Starbucks Corporation

373 NLRB No. 45 NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the bound volumes of NLRB decisions. Readers are requested to notify the Ex- ecutive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C. 20570, of any typographical or other formal errors so that corrections can be included in the bound volumes. Starbucks Corporation and Workers United Labor Union International, a/w Service Employees In- ternational Union. Case 20–CA–296184 April 17, 2024 DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS KAPLAN, PROUTY, AND WILCOX On August 8, 2023, Administrative Law Judge Eleanor Laws issued the attached decision. The Respondent filed 1 The Respondent asserts that Members Prouty and Wilcox should recuse themselves, claiming that their “past, present, and perceived rela- tionships with the Service Employees International Union” create a con- flict of interest. Members Prouty and Wilcox have determined, in con- sultation with the NLRB Designated Agency Ethics Official, that there is no basis to recuse themselves from the adjudication of this case. 2 There are no exceptions to the judge’s dismissal of the complaint allegation that the Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)(1) of the Act when Store Manager Jennifer Rabbia increased her solicitation of employee complaints and grievances in response to the Union’s petition. There are also no exceptions to the judge’s finding that District Manager Keala Ohia’s increased presence at the Mililani Shopping Center store follow- ing the petition did not, by itself, violate Sec. 8(a)(1). The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility find- ings. The Board's established policy is not to overrule an administrative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear preponderance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing the findings. In affirming the judge’s conclusion that the Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)(1) by threatening employees with the loss of a pay raise and loss of benefits if employees voted for the Union, we reject, for the reasons stated in Starbucks Corp., 373 NLRB No. 21 (2024), the Respondent’s argument that the statements at issue were lawful under Sec. 8(c) because they did not contain any explicit threats. Moreover, we find no merit in the Respondent’s contention that the “operational ability” to get products from other stores is not a working condition or an employee benefit and, “therefore, cannot be the basis for a ‘threat’ of loss of benefits.” The uncontradicted testimony of two employees establishes both that the Re- spondent’s employees receive tips and reviews from customers and that customers become “frustrated and angry sometimes” when the product they want is unavailable. Our colleague asserts that “neither employee testified that their inability to secure replacement products from other stores affected their tips or their reviews by customers,” and therefore claims that the General Counsel failed to meet her burden to prove that a threat to employees’ ability to obtain replacement products was a threat to a benefit that affected their terms and conditions of employment. However, the General Counsel may prove points—and the Board may make findings—based on reasonable inferences drawn from evidence in the record. See Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. NLRB, 804 F.2d 808, 813 (3d Cir. 1986); see also Beth Israel Hospital v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 504 (1978) (the Board may draw inferences “in light of its experience, the validity of which ‘depends upon the rationality between what is proved and what is inferred’”) (quoting Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S 793, 805 (1945)). Here, it is reasonable to infer from the two em- ployees’ testimony that some customers who are “frustrated and angry” by a lack of products leave negative reviews and do not tip as well. That is, it is a reasonable “conclusion reached by considering other facts and deducing logical consequence from them.” Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (“Inference”). Accordingly, we find that the sharing of replacement products between stores is a benefit that employees rely on exceptions and a supporting brief, the General Counsel and the Charging Party each filed an answering brief, and the Respondent filed a reply brief. The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.1 The Board has considered the decision and record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings,2 and conclusions and to adopt the judge’s recommended Order as modified and set forth in full below.3 to maintain customer satisfaction and, by extension, their working con- ditions. Member Kaplan agrees with the judge’s finding that the Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)(1) by threatening employees with the loss of benefits when Rabbia told employee Jocelyn Saloma that employees would not be able to pick up shifts at other stores if employees voted for the Union. He finds it unnecessary to pass on the judge’s additional finding that Ohia unlawfully threatened employees that they would lose the ability to pick up shifts from other stores inasmuch as such a finding would be cumulative and would not affect the remedy. Contrary to his colleagues, Member Kaplan would reverse the judge’s findings that the Respondent threatened employees with a loss of benefits when Rabbia and Ohia told Saloma that, if the store unionized, employees would not be able to get products from other stores or give products to other stores. In his view, the record fails to establish that employees’ ability to share products with other stores within their district constitutes a benefit to employees. Spe- cifically, there is no credited evidence that the sharing of products from other stores affected the employees’ wages, hours, or other terms and conditions of employment. His colleagues purport to rely on the testi- mony of two employees that establishes three facts in the record: the Re- spondent’s employees receive tips, customers are able to leave reviews, and that some customers are upset when products are unavailable. His colleagues assert that it is reasonable to infer a fourth record fact from such testimony: that certain customers frustrated by missing products take out their frustrations on the employees themselves by providing neg- ative reviews of the employees and/or smaller tips to the employees. However, Member Kaplan finds that the inference drawn by his col- leagues here is utterly speculative. Neither employee testified that their inability to secure replacement products from other stores affected their tips or their reviews by customers. In the absence of such testimony (or any other evidence), the record is simply insufficient to find such a con- nection. In fact, Member Kaplan notes that neither witness testified that em- ployees received negative reviews as a result of customers who are upset when products are not available; their testimony was that customers can leave feedback. Certainly, if one were to reach any inference from that testimony, an equally, if not more, reasonable inference to draw would be that customers who are upset about products being unavailable would leave negative reviews about the store—noting that they could not pur- chase certain items—rather than about the employees who worked there. But either way, neither inference could properly be considered a fact es- tablished in the record by the General Counsel. The burden to prove that the Respondent threatened employees with a loss of benefit that affected their terms and conditions of employment rested with the General Counsel, and she simply failed to carry that bur- den based on the record evidence. Accordingly, Member Kaplan would dismiss these complaint allegations. 3 The judge’s recommended order provides for a notice-reading rem- edy. Contrary to the judge, we decline to order this enhanced remedy and find that the Board’s traditional remedies are sufficient to effectuate the purposes of the Act in this matter. DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 2 ORDER The National Labor Relations Board orders that the Re- spondent, Starbucks Corporation, Mililani, Hawaii, its of- ficers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall 1. Cease and desist from (a) Threatening employees with economic reprisal, in- cluding that they may not receive a raise that employees at other stores are going to receive, if they select the Union as their collective-bargaining representative. (b) Threatening employees with the loss of benefits, in- cluding the ability to pick up shifts at other stores and share products with other stores, if they select the Union as their collective-bargaining representative. (c) Soliciting grievances from employees and promis- ing to remedy them in order to discourage employees from selecting union representation. (d) In any like or related manner interfering with, re- straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act. (a) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its Mililani Shopping Center store in Mililani, Hawaii, copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix.”4 Cop- ies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Di- rector for Region 20, after being signed by the Respond- ent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the Re- spondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in con- spicuous places, including all places where notices to em- ployees are customarily posted. In addition to physical posting of paper notices, the notices shall be distributed electronically, such as by email, posting on an intranet or We shall modify the judge’s recommended Order to conform to the remedies imposed and our standard remedial language and in accordance with our decision in Paragon Systems, Inc., 371 NLRB No. 104 (2022). We shall also substitute a new notice to conform to the Order as modi- fied. Member Kaplan acknowledges and applies Paragon Systems as Board precedent, although he expressed disagreement there with the Board’s approach and would have adhered to the position the Board adopted in Danbury Ambulance Service, Inc., 369 NLRB No. 68 (2020). For the reasons stated in his concurrence in CP Anchorage 2 d/b/a Hilton Anchorage, 371 NLRB No. 151, slip op. at 9–15 (2022), Member Prouty would make a reading of the notice to employees at a group meet- ing, accompanied by the distribution of the notice at the meeting, a part of the remedy in this case and a standard remedy for all unfair labor prac- tices found by the Board. Member Prouty further notes the insufficiency of the current practice of restricting notice reading to so-called “serious” or “egregious” violations of the Act. The purpose of all Board notice remedies is to redress the unfair labor practices the Board has found by alerting employees to the rights that the Act provides to them, and by providing reassurance to them that the respondent will—and in fact is legally bound to—honor those rights. There is no reason why employees whose legal rights have been violated “X” times or in “Y” ways will re- ceive the amplified benefit and assurance of a notice reading, while em- ployees whose rights have only been violated “X minus one” times or in “Y minus one” ways will not. The remedial imperative of ensuring that the notice is effectively conveyed to employees is present in every case where a respondent has been found to have violated the Act. Our reme- dial scheme should provide that notice reading—which is indisputably a more effective means of communicating with employees than notice an internet site, and/or other electronic means, if the Re- spondent customarily communicates with its employees by such means. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, de- faced, or covered by any other material. If the Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current employees and former employees employed by the Re- spondent at any time since February 15, 2022. (b) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director for Region 20 a sworn certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the Respondent has taken to com- ply. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint is dismissed insofar as it alleges violations of the Act not specifically found. Dated, Washington, D.C. April 17, 2024 ______________________________________ Marvin E. Kaplan Member ______________________________________ David M. Prouty, Member ______________________________________ Gwynne A. Wilcox, Member (SEAL) NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD posting—be used to remedy all violations of the Act. Put another way, notice reading has the restorative goal of ensuring that employees pro- tected by the Act are more effectively informed that their rights have been violated (and that, they should expect, their rights will not be so violated again). The Board should seek to achieve this goal in every case, rather than limiting it to cases where the respondent has behaved really, really, badly. 4 If the facility involved in these proceedings is open and staffed by a substantial complement of employees, the notice must be posted within 14 days after service by the Region. If the facility involved in these pro- ceedings is closed or not staffed by a substantial complement of employ- ees due to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, the no- tice must be posted within 14 days after the facility reopens and a sub- stantial complement of employees have returned to work. If, while closed or not staffed by a substantial complement of employees due to the pandemic, the Respondent is communicating with its employees by electronic means, the notice must also be posted by such electronic means within 14 days after service by the Region. If the notice to be physically posted was posted electronically more than 60 days before physical posting of the notice, the notice shall state at the bottom that “This notice is the same notice previously [sent or posted] electronically on [date].” If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board.” STARBUCKS CORP. 3 APPENDIX NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio- lated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this notice. FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO Form, join, or assist a union Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf Act together with other employees for your bene- fit and protection Choose not to engage in any of these protected ac- tivities. WE WILL NOT threaten you with economic reprisal, in- cluding that you may not receive a raise that employees at other stores are going to receive, if you select the Union as your collective-bargaining representative. WE WILL NOT threaten you with the loss of benefits, in- cluding the ability to pick up shifts at other stores and share products with other stores, if you select the Union as your collective-bargaining representative. WE WILL NOT solicit grievances from you and promise to remedy them in order to discourage you from selecting union representation. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights listed above. STARBUCKS CORPORATION The Board’s decision can be found at www.nlrb.gov/case/20-CA-296184 or by using the QR code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, 1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling (202) 273-1940. 1 All dates are in 2022 unless otherwise indicated. 2 The complaint allegations in par. 6(d) and (e) were withdrawn at the hearing. Pars. 6(j), (k), and (1) were changed or added pursuant to an amendment on February 3, 2023. The Respondent timely denied the amended complaint allegations. Trent K. Kakuda, Esq., for the General Counsel. Judy M. Iriye, Esq. and Wayne S. Yoshigai, Esq. (Littler Mendel- son, P.C.), for the Respondent. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE ELEANOR LAWS, Administrative Law Judge. This case was tried in Honolulu, Hawaii, on February 28–March 6, 2023. Workers United (the Charging Party or Union) filed the charge on May 20, 2022,1 and the General Counsel issued the complaint on December 1, 2022. Starbucks Corp. (the Respondent or Star- bucks) filed a timely answer denying all material allegations and setting forth affirmative and other defenses. The complaint alleges that Starbucks violated Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act) by: (1) Soliciting employee complaints and promising increased benefits and im- proved terms and conditions of employment if the employees did not unionize; (2) Threatening employees with the loss of the abil- ity to pick up shifts at other stores or get product from other stores if the employees unionized; and (3) Threatening employ- ees, during the critical period, that they would not be eligible for a future wage increase and they would lose benefits if they un- ionized.2 On the entire record, including my observation of the de- meanor of the witnesses, and after considering the briefs filed by the General Counsel and the Respondent, I make the following. FINDINGS OF FACT I. JURISDICTION The Respondent is a Washington State corporation with a fa- cility located at the Mililani Shopping Center, 95-221 Kipapa Drive, Mililani, Hawaii 96789 (Store #21011 or the MSC store). At all relevant times, the Respondent annually derived gross rev- enues in excess of $500,000 and purchased and received goods valued at more than $5000 from points outside the State of Ha- waii. The Respondent admits, and I find, that it is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act and that the Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Background Starbucks’ organizational hierarchy includes district manag- ers, store managers, shift supervisors, and baristas. Employees who work in Starbucks’ stores are called “partners.” District managers oversee the stores within their districts. According to the job description: The majority of time is spent staffing, coaching, developing and managing the performance of store managers, understand- ing local customer needs, ensuring district-wide customer sat- isfaction and product quality, analyzing key business indicators and trends, managing the district’s financial performance, and managing safety and security within the district. (R Exh. 12.)3 3 Abbreviations used in this decision are as follows: “Tr.” for tran- script; GC Exh. for General Counsel exhibit; R Exh. for Respondent ex- hibit; Jt. Exh. for joint exhibit; “GC Br.” for the General Counsel’s brief; and “R Br.” for the Respondent’s brief. Although I have included several citations to the record to highlight particular testimony or evidence, I DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 4 Each store has a store manager. Among other duties, store managers build the schedule, approve time off, hire employees, and resolve issues partners bring to them. The store manager pre- pares a daily coverage report, outlining the shifts for the day. A shift supervisor designated as the “keyholder” oversees each shift.4 This shift supervisor assigns tasks to other partners, han- dles cash, and basically runs the shift. Opening shift supervisors ensure that the store is prepared to open and that tasks are per- formed to optimize a smooth transition to the next shift. Closing shift supervisors ensure the morning shift is set up for success. The MSC store, which is part of district 298, has a lobby with seating and merchandise displayed for purchase. A counter with registers, equipment, and a food case separates the lobby from the front-of-the-house area where the partners serve customers. A door separates the front of the house from the back of the house, which contains sinks, a dishwasher, a refrigerator, areas to store supplies, a table and chairs, and an employee restroom. (GC Exh. 5.) The store manager, when not assisting the crew with tasks, works at a desk in the corner of the back of the house. (Tr. 31.) There is no designated work area for the district man- ager. Typically, opening shift starts with two partners, one being the keyholder. At peak times four or five partners work, and then this tapers back down to two partners during the last hour. These two partners clean for about a half hour after closing. During the relevant time period, three individuals served as MSC store manager. Chloe Ward was store manager from July 2021 through February 2022.5 Jennifer Rabbia was store man- ager on a temporary basis from the middle of February until June or July, overlapping briefly with Ward.6 Kayla Higa, who re- turned from maternity leave after being store manager at a dif- ferent Starbucks location, became the store manager at the MSC store the last week of March 2022, overlapping with Rabbia. Keala Ohia was the district manager for district 298 beginning in the fall of 2021. He previously served as a district manager in other districts for about 10 years.7 In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, Starbucks imple- mented check-in procedures at the MSC store to ensure em- ployee and customer safety. For each shift, the keyholder took the temperature of employees entering the store.8 Each emphasize that my findings and conclusions are based not solely on the evidence specifically cited but rather are based my review and consider- ation of the entire record. 4 Other shift supervisors may also be assigned to the shift, but if they are not the keyholder for the shift, they work as baristas. The keyholder is sometimes referred to as the play caller. 5 At the time of the hearing, Ward was store manager at Starbucks’ Stadium & Marketplace store. She requested to transfer because she was not happy at the MSC store and she wanted a higher volume store. Her request to transfer predated the union petition, which is discussed below. Ward has worked at several other Starbucks locations since 2013. 6 At the time of the hearing, Rabbia was a store manager in New Mex- ico, where her husband, an active duty member of the United States Armed Forces, was stationed. She previously was the store manager at the Moanalua Store, but was displaced at the end of 2021 when the store closed due to water contamination issues. Rabbia returned to Moanalua when the store reopened. 7 District 298 has 10 stores including the MSC store. Ohia also pre- viously worked as a store manager and assistant store manager. 8 The testimony about who was checked varied. Ward testified that anyone who was expected to be in close contact for an extended period of about 15 minutes had to do the COVID check-in. (Tr. 607.) Rabbia believed employees and managers had to do the COVID check every time they came to the store. (Tr. 472.) Ohia’s understanding was that the temperature check was logged and initialed by the employee be- ing tested and a verifier. (GC Exhs. 14, 16–18.) These check-in sheets were on a clipboard next to the daily coverage report. About 50 sheets were on the clipboard, and once those were filled out, they were stored in the back of the house.9 (Tr. 598.) The COVID logs were not used as attendance sheets. (Tr. 798.) Due to staffing shortages from COVID, the MSC store was closed temporarily for about two weeks in January 2022, and its employees were reassigned to other stores in District 298. (Tr. 54–55, 581, 801–802.) Employees can pick up available shifts at other stores if they want extra hours with the permission of the respective store man- agers. When stores run out of products or supplies, they can get them from other nearby stores, and this is a common practice.10 (Tr. 270.) B. The Organizing Campaign Employees at the MSC store began organizing for the Union to represent its hourly employees, including baristas and shift su- pervisors, in February 2022. On February 11, the Union posted on its Twitter account a letter to Kevin Johnson, then-CEO of Starbucks, captioned, “Petition for the Unionization of Store 21011.” The letter described some of the issues facing workers as well as some other background information, and asked John- son to let them form their union.11 The letter was signed, “Star- bucks Workers United Organizing Committee, Store 21011, Mililani, HI 96789” and identified partners Nate Jaramillo, Des- tiny Vaca, Alicia McKinley, Kennedy Fields, Amy Naka- bayashi, Sarah Daniels, Koeli Giron, and an anonymous part- ner.12 (GC Exhs. 6, 8; Tr. 35.) Also on February 11, the Union filed a representation petition with the Board. On April 1, following a hearing, the Regional Director issued a Decision and Direction of Election directing an election to be conducted by mail for the following bargaining unit: INCLUDED: All full time and regular part-time Baristas and Shift Supervisors employed by the Employer at its facility lo- cated at 95-221 Kipapa Drive, Mililani, HI (Store 21011). EXCLUDED: All Store Managers, office clericals, logs needed to be filled out whenever someone passed the pastry case to the service area. (Tr. 798.) The COVID logs for various time periods are not a matter of record. (See GC Br. 10–11.) 9 The manner and duration of storage in the back of the house is less than clear and appears to have changed over time, with different store managers offering different testimony. See Tr. 196–198 (Higa: Docu- ments were stored with other health documents in a cabinet, then boxed in a box marked confidential and returned after 6 months, though no doc- uments were returned under her watch); Tr. 463–464 (Rabbia: When she arrived at the store the logs were on a shelf above the desk, she moved them into file folders in a filing cabinet under the desk); Tr. 598–600 (Ward: When she arrived at the store, she moved the COVID logs from a binder to a confidential document folder in the filing cabinet). 10 When products or supplies run out and cannot be replaced, custom- ers become frustrated. Customer feedback factors into employee partner development plans, which shows areas that need to be improved. (Tr. 98, 271.) 11 Attached to the letter was the Starbucks Workers United Non-inter- ference and Fair Election Principles for Partner Unionization for Johnson to sign. 12 Jaramillo drafted the letter. Before he sent it, he asked partners if they were okay with their names being published on the letter. The names that appear are the partners (which include baristas and shift supervisors) who approved their names being published. STARBUCKS CORP. 5 professional employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. The ballots were mailed to eligible voters on April 8, and all bal- lots received by the NLRB were tallied on May 2, with 7 votes for the Union, 8 votes against the Union, and one challenged bal- lot.13 (GC Exh. 4.) As such, the Union was not certified to repre- sent the aforementioned bargaining unit. Ohia learned of the petition the day it was filed. (Tr. 806.) Ohia called partner relations and they discussed the guidance TIPS and FOE. TIPS stood for threats, interrogations, promises, and surveillance, which management was to avoid. FOE stood for facts, which could be shared if true, opinion and experience, which also could be shared. (Tr. 807–809.) Rabbia and Higa like- wise received TIPS training and FOE training. (Tr. 445–447; 736–738.) C. Interactions Between Management and Employees Store managers at the MSC store routinely “connect”14 with partners to make sure they are doing okay and to see if there’s anything they need. (Tr. 568–569, 593, 616–617, 664–665, 722– 724.) The record establishes that Ohia, more than some other district managers, is approachable to the partners and engages them in conversations. (Tr. 580, 626.) Ohia tries to meet with new partners to introduce himself and get to know them. He dis- cusses his experiences at Starbucks and tries to get to know part- ners on a personal level, not just as employees. He also tries to connect with partners when he visits the stores. (Tr. 793–794.) In the fall of 2021, Ohia approached barista Jonah Carreira- Bobadilla, who goes by the nickname “Boba,” at work, said he was the new district manager, and offered to do an icebreaker with him. Boba agreed, and they went to the back of the house where they discussed their backgrounds. Ohia recalled Boba mentioned financial difficulties and stress over working two jobs.15 (Tr. 836–837.) Ohia gave Boba his phone number and told him to call him if he needed anything. (Tr. 176.) Almost every time Boba saw Ohia at work, Ohia asked if there was any- thing he could do for him in passing, usually as Ohia was leaving the store. (Tr. 253–255, 264.) Store managers also regularly asked Boba how he was doing. (Tr. 318–319.) Prior to the petition, barista Alicia McKinley and Ohia had fun casual conversations, including conversations about Marvel vs. DC Comics. (Tr. 390.) McKinley initiated a meeting with Ohia in the fall of 2021 to express concerns about Ward and schedul- ing.16 Ohia suggested McKinley talk to Ward about the problem and noted that Ward was new to the position and still adjusting. Shortly afterward, they had a follow-up conversation about the matter, and McKinley told Ohia she had spoken to Ward even 13 The Union filed objections, which were overruled by the Regional Director. 14 The term “connect” is commonly used in Starbucks’ jargon and ap- pears in the record with modifiers such as “quick connect”, “partner con- nect”, “one-on-one connect”, “scheduled connect”, and “connect meet- ing”. It essentially means having a conversation. 15 Ohia did not offer to remedy this concern during the meeting. 16 McKinley worked as a barista at the MSC store from July 15, 2021 to July 15, 2022. She generally worked Tuesday–Saturday and would sometimes pick up a Monday shift. McKinley resigned from Starbucks. At the time of the hearing, she worked at an elementary school in a school health support staff position. She had previously worked at other Star- bucks locations. (Tr. 338–339.) 17 Jaramillo became a shift supervisor around Thanksgiving of 2019. At the time of the hearing, he worked in merchandising at another though she had only spoken to Ward about the matter prior to, but not after, her conversation with Ohia. This conversation lasted a minute or two. (Tr. 348–350.) In December 2021, Ohia introduced himself to shift supervi- sor Nate Jaramillo.17 They began talking by the refrigerators next to the handwashing sink, and eventually took the conversation to the back of the house. During this conversation, Ohia asked if he could do anything for Jaramillo, or if there was anything Jara- millo thought he should know. Jaramillo mentioned a situation between the store manager Ward and another barista, Caiell Yo- shida,18 that made him and others uncomfortable and seemed to him like favoritism. They discussed the matter in the back of the house, and Ohia suggested that Jaramillo discuss the situation with Ward. In January, Jaramillo initiated a conversation with Ohia on the workroom floor to tell him that partners had been frustrated with how the recent closure of the store for two weeks due to COVID-19 callouts had been handled. Ohia thanked Jara- millo for letting him know. (Tr. 57–60.) Yoshida testified that Ohia greeted him by asking how he was doing and if there was anything Ohia could do to support him. (Tr. at 625-26). Rabbia regularly asked partners how they were doing and if there is anything she could do to help or support them.19 (Tr. 465.) Higa also said that, as part of her checkout process, she asked partners for feedback about the day and if they needed anything from her or the keyholder. (Tr. 723.) McKinley observed that Ohia asked her if there was anything he could do for her more frequently after the petition. (Tr. 391–392.) D. Ohia’s Post-Petition One-on-One Meetings Days after the petition was filed, Ohia initiated one-on-one meetings with the partners at the MSC store. He summarized most of these conversations shortly after they occurred. On Feb- ruary 15, he met with McKinley, Jaramillo, Amy Nakabayashi, and briefly with Sarah Daniels.20 On February 16, he met with Macy Walker, Davanna Gockel, and Rei Fujimura21 separately but summarized them together. (Tr. 811–813; R Exh. 13). On February 17, Ohia met with Boba and Kaeli Giron.22 Ohia also met with Samantha White and Caiell Yoshida, and maybe briefly with Destiny Vaca, but did not take notes about these meetings. The meetings became repetitive, so Ohia’s summaries were less detailed over time, and he eventually stopped taking notes be- cause the conversations were the same, and he did not want to write the same thing over and over. (Tr. 818, 857.) Some of these meetings are further detailed below, but in Ohia’s view, the main concerns employees voiced were losing benefits and transferring out of the store. After consulting with partner relations and attor- neys, Ohia testified that he told employees that everything would stay status quo but then everything goes to collective bargaining company. He was terminated from Starbucks in August 2022, for work- place violence, specifically slamming things and using the F-word. 18 Yoshida transferred to Haleiwa shopping center store at end of elec- tion. He worked at MSC store 2 years prior as a barista. 19 Boba recalled that Rabbia typically asked if there was anything she could do for him before she left the store. (Tr. 264–265.) Samantha White recalled that Rabbia would ask her if there was anything she could do to help or support her when she greeted her. (Tr. 465.) 20 After Ohia denied Daniels’ request to record the meeting, she ended the conversation. (R Exh. 13.) 21 Fujimura’s first name is misspelled in the transcript as “Ray.” 22 Rabbia recalled Ohia met with “pretty much everyone” after the petition was filed. (Tr. 448.) DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 6 and that could result in wages and benefits going up or down, but he didn’t know. (Tr. 818–819.) These meetings usually lasted 10–15 minutes, some were shorter, and Yoshida’s was about an hour. Jaramillo met with Ohia on February 15 at the manager’s desk. Nobody else was present. Jaramillo recorded the meeting. Ohia started out by stating that he was there to put “you guys” at ease because he was told that some partners may feel like their jobs were in jeopardy. Ohia stated he was going to continue lead- ing the way he had been for the last 6 months, and nothing was going to change in terms of his leadership. Ohia said he wanted to be sure he was there to support the partners, and “I came spe- cifically because I—your—both your names came up about that . . .” (Tr. 75.) Jaramillo believed that by “both” Ohia was refer- encing him and McKinley because they were both working that day. Ohia asked if there was anything else he could do to support them, and said, “You guys express the things that you guys need. I would do my very best to do what I can for you guys. And that’s pretty much it. Knowing what you guys need helps me help you guys. And so that’s pretty much it.” (Tr. 76.) Jaramillo did not make any requests following this prompt. Jaramillo then confirmed that the conversation was about the Union: MR. JARAMILLO: Yeah. I’ve heard some concerning things from, you know, the day that—we’re talking about the union. MR. OHIA: Yeah. MR. JARAMILLO: We’re talking unionization strictly, and I want— MR. OHIA: Yeah. MR. JARAMILLO: —that on the record, right? MR. OHIA: Yeah. (Tr. 76–77.) After confirming that they were talking about the Union, Jaramillo expressed his belief that since the union cam- paign went public, things would change. Jaramillo predicted that Ohia would visit the store more often and managers would crack down on partners for “the tiniest infraction.” Ohia responded that all he had heard is that he was to lead the team the way he had been leading them, and that was what he intended to do. Ohia brought up their previous conversation about Ward and the rela- tionship dynamic and said he would still be there to support Jara- millo to become a successful partner. Jaramillo replied that noth- ing with Ward had improved. (Tr.78–79.) Jaramillo asked if Ohia would be speaking with everyone. Ohia responded, “Mainly you two, and then Amy.” Jaramillo in- quired as follows: MR. JARAMILLO: Why the two of us? MR. OHIA: Because your names came up in terms of, like, being concerned about your jobs. MR. JARAMILLO: Every— MR. OHIA: And so I was like, well, I don’t want them to think that, you know? 23 This is inconsistent with Rabbia’s testimony that all employees ex- pressed concern about their jobs, and she escalated this up to Ohia. “All partners expressed that they were worried about their jobs, whether they were pro or antiunion. And I would tell them I don’t know; let me talk to Keala. And Keala would come, and he would have those Connects with the partners to talk to them more about it.” (Tr. 455.) 24 Ohia’s summary is broadly consistent with the recording, though it is for obvious reasons it is much less detailed, omits parts of the MR. JARAMILLO: Everyone signed on the letter, so why just the— MR. OHIA: Yeah. MR. JARAMILLO: —two of us? MR. OHIA: Because specifically, you two—your names came up in a conversation with Jenn, and so I was, like, okay, well, that’s—you know, I don’t want them to feel like that. I’m going to make sure that they know, like—hey, like, you guys do what you guys do, you know, and that’s it. I don’t want you guys to be concerned about it. That’s all. 23 MR. JARAMILLO: This makes us feel a little targeted, but— Mr. Ohia: Yeah. (Tr. 81–82.) Jaramillo asked if maybe they should be speaking to Rabbia, and Ohia stated, “Jenn’s learning all of this as I—as I’m learning all of this.” Jaramillo said he felt “blind sighted” because he had not told anyone he had concerns, so he was not sure why his name came up to Ohia. (Tr. 83.) Ohia ended the conversation by reiterating: MR. OHIA: And then, like I said, whatever else I can do to support you guys that needs to get done in the store, com- municate. Let Jenn know. Let me know if you feel like you’re being heard from—like, with Jenn, tell me. Or you can call PRC [partner resources center]. Okay? Mr. Jaramillo: Okay. (Tr. 84.)24 In contrast to his first conversation with Ohia, Jara- millo perceived that this conversation was “more calculated, it was sanitized. It wasn’t as personable. He had an agenda.” (Tr. 92.) After this conversation, Jaramillo refused to meet with Ohia again. Ohia asked to meet with McKinley on February 15, and they met in the back of the house with nobody else present. According to McKinley, after greeting each other, they spoke about the Un- ion. McKinley said the union drive was not meant to hurt Ohia, and he responded that he did internalize it and his feelings were hurt.25 Ohia asked what they expected to gain by unionizing. Af- ter McKinley answered, Ohia told her he could give them what they wanted from the Union. McKinley felt that it “wasn’t a bad conversation” and she felt like she was truthful and told Ohia how she felt. (Tr. 351–353.) According to Ohia, he said he wanted to address McKinley’s concerns about her job being in jeopardy, and she was appreciative that he came by to put her at ease. McKinley said that none of “the actions” were because of him, but she wanted to make a difference that would help the employees at the store. Ohia assured McKinley that nothing would change in their relationship, he would continue to support employees and advocate for the store’s needs, and he was there to learn from the process and how they could move forward. (R Exh. 13.) At Ohia’s request, Boba and Ohia met on February 17, 2022, on the patio. Boba recorded the meeting. (Tr. 178–180.) They exchange pleasantries, and when prompted by Ohia, Boba said he had some “family stuff” going on “but nothing too crazy.”26 conversation, and reflects Ohia’s point of view on what was important to summarize. 25 This is consistent with Ohia’s testimony that the petition hurt. (Tr. 807.) 26 In its closing brief, the Respondent asserts that Boba said he had been struggling with “personal and family matters” (R Br. 11, 22) but the STARBUCKS CORP. 7 Ohia told Boba that he was there to support the partners and that nothing would change in terms of how he treated partners in the store.27 Ohia said he noticed some tension in the store and that some partners were uncomfortable and didn’t feel at ease. When pointedly prompted on this point, Boba agreed, and expressed that a lot of partners were “floating around in uncertainty.” Ohia said he felt like everyone was walking on eggshells and that nothing should change “regardless of whatever stance or position you have on—on this situation.” (Tr. 225–226.) Ohia said Boba’s name had come up “where they said, hey, have you spo- ken to Boba yet.” Boba said he felt like he had not been talked to about working at the Town Center store when the MSC store closed due to COVID. They discussed the MSC store closure some more and Boba expressed that since then, things had felt uncertain. The following exchange ensued: MR. OHIA: Okay. And so like I said, when—probably when I first might (sic) you, right, it’s like, I want you guys to love your job. I genuinely do. Like, it is the last thing I want is partners to not love being here, not love what they’re doing. And I—I can commit to whatever you need so that you feel good enough. And so what would that be? MR. BOBADILLA: I will think about that question. Actu- ally, I’ll get back to you on that one. Yeah, that—I’m going to need a lot of thinking on that question— MR. OHIA: Yeah. And I—MR. BOBADILLA: —what I— I need. MR. OHIA: —and I haven’t asked that question to—ac- tually, you’re the first person that I asked that question be- cause it sounds like, you know, you’d like that additional support, whatever you’d need. And I—I can follow up and ensure that you get it, you know. I can follow up and ensure like, hey, (indiscernible) please make sure we get commu- nication to Boba because it seems like he’s—he doesn't seem like he’s getting all the information he needs, you know. If it’s like whatever, whatever. And it’s—it’s as— like, as—as if I’m—nothing’s changed basically. I’m going to continue to like, if—support you guys exactly the way I would have supported you guys before this all happening. MR. BOBADILLA: That’s good. (Tr. 238–239.) Ohia asked Boba if he was good financially and Boba said he was good. Ohia told Boba to leverage all of Star- bucks’ benefits and reminded him of a couple specific programs. Ohia had never inquired about Boba’s finances before or initi- ated a meeting with him before.28 (Tr. 249–250.) Boba had not observed Ohia conducting sit-downs with partners before the or- ganizing drive. (Tr. 266.) After these initial meetings, Ohia had follow-up conversations with partners about various issues, including questions about transfers, and clearing up some miscommunication being shared in the store. Yoshida met with Ohia pretty regularly after the pe- tition, mostly because he had questions about the Union. (Tr. 620–625.) White also met with Ohia to ask questions about the only thing Boba mentioned was “family stuff” and he went on to say it was “nothing too crazy” and he just needed to talk to his family about it. Boba did not state he was struggling with personal issues. 27 This is clearly a reference to the organizing drive. 28 Ohia’s notes regarding this meeting look to be incomplete. (R Exh. 13.) 29 The district manager reviews whether a potential recipient of the CUP fund is in good standing before it is awarded. (Tr. 756, 835.) 30 Boba had taken a medical leave of absence at the end of 2021. Union. (Tr. 666–667.) The last week of February, Ohia and McKinley met at the desk in the back of the house. Ohia asked McKinley whether she had received her CUP fund, which is a program permitting employ- ees to apply for cash for hardships/emergencies. McKinley was surprised because she had never told Ohia she applied for the CUP fund.29 Ohia told McKinley to let him know if she needed anything. At some point in March or April, Nakabayashi told Boba that Ohia wanted to meet with him again. Boba told Nakabayashi he did not want to meet with Ohia, and she told him to tell Ohia that himself. Boba went to the back of the house and told Ohia he did not want to talk to him. Ohia said he only wanted to talk to him about his leave of absence (LOA).30 After they discussed the LOA, Ohia said his job for the week was to make the store feel supported and to heal the store given what’s happened. Boba be- lieved Ohia was referring to the Union drive. Ohia asked Boba if there was anything else he could do for him, and Boba responded he would like more hours and a union. Ohia said he could work toward one of those things. (Tr. 250–253, 305–306.) E. Ohia’s Visits to the MSC Store The frequency of Ohia’s store visits within district 298 varies depending on what is going on in the stores. In 2021, Ohia re- called visiting the MSC store about two or three times per week, and occasionally on the weekend.31 He was in the store less dur- ing November 2021–January 2022, due to investigations at other stores, a crisis involving contaminated water, the MSC store’s two-week closure, and a vacation. (Tr. 799–801.) Ohia acknowl- edged that his visits to the MSC store increased following the petition “because of the partner sentiment that I was hearing and feeling was, they were not at ease. There was a lot of tension. And part of my role and responsibility as a district manager is to help with partner morale issues that may occur so that we can create the best partner experience possible regardless of what- ever situation there is.” (Tr. 847.) He also noted that “partners had questions and there were some issues.”32 (Tr. 848–850.) Rabbia had a lot of questions when she took over as store man- ager, and she would reach out to Ohia for answers and/or to come to the store to talk to the partners about issues they raised that she was unable to address. She thought he visited the MSC store about twice a week after the petition was filed. (Tr. 444.) Higa said when she did not know the answer to a question, she would ask Ohia, who would respond or get back to her if he was unable to respond immediately. (Tr. 739.) F. Conversations with Jocelyn Saloma 1. Rabbia Rabbia hired Jocelyn Saloma, who began working at the MSC store in mid-March 2022. (Tr. 501.) Saloma had previously worked at the airport Starbucks run by HMS Host, which has some differences from working in a corporate Starbucks. Ini- tially, Starbucks believed Saloma was not eligible to vote due to 31 Ohia lives near the MSC store and sometimes goes there just to get coffee. Depending on how much time he has, he might talk to the part- ners, but if it’s his day off and his family is in the car, he may just rush in and out. (Tr. 796.) 32 Ohia’s increased visits are reflected in the COVID check-in logs (GC Exh. 14; Jt. Exh. 2.), and there are numerous employee accounts of Ohia’s presence at the store (see, e.g, Tr. 56, 61, 174, 177, 346, 350, 663– 666). Given that Ohia himself does not dispute his increased presence following the petition, the details of this evidence are not recounted. DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 8 the recency of her employment33. On April 6, Rabbia, while driv- ing, called Saloma at home on Saloma’s day off. Rabbia told Sa- loma that she would be eligible to vote in the election, and gave her the onestarbucks.com website for instructions on how to fill out ballots. According to Saloma, Rabbia told her that the Buf- falo store was still going through negotiations, and it was taking a long time. Rabbia said that if the MSC store voted to unionize, they would lose certain benefits, like the ability to take shifts from other stores or have employees from other stores cover their shifts if they called out. Rabbia also said that if they ran out of products from their store, they wouldn’t be able to get products from corporate stores, and if the corporate stores needed any- thing, the MSC store would not be able to give them products. (Tr. 504–505.) Though she could not recall Rabbia’s exact words and testified that Rabbia may have said benefits “might” or “could” be affected, the message Saloma received was that they would lose those benefits if the MSC store unionized. (Tr. 516– 517.) Rabbia did not mention anything about negotiations other than her comments about Buffalo. (Tr. 505–506.) Saloma esti- mated the conversation was about an hour, counting the time that the call was cut off.34 (Tr. 506.) Rabbia did not recall the day or time of the conversation, or whether it took place on the phone or in person. Rabbia said the call lasted less than 30 minutes and did not recall speaking with Saloma during a car ride. (Tr. 530, 540.) Rabbia also did not re- call what either she or Saloma said specifically, but she knew the general idea of what she was to share with Saloma and two other recently hired baristas: Q. And do you recall what either you or Joece said dur- ing that conversation? A. No. I do know the general idea of what I was to share with all three of them, which was to apologize and let them know that there was a change, that they would be voting. I shared the website, the one.starbucks that had the facts to let them know, like, okay, here’s some of the facts and in- formation if you have questions. Yeah. (Tr. 530–531.) She shared facts “corporate” provided about what was happening at the Buffalo store. She denied mentioning not being able to pick up shifts at other stores or share products with other stores.35 (Tr. 531–534.) According to Saloma, after the ballots were mailed but before the vote, as she was putting her items away in the back room and getting ready for work, Rabbia told her there was a pay raise coming, but if they unionized, they would not be eligible for the raise and she didn’t want them to lose all their good benefits. (Tr. 510.) Rabbia did not tell Saloma that any pay raises would be subject to negotiation. (Tr. 526.) Rabbia testified. “I told her that the company was anticipating pay raises for the baristas and the shift supervisors, but I didn't know, like, what it was going to look like since we were petitioning because I don’t know what’s going to happen.” Rabbia didn’t recall where the conversation took place. (Tr. 538.) 33 Rabbia had previously been informed that the new employees, Sa- loma and two other baristas hired around the same time (Bree Wang and Keala Kekoolani), would not be eligible to vote. 34 Saloma based her estimate of an hour’s duration on looking at her phone registry. (Tr. 517.) A screen shot of Saloma’s phone shows that Rabbia initially called Saloma at 2:48 p.m., and left a voicemail at 2:49 p.m. Saloma called Rabbia back at 3:01 and this call lasted for 7 minutes before the call was dripped. At 3:10, Rabbia called Saloma back after the 2. Ohia Saloma met with Ohia shortly after she was hired in mid- March for an introduction. (Tr. 519, 841.) Saloma recalled that a few days after her phone conversation with Rabbia, Higa ap- proached her while she was working with Boba, and said Ohia wanted to talk to her in the back room.36 (Tr. 506–507, 511.) Ac- cording to Saloma, Ohia asked her what she knew about the un- ion campaign, and Saloma mentioned that Rabbia had called her. Ohia asked about the conversation with Rabbia, and Saloma mentioned Rabbia saying employees would not be able to pick up shifts at other stores or borrow product from other stores, “[a]nd he agreed to those.” Ohia also mentioned a Canada store that negotiated for a higher wage but with union dues it really didn’t make a difference. Ohia said that employees could vote how they wanted, expressed his preference they vote nonunion, and that if he had any plans for the store to make changes he would not be able to do that if the employees chose to unionize. (Tr. 506–509.) After the meeting, Boba asked about it, and Sa- loma told him they were talking about the Union campaign. (Tr. 511.) Ohia could only recall meeting with Saloma one more time after their introductory meeting, shortly after he found out she was eligible to vote, to inform her of her eligibility and ask if she had any questions. (Tr. 842.) He did not recall asking her to talk to him in the back of the house and did not recall any conversa- tion with Saloma lasting more than 15 minutes. (Tr. 844.) Higa did not recall telling Saloma that Ohia wanted to meet with her in the back room and she did not recall a pre-scheduled meeting between Ohia and Saloma. (Tr. 765, 766.) Higa did not recall any shifts she worked with Boba and Saloma when Ohia came into the store. (Tr. 765.) Ohia, Higa, Boba, and Saloma all signed COVID logs on April 14. (GC Exh. 13 at 273.) III. DECISION AND ANALYSIS The complaint contains multiple allegations that the Respond- ent violated Section 8(a)(1) by threatening employees and solic- iting grievances with the promise to remedy them. A. General Legal Standards: Section 8(a)(1) and c) The Board's longstanding test to determine if there has been a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act is whether the employer engaged in conduct which might reasonably tend to interfere with the free exercise of employee rights under Section 7 of the Act. American Freightways Co., 124 NLRB 146 (1959). The rights guaranteed in Section 7 include the right “to form, join or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through repre- sentatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other con- certed activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection . . . .” “It is well settled that the test of interference, restraint, and coercion under Section 8(a)(1) of the Act does not turn on the employer’s motive or on whether the coercion succeeded or failed.” American Tissue Corp., 336 NLRB 435, 441 (2001) (citing NLRB v. Illinois Tool Works, 153 F.2d 811, 814 (7th Cir. 1946)). It is the General Counsel’s burden call dropped, and the conversation lasted for 27 more minutes. (Tr. 868– 869; GC Exh 19.) The registry shows activity between 2:48 and 3:37 p.m., with the calls taking place over 34 minutes and 16 seconds. 35 According to Rabbia, Higa later called Saloma to confirm she re- ceived her ballot. (Tr. 534–535.) 36 Boba testified he saw Saloma meet with Ohia, though the record does not indicate when. (Tr 177, 265.) STARBUCKS CORP. 9 to prove an 8(a)(1) violation. Under Section 8(c) of the Act: The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dis- semination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or vis- ual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this Act [subchapter], if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or prom- ise of benefit. During an ongoing organizing campaign, employers may per- missibly engage in legitimate campaign propaganda about the merits of union membership, as long as the campaign propa- ganda is not linked to comments that cross the line set by Section 8(a)(1) and become coercive from the objective standpoint of employees, over whom the employer has a measure of economic power. See Mesker Door, Inc., 357 NLRB 20 591, 595 (2011). B. Alleged Solicitation of Grievances/Promise of Benefits Complaint paragraphs 6(b) and (c) allege that beginning around February 12, the Respondent, by Ohia and Rabbia, re- spectively, by soliciting grievances, promised employees in- creased benefits and improved terms and conditions of employ- ment if they voted against the Union in violation of Section 8(a)(1). Employer solicitation of employee grievances or complaints during an organizing campaign may be considered as an implied promise to resolve complaints elicited favorably for the employ- ees. See Alamo Rent-A-Car, 336 NLRB 1155 (2001). In Majestic Star Casino, LLC, 335 NLRB 407, 407-408 (2001), the Board, quoting Maple Grove Health Care Center, 330 NLRB 775 (2000), stated: Absent a previous practice of doing so . . . the solicitation of grievances during an organizational campaign accompanied by a promise, expressed or implied, to remedy such grievances vio- lates the Act. . . . [ I]t is the promise, expressed or implied, to remedy the grievances that constitutes the essence of the viola- tion. . . . [T]he solicitation of grievances in the midst of a union campaign inherently constitutes an implied promise to remedy the grievances. Furthermore, the fact [that] an employer's repre- sentative does not make a commitment to specifically take cor- rective action does not abrogate the anticipation of improved conditions expectable for the employees involved. [T]he infer- ence that an employer is going to remedy the same when it so- licits grievances in a preelection setting is [sic] rebuttable one. An employer with a past practice of soliciting employee griev- ances may continue to do so during an organizing campaign as long as the practice remains essentially the same. Longview Fi- bre Paper & Packaging, Inc., 356 NLRB 796 (2011). An em- ployer cannot rely on past practice if it “significantly alters its past manner and methods of solicitation during the campaign.” House of Raedford Farms, 308 NLRB 568, 569 (1992). 37 The record shows that Ohia had some one-on-one introductory “ice- breaker” meetings with employees. These were focused on getting to know each other and were, by their nature, with employees new to Ohia. 38 Mercedes-Benz discussed other allegations, including interroga- tions. During the same conversations involving solicitation of griev- ances, the judge found (and the Board affirmed) that the employer inter- rogated employees about their union activities. Though they involved the same conversations, the two allegations, i.e. interrogations and solicita- tions of grievances/promises of benefits, turned on different facts and reasoning, the latter of which is germane here. 1. Ohia I find Ohia’s private one-on-one meetings in the immediate wake of the petition, wherein he discussed the Union with em- ployees and solicited grievances, were a significant departure from his past practice of casually asking, in the course of ordi- nary conversation on the workroom floor, “Is there anything I can do for you?” or words to that effect. The post-petition meet- ings at the manager’s desk in the back room with nobody else present were much more formalized and scripted than Ohia’s previous more casual interactions with employees. Moreover, while the record shows that some employees initiated meetings with Ohia to discuss workplace concerns, Ohia had not, prior to the Union coming on the scene, systematically scheduled and conducted individual meetings with employees where he solic- ited grievances.37 This case bears similarities to Mercedes-Benz of Orlando, 358 NLRB 1729 (2012), which involved a car dealership.38 The deal- ership had an open door policy and the general manager regu- larly spoke with employees on the workroom floor. After hearing about an organizational campaign, the area director told the deal- ership’s general manager and service director “to meet with tech- nicians and get a feel for what’s going on.” Id. at 1736. The general manager and service director conducted individual meet- ings with employees and questioned them about any issues they had. The Board specifically affirmed the judge’s reasoning in finding an 8(a)(1) violation, which stated in relevant part: The Respondents argue that [General Manager] Berryhill had an open door policy and regularly spoke with employees. There is evidence that Berryhill often was in the shop and would speak individually with employees. There is no evidence that Berryhill had, prior to September 25, systematically sought to learn of employee concerns by individually calling them into his office and questioning them in the presence of [the] Service Director.39 Id. (footnote omitted.) Likewise, here, there is no evidence of employees being systematically summoned to private individual meetings aimed at eliciting and offering to remedy employee concerns prior to the union petition. Also highly relevant, and a departure from past practice, is Ohia’s explicit promise to personally take the steps required to effectively remedy employees’ concerns. During his conversa- tion with Boba on February 17, Ohia stated: And I—I can commit to whatever you need so that you feel good enough. And so what would that be? . . . —and I haven’t asked that question to—actually, you’re the first person that I asked that question because it sounds like, you know, you’d like that additional support, whatever you’d need. And I—I can follow up and ensure that you get it, you know.40 39 Though Ohia did not have another manager present at the meetings as in Mercedes-Benz, I find the reasoning applies here given the change from previous practice. 40 This statement, apart from being coercive, also appears to be false, Ohia also asked Jaramillo what he needed stating, “You guys express the things that you guys need. I would do my very best to do what I can for you guys. And that’s pretty much it.” (Tr. 76.) Similarly, he promised his best efforts to get Jaramillo what he needed. Boba and Jaramillo’s DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 10 (Tr. 238–239.) This exchange was followed by Ohia asking Boba if he was good financially even though Boba had not raised any- thing about his finances during this meeting. There is no evi- dence of such an explicit promise (or any concrete promise) to remedy employee concerns prior to the union petition.41 I find it is substantially inconsistent with past practice and would clearly signal to employees that union representation is unnecessary. See NLRB v. Exchange Parts, 375 U.S. 405, 409 (1964). The Respondent cites to, among other cases, Longview Fibre Paper & Packaging, Inc., supra, where the evidence showed that managers had a habit of communicating with employees on the floor and implementing changes based on employee suggestions. Against this backdrop, the Board found that listening to and im- plementing a suggestion about a change in a shift schedule dur- ing a union campaign did not violate Section 8(a)(1).42 The back- drop here is different, in that promises to remedy employee con- cerns by personally taking action materialized only after the pe- tition. Based on the foregoing, I find the General Counsel has estab- lished this complaint allegation. I find, however, that Ohia’s increased presence at the MSC store did not, by itself, violate Section 8(a)(1).43 Ohia acknowl- edged he was at the MSC store more frequently after the petition to try to address increased tensions and to respond to partner re- quests to meet and answer questions about the organizing drive and the upcoming election. The record supports this, as multiple witnesses, some of whom supported the Union and some of whom did not, testified that there was tension in the store follow- ing the petition. Moreover, Yoshida met with Ohia multiple times, at Yoshida’s request, because he had questions about the Union. White also met with Ohia to answer her questions about the Union. In addition, Rabbia and Higa also contacted Ohia when they or partners had questions, which sometimes prompted Ohia to visit the store to provide answers. In short, I find Ohia had legitimate reasons for being at the MSC store more fre- quently following the petition, and his increased presence alone did not violate Section 8(a)(1).43 2. Rabbia The General Counsel asserts that Rabbia increased her solici- tation of employee concerns after the petition, relying on Boba’s testimony that Rabbia previously asked if there was anything he needed as she was leaving the store, but after the petition she also asked this both as she was leaving and during the shift.44 I find that this does not represent a sufficient departure from past recordings also corroborate McKinley’s testimony that Ohia told her he could give them what they expected to gain by unionizing. The Respondent contends that partners agreed that neither Ohia nor Rabbia solicited grievances or promised benefits. (R Br. 11–12.) As I stated on the record (Tr. 330–331, 466), I do not construe testimony from lay witnesses to be consistent with the legal terms of art applicable to this decision, as these terms are often highly nuanced and not readily deduc- ible from their common meanings. 41 I note that, when presented with issues from Jaramillo and McKin- ley prior to the petition that concerned different problems, both involving Ward, Ohia instructed them to speak to Ward. 42 In Longview there was more extensive evidence of a history of for- malized outreach to solicit concerns, and follow-up to responses from it with concrete changes, among other differences from the instant factual situation. I have reviewed the other cases cited by the Respondent and found them to have even more meaningful factual distinctions. 43 This is true even though it would logically increase Ohia’s interac- tions with employees, including asking them how they were doing or if there was anything he could do to support them, or similar sentiments. practice45 and recommend dismissal of complaint paragraph 6(c). C. Alleged Threats The remaining complaint paragraphs, 6(f)-(j) allege the Re- spondent threatened employees, as detailed below. In assessing whether a remark constitutes a threat, the appro- priate test is “whether the remark can reasonably be interpreted by the employee as a threat.” Smithers Tire, 308 NLRB 72 (1992). The actual intent of the speaker or the effect on the lis- tener is immaterial. Id.; see also Wyman-Gordon Co. v. NLRB, 654 F.2d 134, 145 (1st Cir. 1981) (inquiry under Sec. 8(a)(1) is an objective one which examines whether the employer’s actions would tend to coerce a reasonable employee). The “threats in question need not be explicit if the language used by the em- ployer or his representative can reasonably be construed as threatening.” NLRB v. Ayer Lar Sanitarium, 436 F.2d 45, 49 (9th Cir. 1970). The Board considers the totality of the circumstances in assessing the reasonable tendency of an ambiguous statement or a veiled threat to coerce. KSM Industries, 336 NLRB 133 (2001). Tentative language about adverse consequences can be coer- cive, particularly where the employer’s prediction is not based on objective facts or the nature of the collective-bargaining pro- cess. Daikichi Sushi, 335 NLRB at 622, 623–624 (holding that it was not a defense that the employer phrased its prediction that the plant could close if employees unionized “as a possibility ra- ther than a certainty”), enfd. 56 Fed.Appx. 516 (D.C. Cir. 2003); see also Holy Cross Hospital, 370 NLRB No. 16, slip op. at 1 fn. 3 (2020) (employer unlawfully threatened that if employees un- ionized, the employer’s leave policies might become less gener- ous and its shift scheduling less flexible); Metro One Loss Pre- vention Services Group, 356 NLRB 89 (2010) (employer unlaw- fully threatened that an employee’s pay rate could get worse if the union came in); compare Jefferson Smurfit Corp., 325 NLRB 280, fn. 3 (1998) (employer’s statement that benefits “could go either way as a result of collective bargaining” was lawful). An employer may lawfully communicate to its employees “carefully phrased” predictions about “demonstrably probable conse- quences beyond [the employer’s] control” that unionization will have on the company, provided that the predictions are based on objective facts. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618, (1969). However, if the employer predicts, without any support- ing objective facts, that it may or may not take action solely on 43 I also note that Ohia’s reasons for being at the MSC store less fre- quently in the months leading up to the petition, detailed in the statement of facts, are unrefuted. 44 See R Br. 46–47, relying on Tr. 255, 264–265. The General Coun- sel also cites, as supporting evidence, McKinley’s testimony that Rabbia prevented McKinley and her coworkers from talking by sending her on unnecessary tasks and eavesdropping on them the Thursday after the campaign went public. (R. Br. 45–36; Tr. 364–369.) Even assuming Rab- bia engaged in these behaviors, there is no allegation regarding it, and without more evidence to establish she solicited grievances/promised benefits, it does not establish this allegation or meaningfully inform it. 45 It is certainly less of a departure than the increased coaching by walking around (CWBA) conversations the Board found lawful in Wal- Mart Stores, Inc., 339 NLRB 1187 (2003), which the General Counsel argues should be overruled. I am bound to follow the Board’s current precedent and leave the General Counsel’s request for revisiting that precedent to the Board should this decision be appealed. STARBUCKS CORP. 11 its own initiative for reasons unrelated to economic necessities and known only by the employer, then the employer’s prediction is a threat of retaliation that violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Daikichi Sushi, supra. 1. April 6 phone call Complaint paragraphs 6(f)-(h) concern alleged threats during a phone call between Rabbia and Saloma on April 6, that, if the MSC store unionized, employees would not be able to pick up shifts at other stores, and would not be able to get products from other stores and vice-versa. Resolution of the threat allegations stemming from the April 6 phone call rests, at least partially, on witness credibility. A credibility determination may rest on various factors, including “the context of the witness’ testimony, the witness’ demeanor, the weight of the respective evidence, established or admitted facts, inherent probabilities and reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the record as a whole.” Hills & Dales General Hospital, 360 NLRB 611, 615 (2014), citing Double D Con- struction Group, 339 NLRB 303, 305 (2003); Daikichi Sushi, above at 623. In making credibility resolutions, it is well estab- lished that the trier of fact may believe some, but not all, of a witness’s testimony. NLRB v. Universal Camera Corp., 179 F.2d 749 (2d Cir. 1950). I found Saloma to be a credible witness, based first and fore- most on her forthright demeanor during both direct and cross- examination, as well as corroboration of her testimony with other evidence. She did not appear to embellish her testimony, and an- swered the questions asked of her without appearing hesitant or evasive. She maintained an even tone of voice and did not be- come defensive when asked challenging questions. Saloma’s tes- timony is particularly reliable given that, as a current employee, she was testifying against her pecuniary interests. Gold Standard Enterprises, 234 NLRB 618, 619 (1978); Flexsteel Industries, 316 NLRB 745 (1995). I give significant weight to Saloma’s tes- timony. Rabbia could not recall the time or date of the conversation, whether it occurred by phone or in person, or whether she shared information about the Buffalo store during the same conversa- tion with Saloma as the one during which she told Saloma she was eligible to vote.46 (Tr. 530, 532.) Saloma’s testimony was far more detailed and her memory of the substance of the con- versation was much clearer and more vivid. This makes sense, as Saloma had only been employed for about three weeks, and receiving a call at home from her new store manager to discuss the upcoming union election was certainly out of the ordinary.47 The Respondent asserts that Saloma was not credible because 46 With regard to the Buffalo store, Rabbia said she shared the “facts” the company had provided her, but all she could remember was that they were going into bargaining. (Tr. 531–532.) 47 Rabbia testified that Saloma was hired right after the petition, but Saloma’s testimony that she began working at the MSC store is mid- March, around March 16, is credited. I note that it is consistent with the COVID logs (GC Exh. 14), and Ohia’s testimony about the timing of his initial introductory meeting with Saloma. (Tr. 840.) 48 Rabbia’s estimate, though closer, was also incorrect, as she stated the conversation was “not long” and lasted “Less than 30 minutes at the very most.” (Tr. 530.) 49 The Respondent also notes that Saloma testified that Rabbia “wanted to say” that if they unionized they would lose certain benefits. (R Br. 29.) Saloma used the same phrase elsewhere in her testimony about what Rabbia said in the call’s introduction (Tr. 504), a relatively she was incorrect about the length of the phone call. Saloma es- timated the call at issue lasted about an hour, including the time that the call was dropped. Saloma testified she skimmed her phone records and looked at the earliest time, which was 2:48 p.m., and the end of the call. (Tr. 872.) I do not find this error in estimating the length of the call is telling.48 Ability to estimate time and the recollection of a conversation’s substance, particu- larly given the context, are different. In sum, I found Saloma to be a credible witness, and the record establishes that Rabbia’s memory of the phone call was very shaky. Where their testimony conflicts, I credit Saloma. Under the present circumstances, I find Rabbia’s comments were coercive. The comments occurred in a phone call from a boss to a new employee, just 2 days before ballots were distrib- uted, and was about the upcoming election. After stating that the employees could vote however, they wanted, but negotiations in Buffalo were taking a long time, Rabbia conveyed that employ- ees would lose certain benefits if they unionized. Specifically, Saloma recalled Rabbia telling her that if they unionized they could not take shifts from other stores or have employees from other stores cover their shifts, and they would not be able to get products from other stores or give products to other stores. Though Saloma was not sure whether Rabbia said benefits “for certain” would be affected if the store unionized, and agreed she may have said they “might” be affected, Rabbia did not, by any account, explain the bargaining process and/or tell Saloma that these benefits or working conditions would be subject to negoti- ations.49 Daikichi Sushi, above, at 623–624. Rabbia testified broadly that she understood everything was subject to negotia- tions and, because of this, she could not tell employees what would occur if the store unionized. (See, e.g., Tr. 455, 462.) With regard to this particular conversation, however, Rabbia did not testify that she discussed the negotiating process with Sa- loma, much less that she made clear “that any reduction in wages and/or benefits would occur only as the result of the normal give and take of negotiations” or similar wording. Taylor-Dunn Mfg. Co., 252 NLRB 799, 800 (1980), enfd. 810 F.10 2d 638 (9th Cir. 1982). When asked if she spoke with Saloma about what “might” happen to benefits, Rabbia responded, “I wouldn’t be able to tell her what would happen with benefits at the Mililani store be- cause the facts in the FOE would prevent me from saying any- thing because I would only be able to share the facts.” (Tr. 533.) Rabbia curiously did not answer the question posed to her, even though it squarely presented the opportunity for her to say that she explained to Saloma that benefits might get better, might get worse, or might stay the same, and it depended on the give and take of negotiations. Saloma’s testimony that the only perfunctory matter, so I do not find this detracts in any significant man- ner from her testimony. White, a witness for the Respondent, also initially testified that Rabbia told her employees would not be able to pick up shifts at other stores if the store unionized. (Tr. 696–697.) She qualified her answer only after being prompted in a leading way by the Respondent’s counsel. (Tr. 701.) McKinley also testified that Fujimura expressed his belief to her that they would not be able to share product or pick up shifts in other stores if they unionized, and she tried to explain to him that was not true. (Tr. 369–370.) Though Fujimara’s comment to McKinley would be hearsay if offered for the truth of the matter asserted and entitled to little weight (though it is corroborated herein so it is not entitled to no weight), I credit McKinley’s unrefuted testimony that she explained to him that it was not true that these benefits would be lost if the store unionized. See RJR Communications, Inc., 248 NLRB 920, 921 (1980). See also Rome Elec- trical Systems, 356 NLRB 170 fn. 4 (2010) DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 12 negotiations Rabbia mentioned during this conversation were about Buffalo is unrefuted. Especially considering the context and timing here, a reasonable employee could conclude that un- ionizing would jeopardize employees’ ability to share products with other stores and take shifts at other stores.50 I find, therefore, the General Counsel has established these complaint allegations. 2. April conversation between Ohia and Saloma Complaint paragraphs (i)-(k)51 allege that in the days follow- ing the April 6 call, Ohia threatened employees that they would lose the ability to pick up shifts from other stores and share prod- ucts with other stores. These allegations are based on a conver- sation between Ohia and Saloma in the back of the house by the manager’s desk, as described in the statement of facts. I find Saloma’s testimony regarding these allegations was credible. She recounted her conversation with Ohia, and specifi- cally that she informed him what Rabbia had told her about los- ing the ability to share products with other stores and pick up shifts at other stores and stated Ohia agreed with Rabbia’s state- ments. The Respondent again argues that I should not find Saloma credible based in part on a belief that she exaggerated the length of the meeting, and that Boba did not corroborate her testimony. I agree that failing to question Boba as a corroborating witness diminishes the strength of the General Counsel’s case regarding this allegation. I do not find it determinative, however. With re- gard to the length of the meeting, I do not find any error Saloma may have made in estimating the meeting’s time to be material. The record supports the likelihood that a one-on-one meeting between Ohia and Saloma about the Union occurred.52 It would be curious to omit Saloma given Ohia’s one-on-one meetings with the other partners, described above, and the manner in which Saloma testified the meeting was initiated comports with the evidence of other employees’ one-on-one meetings. Ohia’s recollection that he met with Saloma only one other time after the introductory meeting to tell her she was eligible to vote is at odds with the evidence showing it was Rabbia who informed Sa- loma she was eligible to vote. It does not make sense that Ohia would have had a second conversation with Saloma to tell her she was eligible to vote, as he recalled, since that was taken care of during Rabbia’s April 6 phone call. Indeed, Rabbia was tasked with apologizing to Saloma and the other recently hired baristas about having previously been told that they would not be voting, and to inform them they would be voting in the election. Based on the foregoing, I find the General Counsel has met her burden 50 Of course, it was plainly within the Respondent’s control whether or not to offer to retain the sharing of goods between stores and allowing employees pick up shifts at different stores during bargaining if the store unionized. 51 Pars. 6(j), (k), and (l) are set forth in the General Counsel’s February 3, 2023 amendment to the complaint. 52 When Jaramillo asked Ohia if he was meeting with all employees, Ohia responded, “Mainly you two, and then Amy.” This was obviously not the case and was at best an evasive response, as he met with Daniels that same day and several other employees in the following days. It is clear from the record that Ohia is a well-regarded district man- ager, and he tries to treat his employees well and maintain positive inter- actions with them. I found him to be credible in many aspects of his tes- timony. NLRB v. Universal Camera Corp., above. It is clear, however, that he was tasked with carrying out communications with employees that conveyed Starbucks’ position while not running afoul of the law, which is complex, nuanced, and highly fact specific. I do not believe Ohia acted with any malice. I also do not believe that Saloma fabricated of proof regarding these allegations. 3. April conversation between Saloma and Rabbia after ballot distribution and before voting Complaint paragraph 6(l) alleges that in April, Rabbia threat- ened employees by indicating that they would not be eligible for a future wage increase and they would lose benefits if they un- ionized. There is no dispute that Rabbia and Saloma had a conversation about an anticipated pay raise and that Rabbia conveyed that this was in jeopardy at the MSC store because of the petition. In other words, the raise was happening if the employees did not union- ize, but it may not materialize if they did unionize. Rabbia did not tell Saloma that any pay raises would be subject to negotia- tion between Starbucks and the Union. Saloma’s statement that Rabbia told her she did not want her to lose her good benefits during this conversation is unrefuted.53 White had a similar con- versation with Higa, where she said a pay increase in May was for non-unionized stores and the MSC store did not fall within the time period to receive the raise.54 (Tr. 670.) In any event, Rabbia’s recollection of what she said was, “I told her that the company was anticipating pay raises for the baristas and the shift supervisors, but I didn't know, like, what it was going to look like since we were petitioning because I don’t know what's going to happen.” A reasonable inference from this statement is raises will occur at a non-unionized MSC store, but the Union coming in changes that outcome. Accordingly, I find the General Coun- sel has established this complaint allegation. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. 2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. By soliciting employee grievances and promising to rem- edy them during an organizational campaign in a manner incon- sistent with past practice, the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 4. By threatening employees with the loss of a pay raise and loss of benefits, including the ability to pick up shifts at other stores and share products with other stores, the Respondent vio- lated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 5. The unfair labor practices described in conclusions of law 3 and 4 affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 6. All other complaint allegations are dismissed. this meeting, given her detailed testimony about it, the problems with Ohia’s testimony detailed herein, and the factors set forth above in the discussion of the April 6 conversation with Rabbia. 53 I do not accord any significant weight to the various generalized testimony that the store managers always acted consistently with the TIPS and FOE training, and one-word responses to leading questions about the ultimate issues in the case are particularly uncompelling. Such testimony is broadly self-serving and less persuasive than more open- ended testimony about specific conversations. Moreover, the recordings show that Ohia strayed from the training and made promises, as detailed above. Importantly, the promises in the recordings belie the notion that management consistently conveyed that everything was out of their hands and subject to collective bargaining with the Union. 54 Higa did not explicitly say the MSC store would not get the raise if they unionized. (Tr. 670.) In a conversation with Yoshida, Rabbia did not tell him that the MSC store employees would not get the pay raise if they unionized. (Tr. 643.) STARBUCKS CORP. 13 REMEDY Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain un- fair labor practices, I shall order it to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Specifically, the Respondent will be ordered to cease and desist from soliciting employees’ complaints and grievances and promising to remedy them during an organizing campaign in order to discourage them from selecting the Union as their collective-bargaining representative. The Respondent will be ordered to cease and desist from threatening employees with economic reprisal by telling them, in the context of an or- ganizing campaign, that they may not receive a raise other stores were going to receive, and threatening employees with loss of benefits, including the ability to pick up shifts at other stores and share products with other stores, if they choose the Union as their collective-bargaining representative. The General Counsel also requests an enhanced remedy in the form of a notice reading. The Board recently explained the ra- tionale for notice readings, distilled from its caselaw: The Board has ordered the notice-reading remedy in cases where the respondent’s unlawful conduct has been “suffi- ciently serious and widespread” to ensure that the content of the notice is disseminated to all employees. . . . Notice reading is a way to let in a “warming wind of information” to not only alert employees to their rights but also impress upon them that, as a matter of law, their employer or union must and will re- spect those rights in the future. Reading the notice (and any ex- planation of rights) aloud disseminates that information through the work force in a clear and effective way. This awareness, in turn, means that respondents will be less able to violate the Act unnoticed as a matter of course. . . . Notice reading offers employees a chance to hear, in a formal setting and in the presence of other employees and a Board agent, that their rights have value and that the Board takes those rights se- riously. Notice reading also underscores for the respondent that, under a broad order, it cannot simply find another more creative way to violate the Act. WR Reserve, 372 NLRB No. 80 (2023), slip op. at 6 (footnotes omitted). Though the violations at the MSC store are relatively minor standing alone, they are similar to violations at other fa- cilities in response to the recent organizing efforts of the Re- spondent’s employees.55 J. P. Stevens & Co., 245 NLRB 198, 198 (1979). Accordingly, I shall order that an agent of the Board read the notice to employees at the MSC store with a responsible management official present. A representative of the Union may attend the notice reading. I will order that the employer post a notice at the facility in the usual manner and distribute the notice electronically to the extent mandated in J. Picini Flooring, 356 NLRB 11, 15–16 (2010), and Durham School Services, 360 NLRB 694 (2014). In accord- ance with J. Picini Flooring, the question as to whether an elec- tronic notice is appropriate, and if so what method of electronic notice should be required, is to be resolved at the compliance phase. Id. at 13. 55 See, e.g., Starbucks Corp., 372 NLRB No. 93 (2023); Starbucks Coffee Co., 372 NLRB No. 50 (2023); and numerous administrative law judge decisions. See also Starbucks Corp., 2023 NLRB LEXIS 298 (un- published 2023), noting centralized labor relations. 56 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the following recommended56 ORDER The Respondent, Starbucks Corporation, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall 1. Cease and desist from (a) Threatening employees with economic reprisal by telling them, in the context of an organizing campaign, that they may not receive a raise, other stores were going to receive if they choose the Union as their collective-bargaining representative. (b) Threatening employees with the loss of benefits, including the ability to pick up shifts at other stores and share products with other stores, if they choose the Union as their collective-bargain- ing representative. (c) Soliciting employee grievances and promising to remedy them during an organizational campaign in a manner substan- tially inconsistent with past practice. (d) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectu- ate the policies of the Act. (a) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its Mil- ilani Shopping Center store in Mililani, Hawaii, copies of the at- tached notice and explanation of employee rights marked “Ap- pendix”57 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Re- gional Director for Region 31, after being signed by the Re- spondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the Re- spondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are cus- tomarily posted. In addition to physical posting of paper notices, the notices shall be distributed electronically, such as by email, posting on an intranet or an internet site, and/or other electronic means, if the Respondent customarily communicates with its em- ployees by such means. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event that, during the pen- dency of these proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of busi- ness or closed the facility involved in these proceedings, the Re- spondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current employees and former employees em- ployed by the Respondent at any time since February 15, 2022. (b) Within 14 days after service by the Region, hold a meeting or meetings, scheduled to ensure the widest possible attendance, where a Board agent, in the presence of a responsible manage- ment official, will read the notice to employees. An agent of the Union may attend if the Union so desires. (c) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director for Region 20 a sworn certification of a re- sponsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the Respondent has taken to comply. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint is dismissed insofar as it alleges violations of the Act not specifically found. Dated, Washington, D.C. August 8, 2023 Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all purposes. 57 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board.” DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 14 APPENDIX NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES POSTED, DISTRIBUTED, AND READ BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this notice. FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO Form, join, or assist a union Choose representatives to bargain with us on your be- half Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection Choose not to engage in any of these protected activi- ties. WE WILL NOTdo anything to prevent you from exercising these rights. WE WILL NOT solicit employee grievances and promise to rem- edy them during an organizational campaign in a manner sub- stantially inconsistent with past practice. WE WILL NOT threaten you with the loss of a wage increase if you choose Workers United or any union to serve as your collec- tive-bargaining representative. WE WILL NOT threaten you with the loss of benefits, including the ability to pick up shifts at other stores and share products with other stores, if you choose Workers United or any union to serve as your collective-bargaining representative. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, re- strain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act. STARBUCKS CORP. The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at https://www.nlrb.gov/case/20-CA-296184 or by using the QR code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, 1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling (202) 273-1940.