Re- spondent from offering the raise as part of negotiations should the store unionize. The Respondent’s reliance on NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 734 (1962), a case hinging on Sec. 8(a)(5), arguing that Nolda was simply reciting the Respondent’s legal obligations, is misplaced. Based on credited testimony, there was no attempt to explain what the bargain- ing process entails, much less convey bargaining about promised benefits that are then threatened to not materialize if the employees elect a union. is close, a critical factor in determining whether the statement has a threatening color is whether the context of the statement includes contemporaneous threats or unfair labor practices.” Hendrickson USA, LLC v. NLRB, 932 F.3d 465, 472 (6th Cir. 2019) (internal quotations omitted). Here, the comment oc- curred in the context of a meeting that also included a coercive interrogation, as detailed below. Based on the foregoing, I find the General Counsel met her burden to prove the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) as al- leged in complaint paragraph 5(b). E. Alleged Interrogation Paragraph 5(c) of the complaint alleges that the Respondent, by Nolda, interrogated employees about union activity and/or sympathies. The Board considers the totality of the circumstances in deter- mining whether the questioning of an employee constitutes an unlawful interrogation. Rossmore House, 269 NLRB 1176, 1178 fn. 20 (1984), affd. sub nom. HERE Local 11 v. NLRB, 760 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1985). This test involves a case-by-case analysis of various factors, including those set out in Bourne v. NLRB, 332 F.2d 47, 48 (2d Cir. 1964): (1) the background, i.e., whether the employer has a history of hostility toward or discrimination against union activity; (2) the nature of the information sought; (3) the identity of the interrogator, i.e., his or her placement in the Respondent’s hierarchy; (4) the place and method of the in- terrogation; and (5) the truthfulness of the interrogated em- ployee’s reply. See, e.g., Sproule Construction Co., 350 NLRB 774 fn. 2 (2007); Grass Valley Grocery Outlet, 338 NLRB 877 fn. 1 (2003), affd. mem. 121 Fed.Appx. 720 (9th Cir. 2005). The Board also considers the timing of the interrogation and whether the interrogated employees are open and active union supporters. See, e.g., Gardner Engineering, 313 NLRB 755 (1994), enfd. as modified on other grounds 115 F.3d 636 (9th Cir. 1997); Blue Flash Express, 109 NLRB 591 (1954). Another factor is whether adequate assurances against reprisal were provided. See RHCG Safety Corp., 365 NLRB No. 88, slip op. at 2 (2017). These factors “are not to be mechanically applied,” they repre- sent “some areas of inquiry” for consideration in evaluating an interrogation’s legality. Rossmore House, supra, fn. 20. An interrogation need not take the form of a question to be unlawful; Statements designed to elicit a response may constitute an unlawful interrogation. See, e.g., Grass Valley Grocery Out- let, 338 NLRB 877, 882 fn. 1 (2003), affd. sub nom. NLRB v. Cubitt, 121 Fed.Appx. 720 (9th Cir. 2005); Medcare Associates, 330 NLRB 935, 941 fn. 21 (2000). “The questioning of an em- ployee about union activities or sympathies constitutes unlawful interrogation ‘if, under all the circumstances, it reasonably tends Notably, when Alarcon asked Nolda to provide her with information about unionization from a governmental website, she did not provide it, even after Alarcon made a follow-up request. 17 R Br. 13. 18 R Br. 14–15. 19 The Respondent also cites to Tesla, Inc., 370 NLRB No. 101, 9 (2021), and Tri-Cast, Inc., 274 NLRB 377 (1985), but those cases con- cern statements about the change in the nature of the employer/employee relationship when a union represents employees. That issue is not before me. Midland National Life Insurance Co., 263 NLRB 127, 130 (1982), also cited, concerns the standards for setting aside an election, also not before me. STARBUCKS CORP. 7 to restrain, coerce, or interfere with rights guaranteed by the Act.’” Shamrock Foods Co. v. NLRB, 346 F.3d 1130, 1137 (2003),20 quoting Perdue Farms, Inc. v. NLRB, 144 F.3d 830, 835 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). Considering the totality of the circumstances present here, I find Nolda’s statements at the outset and close of the meeting constituted an unlawful interrogation. At the start of the meet- ing, Nolda told Alarcon she wished she knew who started the union campaign, and then paused the conversation and looked at Alarcon. Particularly given the context and chain-of-command, this reasonably would be construed as Nolda seeking the identity of the campaign organizer(s) from Alarcon.21 The reiteration at the end of the meeting reinforced that Nolda was seeking the identity of the organizers. Turning to the first Bourne factor, there is a recent prevalent background of Starbucks hostility toward employee unioniza- tion, as detailed below in footnote 26. As to the second factor, the nature of the information sought was the identity of the indi- vidual who started the union drive at Cypress and Figueroa. The third factor, the identity of the interrogator, was the store man- ager who was the highest ranking official at the store. The fourth factor, the place and method of the interrogation, was a sched- uled one-on-one meeting specifically convened to convey infor- mation about the Respondent’s position on unions, i.e., Star- bucks did not want the store to unionize. These factors all weigh in the General Counsel’s favor. As to the fifth factor, the truth- fulness of the interrogated employee’s reply, this factor is neutral as Alarcon did not respond.22 As to some other relevant consid- erations, Alarcon was not a known union supporter at the time, and no assurances against reprisal were provided. And the tim- ing of the interrogation was after the petition in the time leading up to the election. The Respondent points to the fact that Nolda did not directly say, “Tell me who did this” or words to that effect. But such bla- tancy is not required. The Respondent also cites to caselaw from certain federal courts stating that Section 8(c) and the First Amendment insulate Nolda’s comments. In numerous cases post-dating any of these cited decisions, including many of the cases cited in this decision, however, the Board has found coer- cive interrogations violate Section 8(a)(1).23 In Sunbelt Rentals, Inc., 372 NLRB No. 24, slip op. at 11–12 (2022), 24 the Board stated: As the Board and the courts have long recognized, “an em- ployer, in questioning his employees as to their union sympa- thies, is not expressing views, argument, or opinion within the meaning of Section 8(c) of the Act, as the purpose of an inquiry is not to express views but to ascertain those of the person ques- tioned." Struksnes Construction Co., 165 NLRB 1062, 1062 fn. 8 (1967) (citing Martin Sprocket & Gear Co. v. NLRB, 329 F.2d 417, 420 (5th Cir. 1964)); NLRB v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 179 F.2d 323, 326 (8th Cir. 1950)). Employer inter- rogations of employees that do not express the employer’s views, arguments, or opinions, by definition, fall outside the 20 Enforcing Shamrock Foods, 337 NLRB 915 (2000). 21 In this case, there was no direct question. But, had Nolda, even if she was “venting” to Alarcon, said, “I wish I knew where I put my car keys,” then paused and looked at Alarcon, common sense and courtesy dictate that if Alarcon knew where Nolda had set her keys, she would tell her. 22 The record does not establish whether Alarcon knew who had started the unionization efforts at Cypress & Figueroa. category of expression that Section 8(c) protects. (Footnotes omitted.) Based on the foregoing, I find the General Counsel met her burden to prove the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) as al- leged in complaint paragraph 5(c). F. Respondent’s Contention that Unlawful Statements were De Minimis The Respondent argues that any unlawful statements it may have made in this case were de minimis and should not lead to a finding that Respondent violated the Act. Specifically, the Re- spondent contends that the General Counsel did not show that employees were influenced by any unlawful threats or interroga- tions, or that the unlawful statements had more than a de minimis impact on the election, given that the Union prevailed. The Re- spondent cites to Jimmy Wakely Show, 202 NLRB 620, 622 (1973), where the Board determined that a single incident was a technical violation of the Act but nonetheless dismissed the com- plaint because it was too insignificant to warrant finding a viola- tion or ordering relief. I cannot find, however, that the reasoning in Jimmy Wakely, a case involving a highly specific fact pattern in the context of an alleged 8(b)(1)(B) violation, applies to a case such as this, involving 8(a)(1) threats and interrogations in the midst of an active union campaign. Moreover, the Board has since limited the scope of the de minimis defense by finding that an unlawful statement cannot be deemed de minimis simply be- cause a respondent may not have engaged in other unlawful acts, or because the union found some success with bargaining after the violation occurred. Holladay Park Hospital, 262 NLRB 278, 279 (1982); Regency at the Rodeway Inn, 255 NLRB 961, 961– 962 & fn. 5 (1981). See also Vision Battery USA, 371 NLRB No. 133, slip op. at fn.2 (Board, in affirming dismissal of 8(a)(1) allegation, did “not rely on the judge’s statement that a remedial order would not be necessary even if the General Counsel had established the alleged violation.”) Accordingly, I do not find merit to this defense. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. 2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. By threatening employees with economic reprisal by tell- ing them, in the context of an organizing campaign, that their benefits were on hold and that employees may not receive a raise other stores were going to receive, the Respondent violated Sec- tion 8(a)(1) of the Act. 4. By interrogating employees about their union activities and/or sympathies, the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 5. The unfair labor practices described in Conclusions of Law 3 and 4 affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 23 It is Board caselaw that binds me, absent repudiation by the Su- preme Court. See Nielsen Lithographing Co. v. NLRB, 854 F.2d 1063, 1066–1067 (7th Cir. 1988) (citing cases). 24 Though Sunbelt Rentals involved interrogations under Johnny’s Poultry, 146 NLRB 770, 775 (1964), enf. denied 344 F.2d 617 (8th Cir. 1965), the logic of 8(c) analysis is pertinent here. DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 8 REMEDY Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain un- fair labor practices, I shall order it to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Specifically, the Respondent will be ordered to cease and desist from threatening employees with economic reprisal by telling them, in the context of an organizing cam- paign, that benefits were going to be put on hold and employees may not receive a raise other stores were going to receive, and to cease and desist from interrogating employees about their union activities and/or sympathies. I will also issue a broad cease-and- desist order. In WR Reserve, 372 NLRB No. 80 (2023), the Board, in modifying the judge’s recommended Order to include a broad cease-and-desist provision, undertook a thorough review of the standards set forth in Hickmott Foods, 242 NLRB 1357 (1979). The Board in Hickmott Foods explained that a broad cease and-desist order, enjoining a respondent from violating the Section 7 rights of employees “in any other manner,” is war- ranted “when a respondent is shown to have a proclivity to vio- late the Act or has engaged in such egregious or widespread mis- conduct as to demonstrate a general disregard for the employees’ fundamental statutory rights.” (Emphasis supplied.) In either sit- uation, the Board reviews the totality of the circumstances to as- certain whether the respondent’s unlawful conduct manifests an attitude of opposition to the purposes of the Act to protect the rights of employees generally. Postal Service, 345 NLRB 409, 410 (2005), enfd. as modified 477 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 2007). The Board has found enhanced remedies to be appropriate where the Respondent has demonstrated a proclivity “to commit similar vi- olations at its other facilities in response to the organizing efforts of its employees.” J. P. Stevens & Co., 245 NLRB 198, 198 (1979). In WR Reserve, slip op. at 5, the Board found that re- peated violations over a short period of time “provides ample evidence of its ‘proclivity to violate the Act,’ the second basis for a broad order under Hickmott.” The Board elaborated: [W]here a respondent’s conduct meets the standard for a broad order—i.e., where a proclivity to violate the Act has been estab- lished or where widespread or egregious misconduct demon- strates a general disregard for employees' Section 7 rights—the Board must order commensurate remedies to “effectuate the pol- icies of th[e] Act” (in the words of Section 10(c) of the Act). Id. Because of the numerous recent decisions finding that Star- bucks has violated the Act at various facilities throughout the country, I find a broad order is appropriate based on widespread 25 Many of these decisions are set forth in the General Counsel’s clos- ing brief at pp. 30–31, including the Board’s decision in Starbucks Cof- fee Co., 372 NLRB No. 50 (2023), and the administrative law judge (ALJ) decisions in Cases 18–CA–293653, Starbucks Corp., 2023 NLRB LEXIS 102 (March 3, 2023), Oak Creek, Wisconsin; 03–CA–285671, Starbucks Corp., 2023 NLRB LEXIS 99 (March 1, 2023), various stores in Buffalo, New York; 07–CA–293742, Starbucks Corp., 2023 NLRB LEXIS 61 (February 9, 2023), two locations in Ann Arbor, Michigan area; 27–CA–290551, Starbucks Corp. LLC, 2023 NLRB LEXIS 54 (February 6, 2023), Denver, Colorado; 19–CA–290905, Starbucks, 2023 NLRB LEXIS 35 (January 31, 2023), Seattle, Washington. In addition to the ALJ decisions cited by the General Counsel, ALJ decisions found violations of the Act at stores in Cases 18–CA–299560, Starbucks Corp., 2023 NLRB LEXIS 159 (April 6, 2023), Minneapolis, Minnesota; 13- CA-96145, Starbucks Corp., 2023 NLRB LEXIS 205 (May 2, 2023), two locations in the Chicago, Illinois; and 15–CA–290336 Starbucks Corp., 2023 NLRB LEXIS 217 (May 4, 2023), Memphis, Tennessee. misconduct and a proclivity to violate the Act.25 I will order that the employer post a notice at the facility in the usual manner, and distribute the notice electronically to the ex- tent mandated in J. Picini Flooring, 356 NLRB 11, 15–16 (2010), and Durham School Services, 360 NLRB 694 (2014). In accordance with J. Picini Flooring, the question as to whether an electronic notice is appropriate, and if so what method of elec- tronic notice should be required, is to be resolved at the compli- ance phase. Id. at 13.26 The General Counsel asserts that J. Picini Flooring should be updated as follows: [T]he Board should update its decision in J. Picini Flooring by expressly including text messaging, posting on a social media page, and distribution through an internal smartphone app used by employees, as standard forms of electronic notice distribution. The Board should make clear that the foregoing list of examples is non-exhaustive, and that any other forms of electronic communication available to an employer would also be appropriate. In addition, ra- ther than limiting the use of the most effective means of communication to cases in which the Board finds that an employer “customarily” communicates by such means, the Board should order the electronic distribution of the reme- dial notice whenever an employer is capable of communi- cating with its employees in that manner. The burden in compliance should rest with the employer to show that it lacks the ability to post or distribute the remedial notice us- ing the most effective means of electronic communication available. (GC Br. 33.) The Board has not authorized these proposed up- dated remedies, and I therefore decline to grant them. The General Counsel also requests an enhanced remedy in the form of a notice reading. The Board recently explained the ra- tionale for notice readings, distilled from its caselaw: The Board has ordered the notice-reading remedy in cases where the respondent’s unlawful conduct has been “suffi- ciently serious and widespread” to ensure that the content of the notice is disseminated to all employees. . . . Notice reading is a way to let in a “warming wind of information” to not only alert employees to their rights but also impress upon them that, as a matter of law, their employer or union must and will re- spect those rights in the future. Reading the notice (and any ex- planation of rights) aloud disseminates that information through the work force in a clear and effective way. This awareness, in turn, means that respondents will be less able to These decisions involve wide-ranging violations, including violations of Sec. 8(a)(1), (3), (4), and (5). 26 Even though the resolution is left to the compliance stage, the rele- vant testimony is summarized. Alarcon testified that Starbucks regularly posts notice at the back of the house on boards. Partners can also get Starbucks-related information from a website employees can access by logging into a computer in the back of the house. Training is conducted through an internal website as well as through an app called “my learn- ing” on iPads available to partners. Management communicates with partners via text message in situations such as callouts, schedule changes, and an incident at the store. Alarcon estimated that as a shift supervisor, about 75 percent of her communications with management are by text. (Tr. 44–47. 71–74, 95.) Starbucks’ intranet portal knows as the “partner hub,” houses policies, information about benefits, and any new infor- mation that is changing companywide. It does not house store-specific information. Store-specific matters like the store’s results and any changes of hours are posted on the board in the back of the house. (Tr. 93–94.) STARBUCKS CORP. 9 violate the Act unnoticed as a matter of course. . . . Notice reading offers employees a chance to hear, in a formal setting and in the presence of other employees and a Board agent, that their rights have value and that the Board takes those rights se- riously. Notice reading also underscores for the respondent that, under a broad order, it cannot simply find another more creative way to violate the Act. WR Reserve, above, slip op. at 6 (footnotes omitted). Though the violations at the Cypress and Figueroa store are relatively minor standing alone, they are plainly similar to violations at other facilities in response to the organizing efforts of its em- ployees. J.P. Stevens, above. Accordingly, I shall order that an agent of the Board read the notice to employees at the Cypress and Figueroa store with a responsible management official pre- sent. A representative of the Union may attend the notice read- ing. In addition, pursuant to WR Reserve: In broad order cases where a reading of the notice (and/or any explanation of rights) is ordered, we will also require the Board agent to distribute the notice and explanation of rights to employ- ees at the meeting before the reading. Such distribution will fa- cilitate employee comprehension as employees will be able to follow along as the notice and explanation of rights are read aloud. Id. As such, the notice shall be distributed to employees before the reading. The General Counsel also requests a posting of the Board’s Explanation of Employee Rights poster. For the reasons detailed above, and because the Respondent failed to provide Alarcon with information about a governmental website when she re- quested it, I find this remedy is warranted. I decline to grant an extended posting of either the notice or the explanation of rights, as requested by the General Counsel. The reading of the notice and the posting of both the notice and the explanation of rights will adequately address the violations. Finally, the General Counsel requests mandatory training for supervisors and managers, citing to the Equal Employment Op- portunity Commission’s (EEOC) practice and caselaw. I decline to grant this remedy as the Board has not authorized it. On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the following recommended27 ORDER The Respondent, Starbucks Corporation, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall 1. Cease and desist from (a) Threatening employees with economic reprisal by telling them, in the context of an organizing campaign, that their bene- fits were on hold and that employees may not receive a raise other stores were going to receive; (b) Interrogating employees about their union activities and/or sympathies; (c) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or co- ercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectu- ate the policies of the Act. 27 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Or- der shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all purposes. (a) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its Cy- press & Figueroa store in Los Angeles, California, copies of the attached notice and explanation of employee rights marked “Ap- pendix A” and Appendix B.28 Copies of the notice, on forms pro- vided by the Regional Director for Region 31, after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to employ- ees are customarily posted. In addition to physical posting of pa- per notices, the notices shall be distributed electronically, such as by email, posting on an intranet or an internet site, and/or other electronic means, if the Respondent customarily communicates with its employees by such means. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event that, dur- ing the pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility involved in these proceed- ings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current employees and former employ- ees employed by the Respondent at any time since May 25, 2022. (b) Within 14 days after service by the Region, hold a meeting or meetings, scheduled to ensure the widest possible attendance, at which the attached notice at Appendix A is to be distributed to employees and then read to employees by a Board agent in the presence of a responsible management official and an agent of the Union if the Union so desires. (c) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the Respondent has taken to comply. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint is dismissed insofar as it alleges violations of the Act not specifically found. Dated, Washington, D.C. May 12, 2023 APPENDIX A NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES POSTED, DISTRIBUTED, AND READ BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this notice. FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO Form, join, or assist a union Choose representatives to bargain with us on your be- half Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection Choose not to engage in any of these protected activi- ties. WE WILL NOTdo anything to prevent you from exercising these rights. WE WILL NOT threaten employees with economic reprisal by telling them, in the context of an organizing campaign, that their benefits were on hold and that employees may not receive a raise other stores were going to receive. 28 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board.” DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 10 WE WILL NOT interrogate employees about their union activi- ties and/or sympathies. WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed you by Sec- tion 7 of the Act. WE WILL post this notice and an Explanation of Rights at our facility in Los Angeles, California, for a period of 60 days. In addition, WE WILL post the notice and the Explanation of Rights on our intranet and any other electronic message area, including email, where we generally communicate with you. WE WILL distribute this notice to all employees and, after the notice has been distributed, hold a meeting or meetings during working hours and have this notice read to you and your fellow workers by a Board agent in the presence of a responsible man- agement official and, if the Union so desires, a union representa- tive. STARBUCKS CORPORATION The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at https://www.nlrb.gov/case/31-CA-299257 or by using the QR code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, 1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling (202) 273–1940. APPENDIX B EXPLANATION OF RIGHTS POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government Employees covered by the National Labor Relations Act have the right to join together to improve their wages and working conditions, including by organizing a union and bargaining col- lectively with their employer, and also the right to choose not to do so. This Explanation of Rights contains important information about your rights under this Federal law. The National Labor Re- lations Board has ordered Starbucks to provide you with the Ex- planation of Rights to describe your rights and provide examples of illegal behavior. Under the National Labor Relations Act, you have the right to: • Contact a union and, if they become your representative, have them negotiate with your employer concerning your wages, hours, and working conditions. • Support your union in negotiations. • Discuss your wages, benefits, other terms and conditions of employment, and negotiations between the union and your em- ployer with your coworkers or your union. • Take action with one or more coworkers to improve your working conditions. • Strike and picket, depending on the purpose or means used. • Choose not to do any of these activities. It is illegal for your employer to: • Make unilateral changes in your terms and conditions of em- ployment by implementing a collective-bargaining proposal without first bargaining with the Union to an overall good-faith impasse for a successor collective-bargaining agreement. There are rules that govern your employer’s conduct during col- lective bargaining with your union: • Your employer must meet with your union at reason- able times to bargain in good faith about wages, hours, va- cation time, insurance, safety practices, and other manda- tory subjects. • Your employer must participate actively in the nego- tiations with a sincere intent to reach an agreement. • Your employer must not change existing working terms and conditions while bargaining is ongoing. • Your employer must honor any collective-bargaining agreement that it reaches with your union. • Your employer cannot retaliate against you if you par- ticipate or assist your union in collective bargaining. Illegal conduct will not be permitted. The National Labor Re- lations Board enforces the Act by prosecuting violations. If you believe your rights or the rights of others have been violated, you should contact the NLRB promptly to protect your rights, gener- ally within 6 months of the unlawful activity. You may ask about a possible violation without your employer or anyone else being informed that you have done so. The NLRB will conduct an in- vestigation of possible violations if a charge is filed. Charges may be filed by any person and need not be filed by the employee directly affected by the violation. You can contact the NLRB’s Regional Office, located at: 11500 W Olympic Blvd, Suite 600 Los Angeles, CA 90064- 1753. The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at https://www.nlrb.gov/case/31-CA-299257 or by using the QR code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, 1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling (202) 273–1940.